The European Sovereign Nations (ESN) Group has tabled a series of amendments to the European Parliament's draft resolution on the EU-Uzbekistan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), proposing a fundamental shift from a values-driven strategic investment to a transactional, interest-based arrangement focused on concrete economic and security benefits for EU Member States. The amendments, published on 12 May 2026, target the resolution's normative language and conditionality provisions, with potential impacts on EU-Uzbekistan trade relations, EU aid policy, and the bloc's energy security strategy.
The amendments, all tabled by the ESN Group, represent the only proposed changes to the draft resolution by rapporteur Ilhan Kyuchyuk. They diverge sharply from the mainstream approach of the EPP, S&D, Renew, and Greens/EFA groups, which had broadly supported the original text.
Reframing the EPCA's purpose
The most critical change is Amendment 8, which rewrites the resolution's core rationale. The original text frames Parliament's consent as a "strategic investment" in partnership and stability. The ESN amendment instead states that the EPCA "must serve the concrete economic and security interests of the European Union" and function as a framework for "mutually advantageous cooperation" delivering "measurable benefits to the EU Member States." This reframing strips the resolution of its normative language and replaces it with a focus on tangible outcomes for the EU.
Strict conditionality on trade preferences
Amendment 2 tightens language on Uzbekistan's preferential trade access under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+). The original text notes that Uzbekistan has "acceded to 27 international conventions." The ESN amendment demands that continuation of GSP+ beyond 2027 be "strictly conditional upon the full and verifiable implementation" of those conventions, shifting the burden of proof onto Uzbekistan. This could create a more rigorous review process for trade benefits.
Focus on energy security and geopolitical competition
Amendments 6, 9, and 10 introduce new recitals highlighting Uzbekistan's strategic importance as a supplier of natural gas and uranium. Amendment 9 expresses concern that the EU is being "sidelined" by other powers in the region, while Amendment 10 notes that agreements on critical raw materials lack significant financing, implying the EU is not moving fast enough to secure these resources. These amendments reframe the partnership as a tool for EU energy security rather than long-term development.
Skepticism on EU aid and ideological funding
Amendments 3 and 4 target EU funding practices. Amendment 3 replaces a neutral statement on EU funding with a larger figure (EUR 119 million since 2021). Amendment 4 adds a new recital stating that EU taxpayers' money "should not be used to fund programmes... based on ideological criteria," directly challenging the EU's practice of linking aid to governance and human rights reforms.
Geopolitical realism on the Taliban
Amendment 7 introduces a recital noting Uzbekistan's "limited recognition" policy towards the Taliban and its acceptance of a Taliban-appointed ambassador. This highlights the pragmatic, security-focused approach of regional actors, implicitly contrasting it with the EU's more principled stance.
Impact on stakeholders
The amendments, if adopted, would have several concrete impacts. For EU producers and energy companies, a stronger focus on energy and resource supply could improve access to Uzbek natural gas and critical raw materials, potentially lowering costs and diversifying supply. For EU taxpayers, the amendments could reduce funding for governance and human rights programmes, redirecting resources toward projects with more direct economic returns. For Uzbek authorities, stricter conditionality on GSP+ would increase pressure to demonstrate verifiable implementation of international conventions, potentially raising compliance costs. For EU regulatory bodies, the shift to a transactional framework would require new monitoring mechanisms to assess measurable benefits for Member States, adding administrative complexity.
Institutional follow-up
The amendments will be debated in the European Parliament's plenary session, with a vote expected in the coming weeks. The Council has already adopted its position on the EPCA, and trilogue negotiations would follow if Parliament approves the agreement. The ESN's amendments, if successful, could influence the final resolution and shape the EU's negotiating stance in future partnership agreements.