Maciej WĄSIK

Policy topics Maciej WĄSIK is active on

What Maciej WĄSIK has said (27)

• 2026-06-17 “(15:02:11 – 15:03:29): Ladies and gentlemen, the commission is presenting an unrealistic and utopian plan, and its implementation is only going to deepen the economic collapse and bring poverty to Europe. What does Europe need today? Cheap energy, competitive industry, and economic growth. The idea of decarbonization and phasing out fossil fuels and central management from Brussels go against those needs. Instead of phasing out traditional energy sources, we have to immediately scrap the green deal and the ETS because they are draining the pockets of our citizens and they are, hampering our economy. Europe is going to grow if we are going to expand the area of freedom and possibility for citizens to decide. Imposing solutions on us from Brussels will only increase bureaucracy, and it will lead, as I said, to economic collapse. Europe does not need decision makers in Brussels. They we do not need ideology and green madness. We need more freedom and common sense. We have colleague, a blue card. Would you like to take it? Okay. Move to the next speaker, colleague, Emma Pichner.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-03-26 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question Regular exchanges with the Member States, implementing bodies and stakeholders involved in Rail Baltica give the Commission a clear overview of its progress. Additionally, the European Coordinator keeps the Commission informed and the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) monitors the Rail Baltica activities supported through the Connecting Europe Facility [1] . Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland contributed to the development of the Rail Baltica Implementing Decision [2] and supported its adoption. According to the Commission’s information, the works on Rail Baltica between Warsaw and Bialystok are completed except for the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). On the remaining sections in Poland, works are being tendered or project documentation is being developed. In Lithuania 114 km are under construction, in Latvia 40 km are under construction with 200 km contracted; and in Estonia more than 100 km are under construction. The Commission assesses the progress against the implementing decision. While actions are largely on track, some delays exist. It is important to recall that the overall time to completion will largely depend also on the funding that will be made available for the project from national and European sources. In order to continue supporting cross-border infrastructure projects such as Rail Baltica, the Commission proposed a Connecting Europe Facility with a budget of EUR 51.5 billion for transport as part of the proposals for the next multiannual financial framework [3] . [1] https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/connecting-europe-facility_en. [2] Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1332 of 9 July 2025, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32025D1332. [3] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Connecting Europe Facility for the period 2028-2034, amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2021/1153, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0547&qid=1753799512950.”
  EU funding for transportation · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) [1] is based on Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2] which provides a legal basis for the EU to act swiftly in emergency situations. The SAFE Regulation and in particular Article 10, explicitly empowers the Commission to enter into loan agreements and operational arrangements with Member States, following the adoption of a Council implementing decision. This regulation does not condition disbursement on the prior adoption of a specific national implementing legislation by the Member State since the instrument is directly applicable. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2026/412 on making the financial assistance under Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 available to Poland [3] fulfils the procedural requirement under Article 10(1) of the regulation [4] , and the Commission’s role is to ensure compliance with the eligibility criteria set out in Article 16 of the regulation [5] . To date, Polish authorities have not raised any objections regarding the availability or disbursement of SAFE funds. The Commission will act in accordance with the Treaty and the SAFE Regulation, ensuring that all procedural safeguards are respected. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_122/oj/eng. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2026/412/oj/eng. [4] Please see footnote 1. [5] Please see footnote 1 .”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2026-03-11 “Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to assisting Belarusian journalists and independent media in providing high-quality reporting to Belarusian citizens. EU support has reached over 40 Belarusian independent outlets, helping preserve a diverse, dynamic and widely consumed Belarusian independent media ecosystem. The EU has also provided capacity-building and sector-wide support through education, training and technical assistance. Belarusian citizens, both inside the country and in exile, continue to face persecution. Public disclosure of the projects receiving EU support would expose beneficiaries to further risk. Accordingly, the Commission does not publish the names of implementing partners, in order to protect their ability to continue supporting independent media. For the same reasons, reports on implementation of EU assistance are not published. However, the Commission receives regular, comprehensive reporting from both beneficiaries and implementing partners, confirming that funding is properly accounted for. EU assistance is also subject to standard audit procedures to ensure proper use of funds and compliance with financial management rules.”
  EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-01-21 “Answer given by the Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 31.3.2026 Written question U nder the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, [1] the Commission can tackle distortions of the internal market caused by subsidies from third countries. When such distortions are established following an in-depth investigation, the Commission can impose redressive measures on, or accept commitments from, undertakings receiving such subsidies. The Commission remains at all times committed to ensuring an efficient functioning of the internal market and monitors actively sectors for which it considers that there is a high risk of distortions caused by foreign subsidies. The Commission also analyses market information provided by Member States as well as market participants. This could include information about activities of UZ Cargo Polska . [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2560/oj.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · State Aid
• 2026-01-21 “P-000226/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission fully adheres to the rules and procedures set out in the EU Treaties. The Commission has engaged constructively with both the Council and the European Parliament throughout the negotiation process, intent on ensuring all voices are heard and respected in accordance with the Treaties. It is a prerogative of the Council Presidency to decide on the timing and form of documents for approval of the Council, and the Commission has made no recommendations in this respect. The EU-Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) provides for a possibility of provisional application in its Article 23.3. Article 218(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union foresees a possibility for the Council to adopt, alongside the decision authorising the signing, a decision authorising the provisional application of international agreements before their entry into force. The corresponding Council decision on signature and provisional application of the ITA was adopted on 9 January 2026. The provisional application does not negate the essential role of Parliament in the ratification process, and the ITA can only be concluded and enter into force following the Parliament’s consent. The Commission remains committed to upholding the principles enshrined in the Treaties. It will continue to engage actively with Members of the European Parliament to assist the Parliament to perform its essential role during the ratification process.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-10-06 “E-003913/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intend to publish the contract concluded with DT Global Europe, its annexes and attachments, nor the final report, as these documents contain personal data and commercially sensitive information which are protected from public disclosure. The award of the contract followed an evaluation based on the most economically advantageous tender, applying the best price-quality ratio. The assessment of technical quality focused on the proposed organisation and methodology, as well as the profiles of the key experts, in line with the applicable rules for the selected procedure 1 . The Commission shares key information, such as award data, through its Financial Transparency System 2 . 1 Procedure NEAR/2021/EA-RP/0069 available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/tender-details/8172. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html.”
  EU-Belarus relations · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-09-09 “E-003495/2025 E-004263/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission welcomes the Parliament’s continued focus on this important issue, as Belarus remains high on the political agenda. The EU is committed to supporting the people of Belarus in their path towards freedom and democracy and recognises the crucial role of independent media in this process. Since 2020, the Commission has mobilised over EUR 38 million in support of independent media in Belarus. The EU will continue to prioritise support for independent media as reaffirmed by the Commissioner for Enlargement and the High Representative/Vice-President in their joint statement 1 marking the fifth anniversary of the fraudulent 2020 elections. In designing programmes to support Belarusian independent media, the Commission’s priority is to reach people inside the country and identify Belarusian outlets with strong organic audiences. Support is delivered through experienced implementing partners who operate competitive sub-granting processes. These well-established organisations play a key role in supporting a diverse, healthy and competitive media ecosystem. EU assistance has supported dozens of Belarusian outlets at national, regional and local level, as well as bloggers and investigative media. This has helped media professionals and journalists adapt to a changing repressive environment, including through more active engagement on social media and innovative communication methods. The Commission’s assistance to independent media fosters innovation in the sector by supporting experimentation with content strategies that will help target different priority audiences, including young people. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-kallas-andcommissioner-kos-fifth-anniversary-2025-08-09_en.”
