Anna BRYŁKA

Member of the European Parliament · Poland · PfE

Policy topics Anna BRYŁKA is active on

Trade relations with MercosurFree trade agreements (FTAs)

What Anna BRYŁKA has said (58)

2026-06-15 “Thank you very much, president, commissioner. The negotiations lasted almost a year. We remain critical of this agreement. This is a deal which is asymmetrical. There are too many concessions on the European part that concerns industry, but also agriculture. We are basically capitulating here, which is the result of the policy of the European Commission. There have been more rounds of negotiations. The text, has been amended. Some of the demands, that we have made that the parliament has made have been taken to account. The agreement is now provisional. It can be suspended where a major economic injury occurs. But it is very problematic that there are more commitments in the package. Europe is to buy energy, military equipment. Europe is also required to invest in The United States. This is not favorable. The tariffs are not symmetrical. The problem of steel and aluminum remains unresolved, and there is no formal impact assessment. Europe and America, this is the 30% of global trade. This is very important, but it requires efficiency and courage. The commission doesn't have either. Thank you.”
EU-US trade relations
2025-10-16 “E-004079/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Invasive Alien Species (IAS) Regulation 1 provides a comprehensive framework for the prevention and management of invasive alien species, including restrictions on certain activities and the possibility of derogations under strict conditions. Derogations from the obligations imposed by the Regulation (for instance, as regards breeding, transport or possession of certain species) are possible under Articles 8, 9, and 31, provided that specific conditions are met, as specified under each of these Articles. These include, for instance, ensuring that activities involving invasive species are carried out in contained holding, that risks of escape or spread are effectively managed, etc. The conditions for granting derogations are outlined in the aforementioned Articles of the Regulation. Member States are responsible for designating competent authorities to issue permits, while the Commission is responsible for granting or refusing authorisations under Article 9. 1 Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 35– 55.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU
2025-10-16 “E-004081/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The free trade agreements with Mercosur and with India are crucial for strengthening the EU's trade relations with these key partners. The EU consistently includes bilateral safeguards in its free trade agreements. These safeguards apply across all goods subject to tariff preferences, designed to counteract potential market distortions. Should there be a sudden increase in imports, particularly in critical sectors like agriculture, these measures are aimed to provide essential protection. The Commission remains fully committed to ensuring that imported products adhere to high labour and environmental standards. The EU has already in place autonomous legislation applicable to all imports that require compliance with certain production standards to achieve global environmental objectives or address ethical concerns (like the Forced Labour Regulation 1 ). The Vision for Agriculture 2 will deepen these efforts, aiming for a strong alignment of production standards for imports to ensure they meet EU requirements. The Commission will closely monitor market developments closely after the agreements are implemented, particularly regarding the agricultural sector. Besides, the new multiannual financial framework proposal that the Commission put forward in July 2025 includes a ‘Unity Safety Net’ for crisis measures worth EUR 6.3 billion for 2028-2034, which effectively doubles the current agriculture reserve. If needed, it will allow to respond to market imbalances and stabilise markets, providing support to EU producers of agricultural products affected by agricultural market crises. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202403015. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0075.”
Import of agri-food products in the EU · Trade relations with Mercosur
2025-10-16 “E-004078/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The free trade agreements with Mercosur and with India are crucial for strengthening the EU's trade relations with these key partners. Under the EU-Mercosur Agreement 1 , tobacco and tobacco products are indeed subject to tariff liberalisation. However, the approach adopted is progressive, with a phased-out reduction in tariffs over a period of four to seven years. This will grant the tobacco sector adequate time to adjust gradually to the changes, minimising disruption. Moreover, the EUMercosur agreement provides for bilateral safeguards protecting the agricultural sectors, including tobacco, in case of market disruptions. The Commission is committed to ensuring that these measures do not compromise the competitiveness of European tobacco producers. The Commission is aware of the social and economic significance of the tobacco industry in certain EU regions. In this respect, the Vision for Agriculture 2 pursues a number of initiatives to support agricultural sectors, including stronger alignment of certain production standards for imported products, in compliance with international rules and based on a thorough impact assessment. It also provides for support in case of disturbances of agricultural markets through the unity safety net 3 . As negotiations with India continue, the Commission remains committed to addressing the sensitivities of the EU, particularly concerning the tobacco sector. Throughout these ongoing negotiations, the Commission aims to achieve balanced and equitable outcomes that take duly into account such sensitivities and serve the interests of all parties involved. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0338&qid=1760605855352. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0075. 3 More info available here: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/cap-overview/cap-post2027-next-eu-budget_en.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU
2025-06-30 “P-002626/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The Annex to the Council Implementing Decision amending the Implementing Decision of 17 June 2022 on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Poland adopted on 20 June 2025 1 defines the reforms required under milestones E3G and E4G. According to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility 2 (‘RRF Regulation’), upon completion of the relevant agreed milestones and targets indicated in the recovery and resilience plan as approved in the Council implementing decision, the Member State concerned shall submit to the Commission a duly justified request for payment. The Commission shall then assess whether the relevant milestones and targets set out in the Council implementing decision have been satisfactorily fulfilled. Poland has not yet submitted a payment request covering milestones E3G and E4G. At this stage, the Commission can therefore not comment on how Poland would fulfil milestones E3G and E4G. While recovery and resilience plans can be amended under the conditions set out in Article 21 of the RRF Regulation and, in its Communication of 4 June 2025, the Commission paved the way for a revision with the objective of simplifying the plan, Poland has not requested a revision of the current recovery and resilience plan to remove milestones E3G and E4G. 1 ST 9590/25, see: Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2025/06/20/recovery-and-resilience-fund-council-gives-green-light-to-amended-plans-of-belgiumcyprus-croatia-italy-lithuania-malta-poland-and-slovenia/. 2 OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.”
