Pernando BARRENA ARZA

What Pernando BARRENA ARZA has said (16)

• 2026-06-16 “Good morning. Thank you. Chair. The European technological sovereignty package means good news, as it is allegedly aimed at strengthening Europe's digital autonomy and resilience. However, the package mainly supports a market led expansion of data centres and artificial intelligence infrastructure, risking either market fragmentation between member states or the shift from third country dependencies like China or the USA to dependency on European oligopolies. Please be aware that the problem is not only that Europe takes sufficient chips, cloud and artificial intelligence infrastructure. The political problem is that the Commission risks defining sovereignty mainly as an industrial and market objective, instead of a democratic social and ecological objective. Our concerns are so far the balance between technological sovereignty and democratic control. Simplification cannot be a synonym for the regulation. As we are seeing in the AI omnibus, the open source strategy must not remain symbolic, but seriously taken and the energy dimension of the package. We will reject any revival of nuclear power based solutions. So good intentions in the headlines, but a lot to be improved in the fine print. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “Good morning. Thank you, sir. The European technological sovereignty package means good news as it is allegedly aimed at strengthening Europe's digital autonomy and resilience. However, the package mainly supports a market led expansion of data centers and artificial intelligence infrastructure, risking either market fragmentation between member states or the shift from 3rd country dependencies like China or The USA to dependency on European, oligopolies. Please be aware that the problem is not only that Europe takes sufficient chips, cloud, and artificial intelligence infrastructure. The political problem is that the commission risks defining sovereignty mainly as an industrial and market objective instead of a democratic social and ecological objective. Our concerns are so far, the balance between technological sovereignty and democratic control, simplification cannot be a synonym for the regulation as we are seeing in the AI omnibus. The open source strategy must not remain symbolic but seriously, taken, and the energy dimension of the package, we will reject any revival of nuclear power based solutions. So good intentions in the headlines, but a lot to be improved in the fine print.”
  Artificial Intelligence · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission 6.5.2026 Written question The EU is fully committed to human rights and implementing Colombia's Peace Agreement. With this objective, the EU supports the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Verification Mission (UNVM). While it welcomes the renewal of the UNVM mandate, the EU regrets the reduction in its scope and cuts to the OHCHR budget. The EU collaborates with both organisations through political support and field engagement and is the largest voluntary contributor to OHCHR globally. At this stage, the EU is not planning to take additional specific support measures. The EU does not directly support civil society organisations monitoring the agreements on the ground. However, it supports the civil society as a way to reinforce the implementation of the Peace Agreement under different programmes like the Human Rights and Democracy programme, where the EU funds projects to protect human rights defenders, facilitate victims’ access to justice, and promote gender equality. The EU strengthens the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), through a EUR 2 million project [1] , supports financial inclusion and development in conflict-affected regions through Territorial Alliances for Peace project (EUR 16 million) [2] , or fosters labour inclusion for peace signatories and youth at risk, with EUR 6 million [3] for green and digital employment projects. [1] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/colombia_en. [2] idem. [3] idem.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2025-10-16 “E-004083/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The current framework on facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence in the EU is outlined in the Facilitators Package of 2002 1 . The definition of the facilitation of unauthorised entry or transit therein does not envisage an element of financial or material benefit. The proposal for a Facilitation Directive 2 tabled in 2023 seeks to harmonise criminal laws of Member States by laying down minimum rules on the definitions of, and penalties for the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay, while ensuring respect of the principle of proportionality, fundamental rights and freedoms. This proposal clarifies that facilitation conducts carried out for financial or material benefit, or a promise thereof, are to constitute criminal offences. This aims to further align the EU legal framework with the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 3 . The proposal is being negotiated with the European Parliament and the Council. Its swift adoption is a priority for the Commission. 1 Directive 2002/90/EC establishing a common definition of the offence of facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit (OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, p. 17) and Council framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit, and residence (OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, p. 1). 2 COM (2023)755 final. 3 https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/smuggling-migrants/SoM_Protocol_English.pdf.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-07 “E-002756/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s assessment of the safety of the countries proposed for designation as safe countries of origin at EU level 1 , including Colombia, is based on a range of sources of information, including information prepared by the European Union Agency for Asylum, and on a range of other relevant sources including from Member States and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Commission’s proposal includes countries where there is, in general, no risk of persecution or serious harm. The fact that a third country is included in the proposed list of safe countries of origin does not establish an absolute guarantee of safety for all nationals of that country. Member States may apply the safe country of origin concept only where the applicant cannot provide elements justifying why this concept is not applicable to him or her, in the framework of an individual assessment, and provided that the applicant has the nationality of that country or is a stateless person and was formerly habitually resident in that country. The Commission acknowledges in the proposal, notably in its explanatory memorandum, that certain groups of individuals face specific challenges in the third countries concerned. The situation of human rights defenders in Colombia is specifically mentioned. Member States need to pay special attention to applicants who are in a specific situation in those countries when assessing their applications 2 . 