  EU-Belarus relations
• 2025-08-28 “E-003321/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of the programming period 2014-2020 of the Home Affairs Funds 1 was extended by one year to allow Member States to use the remaining funds to address the challenges resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. During the programming period 2021–2027, EUR 385 million were allocated as emergency assistance in 2022 from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) 2 and the Border Management and Visa Instrument 3 to the Member States most affected by the mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine 4 . EUR 7 million were earmarked for the 'Safe homes' initiative 5 . In 2023, EUR 8 million were earmarked for a EUR 31.2 million International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)-led project, offering psychological first aid and psychosocial support in 28 countries 6 . EUR 65.2 million were allocated under an AMIF Specific Action to Bulgaria, Czechia, Poland, and Romania for hosting a high number of beneficiaries of temporary protection. Currently, EUR 1.5 billion is being made available under AMIF to support Member States with the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum and for hosting displaced persons from Ukraine. Under the 2021-2027 cohesion funds, EUR 1.2 billion 7 from the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund Plus was mobilised to support the integration of third-country nationals, including displaced Ukrainians 8 , mainly via employment and social inclusion. 1 Regulation (EU) No 513/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council; of 16 April 2014 establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management and repealing Council Decision 2007/125/JHA, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, pp. 93–111, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/513/oj; Regulations (EU) No 514/2014 laying down general provisions on the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and on the instrument for financial support for police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, pp. 112– 142, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/514/oj; Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa and repealing Decision No 574/2007/EC, OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, pp. 143– 167, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/515/oj; Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, pp. 168–194, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/516/oj. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1147 establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, pp. 1–47, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1147/oj. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, OJ L 251, 15.7.2021, pp. 48–93, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj. 4 The EUR 385 million were allocated to: Poland EUR 200.1 million, Czechia EUR 54.4 million, Romania EUR 39.1 million, Hungary EUR 21.1 million, Lithuania EUR 10.1 million, Latvia EUR 7.8 million, Estonia EUR 10.1 million, Bulgaria EUR 10.9 million, Slovakia EUR 24.7 million, and Cyprus EUR 6.7 million. 5 https://redcross.eu/projects/safe-homes. The Safe Home initiative was managed by the IFRC. 6 23 Member States as well as Norway, Iceland, Moldova, Ukraine, and Montenegro. Project led by the IFRC. 7 Belgium EUR 28 million; Germany EUR 150 million; Greece EUR 93 million; Spain EUR 132 million; Finland EUR 12 million; France EUR 7 million; Croatia EUR 8 million; Ireland EUR 2 million; Italy EUR 229 million; Latvia EUR 1 million; Malta EUR 1 million; Poland EUR 352 million; Portugal EUR 2 million; Romania EUR 40 million; Sweden EUR 35 million; Slovakia EUR 60 million. 8 The amount cannot be split to show only the part relevant for Ukrainian nationals.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-03-06 “P-000969/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, while respecting their international obligations and EU law. The Commission does not interfere in the electoral processes of Member States. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) to assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to electoral processes and civic discourse, while protecting fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression 2 . The Commission issued guidelines for VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes, which recommend different mitigation measures 3 . Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) coordinate work at national level with the aim of ensuring VLOPs and VLOSEs’ compliance with the DSA, including during electoral periods. The European Board for Digital Services, composed of the DSCs, compiled a DSA Elections Toolkit aiming to support DSCs in this task 4 . DSCs can organise election roundtables to facilitate information sharing and coordination between relevant stakeholders within the scope of the DSA and based on their legal competences and local election legislation. Upon the concerned DSC’s request, the Commission can provide support in this exercise. The Commission has so far not received a request to provide support for a roundtable in Poland. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng 2 Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-02-14 “P-000699/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The legal instruments of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 1 entered into force in June 2024 and they will enter into application in mid-2026. The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 2 foresees mandatory but flexible solidarity. This means that each Member State has full discretion to choose between the various forms of solidarity, namely relocation, financial contributions and alternative measures (in-kind support). Therefore, a Member State may decide to contribute with any form of solidarity, and this would be financial contributions and alternative measures only. Moreover, the Pact provides the necessary flexibility to address the needs of Member States, based on their specific migratory situation. According to the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation, a Member State could receive solidarity or benefit from a full or partial deduction of solidarity contributions. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-01-22 “E-000279/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Europe’s industrial base is essential for competitiveness and prosperity. Yet, rising geopolitical tensions, slow economic growth and technological competition pose important challenges. The high cost of energy, which weighs on European citizens and penalises European industry in global competition, sheds light on the urgency to reduce the EU’s dependency on fossil fuels and to accelerate the transition towards clean energy and technologies. The Clean Industrial Deal 1 brings forward concrete initiatives to strengthen the business case for competitiveness and decarbonisation in Europe. It includes actions to improve access to affordable energy, lead markets, materials and circularity, funding and skills, as well as to a level international playing field, thus answering to the call of European industry 2 . For instance, it announces counter-guarantees to facilitate the take up of corporate power purchase agreements, simplification of permitting to access energy infrastructure and more funding through the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank and the revision of InvestEU 3 . The implementation of these actions will tackle challenges that European industries face and will thus have a positive impact on the EU’s competitiveness. Most of the actions announced by the Clean Industrial Deal will be implemented or, in the case of legislative proposals, presented by the Commission in 2025. The measures will not impose burdens on individual companies. Instead, they will support industry, in particular energy intensive and clean tech industries, and workers involved in the industrial transition. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0085 2 https://antwerp-declaration.eu/ 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0523”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · Energy (green transition) · EU industrial funding
• 2024-12-17 “E-002998/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1. EU development cooperation aims at improving the living conditions of the Cuban population, in the framework of the partnership established under the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement 1 . No EU funds are channelled through the Cuban authorities. EU funding is directly transmitted to the implementing agencies in charge of the various EU projects, be it United Nations (UN) agencies, agencies of the Member States or European non-governmental organisations. 2. There has been some progress on each of the priorities agreed in the framework of the EUCuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement and enumerated in its Article 2. In particular, the Agreement has framed EU-Cuba relations through a critical yet constructive engagement. It has supported Cuba’s economic modernisation through the progressive expansion of its private sector, and fostered improvements in human rights, including the adoption of the Family Code 2 , the acceptance of 81% of recommendations under the UN Universal Periodic Review, and the recent decision by Cuba to free 553 detainees. It has also encouraged Cuba to advance towards the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, facilitated dialogue on trade and economic relations, as well as to address the impact of the United States embargo on the island, which also affects EU companies and citizens. The EU is committed to pursue its efforts to achieve additional, more significant results in all areas, with emphasis on the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms and to promote EU interests. 3. As indicated, no funds are directed at the Cuban government. The objective of all EU cooperation initiatives is to support the Cuban population as a whole, which is currently enduring a particularly severe economic crisis, combined recently with other natural hazards such as hurricanes and earthquakes. 1 Council Decision (EU) 2016/2232 of 6/12/2016 – OJ L337. 2 Law 156/2022, Of. Gazette 99 of 27/09/22.”
  EU-Cuba relations
• 2024-11-13 “E-002507/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 1 foresees mandatory solidarity, but each Member State has full discretion to choose between the various forms of solidarity, namely relocation, financial contributions and alternative measures (in-kind support). The number of persons benefitting from temporary protection in the Member State concerned is among the factors determining whether a Member State is under migratory pressure or facing a significant migratory situation, which allows for full or partial reductions of solidarity contributions. The assessment of which Member State will be under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure or facing a significant migratory situation will be made by the Commission by the end of 2025, feeding into the first annual migration management cycle, starting in mid-2026. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-11-05 “E-002415/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The new EU fiscal framework considers increasing defence capabilities an EU priority 1 . Defence spending can be part of a set of reforms and investments that underpin a more gradual fiscal adjustment path to up to seven rather than four years. However, Poland has opted for a four-year fiscal adjustment in its plan. The framework does not provide for the exclusion of specific types of expenditure, such as on defence, from the deficit. However, government investment in defence was taken into account as a relevant factor in the Report under Article 126(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union assessing a breach of the deficit or debt criteria and in the subsequent steps of an excessive deficit procedure 2 . Moreover, in its recommendation to the Council endorsing the medium-term fiscal structural plan of Poland, the Commission assessed that the increase in defence investment justified a lower fiscal effort in 2025 and a modulation of the time profile of the fiscal adjustment path 3 . The Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation to bring an end to the excessive deficit in Poland is consistent with the fiscal path in the plan 4 . In the plan, Poland presents an indicative fiscal strategy based on limiting net expenditure growth via both expenditure restraint and discretionary revenue increases. For 2025, the measures are specified in the 2025 draft budget. For 2026-2028, Poland refers to several other measures to be specified in the future budgets. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 2 COM(2024) 598 final. 3 COM(2024) 723 final. 4 COM(2024) 956 final.”
