In a written answer to a parliamentary question on 31 July 2026, Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis declined to propose new temporary fiscal deviations for health-sector preparedness investments, instead pointing to existing flexibility under the reformed Stability and Growth Pact and other EU funding instruments. The answer, responding to a question from MEPs Aurelijus Veryga (ECR), Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D), Vlad Vasile-Voiculescu (Renew), Reinis Pozņaks (ECR), and Tomislav Sokol (PPE), reaffirms the Commission's position that current rules already allow Member States to prioritise health resilience without undermining fiscal sustainability.
Dombrovskis highlighted that Regulation 2024/1263, which reformed the EU's fiscal rules, explicitly recognises social and economic resilience as a common priority. This means investments in health-sector preparedness can be included in Member States' medium-term fiscal-structural plans, potentially extending the adjustment period from four to seven years if paired with reforms. He also noted that the national escape clause, activated in March 2025 to boost defence spending, is deliberately limited in scope to preserve fiscal discipline, with eligible expenditure confined to increases under COFOG division 02 (defence). The Commission argues that extending this flexibility to health spending would blur the line between defence and broader resilience, potentially opening the door to unchecked public spending.
The answer also points to the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, published on 26 March 2025, which recognises the importance of resilient healthcare systems, and to the Recovery and Resilience Facility, which has already channelled EUR 42 billion into health system strengthening. However, the Commission stops short of proposing new financial instruments or dedicated funding streams for health preparedness, citing the EU's limited competence in health policy under Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
rather than expanding fiscal flexibility, the Commission prefers to use existing tools—such as the RRF and the Preparedness Union Strategy—to encourage Member States to invest in health resilience. This approach balances the need for preparedness against the risk of fiscal slippage, but it may disappoint those who argue that health systems require dedicated, sustained investment comparable to defence spending. The answer signals that the Commission is unlikely to revisit the fiscal framework for health purposes in the near term, leaving Member States to decide how to prioritise health preparedness within their own budget constraints.