Tineke STRIK

Policy topics Tineke STRIK is active on

What Tineke STRIK has said (63)

• 2026-07-14 “(16:43:03 - 16:45:03): Thank you, chairs, and thank you to the commission for the explanation. My colleague, Juta Parlis, has already said a lot. But I just also want to highlight that, when we talked with protesters, it was really clear, and also you see it from their actions that they are actually very much defending the EU values. And indeed, they feel they belong to the EU, but they also want the EU to act according to the EU standards. So I think the action of the commission is really a test case also for the credibility regarding the citizens of Albania. And therefore, my question would be because indeed this promise of the environmental impact assessment, will you make sure that this impact assessment will be in line with the EU standards? So that's really thorough enough, transparent enough and really trustworthy. Will you also make sure that this moratorium does not only apply to the Viosa Narta area, but to all protected areas until the law will be brought in line with the EU standards? And as has been highlighted before, it seems that it's also exemplary for the high level corruption, which is still not sufficiently tackled in Albania. Do you also push the authorities to comply fully with any investigation coming from the SPAC because SPAC is also doing its investigation there? And how are you looking into allegations of money laundering with a lot of money coming from the organized drugs crime, and also the violations of the public procurement rules? So I think this is a whole set that enables these kinds of transactions and with as a result violations. So I really hope the commission is keen in tackling all of these enabling environmental aspects.”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2026-07-14 “(10:50:46 - 10:52:32): Thank you. Thank you very much, chairs, but also commissioner for putting so much efforts in making sure that, Hungary is going to fulfill all the conditions. I have also a few questions, which are, I think, not sufficiently addressed yet. And this is about Mr. Sirofim, clearly mentioned the need for having checks and balances, and indeed, integrity authority is 1 of them. But also, actively engagement of civil society in the decision making. And I think that still a lot of improvement is needed there. And I also wonder because public consultation is also an important requirement from the commission, of course, that we have a good quality of legislation, but there's also a good consultation by experts and civil society. How do you see that, being evolved right now? And, what are the benchmarks exactly regarding this? And on judicial independence, my colleague, Daniel Freund, already asked a question about possibly reassessing the previous decision to unfreeze the money regarding judicial independence. Do you see also the need to do that, also to look how the National, Judicial Council will be strengthened or not? And also given the the concerns, of many actors that, the the proposal to remove the presidents of the courier and the constitutional court do not solve all the problems regarding judicial independence or maybe even deepen, the crisis which we see right now. So what are you going to do regarding, the independence of judiciary thing?”
  Rule of law in Hungary
• 2026-07-14 “(15:03:24 - 15:07:58): They are there. Yes. Hi. Hi. Please. Okay. Thank you both chairs, and and mister Kopemans for your brief presentation of where we stand with the growth facility. On Serbia, yes, no surprise that we have a lot of attention for Serbia, of course. This the funding that has been suspended followed the adoption of the so called Merdick Laws. And what I understand is that the EU has put a lot of pressure for Serbia to ask, an advice from the Venice Commission. What I understand now is that only 7 out of the 9 recommendations by the Venice Commissions have been addressed by the Serbian government. So my question would actually be, is that sufficient for the commission? Do you see that this is sufficient implementation? Or do you see what why we would like to see that we oblige them to really fulfill all the recommendations from the Venice Commission, including also the reinstatement of the 2 prosecutors that whose accountants to the organized crime prosecution, the talk were unlawfully terminated. And this, of course, also includes a prosecutor who worked on a Novissat, Canopy case, which actually triggered the whole student protest. So we actually think it would really be important for the credibility of the EU if we are strict on that and not be satisfied with 5 steps ahead and then 3 steps back. And more also specifically, what Mr. Pichela already alluded to, and Mr. Nemes, the opening of the Cluster 3 is perceived as quite incomprehensible in the Serbian society because they feel that the Fugits is being rewarded. Well, they are still fighting very hard for the rule of law value. So I think in this case, would also be very important to stick to our conditions. Regarding Albania, I would also want to know from you if you see any possibility for the commission to use funding as a leverage to make sure that the Albanian government goes into the right direction of meeting the environmental standards. I was there in Albania. I also saw the protected area, which was already quite severely damaged, although still an impact assessment has to be made. And I really got the impression that they are moving backwards because with the feeling that they still don't need to align yet with the EU standards, which would, of course, be a breach of the non regression principle. So yes, I would like to know your take on this, if you see any possibility for the commission. 1 short question, if I may, on Bosnia because I don't have a budget colleague here. On Bosnia, we saw there was an info campaign from the EU, which I think, in principle, is a very good idea. But can you discuss a little bit or share with us how it was implemented and how you perceive this as was it successful or not? Did it contribute to a certain discussion or awareness within Bosnia Herzegovina? With which stakeholders? Was it been implemented? And my last thing on Bosnia is also if you say that because they don't manage to get any progress on the state level that you are now trying to let them find any progress more on the decentralized level? I find it a bit concerning actually because this is maybe that they prefer to do on the decentral level and not having to find a way together on making steps at the state level. And this is actually what the EU wants them to do. And we perceive them, and we have to treat them also as 1 state and not of composed of 3 different, entities. So, I would like to hear your vision on that. Thank you.”
  EU-Serbia relations · EU-Albania relations
• 2026-07-13 “(16:26:09 - 16:29:47): Yes. I'm here at the very back of the room. Sorry for that. Thanks. Thank you, Chair, for putting this on the agenda. Also my thanks goes to the Chair of the dRFNG mission, not mission, but a working group who is leading that very cautiously and consciously. I'm a relative newcomer. I just entered the scrutiny group a few months ago, but I'm already very happy to have this opportunity to have so many exchanges really on the substance of rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights of several countries. I think that is a big added value to the work of the commission with its rule of law report that we have these exchanges ourselves, hearing the perspectives from so many different stakeholders so that we can really make up our own minds of how the developments are going in the several countries. I think still there is some room for improvement, and I think that we all have the ambition to have an effective scrutiny group. So it might be good to also see how we can ensure a follow-up to all these precious exchanges that we do all the time. We get a lot of information. How to make sure we can effectively use it, for instance, getting responses from the governments or also from the European Commission if it comes to the necessary work that the commission has to do to enforce compliance. This may be something that we could discuss internally together with the scrutiny group. I also think the hearings that I experienced, not all information is necessarily fit to disclose with a broader audience. So it might also benefit more stakeholders, more people if they would also have the possibility to hear what is being said and to see what we are doing with it. I think what is really key, in line also with what S and D said, it's really key that we will keep a merit-based approach. So be very open to really look at where are the deficiencies, where are things going wrong, what country needs to be on the agenda and not looking at the different colors or political parties that are belonging to that government. I think this is the only way to keep our credibility. I don't agree with Mister Legere saying that concerns regarding NGOs is a leftist issue. This should concern all of us. But in picking or selecting countries, you should really make sure that we are not leading ourselves with political preferences. I'm really looking forward to further working in this scrutiny group. Also looking forward to the next missions under the leadership of Mrs. Wilmes. I would also like to thank the secretariat and all the colleagues for having this scrutiny group to work at such a high level.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2026-06-24 “(10:11:00 – 10:12:38): Yes. Thank you, Chair, and also thanks a lot to the rapporteur for the presentation of the draft report. And also my apologies on behalf of, Saskia Prigman that she could not be here this morning. I would really like to thank also the content of the draft report. We can support, for instance, the reference to the respect for fundamental rights and also, that you stress the importance of technological and strategic independence and that you pay attention to the victims. And we have some additional amendments that we think we can strengthen the report with. 1 of them is that we will propose to exclude certain activities from the possibility to be funded through this instrument, including technologies and that could be used for supporting pushbacks at the border or for the development of spyware. Those 2 uses we would like to exclude. And we will also propose to delete the definition of hybrid threats since we don't think that this is the adequate instrument to, to to target this and to to elaborate on this. And finally, we streamlined the different types of crimes for which the fund can be used by the member states. And, yeah, I can only say on behalf of Saskiaan that she looks forward to the cooperation and to the onboard, negotiation. Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control · Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2026-06-24 “(11:00:36 – 11:03:40): Thank you, Chair, and thank you very much, Mrs. Raccio, for presenting the report and also explaining your plans for next year. I really regret that I hear from my colleagues some insinuations against the FRA, which I find completely unjustified as I see that you do your work based on evidence and independent research. I have 2 issues. One is related to the pact and another one more generally on charter conditionality. On the pact, you are also referring in your report, of course, that as of this month, member states are bound by the pact. We rely very much on national mechanisms to monitor compliance with fundamental rights. France, as you also enumerated in the report, has come up with practical guidance for that. Still, I recently attended a meeting with all national human rights mechanisms and many are still confronted with a lack of resources. For instance, member states say, just find these funds with the AMIF or whatever, that's your responsibility. There are sometimes issues with level of independence and also with a lack of mandate. I would like to hear your views on that and how you can ensure that member states really comply with all the criteria in the pact. Another thing is that we see more and more measures allowing for externalization of border control. You also referred to the return regulation, but we have the Cystic Country concept. I wonder how FRA manages to catch up on these developments given the limited mandate that you have based on the territory? Would this justify stretching the mandate so that FRA can really also work outside of the EU? The charter conditionality, also in the new MFF, we see a broader application of the charter, which is good. But for now, we see that the Commission is very much relying when they assess compliance with the charter on national monitoring committees. Many of these monitoring committees consist of a majority of civil servants or other actors affiliated to the member states. Is this something that you're also worried about? Will you come up with advice or whatever to make sure we have independent monitoring in the different member states? My last question, a bit different, is the attacks on civil society, which are going on in all member states but also even in the European Parliament, unfortunately. Is this something that you also have a strategy on how to protect civil society better? Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-06-23 “(12:28:42 – 12:30:57): Thank you, chair, and also thanks, interpreters. I will keep it brief. Thank you a lot for your support, and and I very much concur, of course, with, what my renew colleague, for instance, said that it also follows from the EU treaty that we need to give full support and, and and make to need to guarantee compliance with international law. I would like to, I I also want to stress the the the importance of that is also said in my opinion that international law is far too precious to politicize or instrumentalize it. This is also why we don't mention any kind of country or whatever. This is about the principles that we need to lay down, but also a strong call upon all the e institutions to, comply with it in a nondiscriminatory and consistent manner. And I think this is 1 of the added value of this report. Regarding the blocking statute, I'm I'm also, happy with the support for that. I would like to say also to my renew colleague that, of course, companies can be, you know, end up in a kind of uncertainty, but this is already the case. It's also the case without the the imposition of of the blocking statute. We now have a recent CGU judgment making very clear that automatic application of a sanction is not allowed. They need to do an an individual assessment of the proportionality. So I think that it also serves the certainty that companies need that the blocking statute is being activated because then they need they know, what to do, what the, what the obligations are on the EU territory. So, I I welcome very much any amendments from, from Renew also on this, but I really also hope for support for the proposed inquiry committee because within that committee, we can also assess how the companies can be, granted, the legal certainty that they need. Thank you very much. Look forward to the amendment.”
