Marta Kos

Policy topics Marta Kos is active on

What Marta Kos has said (80)

• 2026-07-16 “(11:33:26 - 11:46:21): Thank you. Andre, it's 1 of the most important points I'm seeing, at the same time, 1 of the biggest fears I have. What I'm talking about, we can do everything in the accession process on the technical level. Let's say now with Montenegro coming to the end of the negotiations, we could have a green light from the member states, meaning concluding the accession treaty. But if we will not work with the citizens and with all the EU member states, it could happen that we will not get the final green light. And we have started a year ago, we call it engagement campaign, not classical communication campaign. Engagement campaign in the countries where the support for the EU enlargement is below 50%, especially we are concentrating on on France. It is important, and I think no enlargement can happen without the member states represented in the council, and it cannot go against the the citizens. But sometimes here, we have to be careful of how the citizens are building their opinion. So how we tackle them that they can gather the information, this will be the closer we get to '28 when, Montenegro put, join, if they deliver until the end, the more we will have to invest in this. I have just, met the president of the social and economic council representing trade unions, many other civil society organizations. We have to work with them. And, please, my my call to action to you, it it's not enough that we are doing our job here in Brussels. We have all of us. We have to do our work all, in the the member states. You are coming from there. And, also, I would like to see, you know, perhaps sometimes we we go together to those countries which you know which you know the best. So thank you for for this question, which really speaks about that what is happening through this endangering our democracies is by far not only in our candidates. It is happening also in the the member states, and this is the main point of this strategy. Thank you. And then, Kathleen, indeed without trust, it is not, it is not possible. We are working on this that, we will really increase the amount of money for civil society organizations in the new, in the new, MFF, where we have to be careful. And what I am pushing for is that, we have to have a system. We have clear priorities in the European, Union. And, when I speak about democracy shield or protecting the democracy, it means that we will have to choose carefully which civil society organizations we are, we are, financing or or co financing. Meaning that they will do the work which needs to be done, not that they get the money to do something what they think is important. And, of course, also the, also the evaluation. On, on Serbia, the most important part, we don't know when the elections will be probably October, November where we have parliamentary, we'll have presidential elections. 2 important point, about, media pluralism and about free and fair elections. And the last laws which Serbia, have to deliver and is delivering is on the REM. It has been built up with a lot of, engagement from both sides. Because exactly of the point you have said, there was no trust anymore on the side of the civil society organization. They they told us we don't want to come back to work with this government. So now, they have, agreed, and I hope that soon they will be very very capable of doing their work. Because of this was not running well in the last year, as you know, I have withheld the payments, and these are now the preconditions what Serbia needs to do that we will be able to go to go on. For the question of the Hungarian minority, I'm very happy that the government of Hungary and government of Ukraine have been able to, have an agreement on how to protect your minority in, Ukraine. And, this is now the part of the action plan on minorities. Without this agreement, Hungary would not agree to open cluster 1 and also this week, cluster 6. So there was a huge step forward, working on the 11 points from your, government, and everything what you have mentioned is actually most of them. So the government of Hungary, then you have to talk to your government if you are not happy, but the most of, the points the, Hungary your government wanted to have is included in this agreement. And 1 next point, the accession process and fundamentals, negotiations in the fundamental cluster is the best way to gather the protection, not only your Hungarian, minority, but all the minorities. There are more Bulgarians living in Ukraine than Hungarians. Meaning, in this action plan on minorities, what this is now part of the accession process, Ukraine will have to take care about all the minorities, not just, not just 1. The question of disinformation and role of the, Orthodox Church. We have seen, or we see in many countries that, a kind of paradox. The Orthodox Church, like, in Moldova or in Serbia, is very trusted institution. But in some cases, the Orthodox Church is also spreading disinformation. So the 1st point, is that, we are also, and me personally, engaging with representatives of the church. I have met in Moldova representatives of all the churches. The rabbi was there. The bishop was there, and the, metropolit from both of, orthodox churches. I have met the representatives of all the churches from, Ukraine. This is ongoing, ongoing work, and, I see church as a very important part of the society. You know, we cannot think about, civil society engagement without our engagement, with them. Thank you for this. Oh, on the interconnectivity, we could, talk about this, a lot. What is important to see is a big picture. We have a kind of metrics, if I speak about the interconnection between Europe and and Central Asia through countries you know well, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and also Turkey. The big picture is, 1st, this would not be possible without peace among, between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Secondly, the 1st engagement among, 2 countries has been, I'm so happy, the meeting of the civil society organizations now on both sides. 1 in once in Baku, once in, in in Yerevan. So even if the peace is not signed, we can move on. And here, we have, big plans, and, I'm I'm happy about your engagement. You will get more information if you want. Helmut, you have asked me many questions. So, you are 1 of the journalists probably who know how important the media is and how important it is to inform what is actually the hybrid war. So we have no special campaign on this. But when we engage with local media, we also ask them to do this work. What is actually hybrid war? You know, it is, about cybersecurity. For instance, when we have been helping, Armenia, 1 of the biggest question has been, will Armenia have electricity on the day of the elections? If there is no electricity, the computers are not working. So it is not just disinformation. It is not just, taking care that the votes are not bought. It is not just going after the oligarchs who have bunches of money in some accounts, and we found many accounts in in Moldova. It is about technical equipment, and it is also about when the these informations are there, who is the 1 who has to go fighting. What I personally have learned a lot, especially on the case of Moldova. 1st, we have done, before the last parliamentary elections mostly debunking. Meaning, we have, monitoring what is happening, and then we, we answer to this. It is not enough by far. So this is the modern language. Debunking is not enough. We have to do the prebunking. So it is not enough that we answer to the disinformation once they occur. We have to, follow our own narratives. And there are 3 most narratives we are following in, all the countries. The 1st narrative is you will lose your sovereignty if you join the EU. 2nd part is if you accept, the European money through the accession process, you will get indebted and, you will not be free anymore because you will have to pay the loans back. And the 3rd very interesting narrative is, about the identity. You will lose your identity. And this was a clear case in especially in, Moldova, but it's also happening now in Montenegro. We see when 1 3rd of the population is of Serbian are Serbs, and we see what kind of this this information are coming. So this you will lose your identity is is actually easy to fight back because we have many small countries like my small country, Slovenia, my my big country, Slovenia, which is smaller than Moldova, but the EU is protecting our identity. Since we are a member of the EU, our language is 1 of 24 official languages in the EU. We are so proud of this. Then, EU is taking care about, cultural heritage, and orthodox churches are part and every church all the churches are part of our cultural heritage. So we are supporting this. And so I went a bit broader, dear Helmut, helping the the media. I agree with you, and I hope you will be part of our seminar on media, which we intend to organize in in Serbia. The last point you have mentioned, it is MAGA. Sorry. I'm too long. Just just I will finish very shortly. So MAGA ideologists are claiming what we have studied as well. They are claiming that European civilization is in a decline. They are claiming that our economy is in decline that and that we have no democracy anymore. We have many cases where we have proven that our democracy is working. 1 of them is elections in, Hungary where there was the biggest hub for MAGA ideologist. I'm a bit humorous now, but it is very serious. There is a lot of money behind what MAGA ideologists are are doing, and we have to be aware that the threats are not coming just from the East, but, very often also from the West. So we are aware aware of this.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-07-16 “(11:53:16 - 12:00:10): Thank you for another round of the questions or your opinions. I agree with you, dear Thomas. It was appalling in the year 2026. I will not repeat what she said. It was appalling that we have heard something like this. I can't imagine that a minister could further on do her work based on this public, public, statement. I'm always when we talk to the politicians in the candidates, but also in the member states, you know, every word counts. And, Don, you have said about the low support for the EU, in Serbia for the EU, integration. It is also the results of the statements of the politicians of what the journalists are writing, what the media are reporting. European Union for many years have been accused of interfering, organizing the the protest. This is not what we are doing, and I agree with you completely. It cannot be that the candidate country is using anti European rhetoric, especially against you especially against you being a rapporteur, especially against those who are critical to what is happening in in the country. We have some special requirements from our candidates also from Serbia, and I still believe, and the European Commission believe, there is a place for Serbia in the European Union. We have seen some small steps to the better when it is about the REM, when they have corrected the judicial, amendments, which were really bad. And I hope, Thomas, you will be also speaking about the CFSP alignment. It was agreed that Serbia will go on, with a gradual, lifting up the CFSP alignment. So we expect that, Serbia will give us a clear signal on which side of the, history, it will, it will be. We cannot afford to have Trojan horses in the EU. I agree with you completely. That's why, and this is, I am answering also to the last, gentleman asking me question, how to take care, mister Lopez, that, we will not have Trojan horses, Thomas' worth it. We are now suggesting special safeguards. At the end of September, I will introduce, European Commission report also on how the new safeguards in the accession treaty of Montenegro will look like, and this accession treaty will be a blueprint for all the later accession accession, treaty. I agree with you. We have to follow, and we have to work, together, with you, with the European Parliament, and with all the member states and candidate, countries when it is about the the resilience of our, of our societies. I think that we will also have to go into the education system. Will our will we be able to differentiate what is a lie, fake news, and what is the truth. So we also have to go through a process where enabling not just having independent media, but also us to be more careful what we are believing and what we are, what we are not. For me, and generally, I will conclude, conclude this many things are expressing how our candidates are approaching the membership, membership status. For me, 1 of the most important is that, actually, there is a clear sign we want to become a member of the EU. Part of this is public rhetoric. The other thing is free and fair elections. It is media pluralism, and it is having democratic institutions. I was speaking about Moldova before quite a lot. 1 of the reasons that, we have been successful in fighting back this information in Moldova were stronger and stronger democratic institutions. Judiciary system represents also those institutions. So it is not just about not just about the the media. Working with, our enlargement partners is a 2 way process being on the frontline of, hostile foreign interference and other hybrid threats. Enlargement partners bring valuable expertise on firsthand, that can contribute to the union's own preparedness and resilience, and their closer involvement, therefore, creates opportunities for mutual, learning. So we have to get away from this scheme that it is us telling them what they have to do and how they have to be. It is also us learning from them what they are, they are experiencing. I hope that in the future, we will really cooperate well on this very important project and close to my heart, Kathleen, indeed, indeed it is. If we will not protect our democracy, who will do this? If we will not take care about independent media, who will do this, if we will not cooperate, all of us, European institutions and the member states, who will do this work for us? Nobody will. In my opinion, you know, I have the experiencing experiences of living outside the European Union, and many of you too, and now being a part of the European Union. There is no better project than it is the European integration and the European Union. But we have to be very careful what is happening, not just around us, but also what is happening inside the European Union. This is 1 of the most important tasks when I speak about our future, how to protect our democracy.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-07-16 “(11:12:49 - 11:23:06): Moltoumes, dear chair, the members of the European Parliament. The democracy shield has been adopted 8 months ago. It is the 1st ever European comprehensive strategy designed to help protect our democracies. In my work as enlargement commissioner, I experienced firsthand the importance of our efforts to defend our democratic civic space. Elections are often won on small margins, and in our candidate countries, especially those on the hybrid front lines such as Georgia and Moldova, but also Armenia, this can make a generational difference. A free and especially fair elections are more than a democratic expression. They matter to the union security. And this is why the democracy shield places the candidate countries and potential candidates within the remit of actions foreseen for member states separately from the rest of international partners. So the candidates and potential candidates have already a special status in this. This is a strong message about how important our closest neighborhood is for European democratic resilience and security. Geopolitical changes and actions of foreign actors hostile to European integration have exposed several weaknesses of our societies and of our institutions, for example, during elections. With examples of Romania or Moldova, we see actually no difference between candidates or member states. They are attacked alike simply because they have chosen the EU integration and democracy. Work of the special committees on the European Democracy Shield is an important contribution to our collective efforts. I'm particularly grateful for your attention and support to the enlargement dimension. The democracy shield focuses on protecting the information space, strengthening democratic institutions, reinforcing free and independent media, and promoting societal resilience and participation. To that end, a range of action is currently being developed to bring together member states, candidate countries, and potential candidates. 1st, the European network of fact checkers is expanding its fact checking capacity and coverage to enlargement countries. 