Csaba MOLNÁR

Policy topics Csaba MOLNÁR is active on

What Csaba MOLNÁR has said (9)

• “Thank you. I'd like to thank our expert guests for their participation and presentations for today. So I close the first panel and we'll continue with the second panel of the today's hearing. Um, in this second panel, we'll focus on three key key industries for the Europe's critical infrastructure telecommunications, Communications, energy and transport. These sectors keeps keep our economy running, our citizens connected and our democracies functioning. They are also increasingly at the center of foreign interference, cyber attacks and hybrid operations when they are disrupted. The impact is impact is immediate and visible for citizens, businesses and public authorities. What makes this panel particularly valuable is that we will also hear two distinct perspectives on how to protect these vital systems in one hand and industry perspective and the other hand a European agency perspective. Together, these views will help us understand not only where the vulnerabilities lie, but also what practical solutions are within reach and how EU policy can support them. Dear colleagues, over the past years, the European Union has seen a clear intensification of hybrid threats against its infrastructure. Cyber attacks on energy networks have multiplied, with intrusions into control systems and long dwell times before detection. Several operations operators still lack fully functioning security operations centers, particularly in the energy sector. Foreign state linked groups have probed European telecommunications providers for years using advanced persistence techniques and exploiting supply chain weaknesses. At the same time, the transport sector, especially aviation, has had to deal with numerous challenges, including GPS jamming, interference with navigation signals, drone activity near airports, and growing cyber risks to air traffic management and airport systems. So these developments confirmed that Parliament has repeatedly underlined in its work and in the mandate of the European Democracy Shield.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• “Thank you. Uh, that was more of a statement, not a question to our guests. Um, I will have a question to Colonel Foltin this time. Not as chair, but the S&D Group representative. So, uh, dear Colonel, cooperation with the NATO is a crucial pillar of the EU's strategy against hybrid threats. What is the main added value of this collaboration, and how could the two organisations better coordinate their responses to ambiguous incidents that might trigger the mutual defence or solidarity clauses of either treaty? So that is my question and we will continue with the group representatives, as I didn't have any any signal for the P, E and E groups. We will continue with the renew group representative, Mr. Brunstetter, the floor is yours for two minutes.”
  Relations with NATO
• “On behalf of the S&D Group also. So, uh, I would like to ask both authors, uh, given the sophisticated evolution of anti-democratic narratives, how can we better distinguish between legitimate political discourse and malign foreign interference, when both may rely on similar arguments about democracy's shortcomings? Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Dear colleagues, dear guests, please take your seats. We will open our meeting in one minute. You are extremely disciplined, so we don't need one minute. We can start our meeting. The ladies and gentlemen, I open the meeting of the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield today. First of all, we have to adopt the agenda. Dear colleagues, if there are no objections, and I and I can't realize that there are any objections, the agenda has been adopted. Let's continue with the chair's announcements today. Interpretation is available in the following 16 languages German, English, French, Italian, Dutch, Danish, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Finnish, Swedish, Czech, Latvian, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian. As I can tell, we need them all in this meeting. The digital file to the meeting is available via the application E meeting, and the meeting is live streamed. Then we have set up the minutes of the last meeting. If there are no objections, there are no objections. The minutes of the 24th November meeting are deemed adopted. So let's start today's important work. Dear colleagues. Dear guests, I am pleased to welcome you to the public hearing on foreign threats to strategic The infrastructure, cybersecurity, hybrid attacks and sabotage investment leverage systemic resilience. Let me start by thanking all the speakers who have accepted to join us, either here at the Parliament or via remote connection, and share their expertise with our special committee. I would also like to welcome members from the CD and Libe committees who have been invited to this hearing. Resilient infrastructure is strategic sectors is key to preserving the stability of the Union's economy and good functioning of the internal markets and European citizens.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Mr. chair, this time I also speak Hungarian. Thank you. Here in this committee, we've spoken about this topic a lot, and I have already said that Mr. Orban runs the most corrupt government in Europe. There is no European project in Hungary that is not lining the pockets of the family members of Orban or the or the leading figures in his government, and they have completely taken over the whole of the Hungarian civil service, and that's become subordinate to corruption. And we do not have an anti-corruption authority in Hungary that would actually take action against these corrupt crimes. We have supposedly an independent public prosecutor, but it's not actually prosecuting the crimes. It's actually trying to cover them up. And we spoke about this in January. But I have to say, chairman and colleagues, nothing has changed since January in Hungary, perhaps a tiny