A European Commission staff working document published on 17 July 2026 evaluates Regulation (EU) 2019/1148 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors, covering the period from 1 February 2021 to September 2025 across all 27 EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The evaluation finds the regulation effective in restricting precursor availability and improving suspicious transaction reporting, but notes significant data limitations and that precise information on the use of home-made explosives in terrorist attacks remains confidential.
9 restricted (Annex I) and 9 reportable (Annex II), with restrictions applying above certain concentration limits. Eight EU Member States operate a licensing system allowing the public to buy certain restricted precursors, while the other 19 Member States and the three EEA/EFTA States apply a total ban. All supply chain actors must report suspicious transactions, significant disappearances and thefts to national contact points within 24 hours. No delegated act under Articles 15, 16 or 17 was initiated or adopted during the evaluation period.
The evaluation relied heavily on stakeholder consultations due to limited quantitative data. It notes that the regulation strengthened the previous 2013 system by adding sulphuric acid to Annex I, lowering nitromethane's concentration limit to 16% w/w, and abolishing the registration regime for certain precursors. The document does not propose any amendments to the regulation, but serves as a basis for future policy considerations.
The regulation imposes compliance obligations on chemical suppliers and retailers, who must report suspicious transactions and thefts within 24 hours, creating administrative burdens. For the general public, the regulation restricts access to common chemicals such as sulphuric acid and nitromethane, affecting legitimate users like hobbyists and small businesses. National authorities benefit from improved reporting mechanisms but face challenges in data collection and analysis. EU regulatory bodies gain a clearer picture of precursor availability, though the lack of detailed attack-related data limits the ability to assess the regulation's direct impact on security.