  EU foreign policy approach
• 2026-06-23 “(12:10:25 – 12:16:52): Thank you, chair, and, also great to see you, as shadows in the room. International justice is under increasing pressure. Courts, judges, prosecutors, UN mandate holders, and civil society organizations who are engaging with international courts are being intimidated, obstructed, and even sanctioned precisely because they seek to ensure that international law is applied correctly and independently. And this, of course, strikes at the very core of our rules based international order. And it has also serious real life implications as it hampers accountability for the gravest crimes known to mankind, it obstructs victims' access to justice, and it erodes the credibility of the international rule of law that the EU seeks to uphold. The AFET draft report already provides a strong and timely basis for general EU strategy to protect international judges, mechanisms. It rightly recognizes the need for operational, diplomatic, financial, and legal protections for the ICC and for other international justice mechanisms, their personal, and the organizations that enable their work. It also rightly stresses the urgent need to respond to extraterritorial coercive measures and overcompliance, unfortunately, by private actors. From the UGI perspective, our task is to make sure that the union's commitments is not only principled, but legally coherent, operational, and enforceable. Our opinion, therefore, strengthened this report in 4 respects. 1st, we call for legal clarity and accountability within the EU legal order following international judicial decisions, including ICJ advisory opinions. The commission, in our view, should present a comprehensive assessment of all consequences that relevant international decisions and advisory opinions have for the EU legal order. This must include a careful assessment of whether union legislation, policies, programs, funding instruments, trade related measures, diplomatic and administrative practices are fully consistent with the union's international legal obligations, so also including ICJ's rulings. Whether they are where they are not, corrective measures must follow, and the parliament must be informed. 2nd, we insist that no EU actions or funding may ever contribute to violations of international law. It's it sounds very logic, but still, there are sometimes really big risks for, this to happen. So that means the union financial assistance, programs, cooperation agreements, or other instruments must not directly nor indirectly facilitate, aid, assist, or otherwise be linked to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or other serious violations of international humanitarian, criminal, or human rights law. So we therefore call in our opinion for stronger ex ante and ex post assessment, monitoring and safeguards across all EU action and with a focus on international and human rights law. 3rd, we strengthened the EU's duty to protect and cooperate with the ICC. Full support must mean more than statements. It requires effective domestic implement implementation of the Rome Statute, practical support for investigations, witnesses, and civil society, and protection against the chilling effects of sanctions and overcompliance. We also call for monitoring and reporting system on the implementation of the EU ICC cooperation and assistance agreement so that the parliament can hold the institutions to account for delivering on those commitments. And 4th and finally, we address the commission's continued inaction on the blocking statute. When foreign sanctions target ICC officials, UN mandate holders, and organizations who cooperate with international justice mechanisms, the EU must defend both the independence of these institutions and the integrity of its own legal order. The blocking statute is an available legal instrument, yet the commission has still not activated it it to provide the necessary protection and clarity despite numerous calls so far by the parliament to do so. Such persistent inaction simply cannot pass without scrutiny. The opinion, therefore, underlines that parliament should use the instruments available under the treaties and its rules of procedure, including the setting up of a temporary committee of inquiry under article 226 of the TFEU to examine possible maladministration of failures in the implementation of the EU obligations relating to the ICC and the blocking statute. Such an inquiry would ensure the democratic oversight that this matter plainly requires. So, colleague, international justice survives only when those who administer it can do their work without intimidation and when those who support it match their words with action. The jury opinion builds constructively on a solid draft report. It asks the union to be legally consistent, operationally prepared, and political courageous. I really look forward to working with all of you to ensure that our opinion and the final report sends a very clear message that the EU will not merely invoke international law when convenient, but that it will defend the institutions, people, and legal obligation that give it meaning. Thank you. And and you will announce the the deadline for tabling amendments.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• 2026-03-19 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 17.6.2026 Written question The organisation and conduct of elections are solely the competence of the Member States. Supporting Member States to safeguard election integrity is a key objective of the European Democracy Shield. The EU has in place a robust toolbox, which includes the Digital Services Act (DSA) [1] , the Political Advertising Regulation, the recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union [2] , the European Cooperation Network on Elections and specific support for independent fact-checkers and civil society to expose online manipulation and disinformation campaigns [3] . On 5 March 2026, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH), the Digital Services Coordinator of Hungary, organised a DSA Election Roundtable with representatives of very large online platforms, very large online search engines, relevant national authorities and the Commission. As for every national and European election, the signatories of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation, part of the DSA, applied the Rapid Response System for the Hungarian elections, which ran for the period of 16 March to 19 April 2026. The Commission has also encouraged observation of elections by citizens and international organisations, which endorse relevant international standards, such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Ahead of the elections, various stakeholders, including the Hungarian hub of the European Digital Media Observatory [4] , reported on attempts of possible Russian interference. Preparing for elections requires continuously building up resilience, through a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. With the European Democracy Shield, the Commission has considerably reinforced its capacities by setting up a European Centre for Democratic Resilience [5] in February 2026. The Centre supports Member States anticipate and counter threats to democratic processes while strengthening election preparedness and protecting the integrity of the information space. The Commission is fully committed to using all available tools to assist Member States in ensuring free and fair elections, without interference, in full respect of their competences. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. [2] Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng. [3] European Digital Media Observatory and its regional hubs, the European Network of fact-checkers and the development of a Common Research Support Framework. [4] Russian disinformation campaigns against Hungarian opposition figures, 457 political ads in six weeks and AI-generated videos once again’ (2026): https://edmo.eu/publications/russian-disinformation-campaigns-against-hungarian-opposition-figures-457-political-ads-in-6-weeks-and-ai-generated-videos-once-again/; ‘The Matryoshka’s operation has been activated…’ (2026): https://edmo.eu/publications/the-matryoshkas-operation-has-been-activated-peter-magyar-got-the-truth-serum-on-fringe-tiktok-channels/; ‘A Russian attempt to embroil an opposition politician in the Epstein case, statistical distortions and good old cheapfakes’ (2026): https://edmo.eu/publications/a-russian-attempt-to-embroil-an-opposition-politician-in-the-epstein-case-statistical-distortions-and-good-old-cheapfakes/. [5] https://commission.europa.eu/european-centre-democratic-resilience_en.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 3.7.2026 Written question The Commission is aware and takes note of the ongoing discussions among a group of Member States, as it is invited to participate as observer. Member States must ensure that returns from the EU of illegally staying third-country nationals comply with relevant EU law, in particular Directive 2008/115/EC [1] (‘Return Directive’), and respect fundamental rights and obligations stemming from international law . This is also the case for bilateral agreements or arrangements with third countries. The Commission will continue to ensure that EU law is applied correctly across all Member States, taking to the necessary measures in case of breaches of EU law. Article 17 of the Commission’s proposal for a Return Regulation [2] creates the legal framework and sets out the conditions for setting up ‘return hubs’. Among those conditions, the proposal provides for an independent body or mechanism to monitor the effective application of the agreement or arrangement. Political agreement on the Return Regulation was reached in the trilogue on 1 June 2026. It was endorsed by the European Parliament on 17 June and by Coreper on 10 June. [1] Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. [2] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-03-11 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The Busmantsi centre operates as a pre-return detention facility. The Return Directive [1] enables Member States to detain for removal purposes illegally staying third-country nationals if there is a risk of absconding or the third-country national avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process. When imposing detention, Member States have to ensure compliance with the respective safeguards and the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. The centre in question also includes a separate closed unit (places) which operates as a centre for applicants for international protection. The detention of applicants for international protection is regulated by Directive 2013/33/EU [2] . The Commission monitors the correct transposition and implementation of applicable EU law, including the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. Detention conditions in Bulgaria were evaluated as part of the Schengen evaluation mission [3] which took place in November 2025. The outcome of the evaluation will be reflected in the report to be adopted by the Commission in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922 and the remedial measures subsequently put in place by Bulgaria to address the recommendations will be monitored. [1] Article 15 of https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/115/oj?uri=CELEX:32008L0115. [2] In particular Articles 8 to 11 of Directive (EU) 2013/33: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/33/oj/eng. [3] The correct implementation of the return acquis is monitored through the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism in line with Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/922/oj/eng.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-03-09 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question The Commission has followed the developments regarding the adoption of Act XLVIII on the Protection of Local Identity and the related local decrees. The Commission is currently assessing these measures including their possible impacts and implications on EU law and stands ready to take action, as appropriate .”