Road transport environmental policy
2025-06-24 “E-002525/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission During the deferral period of 24 months for listing the American mink (Neovison vison) none of the restrictions from the Invasive Alien Species (IAS) Regulation 1 apply to this species unless covered by national lists derived from Article 12 of the Regulation. Such transition or deferral periods are not new, they have already been granted for other species under previous Implementing Regulations updating the list of invasive alien species of Union concern. Therefore, the Commission does not plan to issue guidelines or legal interpretations on this matter. Article 7 of the IAS Regulation specifies the restrictions that are applicable to IAS of Union concern. Article 32 applies to the commercial stocks present at the time of listing. These Articles apply for all parts of the organism that can reproduce and the Commission makes no distinction between the number of legal entities. The legal entities would be relevant for Article 9 authorisations, as Member States need to specify, in their request for authorisation, the details of the establishments covered by their request. Articles 8 and 9 of the IAS Regulation contain detailed provisions on the conditions to be met for permits and authorisations. Permits under Article 9 may only be issued in exceptional cases, for reasons of compelling public interest, including those of a social or economic nature. In their request for authorisation, Member States must assess the risk of escape and describe the measures envisaged to ensure that escape or spread is not possible. 1 Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 35.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU
2025-06-24 “E-002527/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Article 9 of the Invasive Alien Species (IAS) Regulation 1 provides for authorisations that may be granted by the Commission to mitigate the socio-economic impacts that might arise from listing species as an IAS of Union concern. This would allow economic operators to continue operating under certain conditions and help to limit the impact on businesses and employment. There are no dedicated EU funds available for compensation of investments made for businesses impacted by the listing of species as IAS of Union concern. A considerable number of support and guidance materials have been made publicly available since the IAS Regulation came into force 2 . Moreover, regular meetings are held with the Member States, where their needs for support are discussed and reviewed. Specifically, as regards the American mink, the Commission organised a series of workshops on management and eradication of this species in the first half of 2025. Unless Member States request so, no additional guidance is planned at the moment. The Commission remains open to dialogue with American mink breeders, but no activities as mentioned by the Honourable Member are planned at the moment by the Commission. 1 Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 35. 2 Available on the collaborative platform CIRCABC, https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/4cd6cb36-b0f1-4db4915e-65cd29067f49/library/e55d2b6b-533d-4c8b-a6f2-29ada6f47850?p=1&n=10&sort=modified_DESC.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU
2025-06-24 “E-002524/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission During the deferral period of 24 months after entry into force of the update of the list of invasive alien species (IAS) of Union concern under the Invasive Alien Species Regulation 1 none of the restrictions under this Regulation are applicable. So the activities mentioned by the Honourable Member could continue during these 24 months if not restricted by other legislation. For the activities mentioned by the Honourable Member other legislation, notably animal welfare 2 and animal health 3 legislation as well as environmental legislation applicable to the individual establishments depending on their size and impacts on the environment continue to apply and need to be respected. The follow-up to the European Citizen Initiative ‘Fur Free Europe’ may also have an impact on those activities. The Commission replied in December 2023 with the adoption of a Communication 4 outlining its legal and political conclusions, as well as the actions it plans to take in response. Member States may have or may decide to lay down more stringent national rules. 1 Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 35. 2 Council Directive 98/58/EC of 20 July 1998 concerning the protection of animals kept for farming purposes, OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, pp. 23–27. 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’), OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, pp. 1–208. 4 Communication from The Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) “Fur Free Europe”, OJ C, C/2023/1559, 21.12.2023.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU
2025-06-24 “E-002523/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The deferral of 24 months of listing of American mink (Neovison vison) gives Member States and operators time to prepare for the future listing of the species as an invasive alien species (IAS) of Union concern under the IAS Regulation 1 . This may include the preparation by Member States considering this justified of applications for the authorisations referred to in Article 9 of the Regulation according to which in exceptional cases, for reasons of compelling public interest, Member States may issue permits allowing establishments to continue operating after the inclusion of a species in the List of IAS of Union concern, albeit under strict conditions to be agreed with the Commission. The Commission Implementing Regulation updating the list of invasive alien species of Union concern 2 was adopted on 17 July 2025 and published on 18 July 2025 which means that the American mink will be considered an IAS of Union concern as of 7 August 2027, when the restrictions under Article 7 of the Regulation will start applying to this species. Member States may decide to lay down more stringent national rules already before that date. In line with Article 32 keepers of commercial stock of specimens acquired before the listing shall be allowed up to two years after inclusion of the species on the list to keep and transport live specimens in order to slaughter or humanely cull those to exhaust their stock. The sale or transfer of live specimens to non-commercial users shall be allowed for one year after inclusion of the species on the Union list provided that the specimens are kept and transported in contained holding and all appropriate measures are put in place to ensure that reproduction or escape are not possible. 1 Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 35. 2 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1422 of 17 July 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 to update the list of invasive alien species of Union concern, OJ L, 2025/1422, 18.7.2025.”
Nature protection and restoration in the EU
2025-06-20 “E-002486/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission plans to adopt, in the third quarter of 2025, the proposals for Council Decisions on the signature and conclusion of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA). They will be subsequently submitted to the Council and the European Parliament for their scrutiny. Regarding the ratification of the EMPA, the Singapore Opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) clarified the division of competences in the area of trade policy, confirming that what is typically included in modern Free Trade Agreements falls within the exclusive competence of the EU. Based on the division of competences between the EU and its Member States, as clarified by the CJEU, a variety of models are available to structure comprehensive relationships. Member States are sovereign to express their views on trade international agreements negotiated by the EU on their behalf. They will have the opportunity to make their views public once the proposals for Council Decisions on the signature and conclusion of the EMPA are adopted.”
Trade relations with Mercosur
2025-06-20 “E-002487/2025 E-002488/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission has provided the European’s Parliament Committee on Budgetary Control with all the documents requested by the Committee 1 to facilitate the European Parliament’s scrutiny in the context of the budget discharge for the financial years 2022 and 2023. Amongst the grant agreements received by the Parliament’s Committee for Budgetary Control on 11 January 2024, was the 2022 operating grant agreement with the ClientEarth, which includes the work programme of the organisation 2 . Detailed information on all operating grants financed under the EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE) 3 is published online in the LIFE public dashboard 4 . This dashboard makes available the beneficiaries’ details, the amounts of the EU contributions, and the objectives of each operating grant as stated in the grant agreements. It is updated each year after the operating grants have been awarded. 2. The Commission confirms that it has not had any exchange of information with ClientEarth regarding legal actions undertaken by the non-governmental organisation (NGO) against coalburning plants in the period 2022-2023. 3. The aforementioned operating grant awarded to ClientEarth has been concluded under the LIFE programme, which provides financial support for the functioning of NGOs supporting civil society’s participation in policy making, through competitive calls for proposals. As a beneficiary of the LIFE programme, ClientEarth has full independence in deciding the content and implementation of its work programme. The Commission maintains full impartiality and does not require beneficiaries, including NGOs, to undertake advocacy activities for specific political and policy purposes. The Commission has neither demanded nor encouraged ClientEarth to take legal actions against coal-burning power plants. 1 These requests fall under the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission and have been treated according to the established rules for access to confidential information, as provided for in the Annex II to the said Agreement. 2 Grant agreement with CLIENTEARTH GGMBH for the project LIFE22 NGO-DE-ClientEarth. 3 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en. 4 https://dashboard.tech.ec.europa.eu/qs_digit_dashboard_mt/public/sense/app/8298c020-48a6-4b84-91f4f6f2665c0f99/sheet/d2820200-d4d9-4a26-b23b-58e323c803c2/state/analysis. Under the ‘Call acronym’ tab, select ‘LIFE-[year]-NGO-OG-SGA’ and scroll down to see the list of grants for each year. Data on objectives is only available for the 2021-2028 financial framework.”
Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
2025-06-17 “E-002439/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission A swift and effective implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 1 is a priority for the Commission. Poland submitted to the Commission its position on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum. The Commission is in regular contact with all Member States and continues supporting them in making sure that they will be ready to fully implement the Pact as of mid-2026. Progress across the different elements of implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, including the development of National Implementation Plans, is described in the Commission Communication on the state of play on Pact implementation 2 . The Commission will continue to provide regular information on the state of implementation of the Pact by Member States as part of the reporting requirements established in the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 3 , as well as in the framework of the Working Group on Asylum of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0319. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj/eng.”
Asylum & border control
2025-06-13 “E-002387/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission As announced by the Commission on 30 June 2025 12 , EU and Ukrainian negotiators have reached an agreement in principle on the review under Article 29 3 of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Details of the agreement in principle have been made available online 4 . The Commission debriefed the Parliament’s Committee on International Trade on 14 July 2025. As regards the timeline for entry into force of the results of the review under Article 29, the objective is a swift entry into force once the internal procedures for adoption have been completed on both sides, likely after the summer 2025. Once in force, the new trade regime agreed under the review will supersede the provisions of the current Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. This agreement will replace the transitional regime introduced after the expiry of the old Autonomous Trade Measures 5 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_1677. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1672. 3 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/ukraine_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_25_1673 and https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/b43aeba7-32ce-43b6-846f5c8c7d9fba70/details?download=true. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202501132.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs)
2025-06-12 “E-002377/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission on 16 July 2025 proposed 1 an update of the EU’s Tobacco Taxation Directive 2 . In light of evolving public health challenges and significant shifts in the market, the reform aims at modernising this Directive in line with the EU’s health and economic priorities. The analysis for a revision of the tobacco taxation rules is based on Better Regulation principles, guaranteeing that any revision is based on comprehensive impact analysis and stakeholder consultations to ensure evidence-informed policymaking. The impact assessment takes careful consideration of public health, fiscal and national competence objectives, and in particular economic and social impacts. The proposal follows Council Conclusions of June 2020 in which Member States unanimously requested the Directive to be updated, as well as the Commission’s commitment to advancing Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan goal to reduce smoking prevalence to below 5% by 2040. 1 Proposal for a Council Directive on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to tobacco and tobacco related products (recast), COM (2025) 580 final. 2 Council Directive 2011/64/EU of 21 June 2011 on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured tobacco, OJ L 176, 5 July 2011, p. 24–36.”
