- 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.6.2026 Written question The Commission monitors the main deadlines [1] applicable for energy-transition as well as the implementation of the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP) through the bi-annually reports [2] . Each Member State is assessed for meeting its objectives [3] and targets as set out in its NECP [4] . Where the progress towards meeting the targets is insufficient, the Commission issues recommendations to the Member State concerned [5] . The Commission also monitors the progress of the Member States towards energy transition in the framework of the European Semester annual exercise, which coordinates the EU's economic and social policies including energy policy. The Commission is aware that permitting delays for renewable energy projects are reported in most Member States, including Italy. For this reason, it has put in place a series of actions to ensure that the permitting deadlines and obligations set in the revised Renewable Energy Directive [6] are respected, including launching infringement procedures against Italy [7] and other Member States for lack of transposition of permitting provisions of the revised Renewable Energy Directive. Other actions aim to improve capacity building of permitting authorities, e.g. via the Technical Support Instrument which provided support to Italy to streamline permitting procedures, strengthen administrative capacities, digitalise permits, and enhance public engagement [8] . The Commission also works to avoid slowdowns in the energy transition, coordinates the efforts across Member States to create a robust framework that catalyses public and private investment, supports corrective measures that remove bottlenecks for faster permitting, grid and storage expansion, and de-risking of clean-energy finance. [1] A not exhaustive list of deadlines related to this framework: — 30 June 2024 for final National Energy and Climate Plans, — 1 July 2024 for some renewables permitting rules, — 21 May 2025 for broader Renewable Energy Directive transposition (EU 2023/2413), — 11 October 2025 for the key provisions of the Energy Efficiency Directive (EU/ 2023/1791), — Commission takes action to ensure complete and timely transposition of EU directives (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_25_1842), — 29 May 2026 for the revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EU/2024/1275, EPBD), — 1 March 2026 for national diversification plans under REPowerEU. [2] The next assessment of progress will be published in 2027. [3] The assessment of the updated Italian NECP is available on the Commission's website: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/commission-assessment-final-updated-national-energy-and-climate-plan-italy_en. [4] Art. 29(1)b of Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (Governance Regulation). [5] Article 34 of the Governance Regulation. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng. [7] (INFR(2024)0232: https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringement-decisions/?lang_code=EN&typeOfSearch=byDecision&active_only=0&noncom=0&r_dossier=&decision_date_from=&decision_date_to=&DG=ENER&title=2023%2F2413&submit=Search&langCode=EN&version=v1&dg=ENER&page=1&size=10&order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate&memberState=IT. [8] https://reforms-investments.ec.europa.eu/technical-support-instrument-0/green-transition/faster-permitting-renewable-energy-projects-italy_en.”
Energy (green transition) · EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects
- 2026-03-10 “P-000999/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been in touch with the Italian authorities and is willing to continue supporting them in their effort to ensure that the system of licenses for street trade is compliant with the Services Directive 1 . In particular, it is important that these licenses are assigned according to transparent selection procedures, in compliance with the principles of impartiality, non-discrimination, equal treatment and publicity, as duly recognised by the same Article 11 of Law 214/2023 2 . With respect to the ‘scarcity’ associated to street trade services, it would appear that, in the Italian system, authorisations are assigned based on selection among several candidates, as provided by the above-mentioned Italian legislation: this creates a situation of exclusivity, as only the authorisation holders can provide services within the portion of municipal territory where street trade can be materially provided, with the exclusion of other operators. It is for the Italian authorities to identify the most adequate implementing national measures to ensure that the Services Directive is applied to this sector. In this vein, the Commission supports the objective of reforming and making the overall system more transparent and efficient, to the benefit of interested operators and consumers. 1 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, pp. 36–68. 2 LEGGE 30 dicembre 2023, n. 214 - Legge annuale per il mercato e la concorrenza 2022, https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2023-12-30;214.”
