- “Ten different member organizations which were able before the elections to produce a forecast of disinformation and the risk of Russian interference. In June, the European Commission organised a stress test with a number of voluntary platforms on a voluntary basis. Google, meta, TikTok, TikTok deleted and a lot of content. Not all the content, but this voluntary approach taken by platforms did play a role, as did the Partnership Commission to the Republic of Moldova. Of support has been supplied for a number of years now and for cybersecurity, Fimi, strategic communication, anti interference and crisis management. So Moldova has shown and two times in less than a year that a mass Russian interference can be tackled via a pro-European project. Because Maia Sandu and her party is pro-European via the support of their EU allies and the mobilisation of civil society as a whole. Now to conclude, I've got two minutes left. I'd like to mention some of the challenges which are yet to be resolved. Aside from the lessons which I've just detailed, firstly, increasing the resilience of EU citizens when faced with misinformation and encouraging civil society to get involved. Now it's important to increase the psychological resilience of European citizens. They are faced with a constant barrage of false and information Which can influence their approach.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Moldova relations
- “Something was pointed out that is really essential, and it is very much along the lines of what was said by Stanislavsky, namely that transparency is, for democracies, the best weapon available. Apart from transparency. There is no one shot weapon that can be used against these bad actors. The Russians use what they call a combination. That is to say, a combination of efforts that multiply the dissemination of false information. And therefore we must apply a combination of interventions. I mean, the debunking that, yes, that is a promising approach that gives good results that can be scientifically measured, but debunking on its own cannot be sufficient. It must be accompanied, of course, by fact checking, of course, by the strengthening of a ability to think critically, to assess critically among citizens. And at the same time, we should also consider simultaneously a certain systemic interventions that would make it possible to give more visibility to free and pluralistic, reliable information that at the present time tends to be polluted more and more by propaganda that is intensified through artificial intelligence. So once again, the issue of trust is essential. Trust has to be demonstrated. It is not something you can pull out of thin air. As the Moldovan authorities have shown they have reacted to these very intense information challenges and they've done it quite successfully.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
- “Another an example. The Kremlin wants to interfere in elections before, during and after elections. Just four days ago, the, uh, once again, uh, channels have been broadcasting uh, uh, messages calling into question the validity of the results. Now, observers on the ground have identified this interference and traced it back to Russia. And this is useful in the short term. But in the long term, this does threaten to undermine trust in the electoral process in Europe. So I think the best possible approach in this area is that, uh, suggested by a social network psychologist, a debunking which has proved useful in Brazil and the US and provides a degree of immunity, uh, for, social media users in Europe. The European Digital Media Observatory could implement this type of initiative. Now, the final point and this is crucial we need to ensure the integrity of the information which is fed into generative AI models so the outcome is reliable. Now the Kremlin is flooding these models with unreliable information that undermines our confidence in them as well. We need to strengthen the visibility of reliable information, such as using due prominence as an obligation. When it comes to promoting, uh, information online, it has to come from reliable and credible sources. You could perhaps have an EU label designed to something that could be used by Influences, an EU influences label which shows that the information spread by the influencer is reliable.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content · Foreign interference in Europe
- “This could have enormous impact on the EU information market. Now a free information market. This cannot be based on a false input. Now that the digital, uh digital media is not free, it lies in the hands of a few, uh, companies, and it's distorted by the algorithm used by platforms who prioritize their growth over the reliability of the information distorted by the advertising use of advertising revenue. And I think it would be important now on an EU level, to, uh, to classify social media as a services of general interest. There could be non-profit models not based on, uh, not, uh, financed by advertising revenue. Um, and they could ensure full democratization of Europe on line. Now, you have rewritten history. Moldova. You have stood firm against the Russians, as I'm quoting a moldovan politicians there. And I think if we look at what they have done, I think together we can rewrite a new page of the history of democracy in Europe.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · EU rules on digital competition