EU competences on taxation · Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
2025-06-11 “E-002335/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not identified irregularities in operating grants under the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) programme 1 . To ensure that a wide range of opinions is supported through operating grants, the selection and award of such grants is based on competitive open calls for proposals publicly available on the Funding and Tenders portal 2 . Applicants submit proposals that include the description of their work-programmes of activities in areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation, which are then annexed to the grant agreement. The work programme may mention, among other applicant’s activities, advocacy activities. The Commission does not prescribe the specific activities to be carried out by the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in their work programmes, nor instructs them to support specific positions. The Commission refers to its previous answers 3 and replies to the European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report 11/2025 relating to (NGOs) in internal policies 4 . The Commission adheres strictly to its transparency obligations which require publishing information about recipients 5 . To this end, information about EU fund recipients is published on the Financial Transparency System 6 . The Commission also proactively discloses the objectives and outcomes of funded projects on the Funding and Tenders Portal 7 . Furthermore, interest representatives are required to report their lobbying activities and disclose key funding sources, including any contributions exceeding EUR 10 000 or representing more than 10% of their total budget. The Commission will explore the feasibility of incrementally increasing the frequency of publishing data updates on the Financial Transparency System, as per ECA’s recommendation 8 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000280-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qe/2025/000351/P10_RE(2025)000351_EN.pdf https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/291733/Replies%20to%20questionnaire%20addressed%20to%20Cssr %20responsible%20for%20Budget%20and%20Administration_final.pdf. 4 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/291733/Replies%20to%20questionnaire%20addressed%20to%20Cssr %20responsible%20for%20Budget%20and%20Administration_final.pdf. 5 Article 38 of the Financial Regulation. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html (The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation whereby data on recipients is not disclosed for very low value contracts below EUR 15 000 and where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the persons or entities). 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 8 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECAReplies/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11_EN.pdf.”
Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Transparency requirements for interest groups · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
2025-06-11 “E-002336/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. Operating grants to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) under the EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE) 1 are awarded following competitive calls for proposals and in line with the provisions of the Financial Regulation 2 . Applicants submit proposals that include the description of their work programmes of activities in areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation 3 , which are then annexed to the grant agreement. Detailed information on all operating grants financed under the LIFE programme is published online in the LIFE public dashboard 4 . Each entry includes the beneficiaries’ details, the amounts of the EU contributions, and a description of the objectives of the grant. The dashboard is updated each year after the operating grants have been awarded. In addition, the Commission has provided the European’s Parliament Committee on Budgetary Control with all the documents requested by the Committee to facilitate the European Parliament’s scrutiny in the context of the budget discharge for the financial years 2022 and 2023. 2. The operating grant awarded to ClientEarth has been concluded under the LIFE programme, which provides financial support for the functioning of NGOs supporting civil society’s participation in policy making, through competitive calls for proposals. The Commission maintains full impartiality and does not require beneficiaries, including NGOs, to undertake advocacy activities for specific political and policy purposes. The Commission has neither demanded nor encouraged ClientEarth to take legal actions against coal-burning power plants. As a beneficiary of the LIFE programme, ClientEarth has full independence in deciding the content and implementation of its own work programme. The Commission issued Guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy 5 . A disclaimer in the recent LIFE Calls clearly indicates that beneficiaries of LIFE operating grants, remain responsible for the content of their work programme, views and actions. 1 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783. 4 https://dashboard.tech.ec.europa.eu/qs_digit_dashboard_mt/public/sense/app/8298c020-48a6-4b84-91f4f6f2665c0f99/overview. Under the ‘Call acronym’ tab, select ‘LIFE-[year]-NGO-OG-SGA and scroll down to the list of operating grants for each year of the 2021-2027 financial framework. 5 In 2024: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidancefunding-dev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf.”
Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
2025-04-14 “E-001521/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission In 2025, Poland notified 85 outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in poultry farms 1 representing 35% of the EU’s total number of outbreaks. More than 8 million poultry were affected in the infected farms in Poland, that represents 63,5% of the total number of poultry affected in the HPAI outbreaks in the EU. The Commission is paying special attention to this situation and keeps regular contact with the Polish authorities, in particular on control measures. Starting in March 2025, Poland has faced a specific deterioration regarding HPAI in certain areas of high density with poultry establishments. As consequence of that situation, following technical discussions with the Commission, the Polish competent authorities adopted and implemented certain national measures aiming to contain the spread of the disease in the zones of concern. The measures were presented at the Standing Committee of Plants, Animals Food and Feed 2 and are in accordance with the EU rules, including regionalisation measures where movement restrictions according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 3 and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 4 apply. In view of the evolution of the disease situation, the Commission adopted several Implementing Decisions 5 , amending the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2447 6 , that lists the areas where restrictions due to HPAI must be in place. The economic consequences following infection of poultry with HPAI are significant. Therefore, appropriate preventive and control measures including strict biosecurity in poultry establishments and movement restriction must be taken to prevent infection and further spread leading to devastating damages. 1 https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3628d24e-53ea-4ee7-a121-99bcf304a223_en?filename=regcom_ahw_20250521_pres-15.pdf. 2 https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2f28853a-4693-4f9a-aca3-ee464dc2cdac_en?filename=regcom_ahw_20250328_pres-18.pdf. 3 Animal Health Law: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj. 4 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj. 5 Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/821 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/821/oj , Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/858 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/858/oj , Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/896 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/896/oj; Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/1089 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/1089/oj. 6 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2023/2447/oj.”
Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
2025-04-14 “E-001520/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Commission follows closely the status of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in the EU. From 1 January 2025 until 26 May 2025, Member States have notified 244 outbreaks of HPAI in poultry establishments and more than 12,6 million poultry have been affected in those outbreaks. Poland notified 85 HPAI outbreaks in poultry establishments 1 representing 35% of the EU’s total number of outbreaks. More than 8 million of poultry have been affected in the infected establishments in Poland, that represents 63,5% of the total number of poultry affected in the HPAI outbreaks in the EU. The Commission is paying special attention to this serious situation and keeps regular contact with the Polish authorities, in particular as regards disease control measures. Poland has faced specific difficulties with the control of the disease in certain areas of high density of poultry establishments. As consequence of that situation, following technical discussions with the Commission, the Polish competent authorities are implementing certain additional reinforced national measures in the zones of concern aiming to contain disease spread. These measures were presented at the Standing Committee of Plants, Animals Food and Feed 2 and they operate within the framework of EU rules 3 , including regionalization measures where movement restrictions apply. In view of the evolution of the disease situation, the Commission adopted several Implementing Decisions 4 that lay down restrictions, amending the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2447 5 . 1 https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3628d24e-53ea-4ee7-a121-99bcf304a223_en?filename=regcom_ahw_20250521_pres-15.pdf. 2 https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2f28853a-4693-4f9a-aca3-ee464dc2cdac_en?filename=regcom_ahw_20250328_pres-18.pdf. 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘Animal Health Law’) (OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj). 3 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687 of 17 December 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/429 of the European Parliament and the Council, as regards rules for the prevention and control of certain listed diseases (OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, p. 64, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj). 4 Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/821 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/821/oj: Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/858: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/858/oj, Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/896: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/896/oj. 5 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2023/2447/oj.”
Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
2025-04-14 “E-001522/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The animal health measures (including regionalisation measures with movement restrictions) available to combat animal diseases relevant for Union intervention are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/429 1 (Animal Health Law) and its delegated and implementing acts. As the epidemiological situation of different diseases evolve continuously, harmonised measures are regularly discussed and decided at the Standing Committee of Plants, Animals Food and Feed 2 (the Committee). The Commission is aware that during the last months Poland has faced a specific deterioration in the epidemiological situation regarding highly pathogenic avian influenza in poultry, having difficulties in controlling the disease in certain areas with high density of poultry establishments. As a consequence of that situation, the Polish competent authorities are implementing certain national measures in the zones of major concern. These measures were agreed with the Commission and presented at the Committee. These measures aim to contain the spread of the disease and operate within the framework of EU rules, according to the Animal Health Law. The Commission then adopted Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/896 3 , amending the Annex to Implementing Decision (EU) 2023/2447 4 , demarcating the areas listed as protection, surveillance and further restricted zone in view of the evolution of the disease situation. As stated above, the corresponding extent of restrictions is updated regularly according to the evolution of the epidemiological situation. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj. 2 https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2f28853a-4693-4f9a-aca3-ee464dc2cdac_en?filename=regcom_ahw_20250328_pres-18.pdf. 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2025/896/oj. 4 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2023/2447/oj.”
Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
2025-04-12 “P-001514/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The recurrent hybrid threats, in particular at the EU Eastern border, pose new challenges. To guarantee security and territorial integrity, Member States must be able to act decisively. A strong EU response is also needed, in full respect of EU and international law. The Commission supports Member States in several ways. First, the EU supports Member States to build-up their defence capabilities and increase their defence readiness, through its whole toolbox, that includes defence industry-related instruments. Regarding the monitoring and reinforcement of the external border from a defence perspective, Member States could request financial support under the new Security Action for Europe instrument 1 or as part of the implementation of the future European Defence Industry Programme 2 , particularly since ‘The Eastern Border Shield’ has been identified by the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 3 among priorities. The Commission has also engaged with Member States to explore additional options to support national efforts consented to strengthen EU external borders and the possible scope of magnitude of such support. Second, more broadly, the EU could also support Member States’ borders through funding instruments, such as the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 4 . It ensures funding for effective integrated border management at the external borders, to facilitate legitimate border crossings, prevent and detect illegal immigration and cross-border crime and to effectively manage migratory flows, in accordance with Articles 77(2) and 79(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. For instance, activities related to the automated border surveillance systems are part of Poland’s 2021-2027 BMVI programme. The BMVI does not provide support to Member States’ defence activities. In addition, the Interreg 5 Poland-Ukraine 2021-2027 programme supports the improvement of border mobility and is investing EUR 50 million to reconstruct regional roads and rails along the Polish – Ukrainian border with view of their dual use application. 1 OJ L, 2025/1106, 28.5.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R1059.”
Asylum & border control
2025-04-09 “E-001473/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is pursuing consultations with Ukraine to review the reciprocal tariff liberalisation under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 1 in accordance with Article 29 of that Agreement. This review will lead to a well-balanced solution that will allow for reciprocal trade between the EU and Ukraine in agricultural goods, while at the same time protecting EU farmers and addressing interests flagged by some Member States and Members of the European Parliament. Furthermore, the Commission is proposing that the negotiated solution would also include a safeguard clause that would be triggered to prevent any adverse impacts of trade flows on the EU market, including one Member State. The Commission is working in view of having an outcome in place in time to provide a smooth transition after the expiry of the Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) Regulation 2 . If this is not achievable the above-mentioned Association Agreement will provide a bridging solution. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1392/oj.”
Free trade agreements (FTAs)
2025-03-19 “P-001157/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The serious and persistent nature of the hybrid threats at the Eastern EU border with Russia and Belarus pose new challenges for the whole EU. It calls also for a strengthened EU response, in full respect of EU and international law, which should be comprehensive, both addressing the threat of potential conventional military aggression and ongoing hybrid activities, including campaigns for weaponising migration and challenging the entire Schengen zone. The White Paper on the European Defence Readiness 2030 1 acknowledges that the defence of all EU land, air and maritime borders is important, in particular as regards the EU Eastern border. The Eastern Border Shield project is a noteworthy exercise by a number of Member States to confront the growing challenges in that region. The Commission would consider potential financial support for defence upon Member States request under the future European Defence Industry Programme 2 , the Commission has engaged with Member States undertaking national efforts in strengthening EU external borders to explore possible options and the scope of potential support. The Commission also supports Member States in ensuring strong European integrated border management and effective protection of the EU external borders through the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 3 . Activities related to the automated border surveillance systems are a substantial part of Poland’s 2021-2027 BMVI programme. The EUR 220.5 million allocated to the programme includes funding made available in December 2024 for ‘Enhancing border surveillance capabilities for countries bordering Russia and Belarus’ (currently being added to the programme) and will be increased by EUR 23 million from the mid-term review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32021R1148.”
EU competences on defence · Defence spending
2025-02-20 “E-000788/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Anti-dumping duties on fertilisers are only applicable to imports of urea ammonium nitrate mixtures from Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America. The Commission is currently conducting an expiry review investigation on the anti-dumping measures applicable to these imports. The expiry review was initiated on 8 October 2024, at the request of the EU industry, and the Commission is currently investigating whether expiry of these measures would be likely to result in continuation and/or recurrence of dumping and continuation or recurrence of injury to the EU industry. The review investigation will be normally concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review, but not later than 15 months from initiation. The Commission is not carrying out at this stage legislative work as regards suspending conventional duties on imports of the products referred to by the Honourable Member (codes 3102 10, 3102 80, 3105 30, 3105 40 and 3105 20 from the tariff nomenclature). The Commission is monitoring prices applicable in the EU for these and other nitrogen-based fertilisers and retains its prerogative of proposing to the Council the suspension of Common Customs Tariffs should the price levels of these goods increase. On 19 April 2024, the Commission published for public feedback a draft Commission directive amending annex III of the Nitrates Directive 1 as regards the use of certain fertilising materials from livestock manure (RENURE). Discussions on the draft text are underway in the Nitrates Committee with the competent Member State authorities. 1 Nitrates – updated rules on the use of certain fertilising materials from livestock manure (RENURE); https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14242-Nitrates-updated-rules-on-theuse-of-certain-fertilising-materials-from-livestock-manure-RENURE-_en”
EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports · Import of agri-food products in the EU
2025-02-12 “P-000650/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission and the Member States are working towards the timely implementation of the new Emissions Trading System for buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2), which was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2023. This includes regular technical level discussions and exchanges at the political level with all Member States, including Poland. Several safeguards are already in place to allow for a smooth start of ETS2, including a safeguard to delay the start of the system from 2027 to 2028 in case energy prices are exceptionally high in the first half of 2026. In addition, several triggers would release additional ETS2 allowances from the Market Stability Reserve in case of sharp prices increase or imbalances in the supply of ETS2 allowances. Furthermore, the total number of allowances auctioned in the first year of the system will be 30% higher than the ETS2 cap, to ensure a smooth start of the system. Finally, by taking early action, Member States can help keep ETS2 prices in check. Member States can finance such measures from the revenues ETS2 will raise. Part of the revenues will fund the new Social Climate Fund (SCF) in order to protect vulnerable groups and alleviate the ETS2’s impacts. Poland is the biggest beneficiary of the SCF.”
Road transport environmental policy · Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
2025-01-01 “E-000001/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has received on 27 December 2024 Poland’s third payment request under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This payment request brings together a total of 41 milestones and targets from the fourth and fifth instalments (both loan and grant parts) identified in the Council Implementing Decision Annex 1 . The payment request covers reforms aimed at matching skills with labour market needs, advancing hydrogen technology development, and improving public employment services. In the field of public health, reforms include the entry into force of the Act on the National Cardiological Network, and the introduction of low-emission zones for the largest and most polluted cities. The request also covers investments aiming to shorten the supply chain of agricultural and food products, investments in the replacement of heat sources and the improvement of energy efficiency in single family residential buildings, as well as projects improving road safety. The Commission has generally up to two months to share its preliminary assessment of the satisfactory fulfilment of milestones and targets with the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), asking for its opinion. This period can be extended upon request of the Member State, in particular in case where the Member State decides to revise its plan. In case of a positive preliminary assessment, and following the EFC’s opinion, the Commission will adopt the final decision on the disbursement of the financial contribution, in accordance with the Comitology examination procedure. Following the adoption of the decision by the Commission, the disbursement to Poland can take place. 1 See p. 212 – 251 of the Council Implementing Decision Annex, available through the following link: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/3a4cd838-426b-449d-98fb49d33ba854db_en?filename=COM_2024_284_1_EN_annexe_proposition_cp_part1_v4.pdf”
Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
2024-12-11 “P-002867/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Nitrates Directive 1 requires farms to have sufficient storage capacity to avoid spreading livestock manure on their fields during the sensitive winter period, where the risk of leaching and runoff to ground and surface waters is the greatest. This requirement helps prevent pollution of ground and surface waters. It also allows for a more efficient use of livestock manure, an organic fertiliser, by spreading it during the growing season when the plants most need it. The storage requirement necessitates investments. Most Polish farms therefore have had a sixyear transition period after the requirement was extended to the whole country in 2018 as part of the implementation of the judgment in case C-356/13 Commission v Poland 2 . The Commission is aware that some farms are still facing challenges in complying with the deadline and is in contact with the competent Polish authorities on the matter. 1 Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1–8. 2 https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-356/13&td=ALL”
Use of fertilisers · Water pollution
2024-11-07 “P-002472/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with the negotiating directive by the Council, the Commission is negotiating the EU-Mercosur Agreement as a comprehensive agreement that encompasses trade, political and cooperation pillars. All these aspects are intrinsically linked and intended to be applied simultaneously. The decision on the legal architecture has not been taken yet. The Commission will determine the legal basis after a legal assessment taking into account the content of the agreement when transmitting the agreement to the Council and the European Parliament for signature and conclusion. Regardless of the final outcome, any chosen legal architecture would be fully democratic and in line with the Treaties.”