  Defence spending · EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2024-09-10 “E-001671/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission Article 5 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that the limits of EU competences are governed by the principle of conferral and that the use of EU competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Under the principle of conferral, the EU will act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. However, the EU does not have competences on the administrative and territorial organisation of the Member States. It is the competence and the responsibility of the Member States to lay down the specific conditions for the conduct of their local referendums and public consultations, subject to the respect of the values enshrined in Article 2, which are given expression in basic principles, such as the principle of democracy laid down in Article 10 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and their international commitments. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the competent national administrative and judicial authorities to ensure compliance with applicable law. The Commission is committed to promote and uphold the rule of law, which is one of the values of Article 2 TEU. A key work stream in this respect is the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report. The annual Rule of Law Report focuses on developments, both positive and negative, in four key areas for the rule of law: the justice system, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism and freedom, and other institutional issues related to checks and balances. It presents the Commission’s own assessment of developments occurring in these areas in each Member State. The annual Rule of Law Report does not focus on issues of local self-government.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2024-09-10 “E-001672/2024 Answer given by Vice-President Jourová on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on individual cases and on allegations, which should be addressed to and analysed by the relevant authorities. The Commission monitors the situation of media pluralism and media freedom in all Member States in its annual Rule of Law Reports 1 . In its analysis, the Commission takes into account the 2021 Recommendation 2 on the safety of journalists which, among other things, recommended Member States to enable journalists and other media professionals to obtain access to documents and other information held by public authorities and bodies, including through digital means. In 2025, the Commission will again assess all relevant developments related to media freedom, pluralism and safety of journalists in Poland. As for the previous editions of the Rule of Law Report, this assessment will be based on a careful analysis of the situation. The Rule of Law Report 2025 will take into account information and evidence provided by a broad variety of sources, including national authorities, independent bodies, international institutions and other stakeholders, including civil society. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en 2 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/79357”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2024-09-10 “E-001673/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Readmission of own nationals is an established norm of customary international law that was reaffirmed in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 2016 (resolution 71/1 of the United Nations General Assembly). The Commission supports the conclusion of readmission agreements as they facilitate and streamline the implementation of such obligation. However, there is no obligation as such to conclude readmission agreements. The Commission pursues comprehensive, balanced and tailor-made partnerships with key partners of origin and transit, including those with which there is no readmission agreement. Return and readmission are important elements of these partnerships. Readmission cooperation is fostered in this framework using the relevant tools and policies, as well as available leverages, including visa measures. The implementation of the EU readmission agreements is monitored by the Joint Readmission Committees, where any challenges of cooperation are discussed, including the reasons behind the refusal to readmit their own nationals as well as practical and operational solutions. Frontex supports Member States at all stages of the return process.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-09-06 “E-001643/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission monitors the situation of media freedom and pluralism in all Member States in its annual Rule of Law Reports 1 . It takes into account the 2021 Recommendation on the Safety of Journalists 2 which recommended Member States to ensure that public authorities create transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions for journalists regarding access to press conferences and documents. The Rule of Law Report is prepared in continuous dialogue with the 27 Member States and is based on a transparent methodology, developed in consultation with the Member States in full respect of the principles of equal treatment, impartiality and objectivity. It relies on a broad variety of sources. As regards the country chapter for Poland of the 2023 Rule of Law Report 3 , to which the Honourable Member refers, it briefly and factually mentions concerns raised about the case of Pablo González under the pillar of media freedom, without taking a position. For more details, the Commission refers the Honourable Member to its answers to parliamentary questions E-001534/2024, E-001545/2024 and E-003062/2024. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle/2024-rule-law-report_en 2 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/79357 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b576c76e-0755-4690-92667895c4294433_en?filename=48_1_52627_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• “Thank you very much. I will speak Polish. Commissioner, I welcome the fact that the strategy contains really important elements. So visa policy is supposed to support our security policy. And also visa policy is supposed to support us in our fight against irregular Guilhermetech migration. These are the basic points that actually have surprised me quite positively. So you can count on our support on those two points. Uh, unless the following documents will not go in the same direction. I am also surprised by the scale of irregular migration. After, um, the, um we started the visa suspension mechanism. I have read that one fourth of asylum applications in 2024 were for those who were traveling after the visa suspension mechanism was introduced. This is a lot. This is really a lot. So I do agree with you that you have to verify and review those instruments that we can use against those countries from which the nationals abuse this system. This is super important for us and I would like you to go even further now. Cooperation on returns and visa policy. Yes. This is super important. Uh, your example about Ethiopia was, uh, really, uh, very clear, but I have to remind you that Poland already many years ago, wanted similar solutions in 2015 when we had the major migration crisis. And I also welcome the fact that you see the need to, um. Change course towards those states who are aggressive towards the EU, who are waging a hybrid war. Yes. We do need those types of actions. We do need some kind of sanctions targeted at those states. They have to feel it is not worthwhile waging this war. One more question. One more question, Commissioner, do you think, uh, we should, um, introduce a system of, um, visa deposits for some nationals for some countries? Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “We must combat crime on the internet and equip the authorities with the right tools. However, I have serious reasons to suspect that under the guise of fighting cyberbullying, there is an attempt to restrict freedom of speech online. Social media today play an enormous role in democracies. They are an instrument for ordinary people to genuinely express their views. If we set even the smallest limit on freedom of speech, the temptation to keep pushing that limit further will be immense and will continue to grow. People will have the right to hold opinions different from yours. They have the right to be wrong, just as you are very often wrong. Who are the officials who will decide what is true, harmful or even acceptable? It is easier for you to create an expensive system of mass content removal than to actually and effectively pursue real crimes online. It is precisely freedom of speech that is being eliminated by Putin. Don't be like him. Be like pulsar. Here, President Navrotsky in Poland vetoed the act implementing the DSA. Thanks to this, the government nor left wing NGOs have for now tools for administrative censorship of content on the internet. Tonight, this evening, please read. Orwell's 1984 has never been so relevant. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Mr. president, ladies and gentlemen, please. And adequate services must have at their disposal state of the art technologies, because otherwise they will remain blind and deaf versus criminals, drug traffickers. But of course, procedures need to be observed in Poland. The first Pegasus system appeared in the years 2012 2015, when Donald Tusk was prime minister. Despite the media craze in Poland, no case was identified without necessary judicial permissions. The committee that was established in the Polish parliament cannot identify any irregularities. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has come to the conclusion that it is illegal. In fact, there was a Russian spy attacking the system. There was also a commissioner who is accused of money laundering and also a vice president of the European Parliament that is accused of corruption. Other people who organized troll farms were also criticizing the system. They were always say that they are victims, but the services cannot be deaf and blind. Our security depends on it.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “Nobody would have suggested having that kind of debate because there wasn't the problem of organized criminals recruiting minors. But yesterday, we awarded the European Order of Merit to Madam Merkel. And today, we're talking about the fate of children recruited by organized crime. This mass recruitment is something that's only started occurring in the last 10 years. What happened 10 years ago? Well, 10 years ago, a wave of illegal migrants arrived in Europe, and Miss Merkel is responsible for that. Anywhere migrants are concentrated, there is the concentration of crime. The responsibility for that crime falls on anybody who promotes mass migration. That is why we can't feel safe in Europe. In safe places, this kind of recruitment wouldn't exist, so we don't agree with mass migration.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. Ladies and gentlemen, the green policy promoted by the European Commission. Means that European agriculture is in a very serious situation. We have very low prices in Poland. Farmers have asked people to come and pick their produce because selling it simply doesn't cover the costs of production. There's a complete lack of viability for agriculture, and commission is reducing financing for the cap. But it proposes this green madness in said and this agreement with Mercosur. And who is the one who created all of this disaster is Ursula von der Leyen. She's responsible for the catastrophic state of European agriculture. This green madness must end. Food security is just as important as energy security or our military security. Those people who are working in our countryside deserve our support. European Polish farmers don't want much. They just want a normal life without all of this green madness, without these lies. Ursula von der Leyen and the Commission are destroying food security. And this must stop.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “Well, let me respond in the following way. The biggest error of the current European Commission is changing the cap and reducing the financing of the cap. The second error is the signature of the agreement with Mercosur. It is not possible to compete with agriculture from, uh, South America, which is very extensive compared to our more small scale organic farming. It's a nail in the coffin for agriculture.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “I will I will be speaking Polish commissioner. Two countries have failed to introduce the migration pact Hungary and Poland. Donald Zusk the prime minister of Poland is saying that even though Poland was qualified as one of the countries with high migration risk nonetheless Poland will not take in any migrants and will not pay any money for this. So what is going to be your policy for this and is it possible that Poland will be somehow exempted from this migration policy? **Unknown ££ Thank you very much commissioner I'll be speaking in German. The situation that we're in as you pointed out quite rightly is that asylum figures are the are on the decrease. The Balkan route has been all but assured. We have finger figures going down for asylum applications in almost all member states so actually these are positive developments that you're presenting and I would like to know from you where you see the needs arising for asylum procedures also in third countries whether you see a need for more processing to take place in third countries or whether you want to make returns more simplified and also what role do you see Frontex playing here. Secondly when it comes to internal borders and Schengen controls we have the situation including in Germany but other EU member states as well where the Schengen rules are not being respected. How are you going to ensure that enforcement takes place?”
  Asylum & border control
• “Well, thank you very much, chair. Commissioner, I want to go back to Mr. Kaminski's question. Well, I am happy you will not interfere with Polish election. That's not what we are expecting from you. But not long ago you did interfere in the Romanian election. Nobody even tries to hide that. It was the commission which put pressure on Romania in order to cancel the results of the first round of the election there. What is the difference between the two? There was recently a letter from American congressmen addressed to the commission relating to the breaches of rule of law in Poland by Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Poland. Opposition is being persecuted by Tusk's government arrests, the breaches of the law and the Constitution. Thank you.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law