EU Single Market harmonisation
- 2025-11-05 “E-004353/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission As a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the EU does not engage with Russian public entities, including in the field of culture. Russian cultural figures under EU sanctions are subject to an EU entry ban and to the freezing of assets in the EU due to actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The opera singer in question has not been put under the EU’s restrictive measures. Press reports indicate that the performance at the Teatro Filarmonico in Verona in January 2026 has been cancelled. Entry bans can be entered in the Schengen Information System (SIS) based on restrictive measures or a judicial or administrative decision by a Member State. The Commission has no access to the data in the SIS and therefore cannot establish whether there is an alert on a person for refusal of entry and stay. Russian authorities instrumentalise culture, which in the case of state-controlled cultural and artistic bodies and entities becomes an extended arm of the regime’s propaganda. It is for Member States, however, to determine the level of cultural cooperation while ensuring that their national policies conform to the Union’s positions as set out in Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union 1 and within the existing EU policies vis-à-vis Russia. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-08-20 “E-003266/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission EU sanctions adopted on the basis of Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP 1 are carefully targeted and aimed at those responsible for policies or actions undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Decisions designating specific individuals are taken by the Council and require the unanimous approval of all Member States. When it comes to listing specific individuals or entities, every listing needs to fulfil the criteria defined in the respective sanctions framework and to be backed by evidence. EU restrictive measures under Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP already apply to a total over 2500 individuals and entities. The High Representative/Vice-President will continue to work with Member States in order to further strengthen EU sanctions, including individual designations. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/145(1)/oj/eng.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe
- 2025-07-09 “E-002786/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission It is the competence of national authorities and courts to address individual instances of hate crime and hate speech and to establish if the use of specific symbols, represents an offence from a national criminal law perspective. The Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating racism and xenophobia 1 obliges Member States to criminalise the public incitement to violence or hatred by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin, and specifically the public condoning, denying or grossly trivialising of the Holocaust when likely to incite to violence or hatred. The Commission will continue to support projects across Europe to address the history of totalitarian crimes and encourage remembrance actions on the causes of totalitarian regimes. The EU Agenda for preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, set out in the ProtectEU Strategy 2 , planned for 2026, will propose ambitious EU action reflecting the fastevolving threat landscape. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008F0913&from=EN. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0148. This strategy will succeed the 2020 Counter Terrorism Agenda, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0795&qid=1754899118045.”
EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · Jewish culture and antisemitism
- 2025-07-07 “E-002755/2025 E-002867/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. As confirmed by the Managing Authority of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) programme for Campania, responsible for the implementation of EU cohesion funding in the region, the Commission can confirm that the concert series ‘Un’Estate da RE’ is not financed with EU resources but only with national funds through Italy’s Development and Cohesion Fund (Fondo per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione – FSC). The Commission has no responsibility for the selection and implementation of interventions under national funds which are fully the responsibility of the Member States. 2. For the next long-term EU budget, the Commission has proposed strong safeguards to protect the financial interest of the EU 1 by requiring the respect of the principles of the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the implementation of the Fund. 1 COM (2025) 570 final.”
Cohesion and rural funding
- 2025-07-01 “E-002651/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU has detected and exposed several foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations from the Russian state or pro-Kremlin actors. The EU is aware of ongoing campaigns and the modus operandi of the Russian government. In response to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has taken steps to combat Russian FIMI operations in the territory of the EU. The EU has restricted the broadcasting of content from outlets, including RT, engaging in continuous and concerted propaganda actions supporting the war 1 . The EU has also prohibited providing advertising services to the Russian government or Russian legal persons 2 . EU non-government orgnaisations and media service providers are also prohibited from accepting Russian financing, in order to counter Russian efforts to interfere with EU democratic processes 3 . Member States must ensure that violations of these prohibitions are criminalised 4 . Russian FIMI campaigns are analysed and findings are published in the European External Action Service’s FIMI Threat report 5 and on the EUvsDisinfo platform 6 . Investigations of activities potentially violating EU restrictive measures (sanctions) fall within the competence of the Member States. Sanctions against broadcasting outlets and other actors are implemented and enforced by their authorities. In addition, the European Media Freedom Act 7 provides a regulatory coordination mechanism on media services from outside the EU that prejudice public security. The Commission closely monitors the transposition of Directive 2024/1226 to ensure the effective application of sanctions. It also works with Member States to prepare for the application of Regulation 2024/900, which sets out common transparency and accountability standards for political advertising 8 . 1 Article 2f of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20241029. 2 Article 5n of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014. 3 Article 5t of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014. 4 Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1226/oj. 5 The 3 rd FIMI Threat Report can be found here: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreigninformation-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en. 6 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/. 7 Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1083f the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj/eng. 8 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-06-12 “E-002378/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Hamas has been listed by the EU, under its counterterrorism sanction regime (the EU Terrorist List), since 12 September 2003 1 . Following the 7 October 2023 attacks, the Council has listed three Hamas related individuals under the same sanctions regime. The Council also adopted a new regime targeting Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), on 19 January 2024 2 . There are currently 15 listings (12 individuals and three entities) in force under that regime. Additionally, on 12 April 2024, the Council listed three entities (armed groups of Hamas and PIJ) over widespread sexual and gender-based violence during the 7 October 2023 attacks, under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime 3 . Restrictive measures are adopted by the Member States in the Council by unanimity. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202400332. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024D0385. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32024D1074.”
EU-US relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
- 2025-05-26 “E-002106/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission Directive (EU) 2024/1500 on standards for equality bodies does not apply yet. It is being transposed by EU Member States which have to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive by 19 June 2026. The Commission is supporting Member States in this process through an expert group composed of representatives of Member States in which the European Network of equality bodies (Equinet), the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the European Institute for Gender Equality participate as observers. The expert group had its first meeting right after the adoption of the Directive. A total of five meetings have taken place so far. Once the transposition date of 19 June 2026 is reached, the Commission will verify the compliance of the transposition measures notified by the Member States with the Directive. It will take swift action in the absence of compliant transposition, including, where relevant, by starting infringement procedures in accordance with Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”
EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
- 2025-05-21 “E-002032/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Russian malign influence, interference and attempts to manipulate the public opinion in Member States take many forms. The Russian state operates outlets in more than 32 languages including in Italian, meaning all of the EU and the Member States are targeted. The EU has imposed restrictive measures, including a broadcasting ban, on outlets spreading disinformation about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Certain EU entities, including non-governmental organisations and media service providers, are also barred from accepting Russian financing, in order to counter Russia’s interference with EU democratic processes 1 . The EU has led the development of policies and tools for countering foreign information manipulation and interference 2 (FIMI). Within the mandate of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Russian FIMI campaigns are monitored, analysed and publicly exposed, including on EUvsDisinfo 3 . The High Representative/Vice-President reiterates the EU’s position of strong condemnation of Russia’s malign disinformation campaigns which should be seen together with espionage and hybrid threats. The Commission is preparing a European Democracy Shield to help to counter foreign information manipulation and interference online. Actions or investigations of activities of alleged FIMI actors inside Member States are within the competence of the Member States. Restrictive measures against identified FIMI outlets and actors are implemented and enforced by Member States’ competent authorities. The Commission closely monitors compliance but neither the Commission nor EEAS comments on national investigations nor the administration of justice in the Member States. 1 Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, Article 2(f), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulationinterference-fimi_en. 3 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe
- 2025-04-25 “E-001677/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Persons subject to individual restrictive measures (sanctions), including the Russian journalist mentioned in the question, are subject to an asset freeze, a prohibition to receive funds or economic resources and a travel ban 1 . The Commission oversees the implementation of EU sanctions as per Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 2 . The enforcement of sanctions is primarily the responsibility of national authorities, and the Commission supports Member States in their efforts to ensure compliance, including through monitoring, the issuance of guidance and continuous information-exchange with the relevant national competent authorities of the Member States. Member States shall take all necessary steps to ensure adherence to EU sanctions in their jurisdiction. The EU is taking a number of initiatives aimed at promoting media pluralism and tackling pro-Russian disinformation. These include inter alia the European Democracy Action Plan 3 , the enforcement of the Digital Services Act 4 and the EU vs Disinfo platform 5 . On the sanctions side, some Russian media outlets are already subject to a broadcasting ban according to Article 2f of Council Regulation 833/2014 6 as they have been instrumental in preparing and supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and for their participation in Russia’s systematic information manipulation and disinformation under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation. Any restrictive measure falls under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and must be agreed unanimously by the Council. 1 Article 2, Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0269-20250316. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/269/oj/eng. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ga/ip_20_2250. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legissum:4625430. 5 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng.”
