Marta Kos

Policy topics Marta Kos is active on

What Marta Kos has said (80)

• 2026-06-15 “As we have heard before, the division of Montenegro, as the Prime Minister has said, is to close all the negotiating chapters until the end of the year. This is ambitious, but it is also possible if Montenegro will further on deliver. At is delivering for now, and if we further on will get the support of the Member states to do this, you will not be there anymore in the second half of the year, but we hope that the Irish Presidency will follow on your success and with your energy. So it is. It is possible. And then, of course as I have said, the accession treaty is already in making the financial package will be there after we will finish. Of course, we have to get the ratification process through all the EU 27 member states. So indeed, 28 by 28 is possible.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “We have received our communication assurance from the government of Albania that a full environmental impact assessment will be carried out, and that European environmental standards will be respected. The fact that this is happening while Albania is going through the accession process is important. This process is legally and politically binding and subject to constant scrutiny and assessment, so this offers the strongest guarantee that Albania's nature and environment will be protected in line with the European standards. Regarding. I would like to add that you know how important the right to protest is to us. It is a fundamental right in our union and for all the aspiring members, I am glad to see that this right is respected in Albania. Regarding the foreign investments for every candidate country, but also for the member States, foreign investments are important and what matters to us is not that much from where are they coming? But if they are happening in accordance with the EU legislation and this is what we monitor.”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2026-06-15 “It's great to see how both countries are advancing under difficult circumstances, different difficult, difficult circumstances. I would wish for both of them to keep working at top speed. Also, once we will open all the clusters. But generally good neighbourly relations are so crucial for the existence of the European Union. So we all should take care of this being direct neighbours or not that direct neighbours, but it is something we cherish so much in the European Union. And the war has brought in Ukraine, those two countries together on the European path and we are now all together in helping both of the countries becoming a member of the EU. And this is really, really great in the circumstances which have never been that difficult for the accession process as they are today. So I can only wish just the best for both of the countries.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “Dear Minister, dear Marilena, dear Deputy Prime Minister, dear Taras, the Deputy Speaker of Verona. Rada. Dear Sasha, dear The representative of representatives of Ukrainian media. We have all waited for this day a long time, and today is a day to celebrate. And I say it again, it is a mega Monday for me. No country has ever achieved such progress on its accession path while fighting the most brutal Russian atrocities on its territory, while Ukraine is gaining momentum on the battlefield. It is also building its path towards a prosperous and secure Ukraine inside the European Union. We are taking the single biggest step towards Ukraine's EU membership since opening negotiations in December 2023. And if I may say this time, no one had to leave the room for a coffee break. We are now formally recognising the reform progress Ukraine has made over the past years. Today's decision to open negotiations with Ukraine is also good news for Europe. Ukraine's future EU membership is central to the future of Europe, because building a Europe that is firmly in charge of its own security can only work with a strong, prosperous and stable Ukraine. Today is a moment when Europe delivers for Ukraine. We are not doing any favours. We are delivering upon what Ukraine has earned. During today's conference, member states set out the to do list to press ahead with reforms in the most fundamental areas of our union an independent judiciary, transparent public procurement and stronger safeguards against corruption and organised crime.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “The progress is really huge, but now the focus needs to remain on strengthening the pillars of any successful state. The rule of law, media freedom, democratic institutions supported by an empowered civil society and of course, prosperity. It is important that the negotiation process transcends party lines, and that it is treated as a national priority, one that creates unity and stability for all the people of Montenegro. I have seen this unity grow over the past month. This is what we need to keep moving forward. All political leaders need to continue to find common ground on the EU reform agenda. Thank you for the work you and your team from the Cypriot presidency have done. Your work on Montenegro is really a success story. You closed four chapters, you set up the working group of the Accession Treaty, and you will end your presidency with a financial package. What a success! This gives the Irish presidency the best chance to bring the accession negotiations to the finish line. And then we have even the support of the Pope. When he was visiting Madrid, he said, I quote, I encourage you to nurture the process of European Union, which is not merely a counterweight to other powers, but a gift to humanity and of the, quote, the enlargement process can be very technical and complicated, as you have said, and not always so easy for citizens to follow. But it in in its essence, it was about nurturing our continent, just like the Pope says.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “So what is the basis we are building on? Now we have the roadmaps on the rule of law, public administration reform, functioning of the democratic institutions. All those roadmaps are ambitious and comprehensive. And together with the revised action plan on minorities, they provide a solid framework for the reforms that will guide Ukrainian succession process in the years ahead. And the commission has assessed these commitments positively. Back to your question on the action plan on national minorities. Minorities. This will, of course, require continued attention. And the commitments undertaken are important, and the commission will follow their implementation very closely. Thank you.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “So what makes me optimistic that we will be able to open the rest of the clusters working with Ukraine and working also with the Cypriot presidency. I have seen that sometimes impossible is possible. But clearly I am aware that our accession process is walking on two paths. One path is the technical process I am with my team responsible for, and the other one is the dynamic in the member states. So a continuous working with the member states under the presidency is very, very much important. This is the vision we have. We have done the front loading process. So from all these elements, my optimism is deriving.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “Today is really a great day for the Republic of Moldova, and it is a great day for Europe. It is a moment to celebrate, even if it's a bit late. But the formal opening of the first negotiating cluster is a major advancement and brings Moldova into a next stage of its EU accession path. Moldova is among the best performing EU candidate countries. With today's step, this will become even more visible. Today, we formally recognize the reform progress Moldova has made over the last month. We also provided Moldova with a to do list of reforms to consolidate an independent judiciary, fight organised crime and corruption, and make public procurement more transparent. It lays out the path to strengthen the fundamentals for Moldova's future EU membership. The Commission now expects the council to proceed in the opening of the remaining five negotiating clusters before summer. The next stage of the accession process is the road to the so-called interim benchmarks. Of course, chief negotiator Christina knows this is the next goal or step, after which Moldova will start closing chapters as it advances to our final objective. Full EU membership today. It is also the moment for Moldova to rise as a nation and gather all its forces on the road to the EU. It is the moment for political parties, majority and the opposition to come together and drive reforms forward. It is also the moment for society to unite and make EU integration a reality that improves the lives of all Moldovans.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-06-15 “Moldova is really on the move. Ten days ago, when I last visited your country, we organised the first ever EU Moldova Investors Conference or the biggest. It gathered private companies from across the continent to pledge more than €1 billion of investments. The decision today will further increase the attractiveness of Moldova for investors. It will make EU integration a concrete reality for Moldovans and allow the country to converge economically. When in Moldova, I also felt how much the prospect of opening. Cluster. I was giving renewed energy and injected credibility in Moldova's EU path. We will now build on this positive tide to further accelerate the work and deliver on the promise to Moldovans to finally join the European Union and family. Dear Christina, you are putting in the hard work, patience and perseverance into delivering reforms with your entire team. Dear Prime Minister, you can really be proud on you and your team. Today, your Moldova gets the recognition it deserves. Congratulations for this. Dear Marilena, we started at 3:00. And to conclude this Mega Man day, a word of sincere appreciation and thanks for your hard work throughout your presidency. Some were saying at the beginning where we were speaking about our vision, what we want to do, you will not make it or you are crazy. Or it's not possible. But we would not stand here today if it weren't for you, for your team. And this is really the success of Cypriot presidency. Thank you.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-06-15 “I may add first this is opening of cluster one before we will have accession treaty for Moldova. It will take some time and exact relation between the EU member States and Moldova. It will be put down in this accession. Accession treaty. But what we can say for today is that there is now the discussion with the Member States. If we will somehow adopt a or make our methodology more adaptable to the present geopolitical situation. But nothing has been decided. Decided yet. Yet. Your question, what Moldova can bring to you when the EU decided to give Moldova a candidate status. This was very important not just for Moldova but also for US European Union. It was a commitment. It was also the responsibility, commitment to help you to become a free and prosperous and safe country. So once we will reach this level, you will enrich our European Union. You will contribute to our economy. Our investors will find they are already finding the new areas where they could invest. And of course, we could also benefit in the EU from, for instance, high skilled labour force in the digital. What I have just found out when I was when I was there. But for me, one of the most important things what Moldova will bring is will. Moldova will contribute to our security. We see today that for the first time in the history in the accession process, we have adversaries, and they want to ruin or to bring our candidate countries away from the European path. But we are the most important target, meaning if we will not bring in this case, Moldova, into the EU, some forces outside or inside could weaponize the country against us. So it is in our own interest to have Moldova inside the European Union. Thank you.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-06-15 “I welcome all the leaders or their non-papers or their voices who have been brought up in the last weeks and months. Why is this important? I think that without the engagement of the leaders, we will not be able to think of what we could do better or different. And this is, for me, the most important thing. As you have know, we have from the European Commission given some ideas, how could we make our enlargement methodology more suitable to the geopolitical situation? Today, what we know out of this debate is, as you have said, Marinella is a merit based principle and that, of course, you can only become a member of the EU once you implement all the reforms, and this is the basis. But in between, and this is what I like a lot, is the are the ideas about possible enhanced gradual integration. And this is what we are now still discussing. Your question about the how long those safeguards will be. I can't say this yet because we are still in the discussion with the member states. But what I would like to stress that this is not specifically for, for Montenegro. But because of course, you are the most advanced country, so you could be the first country that joins with those democracy safeguards. And the idea is somehow to have a kind of insurance policy. So new member states that respect the rules will not even notice those safeguards. Also important to stress, this is not a proposal for less rights here. Our treaties are very, very clear. Meaning if you will deliver and I'm sure you will, then you will be a full member.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “I forgive you. So Albania is one of the frontrunners in the enlargement process and has made important progress on environmental protection. And this progress is valuable, acknowledged and should be protected in a situation like this. It is important also that we all work on the basis of facts, and the European Commission is in continuous contact with the Albanian authorities, not just with the Prime Minister, EDI Rama. We just had a visit of our director for Western Balkan, Valentina, meeting the Minister of Environment in Tirana last last week. So in the case of the project in the North area, and as this is in the case for all the ongoing projects in Albania, it will need to comply with the legal framework and with the benchmarks set under the environmental chapter, as you have said, 27 of the accession process and this chapter is currently open Before it can be closed. The situation will need to be fully clarified, with closure currently planned by the end of 27. Our role will be to verify the relevant benchmarks are met if they are met. Until then, we encourage the Albanian authorities to continue taking steps that support the fulfilment of the closing benchmarks and help Albania move forward on its EU path.”