2nd, the mandate of the European Digital Media Observatory, EDMO, has been reviewed to develop new independent capabilities to analyze the online information ecosystem, strengthen situational awareness particularly during elections and crisis. Together with our vice president, Hena Virkonen, we work on launching a new EDMO hub covering the 6 Western Balkans in early 20 27. Ukraine and Moldova are already covered by the existing EDMO in the EU. 3rd point, several enlargement partners are part and playing an increasingly active role in the European network of elections, ACNE. This joint work covers several areas of electoral preparedness ranging from the use of AI in electoral processes to safety in politics, election integrity, and political campaigning. 4th, the core body of the Democracy Shield is the European Center for Democratic Resilience, you know it well, which was launched last launched last February. The 1st step of the onboarding of enlargement partners in the center took place during the high level technical meeting last week, July 9. If you want more information, I could give it to you what happened there. It will be taken forward at the political level on the September 4 in the margins of the informal general affairs council with ministers from the EU and candidate countries. And this marks really important steps towards direct engagement of candidates with the member states in concrete projects. 5th, to build a stronger societal resilience, platform will also be part of the center for democratic resilience. It is currently being designed. Candidate countries and potential candidates will also participate. The platform will facilitate the exchange of knowledge and good practice among all stakeholders, recognizing the crucial role of nongovernmental actors in the protection of democracy. 6th, talking about societal resilience, engagement with young people is our investment in future democratic resilience. Making them aware of threats involving them in actions protecting democracy and active participatory public life is complementary to other urgent steps we are taking under the democracy shield. To this objective, I held the use polity die policy dialogue in Moldova at the beginning of June on on this topic. So youth dialogue is, an event where we invite, young representatives from the member states and candidate countries. 7th, in the parallel to the above actions under Democracy Shield, I wanted to walk an extra mile. And with my services, we are stepping up bilateral engagement with enlargement partners in strengthening their democratic resilience and security. And this works, focuses on identifying vulnerabilities and addressing in an integrated way 3 main areas. 1st, information integrity. 2nd, democratic processes, civil society, and media independence. And 3rd, security including hybrid and cyber threats, areas that are closely aligned with the priorities of the European Democratic Shield. Targeted capacity building is being delivered to EU candidate countries and potential candidates to reinforce their resilience to hybrid threats, including information manipulation and hybrid interference. This is done through regional and bilateral funding geared at long term support and capacity building as well as with the TAEEX, instrument. TAEEX provides short term technical assistance and expertise to strengthen public administration and CSDP, missions, which support partner countries through security sector reform, rule of law, and civilian or military advisory activities. The members of parliament, the commission is investing considerable effort into making the European Democracy Shield achieve its goals and into concrete actions with impact, such as the European Center for Democratic Resilience. Over the course of this year, enlargement partners have shown a very strong interest in taking part in our efforts. This is also because democratic resilience is an area where they feel they have a lot to already contribute, to us with their knowledge, expertise, ideas, but very often also with firsthand experiences of massive hybrid attacks like from Moldova, Armenia, or latest from Montenegro. Candidate countries are in a way springboard towards member states. New tactics are often tested there. And we see that the more we are successful in the enlargement process, the more the hybrid war or disinformation actions are are happening. And 1 very important part with important elections coming in many member states next year, we have an interest in accelerating the implementation of the democracy shield both in the EU and also in candidate country. Our efforts in this direction will continue, and we look forward to seeing the 1st projects where member states and enlargement partners work together and make a real difference on the ground, and I count you on your support. The last point I want to stress is actually the whole accession process is built in a way that we are strengthening democracies in candidate countries. We have many activities, already, ongoing, but now it is important that we really take care about a constant exchange between what is happening in the member states and what is happening in in the candidate countries. Some of them are very skilled to how to tackle this information. The others don't have the structures. So for instance, when, Montenegro asked us to help, for instance, very interesting. 1 day after we have announced that we have, built a working group for the preparation of the accession treaty, the next day, the number of hybrid attacks went, went up, and we have seen stronger and stronger disinformation, against Montenegro's path into the EU. I hope that we will be able to control this much better in the future. We are sending we call them screening teams so let's see what kind of structures our candidates are having, what is missing. 1 part, of course, are the government structures. It's strategic communication, then it is independent media. Independent media are more and more the question of national security. If you would have asked me 10, 15 years back, and I see some externalists sitting in this, this room that we have to support and giving a lot of money to the media, I would say, why should we do this? I'm talking about 15 years back. But today, having an independent media taking care that, the integrity of the information will be at a high level, it is important. So I'm happy to be here and to discuss further on.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-07-14 “(16:16:37 - 16:17:37): On the day when the member states are giving a a country a candidate status, a special triangle relationship starts. And this is the triangle between the candidate country, between the European Commission and the the member states. And, this is a 2 way street, so it is about the credibility and accountability not on the not only on the side of the candidate country, but also on the side of the European Union. And, I hope, that the very good spirit and messages from the EU West Balkan Summit in, Tivat in Montenegro, where, EU member states have confirmed the readiness to accept Montenegro as a new member states will follow us with this positive energy until we will close all the chapters and until, the accession treaty will be ratified in all EU '27. Okay. I see another hand up just there.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-07-14 “(16:18:39 - 16:19:41): There can only be 0 tolerance for such statements what we have, heard, and there is no place in Europe for rhetoric that justifies, advocates, and glorifies ethnic cleansing. And I'm personally really appalled that this even needs to be said in this situation. Such statements really run directly counter to the values of human, dignity, reconciliation, which is very much needed, accountability, and good neighborly relations on which the European Union is funding and without which the accession process cannot happen. Yes. They also contradict Serbia's commitments under the EU facilitated dialogue on the normalization of relations with the Kosovo. I can only assume that these are the views of 1 minister and not the position of the Serbian government. We expect the political leaders to act responsibly, refrain from inflammatory rhetoric and contribute to building trust, reconciliation and regional stability. Okay.”
  EU-Serbia relations
• 2026-07-14 “(16:08:34 - 16:12:18): Dear prime minister, Milojko Spijs, dear minister, Thomas Bern, indeed, today is a super Tuesday for EU enlargement, and Montenegro is a part of it. We are holding accession conferences with our 4 candidates. This has not happened since 2002. With Montenegro, this is, of course, already a very familiar process. I could say this is now the 7th time in the last 1 year and a half that we have come together to close chapters. Montenegro has now closed more than half of all negotiating chapters, and let me extend my warmest congratulations to the government and people of Montenegro also for your statehood yesterday, which I celebrated together with you last Thursday in Zetinje. The chapters we closed today, competition policy and customs union, will bring benefits to citizens and businesses alike. For companies that want to invest in Montenegro, this means that they will operate under 1 set of rules that is identical with the rest of the EU. This means less administrative burden and fewer documents, fewer checks at borders. It will be easier of businesses to choose Montenegro once you are an EU member. Citizens and businesses across our union already enjoy these benefits. Soon, Montenegrins will too. We are in the end game of your preparation of EU membership. That's why this year is really crucial. A couple of weeks ago, the commission adopted a financial package for Montenegro outlining how our budget will adapt to a union of 28. The EU is getting ready for Montenegro. Now is the time to double down on the remaining reforms and cross the finish line. Some of the most critical work still lies ahead, strengthening the democratic foundations of our next member state, and this probably more than any other reform requires a cross political and broad societal support. I have witnessed this unity and sense of responsibility in recent days in Montenegro, and it is this spirit that will carry Montenegro and us here in Brussels forward. I told all political leaders that now is the time to find common ground and deliver on the EU reform agenda. The finish line is inside. Let us reach it together. Together with all the citizens of your country, the latest, perception survey shows that the the number percentage of citizens who are in favor of EU membership has never been that high, 68%. And 77% of your citizens think that, EU membership will bring more advantages than disadvantages. This is a good result. Finally, let me extend my gratitude to you, dear Thomas, and the Irish presidency. You have begun your term with remarkable success. We have the chance that under your leadership, we can bring Montenegro succession negotiations to a historic conclusion. I'm looking forward to continuing to work altogether in the upcoming months. Dear prime minister, you have said at the IGC, we all believe, I quote, we all believe in European project, And we all believe in you, Montenegroin people, that you will be successful. So Boboto Cook, we are coming closer and closer. **@Chair: Thank you, commissioner. Okay. I'll open it for questions. And please state your name and media organization. And I see a hand up from Jack over there, please.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-07-14 “(16:24:46 - 16:26:24): So perhaps I can add from my point of view about your question creating a 2nd class membership. But 1st, it is not the truth that if Montenegro will not finish until the end of the year that it cannot become a member in 2028. So the decisive point will be how quick the process of the ratification will go on in all the member states. Regarding we have heard many different ideas from different leaders discussing the future of enlargement, and, I'm grateful that this discussion is finally going, on and also helping the candidate countries to move, on. What we are doing now is looking for ways to make the process faster and more effective, but it will remain always merit based. But this will never be about creating 2nd class membership. We are now preparing in the European Commission ideas, how to, connect the pre accession review with the enhanced gradual integration with the safeguards, which will be for the 1st time introduced in the accession treaty of the member states will go into this direction. So the goal from our side, from the European Commission, and I hope also from the member states, from the candidate country is a full EU membership with a full responsibilities and the same rights as every other member states. Yes.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-07-07 “Honourable members of the European Parliament, it's really good to see that Moldova has so many supporters here in the European Parliament. Some of them are very passionate. Mr. Andriukaitis, thank you for your passionate words. I am on your side. I would also like to see members of the European Parliament from Moldova as soon as possible to. Moldova has demonstrated determination and delivered meaningful reforms under exceptionally challenging circumstances. It deserves recognition for that progress and our continued support to move forward on its path to EU membership. We have organized very. The biggest until now. Investment conference at the beginning of June in Chisinau, and the companies from the member States are already coming. This is the only way to prosperity. So we have to do the reforms, or they have to do the reforms. The investors will come and then we can speak about the prosperity. Regarding the question when Moldova will be able to become a member of the EU, when all the reforms will be done, meaning Moldova has to deliver, but we have to deliver too. And I have heard this today many times. So it is also our responsibility that this will happen as soon as possible. I used to say that Moldova is the best student in my class since the last successful way on the reforms. I am saying that Moldova is the best performer in my class. Thank you.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-07-07 “Mr. president, honourable members, dear rapporteur, thank you for your. For your comprehensive report and for your work on Serbia. The Commission appreciates the opportunity for a separate debate on Serbia. Serbia is an important partner in the region with a clear EU accession perspective. The European Commission therefore continues encouraging Serbia to seize the current opportunity to advance towards membership. The EU Western Balkans summit. We heard clear commitments from the Serbian leadership that the EU path is their strategic priority. We now need to see Serbia demonstrate its strategic commitments to address the EU's concerns and continue to deliver of the much needed reforms. As I said many times, reforms on the rule of law and respect for democratic principles and freedoms will remain essential for Serbia's progress on its EU path. Two weeks ago, the Serbian parliament took an important step in the right direction to correct the judicial laws adopted in January. This helps starting rebuilding the trust. Serbia also made tangible progress in addressing key audit recommendations by revising legislation relevant for the electoral framework. In May, amendments to four election related laws, among others, on the election of the Members of Parliament and on the election of the president were adopted. Two particularly important and substantial laws that concerns the financing of political activities and the prevention of corruption are currently under preparation, meaning still to be done. The recent invitation to OSCE auditors to conduct the usual needs assessment mission is an important step to ensure, in a timely manner, a fully fledged international election observation mission. Ahead of the next elections. We now need to see Serbia advancing further on the electoral reform, in line with all the recommendations in a transparent and inclusive manner.”
  EU-Serbia relations
• 2026-07-07 “Just Mr. Brunstetter, dear, indeed, the election observation is not enough. That's why, for any new elections, we expect to take place under conditions which ensure free and fair elections in accordance with the European and international standards. So the electoral process requires further tangible improvement and reforms for this. Serbia should build on the first positive steps taken to address concerns about the integrity of the electoral register and the electoral legislation. But work still needs to be done, so. Progress on Serbia's path is in the interest of the EU. And when we speak about supporting Serbia, we speak about supporting Serbian citizens.”