  Rule of law in Hungary · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2026-02-19 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The Commission shares the concerns expressed by the European Parliament in its resolutions of 9 July and 11 September 2025. The Commission remains firmly committed to supporting the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a cornerstone of the international system of criminal justice and to safeguarding its independence and proper functioning. The Commission fully supports the ICC’s work, including its investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Commission is assessing all appropriate measures, including diplomatic, legal and financial avenues, that could help ensure the continuity of the ICC’s operations and its ability to fulfil its mandate. For each measure, the Commission, in close consultation with the High Representative/Vice-President and the Member States as well as with the ICC and relevant stakeholders, is carefully assessing its necessity, proportionality, effectiveness and relevant legal and practical implications. While an amendment to the annex to Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 [1] is among the legal measures assessed, at this stage, the Commission considers that diplomatic efforts and dialogue remain the most effective course of action. [1] OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, pp. 1-6.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• 2026-02-10 “E-000568/2026 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 1. Directive 2006/112/EC allows the application of a reduced value added tax rate to the supply of books, newspapers and periodicals 1 . Member States may apply the reduced rate selectively subject to compliance with the principle of fiscal neutrality, which precludes similar goods being treated differently. Goods are similar where they have similar characteristics and meet the same needs from the point of view of an average consumer, and where the differences between them do not have a significant influence on the latter’s decision to use one or other of those goods. The similarity between publications in different languages must be assessed by the competent national authorities and courts in each concrete situation 2 . 2. The Commission is committed to ensure fundamental rights are protected in the context of implementation of EU law. In particular, the Commission recalls that Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU prohibits any form of discrimination on the basis, inter alia, of language. Any limitation to such fundamental right should be made in compliance with Article 52(1) of the Charter. 3. Latvia has fully transposed the Racial Equality Directive 3 , which provides protection against discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin in specific areas, including access to goods and services. Language as such is not a ground of discrimination on which the EU is empowered to legislate and the Court of Justice of the European Union has clarified that ‘ethnic origin’ is based on a combination of multiple factors, including common nationality, religious faith, language, and cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds 4 . 1 Article 98 and Annex III, point 6, of Directive 2006/112/EC, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/112/oj/eng. 2 See for instance the judgments of 11 September 2014, K Oy, C-219/13, EU:C:2014:2207, paragraphs 21-25 and 30-31; and of 9 November 2017, AZ v Minister Finansów, C-499/16, EU:C:2017:846, paragraphs 22-24 and 30-33. 3 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, pp. 22–26. 4 Judgment of 4 September 2015, "CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria" AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, C-83/14, EU:C:2015:480, paragraph 46; judgment of 6 April 2017, Jyske Finans A/S v Ligebehandlingsnævnet, acting on behalf of Ismar Huskic, C-668/15, EU:C:2017:278, paragraph 17; and judgment of 18 December 2025, Slagelse Almennyttige Boligselskab Afdeling Schackenborgvænge and Others v MV and Others, C417/23, EU:C:2025:1017, paragraph 74.”
  EU and national cultural identities · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2026-02-09 “E-000523/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The legal basis for pilot projects of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is Regulation 2019/1896 1 , in particular Article 66(4) thereof, which provides that Frontex may plan and implement pilot projects regarding matters covered by its tasks under that Regulation, and Article 10(1)(x) thereof, which defines the development of pilot projects ‘for the carrying out of activities as provided for in this Regulation’. The activities conducted under the pilot project fall under the activities which may be conducted under pilot projects in the field of the European Border Surveillance system fusion services as listed in Article 28 of Regulation 2019/1896. Furthermore, under Article 73(7) of Regulation 2019/1896, Frontex should make pilot projects with third countries public. As sub-question three falls under the responsibility of Frontex, the Commission has asked the Agency to provide a response to the question raised by the Honourable Member. The Commission will send the Agency’s reply to the Honourable Member as soon as possible. 1 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624. OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, pp. 1. ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Asylum & border control
• 2026-01-07 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 31.3.2026 Written question The amount of the lump sum and daily penalties for Hungary’s continued failure to comply with an earlier judgment in Case C-808/18 [1] was fixed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment in Case C-123/22, Commission v Hungary [2] . The Commission continues to enforce the recovery of penalties ordered by the Court by means of offsetting funds allocated to Hungary from the EU budget. The general regime of conditionality [3] has been designed to protect the EU budget, both in its revenue and expenditure sides, from breaches of the principles of the rule of law in the Member States that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget or the protection of the financial interests of the EU in a sufficiently direct way. The Council, on a proposal by the Commission, in December 2022 [4] adopted measures to protect the EU budget from breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary. These measures are still in place, as Hungary did not adopt adequate remedies. The Commission keeps monitoring the situation in all the Member States. Under the Conditionality Regulation, lack of implementation of judgments is a situation that is indicative of breaches of the principles of the rule of law. For a procedure to start, any such situation must concern the EU budget in a sufficiently direct way and there would be no other procedure under EU law that would allow to protect the EU budget more effectively. [1] https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/jurisprudence?sort=DOC_DATE-DESC&searchTerm=%22C-808%2F18%22&publishedId=C-808%2F18. [2] https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/affair?sort=AFF_NUM-DESC&searchTerm=%22C-123%2F22%22&publishedId=C-123%2F22. [3] Conditionality Regulation, OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, pp. 1-10, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022D2506.”
  Asylum & border control · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · Rule of law in Hungary
• 2025-10-14 “E-004025/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The final beneficiary of the training provided under Operation Irini was the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), a unified Libyan institution at operational level, under the umbrella of the Joint Military Committee. 15 out of the 30 trainees were from the Eastern branch of the LCG. This training was conducted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework and pursuant to Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/488 of 11 March 2025 1 , which mandates, in Article 4: ‘…EUNAVFOR MED IRINI shall assist the relevant Libyan institutions responsible for law enforcement and for search and rescue at sea, in particular the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, in the development of their capacities and in their training in law enforcement at sea, in particular to prevent human smuggling and trafficking’. The EU engages with authorities throughout the country in line with its one Libya policy. The training delivered was focused on damage control and firefighting training, search and rescue and first aid training. These are standard components of international maritime professional development and are fully compliant with international law, which requires such skills to ensure seafarers can respond effectively to emergencies at sea. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/488/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on Sahel and Sudan
• 2025-10-06 “E-003907/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the law that was voted by the Greek government on 11 July 2025, which introduced a three-month suspension on the examination of international protection applications for individuals arriving from North Africa and ordered their immediate return. Throughout the suspension period, the Commission was in close contact with the Greek authorities to address the concerns raised by this suspension and received assurances of the non-renewal of the measure. The Commission is informed that as of 14 October 2025 the measure has been lifted. The Commission will closely monitor the situation with the Greek authorities to ensure effective access to the procedures for international protection in full compliance with fundamental rights, including the principle of non-refoulement.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-16 “E-002913/2025 Reply The Political and Security Committee (PSC) evaluates whether a CSDP action needs to be refocused, drawing on a Strategic Review developed by the European External Action Service under the responsibility of the High Representative and in accordance with established crisis management procedures. On 16 April 2025, in the context of the Strategic Review of EUBAM Libya, the PSC agreed that the mandate of that mission should be extended by two years. Ensuring full respect for international human rights standards are core aspects of the Mission’s work. EUBAM Libya has adopted a Human Rights Action Plan and Human Rights Due Diligence Policy to be implemented throughout the Mission’s activities. Benchmarking criteria are developed in the Mission’s Operation Plan. For matters concerning the Mission’s operational design, the Honourable Member is invited to address the question to the High Representative. The Council does not produce its own evaluation reports on civilian CSDP missions.”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-07-16 “E-002912/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In addition to monitoring and evaluation activities conducted regularly by implementing partners, the Commission has carried out six result-oriented monitoring reviews relating to border management in Libya since 2019, with an evaluation currently planned to start in the fourth quarter of 2025. Furthermore, implementing partners provide comprehensive and frequent analyses of operating environments in the country, including the human rights situation. On‑site verifications and third‑party monitoring have complemented these efforts since 2019 providing independent assessments of compliance with the do-no-harm principle. The Commission maintains records of EU-funded equipment through detailed project reports, including on the allocation of budget, ensuring accountability and oversight. These documents provide information on all equipment and clarify whether such equipment has been transferred to the relevant stakeholders. Such systematic tracking allows the Commission to monitor distribution and use of equipment, ensuring compliance with project objectives and regulatory frameworks. The Commission ensures that EU-funded equipment is used as intended and in line with the do-no-harm principle through a comprehensive and robust framework that integrates human rights and conflict sensitivity considerations across all project phases, from identification to evaluation. Special attention is given to human rights, with specific clauses embedded in contracts and provisions to suspend or terminate should violations occur. The use of a rightsbased approach ensures that human rights are fully integrated into programme design, with a range of mitigating measures applied, including the provision of trainings on international law and human rights, to ensure awareness and compliance.