Trade relations with Mercosur
2024-10-25 “E-002261/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Mercosur agreement involves the Member States and the Mercosur countries 1 . Ukraine is not part of Mercosur and therefore the EU-Mercosur agreement will not regulate trade between the EU and Ukraine. Regarding sensitive EU agricultural products, such as beef, poultry, pigmeat, sugar, rice, honey and sweetcorn the EU has negotiated limited concessions in the form of tariff rate quotas that represent a small fraction of EU consumption, and using quota segmentation for some products, to avoid concentrating imports in the most sensitive part of the market. These partial openings will be introduced in gradual stages to allow for a smooth transition. The text of the 2019 agreement is publicly available at the Directorate General for Trade and Economic Security website 2 . On 6 December 2024 at the Mercosur Summit in Montevideo, the EU and Mercosur reached a political agreement concluding the negotiations. The text of the negotiated outcome was published simultaneously in the site of the Commission 3 and the official sites of the Mercosur partners on 10 December 2024. 1 Mercosur countries are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 2 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eumercosur-agreement/text-agreement_en 3 See footnote 2.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU
2024-10-11 “E-002035/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU is the world’s largest exporter of agri-food products, with an increasing trade surplus in such products (EUR 70 billion in 2023). This is also thanks to its network of trade agreements. Mercosur is a large and highly protected market with great potential for high quality European agri-food exports such as dairy products, processed foods, olive oil, malt, fruit, wines, spirits and non-alcoholic beverages. With respect to agri-food trade, imported products must always comply with the EU’s stringent food safety requirements. In addition, the EU has established autonomous legislation 1 requiring that imports into the EU adhere to certain production standards aimed at global environmental objectives and ethical concerns. As to deforestation commitments, the 2019 agreement already included an ambitious chapter dedicated to promoting sustainable development. The provisions under this chapter are binding and enforceable through a dedicated dispute resolution mechanism. Moreover, they commit each party to effectively implement the Paris Agreement. On 6 December, the EU and Mercosur reached a political agreement finalising the negotiations. As part of the negotiated outcome, the Parties agreed to make the Paris Agreement an essential element of the EUMercosur agreement and the concrete commitment to halt deforestation. The negotiated texts as well an explanatory document explaining the negotiated outcome achieved in 2024 are published on the Commission’s website 2 . Finally, the European Union Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) 3 will ensure that trade in relevant products such as beef, soy or wood from Mercosur partners will be subject to the same requirements under EUDR – guaranteeing a high standard of environmental protection. 1 See notably the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism Regulation, the Regulation lowering maximum residue levels for two substances which are globally harmful to bees, the Regulation on veterinary products prohibiting the use of antibiotic as growth promoter for imported products, the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence, the proposal for a Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market, etc. 2 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eumercosur-agreement/text-agreement_en 3 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R1115”
Trade impact on forests · Trade relations with Mercosur
2024-10-11 “E-002033/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission views the EU-Mercosur Agreement as politically and economically vital. The Commission’s objective is to ensure that the EU-Mercosur Agreement 1 delivers on the EU’s sustainability goals, while respecting the EU’s sensitivities in the agricultural sector. Chief Negotiators met in October 2024 to discuss the outstanding issues. These include: the EU proposal for a Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Joint Instrument 2 , inclusion of the Paris Agreement as an essential element of the EU-Mercosur Agreement and Mercosur’s interests in the areas of public procurement, vehicles, export duties, a rebalancing mechanism, and a protocol on cooperation. On 6 December at the Mercosur Summit in Montevideo, the EU and Mercosur reached a political agreement concluding the negotiations. In September 2024, eleven Member States 3 addressed a letter to the President expressing strong support for a rapid conclusion of the negotiations on the EU-Mercosur Agreement. These Member States reiterated the high geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the Agreement and its essential role in maintaining the EU’s economic and political influence in the region. They also noted that the agreement provides a unique platform for cooperation between the EU and the Mercosur countries on trade and sustainable development matters, ensuring that we can achieve our common sustainability and climate change ambitions. 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eumercosur-agreement_en 2 https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/09242a36-a438-40fd-a7af-fe32e36cbd0e/library/da997440-4edb-437d-aa4a3cb9a5e77930/details?download=true 3 The following Member States are signatories to the letter: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.”
Import of agri-food products in the EU · Trade relations with Mercosur
2024-10-11 “E-002032/2024 Answer given by Ms McGuinness on behalf of the European Commission The limit on large cash payments introduced by Article 80 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 1 does not apply to transactions that take place between individuals transacting outside of a professional or business context. For example, an individual that wishes to sell their private car to another individual is not prohibited, under the Regulation, from accepting a sum of cash of EUR 10 000 (or the applicable lower limit adopted at national level) or more from the buyer, as long as such a transaction is not part of the seller or buyer’s business activities. Additionally, the limit on large cash payments does not apply to payments or deposits made at credit institutions 2 , electronic money issuers and payment service providers 3 . This means that banks are not prohibited from, for example, receiving cash deposits of EUR 10 000 or more from their customers. As a practical example, a self-employed worker that accumulates a sum of cash derived from payments for services rendered to different clients may continue to deposit that cash into their bank account even when it amounts to EUR 10 000 or more. Likewise, a payment service provider is not prohibited from receiving payments in cash of EUR 10 000 or more from their customers to execute a transfer of funds. 1 OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024. 2 The term credit institution is defined under Article 2(5) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624. 3 Please refer to point (b) of Article 80(4) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, which provides a reference to the definitions of electronic money issuers and payment service providers.”
Cash as means of payment · Anti-money laundering regulation
2024-10-11 “E-002034/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with the negotiating directive by the Council, the Commission is negotiating the EU-Mercosur Agreement as a comprehensive agreement that encompasses trade, political and cooperation pillars. All these aspects are intrinsically linked and intended to be applied simultaneously. The decision on the legal architecture has not been taken yet. The Commission will determine the legal basis after a legal assessment taking into account the content of the agreement when transmitting the agreement to the Council and the Parliament for signature and conclusion. Regardless of the final outcome, any chosen legal architecture would be fully democratic and in line with the Treaties.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU
2024-09-20 “E-001774/2024 Answer given by Mr Lenarčič on behalf of the European Commission Central and Eastern Europe have been affected by heavy rains and strong winds. As of 13 September 2024, Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania pro-actively activated the Copernicus Rapid Mapping for flood delineation and damage assessment 1 . The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) 2 works on a 24 hours/7 days basis to carry out its mandate that includes, among other tasks, monitoring of unfolding or potential disasters and their impacts. In this context, the ERCC daily monitors the forecast estimates for potential flooding across Europe, through the dedicated European Flood Awareness System (EFAS) 3 of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service. EFAS complements the national systems to raise awareness ensuring that flood alerts are taken into good consideration at national level, while retaining the supporting role that the Commission has in this field. From the onset, the ERCC was in contact with the national civil protection authorities of Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and Slovakia to raise awareness about possible upcoming floods and offered support through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 4 . On 18 September 2024, Poland activated the UCPM and requested support to strengthen its response to the floods. 1 https://emergency.copernicus.eu/mapping/node/157182 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordinationcentre-ercc_en 3 https://european-flood.emergency.copernicus.eu/en 4 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en”
Climate efforts
2024-09-20 “P-001773/2024 Answer given by Mr Lenarčič on behalf of the European Commission Central and Eastern Europe has been affected by heavy rains and strong winds. As of 13 September 2024, Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania pro-actively activated the rapid mapping of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service for flood delineation and damage assessment 1 . The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) 2 works on a 24 hours /7 days basis to carry out its mandate that includes, among other tasks, monitoring of unfolding or potential disasters and their impacts. In this context, the ERCC daily monitors the forecast estimates for potential flooding across Europe, through the dedicated European Flood Awareness System (EFAS) 3 of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service. EFAS complements the national systems to raise awareness. From the onset, the ERCC was in contact with the national civil protection authorities of Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia to raise awareness about possible upcoming floods and offered support through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 4 . 1 https://emergency.copernicus.eu/mapping/ems/flood-delineation 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordinationcentre-ercc_en 3 https://european-flood.emergency.copernicus.eu/en 4 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en”
Climate efforts
2024-09-20 “E-001772/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) Agreement will make the EU and Mercosur privileged geopolitical and geoeconomic partners. It will help secure markets and access to raw materials, thereby strengthening the EU’s economic security, and reducing its dependencies. For Mercosur, it will be by far the most far-reaching trade agreement to date, reinforcing the EU´s longstanding alliance with the Latin American region, and providing EU companies with a competitive edge vis-à-vis companies from other regions that will not enjoy such privileged partnership. In the technical ongoing discussions, the EU is seeking assurances from Mercosur concerning deforestation and climate change. The EU focus remains on ensuring that the agreement delivers on the EU’s sustainability goals, while respecting the EU’s sensitivities in the agricultural sector. Regarding sensitive EU agriculture products, such as beef, poultry, or sugar, the EU negotiated limited concessions in the form of tariff rate quotas that represent a small fraction of EU consumption. In addition, these partial openings will be introduced in stages (usually over six years) to allow the sectors to adjust. They will be coupled with safeguard clauses to protect the EU market in case of serious injury caused by Mercosur imports. The Commission believes that those mechanisms will allow to protect the interests of EU farmers. In case that the implementation of the deal would result in market disturbances, beyond the safeguard clauses, the Commission stands ready to support the agriculture sector.”
