Carola RACKETE

Policy topics Carola RACKETE is active on

What Carola RACKETE has said (19)

• 2025-05-22 “E-002065/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Seveso III Directive 1 is relevant to the case at hand. Articles 14, 15, and 23 of this Directive implement, within its scope, the obligations set out under the Aarhus Convention into the EU legal order. Based on the information received so far, the Commission has not identified any breach of the Seveso III Directive. In particular, the absence of a safety report and of external and internal emergency plans does not constitute a violation of Articles 10 and 12 of the Seveso III Directive respectively, as the construction of the plant has not started yet and no hazardous substances are likely to be present for the time being. In any case, without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, the national administrative and/or judicial bodies are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU law and address individual cases of potential breach in the relevant authorisation procedures 2 . 1 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of majoraccident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, OJ L 197, 24.7.2012. 2 In line with its strategic approach on enforcement action, as set out in the Communication of 19 January 2017: EU law: Better results through better application - C/2016/8600, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10–20 and in the Communication of 13 October 2022: COM(2022) 518 final - Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers, the Commission focuses on systemic non-compliance.”
  Industrial emissions directive (IED) · Natural gas
• 2025-04-01 “E-001333/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not currently intend to revise its approach to trophy hunting as outlined in the reply to written question E-1394/2023. The Commission believes that legal, wellregulated trophy hunting programmes can deliver benefits for both wildlife conservation and for the livelihoods and wellbeing of indigenous people and local communities living with wildlife. In line with the revised EU Action plan against wildlife trafficking 1 , the Commission, in consultation with experts from Member States’ scientific authorities, is currently assessing whether the list of species for which stricter import measures in relation to hunting trophies apply (contained in Annex XIII to Commissions Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 2 ) should be revised to include new species. However, the applicable EU legislation governing trade in wildlife 3 , including hunting trophies, does not provide a basis for suspension of trade for reasons other than those related to the adverse impact on the conservation status of the species in question. The EU has repeatedly stated that all measures related to the Maasai communities in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area need to be adopted in compliance with the rule of law and the respect for human rights, providing compensation and fair, transparent sharing of the revenue from natural resources. The EU strongly encourages the conduct of genuinely inclusive dialogue among stakeholders in order to identify consensual and fair solutions to the issues at stake. Guaranteeing both biodiversity conservation and human rights protection calls for an inclusive dialogue involving all the relevant partners. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A581%3AFIN&qid=1667989438184 Action 18. 2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 865/2006 of 4 May 2006 laying down detailed rules concerning the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein, OJ L 166, 19.6.2006, p. 1–69. 3 Council Regulation (EC) No 338/97 of 9 December 1996 on the protection of species of wild fauna and flora by regulating trade therein, OJ L 61, 3.3.1997, p. 1–69.”
  EU relations with United Arab Emirates
• 2025-03-24 “E-001220/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) 1 includes provisions for more streamlined and predictable permitting processes for strategic projects, without compromising or derogating the EU environmental standards. Article 6(1)(c) of the CRMA requires socially responsible practices, respect for human rights, as well as comprehensive and meaningful consultations with local communities, including with indigenous peoples. More in detail, Article 7(1)(j) of the CRMA prescribes that the promoter of a strategic project applying for recognition needs to, where relevant, set up a plan containing measures dedicated to a meaningful consultation of the affected indigenous peoples about the prevention and minimisation of the adverse impacts on indigenous rights and, where appropriate, fair compensation for those people, as well as measures to address the outcomes of the consultation. Where the national law of the country whose territory is concerned by a strategic project contains provisions for such a consultation, the plan may be adjusted accordingly. This approach takes into account national processes for the consultation and compensation of indigenous peoples. Compliance with the criteria in Article 6(1)(c) of the CRMA is assessed by taking into account the regulatory framework, international instruments and evidence that the project is or will be certified by a recognised sustainability scheme. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj.”
  Global priorities for international development
• 2025-03-18 “E-001130/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The EU continues to follow closely the developments concerning the Maasai communities living in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area and in the Loliondo Game Controlled Area. As regards the protection of nature and biodiversity, the EU has provided a significant amount of funding for these sectors in Tanzania from 2014 to the present. The Commission is sending directly to the Honourable Member a table which includes the currently available information on bilateral programmes relating to nature conservation in Tanzania. The table indicates the information relating to each project including titles, adoption year, recipients, objectives, amount of EU contribution, and duration. The total amount of EU bilateral funding for nature conservation in Tanzania from 2014 to the present amounts to EUR 95.38 million. As regards projects adopted under the 2021-2027 multiannual-indicative programme for Tanzania, detailed documents can be found on the Commission website 1 . 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/tanzania_en.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-02-06 “E-000548/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. According to the European Maritime Transport Environmental report 1 , which is crossreferred by the 2 nd Zero Pollution Monitoring and Outlook Report 2 , Sulphur oxides (SOx) emissions in the EU have dropped by about 70% since 2014, largely due to the introduction of SOx Emission Control Areas (ECAs) in Northern EU 3 . The new Mediterranean SOx ECA, set to take effect on 1 May 2025, will deliver further reductions together with the one upcoming in the North-East Atlantic Ocean 4 . Meanwhile, also in line the 4 th Clean Air Outlook 5 , Nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions rose by an average of 10% between 2015 and 2023: NOx increased by 33% and 8% in the Atlantic and Mediterranean basins and decreased by 17%, 7% and 6% in the North, Black and Baltic Seas, respectively. NOx ECAs in Northern EU have proved useful in controlling NOx and their extension to EU waters could prevent to surpass NOx from land sources by 2030 6 . This is why, to protect public health and the environment, the Commission and the Mediterranean States are working on cost and benefits analysis (CBA) for a NOx ECA under the Barcelona Convention 7 . 2. The parties to the Barcelona Convention will note the ongoing CBAs at their 24 th Conference in December 2025; they will decide on the Med NOx ECA at later sessions. The Commission has been consistently stressing the urgency of regulating and enforcing NOx from ships in the Mediterranean. However, decisions in the region are complex given the high number of States and stakeholders involved and their socio-economic differences 8 . In line with the EU’s Zero Pollution 9 , and One Health 10 ambitions, the Commission will continue engaging at all levels to further reduce NOx from ships. 1 https://emsa.europa.eu/emter-2025/full-report.html 2 https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/publications/zero-pollution-monitoring-and-outlook-report 3 The request of the North East Atlantic ECA designation (controlling both SOx and Nitrogen oxides (NOx)) by the EU and non-EU littoral States for both SOx and NOx will be discussed at IMO this year; it will likely enter into force in 2027. Non-EU States are: United Kingdom, Iceland, Faroe Islands and Greenland. 4 ECAs for both SOx and NOx have also been established in the North and the Baltic Sea IMO under Annex VI to MARPOL Convention in early 2000 and 2021 respectively. NOx control applies to new builds. 5 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/air/clean-air-outlook_en 6 https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15729/1/RR-18-002.pdf 7 https://www.unep.org/unepmap/who-we-are/barcelona-convention-and-protocols 8 For example, the decision to control SOx in the Mediterranean region took about ten years and required massive engagement from the EU at all levels, led by the Commission. 9 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/zero-pollution-action-plan_en 10 https://health.ec.europa.eu/one-health_en”
  Air quality policy · Decarbonisation of maritime transport
• 2025-01-29 “P-000412/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission According to the Critical Raw Materials (CRM) Act 1 , projects will be considered strategic when they meet the criteria listed in Article 6, without prioritisation system or ranking. The Commission assesses all complete applications with the help of external experts in technical, financial, and environmental, social and governance-related aspects as well as experts in the United Nations Framework Classification for Resources. The outcome of this assessment is summarised in a consensus report, endorsed by all experts who contributed to it. As requested by the CRM Act, the Commission shares its assessment with the CRM Board, which shall issue an opinion on whether the proposed projects fulfil the assessment criteria. Member States whose territory is concerned by a proposed project have the right to object against the recognition of that project as a strategic project. Moreover, for strategic projects in third countries or overseas countries or territories, the Commission will not approve the application before receiving the explicit approval of the third country concerned. The Commission adopted a first list of strategic projects on 25 March 2025. A second list of non-EU project will be adopted at a later stage. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0160”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials
• 2025-01-06 “E-000013/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission Since 2023, Grão-Pará Maranhão (GPM) representatives have made presentations and given updates of the project to the Commission on several occasions. On 17 January 2024, the Commission helped to convene and hosted the fourth GPM Roundtable, which was co-chaired with the Mission of Brazil to the EU and GPM management. The meeting served to present the project to international financing institutions and Member State cooperation agencies. There is, however, no formal commitment of the Commission to the project. Following the outlining of the project’s basic concept by GPM in the January 2024 meeting, the Commission requested additional information from GPM, including on the application of environmental, social and governance principles. The Commission visited as well the region and met civil society organisations and indigenous communities. Nevertheless, the Commission did not carry out further analysis of the project, did not receive a project proposal and is not in a position to assess any potential financing.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-01-06 “E-000012/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not taken such decisions. In relation to other financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Commission invites the Honourable Member to address those entities, the Commission is in any case not aware of any EIB decisions to finance the project. The Grão-Pará Maranhão project is at a very early stage of proposal development, the Commission has not received requests for financial support and as such it has not taken any financing decision regarding this project.”