  EU-Serbia relations
• 2026-07-07 “Strengthening media freedom and pluralism and ensuring respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, including freedom of peaceful assembly and academic freedom, and an enabling environment for civil society. Recent developments on the formation of the so-called REM Council have been encouraging, and we hope that this regulatory body can start its important work soon. This is a long awaited step in alignment with our EU objectives extend beyond internal policies to our common foreign and security policy. Serbia's European path therefore requires clear strategic choices. This also needs to be reflected in a consistent and high alignment with the Union's common foreign and security policy. A credible European trajectory also means a commitment to regional stability, to normalisation of relations with Kosovo, and to a shared understanding of the security challenges facing our continent. It means tackling disinformation and abstaining from hostile political rhetoric, including against the EU, its institutions and honourable members of this Parliament. Serbia's commitment to the EU path and its political will to implement the required reforms also have to be strengthened via communication and concrete actions, including a meaningful engagement on EU reforms with the relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, to overcome the current deep divisions in Serbian society. Dear honourable members, with other countries advancing in the accession process, we do not want to see Serbia fall behind. This is why, in light of the recent some positive developments, the Commission renewed its recommendation to the Council to open cluster three in the accession negotiations with Serbia. The Commission will also continue to incentivise further reform progress for the benefit of all Serbian citizens and the whole Serbian society. Thank you.”
  EU-Serbia relations
• 2026-07-07 “I was in Chisinau last month, discussed the next steps on the accession process, and once again I could see strong determination to deliver reforms despite the immense pressures they continue to face. In line with our recommendations, it has implemented key reforms supported by the guidance provided by member States during the Frontloading exercise in December 2005 and March 2006. Therefore, I share your opinion. We should call on the Council to open all the clusters as soon as possible. I hope that we will reach this goal. At the same time, Moldova should continue delivering reforms, particularly on justice, the fight against corruption and economic governance. These reforms are essential to meet the interim benchmarks needed to start closing chapters. As you have stressed, Moldova has joined the single euro payments area in October last year and also being part of roam Like at home. At the same time, we are also advancing together on energy integration, trade liberalisation and connectivity. Much has been achieved but the work is not finished. I count on your continued support in accompanying Moldova on its European path. Supporting Moldova is an investment in a stronger, safer and more united Europe.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-07-07 “Mr. president, honourable members, thank you, dear Rapporteur Sven, for your report on Moldova and on your work for an Moldova. You have painted the picture of a nation transforming itself as it advances on its European path. Moldova delivery on reforms is seen all over Europe. Over the past years, we have seen a nation that stood up against foreign interference and hybrid attacks and made its choice for Europe and their path towards membership of our union. This sovereign choice deserves our full support. We have seen a country that is moving against corruption and organised crime, putting people in jail that once seemed untouchable. Moldova has also delivering on enlargement reforms at a record speed in the 2025 enlargement report, the commissioner says that Moldova made progress across all negotiating chapters. This includes important advances on the fundamentals, energy alignment and digital transformation. Since then, Moldova has continued moving forward. We have also seen impressive numbers in the implementation of the growth plan reforms with 93%. Moldova is ahead of all other EU candidates that have growth plans. These reforms build trust. Moldova's European future is an investment in the security and stability of our continent as a whole.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-06-29 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 29.6.2026 Written question The legal basis for macro-financial assistance (MFA) and for structural support in the form of multi-year instruments is found directly in Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 212 provides that ‘the Union shall carry out economic, financial and technical cooperation measures, including assistance, in particular financial assistance, with third countries other than developing countries’. In the past, this provision has been used for single operations in emergency conditions, the MFA. The same legal basis can also be used to provide structural support in the form of multi-year instruments. Under Article 212(2) of the TFEU, clear legal limits are set: each individual loan requires a basic act adopted under one of those legal bases. The basic act empowers the Commission to borrow on the capital markets or from financial institutions, on behalf of the EU, to finance the loan to the third country. The Ukraine, Western Balkans, and Moldova Facilities [1] were each adopted under ordinary legislative procedure, empowering the Commission to implement the multi-year programmes in line with the conditions set in the legislation. The basic act also defines the provisioning rate. Provisioning is a budgetary risk management tool, not a legal basis for borrowing. It protects the budget against risks of future losses from lending operations by setting aside a percentage of each loan amount in the Common Provisioning Fund. [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility, OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024; Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025; Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024.”
  Own EU resources · EU political integration
• 2026-06-23 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 23.6.2026 Written question EU accession is a well-established process based on Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union and conditional upon the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. Accordingly, enlargement is and will remain based on the ‘own merits’ principle and the pace at which candidate countries accomplish the necessary reforms. Both Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova have set themselves targets for closing accession negotiations and the Commission remains committed to supporting their ambitious objectives, contingent on delivery of the necessary reforms. The Commission’s assessment is that Moldova and Ukraine have met the conditions required to formally open all clusters. In the meantime, technical work on the accession negotiations continues with both countries. The reform priorities to be implemented have been communicated by the Danish and Cypriot Presidencies of the Council of the EU in December 2025 and in March 2026. Ultimately, the decision to formally move forward in the process is in the hands of the Member States. The Commission will keep monitoring progress of both countries as well as providing regular assessment of progress through its annual Enlargement package.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Moldova relations · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-06-15 “Dear Minister, dear Marilena, dear Deputy Prime Minister, dear Taras, the Deputy Speaker of Verona. Rada. Dear Sasha, dear The representative of representatives of Ukrainian media. We have all waited for this day a long time, and today is a day to celebrate. And I say it again, it is a mega Monday for me. No country has ever achieved such progress on its accession path while fighting the most brutal Russian atrocities on its territory, while Ukraine is gaining momentum on the battlefield. It is also building its path towards a prosperous and secure Ukraine inside the European Union. We are taking the single biggest step towards Ukraine's EU membership since opening negotiations in December 2023. And if I may say this time, no one had to leave the room for a coffee break. We are now formally recognising the reform progress Ukraine has made over the past years. Today's decision to open negotiations with Ukraine is also good news for Europe. Ukraine's future EU membership is central to the future of Europe, because building a Europe that is firmly in charge of its own security can only work with a strong, prosperous and stable Ukraine. Today is a moment when Europe delivers for Ukraine. We are not doing any favours. We are delivering upon what Ukraine has earned. During today's conference, member states set out the to do list to press ahead with reforms in the most fundamental areas of our union an independent judiciary, transparent public procurement and stronger safeguards against corruption and organised crime.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “Moldova is really on the move. Ten days ago, when I last visited your country, we organised the first ever EU Moldova Investors Conference or the biggest. It gathered private companies from across the continent to pledge more than €1 billion of investments. The decision today will further increase the attractiveness of Moldova for investors. It will make EU integration a concrete reality for Moldovans and allow the country to converge economically. When in Moldova, I also felt how much the prospect of opening. Cluster. I was giving renewed energy and injected credibility in Moldova's EU path. We will now build on this positive tide to further accelerate the work and deliver on the promise to Moldovans to finally join the European Union and family. Dear Christina, you are putting in the hard work, patience and perseverance into delivering reforms with your entire team. Dear Prime Minister, you can really be proud on you and your team. Today, your Moldova gets the recognition it deserves. Congratulations for this. Dear Marilena, we started at 3:00. And to conclude this Mega Man day, a word of sincere appreciation and thanks for your hard work throughout your presidency. Some were saying at the beginning where we were speaking about our vision, what we want to do, you will not make it or you are crazy. Or it's not possible. But we would not stand here today if it weren't for you, for your team. And this is really the success of Cypriot presidency. Thank you.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-06-15 “And you are delivering the Marilena. Dear Prime Minister, Milojko speech of enlargement wouldn't be complete without the most advanced candidate country in the EU accession process. These last few weeks have truly been a recognition of Montenegro's achievements. First, we had the 20th anniversary of Montenegro's restored independence, then the very successful EU Western Balkans Summit in Tivat. And today we mark yet another milestone. We have now closed about half of all the chapters, 16 out of 33. Congratulations. Montenegro is still pushing forward at great pace. The chapters we close today are on freedom of movement for workers and on consumer and health protection. They are opening doors for our citizens towards easier access to work and professional opportunities in the whole European Union, and stronger protection for consumer rights and cooperation on public health. These are the kinds of things we truly cherish as benefits of membership of the European Union. We are already preparing Montenegro's place inside our union. As you have said, the Amaurellina. The council has started work on Montenegro's accession treaty for the first time after 17 years. And thank you to all the teams for this work. This is where essential democratic structures such as the number of MEPs are defined, as well as transition periods and safeguards. At the same time, in the Commission, we intend to adopt the financial package for Montenegro next week. This package will propose how to adjust our budget to a union of 28. We are getting ready Now it's the moment to double down on the remaining reforms and get it over the line.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “The progress is really huge, but now the focus needs to remain on strengthening the pillars of any successful state. The rule of law, media freedom, democratic institutions supported by an empowered civil society and of course, prosperity. It is important that the negotiation process transcends party lines, and that it is treated as a national priority, one that creates unity and stability for all the people of Montenegro. I have seen this unity grow over the past month. This is what we need to keep moving forward. All political leaders need to continue to find common ground on the EU reform agenda. Thank you for the work you and your team from the Cypriot presidency have done. Your work on Montenegro is really a success story. You closed four chapters, you set up the working group of the Accession Treaty, and you will end your presidency with a financial package. What a success! This gives the Irish presidency the best chance to bring the accession negotiations to the finish line. And then we have even the support of the Pope. When he was visiting Madrid, he said, I quote, I encourage you to nurture the process of European Union, which is not merely a counterweight to other powers, but a gift to humanity and of the, quote, the enlargement process can be very technical and complicated, as you have said, and not always so easy for citizens to follow. But it in in its essence, it was about nurturing our continent, just like the Pope says.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “So what is the basis we are building on? Now we have the roadmaps on the rule of law, public administration reform, functioning of the democratic institutions. All those roadmaps are ambitious and comprehensive. And together with the revised action plan on minorities, they provide a solid framework for the reforms that will guide Ukrainian succession process in the years ahead. And the commission has assessed these commitments positively. Back to your question on the action plan on national minorities. Minorities. This will, of course, require continued attention. And the commitments undertaken are important, and the commission will follow their implementation very closely. Thank you.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “I welcome all the leaders or their non-papers or their voices who have been brought up in the last weeks and months. Why is this important? I think that without the engagement of the leaders, we will not be able to think of what we could do better or different. And this is, for me, the most important thing. As you have know, we have from the European Commission given some ideas, how could we make our enlargement methodology more suitable to the geopolitical situation? Today, what we know out of this debate is, as you have said, Marinella is a merit based principle and that, of course, you can only become a member of the EU once you implement all the reforms, and this is the basis. But in between, and this is what I like a lot, is the are the ideas about possible enhanced gradual integration. And this is what we are now still discussing. Your question about the how long those safeguards will be. I can't say this yet because we are still in the discussion with the member states. But what I would like to stress that this is not specifically for, for Montenegro. But because of course, you are the most advanced country, so you could be the first country that joins with those democracy safeguards. And the idea is somehow to have a kind of insurance policy. So new member states that respect the rules will not even notice those safeguards. Also important to stress, this is not a proposal for less rights here. Our treaties are very, very clear. Meaning if you will deliver and I'm sure you will, then you will be a full member.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “As we have heard before, the division of Montenegro, as the Prime Minister has said, is to close all the negotiating chapters until the end of the year. This is ambitious, but it is also possible if Montenegro will further on deliver. At is delivering for now, and if we further on will get the support of the Member states to do this, you will not be there anymore in the second half of the year, but we hope that the Irish Presidency will follow on your success and with your energy. So it is. It is possible. And then, of course as I have said, the accession treaty is already in making the financial package will be there after we will finish. Of course, we have to get the ratification process through all the EU 27 member states. So indeed, 28 by 28 is possible.