Pierre-Romain THIONNET

Policy topics Pierre-Romain THIONNET is active on

What Pierre-Romain THIONNET has said (28)

• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The Commissioner for the Mediterranean attended, as an observer on behalf of the Commission, the Board of Peace meeting on 19 February 2026 in Washington, District of Columbia. As the Commissioner attended as an observer, she did not intervene in the deliberations of the conference. The attendance of the Commissioner was not subject to a Council decision as the objective of the Commission’s participation was to foster coordination and complementarity between the EU and broader international efforts in relation to Gaza, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2803 [1] . The Commissioner was accompanied by the EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process, alongside representatives of some 14 Member States who participated at Ministerial or senior diplomatic level. As the EU plays a significant role as a key provider of external assistance to the Palestinian people and is a major donor for humanitarian assistance in Gaza, it is important to engage with all actors aiming at providing aid in Gaza. In this respect, the meeting offered an occasion to showcase the considerable EU support for Palestine and for a reformed Palestinian Authority, as well as to confirm the EU’s readiness to support recovery and resilience in Gaza. As reiterated on several occasions, the EU is not a member of the Board of Peace and has raised a number of questions about a number of elements in the charter of the Board of Peace related to its scope, its governance, and its compatibility with the UN Charter. [1] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf.”
  EU-US relations · EU diplomatic representation · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-09-04 “P-003424/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU and Member States expressed readiness to contribute to security guarantees based on their respective competences and capabilities, in line with international law, and in full respect of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and taking into account the security and defence interests of all Member States 1 and in coordination with the Coalition of the Willing. An Ukraine capable of defending itself effectively is an integral part of any future security guarantees. The EU and Member States have provided about EUR 63.2 billion in military support, with EUR 6.1 billion through the European Peace Facility. The EU Military Assistance Mission is the largest training provider for Ukraine, having trained 80 500 Ukrainian soldiers so far. It may be deployed to Ukraine post-ceasefire, if the Council so decides. The EU also supports Ukraine's resilience and security sector via the EU Advisory Mission, with over 350 staff currently in Ukraine The EU is increasing support to Ukraine’s defence industry and its integration with the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base, based on windfall profits from Russia’s immobilised assets, the Security Action for Europe, and the Ukraine Support Instrument. EU’s efforts are in line with the joint security commitments 2 signed with Ukraine in 2024. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/12/statement-by-european-union-leaders-onukraine/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/oredhmis/eu-ukraine-security-commitments-en.pdf.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU competences on defence
• 2025-04-23 “E-001611/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Seveso-III Directive 1 establishes rules to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances and mitigate their consequences for human health and the environment. Military establishments, installations, and storage facilities are exempt from the Seveso-III Directive. Non-military companies supplying hazardous substances for military applications, which often involve substances that are explosive, toxic, or highly flammable, are within the scope of the Directive when the quantity of hazardous substances exceeds the thresholds in Annex I. According to data from the European Major Accident Reporting System 2 , the production and storage of explosives and other chemical substances rank among the top ten activities associated with major accidents. This is why the Commission does not intend to propose reducing obligations or introducing exemptions for civil companies supplying hazardous substances for military applications. Regarding the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) 3 , the Commission’s proposal for a Defence Omnibus 4 broadens the scope of the Member States’ defence exemption by not limiting it to specific cases. Moreover, the Commission is examining possible measures to simplify REACH in the context of its upcoming revision. As regards the REACH registration procedure, the European Chemicals Agency 5 is subject to short legal deadlines for reacting and providing registration numbers upon submission of dossiers by registrants. 1 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of majoraccident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 1–37. 2 https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/projects-activities/major-accident-reporting-system-emars_en. 3 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, OJ L 396, 30.12.2006. 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/european-commission-unveils-defence-readiness-omnibus-and-edfinterim-evaluation-2025-06-17_en. 5 https://echa.europa.eu/.”