  EU-Brazil Relations · EU climate aid for global South
• 2024-12-18 “E-003016/2024 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The new yellowfin tuna stock assessment was reviewed and adopted by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Scientific Committee (SC) during its 2024 annual session. It is the result of a rigorous process carried by a team of international scientists. Several problems were identified in the previous assessment models used as of 2015. The SC requested an external review of the data and model configurations, which was carried out by experts from the United States, New Zealand and Norway. The recommendations from this review were incorporated into the new assessment and all data provided by the different fleets (catch, effort, size frequency) were scrutinised by the SC. The new model includes revisions that make it more robust and reliable, as tested through statistical diagnostic analyses. The main driver for the change in the stock status is the abundance index derived from the catch data of Asian longline fleets. The index derived from the EU fleet was not used in the assessment, but it confirms the recovery of the stock. Other data (total catch reduction of 10% and size frequency) also point to a biomass increase. This is good news for all fishers and a recognition of the rebuilding plan adopted in the IOTC and led by the EU. The management advice developed by the SC acknowledges that some uncertainties remain in the assessment and recommends a precautionary course of action. The Commission reiterates its full confidence in the IOTC scientific process and the independence and integrity of scientists from all IOTC contracting parties working together.”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries
• 2024-11-04 “E-002393/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The EU Critical Raw Materials Act 1 (CRMA) is directly applicable to Member States only, therefore it does not prescribe obligations to non-EU countries, including as regards the specific requirements and timeframes covered by Articles 10, 11 and 12 referred to in the Honourable Member’s written question. As such, EU candidate countries are not directly bound by EU legislation until their full accession, unless it is specifically referenced or incorporated into international agreements. However, candidate countries are expected to gradually align their legislative framework with the EU acquis as part of their accession process. This alignment occurs in accordance with their transposition of relevant EU legislation into national law, which takes place progressively, with support and monitoring from the Commission. Therefore, while the CRMA does not directly apply to EU candidate countries, it serves as a complementary framework that may influence their strategic choices, and it will apply when these countries formally join the EU. When it comes to strategic projects, authorities of candidate countries are invited to consider the benefits to be granted to such projects in national policies, such as the permitting provisions. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-16 “E-002119/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission 1. In line with the EU’s international obligations, the Critical Raw Materials Act 1 does not prohibit the export of strategic raw materials to countries outside the EU. 2. According to Annex III.1, point (b) of the Critical Raw Materials Act, the Commission will assess whether a project in the EU fulfils the criterion in Article 6(1), point (a), bearing in mind whether the project contributes to maintaining or strengthening EU capacities as a share of the EU’s annual consumption of strategic raw material, taking into account the expected increase in EU consumption. As such, the capacity of projects to supply European-based offtakers rather than to export the extracted strategic raw materials to countries outside of the EU is an element to consider when assessing how projects contribute to maintaining or strengthening the EU capacities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401252”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials
• 2024-10-16 “P-002102/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Critical Raw Materials Act 1 (CRMA) does not include an obligation to publish the list of applicants for strategic projects and as such the Commission does not intend to communicate on individual projects during the assessment of the applications, even if general information has already been communicated 2 . Once the assessment process is finalised, the Commission will publish on its website the list of recognised strategic projects. 2. The Commission intends to keep the same approach for applications submitted to future cut-offs of open calls for strategic projects. 3. As mentioned above, the CRMA does not include an obligation to publish the list of applicants for strategic projects. Besides, the Commission considers that the publication of the list of applicants for strategic projects could undermine the commercial interests of the project promoters in case of non-selection. 1 COM(2023) 160 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0160 2 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-receives-high-number-applications-respondingcall-strategic-projects-under-critical-raw-2024-08-23_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-14 “E-002038/2024 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The position of the Commission on deep-sea mining is set in the 2022 Joint Communication ‘Setting the course for a sustainable blue planet - Joint Communication on the EU’s International Ocean Governance agenda’ 1 . The Commission will continue to advocate for prohibiting deep-sea mining until scientific gaps are properly filled, it can be demonstrated that no harmful effects arise from mining and, as required under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the necessary provisions in the exploitation regulations for the effective protection of the marine environment are in place. This position is also reflected in recital 18 of the Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 on critical raw materials 2 : ‘In line with the precautionary principle, the Commission should not recognise deep sea mining projects as Strategic Projects before the effects of deep-sea mining on the marine environment, biodiversity and human activities are sufficiently researched, the risks are understood and technologies and operational practices are capable of demonstrating that the environment is not seriously harmed.’ 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022JC0028 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1252&qid=1732030999929”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-17 “E-001734/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission delivered the set of policy actions announced in the 2020 Circular Economy Action Plan 1 aimed at significantly reducing EU's material and consumption footprints, safeguarding natural resources and mitigating environmental impacts such as climate change and biodiversity loss. To monitor trends in achieving these objectives, in 2023 the Commission revised the circular economy monitoring framework and added material and consumption footprint indicators 2 , which serve also to track progress on the 8 th Environmental Action Programme 3 and on the Sustainable Development Goals 4 . The implementation of the actions in the plan, and more broadly of the European Green Deal, will contribute to faster progress towards decreasing EU’s material and consumption footprints. The Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation 5 creates the framework for integrating circular economy principles and resource efficiency requirements in the design of a wide range of products. Specific initiatives under the plan tackle sustainability dimensions of construction products, electronics, batteries and vehicles, packaging and packaging waste, textiles and food waste, industrial production and waste shipments, and aim to empower consumers in the green transition and lead efforts at the global level. The political guidelines for next Commission 2024-2029 6 place circular economy as a pillar of a prosperous and competitive Europe and announce a new Circular Economy Act to boost the market demand for secondary materials and a single market for waste. It is for the next Commission to formulate the most appropriate initiatives to advance the shift to more sustainable production and consumption patterns. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en 2 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/circular-economy-faster-progress-needed-meet-eu-resource-efficiencytargets-ensure-sustainable-use-2023-05-15_en 3 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/implementation-key-achieving-eu-2030-climate-and-environmentobjectives-first-progress-report-8th-2023-12-18_en 4 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/monitoring-report-progress-towards-sdgs-eu-context-2024-2024-0618_en 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1781/oj 6 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-07-26 “E-001434/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. In relation to the project referred to by the Honourable Member, the Commission has asked Italy to provide some clarifications on the implementation of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive 1 . This provision allows Member States to authorise, under certain conditions, projects likely to have a negative impact on a Natura 2000 site if they are justified under imperative reasons of overriding public interest and all the necessary compensatory measures are taken. Member States are required to inform the Commission about those measures. A prior step is an appropriate assessment of all the impacts expected from the project, taking into account the conservation objectives established for the concerned Natura 2000 site, in accordance with the provisions of Article 6(3) of the Directive. The requested clarifications concern namely the nature of the reasons that would justify the authorisation of the project despite a negative assessment of its impacts, as well as the adequacy of the site-specific conservation objectives for the Natura 2000 site to be impacted by the project. Italy has not yet provided the requested clarifications but has communicated that, in the meanwhile, the regional authorities have suspended the project. 2. A Commission opinion is required where the site concerned by the project hosts a priority habitat type or species and the project is carried out for imperative reasons of overriding public interest other than those related to human health, public safety, or beneficial consequences of primary importance for the environment. 3. The Commission has not set any specific deadline for Italian authorities to reply to the note of 15 February 2024, mentioned by the Honourable Member. 