Hans NEUHOFF

Policy topics Hans NEUHOFF is active on

What Hans NEUHOFF has said (10)

• “The US's national security strategy It shows that we are going to have to reorder our international relationships. The objective of the US is now to achieve strategic parity with other great powers. The consequence of that is that European future will have to take more responsibility for its own security. Accordingly, it is not in Europe's interest to transform Ukraine into a wholesale frontline state to an iron porcupine on Russia's border. Let's not forget that the Russian military have a lead in terms of critical weapons systems of at least 20 years over us. And indeed, the head of NATO's intelligence service at the beginning of the year declared that he had no indication that Russia would attempt to attack an EU member state after the Ukraine war. So let's stop telling tales, intimidating people and embark on a course of serious and constructive dialogue. And that includes with the Russian Federation.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Ladies and gentlemen. The European Union loves crises because crises are a fantastic means to push through extraordinary political measures. Certain characteristics of this existential threat, the climate of corona, the Russians. Secondly, time is pressing. We have to act now. Thirdly, a lack of alternatives. Fourthly, the character of the measures themselves stronger state intervention, new laws, mutualised debt processes, and above all, the centralisation of political power. The EU has dealt with all crises since 2008 to push forward union power, financial and banking crisis, the European debt crisis, the migration crisis, the climate apocalypse and the corona crisis. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a very favourable opportunity to unleash the next crisis. The one in defense. And the banner of European security. We are preparing the next great step for integration and internal market for armament, common procurement, closer and closer cooperation across borders. We're being told this is pragmatic efficiency measures as technical, necessary measures as a rational step. But in truth, it's about something very, very different. It's about a political project because as soon as defence industries and procurement structures and military planning are interwoven at European level, then dependencies are generated which are inextricable. Integration will not be decided on in political terms. It will be forced in a structural manner. In other words, we're using an alleged Situation of a threat to get the member States to work closer and closer together in an irrevocable way. Ladies and gentlemen, the alternative for Germany wants to see strategic autonomy in Europe. We welcome that goal. The military competencies and capabilities is a fundamental decision. It's not a crisis project. The planned measures for the establishment of an internal market for defence is something that the ESM group will not support. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Ladies and gentlemen. The European Union loves crises because crises are a fantastic means to push through extraordinary political measures, certain characteristics of this existential threat the climate. Corona, the Russians. Secondly, time is pressing. We have to act now. Thirdly, a lack of alternatives. Fourthly, the character of the measures themselves stronger state intervention, new laws, mutualized debt processes, and above all, the centralization of political power. The EU has dealt with all crises since 2008 to push forward union power, financial and banking crisis, the European debt crisis, the migration crisis, the climate apocalypse and the corona crisis. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a very favorable opportunity to unleash the next crisis. The one in defense. And the banner of European security. We are preparing the next great step for integration and internal market for armament, common procurement, closer and closer cooperation across borders. We're being told this is pragmatic efficiency measures as technical, necessary measures as a rational step. But in truth, it's about something very, very different. It's about a political project because as soon as defence industries and procurement structures and military planning are interwoven at European level, then dependencies are generated which are inextricable. Integration will not be decided on in political terms. It will be forced in a structural manner. In other words, we're using an alleged Situation of a threat to get the member States to work closer and closer together in an irrevocable way. Ladies and gentlemen, the alternative for Germany wants to see strategic autonomy in Europe. We welcome that goal. The military competencies and capabilities is a fundamental decision. It's not a crisis project. The planned measures for the establishment of an internal market for defence is something that the ESM group will not support. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you very much. Thank you to colleagues for their presentations on military mobility in Europe and on the individual amendments. Amendment one we can support. This sabre rattling vis a vis Russia is not very useful, but it does have some points in helping maintenance, logistics, capacity building and resilience without, however, an extension of EU competences. We can also support amendment two. Here we can see a clear strategy for financing using the EIB and other EU instruments where the infrastructure is at the fore rather than a federalization. So that's something that we might lend our support to. We reject compromise. Amendment three. Mr. Stoyanov has already addressed this. Having a road map for a military Schengen without national reservations or rights of veto for us is unacceptable. Deeper harmonisation and priority mechanisms without and ensuring sovereignty contradict the fundamental view we have of Europe of sovereign nations. Also, we will reject compromise. Amendment four. That's already something I've mentioned as it includes Ukraine in the in planning. Ukraine, as you know, is at the moment at war. We don't know how this war will end. And so we are looking at a high risk strategy. Just imagine that the port of Odessa is being modernized but falls into Russian hands. That would be a disaster. And so you should never deal with a state that's been at war and include them in an international organization. That's the usual way of doing things in international organizations.