Dario TAMBURRANO

Member of the European Parliament · Italy · The Left · Movimento 5 Stelle

What Dario TAMBURRANO has said (42)

2026-06-17 “(14:49:21 – 14:50:39): The European Union already has, laws written down, but they have to be implemented. If we'd already done that, we wouldn't be here today. For example, flexibility in the electrical system. This is something that we don't know in Europe. Smart appliances. I was a rapporteur on the energy labeling and included this on electrical goods. Citizens want an a renewable and flexible energy system. The JRC has been working on this for 10 years, but no one's ever seen them come to negotiations. In Italy, lead laws remain subject to decrees. If there's just 1 person who in a building who opposes it, then you can't put, solar panels on the roof. And then, energy communities are held up by bureaucracy, by the fact that you can't split the bills, and, billions are being held up in funding. The Chinese decided this 20 years ago. Electrification was the way they were going to go. There were the policies for it and the money was made available. We have the same objectives, but, we are not moving forward. It doesn't matter how fast you're going if you don't know where you're going. In Europe, we're dying every day. Next speaker on behalf of ESN Group colleague, Markus Buchheit. Thank”
EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
2026-03-23 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission 24.4.2026 Written question Technological developments have brought several changes to the world of work, including advantages such as increasing innovation, flexibility, autonomy and the ability to work remotely. Flexible working arrangements, such as telework, hold great potential both for workers and employers in terms of work-life balance and productivity. However, the risks related to telework, such as increased connectedness, risks to physical and psychosocial health and organisational challenges should not be disregarded. A 2022 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) publication on the environmental effects of telework [1] concluded that telework can be a greener option if supported by specific measures. It noted that the associated potential emission savings depend on many factors, such as the frequency of telework, the distance of commute on non-telework days and the mode of transport, the energy consumption of the worker’s home and the employer’s office, etc. Following a 2021 European Parliament resolution on the right to disconnect [2] , the Commission gathered evidence [3] and conducted, in accordance with Article 154 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, a two-stage consultation of European social partners [4] to gather their views on the possible content of EU action in the areas of workers’ right to disconnect and telework. The Commission continues to gather evidence and evaluate the implications of the possible policy options in the area of telework [5] . The outcome of the consultation, together with other evidence collected, will feed into the Commission’s reflections on the most appropriate way forward. [1] Eurofound, Is telework really a ‘green’ choice? , 2022, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/commentary-and-analysis/all-content/telework-really-green-choice. [2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0021_EN.html. [3] https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/study-social-economic-and-legal-context-and-trends-telework-and-right-disconnect-context_en. [4] https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-starts-second-stage-talks-social-partners-right-disconnect-and-fair-telework-2025-07-25_en. [5] Besides EU rules, several social partners’ agreements concluded at EU level and other social dialogue outcomes incorporate cross-sector or sector-specific rules on telework, including central government administrations (a full list of social dialogue outcomes is available at https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/eu-employment-policies/social-dialogue/social-dialogue-texts-database_en).”
Energy efficiency · Regulation of teleworking labour conditions
2026-02-06 “E-000484/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The EU position on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is developed by the EU in close consultation with Member States. The EU presents its position at the GGE on LAWS. The GGE on LAWS, which began in 2014, is expected to present a recommendation on LAWS to the 2026 November CCW Review Conference. The EU position at the GGE on LAWS is developed in cooperation between EU institutions and Member States, in line with the EU Treaty and its provisions on the Common foreign and security policy, which is agreed by unanimity by Member States. The EU is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. These principles align with EU’s commitment to the promotion and respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The respect of IHL obligations and the ratification of related international conventions remains the competence of Member States. The European defence industrial programmes do not fund actions related to defence products that are prohibited by applicable international law. The programmes, moreover, lay down specific provisions regarding lethal autonomous weapons. The European Defence Fund 1 specifically bans the EU funding of lethal autonomous weapons without the possibility of human control over the selection and engagement decisions when carrying out strikes against humans. In addition, the European Defence Industry Programme 2 cannot fund defence products which are prohibited by applicable international law, nor lethal autonomous systems that operate outside a responsible chain of human command and control or cannot comply with the principles of IHL. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng.”
Artificial Intelligence for military purposes · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
2026-01-07 “P-000028/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission As stated in its reply to written question E-002945/2024, the Commission considers that pruning and other maintenance of vegetation cannot be considered a ‘production process’ as their objective is not the manufacturing of any product. Consequently, the Commission considers that grass clippings and other residues from pruning and other maintenance of vegetation cannot be considered ‘by-products’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Waste Framework Directive 1 . This does not prevent their use for composting, as biomass or for biogas production 2 . The decree of 19 June 2024 referred to by the Honourable Member considers pruning and other vegetation maintenance operations to be ‘by-products’. The scope of the decree is limited to defining inputs eligible for biomass plants under an incentive scheme for renewable energy. Therefore, it does not seem to contradict EU waste legislation, provided that the obligations thereunder are complied with. The Commission does not consider that designating companies that maintain public green spaces as ‘initial producers’ of grass clippings and pruning residues entails that this waste is no longer ‘municipal waste’ but rather a ‘by-product’ from a production activity. The classification of grass clippings and pruning residues as ‘municipal waste’ 3 and the possibility for them to be considered a ‘by-product’ 4 are two different matters under the Waste Framework Directive, which are not affected by the qualification of the original waste producer. 1 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3-30. 2 According to Article 22 of Directive 2008/98/EC, bio-waste shall as of 31 December 2023 be either separated and recycled at source or collected separately and not mixed with other types of waste. 3 Article 3(2b) of the Waste Framework Directive. 4 Article 5(1) of the Waste Framework Directive.”
Circular economy · Biofuels (RED II)
2025-10-31 “P-004292/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Under Article 3(4) of the Waste Framework Directive (WFD) 1 , biodegradable garden and park waste are classified as ‘bio-waste’ 2 . The Commission considers that grass clippings and prunings from park and garden maintenance fall within this category. The classification as waste ensures traceability and accountability of waste producers and haulers 3 . According to Article 22(1) of the WFD, bio-waste shall, as of 31 December 2023, either be separated and recycled at source or collected separately and not mixed with other types of waste. The classification as bio-waste does not prevent the use of grass clippings and prunings from park and garden maintenance for composting or biogas production. This is even encouraged in Article 22(2), letter a) which provides that Member States shall take measures to encourage the recycling, including composting and digestion, of bio-waste in a way that fulfils a high level of environment protection and results in output which meets relevant high-quality standards. Therefore, with regard to the matter in question, there is no evidence demonstrating Italy’s failure to correctly transpose the WFD or any other EU legislation. 1 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3-30. 2 And not as ‘by-products’ as explained in the Commission’s answer to E-002945/24. 3 Notably to prevent the illegal discarding of waste, including dumping in nature or illegally landfilling.”
Food waste · Circular economy
2025-10-16 “E-004074/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is assessing the implementation of the Italian national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) in accordance with the requirements outlined in the Annex to the Council Implementing Decision (CID Annex) 1 . Target M2C4-20bis of the investment on the Protection and enhancement of urban and peri-urban forests, will be assessed following the final payment request by Italy. To assess the satisfactory fulfilment of this target, the Commission will take into account the aforementioned requirements set out in the CID Annex, on the basis of evidence submitted by Italy. Should the Commission assess that any milestone or target of a given payment request is not satisfactorily met, it can take action to make a partial payment or suspend amounts related to non-fulfilled milestones or targets, in line with Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 2 . Member States remain primarily responsible for the implementation of their Recovery and Resilience Plans as approved in the CID Annex, as well as for verifying that the financing provided has been properly used in accordance with all applicable rules. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5def5446-08e6-4cc0-8c02c7d5a8bc9b5c_en?filename=COM_2025_675_1_EN_annexe_proposition_cp_part1_v3%20%282%29.pdf. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/241, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, art. 24: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:057:FULL.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU · EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding
2025-10-01 “E-003834/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Do-No-Significant-Harm (DNSH) principle applies to the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility 1 . However, it does not apply to projects funded through national resources, including the National Complementary Fund. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are primarily responsible for ensuring that specific financed projects comply with Union and national law, including the environmental acquis. They are also responsible for aligning waste infrastructure with the targets and waste hierarchy in line with the EU directives 2 . 1 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en. 2 Directive 2008/98/EC on waste, OJ L 312 22.11.2008 as amended; Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste as mended.”
EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding · Circular economy
2025-09-22 “E-003661/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The control of export of military equipment and technology is exercised by the Member States and subject to national legislations, the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 1 , and international instruments such as the Arms Trade Treaty 2 and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The export outside the EU of equipment and technology listed on the EU Common Military List 3 requires an export license by the relevant Member State. Licence applications for such equipment must comply with the criteria of the Council Common Position and international obligations and commitments of the licensing Member State. The national authorities of the exporting Member State are responsible for such assessment. As announced in the State of the Union address by the President of the Commission 4 , the Commission presented a proposal to the Council to suspend certain trade-related provisions of the Association Agreement between the EU and Israel 5 that fall within the EU’s common commercial policy. If adopted, this would mean that imports from Israel would lose their preferential access to the EU market and exports from the EU would lose their preferential access to the Israelian market. The Council, through its relevant working groups, works towards increased convergence between Member States’ arms export policies. Specifically, the impact of the conflict in Gaza on national arms exports policies of Member States is continuously on the agenda of meetings. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02008E0944-20250415. 2 https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1499/oj/eng. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:22000A0621(01).”
Relations with Israel - Palestine · Arms export from the EU
2025-07-11 “E-002842/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission The EU Open Science Policy 1 aims to improve access to and reuse of publicly funded research results. A secondary publication right (SPR) is a tool that may help reach this objective and is already introduced in six Member States 2 . The Council has recently welcomed this introduction 3 . Following action 2 of the European Research Area (ERA) Policy Agenda 2022-2024 4 and action 1 of the ERA Policy Agenda 2025-2027 5 , the Commission is analysing existing obstacles and possible solutions to improve access to and reuse of research results. To this end, a study 6 was published in May 2024, providing evidence and policy options, including the possibility of an EU-wide SPR with various parameters, including embargoes. It is also a topic of the Commission's ongoing study on the economic impact of identified policy options 7 . Immediate open access to peer-reviewed scientific publications through trusted repositories is mandatory for Horizon Europe beneficiaries, including retention of sufficient intellectual property rights to do so. Through Horizon Europe, the Commission financially supports institutional non-profit open access infrastructures and services without author fees 8 . In 2021 the Commission launched Open Research Europe (ORE) 9 , an open access scholarly publishing service for Commission-funded researchers in all disciplines and with no author fees. It is aligned with Horizon Europe open access requirements, promoting equity, transparency and integrity in scholarly publishing. With several European research funding and performing organisations, the Commission aims to evolve ORE into a sustainable collectively funded and governed non-profit open access service 10, 11 . 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-research-and-innovation/our-digital-future/openscience_en. 2 Germany (2013), the Netherlands (2015), Austria (2015), France (2016) Belgium (2018) and Bulgaria (2023). 3 Council Conclusions of 23 May 2023 on ‘High-quality, transparent, open, trustworthy and equitable scholarly publishing’. 4 https://european-research-area.ec.europa.eu/policy-agenda-2022-2024. 5 https://european-research-area.ec.europa.eu/era-policy-agenda-2025-2027. 6 ‘Improving access to and reuse of research results, publications and data for scientific purposes’: https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/enhancing-researchaccessibility-and-reuse-new-study-outlines-strategic-measures-2024-05-16_en. 7 ’Economic analysis of options for improving EU legislative and regulatory frameworks with impact on access and reuse of publicly funded R&I results and of publications and data for scientific purposes’. Expected to be finalised spring 2026. 8 For example through projects such as DIAMAS (Developing Institutional Open Access Publishing Models to Advance Scholarly Communication) and CRAFT-OA (Creating a Robust Accessible Federated Technology for Open Access), accessible at https://diamasproject.eu/ and https://www.esf.org/eu-projects/craft-oa/, respectively. 9 https://open-research-europe.ec.europa.eu/. 10 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6282402. 11 https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/204155.”