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2026-06-15 “During my visit to Kiev last week, I encouraged all political parties to unite behind a common goal of European integration. I want to repeat this call for national unity today again. These efforts are not just on the government. It requires the entire society to come together and seize the momentum that Ukraine is building up. At the same time, the reforms under cluster one are also the threshold to much deeper integration into EU structures. They built the trust that will allow Ukraine to integrate in our single market and other common European structures, even ahead of full membership. As a next step, the Commission now expects the Council to proceed to the opening of the remaining five negotiating clusters before summer, summer and then we could have a terrific Tuesday in July. Dear Taras, my warmest congratulations for your relentless efforts and your perseverance to bring Ukraine to this historic step. I would also also want to take a moment to thank you, dear Marilena and to Cypriot presidency, to your whole team for what you have done for us to be able to deliver on our commitment to Ukraine. I have just returned from Ireland, which will hold the next council presidency in 15 days. I was heartened to see their enthusiasm to follow on your great work.”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-06-15 “And you are delivering the Marilena. Dear Prime Minister, Milojko speech of enlargement wouldn't be complete without the most advanced candidate country in the EU accession process. These last few weeks have truly been a recognition of Montenegro's achievements. First, we had the 20th anniversary of Montenegro's restored independence, then the very successful EU Western Balkans Summit in Tivat. And today we mark yet another milestone. We have now closed about half of all the chapters, 16 out of 33. Congratulations. Montenegro is still pushing forward at great pace. The chapters we close today are on freedom of movement for workers and on consumer and health protection. They are opening doors for our citizens towards easier access to work and professional opportunities in the whole European Union, and stronger protection for consumer rights and cooperation on public health. These are the kinds of things we truly cherish as benefits of membership of the European Union. We are already preparing Montenegro's place inside our union. As you have said, the Amaurellina. The council has started work on Montenegro's accession treaty for the first time after 17 years. And thank you to all the teams for this work. This is where essential democratic structures such as the number of MEPs are defined, as well as transition periods and safeguards. At the same time, in the Commission, we intend to adopt the financial package for Montenegro next week. This package will propose how to adjust our budget to a union of 28. We are getting ready Now it's the moment to double down on the remaining reforms and get it over the line.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-04 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The Commission attaches great importance to minority rights, education and good neighbourly relations. As part of the accession negotiations, Albania is required to take measures to foster inclusive education, including for persons belonging to minorities. Albania must uphold educational rights stemming from its law on the Protection of National Minorities, which will have to be fully implemented. Furthermore, the 2025 Enlargement report [1] by the Commission sets out that Albania needs to strengthen the quality and inclusiveness of its education system. The Commission will continue monitoring developments related to this field. The EU common position on Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process sets clear and ambitious interim benchmarks that Albania needs to fulfil to advance in accession negotiations, including protection of rights and rights of persons belonging to minorities, whose education-related issues are assessed and monitored in conjunction with Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fe9138b7-90fe-4277-a12c-3a03f6d1957f_en?filename=albania-report-2025.pdf.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2026-06-04 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The Commission took note of the adoption of the law on Internal Affairs and the National Security Agency law in Montenegro. The Commission had assessed the two laws and finds that their data protection provisions are not yet fully aligned with the EU acquis, particularly the General Data Protection Regulation [1] and the Law Enforcement Directive [2] . These laws require legal adjustments to align fully with the EU acquis on personal data protection. Montenegro is working on reviewing its legal framework on data protection in line with the EU acquis and as a first step has prepared a new draft law on Personal Data Protection. The Commission stands ready to assist Montenegro with its comprehensive data protection reform aimed to be finalised by the closure of accession negotiations. In the context of Montenegro’s accession, the Commission will closely monitor implementation of these laws and expects Montenegro to ensure merit-based police recruitments and strong procedural safeguards, and that any dismissals are justified and provide for access to full legal recourse. Comprehensive and inclusive reforms are essential not only for the country’s accession to the EU but for reinforcing public trust in Montenegro’s institutions. [1] Regulation (EU) 2016/679: ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj. [2] Directive (EU) 2016/680: ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/680/oj.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2026-06-04 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. Türkiye is expected to respect international law, good neighbourly relations and the sovereignty of Member States. Türkiye is expected to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including their external aspects, and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. Türkiye also needs to fulfil its obligation to ensure full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement [1] . The Commission follows a phased, proportionate and reversible approach to energise key areas of cooperation with Türkiye, in line with the Joint Communication of 29 November 2023 [2] and the April 2024 European Council conclusions [3] . Türkiye’s own constructive engagement will be instrumental in advancing cooperation across all relevant areas. Resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks is of particular importance in this context. [1] Additional Protocol of 23 November 1970, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:21970A1123(01)&from=EN. [2] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en. [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-05-21 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question The Commission recalls that the legal basis for the accession of new Member States to the EU is Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Article 49 TEU provides that any European state which respects the values set out in Article 2 TEU and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the EU. Article 49 TEU also states that ‘the conditions of eligibility for accession agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account’. Upon the Commission’s opinion and the European Parliament’s consent, the Council adopts a decision on the country’s accession. The conditions of admission to the EU and the adjustments of the EU Treaties which such admission entails are subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. The Accession Treaty is then to be submitted for ratification by all Member States and the acceding State in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The negotiating frameworks, including the one for Ukraine, already stipulate that if sufficient progress is made on reform priorities agreed in the negotiations and the alignment with the relevant acquis has taken place, this should lead to gradual integration into the EU single market. Such gradual integration is possible via international agreements that provide for the necessary safeguards to ensure a level playing field for economic operators, protect the integrity of the internal market and ensure the uniform interpretation of EU law. Ukraine, as some of the other candidates, has set ambitious target dates for its accession path and the Commission is intensely working with them to support these ambitious objectives.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU political integration
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The Commission recalls that the European Council has repeatedly stressed the imperative of enlargement as a strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity. Preparing for enlargement and taking on the obligations of EU membership remains based on the own merits’ principle. The legal basis for the accession of new Member States to the EU is Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Article 49 TEU provides that any European state which respects the values referred to in Article 2 TEU and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the EU. The conditions of admission of a new Member State to the EU and the adjustments of the EU Treaties, which such admission entails are subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant state, which is then submitted for ratification by all Member States and the acceding state in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Thus, Member States possess ample means to protect their interests in the accession process.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to assisting Belarusian journalists and independent media in providing high-quality reporting to Belarusian citizens. EU support has reached over 40 Belarusian independent outlets, helping preserve a diverse, dynamic and widely consumed Belarusian independent media ecosystem. The EU has also provided capacity-building and sector-wide support through education, training and technical assistance. Belarusian citizens, both inside the country and in exile, continue to face persecution. Public disclosure of the projects receiving EU support would expose beneficiaries to further risk. Accordingly, the Commission does not publish the names of implementing partners, in order to protect their ability to continue supporting independent media. For the same reasons, reports on implementation of EU assistance are not published. However, the Commission receives regular, comprehensive reporting from both beneficiaries and implementing partners, confirming that funding is properly accounted for. EU assistance is also subject to standard audit procedures to ensure proper use of funds and compliance with financial management rules.”
  EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The Commission is committed to ensuring that Ukraine’s accession process is conducted with the fairness, predictability, and stability essential to all Member States. The budgetary implications on the future multiannual financial framework will depend on several factors, including the outcome of negotiations of the post-2027 MFF and the application of possible transitional measures. Enlargement is an investment in a larger market, greater growth and stronger collective resilience. The Commission is analysing all options that can be applied in order to ensure that accession produces a net positive outcome for the Union as a whole, including through appropriate transitional measures. In line with previous practice, there is a broad array of such measures to ensure that there are no negative financial spillovers to existing beneficiaries. The chapters of the EU acquis, including on agriculture and rural development, food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, competition policy, or environment and climate change, form the basis of the accession negotiations and candidate countries are required to bring their national legislation into line with EU legislation in these areas by the date of accession. Carefully managed Ukraine’s integration has the potential to strengthen the Union’s food security and sovereignty.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The EU has a strategic interest in a secure and stable environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Commission has repeatedly underlined, most recently in the 2025 Enlargement report [1] , that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes. A comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue would significantly contribute to sustainable stability and security in the region. The EU has welcomed the support provided by Member States through the deployment of military assets in the Eastern Mediterranean and in support of Cyprus and remains determined to defend its interests and those of its Member States. The Joint Communication on EU-Türkiye relations [2] of 2023 recommends resuming Council discussions on the modernisation of the Customs Union if Türkiye keeps addressing trade irritants and circumvention of EU sanctions. It further indicates that a broader environment conducive to the resumption of Cyprus settlement talks is needed to open negotiations for the modernisation of the Customs Union. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db-926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. [2] JOIN (2023) 50 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=JOIN:2023:0050:FIN.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The pace of progress in the accession process is based on the fundamentals cluster. The Commission is closely monitoring Albania’s progress in the areas of rule of law, fundamental rights, democracy, and anti-corruption measures. One obligation under the cluster requires the presentation of a roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions . As stated in the Commission’s Progress Report on Albania 2025 [1] , Albania’s legal framework sets out a generally good basis for the protection of fundamental rights. The adoption in 2025 of a new law on personal data protection, as well as the adoption of implementing legislation on the rights to persons belonging to national minorities represented significant achievements. As part of the EU integration process, the Commission will continue to support the consolidation of the rule of law and judicial independence in Albania and discuss with the Albanian authorities the proper alignment with the relevant European standards in this area . The EU closely followed the 2025 parliamentary elections in Albania, including the preliminary findings of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe. The Commission will continue to monitor developments in Albania’s democratic institutions, including the adoption of further electoral reforms addressing all ODIHR's key recommendations, also those that are still outstanding from previous elections. Building on the assistance provided thus far, for example by supporting campaign finance transparency tools and the role of civil society organisations in monitoring the electoral process, targeted technical assistance will continue as relevant, notably to the Central Elections Committee. Furthermore, the Commission is also monitoring progress in the field of property rights, which is part of the fundamentals cluster. [1] SWD(2025) 750: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/albania-report-2025_en.