Disinformation & online freedoms · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-04-09 “E-1466/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Children’s rights are protected under Article 24 of the EU Charter 1 , which guarantees their right to be heard in matters affecting them. The Commission is committed to ensuring the respect of the Charter within the remit of its competences 2 . The Brussels IIb Regulation 3 provides uniform rules obliging the courts of the Member States to hear a child when exercising jurisdiction in parental responsibility matters. Family law remains under national jurisdiction, according to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, and aligned with national and international law. When child victims are heard in criminal proceedings, pursuant to the Victims’ Rights Directive 4 , the procedural rules are determined by national law. Directive (EU) 2024/1385 5 further recognises child victims, as witnesses to domestic violence, requiring child-friendly procedures, trained professionals, and safe contact arrangements between a child and a holder of parental responsibility who is an offender or suspect of violence against women or domestic violence. Member States must transpose it into their national legislation (by June 2027). During this period, the Commission will hold implementation workshops to steer the timely and complete transposition. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the application of the relevant legal provisions and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 2 According to its Article 51(1), the Charter applies to Member States only when they are implementing EU law. 3 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (recast) OJ L 178, 2.7.2019, p. 1–115. 4 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57. 5 Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, OJ L, 2024/1385, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1385/oj.”
EU policy on victims' compensation rights · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
- 2025-02-10 “E-000600/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attaches great importance to upholding and fostering pluralistic and independent media in the EU – a key pillar of our democratic societies – and condemns any attempts to illegally access data of citizens, as well as any form of interference in the professional activities of journalists and their editorial independence. EU law on data protection and privacy offers comprehensive protection to the confidentiality of communications and users’ personal data and terminal equipment. Moreover, Article 4(3) of the European Media Freedom Act 1 , which will start applying in August 2025, provides a set of safeguards for the protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications, in particular against the deployment of intrusive surveillance software. In this light, any action or decision at national level should respect those safeguards and the Commission is closely following the preparations in Member States to implement and apply them, engaging with the relevant national authorities and ensuring alignment with the Act’s objectives and requirements. The Commission will also continue to monitor the situation of media freedom and pluralism in all Member States, including within the forthcoming 2025 Rule of Law Report 2 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083, OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en”
Privacy & law enforcement · Surveillance equipment & spyware
- 2025-01-20 “E-000230/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the fact that journalists have been questioned by the Hungarian Constitution Protection Office. The Commission monitor incidents involving journalists in all Member States in the framework of its annual Rule of Law Report, which covers all Member States, including Hungary. The next edition will be published in July 2025. As of 8 August 2025, Article 4(3)(a) of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) 1 will become applicable. The provision states that Member States shall ensure that journalistic sources and confidential communications are effectively protected. Member States shall not (…) oblige media service providers or their editorial staff to disclose information related to or capable of identifying journalistic sources or confidential communications or oblige any persons who, because of their regular or professional relationship with a media service provider or its editorial staff, might have such information to disclose it. It is the objective of that and other safeguards in EMFA to ensure free and independent media across the EU and protect them against undue interference. The Commission will use all the tools at its disposal to ensure effective compliance with this provision across the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083”
Rule of law in Hungary · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
- 2025-01-20 “E-000211/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Italian Recovery and Resilience Plan includes a reform of the student housing regulation coupled with an investment aimed at creating additional sleeping accommodations units (beds) for students (reform 1.7 of Mission 4, component 1). The Council Implementing Decision does not include a reference on single rooms. The Commission is working closely with the Italian authorities to ensure the effective implementation of the Italian Recovery and Resilience Plan, and regular dialogues are held to ensure compliance with its requirements, including those relevant to this reform and investment. The Commission's Communication on a comprehensive approach to mental health 1 supports Member States in strengthening their mental health systems with 20 flagship initiatives and close to EUR 1.3 billion in funding opportunities from EU financial instruments. It focuses on supporting young people through initiatives such as the development of a prevention toolkit with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the provision of tailored capacitybuilding from the World Health Organization (WHO) to Member States. 1 https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/comprehensive-approach-mental-health_en”
Governance of academic priorities within the EU