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level; COM(2025) 186 final. (https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0186). 2 See also recital 17 of the proposal.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-03-11 “E-001050/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU significantly intensified efforts in support of democracy and the rule of law, demonstrated by the deployment of the 2023 Electoral Observation Mission, its firm stance in defending the election results, and the adoption of individual restrictive measures 1 . The EU publicly expressed concerns about the instrumentalisation of the justice system and individual cases. The EU Special Representative for Human Rights did so during his visit to Guatemala on 17-19 February 2025 2 . The EU Delegation continues to monitor such cases and where possible observes judicial hearings. This is coordinated with Member States and likeminded partners. The EU works closely together with the government, and all sectors of Guatemalan society, to advance on shared priorities. This includes strengthening governance, transparency, promoting inclusive and sustainable development, and human rights. It is clear that to this end, all Guatemalan state institutions will have to join this effort. The EU will also continue its support to civil society and to human rights defenders. The Guatemalan government demonstrates willingness to advance a positive national agenda. The Commission currently does not intend to review the Association Agreement 3 . It provides, in its political and cooperation part, relevant provisions for bilateral cooperation and dialogue on human rights. Suspension is a measure of last resort. 1 Guatemala: Council renews EU restrictive measures for a year, 13/12/2024, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/16/guatemala-council-renews-eu-restrictivemeasures-for-a-year/. 2 EU Special Representative for Human Rights visits Guatemala, 20/02/2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/guatemala/eu-special-representative-human-rights-visits-guatemala_en. 3 EU-Central America Association Agreement, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:22012A1215(01).”
  EU competences on human rights
• 2025-01-16 “E-000185/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The rule of law and human rights in Azerbaijan remain a priority for the EU and are at the core of the EU-Azerbaijan bilateral relations. The EU has repeatedly voiced concerns regarding the unsettling rise of arrests of independent journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists on politically motivated charges in Azerbaijan. The EU has called on the Azerbaijani authorities to ensure that their actions adhere to the relevant obligations under domestic and international law. In this context, the EU has consistently called for the release of all persons imprisoned for exercising their fundamental rights. These messages have been conveyed publicly and bilaterally at all levels, including at the level of the High Representative/VicePresident 1 . The EU has closely followed the issue of Karabakh Armenian detainees held in Azerbaijan and continues to call on Azerbaijan to respect due process and the rights of detainees and to ensure transparency. The EU has also advocated to address these issues as part of confidence-building measures between the parties. Any Common Foreign Security Policy decision relating to sanctions is for the Council to make by unanimity. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/azerbaijan-statement-spokesperson-human-rights-situation_en; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-10-22-ITM-020_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2024-12-18-ITM-019-03_EN.html; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/1506th-meeting-committee-ministers-11-september2024-eu-statement-exchange-views-european-committee_en?s=51”
  EU-Armenia relations · EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2024-12-18 “E-003013/2024 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission While the coastal States agree that the total catches of mackerel should be set in line with the best available scientific advice, the lack of a comprehensive quota sharing agreement means that coastal States decide individually the level of their annual quotas, thereby collectively exceeding such advice. Unilateral mackerel quota increases by some coastal States threaten the sustainability of shared stocks and undermine the efforts to manage fisheries responsibly. This unsustainable exploitation not only threatens the long-term viability of the stock, but also negatively impacts the economic sustainability of the EU fleet, reducing profitability due to diminishing catch rates and potential regulatory constraints. Coastal States consultations for a sharing arrangement are ongoing since 2022 with an active involvement from the EU, represented by the Commission, in close coordination with the Council. The Commission’s focus in these consultations is to advocate for comprehensive arrangements that ensure a sustainable, equitable, and fair management of the mackerel stock. Moreover, as regards trade, mackerel is currently no longer covered by the EU’s additional bilateral market access concessions to the European Economic Area (EEA) countries. The Commission is determined to strengthen the EU’s sustainability tools. It has therefore adopted in September 2024 a proposal to clarify the application of Regulation 1026/2012 1 to address third country practices regarding non-sustainably fished stocks. This proposal is currently under discussion in the European Parliament and the Council as part of the ordinary legislative procedure. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2024:407:FIN#:~:text=Regulation%20%28EU%29%201026%2F2012%20of%20th e%20European%20Parliament%20and,to%20adopt%20certain%20measures%20regarding%20the%20fisheriesrelated%20act”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries
• 2024-11-27 “E-002680/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The decision of the Basque government approving the application for the protected designation of origin (PDO) Viñedos de Álava/Arabako Mahastiak, the legal challenge against that decision brought by the Regulatory Council of PDO Rioja, and the ruling of the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country overturning the Basque government’s decision are decisions by authorities and courts. The Commission does not comment on national acts and judgements. The registration of a wine name as a PDO follows a two-step procedure at national and EU level. While the ultimate decision on the registration rests with the Commission, the national stage is fundamental to ensure legitimacy and authenticity and to allow for preliminary scrutiny and the resolution of objections from producers or right-holders based in the same country as the PDO. The Commission does not act as an arbitrator for disputes originating at the national level, but considers objections from other Member States or third countries to address broader concerns. Its role is to assess applications presumed to be undisputed after completing the national process. In cases of national disputes challenging the validity of the PDO application, the applicant Member State may request the Commission to suspend its scrutiny. The scrutiny of the application for registration of Viñedos de Álava/Arabako Mahastiak (PDO) has been suspended by the Commission on request of the Spanish authorities made on 29 July 2022 in line with Article 97(3)(b) of Regulation (EU) 1308/2013. The Commission awaits information from the Spanish authorities with a view to giving a proper follow up to the developments in the national judicial proceedings concerning the application in question.”
  EU policy on country of origin food labelling
• 2024-10-31 “E-002369/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. Regulation (EU) 2024/1717, which entered into force on 10 July 2024, has amended the legal framework for the reintroduction of internal border control under the Schengen Borders Code 1 . It provides for clear deadlines and strict reporting obligations for both the Commission and Member States, which the Commission will enforce. Given the overhaul of this legal framework, the first reintroduction after its entry into force will be considered a new reintroduction rather than a prolongation. Moreover, where internal border control is kept in place to address a different serious threat to public policy or internal security, this also constitutes a reintroduction rather than a prolongation 2 . 2. Article 25a of the Schengen Borders Code permits Member States to temporarily reintroduce internal border control to address a serious threat to public policy or internal security. Under this Article, the Commission does not have the competence to authorise such reintroduction but must be notified thereof. The Commission is engaged in an ongoing dialogue with all concerned Member States to ensure that mitigating measures limit the impact on cross-border travel and cross-border regions. It also encourages Member States to make use of alternative measures, as listed in the Commission’s Recommendation of November 2023 3 , to address security threats. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, p.1-52, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1717. 2 Joined Cases C-368/20 and C-369/20, Landespolizeidirektion Steiermark, ECLI:EU:C:2022:298. 3 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/268 of 23 November 2023 on cooperation between the Member States with regard to serious threats to internal security and public policy in the area without internal border controls, OJ L, 2024/268, 17.1.2024.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-10-31 “P-002368/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union explicitly prohibits any discrimination based on membership of a national minority and promotes the respect for linguistic diversity. Within its scope of competence, the Commission remains committed to promoting linguistic diversity. Concretely, Erasmus + and Creative Europe are funding programmes that support linguistic diversity 1 . However, the Commission has no competence in evaluating Member States’ compliance with the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML). The Commission also has no competence regarding the use of languages, as the legal provisions governing the use of languages fall within the exclusive competence of the Member States. Governments at state level have ratified the Charter, and they are responsible for implementing policies to protect and promote regional and minority languages within their borders. The Council of Europe monitors their compliance and provides guidance to ensure their members fulfil their obligations. The latest report from the Committee of Experts on Spain’s compliance with the ECRML was released on 24 September 2024. It reflects ongoing challenges for Spain in meeting its obligations under the Charter and encourages further measures to foster linguistic diversity especially in justice, public administration, and healthcare, where regional languages like Basque are often underused. The Commission has no role in the evaluation of this report. 1 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d325c589-011a-11ef-a251-01aa75ed71a1/language-en”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2024-10-31 “E-002370/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission When Member States extend the application of national law implementing EU law to situations falling outside the scope of EU law, they must do it in a way that does not undermine or circumvent the application of rules or obligations under EU law. As regards the initiative carried out by Italy following the signature of a Protocol on migration management with Albania, the implementation of the Protocol under Italian law must not undermine the Common European Asylum System or be detrimental to common EU rules. Moreover, it needs to be complementary to the existing avenues to access asylum and cannot prevent the aims and objectives of EU law in this field, nor prejudge the rights and guarantees that persons in these situations must be afforded by Member States. In the Commission’s understanding, Italy’s initiative is aimed at enabling applications for international protection lodged by third-country nationals intercepted in the high seas to be examined in the centres in the Albanian territory, under Italian jurisdiction. In case of rejection of such applications, Italy would carry out return procedures from these centres. The Commission understands that the Italian authorities intend to conduct all administrative and judicial procedures and give access to legal remedies as regards decisions on the applications for international protection and return procedures in the facilities located in the Albanian territory based on Italian law and jurisdiction. This includes decisions on detention, which are to be reviewed by Italian national courts.”
  Asylum & border control · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• “Thank you. President. Ladies and gentlemen, we don't really know precisely what caused the blackout on the 28th of April in the Iberian Peninsula, but at least it has meant that we understand the weaknesses of our electricity system and to look at a few different approaches. Now, some are pointing to renewables and the fight against climate change as if it were the cause. Renewables, however, are part of the solution and huge investment in infrastructure should bring more renewables to the to the grid and storage is also key. We have enough technology for this. We also have the ways to make sure that we can have a grid with 100% renewables. So we know that there are huge Benefits and we have to renew the infrastructure when we can see the profits. This shouldn't be a challenge whatsoever. And there's been a complete reshift in the scaling of energy, specifically in Spain, with the four big electric companies that control the grid in Spain. And the electricity grid is infrastructure that is critical infrastructure, and therefore it must be in public hands, far from economic interests that do not benefit the people.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• “President. Ladies and gentlemen, the list of recommendations drawn up by Pegasus was supported by a broad majority, left to right. But now, two years later, we, uh, do not see any of these recommendations having really had a purpose. We have the victims of this spying software. They have not received any kind of compensation. None of the European governments involved Poland, Hungary, Hungary, Spain, Greece have really provided any explanations. We know that Morocco used this software against, uh, politicians, journalists, mainly in France and Spain, and there is no diplomatic objection being made. Any kind of follow up, uh, to this. So the, uh, final sensation here is that these new technologies mean that there are new ways to undermine citizens rights, and nobody's being held accountable for this. Israel created spying tools to violate human rights and has used this military technology for genocide. And we need to end this association agreement with Israel. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you very much, president. European citizens still feel shame when we look at what happened on the 27th of July. And Mrs. von der Leyen met Trump. You accepted this 15% tariffs, but committed to millions of euros of investment that will favor the US. The image that you left for posterity is that of someone kowtowing to the US president. This is the tragic image of the end of the EU strategic autonomy. And it also throws a spanner in the European integration project. Uh, social cuts to continue buying weapons from the US, and this means that the EU will become the accomplice, the necessary accomplice of the genocide. And the EU as a global player, no longer has any clout. Mrs. von der Leyen, you are becoming an openly anti European Commission president. Next time we might have to speak to Donald Trump because he's already boasting that he's the President of Europe.”
  Relations with NATO
• “Thank you, Mr. President. Currently, European individuals are protected from discrimination on the grounds of sex and race in employment and in some areas beyond the labour market. However, the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation are only protected in relation to employment through the Employment Equality Directive, the European Commission introduced a proposal for a directive covering discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, disability, sexual orientation outside of employment in 2008. The Anti-Discrimination directive. However, the legislative process to date has been slowed due to divergent views among member states. The Commission announced its intention to withdraw the horizontal Anti-Discrimination directive in its 2025 work programme, but following the pressure from civil society and MEPs, it decided to keep the programme as a pending file on its 2026 work programme. Our group wants to urge the Member States to overcome this blockade and adopt this piece of legislation that aims to address the cross-border nature of discrimination and the shortcomings of divergent national rules that member States cannot resolve alone. Our view is that not adopting the directive would perpetuate an equal protection and continue exposing individuals to discrimination in key areas of daily life. The horizontal Anti-Discrimination directive would enhance legal certainty, reduce prejudice and increase social inclusion. Furthermore, service providers would benefit from harmonised rules that reduce ambiguity, litigation risks, and reputational harm, particularly in cross-border contexts. So, dear colleagues, let's send a clear message to the council. Please go ahead with the anti-discrimination directive. Don't let it down. Thank you so much.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination