Sven MIKSER

Policy topics Sven MIKSER is active on

What Sven MIKSER has said (19)

• “Colleagues. Commissioner, for years we have spoken about strategic autonomy as an aspiration. In today's world, autonomy is no longer a choice. It's a requirement for survival. As these two reports make clear, we must move from the era of strategising into an era of delivery. The fragmented nature of our defence spending remains vulnerability. We cannot continue to rely extensively on external suppliers for our defence acquisitions. It is not just a matter of economics. It's about operational independence. If we fail to build a genuine single market for defence, we are going to subsidise the industrial base of our competitors while leaving our own supply chains exposed. By strengthening our production capacity and supply chains, the EU can improve its strategic autonomy, improve competitiveness and ensure that defence spending delivers stronger collective security. I also welcome the focus on flagship projects. The EU must close the gaps in strategic enablers from integrated air and missile defence to cyber domain. We need to pool resources, close capability gaps and strengthen our defence industrial base. These large scale pan-European projects must also deliver to smaller companies from smaller countries, like my own home country, Estonia. Thank you very much.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Please. Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much for the presentation and and for zooming in on some key aspects. But I would like to zoom back out and ask questions that are rather general and, and and also political, I suppose first, most of those instruments and strategies and programs that we have launched or introduced over the past three years have among their goals supporting Ukraine. And we periodically hear reports of successful implementation of those programs. And these would appear to suggest that we should be much further down the road of actually achieving this strategic political goal of of putting Ukraine in a position where it could be, could, could, could negotiate an end to the war on terms that are favorable to Ukraine and, and would negotiate from a position of strength. So my first question is, is there a do you believe that there is a sort of sufficiently clear and strong and direct link between this political declaration of standing with Ukraine for as long as it takes, which is actually a different wording from doing as much as it takes. But but still, is there a link between this sort of declared political goal of sort of putting Ukraine in a position of, of, of winning this conflict and the actual those, those rather fragmented programs and instruments that we have for supporting Ukraine.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Thank you. Thank you for very good presentations which addressed the different aspects of an extremely broad issue. Um, nonetheless, I have two questions. One more broad, the other more specific. First, regarding this, um, need to move from the unhealthy dependencies to more managed dependencies. The EU is a rather small player when it comes to issues such as data storage or cloud or AI compared to our global competitors, and we are not catching up. We are falling further behind. And in such a situation, can we really expect to be able to successfully manage these dependencies that we have today? And secondly, can we, in such a situation, expect to remain a strong normative force in times to come? And secondly, on the military side, we've been hearing rather alarming reports from Ukraine so far. Mostly anecdotal, but nonetheless alarming regarding some Russian drones, uh, using for navigation. Uh, advanced. Non-european, uh, solutions such as the American Starlink, which makes the the, uh, neutralization of drones and even detection of the of the of the drones, uh, more more, more difficult. And obviously, we cannot neglect this, this concern since we have been seeing drone incidents also in European skies recently. But also it links, I think, to a broader issue of, uh, what are the technological security implications of this weakening political alignment between the EU and some of our traditional allies, such as the Americans? Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Yes, thank you chair. Commissioner, thank you very much. And I think we all heard very loud and clear your mild criticism. And I think it is indeed the case that we very often, when confronted with a with a very urgent matter, such as the Defense Simplification Omnibus, that we we all recognize the urgency. Then we are ready to cut some corners procedurally in order to save precious seconds and minutes, and then we get stalled for months thereafter. And this is clearly something that we cannot and shouldn't afford. But my question is this. I mean, even with all those, uh, projects that you that you described and that we undertake at the European level, the bulk of the resources will continue to have to come from the national defence budgets. And we have taken very ambitious commitments or the governments have, uh, but we have done this before. And very often we have let them slide thereafter. So my question is, in the light of these recent developments, in light of the shakiness of the transatlantic relationship at the moment, and all these economic challenges that have been compounded by this US and and and Israeli war on Iran and the emanating blockade of the Straits. Do you see the national governments holding firm in their commitment to actually reach to the level of defense spending that would allow us to realize all those ambitious goals and commitments. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you. I will do my best not to repeat what has already been said, and I would like to thank all the colleagues, as well as the representatives of the Commission and the Council, for very constructive remarks. We are obviously not today at the stage of holding negotiations about the content, but I think that there have been some very valuable remarks and and we will definitely do our best to to take those on board when we when we enter first negotiations between and among the, the shadow rapporteurs and then later on with the, with our co-legislators from the other, from the other institutions. And indeed, we have, I think, done what is possible with regard to ensuring a tight and swift calendar without actually cutting corners or undermining our own position as, as, as a parliament, as a, as a legislature. And, and and obviously, I, I do subscribe to what Siegfried Muresan said with regard to the, the, the urgency and with regard to the extraordinary circumstances under which we we, we operate with a with a with regard to the Russian interference in Moldova's, uh, democratic processes, which I believe do or can be described as as, uh, as an extraordinary circumstance, really, and that to justify looking for all possible means of, of of doing what we can today rather than have to spend much more resources later on on, on dealing with the with the consequences. So I think that it is justified to look for extraordinary measures for extraordinary times. And, and, and really, I do believe that it's not not only in the interest of Jordan and of Moldova and Moldovan people, but it's also in the interest of the, of the, of the EU, because we see the, the, the, the impact that our failure to address Russian interference has on our own democratic processes and our own democratic future.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much, Minister. And I would like to commend the Danish presidency for making defence and security so prominent among the presidency priorities. I think that that you have said very ambitious goals. Obviously, I very much agree with you that that when it comes especially to Ukraine, time is not on our side. So we have to really understand the urgency of of moving forward. I think with regard to defence omnibus and simplification, regulatory simplification, um, I hope that that that really you can get the ball moving and I hope that the Parliament will do our part so that we can really get somewhere by the end of the presidency of the your presidency at the end of the year. Now, with regard to Ukraine, I have a question. Uh, Denmark obviously has been very much leading by example, by introducing the Danish model, which I think saves a lot of European taxpayers money when it comes to producing capability in Ukraine. Much cheaper than it would be possible to do in in the European Union, but also by supporting Ukraine, uh, defence industries in improving their capacities. I'm looking forward to hearing back from you regarding the the setting up the production lines in in Denmark, but beyond. Leading by example. Where do you see the the sort of regulatory obstacles that need to be removed or any other ways that that Europe can really sort of, uh, uh, not only encourage member states to do more, but but, but can really do more collectively in order to boost your Ukrainian defence industries. But also, as I've said from the president's priorities, one of the objectives is to fully integrate Ukraine defence industries into European defence industries. So could you perhaps elaborate a little bit more on that?”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• “Colleagues. I want to first underscore what my colleague Ruijten already said so eloquently. Accountability is a precondition for a just and lasting peace, and the best way to achieve full accountability for Russian war crimes is to help Ukrainians win the war. We must not even in exchange for switching from war to peace, offer war criminals an opportunity to save face or escape accountability. This would be wrong on so many levels. First, because it would not be fair to victims and the loved ones, they have the right to justice. Ukrainian people deserve justice, but secondly, it would also be detrimental to future peace and stability in Europe, because giving up on our demand for accountability would be an open invitation for future aggressions in our continent. And finally, I do believe that only if Russian people are made to look in the mirror and own up to their own culpability for the crimes that have been committed by their leaders in their name, can that nation have a brighter and more decent future?”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Mr. president, dear colleagues on Ukraines battlefields, our European values and our freedom are being defended as we speak here. So it is absolutely imperative that we provide the brave Ukrainian fighters all the support they need at the same time. External threats to EU member states security and territorial integrity are not theoretical or hypothetical either. This means we also need real and usable military capabilities to deter and, when necessary, defeat any aggressor. Over the past eight years, we have built strong alliances around the Western Hemisphere, which, let's be honest, have allowed us Europeans to underspend on our own defence. The stark reality is that some of those alliances appear less reliable today than they have been over the past several decades. And the implication is clear and unavoidable. We must urgently build up our own autonomous European defence capability. Moreover, we must also have not only operational autonomy but defence industrial sovereignty. In times like this, obviously we must speed up production and shorten the innovation cycle in defence. But first of all, we need to put our money where our mouth is and provide in both member states and also common EU budget, adequate financial financial resources to implement our capability initiatives as well as our defence industrial programmes. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Okay. Thank thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. We actually, between us agree that that would be the first to take the floor. But anyway, I'd be happy. I'd be happy to do so. Well, obviously this is a very important file. We have had a set of meetings and so far excellent cooperation between the two Co-rapporteurs. I'm happy to say we all appreciate the importance of, of of this facility for Moldova, with the aim of Uh, speeding up the economic growth and, and also, um, uh, allowing uh, Moldova to, to focus more on, on the socio economic reforms that are necessary both for the for the development of the, of the, of the country and, and the welfare of its citizens, as well as preparing the country for for its ambitious EU accession plans. Um, we also recognized that the speed is here of um, essence, even though I agree that that the Parliament should never be a rubber stamp, and that our role alongside and among other EU institutions should be recognised because Moldova is not pursuing its EU ambitions in, in a vacuum, in a geostrategic geopolitical vacuum. And, and and we have seen during the recent elections The keen interest and undue influence that external players, first of all, Russia are exerting on that country. So I think that that we should be able to demonstrate our our commitment to helping Moldova through these very difficult times and, and and supporting its in its, in its very legitimate pursuit of of of EU integration. The plan obviously the the facilities the largest support package for, for, for Moldova and um, the uh well uh draft that we have proposed, um, basically recognized that, but but we also are seeking to make it more even, even even more ambitious in that we would we would very much, um, like to see the pre-financing component being increased from the current 7% to 20%.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• “Yes. Thank you. Our shadow Tonino would not be here this morning, but his officers equipped me with his notes that I'm going to read you right now. First, I wish to start by thanking the rapporteur for his concise draft report, which reflects all the challenges that our relations endure these days, but also reminds remains dedicated to these relations while emphasizing what should and could be done better. It goes without saying that our strategic partnership, based on long standing shared history and democratic values and common interests, has been instrumental in promoting peace, stability, democracy and Prosperity across the Atlantic and also globally. Yet we are acutely aware that the geopolitical landscape today is characterised by new and complex challenges, primarily stemming from the US and the changed political environment there. The US remains our most significant political and economic partner, and vice versa. But we are. We also acknowledge that the relationship encompasses all manner of virtues and sins. We see the difficulties that remain as we discuss here. We are navigating new challenges in trade with the imposition of 30% tariffs. While we hope for a continued dialogue. These moments remind us that our relationship has become more self-aware, with space for both cooperation and diverging interests. Our security is another cornerstone for the EU, operating under the NATO umbrella, but striving for a more autonomous and capable European Union. The recent European Council and NATO summit in June further They underscored the imperative for Europe to play a proactive and responsible role in its own security and defence policies, thereby building a more capable European pillar within the alliance.”
  Relations with NATO
• “Yes. Thank you. The commitment to increase defense spending has been called one of the most tangible results of the summit, but obviously it's only to become tangible by implementation. And the timeframe for for reaching this 3.5% is actually slightly longer than some of us in the northeastern part of the Alliance hoped you mentioned how you arrived at this figure by by the capability targets and force goals. So my question is, do we have sufficient means to actually assist our progress along the way by BI by observing the the force goals and capability targets? So will we be able to say in one year's time, two years time, three years time as to whether we are really on track of reaching this 3%, 3.5% by the year 2035.”
  Defence spending
• “Well, if I may. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thanks to all the experts for their presentations. One area where the US and the EU have historically had a slightly different approach, but still have cooperate very closely with each other, is the defense of democracy and rule of law and human rights globally. And now we all have been alarmed by the rolling back of the USAID operations, where the EU's ability to fulfill all the gaps is, is actually, I think, under question. Um, also, we have been alarmed by the suspension and then partial restoration of the of the EU's efforts to to investigate, gather information regarding the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian aggressors in Ukraine. So I would like to hear the the expert's take on where do we stand in our cooperation in the, in the area of, of defense and democracy and human rights, and also perhaps more particularly with regard to the accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russians against Ukraine.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Colleagues. Commissioner, for years we have spoken about strategic autonomy as an aspiration in today's world. Autonomy is no longer a choice. It's a requirement for survival. As these two reports make clear, we must move from the era of strategising into an era of delivery. The fragmented nature of our defence spending remains a Vulnerability. We cannot continue to rely extensively on external suppliers for our defence acquisitions. It is not just a matter of economics. It's about operational independence. If we fail to build a genuine single market for defence, we are going to subsidise the industrial base of our competitors while leaving our own supply chains exposed. By strengthening our production capacity and supply chains, the EU can improve its strategic autonomy, improve competitiveness and ensure that defence spending delivers stronger collective security. I also welcome the focus on flagship projects. The EU must close the gaps in strategic enablers from integrated air and missile defence to cyber domain. We need to pool resources, close capability gaps and strengthen our defence industrial base. These large scale pan-European projects must also deliver to smaller companies from smaller countries, like my own home country, Estonia. Thank you very much.”