Research priorities within the EU
2025-05-20 “E-002011/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. Under the Birds Directive 1 , Member States are responsible for ensuring that a sufficient and effective preventive system is in place to avoid and mitigate the impact of activities known to lead to disturbance or destruction of birds’ nests or eggs. Activities such as tree felling, hedge trimming, tillage, mowing or ploughing are among them, especially during the breeding season, when there is an increased chance of impact on nests or eggs. Authorities must assess disturbance and destruction levels, considering the characteristics of the species and the activity in question. Member States have certain flexibility to use a range of tools: seasonal activity bans, local orders with limitations, specific environmental rules, codes of conduct, good practices for farming or forestry, species action plans, etc. It is key that the implementation and enforcement of the prevention systems and measures is actively promoted by Member States among all relevant land users involved in activities that risk a breach of the species protection requirements of the Birds Directive. 2. The above principles apply to any type of any bird nests or eggs, irrespective of its location throughout the EU landscape beyond forests, including urban and non-urban areas outside of Natura 2000 sites. 3. The Commission has issued guidance 2 to support Member States in the effective implementation of the Birds Directive and promotes protection of Annex I bird populations both within Natura 2000 sites and in the broader landscape. The Commission is currently developing further guidance to assist Member States in implementing the Birds Directive. 1 Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7–25. 2 https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/3f466d71-92a7-49eb-9c63-6cb0fadf29dc/library/4b5dffd4-369c-4c4b-a249625adc2a7545.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU
2025-04-29 “E-001712/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Waste incineration is regulated by the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) 1 , which contains emission limit values and associated monitoring requirements for pollutants including heavy metals and its compounds and dioxins and furans (PCDD/F). Best Available Techniques (BAT) conclusions 2 also impose more stringent rules to waste incinerators over a certain size. The Commission has already taken steps to address contamination from waste incineration through an ongoing discussion in the industrial emissions expert group on monitoring of biological markers around waste incinerators which started in 2022 3 . In addition, Article 48 of the revised IED 4 has made monitoring of emissions to air from waste incinerators more stringent, as it will be required not only during normal operating conditions but also during other conditions, including PCDD/F and dioxin-like polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Furthermore, in line with Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and the reduction of contamination at source, the same article requires emissions of PCDD/F and PCBs to be prevented or minimised as far as possible. These substances are also included in Annex III to the Regulation on Persistent Organic Pollutants 5 , requiring Member States to identify, characterise and minimise releases, with the objective to eliminate them where feasible. The Commission will monitor the implementation of the provisions of Article 48 and will continue exchanges with experts from Member States, so as to take potential additional measures. The Commission recalls that the primary responsibility for correctly implementing EU law lies with the Member States. 1 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (recast), OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17–119. 2 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/2010 of 12 November 2019 establishing the best available techniques (BAT) conclusions, under Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, for waste incineration, C/2019/7987, OJ L 312, 3.12.2019, p. 55–91. 3 Meeting of the Industrial Emissions Expert Group held on 20 September 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/meetings/consult?lang=en&meetingId=44437. 4 Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, PE/87/2023/REV/1, OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024. 5 Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on persistent organic pollutants (recast), PE/61/2019/REV/1, OJ L 169, 25.6.2019, p. 45–77.”
Air quality policy · Industrial emissions directive (IED)
2025-04-29 “P-001714/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission As already indicated in the written answer to the Parliamentary question by the Honourable Members E-002705/2024 1 , the Commission notes that national courts and review bodies referred to in the directives on remedies in public procurement (Directive 89/665/EEC 2 and Directive 92/13/EEC 3 , as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC 4 and Directive 2014/23/EU 5 ), are best situated to assess in the first place, according to the facts of each case, whether contracting authorities and contracting entities respected their obligations under EU law as transposed into national law in a specific award procedure. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01989L0665-20140417. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31992L0013. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32007L0066. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0023.”
EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
2025-02-13 “E-000678/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Ruddy Shelduck (Tadorna ferruginea) is not included in the list of huntable species under Annex II of the Birds Directive 1 . Member States are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU law, including verifying individual cases of potential breach of the relevant rules, and taking the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. The Commission aims to swiftly follow up on systemic issues involving the application of EU law in EU countries. However, one-off instances are better dealt with at national level, as long as there are available remedies, including judicial ones. In these cases, it is up to the national courts to apply and enforce citizens' rights under EU law. In line with its strategic approach on enforcement action 2 the Commission focuses on those cases that reveal a systemic breach of EU law in a Member State. 1 Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L 020 26.1.2010, p. 7. 2 As set out in the Communication of 19 January 2017: EU law: Better results through better application C/2016/8600, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10–20 and in the Communication of 13 October 2022: COM(2022) 518 final - Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU
2025-01-28 “E-000385/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission monitors closely the implementation of the Ambient Air Quality Directives 1 . Since 2005, the estimated number of premature deaths attributable to exposure to fine particulate matter in Italy has reduced significantly 2 , also thanks to the Commission’s enforcement action, but significant implementation gaps remain across Italy. Two rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union established that Italy breached Directive 2008/50/EC because of systematic exceedances of the limit values for Particulate Matter (PM 10 ) and Nitrogen dioxide (NO 2 ) and because it did not adopt appropriate measures to keep the exceedance period as short as possible. Progress is being closely monitored by the Commission in the framework of the annual reporting on ambient air quality and through periodic meetings with the Italian authorities. Given that the breaches of Directive 2008/50/EC found by the Court in Case C-644/18 3 as regards PM 10 persist, the Commission issued a letter of formal notice to Italy pursuant to Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on 13 March 2024. The Commission is currently assessing Italy’s replies to that letter as well as the actions taken by the Italian authorities to execute the Court’s judgment in Case C-573/19 4 as regards NO 2 . Additionally, it is assessing Italy’s replies to the letter of formal notice issued in 2020 5 as regards the exceedances of PM 2.5 . 1 Directive 2004/107/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 relating to arsenic, cadmium, mercury, nickel and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in ambient air, OJ L 23, 26.1.2005, p. 3–16; Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, OJ L 152, 11.6.2008, p. 1–44. 2 https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/health-impacts-of-exposure-to 3 Judgment of the Court of 10 November 2020 – European Commission v Italian Republic (Case C-644/18), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0644 4 Judgment of the Court of 12 May 2022 – European Commission v Italian Republic (Case C-573/19), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62019CA0573 5 INFR(2020)2299, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/EN/INF_20_1687”
Air quality policy