  Arms export from the EU · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2025-02-03 “P-000453/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The 2040 Climate Target Communication 1 from February 2024 states that all zero and low carbon energy solutions (including renewables, nuclear, energy efficiency, storage, Carbon Capture and Storage, Carbon Capture and Utilisation, carbon removals, geothermal and hydro-energy, and all other current and future net-zero energy technologies) are necessary to decarbonise the energy system by 2040. The 2040 Impact Assessment confirms this. Zero and low carbon solutions, including both renewables and nuclear energy, are especially needed in the electricity sector as electricity’s share in final energy consumption is expected to double from roughly 25% today to about 50% by 2040. A greater share of renewables in 2040 is necessary for the EU to meet its climate goals in the most cost-effective manner, while also enhancing energy independence, energy affordability, create jobs and support economic growth. In that context, and as indicated in the Mission Letter of the Commissioner for Energy and Housing, the Commission will propose initiatives to boost renewable energy including by working on a renewables target for 2040, working with all the energy stakeholders and in close cooperation with all Member States. This target will contribute to reinforce investor predictability, support innovation and market growth for clean technologies. As reaffirmed by the Commissioner for Energy and Housing in his hearing 2 , it is equally important to ensure technology neutrality while decarbonising our economy, in full respect of the Treaty and the right of Member States to choose their energy mix. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A63%3AFIN 2 https://hearings.elections.europa.eu/documents/jorgensen/jorgensen_verbatimreporthearing-original.pdf”
  Energy (green transition) · Nuclear energy
• 2024-12-15 “E-002950/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s approach to Russia is clear and has been implemented in strong unity since the beginning of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and its citizens. Its main elements are: supporting Ukraine, isolating Russia internationally, imposing sanctions against Russia to further limit Russia’s ability to wage war, ensuring accountability for war crimes and the other most serious crimes committed in connection with Russia’s war of aggression, supporting EU’s neighbours and partners, defending the rules-based international order, enhancing EU’s resilience and supporting Russia’s civil society, independent media and human rights defenders. As outlined by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Russia, Mariana Katzarova, Russia’s external aggression and internal repression are closely linked 1 . The EU will continue to call on Russian authorities to abide by their international obligations both with respect to Russia’s international relations and human rights of all its citizens. Russia must unconditionally cease its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, withdraw its troops from the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine as well as pay for the damage caused. 1 https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5759-situation-human-rights-russian-federationreport-special; https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5454-situation-human-rights-russian-federationreport-special”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2024-10-01 “E-001887/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) speaks on behalf of the EU. In the framework of his mandate to conduct the EU’s foreign policy, the HR/VP may deliver ad hoc statements on current developments or in situations requiring an urgent or immediate response without seeking approval of the Council, as long as such statements remain within agreed EU policy positions. The remarks of the HR/VP were made in the context of the EU’s aim of avoiding regional escalation in the Middle East since the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza. Once the violence spread, the EU has been committed to help de-escalate the situation and reduce tensions. This was confirmed in the European Council conclusions of 17 October 2024 1 in which the EU called on all parties to exercise the utmost restraint, put an end to all hostilities immediately and fully abide by international law, including international humanitarian law. The HR/VP spares no effort to work with regional and international partners to reduce the risk of further escalation in the region, to find a way out of the crisis and to revive meaningful peace efforts. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17october-2024/”
  EU competences on foreign affairs
• “And I think Deng Xiaoping had words similar to this. The impressive increase in China's power mirrors the decline in Europe, and we can see that there's no critical response to this. And we're seeing that there's strategic dependencies, meaning that our production is moving to them. The EU has spent the last 30 years about thinking about things and thinking about. Denying aspects of territory and denying geopolitics. And we're seeing that this is coming crashing down around us. Europe will not escape from the power games, and these power games can only be met by recognizing the trade war that is going on at the moment. One of the fronts is vis a vis Beijing.”
  EU-China relations
• “Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I'll be speaking French. I wanted to come back to what Messrs. Buszanski and Moroni said. Maybe I'll just wait until you got your headphones on. Okay. Yes, I wanted to come back on what Messrs. Buszanski and Moroni said, especially concerning cooperation between NATO and the EU. Mr. Moroni, you used an expression that was revelatory to me when you said that NATO will remain the backbone of collective defense in NATO in the EU even if there is a lack of certainty, quote unquote. So this Atlantic defense surely cannot rely, cannot be the backbone for what's going on if we can't rely on the US. So when we're thinking about the EU and NATO, I think we need to move on from this three D that Madeleine Albright defined in 1998: decoupling, duplication, and discrimination should be outlawed. So Washington is the one moving towards decoupling, and in Washington, you got a lot of partisans who used to be strong advocates of this transatlantic alliance, but they are weakening now. When it comes to duplication, we've been discussing this in Europe when looking at the European pillar, which is, when it comes down to, a form of duplication. I think the path we should take is to allow European citizens to defend Europe if the US is not going to help. Discrimination as the final part, and the European Union has to assume some responsibility here. When we're talking about SAFE EDIP, the European Defense Industry Program, we should have strict criteria for buy European, and that's a form of discrimination within the NATO alliance. So it's more than a remark than a question, but don't you think that a deepening of the link between Europe and NATO should be replaced by a different approach and that we should have a better strategic autonomy in Europe that will help defense and will help partnership with the US in the end? Thank you.”
  Relations with NATO
• “Thank you. Chair. Commissioner, I will speak French. Thank you. Commissioner. My question refers to the last topics you brought up about the stakes involved in missiles and munitions. You've. You've been on a missile tour throughout Europe to make a point about the European production capacity. You'll be in France soon. Uh, as a matter of fact. So my first question is whether you can give us tell us about, um, the travels you've had throughout Europe and what your expectations are when it comes to anti aerial defense capacity in Europe, which is crucial. This is particularly relevant to the situation in the Middle East, with the delays in production and with American involvement in Europe, particularly because our countries are no longer a priority in the American Geostrategic Plan. In our discussions and work up till now, urgency has been more important than autonomy, particularly when it comes to munitions and missiles, because in the context of Edip, we have afforded derogations in favour of European production. So bearing in mind the situation we're facing now and the new stakes, which have appeared since the last time we worked on this, do you think we need to harden these European preference criteria, particularly in the run up to the next MFF. Do we need to abandon these derogations, which have been granted to the munitions and missile sectors when it comes to European preference? How do you see the evolution of European autonomy when where these matters are concerned? Thank you.”
  "Buy European" provisions
• “Thank you chairman. Thank you to our guests and MEPs for this important debate. This is a vital debate at the current juncture, not merely because of the urgent threat from Russia, but also because of the transatlantic crisis. This will extend beyond Donald Trump's mandate or term in office. This is why I think it is difficult to continue to talk about a transatlantic community. There is no sense of community. We have different strategic needs, different views on issues such as sovereignty of NATO members, for example, Denmark and Greenland. So that was the first point I wanted to make. Perhaps we should start considering a European community rather than a transatlantic community. What about European institutions? Well, we need to underscore the fact that we no longer have the UK in the European Union. The UK has a significant army and military resources. We also need to look at freedom of Europeans to take action within the transatlantic alliance. There are constraints, for example, linked to the alliance and basic capabilities and the say that Americans have on F-35s and how they are deployed. We need to reconcile different positions. We need to look at resources, military capabilities. As things stand, Europeans fear sovereignty because they don't currently have the resources to take action without US support. Perhaps if we had those resources, we would be more willing or more able to deploy those resources independently. Before the North Atlantic Treaty came into force in 1945, we had the Brussels Treaty, the idea of a Western European alliance. However, at the time, European military resources were paltry and this never came to anything. So my question is about the institutional issues, but also the resources. And how can we change this to take things further? Thank you.”
  Relations with NATO
• “. Well, as I was saying for a number of years now, and in particular since 2022, what we've seen is an increase in the number of Commission competences and initiatives, both upwards. When there has been a council level agreement in order to grant certain prerogatives to the Commission, but downwards as well, and it has to be said that the Commission has used these, and sometimes has distorted the treaties by using articles that relate to the internal market. So this is my question. Mr.. Particularly for the European Defence Agency as well, because given this backdrop, we could see that there is rampant computerisation of defence. So what is the role of the defence agency here given that we have severe competition as well? I'm not saying it's all the commission's fault, but we are seeing that there are different bodies and organisations that are overlapping in terms of governance. How do you perceive the role of the EDA in this whole ecosystem? My second question is you spoke about the role of synergies between EDP and the eeaS, Parliament and Commission, the text that came out on this subject was very European in nature, particularly when it comes to this 70% European components issue. So where are the negotiations at? What's happening with the discussions on Safe? Because there's the same eligibility criteria there that was decided upon by EDP by the European Parliament. The third part of my question is, and this is still on the question of eligibility as well and European preference. Have you had any discussions with your American counterparts on this subject? I wouldn't perhaps talk about pressure, but I would like to know if any requests have been made about stricter use of European preferences to try to dissuade or any needs to any attempts made to dissuade Europeans away from their defense base. So I imagine that you've had some very interesting contacts with Americans at the moment, looking at the way that the debates in Europe have gone recently. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you. Chair. And thank you to the Canadian colleagues online and Professor Rathsack for his presentation and some of what we've heard during our mission to Greenland last September. Gives us the impression that we're in the paradoxical situation that when we listen to the experts. Think tank personnel and reports the one, it's clear that there is no specific military threat in the Arctic today, either from Russia or from China. On the European coast or the Canadian coast, or in Greenland coast. As Professor Lazear showed, there's no specific Russian military navigation around Greenland, or Chinese either, for that matter. And yet you have this American pressure which obliges everybody to announce new investment in the Arctic. Frantically, even though the experts tell us there's no women in threat. So it's a little bit paradoxical. It's kind of a panic. We have to announce investments or increased cooperation in very short term, even though clearly, strategically, there's no analysis showing any imminent threat in the Arctic. And then in terms of geostrategic matters, as the professor mentioned, it's a ballistic and nuclear in that area that Canada has less margin of manoeuvre because it's integrated into NORAD. And in Europe, too, we're integrated into the American deterrent system, and we depend entirely on the Americans in terms of advanced detection, ballistic detection. So the impression that this enhanced cooperation is based based on ballistic and nuclear matters, but not so much between Canada and Europe. And it seems difficult for Canada to escape its defence and European. And as for Europe or the European partners prepared to move towards lesser dependence on the US in terms of. Dual-layer detector and so on. It's my question to the professor is, is there an element of panic in the reaction of the Europeans and perhaps the Canadians too? I don't know, and that the real challenge in cooperation is in terms of, of nuclear and their cooperation really possible?”