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2026-04-29 “E-000572/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has consistently drawn attention to the dire conditions in prisons in North Macedonia, including in its 2025 enlargement report 1 and has raised the issue in the regular political dialogues, including the recent Stabilisation and Association Committee 2 and Justice Freedom and Security Subcommittee 3 meetings. The Commission monitors the situation closely together with partners such as the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The EU provides concrete assistance to improve the conditions in prisons of North Macedonia. Consular assistance and protection for EU citizens detained in the country falls under the responsibility and authority of the relevant Member State. The Commission works closely with Member States on these matters. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SK/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0753. 2 19th meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Committee between the European Union and the Republic of North Macedonia - Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, 13 February 2026: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/19th-meeting-stabilisation-and-association-committee-between-europeanunion-and-republic-north-2026-02-13_en#x. 3 20th meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement Subcommittee with North Macedonia on Justice, Freedom and Security, 19 March 2026: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/north-macedonia/20th-meetingstabilisation-and-association-agreement-subcommittee-north-macedonia-justice-freedom_en?s=229.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2026-04-28 “E-000280/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Since Russia’s unprovoked and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU has adopted comprehensive sanctions and has suspended or terminated engagement, cooperation, programmes, and projects with Russian public bodies. Alongside sanctions and international isolation, the EU has remained committed to supporting Russian civil society and independent media including in exile, recognising the clear link between external aggression and internal repression. The EU has been providing substantial support to civil society organisations, nongovernmental organisations human rights defenders, and independent journalists. For many years, the EU provided substantial support to organisations assisting persons with disabilities and specific health conditions, despite the hostile operating ground in Russia. Since 2022 and Russian aggression against Ukraine, support to civil society and independent media is part of EU’s approach to Russia which aims to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, protect vulnerable groups, and counter state censorship and propaganda. The EU will continue to apply international pressure on Russia for its human rights violations and to support individuals affected by the repression.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-04-17 “E-000555/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes Moldova’s integration into the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) schemes. This has enabled its payment service providers to use the SEPA schemes since October 2025, enhancing cross-border payment efficiency and integration with the EU’s payments market. In terms of impacts on Moldovan citizens, initial indication is positive. According to figures from the National Bank of Moldova, citizens and companies saved around EUR 3.85 million in the first three months after starting to use SEPA schemes, through which 70% of euro payments were processed. SEPA schemes are industry-driven and managed by the European Payments Council. The Commission’s role is therefore limited and does not include conducting a specific investigation into whether the standards for euro transactions under the SEPA schemes may incentivise a shift to non-euro currencies, informal payment channels, or non-transparent intermediaries. Participation in the SEPA schemes reduces the structural drivers of informality by paving the way for faster, cheaper and more transparent cross-border euro transfers within a regulated payment environment. The Commission is committed to supporting Moldova in ensuring that participation in SEPA schemes delivers broad benefits while safeguarding the integrity of the EU’s payment environment. The Commission is ready to work together with the National Bank of Moldova and the SEPA Steering Group, established to discuss SEPA implementation issues among enlargement countries, in order to identify solutions and address any challenges within its competence, ensuring that the SEPA schemes integration strengthens Moldova’s financial ecosystem.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · Anti-money laundering regulation · Financial regulation
• 2026-04-17 “E-000477/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the expulsions and addressed the issue during an emergency debate at the European Parliament on 12 February 2026. As an EU candidate country and member of the Council of Europe, Türkiye is expected to apply the highest democratic standards and practices. Measures affecting freedom of thought, conscience, and religion must be proportionate and should not be treated as national security issues without justification or judicial remedies. The Commission recalls that according to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and of manifesting it. The latter shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The 2025 Enlargement report on Türkiye 1 notes the deportations of foreign Protestant pastors and Jehovah’s Witness ministers and the ongoing cases 2 in the European Court of Human Rights. It states that the situation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion need to be improved and that the EU’s serious concerns about the continued deterioration of democratic standards, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental rights were not addressed. The Commission will continue to call on Türkiye to comply with its obligations under international law, and to respect and protect, and fulfil human rights and the rule of law, and will continue to raise these issues in its contacts with the Turkish authorities, including in the context of the relevant sub-committee established under the Association Agreement with Türkiye 3 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2025_en. 2 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-234570%22]} and https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-248520%22]}. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f8e2f9f4-75c8-4f62-ae3fb86ca5842eee.0008.02/DOC_2&format=PDF.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-04-16 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 16.4.2026 Written question The Commission is aware of the reports referred to by the Honourable Member. In the context of Serbia’s EU accession negotiations, Serbia is expected to align with the EU acquis for animal welfare and comply with the EU animal welfare standards. As noted in the 2025 Enlargement Package [1] , the alignment with the EU acquis on animal welfare is work in progress. For example, Serbia still needs to adopt framework legislation, including on animal welfare, which is a prerequisite for opening Chapter 12 on Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, as well as legislation related to Chapter 27 to ensure full alignment with Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes [2] . In this context, Serbia is preparing to adopt new laws on animal welfare and animal health. Alignment with the EU acquis will be necessary for accession negotiations and the achievement of the relevant step [3] in Serbia’s Reform Agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [4] . The Commission will continue to closely follow developments in Serbia, including as regards animal welfare. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6e68ce26-b95b-48e1-921a-c60c12da8f00_en?filename=serbia-report-2025.pdf . [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/63/oj/eng . [3] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/510d7159-e485-48cf-b49e-6b52164b74c3_en?filename=7.1.%20ANNEX%20VII%20-%20Reform%20Agenda%20Serbia%20-%20annex%201.pdf . [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj/eng .”
  EU-Serbia relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-04-07 “E-000291/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been working with Ukraine and the US with input from the World Bank, on a single unified long-term prosperity framework, representing the collective vision of Ukraine, the US and the EU for Ukraine's post-war future based on a reform agenda embedded in the country’s EU accession path. The plan, which depends entirely on solid and robust security guarantees for Ukraine, was discussed with EU leaders at the informal European Council on 22 January 2026 1 . The Ukraine Investment Framework (under the Ukraine Facility 2 ) and the European Flagship Fund for the Reconstruction of Ukraine 3 are regarded as key channels for deploying investment support, complementing the EU’s ongoing budgetary assistance through the Ukraine plan. Together with reforms aimed at improving the business climate, these instruments are designed to mobilise private investment at scale. The Commission fully supports Ukraine’s accession path, recognising its resilience and commitment. Ukraine has set ambitious target dates for EU accession, and the Commission has made clear that the achievement of these objectives hinges on a sustained and accelerated reform effort, particularly on the fundamentals and the rule of law. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is the legal basis for the accession of any new member state to the EU. It provides that any European country respecting the EU’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU can apply for EU membership, and that the conditions of eligibility set by the European Council shall be taken into account. It further provides that the conditions of admission and the adjustments to the EU treaties which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant state. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_26_199. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202400792 and https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/funding-technical-assistance/ukraine-facility_en. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f39df847-82e7-4c21-8b8a339e71a98d7b_en?filename=European_Fund_Ukraine.pdf.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-04-01 “E-000267/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU has strongly condemned 1 the violence against peaceful protesters that took place at the end of 2024 and consistently urged the Georgian authorities to respect, protect and uphold the human rights of peaceful protesters. The enlargement reports of 2024 and 2025 2 expressed deep concerns on the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of crowd control measures by law enforcement bodies, as well as persisting reports of torture and other forms of ill-treatment of those participating in protests. The failure of national investigations to bring those committing acts of violence to justice shows serious deficiencies in the justice system and underscores its lack of independence and credibility. Reports suggesting that chemicals were used in water cannons during demonstrations must be properly and independently investigated. While the EU does not have a dedicated mechanism to investigate the use of chemical weapons, it actively supports and cooperates 3 with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which holds the mandate to carry out any potential assessments. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/extracts-georgia-conclusions-council_en?s=221; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-spokesperson-developments-georgia_en?s=221. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2024_en; https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report2025_en. 3 The OPCW has consistently received support from the EU through the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget since 2004, currently amounting to a total of EUR 51.4 million.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Georgia relations
• 2026-03-31 “E-004183/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of a draft legislative initiative that could undermine the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons in Türkiye. As highlighted in the 2025 Enlargement report on Türkiye 1 , the situation for LGBTIQ+ persons is particularly worrying and their protection is not aligned with the EU acquis. The Commission will continue to monitor the situation closely and expects Türkiye, as an EU candidate country and a long-standing member of the Council of Europe, to uphold its international commitments. Respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law play a central role in the EU accession process. Accession negotiations with Türkiye are currently at standstill. Over time, in light of Türkiye’s diminished reforms ambitions and backsliding in key accession criteria, the EU has also reduced the volume of financial support to Türkiye under the Instrument for PreAccession Assistance and reoriented funding towards civil society, people-to-people contacts, and key EU priorities. As indicated in the LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy 2026-2030 2 , the Commission remains committed to promoting the rights of LGBTIQ+ people internationally. Protection of LGBTIQ+ persons’ rights is an integral part of EU’s dialogue with Türkiye on the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Commission will continue to raise these issues in its contacts with the Turkish authorities, including in the context of the relevant sub-committee established under the Association Agreement with Türkiye 3 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2025_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0725. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f8e2f9f4-75c8-4f62-ae3fb86ca5842eee.0008.02/DOC_2&format=PDF.”