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2025-07-16 “E-002911/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Tunisia continues to face significant migratory challenges with high mixed movement pressures. In this context, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) carries out essential protection work in Tunisia with EU political, operational and financial support. The EU supports both the Tunisian authorities and UNHCR to uphold international protection and improve migration management. Developing a national asylum system is a priority. While the EU supports Tunisia’s transition towards such a system, it remains essential to ensure continuity of registration of new asylumseekers. The Commission has expressed concern at the Tunisian authorities’ decision to suspend new UNHCR registrations since June 2024. To facilitate a solution, the EU has offered support for a transition to a national asylum framework. The EU also funds the UNHCR in Tunisia, which continues key activities for individuals already registered - case and identity management, basic assistance, access to basic services and legal support, and maintain regular operational dialogue. The 16 July 2023 EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding 1 on a strategic and global partnership is a key instrument to develop a human-rights-based migration management system and is compatible with Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_23_3887/IP_23_3887_EN.pdf.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Tunisia relations
• 2025-06-24 “E-002532/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Decision of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 June 2025 1 establishes the legal framework for the provision of macro-financial assistance (MFA) to Egypt and its Article 2(1) foresees that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights. The EU will continue to closely monitor progress in Egypt’s political reform agenda defined by its domestic and international commitments. In order to assess progress, the EU will be looking as a guiding framework at Egypt’s international human rights commitments (such as the Universal Periodic Review recommendations endorsed in July 2025 2 ) and its declared national goals part of its national human rights strategy and Constitution. The EU will closely monitor progress across the three political parameters set out in Decision 2025/1267 throughout the lifecycle of the MFA (as per Article 2(2)). The Commission’s annual report on MFA will contain information on the implementation of the Decision that will include an evaluation of concrete and credible steps taken towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights as stated in Article 8(1)(c) of the Decision. Article 4(4) of the Decision foresees that the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the EU’s MFA, should the conditions set out in Article 4(3)(a), not be met, where these conditions [indeed] include the above-mentioned requirement of concrete and credible steps. Furthermore, Article 4(4) foresees that in such cases, the Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation. 1 Decision (EU) 2025/1267 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2025 providing macrofinancial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1267/oj/eng. 2 https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/eg-index.”
  EU-Egypt relations
• 2025-04-30 “E-001766/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU follows closely reports regarding the conditions of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons and has raised its concerns repeatedly with the Israeli authorities, both publicly and privately. In the EU’s position for the 13 th EU-Israel Association Council 1 , the EU called on Israel to fully comply with its international human rights obligations including in the context of arrest, interrogation and detention, and recalled that states have a heightened duty of care to take any necessary measures to protect the lives of individuals deprived of their liberty. The EU addressed the specific situation of minors, calling on Israel to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of all Palestinian minors, especially those faced with arrest and detention, in line with its obligations under international law, specifically the United Nations convention on the rights of the child, and standards regarding the detention of children, including in cases of security offences, and ending the practice of administrative detention. The EU also expressed its concern about the recourse by Israel to indiscriminate arrests and administrative detention without formal charge. EU funding does not directly nor indirectly benefit Israeli detention facilities. EU funding is subject to strict rules and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that it is used exclusively for the purposes intended and in line with EU values and international law. Where relevant, the Commission applies robust due diligence procedures, including clauses in contracts and grant agreements to prevent the diversion of funds. Should credible information to the contrary arise, the Commission investigates thoroughly and takes appropriate measures. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6511-2025-INIT/en/pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-04-30 “E-001765/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In addition to the elements already provided in the reply to the Honourable Member’s question on the same matter (E-001073/2025), please kindly find below complementary information with reference to the subject matter. While respecting the independence of the Tunisian judicial system, the EU noted with concern the heavy verdicts pronounced by the Tunisian court on 19 April 2025, which also involved EU citizens. The EU has also shared those concerns directly with Tunisian authorities through bilateral engagements. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms constitutes a key element of EU-Tunisia relations, as enshrined in the Association Agreement 1 and it is raised as part of the regular dialogues with the Tunisian authorities. On 16 April 2025, the Commission adopted a proposal for a targeted amendment to the Asylum Procedure Regulation establishing an EU list of safe countries of origin 2 . Tunisia is indeed one of the countries proposed for designation. The proposal, subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, is under the Council and the European Parliament’s scrutiny. The designation of a third country as safe country of origin does not establish a guarantee of safety for all nationals of that country. Once the targeted amendment is adopted, Member States will still have to carry out an individual assessment of each asylum application from individuals coming from the countries designated as safe countries of origin at EU level, with all procedural safeguards intact (including legal remedies). 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:d3eef257-9b3f-4adb-a4ed941203546998.0008.02/DOC_4&format=PDF. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_8042_2025_INIT.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Tunisia relations
• 2025-04-22 “E-001589/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The general rules on material reception conditions and health care foreseen in Article 19 of the recast Reception Conditions Directive 1 must be applied by all Member States. The Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 will provide Member States with an opportunity to align national legislation and practices with EU law. In this regard, the Commission is carefully monitoring the way in which all Member States will transpose the recast Reception Conditions Directive into national law by 12 June 2026, including in particular Article 19 of this directive. The Commission’s dedicated Task Force for Migration Management 3 coordinates with relevant Greek authorities and actors, as they fulfil their duty to provide, in particular, adequate reception facilities and protection of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable groups, among other areas. The Commission conducts audits and on-the-spot checks to ensure that every euro from the budget is spent in line with the rules and generates added value 4 . If the Commission discovers deficiencies, it can intervene by interrupting or suspending payments to beneficiaries or Member States. If at a later stage the Commission detects any wrongdoing, it can introduce financial corrections and recover the funds already paid. The Commission opened an infringement procedure in January 2023 by sending a letter of formal notice to Greece 5 , for incorrectly transposing certain provisions of the Reception Conditions Directive and is in close contact with the Greek authorities to ensure its correct transposition and application of the recast Reception Conditions Directive. The Commission will continue to monitor transposition in light of the Pact provisions. 1 Directive (EU) 2024/1346 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, OJ L, 2024/1346, 22.5.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1346/oj. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 3 Commission press release (IP/20/1728) of 23 September 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1728. 4 In the case of the Home Affairs Funds programs, the Member States’ authorities are responsible for selecting the projects to finance in accordance with the relevant EU rules and assume responsibility for the day-to-day management and for ensuring that the actions supported by the funds are implemented correctly and effectively. 5 On 26 January 2023 the Commission sent letters of formal notice to Greece alleging failure to transpose in a fully conform manner all provisions of Directive 2013/33/EU (the Reception Conditions Directive).”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-03-25 “E-001233/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Equality and the respect for human dignity and human rights are core values of the EU, enshrined in the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. These also include the rights to freedom of expression and to peaceful assembly and association. The Commission is committed to promoting and safeguarding these rights. The Commission firmly believes that the protection of children rights and the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people are not mutually exclusive. The Commission recalls that, in December 2022, it referred Hungary to the Court of Justice of the EU over national rules that discriminate against people based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. The Commission considers that such rules violate EU law, both single market rules and the fundamental rights of individuals, in particular of LGBTIQ people, as well as the common values at the core of the EU. The case is still pending before the Court of Justice. The Commission is concerned about any development that could put at risk the effective implementation of EU law and remains fully committed to addressing inequality and discrimination affecting LGBTIQ persons, as also outlined in the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 1 . The Commission is closely monitoring the situation in Hungary and is analysing these constitutional amendments, as well as law amending Act LV of 2018 on the right of assembly related to the protection of children, and amending related laws, recently adopted by the Hungarian Parliament, from the perspective of EU law. The Commission will use all the instruments at its disposal to protect the EU’s core values and will not hesitate to take action as necessary. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52020DC0698.”
  LGBTIQ+ · Rule of law in Hungary · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-03-12 “E-001073/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission As Tunisia is a close neighbour and important partner for the EU, the EU follows the situation in the country closely. This also includes the first two hearings in the ‘conspiracy against state security case’, held on 4 March 2025 1 and 11 April 2025 by the criminal chamber of the first instance court in Tunis. The EU Delegation in Tunis was present on both occasions to observe the trial, alongside representatives of the diplomatic missions of several Member States and like-minded partners. The court did not allow diplomatic observation of the final hearing held on 18 April 2025. While respecting the independence of the Tunisian judicial system, the EU noted with concern the heavy verdicts pronounced by the Tunisian court on 19 April 2025, which also involved EU citizens; and the reported controversies around the judicial process. The EU regularly recalls the importance of freedom of expression, respect of the right to a fair trial and due process requirements in its exchanges with the Tunisian authorities. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms constitutes a key element of EU-Tunisia relations, as enshrined in the Association Agreement 2 and it is raised as part of the regular dialogues with the Tunisian authorities. The EU used to support Tunisia’s reform of the justice sector via its Programme to Support Justice Reform (PARJ), which had a budget of EUR 60 million and ended in 2023. As for support to the Ministry of Interior, the EU-funded Programme to Support Security Sector Reform and Modernisation in the Republic of Tunisia (PARMSS) is still ongoing and amounts to EUR 23 million. The EU is also assisting the Ministry of Interior via the migration-related programmes related to Pillar 5 – Migration and Mobility – of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership 3 . 1 Case nr 53856/5. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A21998A0330%2801%29. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/875834/Memorandum_d'entente.pdf.”
  EU-Tunisia relations
• 2025-03-10 “E-001017/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In its conclusions of October 2024 1 , the European Council expressed solidarity with Poland and with other Member States facing the challenge of instrumentalisation of migration and it acknowledged its determination to ensure effective control of the EU’s external borders through all available means, including with the support of the EU, in line with EU and international law. The Commission issued a Communication on 11 December 2024 2 to support Member States in countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration by Russia and Belarus and to strengthen security at the EU's external borders. The Commission clarifies that Member States at the EU external borders with Russia and Belarus may take exceptional measures to tackle the serious and persistent threat to the security of the EU and the territorial integrity of Member States posed by weaponisation of migration. Such measures may limit certain fundamental rights, such as the right to asylum. They must, however, be temporary, proportionate and limited to what is necessary, in line with EU and international law. The Commission is in continuous contact with the Polish authorities, also concerning the implementation of the legislation referred by the Honourable Member. 1 EUCO 25/24: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf. 2 COM(2024) 570 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024DC0570.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-18 “E-000727/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Since the signature of the EU–Tunisia Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership (SCP) 1 , tangible progress has been achieved across all areas of cooperation, including migration management. Human rights and democratic principles remain at the core of the EU’s external action, in line with Article 2 of the Association Agreement 2 . These values are regularly reaffirmed through political and technical dialogue. The EU remains committed that its financial assistance is fully consistent with human rights obligations and reserves the right to invoke specific clauses in its agreements and contracts, enabling adjustments in cases of noncompliance. The Commission considers that increased actions by Tunisia against migrant smuggling, including the prevention of departures and the interception of vessels in its waters, as well as search and rescue operations to save lives at sea, have contributed to a consistent trend of reduction of arrivals from Tunisia since the implementation of the SCP and related support. According to information from the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA) 3 , as of October 2024, no Member State had applied the safe third country concept vis-a-vis Tunisia. The Commission has no information of transfers of non-Tunisian third-country nationals to Tunisia while an application for international protection in the EU was pending. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/en/ip_23_3887/IP_23_3887_EN.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1998/238/oj/eng. 3 See EUAA (2022): https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/202212/2022_safe_country_concept_asylum_procedure_EN.pdf; EUAA: https://whoiswho.euaa.europa.eu/Pages/safe-country-concept.aspx – last updated on 4 October 2024.”
  EU-Tunisia relations · Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-18 “E-000728/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The ‘third-party monitoring mechanism’ in Libya is a tool to help the Commission better understand the situation on the ground, ensuring that EU-funded programs respect human rights and measures are taken when shortcomings in this regard are identified. The contractors’ reports track developments and identify risks. These reports are available to relevant Commission services, including the EU Delegations. The EU welcomes Libya's willingness to engage in dialogue on migration, uphold human rights, and improve detention conditions, especially for vulnerable individuals. The EU continues to raise these issues with Libyan authorities who are committed to working with the EU, the United Nations, and other partners to enhance conditions and procedures. EU funding does not go directly to Libyan authorities but is channelled through international organizations or Member States. Respect for international law and human rights, including non-refoulement and protection of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, is central to EU policy in Libya. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – GE) embed human rights in their design and implementation. The NDICI Regulation 1 stresses human rights as a key aspect of EU external action, making them a criterion for funding eligibility and programs implementation. The Commission monitors its programmes through regular reports from implementing partners, on-the-ground visits, independent expert evaluations and external monitoring. This information supports dialogue with partner countries on migration, asylum, and border management, strengthening a rights-based approach. For border management, the EU-funded Support to Integrated border and migration management in Libya 2 action, implemented by Italy’s Ministry of Interior and the International Organisation for Migration, operates under a Memorandum of Understanding with Libya, ensuring compliance with the ‘do-no-harm’ principle and coordination on search-and-rescue activities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj/eng 2 https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/our-programmes/support-integrated-border-and-migration-managementlibya-firstphase_en#:~:text=The%20programme%20aims%20to%20strengthen%20the%20capacity%20of,and%20rescue %20at%20sea%20and%20in%20the%20desert”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-01-28 “E-000386/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is not competent to supervise or enforce compliance with European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments. The monitoring of the execution of ECtHR judgments falls under the competence of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Commission considers the implementation of leading judgments of the ECtHR an important indicator for the functioning of the rule of law in a country and reports on it in the context of its Rule of Law Report. The Commission will continue monitoring the situation in Greece, including as regards the follow-up to ECtHR judgements, to address any challenges. 2. Full respect of fundamental rights in the management of external borders is a key requirement under EU law, in particular under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Member States must investigate and address reports of fundamental rights violations. Constant dialogue with Member States is necessary to foster a common understanding and ensure effective implementation of EU law. Infringement procedures are one of the tools to ensure such implementation. If the Commission concludes that any Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under the EU acquis, including in terms of adopting legislation that would be incompatible with the acquis or in terms of non-compliance with the EU legislation in their administrative practice, it may decide to initiate infringement procedures. 3. According to the Treaties, the Commission has a discretionary power to launch infringement procedures. The Commission will continue monitoring the situation in Member States, including Greece, to ensure that oversight mechanisms are in place to enable efficient follow-up and effective investigations into alleged fundamental rights violations.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-01-09 “E-000062/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission On 18 February 2025, the Commission replied to the European Ombudsman by providing further clarifications on several elements of compliance with its human rights obligations. Concerning the possible suspension of contracts, the General Conditions for Contribution Agreements (Articles 11 and 12 1 ) stipulate that the implementation may be suspended when a violation of human rights in the respective partner country has been identified per a formal EU Decision. Suspension can be partial and is not the only means to address a potential breach. This can also be done by reinforcing dialogue with the authorities and taking mitigating measures, including trainings on international law and human rights. The Commission is working on enhancing internal procedures to ensure better mainstreaming of human rights in migration management and more effectively follow up on allegations of human rights violations. The Commission has strong monitoring mechanisms in place. Implementing partners conduct risk and context analysis and identify preventive measures to mitigate the risk that EU assistance results in violation of human rights. The EU Delegation also monitors the situation through regular missions, meetings and policy dialogue with relevant stakeholders, including Tunisian authorities and internal security forces. The latter assured that appropriate procedures are in place to address any instances of mistreatment or misconduct. Moreover, dedicated monitoring mechanisms have been deployed to further ensure adherence to human rights’ standards in EU funded projects related to migration and security. All this information serves as basis for dialogue with the authorities and guide the implementation of EU actions. The Commission is committed to the respect of human rights and attaches great importance to transparency and accountability and remains fully committed to engaging with the European Parliament on its activities in Tunisia. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/005e7241-6726-4c5e-b8223b51c28a8819_en?filename=contribution-agreement-annex-ii_en.pdf”
  Activities of EU Ombudsman · Asylum & border control
• 2024-11-12 “P-002502/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s return policy and procedures set out in Directive 2008/115/EC 1 (the Return Directive) have to be implemented in compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 (the Charter). The Return Directive provides safeguards pending return, as set out in Article 14, including emergency health care and special needs of vulnerable persons. Member States must provide basic support (i.e. accommodation and food) in line with the respect of human dignity (Article 1 of the Charter). The Court of Justice has ruled that, to comply with the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, as laid down in Article 4 of the Charter, Member States are bound to prevent situations of ‘extreme material poverty’ 3 . The Commission understands ‘extreme material poverty’ in line with the Court’s interpretation. The Commission has no powers to intervene on specific programs that Member States implement or discontinue. Nevertheless, in its capacity as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission may act in cases of systemic failure to comply with EU law. The Commission is in regular contact with the Dutch authorities on migration management including on returns, implementation of the Pact for Migration and Asylum 4 and follow up of the Schengen evaluation of the Netherlands on return. The Commission notes that affected individuals can make use of the available national redress mechanisms. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/115/oj/eng 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12016P%2FTXT 3 See judgment of 19 March 2019, Abubacarr Jawo v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C‑163/17, EU:C:2019:218, paragraph 92; judgment of 16 July 2020, Milkiyas Addis v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C‑517/17, EU:C:2020:579, paragraph 51; and judgment of 12 September 2024, Changu, C-352/23, EU:C:2024:748, paragraph 75. 