2025-01-21 “E-000237/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Based on the elements provided by the Honourable Member, it seems that the project of the biodigester in Casal Selce aligns with the scope of one specific investment of the Italian Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) 1 but no evidence related to the above-mentioned project has been submitted to the Commission in this context 2 . Therefore, the Commission does not have any evidence that the above-mentioned project is linked with its implementation. Based on its hazardous properties and on whether it is upgraded or not, biogas may be classified under Annex I of the Seveso III Directive 3 as a flammable 4 or as a liquified flammable gas 5 with thresholds of 10 and 50 tonnes for lower-tier requirements and 50 and 200 tonnes for upper-tier requirements 6 . Establishments where those substances may be present in quantities exceeding those thresholds fall under the scope of the Directive: it is the responsibility of the competent national authority to assess whether this is the case 7 . It is the primary responsibility of the Member States to ensure a correct implementation of relevant EU law 8 , including by ensuring compliance with it of specific projects financed under their national RRP. The Commission does not have sufficient information enabling it to assess whether the Seveso III Directive has been correctly applied in relation to the project at stake. The Nature Restoration Regulation 9 establishes overall targets for green space and tree canopy cover in urban areas: it does not relate to the impact of individual developments such as the plant in question. Member States are required to prepare National Restoration Plans by September 2026 10 . 1 Investment related to the ‘Implementation of new waste management plants and modernization of existing plants’ (Investment 1.1 of Mission 2 Component 1). 2 The implementation of the Italian RRP follows the submission of evidence according to the requirements contained in Milestones and Targets description as included in the Council Implementing Decision ST 15114/24 + ST 15114/24 ADD 1 REV 1. 3 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of majoraccident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 1–37. 4 Entry P2 of part 1 of Annex I to the Seveso III Directive. 5 Pursuant to note 19 of Annex I of the Seveso III Directive, for the purpose of the implementation of the Directive, upgraded biogas may be classified under entry 18 of Part 2 of Annex I where it has been processed in accordance with applicable standards for purified and upgraded biogas ensuring a quality equivalent to that of natural gas, including the content of Methane, and which has a maximum of 1 % Oxygen. 6 Stricter legal requirements apply to installations handling high amounts: upper tier establishments, as opposed to lower tier establishments, with lower quantities of dangerous substances and hence presenting a lower risk. 7 Based on information provided by the operator. 8 Commission enforcement action regarding bad implementation of EU law focuses mainly on systemic failures Communication from the Commission — EU law: Better results through better application, C/2016/8600, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10–20. 9 Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869, OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024. 10 Including the details of how they intend to meet the specified targets.”
Industrial emissions directive (IED) · EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Circular economy
2024-12-24 “E-003084/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Directive 2014/23/EU 1 applies to the award of concession contracts within the meaning of Article 5(1) of that Directive with a value exceeding the thresholds laid down in that same Directive. Under Article 43 of Directive 2014/23/EU, concessions may be modified during their term without a new procurement procedure only provided that the conditions laid down exhaustively in the first two paragraphs of that provision are met. In the case at hand, based on the elements available, it is unclear whether the contract referred to in the Honourable Members’ question can be qualified as a concession within the meaning of Directive 2014/23/EU or whether it should rather be considered as an authorisation for the pursuit of an economic activity falling outside the scope of that Directive. However, should the contract referred to by the Honourable Members fall within the scope of Directive 2014/23/EU, the national review bodies laid down under the Directives on remedies in public procurement (Directive 89/665/EEC 2 and Directive 92/13/EEC 3 , as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC 4 and Directive 2014/23/EU) are in the best position to assess, according to the facts of each case, whether these requirements are met in the specific dispute, and therefore whether contracting authorities and contracting entities respected their obligations under EU law. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0023 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01989L0665-20140417 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31992L0013 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32007L0066”
EU Competition policy · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
2024-12-12 “E-002910/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission There are no guidelines on the implementation of the Nature Restoration Regulation 1 with regard to which spaces are the most suitable for building facilities with a high impact such as sports complexes. The Regulation establishes overall targets for green space and tree canopy cover that need to be met, it does not relate to the impact of individual developments. Member States are responsible for the implementation of the Nature Restoration Regulation, and they are required to prepare National Restoration Plans, including the details of how they intend to meet the specified targets by September 2026. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869, OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024.”
Energy (green transition)
2024-11-29 “E-002705/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Based on the information provided in the written question, it is unclear whether Directive 2014/24/EU 1 would apply to the award of the contract referred to by the Honourable Members. In any event, national courts and review bodies referred to in the Directives on remedies in public procurement (Directive 89/665/EEC 2 and Directive 92/13/EEC 3 , as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC 4 and Directive 2014/23/EU 5 ) are best placed to assess in the first place, according to the facts of each case, whether contracting authorities and contracting entities respected their obligations under EU law as transposed into national law in a specific award procedure. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02014L0024-20240101 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01989L0665-20140417 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31992L0013 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32007L0066 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0023”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions
2024-11-25 “E-002651/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. On 3 July 2024, Italy notified the Commission as ‘final’ its updated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) 1 , based on Article 14(2) of the Governance Regulation 2 . The accompanying letter explains that the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is still ongoing. 2. Article 10 of the Governance Regulation states that in so far as the SEA Directive 3 is applicable, consultations undertaken on the draft NECP in accordance with that Directive shall be deemed to satisfy the obligations to consult the public under the Regulation. According to Article 6(2) of the SEA Directive, the public shall be given an early and effective opportunity to express their opinion on the draft plans and the accompanying environmental reports before the adoption of the plans. The Commission’s recommendations 4 on the Italian draft NECP reflect the crucial importance of a wide regional consultation and an early and inclusive consultation on the plan, including effective public participation with sufficient information and time 5 . The Commission, in its ongoing assessment of the updated NECPs, will assess whether Italy has taken due account of the Commission’s recommendations in drafting the final updated NECP. In any event, Member States are primarily responsible for the correct implementation of EU law. In accordance with the principle of effective judicial protection, it is for the national judge to ensure the compatibility of national measures with EU law. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/energy-climate-change-environment/implementation-eu-countries/energy-andclimate-governance-and-reporting/national-energy-and-climate-plans_en 2 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, p. 1–77. 3 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, (OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30). 4 Recommendations issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Governance Regulation, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/af5bd599-e8b5-49fd-a498dc00d6b81a0f_en?filename=Recommendation_draft_updated_NECP_Italy_2023.pdf 5 In line with the Aarhus Convention, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted on 25 June 1998.”