- 2024-09-04 “E-001615/2024 Answer given by Vice-President Jourová on behalf of the European Commission Safeguarding media freedom and pluralism has been at the heart of the Commission’s efforts to uphold democracy and the rule of law in the EU. Article 4(3) of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) 1 requires Member States to effectively protect journalistic sources and confidential communications and to refrain from taking certain measures, including subjecting journalists’ corporate or private premises to search for the purpose of obtaining information related to or capable of identifying journalistic sources or confidential communication. Nonetheless, Article 4(4) of the EMFA provides for a derogation allowing Member States to take such measures under certain strict conditions. These conditions include the requirement that the possibility to take the measure is provided for by EU or national law, that the measure is justified by an overriding reason of public interest and is proportionate, and that the measure is subject to prior authorisation by a judicial authority or an independent and impartial decision-making authority or, in duly justified exceptional and urgent cases, is subsequently authorised by such an authority without undue delay. These EMFA provisions shall apply from 8 August 2025. As part of its annual Rule of Law Report, the Commission assesses the situation on media freedom and pluralism in all Member States 2 . The chapter on Italy notes that in spite of targeted rules on the protection of journalists, the situation regarding their safety and working conditions as well as the increasing prevalence of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) cases 3 remain an issue 4 . If they consider that national measures infringe their rights, citizens and businesses can resort to the competent national authorities. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-europeandemocracy/protecting-democracy/european-media-freedom-act_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/27db4143-58b4-4b61-a021a215940e19d0_en?filename=1_1_58120_communication_rol_en.pdf 3 SLAPP: strategic lawsuits against public participation. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/60d79a4f-49cd-4061-a18fd3a4495d6485_en?filename=29_1_58066_coun_chap_italy_en.pdf”
Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
- “I was saying that either use appropriate language in this chamber or I'll remove the microphone. You cannot insult people in this institution the way you're doing. Please take the floor, but use appropriate language.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions
- “We mustn't think that because they're committed online, there shouldn't be consequences because it has a huge impact on the lives of children, minorities, women teenagers, we're talking about a huge impact. Sometimes the impact is dramatic and the perpetrators need to be made aware of this, and perpetrators should not be given the possibility to hide behind the anonymity provided by the internet. Of course, we have made progress with the DSA, the AI act, but these steps are not enough. More than anything, often there is a lack of implementation. So as we just said when we talked about online gender based violence, we have. There is an urgent need to come up with a clear European definition of cyberbullying. We also need clear prevention measures and punishment of clear punishment of these crimes. All of this has to be enshrined in EU treaties. We need prosecution across the EU. We know that the consequences of cyber bullying can be terrible. We're talking about terrible scars that have a huge impact on people's lives, and we're called upon to take action. Thank you.”
Safety features & content control for child protection online
- “We're waiting for the commissioner. Commissioner Roosevelt hasn't joined us yet. We are obliged to wait for the commissioner to arrive. No. Commissioner Roosevelt is being replaced by a colleague, Mr. Hoekstra.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions
- “You are not allowed to insult this person. I'd like to call you to order and use appropriate language in this chamber. Otherwise, I'll take the microphone away.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions
- “The next item on the agenda is Commission statement. Rail transport safety in the European Union. Lessons learnt from the accident and three years after the Tempe tragedy. I should like to give the floor immediately to the Commissioner if he is ready to speak. Go ahead. Commissioner, you have the floor. Please.”
EU support of rail transport · EU policy on aviation safety
- “Grazie, grazie. Thank you for the presentations. And I'd like to echo the words of thanks. They were very relevant, topical and helpful. I'm very interested in disinformation because, as colleagues have already said, we know that organised crime use these, uh, information bodies to send out. Misinformation, including about the situation in Ukraine, but also about public administration and the EU as well. And we're having to take sanctions. We've suspended 27 different disinformation, uh, channels. And we're also taking measures about the broadcast of information that has been sanctioned within the borders of the EU. But what's the problem? Well, the content is still broadcast. This happens in a lot of countries. It happens in my country, Italy. Where a well known one of the main Russian propagandist Soviet has been invited to speak on public television. Uh, but they can speak on private platforms as well. So what kind of measures can we take? What do you believe we can actually do? What measures can be taken to guarantee respect for these sanctions? I mean, I'm talking again about the Italian case. You're not allowed to broadcast any Russian television on state channels, but we still have a broadcaster who a journalist who is in Italy regularly broadcasting from there. So what can we do? To ensure that sanctions are respected and that we counter disinformation, but at the same time respect freedom of press, which remains sacrosanct. It's still a key principle for our public institutions, but journalism is something different from disinformation.”
Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
- “And the vote tomorrow will continue with our agenda, Council and commission statements ensuring accountability and justice in response to Russia's continued attacks against the civilian population in Ukraine. We'll start by giving the floor to the council right away, and we'll let Commissioner Kubilius take his place. As I said, we'll hear from the Deputy Minister for European Affairs on behalf of the Council.”
EU-Ukraine relations
- “Thank you very much, Mr. Sieper, for what you said. Indeed. We will refer this to the president. And of course, we will entertain sanctions if necessary for Mr. Brown using unacceptable, inappropriate language in this chamber. Now, Miss Grapini has the floor.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions