Jan FARSKÝ

Policy topics Jan FARSKÝ is active on

What Jan FARSKÝ has said (19)

• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission recalls that Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency is subject to restrictive measures (sanctions) under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 [1] , including an asset freeze and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to it, directly or indirectly. Moreover, several outlets of Rossiya Segodnya are also subject to restrictive measures under Article 2f of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 [2] . These measures prohibit the broadcasting or distribution of their content in the EU, regardless of the means of transmission, dissemination or distribution, including via online means. The restrictions on the broadcasting and dissemination of content by certain media outlets (designated entities), including those under the control of the Russian Federation in this sanctions regime, are justified by the designated outlets’ essential and instrumental role in the systematic disinformation and propaganda campaigns in support of the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The implementation and enforcement of restrictive measures primarily fall within the competence of the Member States. The Commission monitors the application of the EU’s sanctions regime in coordination with Member States. Actions that effectively reproduce or systematically republish the above-mentioned prohibited content may, depending on the circumstances, amount to circumvention of the restrictive measures. Where indications of such conduct arise, it is for the competent national authorities to assess the facts and, where appropriate, take enforcement action in accordance with EU and national law. [1] Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0269. [2] Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879 of 3 June 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32014R0833.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission has no specific comment to make on potential plans of the freedom.gov initiative and does not speculate on design or intent. The Commission is thus not planning to issue further comments. By law, the Commission cannot block websites in the EU. Only Member States' authorities may block a website if it is illegal under national or European law. This includes websites promoting child-sexual abuse material, terrorist content or copyright-infringing material. The Commission remains open to engagement with the US. The enforcement of EU law, in digital like in other areas, is the EU’s sovereign right. The Commission has a responsibility to enforce its laws, including the Digital Services Act [1] , effectively, fairly and without discrimination towards all companies operating in the EU. [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.”
  EU-US data transfers · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 1.6.2026 Written question The Commission does not have a general power to intervene in matters related to the regulation or oversight of national political party financing. Member States are competent to lay down the rules regarding the functioning and financing of national political parties, and their competent national authorities ensure compliance with national legislation, EU law and their international obligations. At the EU level, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2025/2445 [1] has strengthened transparency and control mechanisms of the funding received by European political parties and foundations. As transparency and accountability of the party financing rules are an important factor for preventing corruption, the Commission monitors developments in Member States related to the funding of national political parties in the context of its annual Rule of Law Report [2] . The Commission also supports the exchange of practices in the framework of the European cooperation network on elections [3] . Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising [4] facilitates oversight of some aspects of political party funding, including by requiring political advertising publishers to disclose essential information on political advertisements. As announced in the European Democracy Shield [5] , in the framework of the European cooperation network on elections the Commission will further support common work with the Member States on the transparency and integrity of funding in politics [6] , looking at issues of common interest such as anonymous donations and cryptocurrency, in full respect for the allocation of competences on electoral matters. [1] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2025/2445 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2025 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations (recast), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32025R2445. [2] 2025 Rule of Law Report: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle/2025-rule-law-report_en. [3] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/eu-citizenship/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R0900&qid=1774661372049. [5] JOIN(2025) 791 final, https://commission.europa.eu/document/2539eb53-9485-4199-bfdc-97166893ff45_en. [6] This will notably rely on the work to support the application of Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, the Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament, Directive (EU) 2026/1021 on combating corruption recently adopted by co-legislators based on the Commission’s proposal COM(2023)234 final, EU anti-money laundering (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/daily-view/L-series/default.html?&ojDate=19062024) and other relevant EU rules.”
  Transparency requirements for interest groups · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2026-03-03 “E-000878/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Exemptions of the measures in the form of price undertakings are a statutory alternative to collection of countervailing duties, provided that the legal conditions are met. This includes that the proposed minimum import prices fully offset the effect of Chinese subsidisation in comparison to the countervailing duties, and that it is practicable and sufficiently mitigates the risk of cross compensation. Price undertakings are subject to regular monitoring, covering export and resale of each individual vehicle in the EU, and to on-site inspections. Such inspections may occur even after the end of the undertaking implementation period. Non-compliance with the terms of a price undertaking may result in the reinstatement of duties, potentially with retroactive effect, thereby imposing a significant deterrent effect. Additionally, imports from all countries are subject to both regular monitoring by the Commission and customs checks by Member States’ authorities to identify potential circumvention practices and incorrect declarations of product origin. To date, due to the complexity of the product and the diverse range of distribution channels, the Commission has only accepted a single price undertaking offer. This price undertaking includes a satisfactory minimum import price level, as well as effective measures to mitigate the risk of cross-compensation. Any price undertaking offer will be subject to the same thorough assessment and will need to meet identical legal criteria in order to be considered acceptable and practicable.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2026-01-30 “E-000393/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 , including through its European Defence Innovation Scheme 2 , boosts cross-border cooperation across the EU by supporting collaborative research and development of defence products and technologies, including disruptive technologies, in line with commonly agreed capability priorities. In addition, the European Innovation Council accelerator – under the defence mini-omnibus 3 – can support dual-use and defence technologies, including through equity investments. Moreover, the Defence Readiness Omnibus 4 aims to enable quicker innovation cycles under the EDF. To support Member States – as only buyers and users of defence products and technologies – in their endeavour to invest more and together in defence, the EU is backing joint procurement through the European Defence Industry Programme 5 . It also supports production ramp-up activities, enabling the required technologies to be made available at the necessary speed and scale. The recent Commission proposal for a new Programme for agile and rapid defence innovation (AGILE) 6 aims to support the rapid development of emerging and disruptive defence products and technologies, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises, including innovative start-ups and scale-ups, to respond to the most pressing needs of Member States. This holistic approach is expected to continue and expand, as set out in the Commission's proposal for the European Competitiveness Fund 7 , in complementarity with the proposed Horizon Europe programme 8 . Overall, the EU aims to reduce fragmentation within the technological, capability and industrial landscapes, while ensuring a smooth transition from research to deployment and continuity across the full innovation cycles, as well as fostering synergies between civilian and defence research. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-defence-fund-2021-2027.html. 2 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2653/oj. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0822(01)&qid=1774518478081. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2643/oj/eng. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_687. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555. 8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0543.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2026-01-30 “E-000389/2026 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission acknowledges the importance of improving cross-border healthcare in border regions, including emergency care where timely, efficient responses are vital. The Directive 2011/24/EU 1 and Social Security Coordination Regulations 2 (e.g. via the European Health insurance Card, EHIC) both facilitate this process ensuring that citizens can access health services across borders when needed (including in emergency). 2. Through the implementation of Directive 2011/24/EU, the Commission requires Member States to make reimbursement conditions transparent and objective, as well as encourage mutual recognition of prescriptions to avoid administrative barriers. EU social security coordination rules ensure the coordination, not the harmonisation, of national social security systems, protecting individuals’ rights when moving within Europe, while Member States remain competent in defining their own schemes. The EHIC provides those insured under a Member State’s statutory scheme 3 with needed healthcare in other Member States during temporary stays, covering more than just emergencies. 3. The Commission supports Member States in addressing obstacles in cross-border healthcare including in emergency through INTERREG 4 and B solutions 5 . The Commission also provides support for the establishment of Cross-Border Coordination Points (CBCP), in the framework of BRIDGEforEU 6 with dedicated calls for proposals. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/24/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02004R0883-20190731. 3 Article 19 of Regulation 883/2004 juncto Article 25 Regulation 987/2004. 4 https://interreg.eu/. 5 https://www.b-solutionsproject.com/. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/925/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on health
• 2026-01-30 “E-000390/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Under the Geo-blocking Regulation 1 , traders may not apply different general conditions of access to goods or services in cross-border transactions, including different conditions for a payment transaction, for reasons related to a customer’s nationality, place of residence or establishment. In addition, online interfaces may not be designed in a way that would, in practice, not allow customers from other Member States to easily complete their order. This includes differential treatment as a result of the location of a customers’ payment account. As part of its ongoing evaluation of the Regulation, the Commission is continuously assessing barriers to cross-border trade, collecting data to determine its effective enforcement. The evaluation will be published in 2026. The enforcement of the Geo-blocking Regulation and the Single Euro Payments Area Regulation 2 , including the prohibition of International Bank Account Number (IBAN) discrimination, in individual cases does not fall under the responsibility of the Commission, but lies within the competence of national authorities 3 . Nevertheless, in recent years, the Commission has stepped up its efforts to address IBAN discrimination through infringement procedures 4 , complaint handling and a communication campaign. The Commission has also intensified its engagement with Member States to achieve proactive and dissuasive enforcement at national level to combat IBAN discrimination. In the case of cross-border infringements of the Geo-blocking Regulation, national authorities coordinate within the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network to address problematic practices for the whole EU/European Economic Area. Consumers can complain to their relevant national authority. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/302, OJ L 60I, 2.3.2018, pp. 1–15. 2 Regulation (EU) No 260/2012, OJ L 94, 30.3.2012, pp. 22-37. 3 To this aim each Member State shall designate a body or bodies responsible for adequate and effective enforcement of these Regulations: Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2018/302 and Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012. 4 Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”
  EU competences on consumer protection and product standards · EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-01-30 “E-000392/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms and very large online search engines to diligently identify and assess and effectively mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services, including any negative effects on civic discourse. Providers are required to analyse whether and how these risks are influenced by a manipulation of their service, such as the use of bots or fake accounts. In addition, these providers must undergo yearly independent external audits to assess their DSA compliance. The DSA obliges providers of hosting services to set up a user-friendly and easy-to-access notice and action mechanism, empowering users to report content considered to be illegal, including fake identities and to publish transparency reports, including the number of notices received and actions taken. The Code of Conduct on Disinformation 2 , which was integrated into the DSA, includes commitments for its signatories to combat the use of bots and fake accounts to artificially amplify content, deceive users and disinform. Enforcing the DSA is a priority and proceedings on systemic risks to civic discourse are ongoing. For example, the Commission’s investigation of Meta’s policies and practices also concern deceptive advertisements and disinformation due to suspicion that it does not comply with DSA obligations to address coordinated inauthentic behaviour in the EU 3 . The Democracy Shield 4 proposes to reinforce the existing framework with operational measures, such as setting up a DSA incident and crisis protocol or improve the detection and labelling of AI-generated and manipulated content on social media services and voluntary user verification tools. All actions should be progressively rolled out by 2027. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/stronger-measures-protect-our-democracy-and-civilsociety-2025-11-12_en.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-01-30 “E-000391/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Commission explores various policy initiatives to attract and retain doctors, including from outside the EU, to mitigate the shortages on the labour market. Medical professional qualifications are subject to the most advantageous recognition regime envisaged by Directive 2005/36/EC 1 (‘Professional Qualifications Directive’), i.e., the automatic system. This includes doctors with basic training, general practitioners and specialist doctors. The application process for doctors is usually easier and takes less time than a typical process for other professions covered by the so-called general system. Nevertheless, the Commission is exploring potential measures to accelerate recognition procedures for doctors. Under Action 2 of the Skills Portability Initiative 2 , a forthcoming policy initiative within the Fair Labour Mobility package 3 , the Commission is considering measures – including through digitalisation – to modernise procedures for recognition of qualifications to access regulated professions, including medical professions. In addition, within Action 3 of the Skills Portability Initiative 4 , one of the options being assessed is a legislative proposal for common rules to simplify procedures for the recognition of qualifications and skills of third-country nationals. The upcoming EU Talent Pool 5 will also facilitate recruitment of jobseekers outside the EU, including doctors. The recruitment and professional integration of doctors and ensuring access to postgraduate training and specialisation pathways remain responsibility of Member States 6 . The objective of the Commission initiatives is to remove administrative barriers for the fair mobility of doctors while safeguarding public health objectives. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02005L0036-20251029. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15894-Skills-portability-action-2facilitating-modernising-and-expanding-recognition-processes-for-regulated-professions_en complemented by https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15892-Skills-portability-action-1facilitating-worker-mobility-across-the-EU-through-skills-transparency-and-digitalisation_en, particularly as regards utilising digital credentials. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15553-Fair-labour-mobilitypackage_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/15893-Skills-portability-action-3simplifying-the-recognition-of-qualifications-and-skills-of-third-country-nationals_en. 5 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-promoting-our-european-way-of-life/file-eu-talent-pool. 6 The Member States competences include the definition of health policy, the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care as well as the organisation of education systems.”
  EU competences on health
• “The European Union was founded as a peace project. In defense. It relied on NATO, meaning USA. But Europe is not weak in itself. It is fragmented where USA can have 30 different systems, Europe has 178. And simply speaking, for many countries it is more important to support their local military industry rather than ensuring collective security. Not only are we not able to ensure our own defense, but we also waste money. Lack of coordination cost us up to 57 billion annually. We don't live in a safe world and we don't have unlimited resources. We need to act. We need to cooperate. Investments in defense are also a big opportunity for entire Europe. If we invest smartly, we will strengthen European technologies. European infrastructure. These changes will last, but we can start immediately. We should have European West Point. We should have a good basis for cooperation. One wise man said that Europe cannot defend itself, will become a prey. Let's start building the European pillar of NATO.”
  EU competences on defence
• “(09:11:24 – 09:14:21): First of all, I truly welcome the commission proposal on agile. We urgently need a faster, simpler, and more flexible instrument to support defense innovation and research in Europe. The war in Ukraine has shown very clearly that speed, adaptability, and the ability to bring new solutions quickly into operational use are no longer optional. They are essential. I also want to express my support for the reporters' intention to move this file as quickly as possible. And I would like to thank reporters and colleagues for the constructive spirit in which the technical negotiations are progressing. The pace is essential. Our amendments are limited and targeted. They are not intended to change the basic logic of the commission proposal which we support. First, we clarify that disruptive potential should not be understood only as an entirely new technology. It can also mean a smarter, faster, cheaper or or more effective use of existing technologies. Second, we ask for clearer links between agile calls and the real capability needs of member states including through a structured mapping in the work program. Third, we support simplification, in particular the use of, lump sums, wherever it's possible. Fourth, we propose a cap on inducement intervention so that this useful flexibility remains proportionate. And finally, given the pilot nature of agile, we ask the commission to assess whether the instrument should be continued and reinforced in the next MFF. Let me underline 1 point in particular, the role of prime contractors, system integrators, and first tire subcontractors. Agile is rightly focused on SMEs, startups, and scale ups. We fully support that. But if we want their innovations to reach the market and ultimately armed forces, they often need to work with larger defense companies. Testing, validation, certification, integration, and access to supply chains are often impossible without prime contractors and system integrators. Therefore, including these actors in the scope of the file is not about weakening support for SMEs. It is about making that support effective. The objective must be not only to finance good ideas but to help bring them into real defense capability. I look forward to continuing the work, in the same constructive spirit and to reaching an agreement swiftly. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you very much indeed. Well. We're hearing about a strict ban as of 2035, this ban on the, um, combustion engine vehicles. I am increasingly convinced that this is a mistake. I'm convinced that the future is electrical. Certainly. But, um, we need the question is, will it be European or will it be Chinese? So should we already stop in 2035 selling these combustion cars? I don't know whether that's a good thing, because. If we are not able to sell cars at a competitive price, then Chinese industry will move in. So to ensure that the sector can grow, this should not be decided around a table. We should. It should be the car sector itself that's involved in all of this. We need to be very aware of what's happening.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Distinguished colleagues, any dependence is a weakness, and it is a rule that the competitor will take advantage sooner or later. And indeed, if it is an enemy, it can be a security risk and China will make the world dependent. The limitations to exports of some raw materials, therefore, must be a clear message for us. Europe must be ready to implement countermeasures with in a decisive manner. That's the short term, um, action we need. In the long term. We need to work also on the relations with African countries working within Global Gateway to provide these special materials. We should not be dependent on any one country, including China. Thank you very much.”
  Trade relations with China
• “Dear chair. Dear Danish Presidency Commissioner, Russian gas will be in Europe no more. Finally, only an energy independent Europe can be safe, strong and prosperous. The majority of EU countries, including the Czech Republic, have done their homework and have decoupled from Russian energy. But even so, last year the Kremlin represented about one fifth of the overall gas imports in the EU. Russian gas isn't cheaper. It isn't better in any way because in addition to the prices on your invoice, you have to add the costs of your vascellari and the costs of defending yourself against Russian imperialism. And that's no pocket change. Colleagues, dear brother, Slovaks and dear neighbour Hungarians. Europe by purchasing gas from Russia is financing the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Let us stop financing the Russian war machine. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “First of all, I truly welcome the commission proposal on agile. We urgently need a faster, simpler, and more flexible instrument to support defense innovation and research in Europe. The war in Ukraine has shown very clearly that speed, adaptability, and the ability to bring new solutions quickly into operational use are no longer optional. They are essential. I also want to express my support for the reporters' intention to move this file as quickly as possible. And I would like to thank reporters and colleagues for the constructive spirit in which the technical negotiations are progressing. The pace is essential. Our amendments are limited and targeted. They are not intended to change the basic logic of the commission proposal which we support. First, we clarify that disruptive potential should not be understood only as an entirely new technology. It can also mean a smarter, faster, cheaper or or more effective use of existing technologies. Second, we ask for clearer links between agile calls and the real capability needs of member states including through a structured mapping in the work program. Third, we support simplification, in particular the use of, lump sums, wherever it's possible. Fourth, we propose a cap on inducement intervention so that this useful flexibility remains proportionate. And finally, given the pilot nature of agile, we ask the commission to assess whether the instrument should be continued and reinforced in the next MFF. Let me underline 1 point in particular, the role of prime contractors, system integrators, and first tire subcontractors. Agile is rightly focused on SMEs, startups, and scale ups. We fully support that. But if we want their innovations to reach the market and ultimately armed forces, they often need to work with larger defense companies. Testing, validation, certification, integration, and access to supply chains are often impossible without prime contractors and system integrators. Therefore, including these actors in the scope of the file is not about weakening support for SMEs. It is about making that support effective. The objective must be not only to finance good ideas but to help bring them into real defense capability. I look forward to continuing the work, in the same constructive spirit and to reaching an agreement swiftly. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you. Thank you for for the presentation. What? I really appreciate it. And I think that sooner our defense companies can start benefiting from the program, the better. So I'm glad that we are on the track. Hopefully. Uh, and I also appreciate the focus on Anti-drone defense as well as on production of drones is also welcome. And I think that it, uh, it's one of the topics we can really be enriched by the Ukrainian experience in our European sphere. So that's what I really, really like. Uh, however, military experts keep warning us that the risk of Russian attack against Europe is growing and can become a reality in a matter of months, not years. And that. Therefore I have two remarks. I see that the deadlines for realization of many projects are up to the year 2033. I believe priority should be given to companies and countries that can deliver results much sooner. Does Commission have any tools available to prioritize projects able to deliver as soon as possible? And the second remark Commission's website promises that as of third 31st March, first round of calls for proposals would be available. These are still not available on the EU Funding and Tenders portal. Uh, when will companies be able finally to have a look at the various calls for proposals? I believe every day matters now. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Again, I'm sorry I had no microphone. The European Union was founded as a peace project. In defense. It relied on NATO, meaning USA. But Europe is not weak in itself. It is fragmented. Where USA can have 30 different systems, Europe has 178. And simply speaking, for many countries, it is more important to support their local military industry rather than ensuring collective security. Not only are we not able to ensure our own defense, but we also waste money. Lack of coordination cost us up to 57 billion annually. We don't live in a safe world and we don't have unlimited resources. We need to act. We need to cooperate. Investments in defense are also a big opportunity for entire Europe. If we invest smartly, we will strengthen European technologies. European infrastructure. These changes will last, but we can start immediately. We should have European West Point. We should have a good basis for European cooperation. One wise man said that Europe cannot defend itself, will become a prey. Let's start building the European pillar of NATO.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Each chain is as strong, as strong as the weakest link, and each country is as strong as strong is the weakest region. That is why we cannot forget about our regions. When people have to move elsewhere because of jobs, we have insufficient capacities in healthcare in some places and somewhere else, we have too much capacities. Housing is becoming inaccessible and transport is not coping. That's why we need conditions so that people do not have to move when they want to use their full potential, so that people have a chance to develop their skills and be successful. They simply cannot be forced to move. Lots of people forget about regions and people living in them. I'm happy that our movement is not the case, and I am a vice chairman of that movement because we are very well aware of the quality of life in these regions. The best capital in our country and in Europe is in people. The human capital, and not only because we were not able to allow them to success. That's not going to solve the situation. We have to give them a chance. If we don't give them a chance later on, it will be very expensive and damages won't be compensated. The European Union has tools to do that. It is up to us how we use them, whether we'll give people a chance or whether we'll build a tower in a region. The decision is up on us.”
  EU policy on brain drain
• “(16:36:24 – 16:38:07): Hello, thank you for the possibility to say some words and to place the question. I very much welcome the creation of a new European Competitiveness Fund and concentration of former instruments into one current tool to boost EU competitiveness. But I have to mention that historically applicants in some member countries of all regions have been far less successful in applying for funding from programs aimed for the support of research and development and innovation. In fact, the disparity is so wide that five member states have drawn more Union funding for innovation projects than the fifteen widening countries combined since 2021. I really, I'm in favor of excellence and of supporting the best of the best and not only the winners but the competitors, the competitiveness, but I cannot skip these facts. And my question is: how to improve the current trend that is widening the gap between the successful and not so successful, between some countries and the other ones? Do we have better instruments that at least set some even limited conditional at the end calls for projects that will intensify participation in consortia by entities that have less experience from applying for this kind of EU funding? Do we have better ideas to create the desired spillover effects? We haven't been successful in bridging this gap yet, and this new MFF is our chance to help to improve it. So please do that. Thanks.”
  EU research funding