  EU competences on defence
• “(15:51:30 – 15:53:07): Yes. Thank you. I'm not a shadow of aperture. I am neither do I represent my group's shadow. I just speak in my own capacity. I think that, Rainey has very correctly said that that, this is not a theoretical threat of future. It's, it's something that is there today. And and, obviously, we have demonstrated that we do have some capacity to deal with the a small number of straight drones that might drift into our airspace from a neighboring country. Well, we also need to be able to protect our critical infrastructures against individual targeted attacks, and and we need to be able to deal with the, threats to disruption of the civilian air traffic by drone incidents. But these are very different things from this large scale military, scenarios. And even by conservative estimates, the Russians are today producing, somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000,000 drones annually and large proportion of those are are strike drones. So, my question, therefore, to the speakers is that, where are we, when it comes to our ability to to, defend against threats over the same magnitude that Ukrainians are facing every day because there is no reason to believe that in any future potential aggression against, your native country, Russians would not rely on the drones to the same degree they are relying on them in Ukraine today?”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “And secondly, most of those instruments actually are very ambitious, but at the same time they are conditional on member states spending enough money. And we've seen rather modest increases over the past several years in defense spending across Europe. And this that continues to be a modest growth of defense spending, but it's rather uneven. There are still important large member states who are not spending much. And we know that that now, 17 out of 27 member states have declared an interest in using the escape clause. But somewhat fewer member states have declared an interest in using the Safe instrument. So the sense of urgency of spending more on defense, including on on, on on the, uh, sort of, uh, revitalization of defense industry, that a sense of urgency seems to be not equally strongly felt in, in all member states capitals. So how optimistic are you that that that actually, uh, we will have because last last week we we we we heard from the Defense Commission that that his job description basically is focused on on how to spend money on achieving those goals. But he doesn't have a very precise idea as to where this money should come from. So how do you feel about that? Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Yes, thank you very much, Commissioner. I have just one question, and it also has to do with the money. Many of the instruments and and initiatives that have been introduced, uh, are supposed to incentivise member states to spend much more on defence and indeed, by exempting defense expenditure from the strict fiscal rules and by making cheap loans available to member states. Some of the member states might be incentivized. But it's mostly those member states who are already actively looking for ways to to spend more than they are currently spending. While there are member states, including some relatively large member states who are not spending or meeting their spending targets, not because of the rigidity of the fiscal rules, but simply because they seemingly do not see the urgency. So could you share with us your optimism about actually meeting those very ambitious targets expressed in those hundreds of billions of additional spending by the member states?”
  Defence spending
• “And we we we are we are eager to to negotiate that with the with the other institutions. We believe that it's it's important to, to make that money accessible to the Moldovan beneficiaries as as quickly as possible. Also, we would like to change the balance of grants versus loans. Uh, so as to increase the, the proportion of, of of grants. Um, and well, basically we are we are also um, uh, trying to make sure that, that the Parliament would have or would be able to exercise sufficient oversight over the implementation of the facility. But we propose to do that on a sort of basis of of of of, of need and interest by the Parliament. We recognize that, that the regulation very, very closely follows the the model of Balkans Growth facility, meaning that that the Commission has taken on board a significant number of, of, of Parliament's proposals, uh, that we presented when, when we discussed and voted on the, on the Balkans Growth facility. So that should make the the work of the of the, of the Parliament, uh, somewhat easier and and and swifter in this instance and, and indeed for the timeframe that we foresee, uh, or we hope to be able to, to pursue is is very ambitious, but at the same time, um, realistic. Uh, so I hope that that we will have also excellent cooperation with the with the shadow rapporteurs from both committees. And I'm optimistic that this will be the case, because I believe that it's an overwhelming majority in this Parliament who also understand the the importance of this facility, but also the the importance of moving on as swiftly and and smoothly as possible. Thank you.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• “Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. As you are well informed, on behalf of the S&D Group, I would like to nominate Mr. Mihai Tudose, another highly qualified and and, uh, good candidate with a distinguished career in politics for the position of the second vice chair of the subcommittee. Thank you.”
  Recruitment policies in the EU
• “Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you very much, Commissioner, for providing us with an overview of this very fresh proposal for regulation for the for the for the omnibus regulation. And I think that it's timely. It's necessary. Obviously, reducing the administrative burden is important. Speeding up the decision making processes. That's that's equally important. And I very much support the the initiative of making finance more easily accessible for, for the for the investors who want to invest in defence. But, um, I also have a question regarding the exemptions from a slightly different angle. You said that the exemptions will remain a member state discretion, and obviously they can determine what is, uh, a priority from their national defence perspective. But we know that that we are speaking about European defence and and European European defence obviously is indivisible. So do you foresee a way whereby, um, what is a priority from the defense perspective? Can, can, can be decided at the union level or can can these exemptions be applied in France or Spain only if it's deemed to be of, of of priority status for those countries or can can can they also be applied if they are deemed a defense priority by, say, the Baltic countries or Poland? Uh, is it limited to the particular member state or can it be applied sort of union wide?”
  EU competences on defence