  LGBTIQ+
• 2026-03-26 “P-000605/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Audit Board reports to the Commission and addresses recommendations to the Ukrainian authorities. In accordance with Article 12 of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1697 1 , the Commission regularly informs the European Parliament and the Council of the Board’s activities, via the Ukraine Facility dialogue. The mandate of the Audit Board focuses on strengthening Ukraine’s audit, control and anti-fraud architecture to ensure the sound management of EU funds. The operating costs of the Audit Board were published in the relevant calls. The Secretariat is financed through a service contract covering the full duration of the mandate (until July 2028), with a total amount of EUR 8 598 000. In 2025, the Audit Board produced one report covering internal audit and control systems. The secretariat is based in Kyiv and currently comprises one Head of Secretariat, who is an official, three key experts and eleven non-key experts covering audit, internal control, procurement, anti-fraud and anti-corruption. The three Audit Board members are appointed as Special Advisers for a maximum of 90 working days per year. The Audit Board can also do on-the-spot visits to collect relevant information. In December 2025, the Audit Board Secretariat conducted such an on-the-spot visit to Kryvyi Rih to analyse audit and monitoring at regional level. This visit, approximately 60 km from the line of contact, demonstrates the capacity to perform oversight even under wartime conditions. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2024/1697/oj/eng.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-02-27 “E-004735/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring the recent developments around investigations conducted by Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Those investigations show that anticorruption bodies are delivering on their mandate and building a track record of investigations, reflecting progress made under the enlargement framework and through the implementation of the Ukraine Facility. In line with the EU enlargement methodology and the negotiating framework adopted by the Council on 21 June 2024 1 , in May 2025 Ukraine adopted a roadmap for the rule of law, addressing an opening benchmark for Cluster 1 negotiations. The roadmap commits Ukraine to strengthen its capacity to tackle corruption. The importance of implementing these reforms was further highlighted in the Joint Statement between the Commissioner for Enlargement and the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, concluded on 11 December 2025 in Lviv and establishing a list of ten important reforms to be implemented as a matter of priority. The Commission regularly assesses Ukraine’s progress and issues recommendations through the annual country reports. In addition, several reforms in the areas of rule of law and anticorruption are funding conditionalities required and implemented under the Ukraine Facility, and payments can be partially suspended if the required reforms are not implemented. As a precondition for any payments, the Commission assesses that Ukraine continues to uphold and respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system and the rule of law. In its latest assessment on 17 November 2025 the Commission concluded that the conditions are in place. Any financial support from the EU includes anti-fraud measures allowing for controls of funds, with the possibility to take corrective action. The framework and the financing agreement between the Commission and Ukraine on the Ukraine Facility includes a system of audit and controls providing a multilayer mechanism of protection of EU’s financial interests. As part of the Ukraine Plan, Ukraine has committed to strengthen its audit and control systems. Finally, an independent Audit Board has been set up. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/hzmfw1ji/public-ad00009en24.pdf.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-02-17 “E-003495/2025 E-004263/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes the Parliament’s continued focus on this important issue, as Belarus remains high on the political agenda. The EU is committed to supporting the people of Belarus in their path towards freedom and democracy and recognises the crucial role of independent media in this process. Since 2020, the Commission has mobilised over EUR 38 million in support of independent media in Belarus. The EU will continue to prioritise support for independent media as reaffirmed by the Commissioner for Enlargement and the High Representative/Vice-President in their joint statement 1 marking the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent 2020 elections. In designing programmes to support Belarusian independent media, the Commission’s priority is to reach people inside the country and identify Belarusian outlets with strong organic audiences. Support is delivered through experienced implementing partners who operate competitive sub-granting processes. These well-established organisations play a key role in supporting a diverse, healthy and competitive media ecosystem. EU assistance has supported dozens of Belarusian outlets at national, regional and local level, as well as bloggers and investigative media. This has helped media professionals and journalists adapt to a changing repressive environment, including through more active engagement on social media and innovative communication methods. The Commission’s assistance to independent media fosters innovation in the sector by supporting experimentation with content strategies that will help target different priority audiences, including young people. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-kallas-andcommissioner-kos-fifth-anniversary-2025-08-09_en.”
  EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-02-12 “E-003610/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant reforms (i.e. the nine steps) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 were taken 1 . In view of the developments in Georgia, the European Council concluded in June 2 and October 2024 3 that the authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. Visa-free travel to the EU is a conditional benefit, contingent upon the fulfilment of specific criteria set out in Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 4 , including the obligation to uphold and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Commission issues a yearly report to monitor the EU’s visa-free regimes with third countries. In its eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism Report adopted on 19 December 2025 5 , the Commission identified that Georgia had not addressed the recommendations from the Seventh Suspension Mechanism Report 6 regarding compliance with visa liberalisation benchmarks and instead further regressed in key areas of governance and human rights. The report concluded that given the systemic and deliberate nature of the democratic backsliding in Georgia, the Commission will consider appropriate measures under the revised Visa Suspension Mechanism. According to the new rules, in the first phase, the visa suspension could target holders of diplomatic, service and official passports. In the second stage, the suspension could be extended to the entire population if issues are not addressed by the Georgian authorities. Ultimately, Georgia could lose its visa free status entirely and be transferred to Annex I of the Visa Regulation 2018/ 1806 (visa-required third countries list) 7 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-council-conclusions-27-june2024/. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17october-2024/. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1806/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0792&qid=1768565258267. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A571%3AFIN. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1806/oj/eng.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2026-02-09 “E-004702/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission On 18 November 2025, the Commission held the EU Enlargement Forum as a flagship initiative to elevate the conversation on EU enlargement as a shared political, societal, and generational project. After discussions on the geopolitical imperative for enlargement and the perspective of Member States, Panel III focused on EU enlargement from the perspective of citizens. It brought together voices from civil society to reflect on how the EU is perceived beyond its borders and how those perceptions are shaped by experience, aspiration, and identity. It also provided a platform for citizens in candidate countries to discuss their perceptions of the EU and their countries’ accession prospects, and how mutual understanding can be improved, noting that opinion polls in Member States and candidate countries show that citizens do not feel sufficiently informed about enlargement. The final panel of the Forum ‘Getting to YES!’ reaffirmed the current momentum for enlargement, discussed shared priorities and candidate countries’ ambitions to conclude accession negotiations and join the EU and the importance of public support as one of the necessary elements for EU enlargement. Applying for EU membership is a sovereign decision that only the candidate can take; in doing so, candidate countries and potential candidates have voluntarily chosen an EU path aligning with the EU’s priorities, policies and shared values. EU support for civil society in candidate countries and potential candidates as well as in the Eastern Neighbourhood is an explicit objective of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Regulation 1 , with a view to fostering an enabling environment that allows for a plurality of views to be heard, which is in turn vital for an open democratic debate. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III).”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU enlargement
• 2026-02-06 “E-004737/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors developments around corruption allegations in Ukraine. The uncovering of corruption cases in Ukraine demonstrates that anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine are delivering on their mandate and building a track record of investigations. There are no confirmed cases of EU funding being misappropriated in Ukraine. There are three main channels of disbursement of funds to Ukraine from the Commission: the Ukraine Facility 1 , the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration 2 and the European Peace Facility 3 . All budget support is disbursed to the Government of Ukraine upon the fulfilment of defined conditions, which include safeguards concerning corruption and the proper use of funds. All financial support received by the Government of Ukraine from the EU is subject to antifraud measures and provisions allowing for controls of funds, with the possibility to take corrective action if issues arise. This includes provisions allowing the European Anti-Fraud Office, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Court of Auditors to carry out any technical or financial controls and investigations that they consider necessary. In the case of the funds disbursed under the Ukraine Facility, an independent Audit Board has been set up, to provide oversight, including in the area of public procurement. Furthermore, in the context of the EU accession negotiations, Ukraine has committed to achieve high levels of alignment with relevant EU acquis in the areas of public procurement, defence procurement, audit and control systems. The Commission will continue to closely monitor implementation and, where appropriate, assess the need for adjustments on the basis of identified risks, including corruption risks. 1 OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024. 2 OJ L, 2024/2773, 28.10.2024. 3 OJ L, 2024/890, 19.3.2024.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-01-29 “E-003897/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is following closely whether candidate countries, including the Republic of Moldova, respect fundamental rights as outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 . This includes monitoring the Republic of Moldova’s compliance with fundamental rights in the EU acquis, including freedom of religion, as part of the EU’s enlargement policy. The 2025 enlargement report 2 highlights that the Republic of Moldova provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of religion or belief and there were no reported breaches of freedom of religion or belief by the Republic of Moldova in the reporting timeframe. The Commission remains committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova in its efforts to meet the standards required for EU membership. 1 OJ C326, 26.10.2012. 2 SWD(2025) 758 final.”
  EU-Moldova relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-01-28 “E-003913/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intend to publish the contract concluded with DT Global Europe, its annexes and attachments, nor the final report, as these documents contain personal data and commercially sensitive information which are protected from public disclosure. The award of the contract followed an evaluation based on the most economically advantageous tender, applying the best price-quality ratio. The assessment of technical quality focused on the proposed organisation and methodology, as well as the profiles of the key experts, in line with the applicable rules for the selected procedure 1 . The Commission shares key information, such as award data, through its Financial Transparency System 2 . 1 Procedure NEAR/2021/EA-RP/0069 available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/tender-details/8172. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html.”
  EU-Belarus relations · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-01-13 “E-004463/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission, in coordination with Member States, European development banks and international partners, is delivering financial and technical assistance to Ukraine through wellestablished mechanisms. Since February 2022, the EU has provided over EUR 3 billion specifically to strengthen Ukraine’s energy security. Through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 1 , with coordination and operational support provided by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre 2 , the Commission is facilitating the donation of in-kind energy-related assistance to Ukraine from Member States and UCPM Participating States. This includes material for repairs of the electricity grid and large equipment, such as decommissioned power plant parts, generators and transformers, in addition to EU-fully financed rescEU stockpiles. The UCPM also supports donations from private and third country partners via its rescEU Private Donations Scheme. The Ukraine Facility 3 via the Ukraine Energy Support Fund focuses on physical protection and urgent repairs, particularly in vulnerable regions. Higher electricity export capacity increases Ukraine’s security of supply during winter. The Commission has also allocated an extra EUR 40 million in humanitarian funding to help with solid fuels, heating appliances and insulation. The Ukraine Facility recently mobilised close to EUR 1 billion of loans and grants for emergency gas purchases to cover the deficit caused by targeted attacks. Following the adoption of the 19th sanctions package against Russia on 23 October 2025, work has already begun on the 20th sanctions package. 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordinationcentre-ercc_en. 3 OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-01-09 “E-004101/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Media freedom is one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and a fundamental right in the EU, and therefore a crucial element and prerequisite of Serbia's EU accession process. As a candidate country, Serbia is expected to create an enabling environment for media freedom that safeguards independent journalism and ensure that freedom of expression can be exercised without hindrance. Moreover, Serbia is expected to align its legislation with the EU acquis, including the European Media Freedom Act 1 , which provides unprecedented safeguards for media and journalists against political interference, ensuring editorial independence which is a key requirement under the Regulation. In both the 2025 Rule of Law report 2 and in the 2025 Enlargement Package 3 the Commission has outlined its concerns about the worsening situation facing journalists, media professionals and outlets in Serbia and the chilling effect the recurrent statements by high-level officials are having on freedom of expression and the work of journalists. The Commission has been consistent in calling for the attacks on journalists in the context of the protests to stop, including reported cases of police involvement and verbal attacks from high-level officials. The Commission will continue to monitor these issues in the context of the EU accession process and the annual Rule of Law report. Through the Instrument for pre-accession assistance, the Commission has provided more than EUR 9 million to support independent and professional media outlets as well as media associations supporting the rights and safety of journalists and an enabling environment in Serbia. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083. 2 SWD(2025) 931 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025SC0931. 3 SWD(2025) 755 final, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6e68ce26-b95b-48e1-921ac60c12da8f00_en?filename=serbia-report-2025.pdf.”