- “Good afternoon. Chair. Good afternoon. My apologies for joining you online. I'm in Prague for the 2004, and I'd like to thank the French embassy, uh, for allowing me to join you, uh, online. I am a, um, a researcher in history. Uh, and I've written several books. I began to take an interest in Moldova, uh, in 2023, uh, when I heard a moldovan politician declare that they were an easy target for the Kremlin. Now, as part of the delegation which accompanied our French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs to China, and I was expecting to meet citizens who were reassured by the outcome of the elections in 2024. Instead, I met people who were extremely concerned because they were aware that the Russians were preparing already to interfere and distort their next elections. Now, the main lesson I've taken from this is that today, the EU is seen as the Kremlin's main enemy. They are interfering in Moldovan elections because of possible EU membership. This has been mentioned on several occasions, namely when there were attacks targeting the Vice President of the European Commission before the summit, which was held in Chisinau on the 4th of July, and before then, Russians created a Bot which would pay people on telegram, pay people who were recruited to speak badly of the EU.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Moldova relations
- “A whole of society approach Moldovan uh, the judiciary was on the front line. Uh, reporters and journalists were also involved. But research, uh, journalists from other countries as well, such as the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting, which published a series of revelations. Then there were, uh, Specialists who played a key role, such as the Anti Bot Forum for Navalny, which was. Designed to tackle doppelganger network and Matrioshka networks. They publicly denounced the activities taken by the matryoshka network. It's shown how important it is to defend a free press, an independent press, and provide the necessary resources to investigative journalists to uncover what the Kremlin is doing. That the next lesson, with the support of its allies, especially European allies, Moldova, was able to tackle the consequences of mass manipulation online. Now, the main thing we learned from 2024 is that the role played by chatbots. Militants, which are recruited by an Oligarch's network, used ChatGPT to promote content on social media and according to an Open Mind report, this allowed them to saturate Moldovan Telegram channels with content which was hostile to Mason due to the EU, to NATO and in favour of and in support of the Kremlin. The role played by European structures is also important, namely the EU Disinfo Lab and the Country Assessment Risk Assessment, which with the FEMA Election Integrity Program as well, they're very important and important to make use of this shared expertise.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Moldova relations
- “Chairperson, I'll start with your question about advertising. Well, I don't have any data on recourse to paid advertising, in particular on Facebook in 2025. On the other hand, it can be assumed that what was the case in 2024 has not come to an end suddenly in 2025, but in 2024 it was calculated that over a period of 18 months, those engaged in Russian fake information had received €70,000. I mean, that was three times what was spent in the American elections in 2016. So, so, I mean, it is a very considerable share of the advertising political advertising budget spent overall in Moldova. And that would mean, in passing that meta has earned directly money financial earnings on the. Fake political campaigning of the Russians, and this is a huge problem. Meta. Google, Microsoft have announced their intentions not to apply the DSA and simply to turn their backs on political advertising, which means that the bad actors will not give up and they will continue to have recourse to techniques that makes it possible for them to get around the regulations and to continue their activities. So mechanically, arithmetically, this means that the share of paid political advertising by the Kremlin in information on Facebook pages of Moldovan users will increase. Now, let me now answer the question. Having to do with the best solution to apply or the best weapon available. In its report the Facts are false of the OECD.”
Digital advertising · Disinformation & online freedoms · EU-Moldova relations
- “We shouldn't underestimate the power of disinformation or the power of foreign interference. So that's what Kristina Gerasimov said during a press conference in Chisinau in November 2024. We should shouldn't underestimate Moldova's ability to stand firm in the face of this extraordinarily, unprecedentedly intense level of interference, attacking all levels of society. Russian intelligence services, amongst others. But there are some lessons we can take from this. Firstly, Moldova was able to set up a very successful structure to tackle Russian interference. This was implemented in November 2023, when the centre for Strategic Communication and Information was set up. This is an independent centre set up under the aegis of the Parliament. It is. To tackle disinformation, and the Moldova set up a strategic communication strategy upstream, which was designed to tackle not just what the Kremlin was doing, but what the Kremlin might do in the future. Now, Maia Sandu said this, um, they, uh, sent out an official public alert warning citizens of this. There was strategic declassification of strategic documents, and this was extremely important. They were able to tackle accusations with verifiable facts. The next lesson we can learn is that Moldova, as has already been said, was able to successfully implement a strategy involving the whole of society.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Moldova relations