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “It's great to see how both countries are advancing under difficult circumstances, different difficult, difficult circumstances. I would wish for both of them to keep working at top speed. Also, once we will open all the clusters. But generally good neighbourly relations are so crucial for the existence of the European Union. So we all should take care of this being direct neighbours or not that direct neighbours, but it is something we cherish so much in the European Union. And the war has brought in Ukraine, those two countries together on the European path and we are now all together in helping both of the countries becoming a member of the EU. And this is really, really great in the circumstances which have never been that difficult for the accession process as they are today. So I can only wish just the best for both of the countries.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-15 “During my visit to Kiev last week, I encouraged all political parties to unite behind a common goal of European integration. I want to repeat this call for national unity today again. These efforts are not just on the government. It requires the entire society to come together and seize the momentum that Ukraine is building up. At the same time, the reforms under cluster one are also the threshold to much deeper integration into EU structures. They built the trust that will allow Ukraine to integrate in our single market and other common European structures, even ahead of full membership. As a next step, the Commission now expects the Council to proceed to the opening of the remaining five negotiating clusters before summer, summer and then we could have a terrific Tuesday in July. Dear Taras, my warmest congratulations for your relentless efforts and your perseverance to bring Ukraine to this historic step. I would also also want to take a moment to thank you, dear Marilena and to Cypriot presidency, to your whole team for what you have done for us to be able to deliver on our commitment to Ukraine. I have just returned from Ireland, which will hold the next council presidency in 15 days. I was heartened to see their enthusiasm to follow on your great work.”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-06-15 “I forgive you. So Albania is one of the frontrunners in the enlargement process and has made important progress on environmental protection. And this progress is valuable, acknowledged and should be protected in a situation like this. It is important also that we all work on the basis of facts, and the European Commission is in continuous contact with the Albanian authorities, not just with the Prime Minister, EDI Rama. We just had a visit of our director for Western Balkan, Valentina, meeting the Minister of Environment in Tirana last last week. So in the case of the project in the North area, and as this is in the case for all the ongoing projects in Albania, it will need to comply with the legal framework and with the benchmarks set under the environmental chapter, as you have said, 27 of the accession process and this chapter is currently open Before it can be closed. The situation will need to be fully clarified, with closure currently planned by the end of 27. Our role will be to verify the relevant benchmarks are met if they are met. Until then, we encourage the Albanian authorities to continue taking steps that support the fulfilment of the closing benchmarks and help Albania move forward on its EU path.”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2026-06-15 “We have received our communication assurance from the government of Albania that a full environmental impact assessment will be carried out, and that European environmental standards will be respected. The fact that this is happening while Albania is going through the accession process is important. This process is legally and politically binding and subject to constant scrutiny and assessment, so this offers the strongest guarantee that Albania's nature and environment will be protected in line with the European standards. Regarding. I would like to add that you know how important the right to protest is to us. It is a fundamental right in our union and for all the aspiring members, I am glad to see that this right is respected in Albania. Regarding the foreign investments for every candidate country, but also for the member States, foreign investments are important and what matters to us is not that much from where are they coming? But if they are happening in accordance with the EU legislation and this is what we monitor.”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2026-06-15 “Today is really a great day for the Republic of Moldova, and it is a great day for Europe. It is a moment to celebrate, even if it's a bit late. But the formal opening of the first negotiating cluster is a major advancement and brings Moldova into a next stage of its EU accession path. Moldova is among the best performing EU candidate countries. With today's step, this will become even more visible. Today, we formally recognize the reform progress Moldova has made over the last month. We also provided Moldova with a to do list of reforms to consolidate an independent judiciary, fight organised crime and corruption, and make public procurement more transparent. It lays out the path to strengthen the fundamentals for Moldova's future EU membership. The Commission now expects the council to proceed in the opening of the remaining five negotiating clusters before summer. The next stage of the accession process is the road to the so-called interim benchmarks. Of course, chief negotiator Christina knows this is the next goal or step, after which Moldova will start closing chapters as it advances to our final objective. Full EU membership today. It is also the moment for Moldova to rise as a nation and gather all its forces on the road to the EU. It is the moment for political parties, majority and the opposition to come together and drive reforms forward. It is also the moment for society to unite and make EU integration a reality that improves the lives of all Moldovans.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-06-15 “I may add first this is opening of cluster one before we will have accession treaty for Moldova. It will take some time and exact relation between the EU member States and Moldova. It will be put down in this accession. Accession treaty. But what we can say for today is that there is now the discussion with the Member States. If we will somehow adopt a or make our methodology more adaptable to the present geopolitical situation. But nothing has been decided. Decided yet. Yet. Your question, what Moldova can bring to you when the EU decided to give Moldova a candidate status. This was very important not just for Moldova but also for US European Union. It was a commitment. It was also the responsibility, commitment to help you to become a free and prosperous and safe country. So once we will reach this level, you will enrich our European Union. You will contribute to our economy. Our investors will find they are already finding the new areas where they could invest. And of course, we could also benefit in the EU from, for instance, high skilled labour force in the digital. What I have just found out when I was when I was there. But for me, one of the most important things what Moldova will bring is will. Moldova will contribute to our security. We see today that for the first time in the history in the accession process, we have adversaries, and they want to ruin or to bring our candidate countries away from the European path. But we are the most important target, meaning if we will not bring in this case, Moldova, into the EU, some forces outside or inside could weaponize the country against us. So it is in our own interest to have Moldova inside the European Union. Thank you.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• 2026-06-15 “So what makes me optimistic that we will be able to open the rest of the clusters working with Ukraine and working also with the Cypriot presidency. I have seen that sometimes impossible is possible. But clearly I am aware that our accession process is walking on two paths. One path is the technical process I am with my team responsible for, and the other one is the dynamic in the member states. So a continuous working with the member states under the presidency is very, very much important. This is the vision we have. We have done the front loading process. So from all these elements, my optimism is deriving.”
  EU enlargement
• 2026-06-04 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The Commission attaches great importance to minority rights, education and good neighbourly relations. As part of the accession negotiations, Albania is required to take measures to foster inclusive education, including for persons belonging to minorities. Albania must uphold educational rights stemming from its law on the Protection of National Minorities, which will have to be fully implemented. Furthermore, the 2025 Enlargement report [1] by the Commission sets out that Albania needs to strengthen the quality and inclusiveness of its education system. The Commission will continue monitoring developments related to this field. The EU common position on Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process sets clear and ambitious interim benchmarks that Albania needs to fulfil to advance in accession negotiations, including protection of rights and rights of persons belonging to minorities, whose education-related issues are assessed and monitored in conjunction with Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fe9138b7-90fe-4277-a12c-3a03f6d1957f_en?filename=albania-report-2025.pdf.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2026-06-04 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The Commission took note of the adoption of the law on Internal Affairs and the National Security Agency law in Montenegro. The Commission had assessed the two laws and finds that their data protection provisions are not yet fully aligned with the EU acquis, particularly the General Data Protection Regulation [1] and the Law Enforcement Directive [2] . These laws require legal adjustments to align fully with the EU acquis on personal data protection. Montenegro is working on reviewing its legal framework on data protection in line with the EU acquis and as a first step has prepared a new draft law on Personal Data Protection. The Commission stands ready to assist Montenegro with its comprehensive data protection reform aimed to be finalised by the closure of accession negotiations. In the context of Montenegro’s accession, the Commission will closely monitor implementation of these laws and expects Montenegro to ensure merit-based police recruitments and strong procedural safeguards, and that any dismissals are justified and provide for access to full legal recourse. Comprehensive and inclusive reforms are essential not only for the country’s accession to the EU but for reinforcing public trust in Montenegro’s institutions. [1] Regulation (EU) 2016/679: ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj. [2] Directive (EU) 2016/680: ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/680/oj.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2026-06-04 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. Türkiye is expected to respect international law, good neighbourly relations and the sovereignty of Member States. Türkiye is expected to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including their external aspects, and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. Türkiye also needs to fulfil its obligation to ensure full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the EU-Turkey Association Agreement [1] . The Commission follows a phased, proportionate and reversible approach to energise key areas of cooperation with Türkiye, in line with the Joint Communication of 29 November 2023 [2] and the April 2024 European Council conclusions [3] . Türkiye’s own constructive engagement will be instrumental in advancing cooperation across all relevant areas. Resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks is of particular importance in this context. [1] Additional Protocol of 23 November 1970, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:21970A1123(01)&from=EN. [2] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en. [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-05-21 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question The Commission recalls that the legal basis for the accession of new Member States to the EU is Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Article 49 TEU provides that any European state which respects the values set out in Article 2 TEU and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the EU. Article 49 TEU also states that ‘the conditions of eligibility for accession agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account’. Upon the Commission’s opinion and the European Parliament’s consent, the Council adopts a decision on the country’s accession. The conditions of admission to the EU and the adjustments of the EU Treaties which such admission entails are subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. The Accession Treaty is then to be submitted for ratification by all Member States and the acceding State in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The negotiating frameworks, including the one for Ukraine, already stipulate that if sufficient progress is made on reform priorities agreed in the negotiations and the alignment with the relevant acquis has taken place, this should lead to gradual integration into the EU single market. Such gradual integration is possible via international agreements that provide for the necessary safeguards to ensure a level playing field for economic operators, protect the integrity of the internal market and ensure the uniform interpretation of EU law. Ukraine, as some of the other candidates, has set ambitious target dates for its accession path and the Commission is intensely working with them to support these ambitious objectives.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU political integration
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The Commission recalls that the European Council has repeatedly stressed the imperative of enlargement as a strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity. Preparing for enlargement and taking on the obligations of EU membership remains based on the own merits’ principle. The legal basis for the accession of new Member States to the EU is Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Article 49 TEU provides that any European state which respects the values referred to in Article 2 TEU and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the EU. The conditions of admission of a new Member State to the EU and the adjustments of the EU Treaties, which such admission entails are subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant state, which is then submitted for ratification by all Member States and the acceding state in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Thus, Member States possess ample means to protect their interests in the accession process.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to assisting Belarusian journalists and independent media in providing high-quality reporting to Belarusian citizens. EU support has reached over 40 Belarusian independent outlets, helping preserve a diverse, dynamic and widely consumed Belarusian independent media ecosystem. The EU has also provided capacity-building and sector-wide support through education, training and technical assistance. Belarusian citizens, both inside the country and in exile, continue to face persecution. Public disclosure of the projects receiving EU support would expose beneficiaries to further risk. Accordingly, the Commission does not publish the names of implementing partners, in order to protect their ability to continue supporting independent media. For the same reasons, reports on implementation of EU assistance are not published. However, the Commission receives regular, comprehensive reporting from both beneficiaries and implementing partners, confirming that funding is properly accounted for. EU assistance is also subject to standard audit procedures to ensure proper use of funds and compliance with financial management rules.”
  EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The Commission is committed to ensuring that Ukraine’s accession process is conducted with the fairness, predictability, and stability essential to all Member States. The budgetary implications on the future multiannual financial framework will depend on several factors, including the outcome of negotiations of the post-2027 MFF and the application of possible transitional measures. Enlargement is an investment in a larger market, greater growth and stronger collective resilience. The Commission is analysing all options that can be applied in order to ensure that accession produces a net positive outcome for the Union as a whole, including through appropriate transitional measures. In line with previous practice, there is a broad array of such measures to ensure that there are no negative financial spillovers to existing beneficiaries. The chapters of the EU acquis, including on agriculture and rural development, food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, competition policy, or environment and climate change, form the basis of the accession negotiations and candidate countries are required to bring their national legislation into line with EU legislation in these areas by the date of accession. Carefully managed Ukraine’s integration has the potential to strengthen the Union’s food security and sovereignty.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-05-08 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The EU has a strategic interest in a secure and stable environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Commission has repeatedly underlined, most recently in the 2025 Enlargement report [1] , that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes. A comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue would significantly contribute to sustainable stability and security in the region. The EU has welcomed the support provided by Member States through the deployment of military assets in the Eastern Mediterranean and in support of Cyprus and remains determined to defend its interests and those of its Member States. The Joint Communication on EU-Türkiye relations [2] of 2023 recommends resuming Council discussions on the modernisation of the Customs Union if Türkiye keeps addressing trade irritants and circumvention of EU sanctions. It further indicates that a broader environment conducive to the resumption of Cyprus settlement talks is needed to open negotiations for the modernisation of the Customs Union. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db-926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. [2] JOIN (2023) 50 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=JOIN:2023:0050:FIN.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The pace of progress in the accession process is based on the fundamentals cluster. The Commission is closely monitoring Albania’s progress in the areas of rule of law, fundamental rights, democracy, and anti-corruption measures. One obligation under the cluster requires the presentation of a roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions . As stated in the Commission’s Progress Report on Albania 2025 [1] , Albania’s legal framework sets out a generally good basis for the protection of fundamental rights. The adoption in 2025 of a new law on personal data protection, as well as the adoption of implementing legislation on the rights to persons belonging to national minorities represented significant achievements. As part of the EU integration process, the Commission will continue to support the consolidation of the rule of law and judicial independence in Albania and discuss with the Albanian authorities the proper alignment with the relevant European standards in this area . The EU closely followed the 2025 parliamentary elections in Albania, including the preliminary findings of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe. The Commission will continue to monitor developments in Albania’s democratic institutions, including the adoption of further electoral reforms addressing all ODIHR's key recommendations, also those that are still outstanding from previous elections. Building on the assistance provided thus far, for example by supporting campaign finance transparency tools and the role of civil society organisations in monitoring the electoral process, targeted technical assistance will continue as relevant, notably to the Central Elections Committee. Furthermore, the Commission is also monitoring progress in the field of property rights, which is part of the fundamentals cluster. [1] SWD(2025) 750: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/albania-report-2025_en.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2026-04-29 “E-000572/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has consistently drawn attention to the dire conditions in prisons in North Macedonia, including in its 2025 enlargement report 1 and has raised the issue in the regular political dialogues, including the recent Stabilisation and Association Committee 2 and Justice Freedom and Security Subcommittee 3 meetings. The Commission monitors the situation closely together with partners such as the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The EU provides concrete assistance to improve the conditions in prisons of North Macedonia. Consular assistance and protection for EU citizens detained in the country falls under the responsibility and authority of the relevant Member State. The Commission works closely with Member States on these matters. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SK/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0753. 2 19th meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Committee between the European Union and the Republic of North Macedonia - Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, 13 February 2026: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/19th-meeting-stabilisation-and-association-committee-between-europeanunion-and-republic-north-2026-02-13_en#x. 3 20th meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement Subcommittee with North Macedonia on Justice, Freedom and Security, 19 March 2026: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/north-macedonia/20th-meetingstabilisation-and-association-agreement-subcommittee-north-macedonia-justice-freedom_en?s=229.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2026-04-28 “E-000280/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Since Russia’s unprovoked and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU has adopted comprehensive sanctions and has suspended or terminated engagement, cooperation, programmes, and projects with Russian public bodies. Alongside sanctions and international isolation, the EU has remained committed to supporting Russian civil society and independent media including in exile, recognising the clear link between external aggression and internal repression. The EU has been providing substantial support to civil society organisations, nongovernmental organisations human rights defenders, and independent journalists. For many years, the EU provided substantial support to organisations assisting persons with disabilities and specific health conditions, despite the hostile operating ground in Russia. Since 2022 and Russian aggression against Ukraine, support to civil society and independent media is part of EU’s approach to Russia which aims to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, protect vulnerable groups, and counter state censorship and propaganda. The EU will continue to apply international pressure on Russia for its human rights violations and to support individuals affected by the repression.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-04-17 “E-000477/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the expulsions and addressed the issue during an emergency debate at the European Parliament on 12 February 2026. As an EU candidate country and member of the Council of Europe, Türkiye is expected to apply the highest democratic standards and practices. Measures affecting freedom of thought, conscience, and religion must be proportionate and should not be treated as national security issues without justification or judicial remedies. The Commission recalls that according to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and of manifesting it. The latter shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The 2025 Enlargement report on Türkiye 1 notes the deportations of foreign Protestant pastors and Jehovah’s Witness ministers and the ongoing cases 2 in the European Court of Human Rights. It states that the situation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion need to be improved and that the EU’s serious concerns about the continued deterioration of democratic standards, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental rights were not addressed. The Commission will continue to call on Türkiye to comply with its obligations under international law, and to respect and protect, and fulfil human rights and the rule of law, and will continue to raise these issues in its contacts with the Turkish authorities, including in the context of the relevant sub-committee established under the Association Agreement with Türkiye 3 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2025_en. 2 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-234570%22]} and https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-248520%22]}. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f8e2f9f4-75c8-4f62-ae3fb86ca5842eee.0008.02/DOC_2&format=PDF.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-04-17 “E-000555/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes Moldova’s integration into the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) schemes. This has enabled its payment service providers to use the SEPA schemes since October 2025, enhancing cross-border payment efficiency and integration with the EU’s payments market. In terms of impacts on Moldovan citizens, initial indication is positive. According to figures from the National Bank of Moldova, citizens and companies saved around EUR 3.85 million in the first three months after starting to use SEPA schemes, through which 70% of euro payments were processed. SEPA schemes are industry-driven and managed by the European Payments Council. The Commission’s role is therefore limited and does not include conducting a specific investigation into whether the standards for euro transactions under the SEPA schemes may incentivise a shift to non-euro currencies, informal payment channels, or non-transparent intermediaries. Participation in the SEPA schemes reduces the structural drivers of informality by paving the way for faster, cheaper and more transparent cross-border euro transfers within a regulated payment environment. The Commission is committed to supporting Moldova in ensuring that participation in SEPA schemes delivers broad benefits while safeguarding the integrity of the EU’s payment environment. The Commission is ready to work together with the National Bank of Moldova and the SEPA Steering Group, established to discuss SEPA implementation issues among enlargement countries, in order to identify solutions and address any challenges within its competence, ensuring that the SEPA schemes integration strengthens Moldova’s financial ecosystem.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · Anti-money laundering regulation · Financial regulation
• 2026-04-16 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 16.4.2026 Written question The Commission is aware of the reports referred to by the Honourable Member. In the context of Serbia’s EU accession negotiations, Serbia is expected to align with the EU acquis for animal welfare and comply with the EU animal welfare standards. As noted in the 2025 Enlargement Package [1] , the alignment with the EU acquis on animal welfare is work in progress. For example, Serbia still needs to adopt framework legislation, including on animal welfare, which is a prerequisite for opening Chapter 12 on Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, as well as legislation related to Chapter 27 to ensure full alignment with Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes [2] . In this context, Serbia is preparing to adopt new laws on animal welfare and animal health. Alignment with the EU acquis will be necessary for accession negotiations and the achievement of the relevant step [3] in Serbia’s Reform Agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [4] . The Commission will continue to closely follow developments in Serbia, including as regards animal welfare. [1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6e68ce26-b95b-48e1-921a-c60c12da8f00_en?filename=serbia-report-2025.pdf . [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/63/oj/eng . [3] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/510d7159-e485-48cf-b49e-6b52164b74c3_en?filename=7.1.%20ANNEX%20VII%20-%20Reform%20Agenda%20Serbia%20-%20annex%201.pdf . [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj/eng .”
  EU-Serbia relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-04-07 “E-000291/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been working with Ukraine and the US with input from the World Bank, on a single unified long-term prosperity framework, representing the collective vision of Ukraine, the US and the EU for Ukraine's post-war future based on a reform agenda embedded in the country’s EU accession path. The plan, which depends entirely on solid and robust security guarantees for Ukraine, was discussed with EU leaders at the informal European Council on 22 January 2026 1 . The Ukraine Investment Framework (under the Ukraine Facility 2 ) and the European Flagship Fund for the Reconstruction of Ukraine 3 are regarded as key channels for deploying investment support, complementing the EU’s ongoing budgetary assistance through the Ukraine plan. Together with reforms aimed at improving the business climate, these instruments are designed to mobilise private investment at scale. The Commission fully supports Ukraine’s accession path, recognising its resilience and commitment. Ukraine has set ambitious target dates for EU accession, and the Commission has made clear that the achievement of these objectives hinges on a sustained and accelerated reform effort, particularly on the fundamentals and the rule of law. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is the legal basis for the accession of any new member state to the EU. It provides that any European country respecting the EU’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU can apply for EU membership, and that the conditions of eligibility set by the European Council shall be taken into account. It further provides that the conditions of admission and the adjustments to the EU treaties which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant state. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_26_199. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202400792 and https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/funding-technical-assistance/ukraine-facility_en. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f39df847-82e7-4c21-8b8a339e71a98d7b_en?filename=European_Fund_Ukraine.pdf.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-04-01 “E-000267/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU has strongly condemned 1 the violence against peaceful protesters that took place at the end of 2024 and consistently urged the Georgian authorities to respect, protect and uphold the human rights of peaceful protesters. The enlargement reports of 2024 and 2025 2 expressed deep concerns on the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of crowd control measures by law enforcement bodies, as well as persisting reports of torture and other forms of ill-treatment of those participating in protests. The failure of national investigations to bring those committing acts of violence to justice shows serious deficiencies in the justice system and underscores its lack of independence and credibility. Reports suggesting that chemicals were used in water cannons during demonstrations must be properly and independently investigated. While the EU does not have a dedicated mechanism to investigate the use of chemical weapons, it actively supports and cooperates 3 with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which holds the mandate to carry out any potential assessments. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/extracts-georgia-conclusions-council_en?s=221; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-spokesperson-developments-georgia_en?s=221. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2024_en; https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report2025_en. 3 The OPCW has consistently received support from the EU through the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget since 2004, currently amounting to a total of EUR 51.4 million.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Georgia relations
• 2026-03-31 “E-004183/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of a draft legislative initiative that could undermine the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons in Türkiye. As highlighted in the 2025 Enlargement report on Türkiye 1 , the situation for LGBTIQ+ persons is particularly worrying and their protection is not aligned with the EU acquis. The Commission will continue to monitor the situation closely and expects Türkiye, as an EU candidate country and a long-standing member of the Council of Europe, to uphold its international commitments. Respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law play a central role in the EU accession process. Accession negotiations with Türkiye are currently at standstill. Over time, in light of Türkiye’s diminished reforms ambitions and backsliding in key accession criteria, the EU has also reduced the volume of financial support to Türkiye under the Instrument for PreAccession Assistance and reoriented funding towards civil society, people-to-people contacts, and key EU priorities. As indicated in the LGBTIQ+ Equality Strategy 2026-2030 2 , the Commission remains committed to promoting the rights of LGBTIQ+ people internationally. Protection of LGBTIQ+ persons’ rights is an integral part of EU’s dialogue with Türkiye on the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Commission will continue to raise these issues in its contacts with the Turkish authorities, including in the context of the relevant sub-committee established under the Association Agreement with Türkiye 3 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2025_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0725. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:f8e2f9f4-75c8-4f62-ae3fb86ca5842eee.0008.02/DOC_2&format=PDF.”