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you very much. I'll be speaking German so that our wonderful interpreters don't lose their touch. Thank you very much to the experts from me too, but after that vote of thanks, I have to put some criticism. We haven't heard anything from you that we didn't already know. You trotted out the credos that we hear all around this building all the time, confirmed them, but I expect from experts that they are prepared to challenge our traditional ways of thinking in political terms. None of you talked about the multipolar nature of modern relationships. None of you considered the fact that Ukraine may lose this war. Nobody mentioned this, but obviously that's something we need to be prepared for. Ms. Weber, you talked about balancing Russia. Maybe you're telling us that the RAND Corporation document from 2019, the Pentagon-financed Californian think tank where the foreign ministry recruits people from, and this paper had the title "Extending, Overextending, and Disbalancing Russia," disbalancing Russia. Could it be that the situation we find ourselves in today is actually to be seen in the context of the grand strategy of the US all along, that we've just sleepwalked into and that has put us in this situation that we find ourselves in today? Hence my specific question to you: do you recognize the fact of multipolarity but that we don't have a multipolar order? And if yes, what consequences, what recommendations would you give in terms of action that needs to be taken by the EU? Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “I'll speak for two minutes. So I'll be speaking German. Mr. Dombrovskis, uh, you have mentioned several times of, uh, talking about the 90 billion and the Russian assets as a guarantee. Uh, let me say that at the December council. I think we saw, uh, where the political, uh, weight was, uh, with regard to this decision, it completely Failed. You know very clearly that you would risk the EU financial stability. You would do irreparable damage. That is why we cannot be using Russian frozen assets in the future. I'm a little bit surprised where you, uh, have you find the courage to sell this fairy tale to European citizens? You need to tell them the truth that at the end of the day, it's the European taxpayers who are going to be shouldering this loan. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Colleagues. A common security and defence policy in the EU. There has never been such a thing when the Ukraine war. When we talked about we had when it became serious with defence, it wasn't the EU that acted. It was a coalition of the willing, a handful of EU states with some non-EU states. And that's no coincidence. A true common defence policy was never necessary because all relied on NATO. And there was a good reason. Only NATO has, because of the US, the necessary the military assets to provide real deterrence. So how could a strengthening of the EU defence in a more Um, unstable international environment with more powers for the EU by even more concentration of power and regulation from Brussels. If you're serious about the defence of Europe, this won't be done by the EU. What we need is the opposite a clear institutional division between European, European Union and European defence. What we need is our own independent body, a license of states that are prepared to deliver, to bring their capabilities together and which will strengthen NATO as a European pillar. But if the EU, when it comes to protecting its external borders, when it's failed so miserably, shouldn't. Look to the much bigger task of military defense colleagues. Every change starts with thinking. If you want to rethink Europe, you must have the courage to open the European treaties and renegotiate them. Yes, the title five of the TEU is one of the things that we need to be taking a close look at.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you very much. I'll speak in German. Mr. Kubilius. You repeatedly mentioned that we have to learn from the Ukraine, and this is something that we can see quite clearly. Of course, Ukraine is in war right now. And then Ukraine presents its achievements, of course, with huge support from abroad. That means dependency as well. And third, the Ukraine is conducting a high tech war. Uh, there are two high tech, if you like, sectors. Uh, uh, one is, of course the European Union. And then what's developing in the Ukraine and the other involves the, uh, abilities, the space abilities, in other words, satellite supported abilities. And here the Ukraine, of course, depends on Starlink. That means on a U. S American private enterprise. Uh, This is what provides the service to Ukraine, Starlink and the ESA with regard to that. Uh, well, we they're considerably behind as far as investments, uh, as far as space capabilities. And the director of ESA at the Paris Air Show, uh, said that all other space countries or countries involved in the space in space are investing much more than the ESA is investing. And the second point involves the artificial intelligence system supported system that's used on land and in the air. And once again, Palantir, a US enterprise with its Gotham program, has, of course, created this program and supported it considerably. And my question is, is there in the European Union any sort of Enterprise. Which has been involved in activities which would be comparable to the activities of Palantir in Ukraine, and which would be able to produce some sort of concrete results in the foreseeable future as well. Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes · EU competences on space policy
• “Does the European Parliament, with its. The fact that it has supported from the very beginning this. Has criticized this particular aggressive act from the very start, but at the same time, nothing has been condemned as far as the war of the United States against Iran and also the other wars that took place in the region that in 2003, with hundreds of thousands of dead. No criticism whatsoever. So as far as violations of human rights and international law, well, there's a lot left to be desired on the part of the European Parliament and its consistency. We need consistency. That's what we need. Legal standards. Human rights standards have to be maintained across the broad double standards unfortunately undermine us. They will be used and they will be a central impediment as far as our behaving, able to move forward as any sort of defender of human rights or international law anywhere in the world.”
  EU foreign policy approach
• “Thank you very much. I would like to continue in German to Mr. Kubilius. I find your comments possibly slightly irritating, because it has become clear that the core of this whole massive enterprise that you have concocted actually has as an objective, helping Ukraine. And you've really used this word Ukraine, this term so frequently that you've given yourselves away. I think that it's quite clear to you that this is your objective. But are we all signed up to this, and to what extent are we willing to support Ukraine, and to what extent are we able to, if there is not American assistance of what are the implications of, for, for and of Chinese involvement? All these considerations that you've outlined actually only make any sense if it is certain that within a specific period of time, it would be possible for Ukraine to put in place an offensive which would actually enable them to recover the territory which Russia has taken from them in the east and in Crimea. And so my question really is what are your underlying assumptions here? There are a whole lot of potential steps that you've outlined. Do you actually think that in the final analysis and offensive, such as this is actually within the realms of the remotely possible. Thank you. Thank you very much. And now over to you for some replies, Commissioner.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)