Trade relations with Mercosur · Trade impact on forests · Import of agri-food products in the EU
2024-08-29 “P-001565/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The powers conferred on the Commission to adopt delegated and implementing acts and the detailed requirements in terms of the subject, scope and timing of those acts are laid down in the Batteries Regulation 1 . In adopting implementing acts the Commission is assisted by the committee established by Article 39 of Directive 2008/98/EC 2 (code C37000 3 ). As regards delegated acts, the Commission consults the expert group on waste (code E03343 4 ). Drafts of the delegated act on the calculation and verification of the carbon footprint of electric vehicle batteries and of the implementing act for the carbon footprint declaration were published for public feedback 5 on 30 April 2024. Following a dedicated meeting of the expert group and of the committee on 11 July 2024, the Commission is currently analysing the way forward in view of their adoption pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation. A draft delegated act on the calculation and verification of rates for recycling efficiency and recovery of materials pursuant to Article 71 of the Regulation was published for public feedback 6 on 20 September 2024. This act is due to be adopted by February 2025. The Commission is also preparing implementing acts establishing rules for harmonised application of the labelling requirements for batteries pursuant to Articles 13 and 7, and the format for reporting on waste batteries pursuant to Article 76 of the Regulation. These acts are due to be adopted by August 2025. Further work on secondary legislation, for example related to the collection of waste batteries and to recycled content in new batteries, is at early preparatory stages. The Commission will continue to carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work to implement the Regulation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 concerning batteries and waste batteries, amending Directive 2008/98/EC and Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and repealing Directive 2006/66/EC, OJ L 191, 28.7.2023, p. 1–117. 2 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3–30. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/comitology-register/screen/committees/C37000/consult 4 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-groups/consult?lang=en&groupID=3343 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13877-Batteries-for-electric-vehiclescarbon-footprint-methodology_en and https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-yoursay/initiatives/13878-Batteries-format-of-carbon-footprint-declaration_en 6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14265-Calculation-and-verificationmethodology-of-rates-for-recycling-efficiency-and-recovery-of-materials-of-waste-batteries_en”
Energy (green transition)
“Dear colleagues, the EU Mercosur agreement is an example of the Commission's trade policy that is disjointed with EU interests. So this is why the Council should take a look at how the Commission is performing its mandate. Because what we are seeing now is a dictate the commission is breaching and going in opposition to all its values. It sacrifices EU farmers who have to comply with ever stricter norms for environmental protection and animal well-being, and they are forced to compete with exports from outside of the EU that do not have to comply. This is a blatant, unfair competition. The Commission is trying to circumvent the opposition of member states and reduce the role of national parliaments, which is why we have requested a check of compliance with the treaties. The fact that the president is in a hurry is not an excuse. We have worked on it for years. Now we are trying to push this through. This undermines food security and shows the commission's hypocrisy, which on the one hand talks about climate protection and on the other supports its degradation outside of the EU. Why are you thwarting our economy with your climate ideas? Whereas you support opposite directions in other countries, you are undermining the sovereignty of national states.”
Trade relations with Mercosur
“(17:43:41 – 17:45:51): Thank you, chair, commissioner. In recent years, we've seen 2 very negative trends. They overlap, and they show, in how deep a structural crisis the European steel sector is stuck. Our steel production has dropped by a dozen percent, and the import has increased by a dozen percent. The European Commission could ask a question. Why is that happening? Well, the answer is clear. It is also your fault. High energy costs, the climate policy, decarbonization, ETS. You are also to blame for the fact that the European steel is more expensive than the steel from abroad, But the steel industry is the backbone of our economy. It's the foundation of our sovereignty, economic sovereignty. This sector plays a crucial role in the defense in industry, in railway transport, construction, automotive, energy, etcetera. And this is exactly why it is especially important to pay attention to the security of this sector. According to various reports, the European steel production last year, it it reached its its lowest point. It's catastrophe. The import of steel, including half products, increased by 14%. And these consequences are especially tangible in Poland. Thousands of jobs in local contractors and steel mills. It's a blow to our innovative thought and to the secure and safe supply chain in the Polish economy. The plans of the European Commission, including climate ambitions, is the main, is the main break for the development of our steel industry. What we actually need is increased competitiveness. We need to solve structural problems. We should not powder the color. Thank you. Thank you very much, dear colleague. On behalf of the ECR Group, El Senor Polato.”
Energy (green transition)
“Thank you. The ban on new combustion cars after 2035. It's a harmful ideological utopia, and it leads to an economic disaster all over Europe. It doesn't lead to the green future. You are lying to us. This idea could come to a completely detached Brussels official. Those I talked to know cannot believe that somebody could think of something so harmful. Electric cars are neither cheap nor neutral. The infrastructure for charging is not accessible. We are losing millions of jobs. And you are making Europe dependent on China and Africa. Yes, the commission is destroying the transport sector in industry, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. We've got barriers, we've got Green Deal and it hits thousands and millions of workers. We are talking about the war and the threat of war. And your ideas may result in less transport security in Europe. Do you really think that the army will use electric lorries? And what electric tanks. People will not bear your madness. You will be swept away by reason. And the question to. The Commission. When will you reverse the ban on combustion engines?”
Road transport environmental policy
“Thank you very much. Thank you very much for the presentation of the Commission. Now, what ought to be a priority for us? These are the questions. Security. Security as far as technology is concerned. Cyber security is extremely important. Trade is, of course, one of the competencies that fall within the remit of the commission. But I think indeed we need a concerted approach. And when will we receive the 2024 report that we've been working on, because we're working on the basis of the 2022 report. And indeed a numerous different developments. A huge leap forward has taken place during this period. So I think indeed, we need clear messages from a new from the new 2024 report. We need more detail on this as well. Uh, technology is at risk right now. The development, the semiconductor sector, the entire industry as well. Uh, the United States. Are working very hard to have the to create that internecine strife within the European Union and between the various member states, in other words, so very, very carefully, we do have to tread and make sure that this particular sector develops in a more effective and productive fashion. Thank you.”