  EU-Serbia relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2026-01-09 “P-004505/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU support to Ukraine is based on strong safeguards to ensure the proper use of EU funds. Any financial support provided by the EU includes dedicated anti-fraud measures and all funds are strictly monitored, with corrective action taken if issues arise. Under the Ukraine Facility 1 , Ukraine must ensure the integrity of all energy-related financial support and followup on corruption allegations in an appropriate way. The Commission is monitoring the recent developments around corruption allegations in the energy sector closely. There is no evidence to this day that EU money has been diverted to unintended purposes, in relation to the reported case. The fight against corruption is a central element for a country to join the EU. The uncovering of this case demonstrates that anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine are delivering on their mandate and building a track record of investigations. Therefore, the Commission maintains its stance that Ukraine is ready for the next step in the EU accession negotiations. The EU maintains a zero-tolerance policy on corruption and notes that the opening of accession negotiations would enable a more rigorous monitoring and effective support of the process. 1 OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-01-05 “E-003325/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU closely monitored the preparations and the holding of the local elections in Kosovo that took place on 12 October 2025 with the second round on 9 November 2025. This included the deployment of an Election Expert Mission, following an invitation by the President of Kosovo. The EU took note of the certification of two Kosovo-Serb political parties following a successful appeal process. The EU welcomed the peaceful, competitive and inclusive conduct of this first election round with the participation of all communities, as well as a free, fair and inclusive media coverage contributing to a transparent electoral process. Following the certification of results, the EU expects an orderly transition of local governance in northern municipalities and expects newly elected municipal authorities and government institutions alike to engage constructively in addressing the needs and demands of the population in an institutional manner and in accordance with Kosovo law.”
  EU-Kosovo relations · EU-Serbia relations
• 2026-01-05 “E-003431/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU has supported the Turkish Coast guard in the form of financial assistance for the supply of search and rescue vessels. Assistance has been provided under the condition that the vessels will be of civilian use, while their technical specifications will allow only for search and rescue operations. As outlined in the relevant programming documents 1 , the search and rescue operations of these boats will be carried out in line with international human rights standards and in full respect of the sovereignty and relevant jurisdiction of Member States in accordance with international law. The implementation of the pre-accession assistance in Türkiye follows the EU Financial Regulation 2,3 . The Commission monitors its programmes through several means, including regular reports from implementing partners, on-the-spot verification missions, results-oriented monitoring exercises and external evaluations. If there is evidence that a beneficiary violated the applicable European legislation during the implementation of a project and did not comply with EU rules, the Commission and the national agency shall make use of all available means, including terminating the cooperation and recovering the EU funds. Any allegations will be investigated on the basis of provided evidence. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/32ff8768-90e8-49ef-8ae82fdaf429d399_en?filename=C_2024_9168_F1_ANNEX_EN_V1_P1_3857028.PDF. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkey-negotiating-framework-october-2005_en. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast).”
  Trade relations with Turkey · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-12-23 “E-004352/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission In the context of EU accession negotiations, Serbia must meet the interim benchmarks under Chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights. Particularly, on the handling of domestic war crimes cases, Serbia is expected to effectively demonstrate adequate investigations of allegations and equal treatment of suspects to ensure that no one is above the law, regardless of their nationality or ethnicity or that of the victims. Moreover, Serbia is expected to engage in meaningful regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations in handling war crimes by avoiding conflicts of jurisdictions and ensuring that war crimes are prosecuted without any discrimination. All outstanding issues in this regard must be fully resolved before accession. The Commission follows closely the domestic handling of war crimes cases in the context of Serbia’s EU accession negotiations. In the 2025 Enlargement Package 1 , it is reported that individuals in Serbia are able to evade justice by taking advantage of prohibitions against extradition of nationals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Commission does not comment on individual cases. 1 SWD(2025) 755 final.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Serbia relations · Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-12-23 “E-003094/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission As a contracting party to the European Convention on Human Rights Türkiye has committed to abide by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Commission has repeatedly called on Türkiye, including in the latest 2025 Enlargement Report 1 , and in its contacts with Turkish authorities, to implement judgments of the ECtHR as a matter of priority. Respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights is also at the heart of the EU accession process. Accession negotiations with Türkiye have remained at a standstill since 2018, in line with the European Council conclusions 2 of 17 December 2024. The underlying facts leading to this assessment still hold. As noted in the 2025 Enlargement report, serious concerns remain in the areas of fundamental rights and rule of law, including the independence of the judiciary. With regard to the sensitive issue of missing persons, the Commission has been fully supportive of the efforts of the bi-communal Committee on Missing Persons 3 (CMP), which aims to recover, identify and return to their families the remains of people who went missing during the inter-communal fighting in 1963, 1964 and the events of 1974. EU funding of more than EUR 41 million since 2006 has covered around 80% of the CMP’s budget. It has allowed the committee to locate, exhume, identify and return to the families for dignified burial the remains of 1 055 persons from an official list of 2 002 missing persons. It is the CMP’s role to be in contact with the two communities and relevant authorities, including those of Türkiye, to conduct investigations, identify burial sites, and carry out excavations. The Commission stands ready to support CMP’s efforts whenever requested by the committee. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2025_en. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 3 https://www.cmp-cyprus.org/.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-12-22 “E-004148/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission expects Türkiye, as a candidate country and Council of Europe member, to respect media freedom and freedom of expression. These principles must be upheld by Türkiye, which has committed to aligning with the EU acquis, the European standards and values. They should apply to all journalists – Turkish or foreign. The Commission closely follows the situation of media freedom in Türkiye and provides regular assessments and recommendations in its annual reports. In its 2025 Enlargement report on Türkiye 1 , the Commission stressed the backsliding in the area of freedom of expression, which restrained the environment for journalists and media professionals in Türkiye, particularly through arbitrary arrests, detentions, prosecutions and convictions. It is crucial that journalists can do their job free of any threat of violence, harassment or intimidation to ensure that citizens have access to diverse and reliable information. The Commission has underlined on numerous occasions that Türkiye should guarantee a safe, pluralistic, and independent media environment, enabling journalists to operate without fear of reprisals, censorship or undue pressure. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2025_en.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-12-15 “E-003382/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression, the EU and Member States have mobilised EUR 187.3 billion in support to Ukraine and its citizens as of 3 December 2025. This amount includes EUR 15 billion in bilateral financial and humanitarian assistance from the Member States. The Commission does not have access to the details of the bilateral financial assistance packages that Member States provide to Ukraine and communicate to the Commission. The abovementioned total amount also includes approximately EUR 17 billion of support mobilised by the EU and its Member States to support people fleeing Ukraine. However, support enabling the transport of goods to and from Ukraine via Member States’ territories is not included in the above quantification. This exclusion is due to the complexity of this type of support as it also generates revenues through increased traffic on EU rail, road and ports infrastructure and increased fees to be paid to national authorities.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-12-04 “E-003126/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission noted the recent arrest of Serbian Government Official, Mr Igor Popović, and his subsequent release on 8 August 2025 following a plea deal. The Commission remains supportive of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue facilitated by the High Representative/Vice President and by the EU Special Representative under the Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/144. In recent weeks, there have been arrests and deportations conducted by Kosovo authorities as well as arrests conducted by Serbian authorities. Such actions and similar escalatory rhetoric are unacceptable and must be avoided. The Commission, together with the European External Action Service, urged Kosovo and Serbia to engage constructively in the EU-facilitated Dialogue. For both parties, it is only through the Dialogue that they can advance on their respective EU paths.”
  EU-Kosovo relations · EU-Serbia relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-11-28 “E-003684/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of allegations of human rights abuses in removal centres partly funded by the EU and of forced returns at the Turkish border. The Commission takes these seriously and is committed to ensuring that EU funding is used in accordance with international and EU standards. To this end, the Commission has been providing financial assistance to Türkiye to improve conditions in removal centres and enhance access to rights and services for migrants and refugees. Since 2016, it has conducted regular monitoring visits in these centres. The Commission also requires that all EU-funded projects in Türkiye be implemented in accordance with EU standards and principles, including the respect for human rights and the principle of non-refoulement. Following the allegations of human rights abuses in the media in 2024, the Commission has strengthened its regular independent monitoring visits. The Commission is supporting actions to build the capacity of staff on fundamental rights and freedoms in the context of immigration detention and is providing training to institutions that oversee detention facilities and handle complaints. The Commission notes however that it is for the Turkish authorities to grant access to removal centres. Therefore, the Commission will continue working with the authorities to facilitate access for monitoring purposes, while respecting their prerogatives in this regard.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-11-26 “P-003799/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Steering Committee of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey provides strategic guidance on the overall priorities, types of actions and instruments to be used. It also permanently monitors and assesses implementation of the EU-Turkey statement 1 . It last met on 23 May 2025. As noted in the report 2 , Türkiye continues to make very significant efforts in hosting and addressing the needs of refugees and migrants and the EU-Turkey statement continued to deliver concrete results in 2024. As per financial rules, the Commission is obliged to disburse funding once it has been contracted, except in cases of fraud or other serious infractions against the principle of sound financial management enshrined in the applicable legislation. According to the Statistical Office of the EU (Eurostat) data, from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2024, 31 525 Turkish nationals were returned from the EU to Türkiye following an order to leave 3 . 1 EU-Turkey Statement, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkeystatement/. 2 Ninth Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ninth-annualreport-facility-refugees-turkey_en. 3 Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_eirtn__custom_18334598/default/table. No data is available for the number of third country nationals returned to Türkiye in Eurostat or in the Irregular Migration Management Application, and only data concerning the return of Turkish nationals is available.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-11-24 “E-003759/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of pre-accession assistance in Türkiye follows the EU Financial Regulation 1 . The Commission monitors its programmes through several means, including regular reports from implementing partners, on-the-spot verification missions, results-oriented monitoring and external evaluations. If there is evidence that a beneficiary violated the applicable legislation during the implementation of a project and did not comply with EU rules, the Commission and national agencies shall make use of all available means, including terminating the cooperation and recovering the EU funds. So far there is no indication suggesting that EU funds would be used for other purposes than the ones intended for. Any allegations will be investigated on the basis of provided evidence. The Commission has a comprehensive set of preventive and investigative mechanisms in place, including stringent internal controls, regular audits, transparency rules, and cooperation with bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). When the Commission becomes aware of any suspected cases of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the EU budget, it informs OLAF and, where applicable, the EPPO. The Commission ensures follow-up and makes sure funds have an impact on the ground. Reporting requirements, which may include expenditure verification and audits, are agreed depending on the specific projects, implementing partners and modalities. A monitoring framework 2 is in place which includes bi-annual Sectoral Monitoring Committees, for each sector receiving EU support and an annual Joint Monitoring Committee, covering all contracts under implementation across all sectors. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en. 2 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4450df88-19ad-11ec-b4fe-01aa75ed71a1/language-en, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/23b6af49-5e12-11ec-9c6c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-11-20 “E-003609/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU is a consistent and reliable partner to Georgia and reaffirms its unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Georgia as well as its solidarity with the Georgian people. In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status 1 on the understanding that the relevant reforms (i.e. the ‘nine steps’) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 2 were adopted. In view of the developments in Georgia, including democratic backsliding, in June 3 and October 2024 4 the European Council concluded that the authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. In November 2024, the Georgian government announced the decision to suspend the EU accession process until 2028. The EU is ready to consider the return of Georgia to the EU accession path if the authorities take credible steps to reverse democratic backsliding. The responsibility lies solely with the Georgian authorities. In terms of public opinion, the recently published 2025 annual survey results on perceptions towards the EU in Georgia indicate trust towards the EU is at 67%. 74% of citizens would vote in favour of Georgia’s membership of the EU and 80% believe that EU membership would bring more advantages than disadvantages 5 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/15/european-council-conclusions-14-and-15december-2023/. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-council-conclusions-27-june2024/. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17october-2024. 5 More information available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/special-eurobarometer-and-perceptionsurveys-2025-09-02_en, including Eurobarometer survey results among Member States citizens and perception survey results in Georgia.”