Energy (green transition)
2024-10-31 “P-002376/202 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s energy policy is focused on reducing its reliance on fossil fuels and decarbonising the economy. At the same time, the EU is committed to ensuring a secure and reliable energy supply. It is well understood that there are emissions of methane and other greenhouse gases linked to imported liquefied natural gas (LNG). Similarly, emissions are also associated with pipelines that are not properly maintained or traverse long distances. To address these issues, the new EU Methane Regulation 1 has an international dimension with requirements for measurement, reporting, and verification equivalence from 2027 and a methane intensity limit from 2030 onwards. A related reduction in emissions from EU imports in the future is therefore expected. EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories follow the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) guidelines, which as a key principle are built on emissions taking place within the territory (and its offshore areas). Considering this principle, all relevant GHG emissions from the natural gas supply chain taking place on EU’s territory are duly reported under the relevant categories of inventories covering the production, the transport or the consumption of natural gas. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942.”
Energy (green transition)
2024-08-20 “P-001533/2024 Answer given by Ms Simson on behalf of the European Commission Pursuant to article 16 (3) (a) of Directive (EU) 2019/944 1 , citizen energy communities should benefit from an enabling regulatory framework which enables them to access all electricity markets, either directly or through aggregation. Article 22 (2) (c) of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 2 ensures that renewable energy communities have direct access to all suitable energy markets both directly or through aggregation. Electricity markets include markets for the trading of energy, capacity, balancing and ancillary services in all timeframes pursuant to Article 2(9) of Directive (EU) 2019/944. The Commission is aware that in 2023, the Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy, Networks and Environment (ARERA) adopted a comprehensive reform of the rules on dispatching 3 . These rules will come into force on 1 January 2025 with the aim of implementing incentive mechanisms for those who contribute to the system's flexibility and open access to a larger number of participants, including renewable and citizen energy communities. The Commission will continue to follow this work to ensure full compliance with the Regulation (EU) 2019/943 and Directives (EU) 2019/944 and (EU) 2018/2001. The Commission has started the process of drafting a new network code on demand response 4 . These Union wide rules shall further clarify rules, responsibilities and procedures for all market participants, including aggregators. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019L0944 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2018.328.01.0082.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2018:328:TOC 3 Delibera ARERA 345/2023/R/2019 https://www.arera.it/atti-e-provvedimenti/dettaglio/23/345-23 4 https://www.acer.europa.eu/documents/public-consultations/pc2024e07-public-consultation-draft-networkcode-demand-response”
Energy (green transition)
2024-07-30 “P-001454/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. EU law requires Member States to ensure proper waste management, including to prepare for reuse or recycle at least 65% 1 and not landfill more than 10% 2 of their municipal waste by 2035. Incineration with energy recovery can provide appropriate treatment of non-recyclable residual waste 3 by extracting energy and valuable materials, diverting it from landfilling or illegal dumping, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution. To align waste infrastructure with the recycling targets, overcapacity in residual waste treatment should be avoided. No information indicates that this incinerator would contribute to incineration overcapacity or cause significant damage to the EU’s environmental objectives. 2. Decisions on the type and location of waste treatment plants are in the competence of the Member States and are part of their waste management plans to implement EU waste legislation, ensuring a high level of environmental protection and the application of the principles of the waste hierarchy, proximity, self-sufficiency and polluter-pays. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU law, including as regards assessing possible environmental impacts of projects and verifying individual cases of potential breaches of the rules. 3. The waste hierarchy lays down a priority order favoring waste prevention and preparing for re-use, followed by recycling, and only then recovery, including energy recovery, while the least preferred option is disposal, such as incineration without energy recovery and landfilling of waste 4 . The Commission considers that the place of energy recovery in the waste hierarchy is still valid. 1 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109–140. 2 Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste, OJ L 182, 16.7.1999, p. 1–19, amended by Directive (EU) 2018/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 100–108. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘The role of waste-to-energy in the circular economy’, COM(2017) 34 final. 4 Article 4 of Directive 2008/98/EC.”
Energy (green transition)
2024-07-29 “E-001449/2024 Answer given by Ms Simson on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is in the process of checking the transposition of the Directive 2019/944 1 in all Member States and does not comment on ongoing transposition checks or potential infringement procedures. The transposition of the provisions on demand response have been discussed with the members of the Cross Border Committee 2 on several occasions. Member States were tasked to answer a questionnaire, which investigates the national transposition and implementation of the provisions as well as the challenges faced. Subsequently, meetings with Members States have been conducted to clarify the provided answers, including with Italy. Please take note of the ongoing public consultation on the draft network code on demand response 3 that is conducted by ACER (European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators). These Union wide framework shall further clarify rules, responsibilities and procedures for all market participants including aggregators. Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 4 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/943 5 has introduced changes that aim at facilitating the participation of non-fossil flexibility and hence aggregation of distributed resources by means of indicative national objectives and potential support schemes. The relevant authorities shall periodically assess the need for flexibility at national level in the electricity system based on a common European methodology that is subject to public consultation and approval by ACER. Member States may apply non-fossil flexibility support schemes to reach the defined national indicative objectives. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L0944 2 This group is to provide a platform for exchanges between Member States, national regulators, ACER, ENTSO-E and the Commission on electricity policy having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 Article 68, Regulation (EU) 2019/943 Article 67 and Regulation (EU) 182/2011 in particular Article 9(1). It assists the Commission in relation to the implementation of existing Union legislation, programmes and policies as well as the preparation of delegated acts. 3 https://www.acer.europa.eu/documents/public-consultations/pc2024e07-public-consultation-draft-networkcode-demand-response 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1747/oj 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/943/oj”
Energy (green transition)
“Every day, every single day we import 2 million tonnes of fossil fuels. Every time a tank empties, we have to hook up to the nozzle of an oil pipeline or a tanker like needy sucklings at the bottle. Also one of the main objectives of a targets of conflicts are refineries and oil pipelines. Do you think no one would be tempted to strike an oil or gas tanker on its way to Europe for electrical vehicles? It's true that this dependence on critical materials, but once on the territory of the Union, those can be reused, maybe ad infinitum, and batteries can be recharged using electricity, which we can produce internally. An electrified energy system with renewable generation and smart networks, and distributed distributed storage, for which electrical cars will be a component 1000 times more resilient. Now, given excellent progress on batteries in terms of lifespan, capacity and reduced use of critical materials. Talking about technological neutrality, it would have been like asking Apple back in the 90s to stop producing computers, but to start selling typewriters. Tis.”
EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
“Thank you very much. Well, finally, ladies and gentlemen, I'm very pleased to welcome the reference to implement standards that are already in force. If the states had really achieved what they'd already planned more than seven years ago, we wouldn't be in this situation. The recent report from the Court of Auditors, by way of example, highlights the untapped structural potential of the energy community and the defaults of the member states. The Italian government, after a delay of implementing regulation for more than two years, has finally launched an RFP bid, but reduced the allocation from 2.2 billion to 795 million. This is versus a request to access 1.5 billion, and this was done with the approval of the commission, which is here today, saying one thing, but a few months ago was allowing the exact opposite. And what does that say about energy autonomy? Well, after putting us in the hands of the US and Qatari gas with the geopolitical cost outcomes we're all aware of, the commission is pushing for nuclear power again, to make us more independent on enriched uranium from Rosatom and from the US. Well done, well done indeed. We need somebody to lead Europe properly, I think.”
EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
“Thank you. And thank you for being with us and for your replies. I would like to come back to this issue of uncoupling. In the plan, we read that basically we'll be looking in particular at state aid, which can be adopted by member states if we have these peaks in energy prices Now that's certainly a possible solution, but not really structural, which will also affect public finances. Now, you told my colleague today who asked about uncoupling that we need to, um, push, um, collective purchasing. So it's not clear to us how the commission intends to really address, in structural and definitive terms, this question of the principle merit order on decoupling is not only a price issue, it's about public acceptance and questions about renewables. Until we have decoupling, obviously local bodies will be against this because they're not going to see any reflection of, um, better usage of renewables through their bills. So I'd like to come back to this question to ask whether we're hearing today that the Commission wants to push on decoupling, not only assisted by state aid, but also implementing what was written black on white in the plan that was published some weeks ago. Thank you.”
EU approach to electricity market and prices
“Good morning. Colleagues. This is a very interesting debate. Because it's the mirror image of a policy that is based on fake news and lack of scientific and technological information and postponements. For example, we could say that this is a failed industrial policy. You you're blaming the Green Deal for the automotive crisis? When the automotive crisis started 20 years ago, you blame the Green Deal for loss of jobs, when in reality. Regular, everyday Europeans cannot buy a car because due to the to misled economic and industrial policies, Europeans have lost purchasing power. And instead of having an industrial policy. And I'm happy that Mrs. von der Leyen have realized that industrial policies are something that we need to look at. While creating small and accessible green cars, electric cars. But instead, you're proposing electric vehicles that cost 50, 60, €80,000. Which means that by 2035, the middle classes in Europe will simply not be able to afford these cars, and they'll be opposed to these green policies. So we need better communication and planning when it comes to industrial policy. The goal should be creating economies of scale with small cars. That should be the goal, not 2035, which I think is a useless goal because the technological changes and the economies of scale outside of Europe will have a great advantage over European industry. The goal was to make the population understand that even within cities, electric vehicles are not only good for emissions, they're and all the good health effects that does have, but we should rather start with quad, quad, quad bikes, motorcycles, biking, small vehicles. But instead, too often Europe is focusing on other sectors. And finally, it's a question of sovereignty. Every time that we need to use hydrogen, we depend on imports. And if we have electric batteries, they can be produced locally. They're also recyclable, unlike fossil fuels, which are simply burnt into the air and are never seen again. Thank you.”
Energy (green transition)
“Trees are extremely useful in mitigating urban heat islands. They reduce our spending on cooling buildings, they sequester carbon, they cool asphalt, and they improve health. They are truly a marvel and reforestation is something that resources have been earmarked for under our end, and that is something good that the union has done. Wasn't so good to allow exemptions to the nature restoration law and allow people to cut down trees merely with a promise to plant others elsewhere. It is important that we have mature trees because young trees that are replanted often don't survive our heat waves, and that is why we should have micro forests, such as in Rome, where we've had trees cut down to build a sports stadium. So we have got to make sure the good intentions don't lead us on a hellish path. There shouldn't be compensation. We need to face up to a climate crisis, not a football crisis.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU
“Good morning. Commissioner. Relating to Ets2 and its entry into force. We support the mechanism and its dual aim. But we need to take account of gas prices. 10% of Europeans are living in energy poverty right now, and we face a very serious situation. The mechanism was conceived in 2021 when gas prices were much lower. We're now seeing prices which are 80% higher. The impact assessment accompanying the 2021 proposal was based on a predicted increase, the increase, the commission said of 9 to 33%. So ETS two coming into force now could have very unfortunate consequences for the well-being and prosperity of families, particularly the poorest families. I saw in the press recently that the Czech Republic, supporting, among others, by Slovakia, has apparently asked the Commission to postpone the entry into force of ETS two. So I would be very interested to know what the Commission's position is on the Czech Republic's proposal, first of all. Secondly, has the Commission updated its impact assessment of the 2021 impact assessment, given the price increases in the meantime, in the geopolitical instability and the current situation of gas prices, and if such an update has not been carried out, which I would consider to be a very serious matter. But if that is the case, does the Commission intend to produce such an updated impact assessment before the entry into force of ETS two. And do you intend to look at the Social Fund for climate to assist the most vulnerable families in facing the consequences of the entry into force of the mechanism? Thank you.”