4 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-10-22 “E-002205/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice-President expressed the EU’s grave concern about the national legislation of the State of Israel concerning United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 1 . The EU has been clear in condemning any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA or to otherwise attempt to obstruct its capacity to operate its mandate 2 . If implemented, the laws will have far-reaching consequences, stopping all UNRWA’s operations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, de facto preventing UNRWA’s vital operations in Gaza, hampering UNRWA’s provision of health, education and social services in the West Bank and revoking UNRWA’s diplomatic privileges and immunities in Israel 3 . The EU continues to reach out to the Israeli government to voice its advocacy together with its international partners through public and private channels. The EU is a firm supporter of the United Nations (UN) and the multilateral and rules-based global governance system of which UNRWA, as a UN agency whose specific mandate derives from the UN General Assembly Resolution 302(IV) of 8 December 1949 4 , is a part. The Commission is committed to continuing its support to UNRWA and Palestinian refugees. On 17 October 2024, the Commission disbursed EUR16 million to UNRWA, completing the disbursement of the EUR82 million allocated for the agency for 2024. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-statement-high-representative-draft-legislation-could-stopunrwa-operations-occupied_en 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/31/statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-eu-on-the-unrwa-legislation/ 4 https://www.unrwa.org/content/general-assembly-resolution-302”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2024-10-17 “P-002141/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes note of the recent publication of the Polish migration strategy. The Commission lacks at this stage the necessary information as to the precise modalities of any possible future national legislation that may emerge as a result of the proposals contained in the strategy. The Commission is therefore not in a position to provide an assessment as to their compliance with EU law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Commission condemns Belarus’ hybrid attack on the EU’s external borders and stands in full solidarity with the Member States affected by these actions. In its conclusions of 17 th October 2024, the European council expressed its solidarity with Poland and with Member States facing these challenges. It also reaffirmed its commitment to countering the instrumentalisation of migrants for political purposes. Member States have a duty to protect the external borders, in line with their obligations under EU law, including the respect of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the application of EU law. The Commission is in close contact with the Polish authorities with the aim of ensuring that the protection of the EU’s external borders against the instrumentalisation of migration for political purposes is done in a manner that is compliant with all fundamental rights, including the right to asylum and the principle of non-refoulement.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-10-16 “E-002089/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In line with the President of the Commission’s political guidelines presented in July 2024 1 there is a need to strengthen the coordination of search and rescue (SAR) operations to prevent loss of life at sea, including in cooperation with neighbouring third countries. The Commission confirms that providing EU financial support to the training and capacity building of the Libyan coastguard for operations in its own SAR zone contributes to the efforts of saving lives of people who disembark on dangerous journeys, often resorting to smugglers and traffickers, and risking their lives. Notably, in the framework of the EU-funded ‘Support to integrated border and migration management in Libya’ programme, the Commission aims at improving Libyan authorities’ capacity to carry out SAR operations and thus saving lives both at sea and in the desert, in respect of international rules and human rights obligations. The Commission takes note of the June 2024 Croton Civil Court ruling. It is committed to continue to engage, alongside the international partners, with the Libyan authorities to ensure that SAR operations are carried out in line with international standards. A regular dialogue at technical level has been established with Libyan authorities to address all issues in the context of migration and protection, including respect of human rights. Five technical missions of the Commission took place between 2024 and 2025 and observed notable improvements on both engagement from the Libyan authorities and practical results in terms of access to disembarkation points and detention centres, release of vulnerable migrants, and the doubling of voluntary humanitarian returns, compared to the figures of 2023. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf”
  Asylum & border control · EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2024-10-15 “E-002086/2024 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission With regards to recommendation 3 of the European Court of Auditors’ Special report 17/2024 1 , the Commission is currently working on developing a set of practical tools in response to the Court of Auditors’ recommendations to strengthen the implementation of the human rights-based approach in all its interventions and enhance related internal procedures. The Commission remains committed to providing all relevant information to the European Parliament in the context of developing and implementing strategic and comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit of migration, allowing the Parliament to exercise its oversight. The Commission also remains committed to conducting high-level geopolitical dialogues between the two Institutions on the implementation of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) Regulation 2 to ensure democratic scrutiny, transparency and accountability. In addition, the Commission is available to regularly update the Parliament on the adopted actions contributing to the indicative target foreseen in the NDICI–GE Regulation related to spending on actions supporting management and governance of migration and forced displacement. 1 https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications/SR-2024-17 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/947, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/global-europe-the-euneighbourhood-development-and-international-cooperation-instrument.html”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU competences on human rights
• 2024-09-23 “E-001781/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission For Member States to opt-out from the Pact on Migration and Asylum 1 or from the EU’s asylum and migration rules in general, there needs to be an amendment to the EU Treaty. Only Denmark and Ireland enjoy a particular status due to protocols to the Treaties. The Dutch government acknowledges this legal requirement and has informed the Commission that it would ask for an opt-out from EU law on asylum and migration in the event of a Treaty amendment. Once adopted, EU law is binding on all Member States concerned and, following its entry into force, applicable according to the specific provisions contained in each legal act. The core instruments of the Pact on Migration and Asylum were adopted in May 2024. These instruments are binding on the Netherlands and the Netherlands has expressed its commitment to ensure a swift implementation of the Pact. The Commission will monitor the national implementation plans and will support Member States, including by helping to identify gaps and operational steps to address them. The Commission is in constant dialogue with the Member States on both the current acquis and the Pact. As the guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the correct application and implementation of EU law, and stands ready to initiate appropriate procedures where deemed necessary and justified, including infringement procedures. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/daily-view/L-series/default.html?&ojDate=22052024”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-07-26 “P-001430/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is in the process of conducting an assessment of the legislative changes introduced by Hungary. Therefore, it is not yet in a position to provide a legal assessment of the compatibility of said changes with EU law. In this context, the Commission is in contact with the Hungarian authorities and has asked them to share more detailed information on this particular matter.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you. Chair. Thank you very much, Commissioner, for being here and addressing us. Yeah. A few questions on the rule of law report. Look forward to the next one. Of course. But what the Parliament has called for a longer time now is that the commission uses the rule of law report with very clear and concrete Themes. What are the infringements done by the Member States? What are the recommendations? What are the deadlines and what are the actions by the Commission if the deadlines are not met with fulfilling the recommendations? And I wonder to what extent this is being implemented in the new rule of law report, what can we see about this? We also call oftentimes for more support and protection for NGOs who are increasingly under pressure in many member states. So on the one hand, more practical support, but also measures against member states who keep on oppressing or violating their rights. And then specifically on Hungary, in the report of the European Parliament, we called upon the Council to really I finally effectively apply article seven procedure to start with the recommendations or otherwise withdrawing the voting rights We see now what is happening, because the council is refusing to use its means the blackmailing, the blocking of our EU security policy and actually serving Putin's agenda.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Thank you very much, dear three chairs and dear three speakers. I have one question. One question for Mrs. Calabrese, and this is about you mentioned the need for shared benchmarks within the EU. Maybe you could elaborate a little bit on on how they would look like, and also how we could better anticipate to the use of AI in the elections. And the other question is for Mrs. Miller, because the Hungarian elections were already referred to, it will take place within less than four weeks. And we have very worrying news about Russian intelligence interference. Uh, that is about to emerge where we see that the National Election Commission decided not to interfere. Neither the Hungarian intelligence services. So this is, of course, a problem in a captured state where there is a sort of deliberate cooperation with foreign Interference actors. And my question is actually in these kinds of situations, what could the EU do? We have this European Centre for Democratic Resilience. Could they do more than simply monitoring? Could they also put more pressure on the Hungarian authorities to to stop this and to interfere in this interference? And what could the European Commission do if it comes to enforcement of of our legislation and our values?”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Uh, dear chair, I would like to give a very brief explanation on the request that we made because on behalf of the Greens EFA group, we have requested to put to a vote a decision made during the last coordinators meeting on allocation of two files, namely the regulations on safe third country and safe country of origin under the standard procedure established in the Famicom. It's the group with the highest percentage of the points still available. Who can become rapporteur on a certain file and accept its concerns and amendment? We look at which group had the rapporteurs before and the file can also be allocated to that group. Furthermore, we have certain rules on the number of points to be paid. Both rules were not followed for the allocations of those two files, and those rules contained in the scheme allow every political group in this House to work harmoniously and in the spirit of fairness and equity, according to their size. So it's a very protective mechanism that we have in Macomb, and we believe that what happened during this meeting is a breach of these provisions on allocations of reports and opinions, and creating a dangerous precedent for all groups, as it may prevent each group from getting a file they would be entitled to.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you so much for for organizing this and also for your great, a witnessing of the consequences of, of of these sanctions directly upon your work and upon your daily life. I think it's very clear. And you call upon us. Sorry, I don't see you, but you call upon all of us to uphold international law and also to protect our independent instances and courts to to do their job in order to, to uphold international law. And I think it's very legitimate. And I think we should respond and provide you with, um, with support and with satisfactory responses. And we are very much depending, of course, on what the European Commission and the council member states also are prepared to do. So my, um, my call would also be about activating the blocking statute. I call I count already three resolutions that the European Parliament adopted in which we urgently called for the activation of the blocking statute. So there's a clear majority in the European Parliament wanting the European Commission to do so. I just heard the explanation that the the institutions can already, uh, let the Commission know that they would not object. I think these resolutions are a clear signal that we don't object, that we want action. So my main question is actually also what needs to be done in order for the commission to start with a delegated act? I don't know what else we should do.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “You promote the issue. You say the issuance for human rights defenders and vulnerable persons should be promoted. What is your plan on that? Because I only read about updating the visa handbook. Are there other ways to make sure that it will become an effective.”
  EU competences on human rights
• “Thank you, chair. And thank you, Mr. Brunner, for being here and also more often engaging with us. Um, of course, as you said, the implementation of the pact is key at the moment. It deserves. It requires all our attention. And I one specific element on that. Uh, one of the new things is the fundamental rights monitoring mechanism, uh, which is established in the screening, but also, uh, regulation, but also the ADR. And many member states are now figuring out who would get the mandate, how to establish it. Um, and for us, if for the legislation is really key that it is independent, it has sufficient competences and sufficient resources. The Fra guidelines should be a strong guidance for the Commission. I hope to check the compliance of the Member States new fundamental rights monitor mechanisms. So maybe you can dwell into that how you're going to do that. And of course you should not wait with enforcing compliance until the pact is implemented. There are many non-compliant member states at the moment. For instance, in January, the European Court of Human Rights already ruled that Greece is conducting systematic pushbacks for years now. Also, if you look at the reports of Frontex, they are very alarming.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you. Chair. Thank you very much, Commissioner, for being here and addressing us. Yeah. A few questions on the rule of law report. Look forward to the next one. Of course. But what the Parliament has called for a longer time now is that the commission uses the rule of law report with very clear and concrete Themes. What are the infringements done by the Member States? What are the recommendations? What are the deadlines and what are the actions by the Commission if the deadlines are not met with fulfilling the recommendations? And I wonder to what extent this is being implemented in the new rule of law report, what can we see about this? We also call oftentimes for more support and protection for NGOs who are increasingly under pressure in many member states. So on the one hand, more practical support, but also measures against member states who keep on oppressing or violating their rights. And then specifically on Hungary, in the report of the European Parliament, we called upon the Council to really I finally effectively apply article seven procedure to start with the recommendations or otherwise withdrawing the voting rights We see now what is happening, because the council is refusing to use its means the blackmailing, the blocking of our EU security policy and actually serving Putin's agenda.”
  Rule of law in Hungary
• “44:17 – 14:47:24): Yeah, thank you, Chair, and thanks a lot to the rapporteur for presentation of the report. It's not his fault that it's not a very positive report. I think it's really good to be very honest to take stock of the current situation, which is really discouraging, I must say. Last week, we had a joint delegation meeting with the Bosnian members of the parliament, and there we actually almost all concluded the same. The Commission was very clear, but also members of the delegation, they actually agreed that it's a shame that for so long now, since two years, there's hardly any progress to be measured. This, of course, means that we cannot take any progress in the accession talks as well, and I think we should make that very clear but also come up with recommendations, of course, on how to overcome this deadlock. I think, and our group thinks, that we really have to look at the ethnic division which is cemented throughout the whole system, creating also and contributing to this deadlock and maybe also to the political willingness to keep the status quo. And that we really have to look how to overcome this because as long as political leaders have an interest in not getting any progress, how do you get there then? And I think in that sense the EU should use its leverage, its incentives as good as possible. They really did their best to let the growth plan be adopted, but now we're still waiting for ratification, which is really a big shame. But also to make sure that we make clear that we have also our conditions. It comes to IPA funding and any other financial support that it should go hand in hand with progress also on rule of law, the judiciary laws, for instance, but also on involvement of civil society because that was lacking with the growth pact. So I think we should really also, and we will come with amendments to the report to make sure that there is an obligation and really a big incentive to work together with civil society and all kinds of actors in society who are oftentimes more motivated for reforms than the leaders in power. And maybe, I think it's also really good to acknowledge and to complement the EU in its communication which finally became also more clear in Bosnia and the Balkans that what is the contribution of the EU and why it is so important to make certain steps to get closer to the EU because that is what the EU wants and what most of the citizens of Bosnia want as well. Thank you.”
  EU relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina
• “(17:29:00 – 17:31:46): Yeah, thank you Chair, thank you very much Commissioner for being here and addressing us. Yeah, have a few questions on the rule of law report, look forward to the next one of course. But what the Parliament has called for a longer time now is that the Commission uses the rule of law report with very clear and concrete themes: what are the infringements done by the member states, what are the recommendations, what are the deadlines, and what are the actions by the Commission if the deadlines are not met with fulfilling the recommendations? And I wonder to what extent this is being implemented in a new rule of law report, what can we see about this? We also call oftentimes for more support and protection for NGOs who are increasingly under pressure in many member states. So on the one hand, more practical support, but also measures against member states who keep on oppressing or violating their rights. And then specifically on Hungary, in the Europe the report of the European Parliament, we called upon the Council to really finally effectively apply Article 7 procedure to start with the recommendations or otherwise withdrawing the voting rights. We see now what is happening because the Council is refusing to use its means, the blackmailing, the blocking of our EU security policy, and actually serving Putin's agenda. So is the Commission prepared to do the proposal to the Council to trigger Article 7 paragraph two? And my last point is about transparency and clear communication about the measures that the Commission takes to freeze or unfreeze funding. We have now also seen the opinion of the Attorney General concurring with the European Parliament when we went to the Court of Justice saying, look, this decision to unfreeze the funding was not based on justified grounds. How do we prevent these kinds of proceedings? Are you ready to communicate more properly and to really also be more consistent in your policies on freezing funding? My final, final call on the Justice Program, and this is related to that we see that the Commission tends to sideline the Parliament if it comes to scrutiny. If you look at the Justice Program and also under the framework of flexibility, Thank you.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “(17:29:00 – 17:31:46): Yeah, thank you Chair, thank you very much Commissioner for being here and addressing us. Yeah, have a few questions on the rule of law report, look forward to the next one of course.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “So is the Commission prepared to do the proposal to the council to trigger article seven, paragraph two? And my last point is about transparency and clear communication about the measures that the commission takes to freeze or unfreeze funding. We have now also seen the opinion of the advocate general concurring with the European Parliament when we went to the Court of Justice saying, look, this decision to unfreeze the funding was not based on justified grounds. How do we prevent these kinds of proceedings? Are you ready to communicate more properly and to really also be more consistent in your policies on freezing funding? My final, final call on the justice program, and this is related to that. We see that the commission tends to sideline the Parliament if it comes to scrutiny. If you look at the justice program and also under the framework of flexibility, being less transparent and clear, and I hope that the commission will will change its course into that in that direction.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “One thing on suspension, which I think that the emphasis is too much on that. But in in. As a follow up, also to the question of Mr. Nemec, we use the suspension of visa facilitation, of course, already as a sanction in our foreign policy. If you look at Belarus, Russia, there are other examples of that. So if you say in your answer to Mr. Nemec about Israel, there's no migratory risk, then you again, only link it to the migration issue. And this is what I really do not completely grasp. Um, is that always an additional ground? I think that the suspension ground on the basis of human rights violations or, or other bad behavior to suspend diplomats, high officials is not is a self-standing ground. So maybe you can explain a bit about that. And what is your strategy? Is there a plan in order to to work this further out? Then if you link it to migration and security, do you promote also the issuance of visa in a more positive way? For instance, if we want to get a better return cooperation to make sure that member states are ready to also have a strengthened visa policy.”
  EU-Belarus relations
• “Commissioner, what is the EU commitment to upholding international law and rule of law worth. If it refuses to defend international judges under attack, the US has sanctioned ICC judges not for corruption, not for abuse, but for delivering justice against the most heinous international crimes. And the same applies to actors delivering evidence to the ICC like UN rapporteurs and NGOs. This strikes at the very core of our international legal order, and it's a brutal assault on national judicial independence. The sanctions are not symbolic. They punish real people, disrupt real lives, and try to break those who dare to stand up for international Accountability. This Parliament has repeatedly called for the activation of the blocking statute. The silence of the Commission and Council is plain weakness disguised as caution. Europe has the legal tools to respond, so use them. Protect the judges, protect international law and the credibility of our union. These judges did exactly what their role demanded from them. Now, Commissioner, it's your job to do the same. Thank you.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you all for commissioners for being here. Um, EU leaders and the Commission are very critical on the way Trump is dealing with other countries, selfish, short sighted and unequal and rightly so. They are criticizing that. So we must and can do much better in line with our values and also based on equality. So in our view that would mean not polluting development aid with our migration conditionality, for instance, but instead condition funding to the respect for rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. The way the Commission applies this conditionality is not transparent at all, which really impedes the Parliament in controlling and steering this. And this is more an overall concern that the increase of flexibility in the reduction of targets is really a threat for parliamentary scrutiny. So I very much agree with the call of the Co-rapporteurs to restore that and to bring back the possibility for Parliament to have better oversight and also to have stronger tools. And an effective humanitarian aid requires a predictability. What the Commission also said, and impartiality. How do we guarantee that flexibility does not further undermine that? We have negative experience in the past with merging funding, and the same goes for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, given the absence of a ring fenced budget. How do we guarantee continuity and Predictability of existing programs, but even also to strengthen them in a time of increasing democratic backsliding and geopolitical pressure. Thank you.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• “And let's see then if the council would object or not. But why has that not happened yet so far? Because ICC has a seat in the EU. We always say we want to and we need to support and protect ICC. So please, I would like to get an answer from you. And also would like to know from Mrs. Holland, because you have a seat in The Hague, and I also come from the Netherlands. So what is the Netherlands doing for you? Do you see any possibility for the Netherlands to do more in a protective way? And maybe also to speak out in the council as well in order to to have this activation of the court. And I would also remind it's not it's about judges. But as you also say, it's about a lot of high UN officials, including rapporteurs and about other actors collecting evidence in cooperation with the ICC. So it's really very much undermining fact finding, investigating and and coming up with rulings that are in compliance with our international law. So that's actually the most important thing to Mrs. Steltzer like, what can we do? What can we expect from the Commission? And maybe also with Mr. Reingaard, are there any other things that we could do in order to get progress on this.”