  LGBTIQ+
• 2026-03-26 “P-000605/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Audit Board reports to the Commission and addresses recommendations to the Ukrainian authorities. In accordance with Article 12 of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1697 1 , the Commission regularly informs the European Parliament and the Council of the Board’s activities, via the Ukraine Facility dialogue. The mandate of the Audit Board focuses on strengthening Ukraine’s audit, control and anti-fraud architecture to ensure the sound management of EU funds. The operating costs of the Audit Board were published in the relevant calls. The Secretariat is financed through a service contract covering the full duration of the mandate (until July 2028), with a total amount of EUR 8 598 000. In 2025, the Audit Board produced one report covering internal audit and control systems. The secretariat is based in Kyiv and currently comprises one Head of Secretariat, who is an official, three key experts and eleven non-key experts covering audit, internal control, procurement, anti-fraud and anti-corruption. The three Audit Board members are appointed as Special Advisers for a maximum of 90 working days per year. The Audit Board can also do on-the-spot visits to collect relevant information. In December 2025, the Audit Board Secretariat conducted such an on-the-spot visit to Kryvyi Rih to analyse audit and monitoring at regional level. This visit, approximately 60 km from the line of contact, demonstrates the capacity to perform oversight even under wartime conditions. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2024/1697/oj/eng.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-02-27 “E-004735/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring the recent developments around investigations conducted by Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions. Those investigations show that anticorruption bodies are delivering on their mandate and building a track record of investigations, reflecting progress made under the enlargement framework and through the implementation of the Ukraine Facility. In line with the EU enlargement methodology and the negotiating framework adopted by the Council on 21 June 2024 1 , in May 2025 Ukraine adopted a roadmap for the rule of law, addressing an opening benchmark for Cluster 1 negotiations. The roadmap commits Ukraine to strengthen its capacity to tackle corruption. The importance of implementing these reforms was further highlighted in the Joint Statement between the Commissioner for Enlargement and the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, concluded on 11 December 2025 in Lviv and establishing a list of ten important reforms to be implemented as a matter of priority. The Commission regularly assesses Ukraine’s progress and issues recommendations through the annual country reports. In addition, several reforms in the areas of rule of law and anticorruption are funding conditionalities required and implemented under the Ukraine Facility, and payments can be partially suspended if the required reforms are not implemented. As a precondition for any payments, the Commission assesses that Ukraine continues to uphold and respect effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system and the rule of law. In its latest assessment on 17 November 2025 the Commission concluded that the conditions are in place. Any financial support from the EU includes anti-fraud measures allowing for controls of funds, with the possibility to take corrective action. The framework and the financing agreement between the Commission and Ukraine on the Ukraine Facility includes a system of audit and controls providing a multilayer mechanism of protection of EU’s financial interests. As part of the Ukraine Plan, Ukraine has committed to strengthen its audit and control systems. Finally, an independent Audit Board has been set up. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/hzmfw1ji/public-ad00009en24.pdf.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-02-17 “E-003495/2025 E-004263/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes the Parliament’s continued focus on this important issue, as Belarus remains high on the political agenda. The EU is committed to supporting the people of Belarus in their path towards freedom and democracy and recognises the crucial role of independent media in this process. Since 2020, the Commission has mobilised over EUR 38 million in support of independent media in Belarus. The EU will continue to prioritise support for independent media as reaffirmed by the Commissioner for Enlargement and the High Representative/Vice-President in their joint statement 1 marking the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent 2020 elections. In designing programmes to support Belarusian independent media, the Commission’s priority is to reach people inside the country and identify Belarusian outlets with strong organic audiences. Support is delivered through experienced implementing partners who operate competitive sub-granting processes. These well-established organisations play a key role in supporting a diverse, healthy and competitive media ecosystem. EU assistance has supported dozens of Belarusian outlets at national, regional and local level, as well as bloggers and investigative media. This has helped media professionals and journalists adapt to a changing repressive environment, including through more active engagement on social media and innovative communication methods. The Commission’s assistance to independent media fosters innovation in the sector by supporting experimentation with content strategies that will help target different priority audiences, including young people. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-kallas-andcommissioner-kos-fifth-anniversary-2025-08-09_en.”
  EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-02-12 “E-003610/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant reforms (i.e. the nine steps) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 were taken 1 . In view of the developments in Georgia, the European Council concluded in June 2 and October 2024 3 that the authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. Visa-free travel to the EU is a conditional benefit, contingent upon the fulfilment of specific criteria set out in Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 4 , including the obligation to uphold and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Commission issues a yearly report to monitor the EU’s visa-free regimes with third countries. In its eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism Report adopted on 19 December 2025 5 , the Commission identified that Georgia had not addressed the recommendations from the Seventh Suspension Mechanism Report 6 regarding compliance with visa liberalisation benchmarks and instead further regressed in key areas of governance and human rights. The report concluded that given the systemic and deliberate nature of the democratic backsliding in Georgia, the Commission will consider appropriate measures under the revised Visa Suspension Mechanism. According to the new rules, in the first phase, the visa suspension could target holders of diplomatic, service and official passports. In the second stage, the suspension could be extended to the entire population if issues are not addressed by the Georgian authorities. Ultimately, Georgia could lose its visa free status entirely and be transferred to Annex I of the Visa Regulation 2018/ 1806 (visa-required third countries list) 7 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-council-conclusions-27-june2024/. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17october-2024/. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1806/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0792&qid=1768565258267. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A571%3AFIN. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1806/oj/eng.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2026-02-09 “E-004702/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission On 18 November 2025, the Commission held the EU Enlargement Forum as a flagship initiative to elevate the conversation on EU enlargement as a shared political, societal, and generational project. After discussions on the geopolitical imperative for enlargement and the perspective of Member States, Panel III focused on EU enlargement from the perspective of citizens. It brought together voices from civil society to reflect on how the EU is perceived beyond its borders and how those perceptions are shaped by experience, aspiration, and identity. It also provided a platform for citizens in candidate countries to discuss their perceptions of the EU and their countries’ accession prospects, and how mutual understanding can be improved, noting that opinion polls in Member States and candidate countries show that citizens do not feel sufficiently informed about enlargement. The final panel of the Forum ‘Getting to YES!’ reaffirmed the current momentum for enlargement, discussed shared priorities and candidate countries’ ambitions to conclude accession negotiations and join the EU and the importance of public support as one of the necessary elements for EU enlargement. Applying for EU membership is a sovereign decision that only the candidate can take; in doing so, candidate countries and potential candidates have voluntarily chosen an EU path aligning with the EU’s priorities, policies and shared values. EU support for civil society in candidate countries and potential candidates as well as in the Eastern Neighbourhood is an explicit objective of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Regulation 1 , with a view to fostering an enabling environment that allows for a plurality of views to be heard, which is in turn vital for an open democratic debate. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III).”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU enlargement
• 2026-02-06 “E-004737/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors developments around corruption allegations in Ukraine. The uncovering of corruption cases in Ukraine demonstrates that anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine are delivering on their mandate and building a track record of investigations. There are no confirmed cases of EU funding being misappropriated in Ukraine. There are three main channels of disbursement of funds to Ukraine from the Commission: the Ukraine Facility 1 , the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration 2 and the European Peace Facility 3 . All budget support is disbursed to the Government of Ukraine upon the fulfilment of defined conditions, which include safeguards concerning corruption and the proper use of funds. All financial support received by the Government of Ukraine from the EU is subject to antifraud measures and provisions allowing for controls of funds, with the possibility to take corrective action if issues arise. This includes provisions allowing the European Anti-Fraud Office, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Court of Auditors to carry out any technical or financial controls and investigations that they consider necessary. In the case of the funds disbursed under the Ukraine Facility, an independent Audit Board has been set up, to provide oversight, including in the area of public procurement. Furthermore, in the context of the EU accession negotiations, Ukraine has committed to achieve high levels of alignment with relevant EU acquis in the areas of public procurement, defence procurement, audit and control systems. The Commission will continue to closely monitor implementation and, where appropriate, assess the need for adjustments on the basis of identified risks, including corruption risks. 1 OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024. 2 OJ L, 2024/2773, 28.10.2024. 3 OJ L, 2024/890, 19.3.2024.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-01-29 “E-003897/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is following closely whether candidate countries, including the Republic of Moldova, respect fundamental rights as outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 . This includes monitoring the Republic of Moldova’s compliance with fundamental rights in the EU acquis, including freedom of religion, as part of the EU’s enlargement policy. The 2025 enlargement report 2 highlights that the Republic of Moldova provides adequate legal guarantees on freedom of religion or belief and there were no reported breaches of freedom of religion or belief by the Republic of Moldova in the reporting timeframe. The Commission remains committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova in its efforts to meet the standards required for EU membership. 1 OJ C326, 26.10.2012. 2 SWD(2025) 758 final.”
  EU-Moldova relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-01-28 “E-003913/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intend to publish the contract concluded with DT Global Europe, its annexes and attachments, nor the final report, as these documents contain personal data and commercially sensitive information which are protected from public disclosure. The award of the contract followed an evaluation based on the most economically advantageous tender, applying the best price-quality ratio. The assessment of technical quality focused on the proposed organisation and methodology, as well as the profiles of the key experts, in line with the applicable rules for the selected procedure 1 . The Commission shares key information, such as award data, through its Financial Transparency System 2 . 1 Procedure NEAR/2021/EA-RP/0069 available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/tender-details/8172. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html.”
  EU-Belarus relations · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-01-13 “E-004463/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission, in coordination with Member States, European development banks and international partners, is delivering financial and technical assistance to Ukraine through wellestablished mechanisms. Since February 2022, the EU has provided over EUR 3 billion specifically to strengthen Ukraine’s energy security. Through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 1 , with coordination and operational support provided by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre 2 , the Commission is facilitating the donation of in-kind energy-related assistance to Ukraine from Member States and UCPM Participating States. This includes material for repairs of the electricity grid and large equipment, such as decommissioned power plant parts, generators and transformers, in addition to EU-fully financed rescEU stockpiles. The UCPM also supports donations from private and third country partners via its rescEU Private Donations Scheme. The Ukraine Facility 3 via the Ukraine Energy Support Fund focuses on physical protection and urgent repairs, particularly in vulnerable regions. Higher electricity export capacity increases Ukraine’s security of supply during winter. The Commission has also allocated an extra EUR 40 million in humanitarian funding to help with solid fuels, heating appliances and insulation. The Ukraine Facility recently mobilised close to EUR 1 billion of loans and grants for emergency gas purchases to cover the deficit caused by targeted attacks. Following the adoption of the 19th sanctions package against Russia on 23 October 2025, work has already begun on the 20th sanctions package. 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordinationcentre-ercc_en. 3 OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-01-09 “E-004101/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Media freedom is one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and a fundamental right in the EU, and therefore a crucial element and prerequisite of Serbia's EU accession process. As a candidate country, Serbia is expected to create an enabling environment for media freedom that safeguards independent journalism and ensure that freedom of expression can be exercised without hindrance. Moreover, Serbia is expected to align its legislation with the EU acquis, including the European Media Freedom Act 1 , which provides unprecedented safeguards for media and journalists against political interference, ensuring editorial independence which is a key requirement under the Regulation. In both the 2025 Rule of Law report 2 and in the 2025 Enlargement Package 3 the Commission has outlined its concerns about the worsening situation facing journalists, media professionals and outlets in Serbia and the chilling effect the recurrent statements by high-level officials are having on freedom of expression and the work of journalists. The Commission has been consistent in calling for the attacks on journalists in the context of the protests to stop, including reported cases of police involvement and verbal attacks from high-level officials. The Commission will continue to monitor these issues in the context of the EU accession process and the annual Rule of Law report. Through the Instrument for pre-accession assistance, the Commission has provided more than EUR 9 million to support independent and professional media outlets as well as media associations supporting the rights and safety of journalists and an enabling environment in Serbia. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083. 2 SWD(2025) 931 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025SC0931. 3 SWD(2025) 755 final, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6e68ce26-b95b-48e1-921ac60c12da8f00_en?filename=serbia-report-2025.pdf.”
  EU-Serbia relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2026-01-09 “P-004505/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU support to Ukraine is based on strong safeguards to ensure the proper use of EU funds. Any financial support provided by the EU includes dedicated anti-fraud measures and all funds are strictly monitored, with corrective action taken if issues arise. Under the Ukraine Facility 1 , Ukraine must ensure the integrity of all energy-related financial support and followup on corruption allegations in an appropriate way. The Commission is monitoring the recent developments around corruption allegations in the energy sector closely. There is no evidence to this day that EU money has been diverted to unintended purposes, in relation to the reported case. The fight against corruption is a central element for a country to join the EU. The uncovering of this case demonstrates that anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine are delivering on their mandate and building a track record of investigations. Therefore, the Commission maintains its stance that Ukraine is ready for the next step in the EU accession negotiations. The EU maintains a zero-tolerance policy on corruption and notes that the opening of accession negotiations would enable a more rigorous monitoring and effective support of the process. 1 OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU enlargement
• 2026-01-05 “E-003325/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU closely monitored the preparations and the holding of the local elections in Kosovo that took place on 12 October 2025 with the second round on 9 November 2025. This included the deployment of an Election Expert Mission, following an invitation by the President of Kosovo. The EU took note of the certification of two Kosovo-Serb political parties following a successful appeal process. The EU welcomed the peaceful, competitive and inclusive conduct of this first election round with the participation of all communities, as well as a free, fair and inclusive media coverage contributing to a transparent electoral process. Following the certification of results, the EU expects an orderly transition of local governance in northern municipalities and expects newly elected municipal authorities and government institutions alike to engage constructively in addressing the needs and demands of the population in an institutional manner and in accordance with Kosovo law.”