  EU-US relations
• “Russia is devoting enormous time and effort to portraying itself as an anti-colonial force. It's using a double ideological heritage in doing this. Slavic identity and anti-colonialism. This appeals to young people, particularly in Africa. We have to undermine and destroy this image in the same way as Russia has been deploying an aggressive strategy against France, or indeed the European Union in general for what it calls modernity. We have to make it clear to Africans the way in which the Russian services are being manipulated, Kenyans and so on, to turn them into cannon fodder. We should remind them that Russia was and still is an imperial power in Siberia and Europe. We also have to reveal the role played by Russian mercenaries in the Sahel. Part of what they're doing is trying to steal resources from the local populations. Moscow's anti-colonial discourse is hypocritical, designed to serve its own interests and to conceal its appeal agenda in neighbouring countries. Uh, first and foremost in Ukraine, which is nothing more than a war of recolonization.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Mr. Commissioner, colleagues, let's see it clearly. There is no debate on European debate. European defence without talking about NATO. From the start, we has been an exclusive thing. Many just talk about defence between Europeans and there's a risk of losing the Americans and losing the alliance. What can fail to sink NATO is weakening it. The green on crisis showed two things. The US want to preserve their freedom of action, and they don't want any alliance to hold back their interests. And the Americans talk about a Europe Atlantic Community and and the pushing back against China and not Russia. What can we do about for ourselves and our common interests? We have to have the critical capacities for our national armies, and we are too dependent still on the Americans. Yes, we have to have a European pillar within NATO, but the structures and the capacities won't be enough if they are not put at the service of a conceptual, um, service. We need to rethink our defense in Europe, taking into account our specificities, which makes that we have a different model than the European federal model. And we have to have confidence in our officers or soldiers, researchers and our peoples. No one will organize our defense for us. And let's let's not let anybody think our defense for us.”
  Relations with NATO
• “Chairman, vice president, I have a question. You talked about commercial banks and the fact that there was more cooperation and more joint projects being implemented with the commercial banks. And this is something that, of course, we welcome. You've also talked about the positive impact of the omnibus, which is at least seeming to make progress in the face of some regulatory obstacles, which is beneficial for defense and defense investment and projects. In terms of name and shame, are there still as many obstacles amongst the commercial banks, do you think, in terms of the brand image in the eyes of the public? Do you think in 2026 certain commercial banks are still concerned about how this plays in the eyes of the public? And if so, what do you think about this, and what do you think can be done to address this issue and this reticence regarding investment in defence? At the beginning of your introduction, you said you'd like to do more to support defence project investment, and you talked about the extension of your mandate in the EIB, which is something which, of course, we all welcome. What else would you suggest in terms of widening the scope? A number of times you've alluded to direct financing of arms and munitions and munitions. But what could be done over and above that to. Build on the number of defence investment projects in your array. And in order to bring on board more members who would be prepared to make progress with the mutual defence clause. Is this actually, do you think, a prerequisite for you really to be able to change to a bit more of a crisis management footing, which of course would be very different? Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Merci. Thank you. I'll ask my question in French. My question is linked to what Mr. Royton said a few days ago in Bethlehem, the. Cradle of Christianity, that that the Christmas lights Christmas tree was lit up, which is a sign of hope for the region. But the situation of Christians in the West Bank is problematic. The vulnerable communities are being threatened. In the summer we saw the situation of TB in the West Bank, the the Christian village which was intimidated, leading to the departure of the inhabitants. So apart from the respect of international law, this is a religious, uh, Birthplace or without. Looking at the whole Palestinian area, do you think that the West Bank issue is sufficiently addressed, or do you think there should be more media attention given to the Christian communities? Do you think that would mobilize public opinion on the situation in in the West Bank? Because sometimes we see a degree of indifference. Thank you.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• “Mr. president. Thank you. Chairman. I'll be asking my question in French for our guests. Thank you very much. Thank you for your presentation and particularly for the report, which raises strategic questions. I have two questions. Well, one question and one comment. First of all, on the new American security strategy, where of course, the priority is in Asia, but the West is, uh. Described, uh, as a zone of American leadership. And then, uh, Europe, that would count on regional allies. So I'm just wondering that about this new security strategy, whether there's a risk of encouraging the the Americans, for the Europeans to not engage as much in Asia and concentrate their military efforts in Europe. Does that mean that Washington might concentrate European efforts in Europe and make us a regional ally? Then secondly, where I have a bit of difficulty with your report, is where you talk about profitable cooperation in defence with the American partner. But if we talk about Europeans here, you know, in 2021, we had that clear, uh, closure of that contract between Australia and France for nuclear submarines. And then immediately after that, we had the Aukus agreement announced between Australia, UK and Americans for a submarine agreement with the Americans. It's a tricky, uh, element now, but it's, uh, about, uh, basically excluding a European country from that agreement. So I'm wondering whether when you talk about like minded partners in the region, um, is that actually true, given that action by the Americans?”