EU digital & tech sovereignty
“Thank you, Madam President. Mr. Commissioner. It seems that the European Commission has finally understood that uncontrolled mass migration is a great crime on Europe, albeit you are the last one to do so after a period of enthusiasm followed by denial after denial. You have understood that Europe is not safe and Europeans cannot feel safe on the streets of their cities. Instead of debating, you need to act. We demand an immediate programme for deportation of all illegal migrants. We demand an immediate launch of a programme to combat criminal groups involved in human Trafficking. We demand that this program also include and in its investigations, non-governmental organizations involved in aiding and abetting illegal entry into the European Union. We demand that the external borders of the Union be sealed immediately and unconditionally. We demand that the member States have the full sovereign right to introduce additional, even stricter criteria. The Commission is faced with a major challenge of drawing up a return directive because until now, expulsion of illegal migrants has been an inefficient process fraught with organisational and legal problems. If you are not able to do this, then resign. We Patriots for Europe put the interest of European citizens first. This is why we are determined to protect Europe's external borders, to stop illegal migration, and to preserve Europe's cultural identity and to ensure the security of our citizens.”
Asylum & border control
“Thank you very much. Um, first, uh, the agreement with the United States is asymmetrical. The commission has, uh, given a lot of concessions to the US and committed itself to purchase and invest in the United States. It will be very difficult, um, lifting, uh, tariffs, preferential treatment of. Agricultural products. And there is no ban on, uh, trade barriers. So there is a risk that additional tariffs can be, uh, um, uh, put on, um, European products. Uh, and uh, there is not enough detail. So there may be different interpretations. Uh, um, and uh, one example is steel and aluminum. So our negotiating position is very weak. If we don't, uh, solve our own systemic problems and, uh, uh, competition problems, and if we don't strengthen our economy, we will, uh, be left with the option of, uh, Are carrying out US trade policy. The negotiations didn't have a strong mandate from the member states, so it will be difficult to ratify this agreement. I also have one doubt about trade flows, global trade flows in general, because right now a number of states are. Strike deals with the United States to avoid higher tariffs. But the question is whether the Commission has, uh, calculated from which markets we will be, um, pushed out.”
EU-US trade relations
“Thank you. President. Commissioner. The situation in the Middle East once again shows us that the utopian climate policy, which has been promoted by the European Union, it cannot withstand the geopolitical situation. Yet another energy crisis. This one might lead to a food crisis. High prices of gas mean high prices of fertilizer. The only activity that the EU undertakes is demanding additional payments in the. Ate under the ETS and sebum. What has to happen for us to go back to make a U-turn? You are pushing production outside of Europe. You are putting in jeopardy our security. We need to do something else. More industry, more production, more farming in Europe. This is in the interest of all of us. We should not be pursuing this climate policy and buy food from South America. Strong Europe can feed itself and heat itself. It must not be helpless with respect to every crisis.”
Use of fertilisers
“Thank you very much, chair. Mr. Commissioner, the security of Europe must be based on strong armed forces of sovereign nations and not the European Commission. Taking away yet more competences. The issue of defence cannot be the subject matter of experiments such as a common European army. The main element of the security is cooperation of most EU member states. In NATO structures, there is no need to duplicate the role and competences of the pact. The more decisions stay in the hands of the European Commission, the more trouble the European member states have. The European Commission must stop instrumentally using security for exerting political pressure. Funds for defence cannot be blocked for ideological or political reasons, and this is what happened vis a vis the Hungarian government to impact the parliamentary elections that are approaching. This is acting to the detriment of Europe. All the governments should meet the planned. Um, commitment of 5% of GDP for defence.”
EU competences on defence
“Thank you chair. The Patriots Group welcomes the termination of this voluntary partnership agreement with Liberia. This agreement has been dead for over a decade. Since 2013, Liberia has failed to implement the required timber licensing scheme. Yet the European Union kept this Bureaucratic ghost alive. Furthermore, this failure proves a much broader point. We cannot. We cannot simply export our complex environmental regulation and expect the rest of the world to respect it. Lecturing third countries while ignoring the reality on the ground simply does not work. We must prioritize the protection of our own European market and industries. If a third country cannot guarantee that its timber comes from legal and verified verified sources, there is absolutely no room for preferential treatment, treatment or empty partnership. We must stop funding illusions and it is time to end this facade today. Thank you.”
Trade impact on forests
“Thank you chair. Commissioner, in recent years, we've seen two very negative trends. They overlap and they show in how deep a structural crisis the European steel sector is stuck. Our steel production has dropped by a dozen percent and the import has increased by a dozen percent. The European Commission could ask a question. Why is that happening? Well, the answer is clear. It is also your fault. High energy costs, the climate policy, decarbonization, ETS. You are also to blame for the fact that the European steel is more expensive than the steel from abroad. But the steel industry is the backbone of our economy. It's the foundation of our sovereignty, economic sovereignty. This sector plays a crucial role in the defense industry in railway, transport, construction, automotive, energy, etc. and this is exactly why it is especially important to pay attention to the security of this sector. According to various reports, the European steel production last year, it it reached its its its lowest point. It's a catastrophe. The importer of steel, including half products, increased by 14%. And these consequences are especially tangible in Poland. Thousands of jobs in local contractors and steel mills. It's a blow to our innovative thought and to the secure and safe supply chain in the Polish economy. The plans of the European Commission, including climate ambitions, is. The main. Is the main brake for the development of our steel industry. What we actually need is increased competitiveness. We need to solve structural problems. We should not powder the cadaver. Thank you.”
Energy (green transition)
“Thank you very much, chairman. Unfortunately, our assessment of this deal remains very negative because there are some concessions to be made on the European part, both in terms of industry and agriculture, but we are rehashing those arguments all the time. This process has been going on for too long, and these discussions bring no new value into the process. Now, we do appreciate the fact that the text of the deal is now improved, even though the various review clauses have been introduced and Parliament's arguments have been taken on board. The suspension clause, for example, and something. What is most important for us. That is the lowering of the tariffs to the 15% in terms of the steel products. Now, the cooperation with the US in the framework in this regard here we can see that we are capitulating, abandoning our ideas here in the European Union. Fortunately.”
EU-US trade relations
“Ladies and gentlemen. The United States have. Finally turned away from the green lobbyists and turned back to common sense. So whether we like it or not, we're moving back towards protectionism. And we have to concentrate on our domestic industries and be more be more competitive. The United States are working hard on that, but the European Union are doing exactly the opposite. So German interest, the EU is trying to push through the Eu-mercosur agreement, which will destroy agricultural production and make Europe dependent on food supplies instead of fossil fuels. It wants to make Europe dependent on sun and wind and wind. But the high energy prices are bad, and we've got tons of bureaucracy that is sending our companies into bankruptcy. Just because somebody gets the feeling that zero emissions is worthwhile. But don't you understand that the Chinese and the Americans are laughing at us? The most recent decisions of the US government have been the most aggressive trade policy measures in decades. The Chinese. Will be responding to these tariffs with radical changes to their policies that will transform the world trade arena. What is the EU going to do? But the EU is not doing what they should. Why don't you have a look at the initiative from the Patriots for getting rid of the Green Deal? That is the only opportunity for our continent.”
Trade relations with Mercosur
“Thank you, Madam President. Commissioner. The ETS. Should have helped to modernise Europe and fund decarbonisation projects. But it's become de facto a climate tax forcing industry out of Europe. Consumers are buying the same products with even greater emissions from outside of the EU. That is what signals the decline of European industry. We have to be clear these targets are not reachable. Other economies are growing faster and faster, and the European economy is lagging behind. Year after year, the ETS system needs to be overhauled and suspended. We need to stop allowing this green legislation to run rampant, and we need to abolish the ETS rather than prolonging it. Without it, we won't have a strong Europe. European industry.”
Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
“Thank you very much. Um, chairman, thank you to the commission for this analysis. Well, obviously, the last three years, in the last three years, we have seen an enormous influx of agricultural produce into the EU, especially the border countries, which damaged the interests of farmers, including farmers in Poland, where in 2023 we had to introduce a one sided embargo on on the imports of some agri food products. Agriculture was greatly affected by this, especially in the sector of cereals, uh, eggs, ethanol, fruit, soft fruit, poultry, raspberries, um farmers greatly suffered production costs, went up, went up. Uh, of course we should be helping Ukraine, but not at the expense of Polish or European farmers, not at the expense of at the cost of food security. So what is the exact calendar? Because as far as I understood, on the 6th of June we will have this implementing measures coming into force. And then there will be another agreement, a long term agreement. So once again, what is the timetable here. Thank you.”
Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
“Thank you chair. Switzerland is a highly successful sovereign nation and one of our most important economic partners. Our group strongly support a robust, mutually beneficial trade relationship with our Swiss partners. Pragmatic free trade is exactly what Europe needs to build prosperity. However, looking at this report, it is clear that Brussels cannot simply trade. It must dominate by using. By using market access to force so-called dynamic element on a third country. You are demanding that Switzerland blindly copies EU regulations and accept the European Court of Justice as the Supreme Judge. This nada trade partnership. You insist on tying economic cooperation to the free movement of persons. Switzerland has a fundamental, fundamental right to control its own borders, borders and protect its labour market. All right. Its citizens have repeatedly defended in democratic referendums. Let us focus on what truly benefits both sides removing trade barriers and fostering economic growth. We need free trade based on mutual respect between sovereign nations. Thank you so much.”
EU-Switzerland relations
“Thank you very much. Uh, I think we can say that there's no win win situation. Some people will win, but there are professional groups that will lose and will lose a lot with this agreement. And there's no consensus among member states to support this agreement. France and Poland are against. The Polish government adopted a recommendation on the matter. I would rather us have a ratification in the European Union. I would like to know when the Commission can present a request for signing. I mean, you know, it has to go through translation and all of that, but can you give us an approximate date? Would it be the first half of 2025 or the second half? And can you also tell us about the agreement entering into force? Would it be temporary application or not, within the Within the context of the ratification process and with the information we have received, you see that the sanitary and phytosanitary checks have been reduced to an absolute minimum. Customs procedures will be simplified, which means that goods will be able to enter the EU territory without being checked. What about the quality control for the agri food products? Will there really be any checks to make sure that there is no pesticide residue or other banned substances when these goods enter the EU? I mean, we've been talking about how damaging this agreement could be for the agri food sector in EU. The agricultural sector is facing unfair competition, but there's also the citizens who are who are concerned about the lack of guarantees for the quality of products.”
Import of agri-food products in the EU
“06:09 – 16:10:09): Thank you very much chair. We're all very aware of how critical these resources are, rare earth minerals, and how they feed into our production. Without these raw materials, we have no defense capacities, no advanced telecommunications and electronics. They have key importance for the telecommunications networks, robotics, automatization of industry. But we're extremely dependent on third countries, especially China. Hence, we need to have the partnership with the US as long as it helps support the defense of the EU. We need to have secure supply chains for new technologies for Europe. At the same time, the European Union needs to work on its own capacities, so building up a partnership with the US constitutes an opportunity. We need to make sure that we have investments into safe and secure supply chains and recycling. We need to make sure that we are looking to more details from the Commission on the future agreements. Thank you. I read attentively the joint communication of the US, Japan and the EU on critical minerals, and it left me thinking that this is a document drafted in a parallel universe divorced from all political reality, refusing to see what has been happening since the new American president arrived on the scene. So it's almost touching to have this memorandum of understanding, this formal memorandum to try and stimulate demand and work with supply over the course of thirty days as if this critical minerals market can just be dictated by some sort of agreement by Washington. Washington doesn't respect anything if it's not what its president has decided. The America of Donald Trump is not a protective angel helping us. We're looking at demands for America First, and it's their sovereign right to do so. So how can we seriously believe that this very same America is going to line up in fair cooperation with the European Union on critical minerals when at the same time it is attacking us on competitive fronts everywhere? We know that rules are mutable whenever you have a crisis. It's every man for himself. The US has signed their bilateral agreement with Japan back in 2020-25. They're sorting out their supply chains. We're working with production countries as well, and we need to do that quicker. We're talking about pre-adjustment border mechanisms and plurilateral offtake agreements, which are technocratic approaches working through customs when our competitors are actually doing things. The Commission has no strategy, no credible strategy, as we've seen from the Court of Auditors' report. This three-way partnership, even if it has good intentions behind it on paper, cannot replace a genuine European industrial policy. We've been humiliated, ridden roughshod over by the customs position of the US. I don't know if it's masochism and jealousism or whatever, but it's the rule of reality that I think is going to impose the ant of politics now.”
EU-US trade relations
“Dear colleagues, the background for this debate is the appalling behaviour of the European Commission. The Mercosur deal has been finalised by the Commission without respecting the procedures, treaties, without the participation of the European Parliament in the atmosphere of a political blackmail. The dictatorial tendencies of miss von der Leyen go to show that she doesn't care about legal procedures and the will and opinion of millions of our voters. There is no logical explanation for what has happened during the recent months. What was the European Commission motivated by? Why didn't you submit the deal to the European Parliament before signing it? Were you afraid it wouldn't pass? Are you not able to negotiate, or was there some behind the scenes pressure? Mercosur is not only about the downfall of our agriculture. It's not only about abandoning our food security. It's also the end of democracy and law. The rule of law in Europe. And it's just a tip of the iceberg. People are poor because of the Green Deal. We have aggressive illegal migrants. Our industry is being destroyed. Plus, now the European Commission is dictatorial. If you want safe and sovereign Europe, you need to support tomorrow's motion of censure. The Parliament is being put to a test. It is an opportunity to do something. Our citizens will appreciate the agriculture in Europe must stay. The industry must stay. But the Commission must go. Thank you.”
Von der Leyen
“Ladies and gentlemen, Commissioner. What about Ets2 revision? It is one of the worst element of the European climate law. Climate tax, which will touch everyone. This is the fee which will be paid by every household, every owner of a building using a fuel fossil to heat it. Every owner of traditional car will pay it already in 2027 for months. Here we've been discussing this issue and nothing has really happened concerning it. The European Commission Whatsmore is forcing one more climatic objective for 2040. It does not withdraw from any climate objectives. The only thing we can see are some minor changes which do not introduce any real changes to the real problems of European industry, transportation or agriculture. They are so unrealistic and it's terrifying. You should go back to regular people, regular citizens who worry about their well-being, about their future jobs. You should find out what ordinary people think when they hear about your new ideas, for which they will pay. We disagree for an ideological transformation. Green ideological transformation. We expect immediate resignation of it. Citizens cannot afford to pay for some strange ideas by the Greens. Polish Prime Minister Tusk in January here said it is too, and the prices of energy can change and can pull down any government and this will come true. Thank you and Vice President.”
Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
“Thank you. The European Union felt that all problems could be solved on the basis of one regulation or another, but not this one. This is a von der Leyen. We've heard that your resignation is necessary. But anyway, we've heard we've got the climate policy, we've got ETS, and the European Commission is proposing more centralisation, more administrative muzzling in member states. And what we would like to say is that if we take a look at the conflict in the Middle East, if it goes on, Europe is going to be defenseless in the face of increasing fuel prices. Nobody knows. Nobody is listening to us. You seem to be just giving free loans to Ukraine. And this agreement with Mercosur, you're losing out to China, to the United States. And there's no innovation, innovation, no investment. And the only remedy that you're putting forward is a parody of governments. The whole project is crumbling and it's Mrs. von der Leyen who is the gravedigger.”
Von der Leyen
“Thank you very much, chair. Well, what the Commission has presented to us about the bilateral safeguard clause is an illusion. This is an illusion that is supposed to placate the farmers, the agri food business, and it's supposed to quickly rubberstamp the agreement. Uh, there are no changes in terms of what the farmers have to prove if there has been a damage or not. Uh, the agri, the agricultural business, the farmers are basically forced. Okay. You can go bankrupt first and try to, uh, find means of redress later. How are you going to, Solve this out. The conditions that are there have been tailor made to some gigantic, um, um, farming business, uh, cases and not to our small farmers. Those safeguards are not going to stop the flood of sugar or beef. That does not mean the same requirements that we are forcing our farmers to comply with here in Europe. This turns around our agricultural model. The structures will fall down, and any protection in this regulation is just an illusion. Thank you.”
Trade relations with Mercosur
“56:37 – 16:58:33): Thank you. I need to clarify a few things, especially from the perspective of Poland as well, because Poland maintains these bans. The crisis was huge on the Polish market. This happened in 2022 when the market was liberalized due to the war, and farmers are still suffering the consequences.”
Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports

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