  EU-Georgia relations · EU enlargement
• 2025-11-19 “E-003608/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Visa-free travel to the EU is a conditional benefit, contingent upon the fulfilment of specific criteria. One of the criteria is upholding and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Every year the Commission issues a report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism to monitor the EU’s visa-free regimes with third countries, including Georgia. The progress on recommendations is monitored with reference to the previous year’s report and points towards areas that still require improvement. In the seventh Visa Suspension Mechanism Report adopted on 6 December 2024 1 , the Commission called on Georgian authorities to, inter alia, ensure the protection of fundamental rights of all Georgian citizens. The Commission recommended to repeal legislation that restricts fundamental rights and freedoms, goes against the principle of non-discrimination and contradicts relevant European and international standards. This includes the Law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and the legislative package on ‘family values and protection of minors.’ In its upcoming eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism Report, the Commission will review to what extent these recommendations have been addressed by Georgian authorities and decide on the possible activation of the suspension mechanism. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024DC0571&qid=1762252659031.”
  EU-Georgia relations · LGBTIQ+
• 2025-11-18 “E-003383/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Currently, in Serbia, there are no EU-funded projects specifically covering animal welfare that involve civil society organisations (CSOs). EU financial support for civil society in Serbia is channelled primarily through the Civil Society Facility 1 . The aim is to support the development of civil society in Serbia and to strengthen the contribution of CSOs to Serbia’s accession process to the EU. Funding is either managed directly by the EU Delegation or through implementing CSOs selected on a competitive basis. Serbian CSOs can apply for funding provided the eligibility criteria are met. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance in Rural Development (IPARD III 2 ) provides support aiming at enhancing food security, sustainability of agricultural systems, and rural development. The application process is structured around specific entrusted measures, with requirements defined for each call 3 . CSOs do not usually qualify unless the specific requirements are met, such as being a cooperative. Nevertheless, one ongoing programme offers grant support for environmental CSOs 4 . The Commission has several measures at disposal to prevent, detect and correct the misuse of EU funds, such as ex-ante and ex-post controls, audits and monitoring, as well as investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office. The annual Instrument for pre-Accession Assistance monitoring committee is a key tool to track progress on the use of funds and to provide assurance regarding the sound management of the EU funds. 1 Financing Decision: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/financing-decision-civil-society-facility_en. 2 DG ENEST website overview: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/international/internationalcooperation/enlargement/pre-accession-assistance/overview_en. 3 IPARD III for Serbia: https://uap.gov.rs/ipard-iii-podrska-ruralnom-razvoju/. 4 ‘Volunteers for Nature – grown impact for citizens, actions on environmental protection’: https://mis.org.rs/en/portfolio-items/volunteers-for-nature/.”
  Funding for EU Neighbourhood
• 2025-11-18 “E-002645/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission It is the Commission’s understanding that discussions on the effective operationalisation of the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund are being finalised, therefore a full assessment is not yet possible. The Commission provisionally assesses that the provisions of the formal Agreements do not appear to constitute a direct breach of Ukraine’s current obligations towards the EU. Upon accession, Ukraine is generally required to fully apply the EU acquis, including the Water Framework Directive and Extractive Waste Directive and to take all necessary steps to eliminate any incompatibility of EU law with international agreements concluded with a third party. The temporary and partial suspension of the environmental impact assessment by Ukraine has been done in the context of the martial law. The Commission has on several occasions encouraged Ukraine to ensure that the application of martial law remains limited to what is strictly necessary. The Commission remains committed to supporting Ukraine in its efforts to resume the full implementation of the environmental legislation at the earliest possible opportunity. Several technical assistance projects are already in place to assist Ukraine in meeting its obligations under EU environmental acquis.”
  EU-US relations · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-10-31 “E-003425/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The enlargement process is and remains a strict, fair and merit-based process, based on the objective progress achieved by each enlargement country, in line with the Copenhagen criteria. This process aims to ensure that the EU will continue to deliver and function as was the case in previous enlargements, and not undermine the cohesion, functionality and legitimacy of the EU. Moreover, following the Communication of March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews 1 , the Commission is currently carrying out pre-enlargement reviews, assessing the extent to which policies and governance of the EU will be affected by future enlargement and what changes could be considered to address any identified gaps. The Commission recalls that under the EU Treaties, any decision to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting in Council requires the unanimous support by all Member States. 1 COM(2024)146 final.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
• 2025-10-31 “E-002880/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of the pre-accession assistance in Türkiye follows the EU Financial Regulation 1 . The Commission ensures follow-up with the applicable rules and ensures funds have an impact on the ground. Reporting requirements, which may include expenditure verification and audits, are agreed depending on the specific projects, implementing partners and modalities. A monitoring framework is in place and includes bi-annual Sectoral Monitoring Committees, for each sector receiving EU support, and an annual Joint Monitoring Committee covering all contracts under implementation across all sectors. If there is evidence that a beneficiary violated the applicable legislation during the implementation of a project and did not comply with EU rules, the Commission and the national agency shall make use of all available means, including terminating the cooperation and recovering the EU funds. In addition, the Commission has put in place a comprehensive set of preventive and investigative mechanisms, including stringent internal controls, regular audits, transparency rules, and cooperation with bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. As to the protection of biometric data, Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 2 establishes standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States. Each Member State is responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules on procurement, production and personalisation of passports and travel documents they issue. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 3 also applies to the personal data to be processed in this context, and its enforcement lies primarily with the competent national supervisory authorities and courts. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en. 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, OJ L 385, 29.12.2004, p. 1. 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-09-29 “E-002321/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Following the decision to grant Ukraine EU candidate status in June 2022, Ukraine is currently in the screening phase of accession negotiations. The assessment to open cluster 1fundamentals, is with the Council. In terms of reforms, Ukraine established a transparent preselection system for Constitutional Court judges and further reformed the judicial governance bodies. It has strengthened its institutional anti-corruption framework and its legislation on anti-money laundering, smuggling and financial investigations. It has adopted a law reforming the Economic Security Bureau, a new media law, and revised legislation on national minorities. Further progress is needed, including on judicial and prosecutorial appointments, vetting and disciplinary procedures, safeguarding the independence of anti-corruption institutions and advancing the reform of law enforcement agencies. Following the revised enlargement methodology 1 which made the EU accession process more credible, predictable, and dynamic, there have been no changes to the requirements. EU accession negotiations remain based on merit and equal treatment, putting the rule of law at the core of the process. The Commission continues to support all enlargement partners towards EU accession. Overall, enlargement is and will remain a priority for the Commission not least because of the geopolitical context, including Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The geopolitical context might have an impact on the path but does not exempt a candidate country from fulfilling all necessary obligations to join the EU. As in previous rounds of EU accession negotiations transitional arrangements will be exceptional and limited in time and scope. 1 COM(2020) 57 final.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
• 2025-09-25 “E-002926/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission agrees that the extension of the EU Roam Like at Home area to the Western Balkans could bring substantial benefits to citizens. It is important to note that the Association Agreements that the EU has with Ukraine and Moldova 1 include a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which provide the necessary legal frameworks allowing the Parties to reciprocally open their roaming markets, which in turn enabled the EU to extend the EU Roam Like at Home area. The EU-Western Balkans Stabilisation and Association Agreements 2 lack such a legal framework. The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans 3 adopted in 2023 aims at integrating the Western Balkan partners into the EU’s single market, including the digital single market. The Commission services are working on a solution with the aim to complement the current Stabilisation and Association Agreements and to provide the necessary legal framework to extend the EU Roam Like at Home area also to the Western Balkans. 1 Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22014A0529%2801%29; Moldova, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22014A0830%2801%29. 2 Albania, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22009A0428%2802%29; Montenegro, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22010A0429%2801%29; Serbia, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22013A1018%2801%29; North Macedonia, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22004A0320%2803%29; Bosnia and Herzegovina, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22015A0630%2801%29; Kosovo, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22016A0316%2801%29. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/2023-communication-new-growth-plan-western-balkans_en.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-09-15 “E-003092/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of Albania’s European integration process as stated in the 2024 enlargement report 1 , as well as in previous ones. In the context of the accession negotiations, Albania has stated its commitment to good neighbourly relations. The Commission took note that the map in question was swiftly removed following its initial publication. As regards the rights of persons belonging to minorities, Albania adopted three bylaws in December 2024, which were necessary to ensure implementation of the relevant framework legislation. These bylaws addressed the crucial issues of free self-identification and the use of languages for persons belonging to minorities, guaranteeing alignment with European standards and the principle of free self-identification. Albania needs to ensure effective implementation of its legislative framework, notably by allocating adequate resources to central agencies and local government, staffing and training of local authorities based on annual projections, including, among others, capacities for data collection. The Commission is now closely monitoring Albania’s progress on empowering the State Committee on National Minorities, which needs to be fully functional and have adequate resources and recruitment procedures in line with the recommendations of the Commission and of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ Advisory Committee. 1 SWD(2024) 690 final.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2025-09-10 “E-002943/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors progress in the areas of the Rule of Law, and property rights, as part of the accession negotiations under Cluster 1 – Fundamentals. In the 2024 enlargement report on Albania 1 , it assessed that overall enjoyment of property rights remained limited and continued to be affected by significant challenges. It also underlined that ensuring the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy in cases of expropriation and removal of properties remains essential. As part of accession negotiations, the Commission also monitors Albania's progress in strengthening its judicial system and ensuring that citizens have access to effective and impartial judicial review of administrative acts, including those related to property expropriation and demolition. The Commission will continue to engage with Albanian authorities to ensure that they comply with EU requirements on the rule of law, property, and the right to a fair trial. 1 SWD(2024) 690 final.”