  Support for International Criminal Court
• “Yeah. The last question is about global Europe and the idea of, um, well, an extension of the negative conditionality. Uh, if in the case that would happen, would the suspension only apply to the governments of these countries or also to NGOs, international organizations, and local actors working in the field and in need of humanitarian aid? Thank you.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• “(10:14:26 – 10:16:56): Thank you very much. And I speak on behalf of Vlad who just arrived. So, so dear Pamela, as you very well know, these are trying times for Europe and for global health. The World Health Organization system is you could actually call it under attack. It is being defunded, and important experts are being redrawn. That means that Europe and everyone else is now more exposed to the next pandemic, for example, avian flu. The EU institutions and member states taken together are the biggest contributors to the WHO. We must use this position and leverage it. A direct consequence of this is the fact that new pandemics for which there are no known vaccines yet like Ebola present even present even bigger threats to the world and, obviously, to Europe. And this is exactly why we need our ECDC and our HARA. Strong mandates, secured funding, more Europe in ensuring our resilience and security also in the public health crisis area. So, dear Pamela, do you see yourself with everything that I mentioned here? Do you see yourself, funded? And this is, I guess, really also corresponding to my colleague's questions. Well enough, do you see yourself, positioned well enough to attract attention from the countries? I mean, are they listening when you speak? And then again on, you know, could it be an idea to have an even stronger and better radar to detect new threats before they become critical? And and just 1 comment connecting to the funding. As we all very well know, it is much more expensive to not know, and and we saw it. I mean, we've got the figures, and they are devastating from from the COVID 19. So what is what is your thinking around the funding, and and how can we, put this up on the agenda?”
  EU competences on health (internal-competence axis, sharpened)
• “Thank you, chair. Thank you, um, Commissioner, for being here and for presenting the strategy. And indeed, I also concur with the ones who gave you compliment for that because we need a strategy, as you say. Uh, visa is a tool that can be used and it should be part of pencil of many different objects of policy areas that we have. Um, and, um, and I think it can only work if all of these different objectives will be taken into account. If not, I think member states will simply go their own way because they have an interest in fostering their relationship with individual countries. And I think this is one of the challenging elements of visa policy that to a large extent, it's still the competence of the member states and the Commission. The EU tries to harmonise and really make it an effective tool. Um, but because of the member states really have an interest in a good partnership, I think that the Commission is still too much focusing on using visa as a, in a punitive way, as a punitive approach. Um, and that would disregard, in my view, the foreign policy objectives and the goal to intensify the cooperation with third countries.”
  Visa policy as an external-relations instrument
• “Thank you chair, and thanks a lot to all three speakers. I think that you were also very consistent in showing that it's not only the foreign interference, but also the national leader, some of the national leaders fuelling the, um, the anti-EU sentiment. Um, so, um, and I think that I very much concur with you that we have much more leverage that we could use, and that independent media and civil society are our biggest allies at the moment. So I have some concrete questions about this. You mentioned emergency funding that we could use to fill the gaps that USAID has left. Could you say, could that be in the framework of funding or any other way? Or maybe you can elaborate on this a little bit. And also, how could we use our conditionality more strictly, for instance, to ensure media pluralism, ISM to combat Russian style acts like foreign agent laws or national protection laws. So really also to make sure there is a regulatory framework there protecting them. Um, and in the previous panel that was already mentioned, the use of more strategic communication. Maybe you could also say something about this where the EU could improve its its policies. And as we also just heard, I think here in the room there are also actions from the member states, um, enabling this anti-EU sentiment and anti um, civil society sentiment. So how could we, uh, you know, how could we consider this or treat this, uh, because I see it as an internal threat towards our EU foreign policy. And one question on the digital agenda, if I may, um, how could we use the accession process more to be keen on compliance with EU regulations like the AI act, DSA, etc..”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “So now I think we must do our best to use the study findings to our advantage in order to break the deadlock. And for this purpose, it's really my strong hope that the EU Commission will refrain from repeating his last year's controversial move to announce potential withdrawal of the directive for the rest of the mandate. And I think that your study really shows how necessary it would be to advance further with these proposals. Um, my questions would be maybe you could elaborate a little bit on that and which areas of life covered by the directive you have found there to be most to gain from adopting this proposal? I already saw, uh, a few areas that were, um, the biggest in your, um, in your overview are the clear differences in added value in the field of education compared with other fields, for instance, um, and maybe you can say something because you already also touched upon cross-border effects. Could you say that, um, if we don't advance with the directive that this would also undermine or affect the free movement. Rules that we have in the EU. Um, so to conclude, on behalf of the green group and our green rapporteur for the horizontal Anti-Discrimination directive. Thanks a lot for your work, and I hope we continue to cooperate on this issue.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• “Dear chair, Commissioner in Gaza we all observe the genocide, the killing and the starvation continues and the people are suffering tremendously. Yet we observe a paralysed EU. I just visit the West Bank with my colleagues, and there we see the apartheid and the ethnic cleansing through state organised violence and repression, sterilized roads, walls and checkpoints, demolished houses, olive groves, groves and refugee camps, and homeless and an impoverished Palestinians. The UN being criminalized. And yet we observe the EU's complete silence and complicity in those gross violations of international law. There is no justice without accountability, colleagues. Our values, our credibility, our legal orders are dying before our eyes. Time is long overdue. So commission and council act now.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you chair. Thank you very much for for this presentation. Uh, from the commission. Um, and I think it's really vital that the commission recognises the important, the key role that civil society plays also in upholding the rule of law, um, be it combating corruption, ensuring checks and balances, and also being a watchdog of the policies. And I think that in these times, the role of the commission becomes more and more vital in, uh, as a kind of protective shield against increasing attacks on civil society. Um, and there I think the commission should also use all its tools available to do so. I mean, here in the European Parliament, we called upon the Commission. We urge the Commission to also use the instrument of infringement procedures, specifically through asking for interim measures if it comes to the LGBTQ law, in order to protect the organizers of the pride, but also regarding the National Sovereignty Act, because, you see, the backsliding is going so quick that we cannot wait for years of inaction. And I wonder if the Commission has learned from these things. And also on the funding, of course, we would like to have seen a bigger funding also in Agora EU proposal, but specifically those who are at risk in backsliding countries, they are strangled by their authorities and they are also at risk specifically because of the cuts in the US aid. So what is the strategy if it comes to the commission, to let these organizations survive and do their work. Um, could you elaborate more on the platform? Uh, like there's so much still unknown about the composition, for instance, the powers they have. Is there a right to initiative? How will it work? So maybe you can elaborate a little bit on that. And finally, uh, you also mentioned, uh, EU protection mechanism for NGOs at risk. Could you also elaborate a little bit more about that? Thank you.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “So is the Commission prepared to do the proposal to the council to trigger article seven, paragraph two? And my last point is about transparency and clear communication about the measures that the commission takes to freeze or unfreeze funding. We have now also seen the opinion of the advocate general concurring with the European Parliament when we went to the Court of Justice saying, look, this decision to unfreeze the funding was not based on justified grounds. How do we prevent these kinds of proceedings? Are you ready to communicate more properly and to really also be more consistent in your policies on freezing funding? My final, final call on the justice program, and this is related to that. We see that the commission tends to sideline the Parliament if it comes to scrutiny. If you look at the justice program and also under the framework of flexibility, being less transparent and clear, and I hope that the commission will will change its course into that in that direction.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Um, look at Poland has de facto suspended the right to access to an asylum procedure. And you also refer to Schengen, where many member states do not comply with the criteria that you were just describing. So I would really like to know from you, what do you do in order to enforce compliance with the current rules and also afterwards, because we have conditionality in the funding, we have the possibility of infringement procedure we need to make sure that rules are credible and that they are useful, and that's only the case when they are enforced. My last question is about civil society. We need civil society urgently in order to have a proper implementation of the asylum pact and giving the EU's aid cuts, but also national cuts. Civil society, especially in Greece, Poland and also Turkey, are threatening are being threatened with their real essential tasks. For instance, the Greek Council of Refugees is faced with 40% of the cuts in their legal support tasks. So, and we know how key legal support is, especially in border countries. So how do you see possibilities and are you intending to resolve this, for instance, maybe through the IMF? Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control