  EU-Kosovo relations · EU-Serbia relations
• 2026-01-05 “E-003431/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU has supported the Turkish Coast guard in the form of financial assistance for the supply of search and rescue vessels. Assistance has been provided under the condition that the vessels will be of civilian use, while their technical specifications will allow only for search and rescue operations. As outlined in the relevant programming documents 1 , the search and rescue operations of these boats will be carried out in line with international human rights standards and in full respect of the sovereignty and relevant jurisdiction of Member States in accordance with international law. The implementation of the pre-accession assistance in Türkiye follows the EU Financial Regulation 2,3 . The Commission monitors its programmes through several means, including regular reports from implementing partners, on-the-spot verification missions, results-oriented monitoring exercises and external evaluations. If there is evidence that a beneficiary violated the applicable European legislation during the implementation of a project and did not comply with EU rules, the Commission and the national agency shall make use of all available means, including terminating the cooperation and recovering the EU funds. Any allegations will be investigated on the basis of provided evidence. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/32ff8768-90e8-49ef-8ae82fdaf429d399_en?filename=C_2024_9168_F1_ANNEX_EN_V1_P1_3857028.PDF. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkey-negotiating-framework-october-2005_en. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast).”
  Trade relations with Turkey · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-12-23 “E-004352/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission In the context of EU accession negotiations, Serbia must meet the interim benchmarks under Chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights. Particularly, on the handling of domestic war crimes cases, Serbia is expected to effectively demonstrate adequate investigations of allegations and equal treatment of suspects to ensure that no one is above the law, regardless of their nationality or ethnicity or that of the victims. Moreover, Serbia is expected to engage in meaningful regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations in handling war crimes by avoiding conflicts of jurisdictions and ensuring that war crimes are prosecuted without any discrimination. All outstanding issues in this regard must be fully resolved before accession. The Commission follows closely the domestic handling of war crimes cases in the context of Serbia’s EU accession negotiations. In the 2025 Enlargement Package 1 , it is reported that individuals in Serbia are able to evade justice by taking advantage of prohibitions against extradition of nationals for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Commission does not comment on individual cases. 1 SWD(2025) 755 final.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Serbia relations · Support for International Criminal Court
• 2025-12-23 “E-003094/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission As a contracting party to the European Convention on Human Rights Türkiye has committed to abide by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Commission has repeatedly called on Türkiye, including in the latest 2025 Enlargement Report 1 , and in its contacts with Turkish authorities, to implement judgments of the ECtHR as a matter of priority. Respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights is also at the heart of the EU accession process. Accession negotiations with Türkiye have remained at a standstill since 2018, in line with the European Council conclusions 2 of 17 December 2024. The underlying facts leading to this assessment still hold. As noted in the 2025 Enlargement report, serious concerns remain in the areas of fundamental rights and rule of law, including the independence of the judiciary. With regard to the sensitive issue of missing persons, the Commission has been fully supportive of the efforts of the bi-communal Committee on Missing Persons 3 (CMP), which aims to recover, identify and return to their families the remains of people who went missing during the inter-communal fighting in 1963, 1964 and the events of 1974. EU funding of more than EUR 41 million since 2006 has covered around 80% of the CMP’s budget. It has allowed the committee to locate, exhume, identify and return to the families for dignified burial the remains of 1 055 persons from an official list of 2 002 missing persons. It is the CMP’s role to be in contact with the two communities and relevant authorities, including those of Türkiye, to conduct investigations, identify burial sites, and carry out excavations. The Commission stands ready to support CMP’s efforts whenever requested by the committee. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2025_en. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 3 https://www.cmp-cyprus.org/.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-12-22 “E-004148/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission expects Türkiye, as a candidate country and Council of Europe member, to respect media freedom and freedom of expression. These principles must be upheld by Türkiye, which has committed to aligning with the EU acquis, the European standards and values. They should apply to all journalists – Turkish or foreign. The Commission closely follows the situation of media freedom in Türkiye and provides regular assessments and recommendations in its annual reports. In its 2025 Enlargement report on Türkiye 1 , the Commission stressed the backsliding in the area of freedom of expression, which restrained the environment for journalists and media professionals in Türkiye, particularly through arbitrary arrests, detentions, prosecutions and convictions. It is crucial that journalists can do their job free of any threat of violence, harassment or intimidation to ensure that citizens have access to diverse and reliable information. The Commission has underlined on numerous occasions that Türkiye should guarantee a safe, pluralistic, and independent media environment, enabling journalists to operate without fear of reprisals, censorship or undue pressure. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2025_en.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-12-15 “E-003382/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression, the EU and Member States have mobilised EUR 187.3 billion in support to Ukraine and its citizens as of 3 December 2025. This amount includes EUR 15 billion in bilateral financial and humanitarian assistance from the Member States. The Commission does not have access to the details of the bilateral financial assistance packages that Member States provide to Ukraine and communicate to the Commission. The abovementioned total amount also includes approximately EUR 17 billion of support mobilised by the EU and its Member States to support people fleeing Ukraine. However, support enabling the transport of goods to and from Ukraine via Member States’ territories is not included in the above quantification. This exclusion is due to the complexity of this type of support as it also generates revenues through increased traffic on EU rail, road and ports infrastructure and increased fees to be paid to national authorities.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-12-04 “E-003126/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission noted the recent arrest of Serbian Government Official, Mr Igor Popović, and his subsequent release on 8 August 2025 following a plea deal. The Commission remains supportive of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue facilitated by the High Representative/Vice President and by the EU Special Representative under the Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/144. In recent weeks, there have been arrests and deportations conducted by Kosovo authorities as well as arrests conducted by Serbian authorities. Such actions and similar escalatory rhetoric are unacceptable and must be avoided. The Commission, together with the European External Action Service, urged Kosovo and Serbia to engage constructively in the EU-facilitated Dialogue. For both parties, it is only through the Dialogue that they can advance on their respective EU paths.”
  EU-Kosovo relations · EU-Serbia relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-11-28 “E-003684/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of allegations of human rights abuses in removal centres partly funded by the EU and of forced returns at the Turkish border. The Commission takes these seriously and is committed to ensuring that EU funding is used in accordance with international and EU standards. To this end, the Commission has been providing financial assistance to Türkiye to improve conditions in removal centres and enhance access to rights and services for migrants and refugees. Since 2016, it has conducted regular monitoring visits in these centres. The Commission also requires that all EU-funded projects in Türkiye be implemented in accordance with EU standards and principles, including the respect for human rights and the principle of non-refoulement. Following the allegations of human rights abuses in the media in 2024, the Commission has strengthened its regular independent monitoring visits. The Commission is supporting actions to build the capacity of staff on fundamental rights and freedoms in the context of immigration detention and is providing training to institutions that oversee detention facilities and handle complaints. The Commission notes however that it is for the Turkish authorities to grant access to removal centres. Therefore, the Commission will continue working with the authorities to facilitate access for monitoring purposes, while respecting their prerogatives in this regard.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-11-26 “P-003799/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Steering Committee of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey provides strategic guidance on the overall priorities, types of actions and instruments to be used. It also permanently monitors and assesses implementation of the EU-Turkey statement 1 . It last met on 23 May 2025. As noted in the report 2 , Türkiye continues to make very significant efforts in hosting and addressing the needs of refugees and migrants and the EU-Turkey statement continued to deliver concrete results in 2024. As per financial rules, the Commission is obliged to disburse funding once it has been contracted, except in cases of fraud or other serious infractions against the principle of sound financial management enshrined in the applicable legislation. According to the Statistical Office of the EU (Eurostat) data, from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2024, 31 525 Turkish nationals were returned from the EU to Türkiye following an order to leave 3 . 1 EU-Turkey Statement, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkeystatement/. 2 Ninth Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ninth-annualreport-facility-refugees-turkey_en. 3 Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_eirtn__custom_18334598/default/table. No data is available for the number of third country nationals returned to Türkiye in Eurostat or in the Irregular Migration Management Application, and only data concerning the return of Turkish nationals is available.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-11-24 “E-003759/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of pre-accession assistance in Türkiye follows the EU Financial Regulation 1 . The Commission monitors its programmes through several means, including regular reports from implementing partners, on-the-spot verification missions, results-oriented monitoring and external evaluations. If there is evidence that a beneficiary violated the applicable legislation during the implementation of a project and did not comply with EU rules, the Commission and national agencies shall make use of all available means, including terminating the cooperation and recovering the EU funds. So far there is no indication suggesting that EU funds would be used for other purposes than the ones intended for. Any allegations will be investigated on the basis of provided evidence. The Commission has a comprehensive set of preventive and investigative mechanisms in place, including stringent internal controls, regular audits, transparency rules, and cooperation with bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). When the Commission becomes aware of any suspected cases of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the EU budget, it informs OLAF and, where applicable, the EPPO. The Commission ensures follow-up and makes sure funds have an impact on the ground. Reporting requirements, which may include expenditure verification and audits, are agreed depending on the specific projects, implementing partners and modalities. A monitoring framework 2 is in place which includes bi-annual Sectoral Monitoring Committees, for each sector receiving EU support and an annual Joint Monitoring Committee, covering all contracts under implementation across all sectors. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en. 2 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4450df88-19ad-11ec-b4fe-01aa75ed71a1/language-en, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/23b6af49-5e12-11ec-9c6c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-11-20 “E-003609/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU is a consistent and reliable partner to Georgia and reaffirms its unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Georgia as well as its solidarity with the Georgian people. In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status 1 on the understanding that the relevant reforms (i.e. the ‘nine steps’) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 2 were adopted. In view of the developments in Georgia, including democratic backsliding, in June 3 and October 2024 4 the European Council concluded that the authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. In November 2024, the Georgian government announced the decision to suspend the EU accession process until 2028. The EU is ready to consider the return of Georgia to the EU accession path if the authorities take credible steps to reverse democratic backsliding. The responsibility lies solely with the Georgian authorities. In terms of public opinion, the recently published 2025 annual survey results on perceptions towards the EU in Georgia indicate trust towards the EU is at 67%. 74% of citizens would vote in favour of Georgia’s membership of the EU and 80% believe that EU membership would bring more advantages than disadvantages 5 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/15/european-council-conclusions-14-and-15december-2023/. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-council-conclusions-27-june2024/. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17october-2024. 5 More information available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/special-eurobarometer-and-perceptionsurveys-2025-09-02_en, including Eurobarometer survey results among Member States citizens and perception survey results in Georgia.”
  EU-Georgia relations · EU enlargement
• 2025-11-19 “E-003608/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Visa-free travel to the EU is a conditional benefit, contingent upon the fulfilment of specific criteria. One of the criteria is upholding and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Every year the Commission issues a report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism to monitor the EU’s visa-free regimes with third countries, including Georgia. The progress on recommendations is monitored with reference to the previous year’s report and points towards areas that still require improvement. In the seventh Visa Suspension Mechanism Report adopted on 6 December 2024 1 , the Commission called on Georgian authorities to, inter alia, ensure the protection of fundamental rights of all Georgian citizens. The Commission recommended to repeal legislation that restricts fundamental rights and freedoms, goes against the principle of non-discrimination and contradicts relevant European and international standards. This includes the Law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and the legislative package on ‘family values and protection of minors.’ In its upcoming eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism Report, the Commission will review to what extent these recommendations have been addressed by Georgian authorities and decide on the possible activation of the suspension mechanism. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024DC0571&qid=1762252659031.”
  EU-Georgia relations · LGBTIQ+
• 2025-11-18 “E-002645/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission It is the Commission’s understanding that discussions on the effective operationalisation of the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund are being finalised, therefore a full assessment is not yet possible. The Commission provisionally assesses that the provisions of the formal Agreements do not appear to constitute a direct breach of Ukraine’s current obligations towards the EU. Upon accession, Ukraine is generally required to fully apply the EU acquis, including the Water Framework Directive and Extractive Waste Directive and to take all necessary steps to eliminate any incompatibility of EU law with international agreements concluded with a third party. The temporary and partial suspension of the environmental impact assessment by Ukraine has been done in the context of the martial law. The Commission has on several occasions encouraged Ukraine to ensure that the application of martial law remains limited to what is strictly necessary. The Commission remains committed to supporting Ukraine in its efforts to resume the full implementation of the environmental legislation at the earliest possible opportunity. Several technical assistance projects are already in place to assist Ukraine in meeting its obligations under EU environmental acquis.”
  EU-US relations · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-11-18 “E-003383/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Currently, in Serbia, there are no EU-funded projects specifically covering animal welfare that involve civil society organisations (CSOs). EU financial support for civil society in Serbia is channelled primarily through the Civil Society Facility 1 . The aim is to support the development of civil society in Serbia and to strengthen the contribution of CSOs to Serbia’s accession process to the EU. Funding is either managed directly by the EU Delegation or through implementing CSOs selected on a competitive basis. Serbian CSOs can apply for funding provided the eligibility criteria are met. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance in Rural Development (IPARD III 2 ) provides support aiming at enhancing food security, sustainability of agricultural systems, and rural development. The application process is structured around specific entrusted measures, with requirements defined for each call 3 . CSOs do not usually qualify unless the specific requirements are met, such as being a cooperative. Nevertheless, one ongoing programme offers grant support for environmental CSOs 4 . The Commission has several measures at disposal to prevent, detect and correct the misuse of EU funds, such as ex-ante and ex-post controls, audits and monitoring, as well as investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office. The annual Instrument for pre-Accession Assistance monitoring committee is a key tool to track progress on the use of funds and to provide assurance regarding the sound management of the EU funds. 1 Financing Decision: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/financing-decision-civil-society-facility_en. 2 DG ENEST website overview: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/international/internationalcooperation/enlargement/pre-accession-assistance/overview_en. 3 IPARD III for Serbia: https://uap.gov.rs/ipard-iii-podrska-ruralnom-razvoju/. 4 ‘Volunteers for Nature – grown impact for citizens, actions on environmental protection’: https://mis.org.rs/en/portfolio-items/volunteers-for-nature/.”
  Funding for EU Neighbourhood
• 2025-10-31 “E-003425/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The enlargement process is and remains a strict, fair and merit-based process, based on the objective progress achieved by each enlargement country, in line with the Copenhagen criteria. This process aims to ensure that the EU will continue to deliver and function as was the case in previous enlargements, and not undermine the cohesion, functionality and legitimacy of the EU. Moreover, following the Communication of March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews 1 , the Commission is currently carrying out pre-enlargement reviews, assessing the extent to which policies and governance of the EU will be affected by future enlargement and what changes could be considered to address any identified gaps. The Commission recalls that under the EU Treaties, any decision to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting in Council requires the unanimous support by all Member States. 1 COM(2024)146 final.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
• 2025-10-31 “E-002880/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of the pre-accession assistance in Türkiye follows the EU Financial Regulation 1 . The Commission ensures follow-up with the applicable rules and ensures funds have an impact on the ground. Reporting requirements, which may include expenditure verification and audits, are agreed depending on the specific projects, implementing partners and modalities. A monitoring framework is in place and includes bi-annual Sectoral Monitoring Committees, for each sector receiving EU support, and an annual Joint Monitoring Committee covering all contracts under implementation across all sectors. If there is evidence that a beneficiary violated the applicable legislation during the implementation of a project and did not comply with EU rules, the Commission and the national agency shall make use of all available means, including terminating the cooperation and recovering the EU funds. In addition, the Commission has put in place a comprehensive set of preventive and investigative mechanisms, including stringent internal controls, regular audits, transparency rules, and cooperation with bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. As to the protection of biometric data, Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 2 establishes standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States. Each Member State is responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules on procurement, production and personalisation of passports and travel documents they issue. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 3 also applies to the personal data to be processed in this context, and its enforcement lies primarily with the competent national supervisory authorities and courts. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en. 2 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, OJ L 385, 29.12.2004, p. 1. 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-09-29 “E-002321/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Following the decision to grant Ukraine EU candidate status in June 2022, Ukraine is currently in the screening phase of accession negotiations. The assessment to open cluster 1fundamentals, is with the Council. In terms of reforms, Ukraine established a transparent preselection system for Constitutional Court judges and further reformed the judicial governance bodies. It has strengthened its institutional anti-corruption framework and its legislation on anti-money laundering, smuggling and financial investigations. It has adopted a law reforming the Economic Security Bureau, a new media law, and revised legislation on national minorities. Further progress is needed, including on judicial and prosecutorial appointments, vetting and disciplinary procedures, safeguarding the independence of anti-corruption institutions and advancing the reform of law enforcement agencies. Following the revised enlargement methodology 1 which made the EU accession process more credible, predictable, and dynamic, there have been no changes to the requirements. EU accession negotiations remain based on merit and equal treatment, putting the rule of law at the core of the process. The Commission continues to support all enlargement partners towards EU accession. Overall, enlargement is and will remain a priority for the Commission not least because of the geopolitical context, including Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The geopolitical context might have an impact on the path but does not exempt a candidate country from fulfilling all necessary obligations to join the EU. As in previous rounds of EU accession negotiations transitional arrangements will be exceptional and limited in time and scope. 1 COM(2020) 57 final.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU relations with Western Balkans · EU enlargement
• 2025-09-25 “E-002926/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission agrees that the extension of the EU Roam Like at Home area to the Western Balkans could bring substantial benefits to citizens. It is important to note that the Association Agreements that the EU has with Ukraine and Moldova 1 include a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which provide the necessary legal frameworks allowing the Parties to reciprocally open their roaming markets, which in turn enabled the EU to extend the EU Roam Like at Home area. The EU-Western Balkans Stabilisation and Association Agreements 2 lack such a legal framework. The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans 3 adopted in 2023 aims at integrating the Western Balkan partners into the EU’s single market, including the digital single market. The Commission services are working on a solution with the aim to complement the current Stabilisation and Association Agreements and to provide the necessary legal framework to extend the EU Roam Like at Home area also to the Western Balkans. 1 Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22014A0529%2801%29; Moldova, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22014A0830%2801%29. 2 Albania, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22009A0428%2802%29; Montenegro, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22010A0429%2801%29; Serbia, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22013A1018%2801%29; North Macedonia, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22004A0320%2803%29; Bosnia and Herzegovina, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22015A0630%2801%29; Kosovo, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A22016A0316%2801%29. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/2023-communication-new-growth-plan-western-balkans_en.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-09-15 “E-003092/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation form an essential part of Albania’s European integration process as stated in the 2024 enlargement report 1 , as well as in previous ones. In the context of the accession negotiations, Albania has stated its commitment to good neighbourly relations. The Commission took note that the map in question was swiftly removed following its initial publication. As regards the rights of persons belonging to minorities, Albania adopted three bylaws in December 2024, which were necessary to ensure implementation of the relevant framework legislation. These bylaws addressed the crucial issues of free self-identification and the use of languages for persons belonging to minorities, guaranteeing alignment with European standards and the principle of free self-identification. Albania needs to ensure effective implementation of its legislative framework, notably by allocating adequate resources to central agencies and local government, staffing and training of local authorities based on annual projections, including, among others, capacities for data collection. The Commission is now closely monitoring Albania’s progress on empowering the State Committee on National Minorities, which needs to be fully functional and have adequate resources and recruitment procedures in line with the recommendations of the Commission and of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ Advisory Committee. 1 SWD(2024) 690 final.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans · EU-Albania relations
• 2025-09-10 “E-002943/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors progress in the areas of the Rule of Law, and property rights, as part of the accession negotiations under Cluster 1 – Fundamentals. In the 2024 enlargement report on Albania 1 , it assessed that overall enjoyment of property rights remained limited and continued to be affected by significant challenges. It also underlined that ensuring the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy in cases of expropriation and removal of properties remains essential. As part of accession negotiations, the Commission also monitors Albania's progress in strengthening its judicial system and ensuring that citizens have access to effective and impartial judicial review of administrative acts, including those related to property expropriation and demolition. The Commission will continue to engage with Albanian authorities to ensure that they comply with EU requirements on the rule of law, property, and the right to a fair trial. 1 SWD(2024) 690 final.”
  EU-Albania relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-09-09 “E-002934/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes note of the reports regarding the potential misuse of legal procedures to target the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons in the Republic of Moldova. To ensure accountability, the EU is closely monitoring prison conditions and the rule of law in the Republic of Moldova, working with the Council of Europe and with civil society and independent non-governmental organisations to uphold human rights standards and transparency. Progress in the Republic of Moldova’s EU accession process remains conditional on meaningful judicial reforms, as highlighted in the Commission’s 2024 Enlargement Report 1 , to eliminate legal abuses and safeguard the rights of vulnerable persons, including from the LGBTIQ community. The EU remains committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova on its European path and the Commission will continue to raise the rights of vulnerable persons in the political dialogue. The Commission will continue supporting measures to tackle violence, hatred and discrimination against LGBTIQ people. Further steps in the accession process will depend on demonstrable progress in strengthening the rule of law, tackling discrimination, and ensuring equality for all citizens. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/moldova-report-2024_en.”
  EU-Moldova relations · LGBTIQ+
• 2025-09-08 “E-003004/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has consistently supported Albania’s efforts to consolidate an independent, accountable, impartial, and professional judiciary. It monitors progress of relevant reforms, providing also technical assistance and capacity-building programs. The Commission has ensured thorough monitoring of the vetting process through the deployment of senior magistrates from Member States in the context of the international monitoring operation. The vetting has been crucial to strengthen integrity across the judiciary, overall having a positive impact on eradicating corruption. The Commission noted that the process has also resulted in capacity gaps. In its 2024 report on Albania 1 , the Commission stressed the need to accelerate vetting appeal procedures and encouraged Albania to fill vacant positions with qualified magistrates, at all levels of the judiciary, through transparent and merit-based processes. The Commission closely monitors the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decisions and assesses the progress made in addressing the shortcomings in access to justice. It encourages the publication of court rulings and providing access to information for citizens. The Commission also continues to support civil society organisations and independent institutions, such as the Peoples’ Advocate and the Commissioner against Discrimination in their efforts to promote access to justice and hold the authorities accountable. 1 SWD(2024) 690 final.”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2025-09-02 “E-001511/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The autonomous trade measures (ATMs) 1 continue to provide temporary full trade liberalisation for Moldovan agricultural products by eliminating remaining import tariffs and quotas on seven products not yet fully liberalised under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) 2 . These measures have contributed to increased export levels. The Commission remains committed to facilitating a smooth transition from the current ATMs to the new DCFTA regime under Article 147 of the Association Agreement, which envisages reciprocal concessions aimed at enhancing trade liberalisation, particularly concerning products subject to tariff-rate quotas. The objective is to progress from a short-term unilateral framework to a long-term reciprocal arrangement, thereby supporting Moldova’s EU accession process, including alignment with EU standards, and enabling Moldovan agricultural exporters to expand their access to EU markets. The new Growth Plan 3 (GP) will provide the necessary funding to bolster investments in Moldova’s productive sectors and reinforce the trade partnership between the EU and Moldova. The GP will prioritise key sectors, including agriculture, energy, and transport, promoting sustainable economic growth, employment creation, and social development. The Commission will collaborate closely with Moldovan authorities to ensure effective implementation of the GP and a potential DCFTA review under Article 147, offering technical assistance and capacity-building to support Moldova in meeting its obligations and capitalising on arising opportunities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1501. 2 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-moldova-deep-and-comprehensive-free-trade-area. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/growth-plan-moldova-regulation_en.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · EU-Moldova relations