1 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “The EU Mercosur agreement is designed to enrich the bosses of corporations and Frankfurt or Buenos Aires, at the expense of locals and farmers in the countryside on both sides of the Atlantic. It is a deliberate attack on workers rights, on indigenous communities, on family farmers, but also on entire ecosystems and a stable climate. This agreement has already derailed the EU's Use deforestation regulation. It is also a blueprint for further deregulation pushed by the Commission. Everything for the wealthy and no rules to prevent exploitation. Instead, this deal plants the seeds of famine. This deal is expanding the same destructive agriculture that pollutes soils, water and atmosphere that impoverishes farmers and peasants for the profits of agribusiness. Our biodiversity is crushing and temperatures are rising. And this deals means racing faster towards the abyss. And we have to stop this deal and listen to the proposals of small scale farmers and agricultural unions in the EU and in the Mercosur countries. They do not want this deal.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Well, um, first of all, I would like to respectfully disagree with the analysis that the Cop 16 was a success because we can see biodiversity is crashing, and that is certainly hardly any good news in the physical or biological evaluation of of the status of our ecosystems. So the fact that some sort of agreement has been found, instead of a complete breakdown of agreements, is certainly not good enough. When we look at the real world and what is happening, where in the sixth mass extinction of species still and going into the wrong direction all the time. So, um, I would like to second the question that has been put by Mr. Gerbrandy, and that is the question on the harmful subsidies. When exactly is the EU Commission going to take concrete steps to end harmful subsidies? Because yet again, in the last meeting in Rome, the paragraph the target 18 on that was severely watered down. So the EU has to lead. We can phase out these subsidies. When are you going to move ahead with that? And my second question in more detail concerns these biodiversity credits, which are supposedly going to be used to create some finance which is dearly needed. And I, I know that you have spoken recently, Mr. Delgado Rossa on, um, a stakeholder consultation by the European Committee of the regions on the um on the design of the nature credits.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• “Well, first of all, thank you very much for this excellent report. It's clear, of course, that our quality is incredibly important to protect the health of human and non-human lives. And we are very much committed to that. I have a couple of questions, because I have to say, I'm extremely concerned that only eight member states will not overshoot on the ammonia emissions. And in the press release for the report, the authors also stated clearly that you are concerned about the ammonia emissions predominantly coming from intensive livestock farming, manure and slurry management and fertilizer application, which contribute to excessive nitrogen presence in the water ecosystems, leading to eutrophication and other environmental negative impacts. So I was wondering, um, do you agree that shaping agricultural policies to reduce ammonia emissions would be urgent and that this should be an important part of any EU agricultural strategy moving forward, but also particularly for the next Common agricultural policy. And my next question is like which concrete emergency? Additional measures can be taken by the member States, which are not fulfilling their commitments on the slides? Um, I read about, um, reducing the spreading of manure, mineral fertilizers, but also to, uh, cease from breeding pigs and poultry. I would be really interested if you could expand on these additional measures that the member states certainly have and have to take and can take on. My final question would be, um, if the member states choose not to act. When are they going to face consequences? Because I don't think we can allow them to play with the lives and the health of the citizens. Thank you.”
  Water pollution
• “Good morning, and thank you very much for being here. I'm really happy to hear your announcement that you have well prepared for your leadership in climate and environment in the next six months. My first question is about the Polish National Energy and Climate Plan. It should have been submitted to the European Commission by the end of June 2024, but as far as I know, it hasn't happened. And this could lead to an infringement procedure, as you know. So could you please tell me when Poland will publish and submit the final version of the NAACP, please? And similar to other countries, Poland wants to significantly increase fossil gas capacities, but it is not public if there is any, any plan to phase out fossil gas. So in Poland has it been assessed if this policy is aligned with the upcoming EU emission reduction target of 90% until 2040? And I agree with my colleagues that we should have one for 2035. And another question. It concerns the use of hydrogen, which Poland says plays an important role in energy transition and has committed a considerable amount of money for that. Could you please tell us which hydrogen technology you want to develop in Poland, and when your ministry plans to announce the public consultations about that hydrogen strategy? I am particularly curious about that because Poland sees a future for hydrogen in transport. However, in many European cities, for example Wiesbaden in Germany or Montpellier in France. Hydrogen. Public transport turned out to be far more expensive than electric buses. So I don't see much benefit for the public. Thank you very much.”
  Low-carbon hydrogen