  EU-US relations
• “Thank you very much, chair. Minister. You said in your introduction the next six months will not be business as usual, and you aim to ensure that Europe is stronger in terms of defence and that it would be able to build up and reduce these capability gaps, reducing dependence on outside factors. But there are a few negative messages coming through recently in view of these very legitimate and desirable targets and goals. It seems that certain people in Europe wish to involve the EU, the US military aid and call for that, but also this would be European money funding the American military industry using European money. Denmark, perhaps the Netherlands as well. It seems to me would be potentially interested in this proposal. On the other hand, we are also seeing that some startups in the US are trying to set up business in Europe with drones and the like in order to capture the rising demand on European soil in the European ammunitions market and in our European, uh, safe and Oedipal texts. We see derogations entering these texts for this type of munition, which would not be covered and controlled by Europe. So very simply, as you've probably understood, my question is, how do we ensure that it is not business as usual, when at the same time in our negotiations, uh, with future measures. We are doing business as usual by financing the US military machine. Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “Thank you. Chair. Thank you for your presentation. The European Defense Fund plays a very important role with our big companies and SMEs. And as we know in many areas, Europe has the best engineers and researchers, but sometimes for budget, two reasons. Sometimes there's a lack of capital to support the R&D phases. And when we look at the number of projects supported, but also the number of candidates. The EDF is quite attractive in that sense, but these figures, given the number of projects and companies, also show a contradiction vis a vis some European objectives in terms of the defence industry. And one of the key objectives, whether it be ideas or other instruments, is to reduce fragmentation in the market. And I might be mistaken here, but in 2024, over 62 projects were supported for under €1 billion in total, and except for the new Generation Helicopter project, no project was supported for over €100 million. So is there not a risk here of scattering about, uh, resources, when in fact the aim is to to support large capacity projects? Another question do you Planned on supporting fewer projects in the future, but with average amounts that are higher. Another question. What is the share of the EDF has supported in terms of R&D that did not reach marketing a marketing phase? And how to better guarantee that the projects that are supported are fully integrated and included by governments in national programmes to prevent projects from dying off after the research period. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “28:42 – 15:30:52): Thank you Chair, Madam High Representative. I'll be putting my question in French. The most recent major international crises have pushed European countries to adopt sometimes common positions but quite often diverse and divergent. Spain has clearly condemned the US attack on Iran. Other countries support it, others don't support it but are deploying resources in the region to defend their interests. On the question of Russian assets, it's not been possible to reach unanimity and the new demonstration of support to Ukraine will be made by twenty-four of them, twenty-seven. We've heard the Belgian Prime Minister talk about the future normalization of relations between Europe and Russia, something which is totally unimaginable for other capitals. In the diplomatic crisis around Greenland, several states cooperated to send a clear political message to the US administration while others sought discretion working within NATO rather than trying to demonstrate force. There's also the example of a coalition of the willing trying to regulate or trying to settle the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Not all European states were involved, everybody participating according to their capacity and political will. So in light of that, there seems to be no common will or interest in Europe either in the Middle East or elsewhere. At the same time, we can see that the greatest level of effectiveness can be found in the formats of ad hoc coalitions between countries and not in seeking a baseline position that everybody can agree on. How do you understand this reality? Do you support the development to a differentiated Europe where states can progress together as far as they wish to? And in light of this trend, is there a risk that we will see the Commission try to ex work beyond its remit and speak on behalf of the twenty-seven given that there is a lack of unanimity amongst the states themselves? Thank you.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs
• “Madam Prime Minister. Well, if the Danish presidency was one of preference for Europe, once finally assumed, Denmark would have the way of showing the way on the defence industry. You're inheriting the past negotiations, and it's crucial that the ambitions of the document should not be wiped out by the ambition to remain dependent on the United States on migratory policy. Denmark is a figure for inspiration. You show us that culture and social cohesion of a nation can only be achieved if you strictly control your borders and regulate demographic balances, defence and immigration. Those are just two of the issues, but maybe the most crucial and emblematic ones of the new world taking shape before us are two are closely linked. Europe would have no free destiny if it didn't have the military means to dissuade the new imperial pretenders. And Europe would not be externally credible if its identity were not guaranteed internally. So you are the Guardians in the North, and you can now lead Europe towards a new approach. Its renaissance. Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you. Commissioner. I'm going to speak French. The omnibus package you've just introduced and you've shown this evening is very ambitious. It's going in the right direction and corresponds to the idea we might have on the role of the commission when we're looking at defence. So a layer, something which will facilitate the actions of the member of a member state and accompanying the member state. Now my first question is a question of scheduling the calendar. We saw from previous texts, we've seen that it took time to set up about a year. We've seen with the Oedipus that the commission suggested a text in March. 2020 was still discussing this. And what about omnibus? Do you think it's going to be faster before the end of the of the Danish presidency? It will be possible. And another question to go back to, to refer back to previous questions on, uh, Exemptions and the role of the member states. I'm thinking of the 2009 directives. We haven't mentioned them explicitly, but we would like to know whether we will be revising the two 2009 directives on the free circulation of defence products, if we're revising it. So what we found for my group and for myself would be reducing the exemptions, maybe in order to have a greater role for the commission so they can impose a defence single market. So I'd like you to clarify this. So will the omnibus package look at the directives of 2009 again?”
  EU competences on defence
• “Madam president thank you, Madam Chair. Director what the war in Iran shows today and its impacts throughout the Middle East, is the crucial importance of missiles and munitions in the Egypt discussions. We said there were derogations with regard to the European preference that were decided during the negotiations. I won't reopen that debate. We're talking now about implementation, but I do have a question. Um. You gave us a bit of a breakdown for the various headings, but can you tell me anything about any capacities or capabilities that may have been approved already under that would cover munitions or missiles in terms of strengthening production lines or joint procurement? Not so much about the EDI pieces because these are still under way. But concerning this particular sector, are there any actions that have already been validated? And if so, do they seek to strengthen the purely European sector. Or will they continue our external dependence in this area?”
  "Buy European" provisions
• “Commissioner. Rapporteurs. Colleagues. Strengthening defense in Europe, given our potential enemies and reducing dependency on external actors are goals that we all believe in in this Parliament. It's the means by which we get. There is something we're debating. So this we need to think about the logic of this, but we need to consider the finality as well. Respecting sovereignty is crucial, but we also believe that this perhaps is not the best way of strengthening our security, according to the report. The main cause of their not being strategic autonomy is in the selfish reflexes of states who. And this leads to a lack of integration. We reject this idea. According to us, this. The weakness of Europe comes from an absence of investment in defence for many years now. For ideological reasons, thinking of a post-historical world, but also because of a certainty of being part of a transatlantic community which is solid and trustworthy. We've seen the limits of this and the failure of this dogma and of the single market as well. Everything that we've done has hindered the emergence of champions, and we cannot reproduce this path when it comes to defense. The Europe that we have now doesn't need a single market. It needs political will that comes together to organize defense in Europe. We therefore prioritize the philosophy that comes across in this report. We will support this. We prioritize cooperation in key sectors in order to fill these gaps. And we've seen many examples of this over the years. This is how Europe will be better defended in the future. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you chairman. Thank you to our guests and MEPs for this important debate. This is a vital debate at the current juncture, not merely because of the urgent threat from Russia, but also because of the transatlantic crisis. This will extend beyond Donald Trump's mandate or term in office. This is why I think it is difficult to continue to talk about a transatlantic community. There is no sense of community. We have different strategic needs, different views on issues such as sovereignty of NATO members, for example, Denmark and Greenland. So that was the first point I wanted to make. Perhaps we should start considering a European community rather than a transatlantic community. What about European institutions? Well, we need to underscore the fact that we no longer have the UK in the European Union. The UK has a significant army and military resources. We also need to look at freedom of Europeans to take action within the transatlantic alliance. There are constraints, for example, linked to the alliance and basic capabilities and the say that Americans have on F-35s and how they are deployed. We need to reconcile different positions. We need to look at resources, military capabilities. As things stand, Europeans fear sovereignty because they don't currently have the resources to take action without US support. Perhaps if we had those resources, we would be more willing or more able to deploy those resources independently. Before the North Atlantic Treaty came into force in 1945, we had the Brussels Treaty, the idea of a Western European alliance. However, at the time, European military resources were paltry and this never came to anything. So my question is about the institutional issues, but also the resources. And how can we change this to take things further? Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “The release of the new US National Security Strategy has triggered a sad spectacle in Europe. We Europeans should be able to defend ourselves. But instead of self-reflection, what we have seen is various individuals designated as the fifth state enemies within. Last summer, Ursula von der Leyen bowed to Trump on Europe's Trade. At the same time, Mark Rutte, a European NATO secretary general, turned himself into the Trump whisperer. You humiliated Europe, have hidden in Washington skirts for decades. You have prevented true independence in Europe. Honourable members don't look for the scapegoat. There is no strategy in Europe and you are to blame. We, the Patriots, will not give up our ideology. We're not looking for a Europe aligned on the US. We need to tackle the major challenges ahead. Work together to build a European Europe. Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “Commissioner. Rapporteurs. Colleagues. Strengthening defense in Europe, given our potential enemies and reducing dependency on external actors are goals that we all believe in in this Parliament. It's the means by which we get. There is something we're debating. So this. We need to think about the logic of this, but we need to consider the finality as well. Respecting sovereignty is crucial, but we also believe that this perhaps is not the best way of strengthening our security, according to the report. The main cause of their not being strategic autonomy is in the selfish reflexes of states who. And this leads to a lack of integration. We reject this idea. According to us, this. The weakness of Europe comes from an absence of investment in defence for many years now. For ideological reasons, thinking of a post-historical world, but also because of a certainty of being part of a transatlantic community which is solid and trustworthy. We've seen the limits of this and the failure of this dogma and of the single market as well. Everything that we've done has hindered the emergence of champions, and we cannot reproduce this path when it comes to defense. The Europe that we have now doesn't need a single market. It needs political will that comes together to organize defense in Europe. We therefore prioritize the philosophy that comes across in this report. We will support this. We prioritize cooperation in key sectors in order to fill these gaps. And we've seen many examples of this over the years. This is how Europe will be better defended in the future. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Commissioner. Colleagues, the war of Russia against Ukraine is not about territory. After four years and the Russian army occupies 20% of Ukraine is clear that it is war is to wipe out a country, wipe out its identity and sovereignty. The maximalist objectives lead to war crimes. The horror of butcher has been followed by many other crimes, and there's a documentation of the Russification of Ukrainians. What is. Behind the decisions for these crimes should be judged. The crime of aggression, which is the task of this special tribunal. It is necessary. It is shown the total legitimacy of Ukraine as a sovereign state and which is a historical mission. Its attachment to the respect of the nations on a country, continent, Europe, which have suffered through the centuries from the redrawing of maps and borders. And that doesn't have any place in Europe. And we reject all the ideas of a geopolitical, special geopolitical space for Russia. We defend nation states. And that's not up for discussion. Let me just say one thing to conclude this work for justice is important, but there should be an active and intensive contribution from Europe to the peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. It's it's as if we thought that the peace would fall from the sky negotiated by the US and Russia. It's a question of our interests in Europe. We shouldn't punish the crime of aggression only. But there should be a durable peace. Which will result from the cessation of this conflict. Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)