- “And indeed, the Ukraine war brought sanctions, but also export restrictions and controls much more into focus than had been the case in the past, and also pressures in terms of implementation and making sure that both sanctions and export controls are actually applied in practice. But with that tension also came, if you like, a double mandate and bottlenecks in what authorities at a national level are able to do. The geopolitical tensions make it harder for the multilateral regimes to work, notably in Wassenaar, in terms of agreeing new items, because those have to be agreed by consensus. And with Russia in those regimes, it hasn't been possible to build consensus on many occasions where the controls are blocked and sometimes where the regimes don't move fast enough to adopt controls on new, risky technology. Then the member states are acting on their own and putting national controls in place. As I said, this has been the case for the US, for Japan and the Netherlands in relation to semiconductors and semiconductor machinery. But it's also the case within the other parts of the European Union. In areas like quantum technology, we've had controls adopted by by member states. So if part of the question is, is our regime working reasonably well? I think yes. At first reading, we have a regime which, uh, operates reasonably well and provides a good level of control.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- “These during the Biden administration were proliferate. They were based on the idea of small, uh, small yard, uh, high fence. Our concern as control comes after control is that that yard is getting bigger and bigger. And most recently, we saw this with the I diffusion rules, which were subject of an oral question debate in Strasbourg last week. Obviously, it is of major concern to us that the measures divide EU member states into first and second class citizens, to whom different restrictions will apply regarding the supply of the most advanced AI chips, but also in terms of access to the most advanced AI models. Epp Commissioner Sefcovic, of both publicly and privately, expressed their concerns, and these are being passed up to the US authorities. We're working very closely at this stage with the member States to see how and to coordinate the responses in terms of trying to push this back. Um, the the the the supply of the best chips for European industry, for the development of AI in Europe is of critical importance and it is, um, counterproductive in terms we think of policy for the US to deprive European operators and ally, uh, of, of access to these technologies. It will force us to look elsewhere. It will hinder potentially the development of AI within the European Union and specific projects like the high performing computer platform. I'll stop there, chair. Um, but I'm very happy to listen to the comments and engage in the debate today. Thank you.”
EU digital & tech sovereignty · EU-US trade relations
- “The White Paper proposed three new ideas. One was a route to make sure that we can put blocked controls in the multilateral regimes into the EU list, where all member states agree. Secondly, more coordination of the national controls that member States put in place. And thirdly, creating a higher level, more political discussion. So a top down political element and not just bottom up technical view to address export controls more broadly. If we look then at the recent Chinese and US controls, we've seen and remain particularly concerned about the Chinese use of export controls, often appearing to be on a tit for tat basis, linked not necessarily to security risks, but to other Um, geopolitical developments. We've seen it with controls on a range of critical minerals gadolinium, germanium, graphite, a new package at the beginning of this month as well on different critical minerals. We're looking hard to see how those are applied in practice. Um, our main concern is that whilst these may be areas which are regulated at a multilateral level in the regimes that China isn't part of, the definitions of parameters seem to be much broader than those which are operating within the regimes. And we need to see in practice how these actually impact the fact that they have a control doesn't mean export is banned, it means it's subject to control. So we need to see how the Chinese authorities manage the tap. Then finally we have the US controls.”
Trade relations with China · Sourcing of critical raw materials · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
- “So that translates into around 140,000 authorized exports, and about 17,000 of those are subject to individual applications. The rest go under general or global authorizations out of the 17 117,000. Around 800 were denied. So when member states judged that there was a real risk associated with their export, you'll note there that there's a long data gap that the report is presenting data from 2022. The reason for this is that we are putting in place under the new regulation, much better data collection, much more detailed information. But it has taken time for member states to get there. We had to agreed general guidance for what they would do. This has been agreed um, and is being implemented. We hope to close by the end of this year in the 2025 report. The data gap. So we will be up to information up to and including 2024. The other thing the report picks up on is cyber surveillance. This was an important issue in the adoption of the regulation there. There were around 280 applications and almost 40 of them were blocked. So it's an area that we watch very closely. And this autumn we adopted guidelines for exporters so that they know what to be looking for when they're dealing with potential cyber surveillance items so they can do better due diligence. Turning then, to the broader international context, the rollout of the new regulation has, of course, been done against the backdrop of the invasion of Ukraine, the increased US-China tensions, the rapid changes in technology, particularly semiconductors and artificial intelligence, and the increasing use and reliance on unilateral export controls.”
Surveillance equipment & spyware · Arms export from the EU
- “Um, and in both areas trade single market. It's also to further wider foreign policy goals, so clearly a strong European dimension to export controls. Of course, the EU rules establish a list, and that's items which should be subject to controls at a national level. And those are derived from four multilateral regimes. The most relevant one in terms of dual use technologies is the Wassenaar Regime. All member states are participants in that regime except Cyprus. The EU is not in that regime, and member states, of course, can also adopt national controls. We've seen that in the case of the Dutch, for example, in relation to, uh, ASML machines, machines used to make semiconductors. I'll come back to that in due course. So what do the exporters have to do. They have to apply to national level, uh, if they have listed goods or if they have goods which are subject to a national control. They have to get clearance for the export, and the member states are responsible for checking the proposed uses of the items and also the users. Who's actually going to get hold of those items. And then they are responsible for checking that the controls are going to be correctly applied. Last January's report shows that for the last year for which data is collected, the which is 2022, the total value of dual use exports amounted to around 57 billion worth of goods. It's about 2% of the EU's external trade.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Arms export from the EU
- “Thank you very much, chair, and good morning, everyone. I'm delighted to have the opportunity indeed to address the latest developments on export controls. I think it's the first time we've touched on this subject in this Parliament. I do so on the back of the publication of the report. You just mentioned that, and I'll say a little bit about that, but also we'll, we'll we'll focus on the latest geopolitical challenges and in particular the increasing use of unilateral export controls, for example, by the US. You've referred to the I diffusion tools measures, but also from China, for example. We'll come to those in due course. Maybe I start just by a few words of of general context recalling how export controls operate within the European Union. Export controls apply to so-called dual use goods and software. These are items which can be used for civilian and military uses. The aim is to control the risks of those goods getting into the wrong hands and fuelling proliferation or supporting human rights abuses or terrorism. Parliament and Council agreed a framework in 2021 which updated the the rules for dual use, and it came came into force in the autumn of 2021. It established a delicate balance between action at a national level. So the authorisations, the assessment of a request to export are taken at a national level because it's a national security dimension. But equally the action plays out in trade, which is an EU level responsibility and has an impact on the operation of the single market as well.”
EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
- “Um, but but maybe in the debate we'll come to that in more detail. Of course, with national controls or US controls with extraterritorial application, there is a real problem in terms of the single market. You may have controls in place in one member state. The goods can be exported from that member state to a second member state and then out of the Union, because in the second member state, there are no particular controls. If you have a have a two tier system, as the US try to put in place for AI technology, you have the risk of different rules applying to parts of the union where AI may be. Engines and machines may be developed, making it difficult for access to those machines to those systems from other parts of the union because of the two tier structure. In that context, the Commission in 2024 issued a white paper. Fundamental approach to the White Paper was to introduce a bit more Europe into the operation of US export controls to recognise the new geopolitical realities, um, without changing the fundamental balance between what is done at a European level and what is done at a national level. That would require changes to the regulation, though I should say. The white paper also brings forward the With the evaluation of the regulation from at the latest, 2028, to actually starting that evaluation. During the course of this year.”
EU digital & tech sovereignty · EU Single Market harmonisation · EU-US trade relations