little thing that the chief prosecutor in Hungary, who is actually covering up Fidesz crimes is now become the president of the Constitutional Court. And we've now a new person and one is a party soldier, Fidesz. And now we have another one who's a party soldier for Fidesz. We've seen the Sweden, Poland joining the EPPO, and soon we've heard that Ireland will as well, but Hungary is not willing to join. Meanwhile, the European Parliament has several times taken a position which says that a member state should only receive EU funds if it joins the EPPO. That is the most natural thing in the world. If you receive money from somewhere, then of course how you spend that money should be investigated and verified. So taxpayers are paying money into this, and we cannot have European taxpayers money being used by Orban to build big mansions across the country. Now we have a representative of the Hungarian government here, because we know that the prosecutor works in the interests of the Hungarian government.”
  Rule of law in Hungary
• “Thank you. Chair. I will speak Hungarian this time. So. Dear colleagues. Democracy is threatened by political and financial interference. And I'd like to ask you a question about the special form of it. Um, when, uh, a an extra European power, a mafia state, as the professor said, uh, is trying to interfere within the European Union with the help of a European Union member state. Can I quote a specific example? Or a couple of years ago, um, the Russian government set up an international investment bank in Budapest, in the capital of one of the member states of the European Union. Um, at first sight, it's an investment bank, but everybody is aware that it's a spy bank which finances political interference attempts. It was set up within the territory of the European Union, and the Hungarian government provided people working there with diplomatic immunity, and that bank went on functioning until very recently in the capital city of a member state of the European Union. And then 2 or 3 years ago, it was revealed that Russian hackers hacked the servers of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. For several months, Russian agents were studying messages exchanged by Foreign Ministry employees. And of course, these Russian agents were interested in European pieces of info, not just Hungarian pieces of info. And the Hungarian government just let them do it. So my question is, what can we do when an outside actor is collaborating with member States and the member state doesn't counter these attempts, but helps them?”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “In Hungary there is a saying which we laugh at, That says Russians are already in the backyard. What? What is happening today is not so funny anymore. Europeans. If you hear about Putin, then they think of fake news. Ukraine, Romanian elections, fighter planes entering the airspace and drones. But the threat is even more colorful. That comes from Russia. In Budapest, Russian propaganda is not spread by agents, but the Hungarian government. And it is not the Russian ambassador who is lobbying for Moscow, but the Hungarian minister of Foreign affairs and their spies are sitting in Budapest Bank in downtown. And they get Putin's people get citizenship and, uh, and prizes, even if they are pedophile priests and Orban is buying gas and oil from them and upload it for the peace plan of Trump, even more than Putin himself. So the Russians are not only in the backyard, but through the person of Mr. Orban. They are in the European institutions, in the European Council and in the European Parliament, and it is not funny anymore.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. Chair. That was a common decision. So, dear, dear guests, dear directors, thank you for your really detailed presentation. This presentation has already provided us a very solid basis for our work on this discharge file. So these undertakings clearly demonstrate the strategic importance of this partnership across key European sectors such as energy, technology, health and transport. While their financing is essential, ensuring the right balance between public and private cooperation remains equally important. So I don't want to to drag on this meeting. So I have only two questions to our guests. The first one to Mr. Bazzi about the ether. So in light of the EU, several political and financial sanctions packages adopted against Russia following its aggression against Ukraine. Do you consider it is acceptable that Russia remains a participating member in this strategically very, very sensitive projects such as the Iter? And I really would like to know that. To your mind, does Russia's continued participation entail potential security risks or at least financial risk in the future? And I have one question to Mr. Jensen as well. You mentioned in your presentation the very low level of the private members contributions. According to the to the data, it reached only the 0.3% of the 21, 20, 21, 27, 20, 27 targets. So please could you update us on the reassessment of this target and a little bit more country steps to increase the private contributions? Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Thank you so much for your presentation. So let me open the discussion with a question Uh, to Mr. Young's, uh, your recommendation emphasizes the need for the European Parliament to, I quote, play and play an upgraded role in countering authoritarian dynamics and narratives. What will be the main recommendation you would want to see both in the US and the EU? Reports? And I would like to have a question to Mr. Semaca as well. You identify foreign agent laws and media restrictions as autocratic tools spreading globally. What preventive measures could the EU implement to help partner countries resist such legislation before it becomes entrenched? Thank you very much. And now I give the floor to the chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, Mr. Satouri.”
  Foreign interference in Europe