  EU-Albania relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-09-09 “E-002934/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes note of the reports regarding the potential misuse of legal procedures to target the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons in the Republic of Moldova. To ensure accountability, the EU is closely monitoring prison conditions and the rule of law in the Republic of Moldova, working with the Council of Europe and with civil society and independent non-governmental organisations to uphold human rights standards and transparency. Progress in the Republic of Moldova’s EU accession process remains conditional on meaningful judicial reforms, as highlighted in the Commission’s 2024 Enlargement Report 1 , to eliminate legal abuses and safeguard the rights of vulnerable persons, including from the LGBTIQ community. The EU remains committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova on its European path and the Commission will continue to raise the rights of vulnerable persons in the political dialogue. The Commission will continue supporting measures to tackle violence, hatred and discrimination against LGBTIQ people. Further steps in the accession process will depend on demonstrable progress in strengthening the rule of law, tackling discrimination, and ensuring equality for all citizens. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/moldova-report-2024_en.”
  EU-Moldova relations · LGBTIQ+
• 2025-09-08 “E-003004/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has consistently supported Albania’s efforts to consolidate an independent, accountable, impartial, and professional judiciary. It monitors progress of relevant reforms, providing also technical assistance and capacity-building programs. The Commission has ensured thorough monitoring of the vetting process through the deployment of senior magistrates from Member States in the context of the international monitoring operation. The vetting has been crucial to strengthen integrity across the judiciary, overall having a positive impact on eradicating corruption. The Commission noted that the process has also resulted in capacity gaps. In its 2024 report on Albania 1 , the Commission stressed the need to accelerate vetting appeal procedures and encouraged Albania to fill vacant positions with qualified magistrates, at all levels of the judiciary, through transparent and merit-based processes. The Commission closely monitors the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decisions and assesses the progress made in addressing the shortcomings in access to justice. It encourages the publication of court rulings and providing access to information for citizens. The Commission also continues to support civil society organisations and independent institutions, such as the Peoples’ Advocate and the Commissioner against Discrimination in their efforts to promote access to justice and hold the authorities accountable. 1 SWD(2024) 690 final.”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2025-09-02 “E-001511/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The autonomous trade measures (ATMs) 1 continue to provide temporary full trade liberalisation for Moldovan agricultural products by eliminating remaining import tariffs and quotas on seven products not yet fully liberalised under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 2 . These measures have contributed to increased export levels. The Commission remains committed to facilitating a smooth transition from the current ATMs to the new DCFTA regime under Article 147 of the Association Agreement, which envisages reciprocal concessions aimed at enhancing trade liberalisation, particularly concerning products subject to tariff-rate quotas. The objective is to progress from a short-term unilateral framework to a long-term reciprocal arrangement, thereby supporting Moldova’s EU accession process, including alignment with EU standards, and enabling Moldovan agricultural exporters to expand their access to EU markets. The new Growth Plan 3 (GP) will provide the necessary funding to bolster investments in Moldova’s productive sectors and reinforce the trade partnership between the EU and Moldova. The GP will prioritise key sectors, including agriculture, energy, and transport, promoting sustainable economic growth, employment creation, and social development. The Commission will collaborate closely with Moldovan authorities to ensure effective implementation of the GP and a potential DCFTA review under Article 147, offering technical assistance and capacity-building to support Moldova in meeting its obligations and capitalising on arising opportunities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1501. 2 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-moldova-deep-and-comprehensive-free-trade-area. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/growth-plan-moldova-regulation_en.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · EU-Moldova relations
• 2025-09-01 “E-001437/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission According to the information available in the Commission’s database 1 , since 2014, the following amounts from Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes have been granted to the following organisations: — TRT: EUR 448 000 — TÜGVA: EUR 1 013 138 — TÜRGEV: EUR 773 315 — IHH: EUR 102 438 — ÖNDER İmam Hatipliler Derneği: EUR 182 683 — Dünya Etnospor Konfederasyonu: EUR 554 058 The amounts represent total contracted or finalised grants for the projects where these organisations appeared as applicants. The funding was provided via the Turkish national agency under the indirect management mode. Under the Instrument for pre–Accession Assistance (IPA) II 2015 programme, the contract with SETA 2 amounted to EUR 126 951.81, of which 90% constituted EU funds. This programme was implemented through indirect management by Türkiye. The Commission was not involved in the selection process of the projects, nor is responsible for the content of communication material and reports produced by contractors, partners or organisations using EU funds; these are the sole responsibility of the beneficiaries. The Commission ensures that strict rules, governed by transparency and equal treatment, were applied in the way the grants or contracts were awarded. According to the Financial Regulation 3 and grant agreements, the Commission must ensure that beneficiaries uphold EU values and avoid professional misconduct. If a beneficiary violates laws or EU values during the project, the Commission and national agency will recover the funds. Since 2017, aiming at stricter control over the use of IPA funds, the Commission has moved away from entrusting Türkiye with the management of EU funds in support to civil society. 1 Beneficiary Module and Programme Management Module – internal IT tool for project management of Erasmus + granted projects. 2 https://www.setav.org/en/. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en.”
  Funding for EU Neighbourhood · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-09-01 “E-2278/25 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the valuable role that enhanced economic cooperation between Romania, Ukraine and Moldova can provide to Ukraine’s economic resilience and reconstruction as well as for the EU integration process for Ukraine and Moldova. The Commission encourages the self-organisation of entrepreneurs, including initiatives that strengthen cross-border economic cooperation. The creation of a trilateral Chamber of Commerce could be an example of such an initiative, jointly designed and implemented by the business communities of Romania, Ukraine and Moldova. Entrepreneurs from these countries are uniquely positioned to understand and take advantage of the specific needs and opportunities for furthering cross-border economic cooperation. In parallel, the Commission is actively supporting efforts to enhance long-term economic cooperation in the Eastern Partnership countries through technical assistance projects such as the EU4Business Programme 1 . These programmes provide financial, logistical and technical support for structured exchanges and working visits to the business community from Eastern Partnership countries, including from Ukraine and Moldova. Moreover, the Commission is mobilising Member States’ expertise via the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) instrument 2 , which facilitates exchange of best practice between public administrations in the EU, Ukraine and Moldova contributing to improving the regulatory environment for businesses. 1 https://old.eu4business.eu/moldova. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/funding-technical-assistance/taiex_en.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-08-28 “E-003005/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely followed the 2025 parliamentary elections in Albania and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)’s preliminary findings. The Commission will continue to monitor developments in Albania’s democratic institutions and has encouraged Albania to continue pursuing all reforms required for its future accession to the EU, including the adoption of further electoral reforms addressing all ODIHR's key recommendations, including those that are still outstanding from previous elections. In the context of the accession negotiations, Albania has presented a roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions. This foresees further progress on effective application in practice of the right to vote, through the enforcement of revised legislation; of the strengthening of transparency through digitalisation and enhanced procedures; and of increasingly ensuring equal treatment before the law and equal opportunity in the electoral process, including the rights of vulnerable groups to be informed on the process. The Commission will closely monitor progress in this regard, including in the context of the accession negotiations related to Cluster 1 – Fundamentals. Building on the assistance already provided (among others, by supporting campaign finance transparency tools, and the monitoring of the electoral process by civil society organisations), targeted technical assistance will continue to be provided where necessary, notably to the Central Elections Committee.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2025-08-25 “E-002940/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Council has been actively involved since the EU imposed measures on Kosovo* in June 2023. In its December 2024 conclusions 1 , it stated that these measures would be lifted gradually as Kosovo takes steps to reduce tensions in the north. The Council plays a key role in offering political guidance and must stay updated on developments and progress related to lifting the measures. As part of the measures, the work of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) bodies has been put on hold, the programming of funds under the Instrument for pre-Accession Assistance and Western Balkans Investment Fund projects suspended, as well as procurement procedures and the signing of new contracts 2 . The measures do not affect payments under the Reform and Growth Facility (RGF), EU funding for civil society the participation of Kosovo in EU and cross-border cooperation programmes. The Commission has also applied a constructive approach for projects in support of the EU-facilitated Dialogue 3 . The suspended EU assistance amounts to EUR 400 million, with EUR 8.7 million lost due to expired contracting deadlines; however, compensatory measures can be considered, subject to Kosovo addressing the EU’s de-escalation requirements in the north. Some steps towards de-escalation were taken since the December 2024 Council conclusions leading to the start of the gradual lifting, namely the resumption of SAA Sub-Committees as well as the unlocking of projects in support of the RGF. Kosovo is aware that the lifting of the measures remains dependant on its effort to de-escalate the situation in the north. * This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/kosovo-report-2024_en. 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovoand-serbia_en.”
  EU-Kosovo relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-08-21 “E-002612/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Prespa Agreement between the Republic of North Macedonia and Greece, which is binding under international law, is a cornerstone of regional stability and an example of reconciliation for the Western Balkans and beyond. As highlighted in the December 2024 Council conclusions 1 , in the 2024 Commission enlargement package 2 and, recently, in the European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2025 on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia 3 , it is crucial that all parties fully implement the agreement in good faith and achieve concrete outcomes. The enlargement process is and will remain a merit-based process. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of North Macedonia’s EU integration process. They contribute to stability, reconciliation and a climate conducive to addressing open bilateral issues and legacies of the past. The Commission continues to actively engage with North Macedonia to ensure that bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries remain unchallenged and are fully upheld. The Commission will continue to support North Macedonia in all efforts to build trust with countries in the region. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 SWD(2024) 693 final. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0157_EN.pdf.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
• 2025-08-21 “E-001834/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission notes the concerns regarding the alleged incident involving Archbishop Marchel of the Moldovan Orthodox Church. The 2024 enlargement report 1 highlights that Moldova largely upholds the freedom of religion and belief, with no documented violations reported. The country has implemented a national strategy aimed at cultivating tolerance to address issues such as racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance, in accordance with the Commission’s guidance. A new enlargement report for 2025 is anticipated to be released in the fall of 2025. The Commission remains committed to upholding the principles of rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of religion or belief, as core EU values. These principles are central to Moldova’s EU accession process. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/858717b3-f8ef-4514-89fe54a6aa15ef69_en?filename=Moldova%20Report%202024.pdf.”