EU approach to electricity market and prices
“Thank you very much indeed. A Bloomberg report on Friday, which is not exactly a socialist collective, talked about the price of gas increasing by 20% by 2026 and even more by 2030. And we are seeing artificially high gas prices. And we need, however, to reduce emissions. Along with my group, we are very much in favour of the decarbonisation of transport and heating, but we need to make sure that prices are still sustainable for families, businesses and look at some tax breaks. We believe, however, that we need to urgently revise the mechanisms for doing this, and the Clean Energy Fund is probably no longer fit for purpose. That is why we would call for accessible energy. I think we are in time to correct imbalances. We have to tackle the cost of electricity, decouple it from gas. If we cannot, um, affect the price of gas.”
EU approach to electricity market and prices
“Ladies and gentlemen, Buckminster Fuller is known as the architect of Geodesic Dome, but he was also a visionary engineer. I'd like to quote some of his thoughts from over 40 years ago that are still very relevant today. His proposal for solving poverty in many international conflicts was to develop, and I quote, a world energy grid, an electric grid where everybody is on the same grid. All of a sudden there would be no problems anymore, no international troubles are new economic basis wouldn't be gold or dollars, it would be kilowatt hours. He presented a plan, in his own words, a plan for using our increasing technical ability to construct high voltage superconducting transmission lines and implement an around the world electrical energy grid, integrating the daytime and night time hemispheres, thus swiftly increasing the operating capacity of the world's electrical energy system and concomitantly, living standards. In an unprecedented feat of international cooperation, the European electricity grid is an indispensable tool for compensating for the intermittency of renewables, whereby electrons will flow without borders. The Spanish sun will heat Swedish steelworks, and the Baltic wind will cool apartment buildings in Naples. I would like to thank the rapporteur and my colleagues. This text makes a fundamental contribution to achieving a true energy union with no more obstacles, borders, emissions or geopolitical dependencies.”
EU energy infrastructure integration
“And this will take up availability on the connector market. And it will also cause problems for planning for upgrading networks and grids. And I believe that we need European rules on this phenomenon of the secondary market. What is also of fundamental importance is that for energy communities, connections to the grid can be secured. Those who don't have the know how to do so necessarily. And we do believe that we should take account of that. And still on connections, there's the whole business of timing. We need to make sure that our citizens and companies have guarantees and know for sure when homes and other units will be connected to renewable energies. People are investing in solar panels, for example, and, you know, often member states make incentives available for for those. But sometimes people who've put the solar panels in have to wait for months before their generation of electricity can be connected to the grid. And that doesn't really create any trust in renewable energy, which is what we all want quickly. So that's something we need to look at too. Thank you.”
EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
“Thank you very much indeed. Let me start by thanking the rapporteur, of course, because apart from the fact that the draft opinion is an excellent one, she's also made sure that the atmosphere that we've been working in ever since our first meeting was really great and warm, and I hope that we could repeat that with respect to all of our files. So anyway, the draft is a good point of departure. That said, there are a couple of aspects which are already in the draft, but which, as I see it, could be clarified a bit further. First of all, the point on resilience of grids or anti-fragility? If you want to put it differently, we need to make sure that we can have investment in the resilience of our grids so that we can stave of heat waves, floods and so on. Climatic conditions, they will be increasing in number and severity. And if we can't beef up the resilience, we risk blackouts on our grids. Then there are the connections. In Italy, there's a secondary market of proposals for connection in relation to non capacity, but there is no financial solidity to this.”
EU energy infrastructure integration
“Thanks very much indeed for organizing this hearing. Thank you. To the speakers. I am embrace most of what you've had to say. Climate Action Network Europe I particularly agree with. Given that renewable energies have a tremendous untapped potential. You are quite right there, particularly in some member states. It's also correct that we should not just sweep aside Russian gas imports, because getting rid of fossil fuels is. Only geared towards one country, and we're not whittling away dependency on other countries when it comes to the need to reduce prices for consumers and increasing our competitiveness. Competitiveness in the EU, increasing renewables capacity. We're seeing negative prices in the electric electricity market, particularly in some countries where the energy switch is further ahead, such as Germany. This can undermine her revenue of operators who are investing in in renewables, preventing us from reaching our climate aims. At the same time, when there is low energy production, electricity prices on the electricity market can jump up because these prices are still fixed by the gas generation at price. So our consumers, companies and our families are exposed to very high prices, which are also very volatile. Investing in the grid and solutions, promoting flexibility and a rejigging of supply zones. All of this can of course serve to improve things, but this is not a complete and definitive solution. Solutions such as CFD and PPD promoted by the Commission in the previous term of office, and which was also signed off on by the Parliament, can help to resolve the problem. But these have proven not particularly efficient so far. So why are we not yet seeing the effects of CFD and PPD on the electricity market? Do you not think it is high time to conceive of gradually coupling and renewable energy prices from gas prices? What do you think? How should we go about this?”
EU approach to electricity market and prices
“Thank you very much. My approach is actually the opposite to that of the majority, because we're blocking Russian gas, because we have to actually turn to reliable partners, especially when it comes to human rights. But what about the US? Trumps US and Qatar? Can they really be reliable and trustworthy? Do they really respect human rights? The Greens and the environmentalists are unhappy with this, especially when LNG, especially us, LNG actually emits more than other types of gas. So we talk about climate targets. And yet we are reducing electrification targets. Um, thinking about the fact that mobility electrification is slowing down and the fact that we have problems with the range standards for cars. And then of course storage. Less storage. We're against the decisions that have been taking. We feel that these are like leaves on autumn trees, and we're really exposed to what is happening with the climate in the Arctic Circle. And I hope that this winter won't be particularly cold. Because we have reduced storage. And I hope that in the future there won't be geopolitical consequences that will hinge on Trump's mood swings. And because, of course, this will have an impact on our citizens pockets.”
EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
“Good morning colleagues. Good morning Minister. Well, ministers, welcome. We were very pleased to hear your reference to the issue of managing storage. We know we have a goal to achieve 90% storage rates by the first of every year. And every member state is responsible. But there are problems in terms of gas prices now. And that's something we need to look at. It's almost €60 per megawatt hour now the wholesale price of gas. So the issue now is that there may well be internal competition between member states, because they've all got to fill up their gas storage levels. And at this time, we're seeing speculation on the gas market and a lack of diversification in terms of suppliers. And that's causing problems for families and businesses in Europe and is also causing problems in terms of our efforts to become more competitive. So this brings me to my question. Together with over 30 colleagues, we sent a letter to the commission a month ago to extend the duration of the gas price ceiling, because that's that obligation ran out on the 30th of January. So the idea was to reduce the level of the ceiling, which makes prices acceptable to citizens and businesses, and also how to delink the price of electricity from the price of gas. And the idea was to have a more radical and structured intervention. So the question is, is the Council presidency going to be an ally in these efforts? What do you think about all of this? Thank you.”
EU approach to electricity market and prices
“Honourable members. The situation that we're seeing today is not new in 2022. We had diesel at over €2 a litre, the price of energy at tripled and fertiliser prices going up as well. We knew the solutions back then. Renewables, energy efficiency, storage and sustainable agriculture. But many people, even within this House have been holding up this transition, leaving us exposed to the crisis we see today. Too many people in Europe, in the West have peddled fake narratives. They said that wind turbines, rust efficiency costs too much, and electric vehicles burst into flames. People who are now calling for emergency measures have tried to get rid of the Green Deal. They have reduced our energy autonomy and they have they've resisted efforts to decarbonize and to have sustainable agriculture. Do we want to find ourselves in this situation in four days or in four years? Or do we want to realize that depending on fossil fuels is a noose around our neck, and that liberalism and budget balancing has failed? We don't want to we want to drag Europe towards a social market economy with a broad vision for the future. Thank you.”
Energy (green transition)
“Ladies and gentlemen, we know that to date a great deal has been done on decarbonisation, but not enough has been done to strengthen and adapt our electricity grids, interconnectors between states and continents, national transmission networks as well as distribution points. Each one of these three extenders has a fundamental task to ensure security and stability of supply in electrified and decarbonized energy model. We need to ensure our resilience and strategic autonomy in a turbulent geopolitical context that exposes us to economic threats and an in increasing risk of cyber attacks, as well as potential physical attacks as well. The package is a good starting point to adapt our electricity grids to these new realities, to improve the effectiveness of investments, speeding up connections as well, both at a macro level as a principle of solidarity, cooperation and energy exchange between member states. There will also be able to compensate for intermittency of some of the renewable sources, but also trickling down to the micro territorial level as well, where networks should be at the service of local communities, small generation and distributed accumulation, and unable to operate by design autonomously in the event of disruptive events of any kind, be it climatic, hybrid attacks or conventional attacks. This is one of the best forms of European defence and resilience that we can actually achieve. Thank you very much, colleagues. We're going to be working on this package. We look forward to working on it too. Thank you.”
EU energy infrastructure integration
“It is a real pleasure to remind the Sovereignists today that decarbonization spells autonomy and security. I mean, it's easy enough for a child to understand. If we're more efficient, then we'll be less dependent on debt traps, and we'll be less dependent on dangerous straits such as Hormuz. We have a situation in which people are seriously mooting scrapping the ETS and rather remaining dependent on the market speculation and the Petro monarchies. We have to realize that our fragility is not aggravated by decarbonization, and anybody who doesn't realize that will continue to stand in the way. We have generated €18 billion thanks to ETS, and we have managed to invest in renewables and the energy. We have a tax which is not unbearable and unproductive, as some contend, but rather it is an instrument which serves the interests of the future of industry. Thank you very much.”
Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
“It’s a pleasure to see how we are entirely in agreement with colleagues Kelly, Tobac, and Stork. I think this reflects the excellent meeting of minds in the drafting of our report, so I won't repeat what colleagues have said. I'll simply add some thoughts and some avenues for reflection. Firstly, Europe has gone for renewable energy objectives without at the same time guaranteeing that electrical grids commensurate with them have been developed so that the renewable energy generated can be uniformly distributed across the whole continent. Therefore, more concentration needs to go into the planning of renewables to ensure that as they increase, they can also be transmitted and distributed. Then on security, both military and climate security, electrical grids, as we've seen for example in the case of the Ukraine conflict where energy generating stations have been one of the main targets, need to be looked at. Renewables can allow for that distribution and also energy savings. They will be more resilient in terms of military security but also they would ensure that distribution and transmission is guaranteed. It's unacceptable what's happening in some parts of Italy. In Rome, I had to wait a long time to get a contract allowing me to connect to my wall box. If we want to do something with distribution, we're starting from scratch on the ground often. Then there needs to be more attention done to the transmission system operators and there needs to be more financing to go into their connection with the distribution operators. **Giorgio GORI @Chair (Italy, S&D): There's no Miss Nagyova, no. So I now give the floor to our two guests, starting with Mister Joakim Balka, Head of Unit in DGNN. Thank you. You have five minutes.”
EU energy infrastructure integration
“Thank you very much. Well, finally, ladies and gentlemen, I'm very pleased to welcome the reference to implement standards that are already in force. If the states had really achieved what they'd already planned more than seven years ago, we wouldn't be in this situation. The recent report from the Court of Auditors, by way of example, highlights the untapped structural potential of the energy community and the defaults of the member states. The Italian government, after a delay of implementing regulation for more than two years, has finally launched an RFP bid, but reduced the allocation from 2.2 billion to 795 million. This is versus a request to access 1.5 billion, and this was done with the approval of the commission, which is here today, saying one thing, but a few months ago was allowing the exact opposite. And what does that say about energy autonomy? Well, after putting us in the hands of the US and Qatari gas with the geopolitical cost outcomes we're all aware of, the commission is pushing for nuclear power again, to make us more independent on enriched uranium from Rosatom and from the US. Well done, well done indeed. We need somebody to lead Europe properly, I think.”
EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
“Okay. And then the potential mandatory nature of that. So that's a follow up to my first question. And then just very briefly, €1.5 billion funding for innovation to support European products linked to these batteries. Are their resilience criteria when it comes to looking at the net zero industry when it comes to products that aren't primary raw materials. For example, when it comes to sodium based batteries.”
EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding

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