  EU-Moldova relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-08-21 “E-002196/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission indicated in its Communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews of March 2024 1 , the precise financial impact of enlargement will primarily depend on its timing and scope, on the result of the accession negotiations, which remain merit-based, and on the applicable EU acquis at the moment of accession. Since the 2022 Conference on the Future of Europe, there have been reflections ongoing on EU institutional reform. With the prospect of enlargement, this debate has gained prominence. The Political Guidelines 2024-2029 2 acknowledge the need to ensure that the EU as well as future Member States should be ready at the time of accession, and that work to prepare both should run in parallel. While the Commission has indicated its support to Treaty change if and where it is needed, it believes that the EU’s governance can be swiftly improved by fully harnessing the potential of the current Treaties. Decisions to reform EU institutions lie with the Member States. As laid down in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, the decision to admit a new Member State requires the unanimous agreement of Member States’ representatives in the Council and an agreement between the Member States and the new Member State that needs to be ratified by all the contracting states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 1 COM(2024) 146 final. 2 European Commission: Directorate-General for Communication and Leyen, U. v. d., Europe’s choice – Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024−2029, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2775/260104.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement · EU-Moldova relations
• 2025-08-19 “E-002556/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission took note of the March 2025 ‘Mountain Package’ law. As a principle, Albania is encouraged to ensure that all new laws align with EU legislation, if there is existing acquis. As noted by the Commission in its report on Albania of October 2024 1 , the enjoyment of property rights remained limited and continued to be affected by significant challenges. Some steps have been taken on the digitalisation of ownership titles and cadastral maps. Yet, further improvements on data quality remain necessary. As regards the rights of persons belonging to minorities, Albania adopted three bylaws in December 2024 to implement the framework legislation and to ensure alignment with European standards. Albania needs to ensure effective implementation, notably by allocating adequate resources to central agencies and local government. Issues linked to both property rights and rights of persons belonging to minorities are monitored by the Commission as part of the Accession negotiations under Cluster 1 – Fundamentals 2 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a8eec3f9-b2ec-4cb1-87489058854dbc68_en?filename=Albania%20Report%202024.pdf. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/AD-18-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2025-08-18 “E-002464/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the Commission The EU has reacted firmly to the recent political developments in Georgia, voicing concerns over the election irregularities, the violence against peaceful protesters, and the rushed adoption of the recent legislative amendments 1 . The Commission has taken appropriate measures, including the suspension of direct financial support to the authorities, downgrading of political contacts and stepping up the support to strengthen Georgia's civil society and media landscape. On 27 June 2024, the European Council called on Georgia’s authorities to clarify their intentions by reversing the current course of action which jeopardises Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process 2 . On 17 October 2024 3 and 19 December 2024 4 , the European Council reiterated its serious concern regarding the course of action taken by the Georgian government, which runs counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded, and de facto halts the accession process. The election observation mission by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) highlighted numerous shortcomings in the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 5 . The EU has repeatedly called for OSCE/ODIHR to be invited to observe the next elections and for Georgia to address the previous OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. The EU will continue following closely the developments regarding the municipal elections on 4 October 2025, calling for a free, fair and competitive electoral process. The EU continues to reiterate its call on the Georgian authorities to take credible steps to reverse democratic backsliding in order to return to the European path. The responsibility lies solely with the Georgian authorities. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/extracts-georgia-conclusions-european-council-2_en; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-kallas-andcommissioner-marta-kos-latest_en. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf. 5 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/6/584029_0.pdf.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2025-08-13 “E-002474/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Prespa Agreement between North Macedonia and Greece, which is binding under international law, is a cornerstone of regional stability and an example of reconciliation for the Western Balkans and beyond. As highlighted in the December 2024 Council conclusions 1 and in the Commission 2024 Enlargement Package 2 , it is crucial that all parties implement the agreement in good faith and achieve concrete outcomes. The enlargement process is and will remain a merit-based process and maintaining good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation is vital. The Commission continues to actively engage with North Macedonia to ensure that bilateral agreements remain unchallenged and are fully upheld. The Commission will continue to support North Macedonia in all efforts to build trust with countries in the region. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 SWD(2024) 693 final.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
• 2025-08-13 “E-002284/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Good neighbourly relations are a fundamental principle of the EU’s engagement with neighbouring countries, as set out in Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union. Hence, the Commission welcomes the close and constructive relationship between Romania and Moldova. The Commission is committed to supporting Moldova on its European path. This support takes many forms, such as political support, technical assistance, and indeed financial assistance. As an example of the latter, the Commission is providing EUR 1.9 billion under the Moldova Growth Plan 1 , which will help the country implement essential reforms and has the potential to double the Moldovan economy over the next 10 years. The disbursement of this – and other – financial assistance is conditional on agreed reform targets. The compliance assessment and decision to disburse or not is performed by the Commission. The Commission does not see a contradiction between its solidarity with Moldova and commitment to supporting the country on the one hand, and the principle of conditionality, which continues to guide the disbursement of financial assistance, on the other hand. 1 Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025.”
  EU-Moldova relations · EU relations with Eastern Neighbourhood
• 2025-08-11 “P-002625/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely follows the human rights situation in Türkiye and provides regular assessments and recommendations in its annual reports. In its Türkiye report for 2024 1 , the Commission stressed the lack of protection for the fundamental rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons in the country. Hate speech and hate crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity, negative stereotyping in the media and discriminatory rhetoric by high-ranking government officials continued. The report specifically points out the decision of Türkiye’s authorities to ban pride marches, while allowing anti-LGBTIQ rallies. The Commission is committed to fostering inclusive societies for LGBTIQ people, in the EU and beyond. This commitment is reflected in the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 2 , which aims at advancing equality and combating discrimination against LGBTIQ people, including in candidate countries. As announced in the 2025 Commission Work Programme 3 , the Commission will present a new LGBTIQ equality strategy post-2025 by the end of 2025. Protection of LGBTQ persons’ rights is an integral part of the EU’s dialogue with Türkiye on the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Commission raises this issue in all relevant contacts with the Turkish authorities, including in the context of the sub-committee covering this area established under the European Economic Community-Turkey Association Agreement 4 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2024_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0698&qid=175025862364712, November 2020, COM(2020)698 final. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0045, COM(2025)45 final. 4 OJ L 361 of 31.12.1977, p. 29.”
  EU-Turkey relations · LGBTIQ+
• 2025-08-06 “E-002081/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of public reports concerning foreign influence operations in various countries. The Commission has put in place a comprehensive set of preventive and investigative mechanisms to combat fraud and corruption, including stringent internal controls, regular audits, transparency rules, and cooperation with bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The EU Security Union Strategy 1 recognises ‘hybrid threats’ as including a mixture of coercive and subversive activity by state or non‑state actors aimed at influencing public opinion and policy while remaining below the threshold of declared warfare. This encompasses illicit streams of funding, political corruption and manipulation of diaspora networks to sway decision‑making both inside and outside the EU. The ProtectEU Internal Security Strategy 2 establishes a pan-EU, country-neutral framework – mainstreaming security impact assessments into all Commission policy-making, enhancing cross-agency anti-money laundering and anti-fraud cooperation (the Authority for AntiMoney Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, OLAF, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation) and underpinning a harmonised anti-corruption directive – to detect and counter any illicit foreign or domestic influence, including that alleged of Türkiye. The Commission remains vigilant to any analogous attempts to influence EU policy through covert funding or corruption channels, including via foreign broadcasters, cultural agencies or financial institutions operating in Member States. 1 COM(2020) 605 final. 2 COM(2025) 148 final.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-08-05 “E-002160/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has provided assistance and redirected funds to support the socio-economic integration of Karabakh Armenians. EUR 21 million were mobilised in humanitarian support, including food and non-food items, cash assistance, winterisation support, primary health care, mental health and psychosocial support. In January 2024, the Commission adopted a EUR 15 million budget support programme under the Resilience and Growth Plan to assist the government of Armenia address the medium and long-term needs of Karabakh Armenians. In July 2024, this assistance was topped up by EUR 25 million to address housing and employment needs of the displaced population. Three projects with civil society consortia are also currently ongoing focusing on (i) livelihoods support and socio-economic integration activities (ii) access to social services and social assistance mechanisms (iii) protection of human rights of refugees. Moreover, support to Karabakh Armenians has also been streamlined across other activities, for example through the redirection of EUR 8 million to support the displaced and host communities in their business expansion needs, facilitating integration into the Armenian economy through improved access to livelihood opportunities. EU assistance is supporting the implementation of the government’s housing programme for Karabakh Armenian families, and with payments under the rent and utilities cost compensation programme. Furthermore, support was provided for the socio-economic integration activities including facilitating access to the general education, offering partial tuition subsidisation programmes, providing primary health care services and enrolling pension age refugees in the national pensions scheme.”
  Funding for EU Neighbourhood · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-08-04 “E-001580/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission In the 2024 Report 1 , the Commission noted that Albania’s alignment with the EU acquis on nature protection is advanced but expressed concerns about legislative changes made by Albania in the same sector which risk compromising Albania’s ecological and biodiversity value including potential Natura 2000 sites, in conflict with EU standards. These entail the extension of the 2015 legislation on strategic investments and its potential biodiversity which may lead to tourism or industrial investments in protected areas, and amendments to the Law on Protected Areas to permit activities like water extraction for irrigation and construction of tourist resorts within those areas. The Commission attaches great importance to the rule of law, which is a fundamental part of Albania’s accession process and is monitored in the context of Cluster 1 – Fundamentals and the Annual Rule of Law Report, as well as to environmental protection, which is monitored under negotiation Cluster 4 - Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity. Through the enlargement process and the EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 2 , the Commission is and will continue to closely follow the consolidation of rule of law rights in Albania, including property rights, as well as environmental protection. In the SAA subcommittee meeting on transport, environment, energy and regional development which took place on 24 June 2025, the Commission enquired with the Albanian authorities about alignment with the nature protection acquis and the Llamani Beach case, on which the Commission remains in contact with the Albanian authorities. 1 Albania 2024 Enlargement Report, SWD(2024) 690 final, p. 17-18; 85-86, available at https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a8eec3f9-b2ec-4cb1-87489058854dbc68_en?filename=Albania%20Report%202024.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02009A0428%2802%29-20210901.”
  EU-Albania relations · EU enlargement