Michał DWORCZYK

Policy topics Michał DWORCZYK is active on

What Michał DWORCZYK has said (21)

• 2026-02-19 “Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 4.6.2026 Written question The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to the reply provided to Question P-469/2026 [1] on the same subject and explaining why the product SILTAC must be considered as a plant protection product according to Article 2(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 on the placing on the market of plant protection products (the PPP Regulation) [2] . All documents relating to the regular discussions in the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed Section Phytopharmaceuticals — Legislation on whether products are in the scope of the PPP Regulation and to the particular case of SILTAC have been disclosed following specific requests submitted in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [3] . In accordance with the Commission’s Working Methods, contacts with stakeholders are conducted with transparency and members of the Commission should seek to ensure an appropriate balance and representativeness in the stakeholders they meet. Commissioners, members of their cabinets and all Commission staff holding management functions are required to meet only interest representatives that are registered in the Transparency Register and publish information on and minutes of all such meetings in accordance with Commission Decisions (EU) 2024/3081 [4] and 2024/3082 [5] . [1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2026-000469_EN.html. [2] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/1107/oj. [3] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/1049/oj. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403081. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202403082.”
  EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-02-17 “E-000669/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund 1 (EDF)’s aims to enhance the competitiveness of the European defence technological and industrial base, and to promote cooperation in defence research and development between entities of all sizes across the EU and EDF associated countries. All applicants can compete for EDF funding under fair, transparent and non-discriminatory call conditions, in line with the EDF and the Financial Regulations. Applications are assessed using uniform eligibility and selection criteria. National defence ecosystems are very diverse: some Member States have well-established, internationally active defence industries, while others have ecosystems dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The EDF implements several measures to foster broader inclusion and cross-border collaboration, particularly with and among SMEs. The European Defence Innovation Scheme, funded at around 20% of the annual EDF budget, aims to drive technological progress and boost SME involvement 2 . As a result, the EDF Interim Evaluation Report 3 highlighted that SMEs accounted for 43% of distinct beneficiaries, particularly from Eastern Europe. The Commission’s proposal for the European Competitiveness Fund includes several additional cross-sectoral measures designed to encourage participation across the EU, such as project advisory services, the ‘EU for Business’ Network, value chain builder actions and EU Tech frontrunners actions. 1 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 149–177. 2 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 3 COM(2025) 299 final of 17 June 2025 - https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defenceindustry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission/edf-interim-evaluation-report_en.”
  Defence spending · "Buy European" provisions
• 2026-02-06 “E-000530/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund’s (EDF 1 ) general objective is to foster the competitiveness of the entire European defence technological and industrial base. All eligible entities established in Member States and EDF associated countries can apply for funding through annual calls for proposals on equal and fair competitive terms and conditions, which are prepared with full transparency and in close coordination with the Member States. Proposals are selected for funding based on the same set of award criteria, as set out in the EDF Regulation 2 . The geographical distribution of EDF beneficiaries remains, to date, uneven across Europe. The EDF, like the other EU defence industrial programmes, pursues an objective of inclusiveness by fostering transnational cooperation and also incentivising the entry of new players in the defence sector. It remains that the levels of participation in the programmes depends significantly on the respective size, structure and maturity level of each national defence technological and industrial base. Each Member State is characterised by a different history and legacy in terms of its defence-relevant industry, with specific features and strengths. Nevertheless, the particular attention paid by defence programmes on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) plays in support of the broadest possible access to EU funding. In addition, the European defence innovation scheme 3 , which is funded with around 20% of the EDF annual budget, provides a range of measures designed to support innovation and SMEs. As a result, as highlighted in the EDF interim evaluation report 4 , 43% of unique participants in the EDF are SMEs, a significant proportion of which are established in Central and Eastern Europe. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj. 2 OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, pp. 149–177. 3 https://eudis.europa.eu/index_en. 4 COM(2025) 299 final of 17.6.2025 - https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defenceindustry/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission/edf-interim-evaluation-report_en.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-11-04 “E-004320/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Critical raw materials (CRMs) dependencies undermine the EU’s long-term competitiveness and transition objectives. They also risk hampering its defence readiness targets and support to Ukraine, thereby posing a direct security risk and undermining European security. EU institutions and Member States, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, should mobilise every possible lever at their disposal to expediently decrease CRMs dependencies from defence industrial value chains. The Commission takes seriously the risk stemming from dependency on China on the different stages of the raw materials process. The Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan on 3 December 2025 1 . The aim of RESourceEU is to secure access to alternative sources of CRMs in the short, medium and long term for the European industry. The RESourceEU Action Plan includes a proposal for a new financing hub that will de-risk investment and coordinate different aims of funding, as well as proposals of adjustments to the EU-regulatory framework on permitting. Work on CRMs partnerships with resource-rich countries will continue, as well as coordination with like-minded countries in relevant multilateral fora. The above-mentioned avenues to address the CRMs dependencies’ risks are instrumental to strengthen defence capabilities, as well as defence readiness and industrial resilience by 2030. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/01c448d6-dc93-40d7-9afe-4c2af448d00c_en.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US relations
• 2025-07-18 “E-002997/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission In the current budgetary period, the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) is the main funding instrument for the Rail Baltica project. The clear schedule for calls for proposals under the current CEF provided project promoters with a reasonable understanding of when how much funding would be available. Currently Rail Baltica can also benefit from the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Certain elements could also benefit from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument. For the next multiannual financial period, the Commission proposed a much larger CEF to cofund cross-border infrastructure. EUR 51.5 billion are earmarked for transport and military mobility projects, which include Rail Baltica. The budget split between transport and military mobility foresees EUR 17.6 billion for the latter, but resources can be redeployed between the two, depending on the needs. Additionally, the Commission proposes measures to simplify funding procedures, also for large ‘global projects’ spanning over several calls, such as Rail Baltica. Rail Baltica could also benefit from the National and Regional Partnerships and the Competitiveness Fund proposed by the Commission. Nevertheless, national funding will remain essential to ensure adequate support to the project. Going beyond the Rail Baltica project, in 2024, the North Sea – Baltic and the Baltic Sea – Black Sea – Aegean Sea European Transport Corridors of trans-European transport network (TEN-T) were extended to connect Warsaw to Ukraine and to Moldova. Additionally, CEF funds projects to extend the European standard railway gauge into Ukraine.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU funding for transportation · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2025-07-04 “PE776.321v01-00 EN E-002742/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission All facts concerning the Smart Kid product have been duly assessed by the Commission services over the years and the relevant information has been regularly communicated in a transparent and open manner to the economic operator and the Polish authorities. The correspondence between the Commission official and the stakeholders to which access was requested in case T-227/24 1 did not constitute a formal position of the Institution. Moreover, the respective correspondence has not resulted in any formal decision or action of the Commission that would impair the interest of the economic operator concerned. Based on the facts, it is not possible to conclude on any existence of abuse of office, conflict of interest or breach of professional ethics by the Commission official involved in that correspondence. Hence, there are no grounds for any investigation towards eventual professional or disciplinary measures. Following the judgment of the General Court of 14 May 2025 in Case T-227/24, Smart Kid S.A. v European Commission 2 , the Commission adopted on 24 July 2025 a new confirmatory decision granting wide partial access to the correspondence requested with only limited redactions based on the exception of Article 4(1)(b) (protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 not contested by the Applicant in case T227/24. A new confirmatory decision implementing the judgment in Pfizergate case was adopted on 28 July 2025. As the implementation of the judgments in cases Smart Kid Belt and Pfizergate did not present any specific legal issues the Commission considers that there are no grounds for a review of its horizontal administrative practice regarding access to documents. 1 Case T-227/24: Action brought on 26 April 2024 – Smart Kid v Commission: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202403785. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:62024TJ0227.”
  Transparency requirements for interest groups · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-05-26 “E-002096/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. For reasons of confidentiality of classified information, the Commission unfortunately cannot disclose which ports and priorities are located on the EU military mobility network. Generally, the Commission wishes to stress that ports are very important economic hubs for the arrival, departure or transshipment of both civilian and military cargo and persons. In the framework of the upcoming EU Ports Strategy, the Commission is also assessing the strategic role of ports and their fit for dual-use purpose. 2. Under the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) made available EUR 1.7 billion for investment in military mobility transport infrastructure and the entire envelope was spent out in three funding calls on 95 dual-use projects in 21 Member States. While there are currently no new calls under the existing programme, the eligibility of any future application, including from projects such as the Central Communication Port, would depend on its alignment with the relevant eligibility and award criteria established in the context of any future CEF military mobility funding. 3. The Commission’s proposal for the 2028–2034 MFF includes a revamped CEF for transport with a provisional budget of EUR 51.5 billion and with a dedicated envelope of EUR 17.6 billion for dual-use infrastructure. The Commission has proposed that projects of dual-use infrastructure on four EU Priority Military Mobility Corridors identified by Member States in Annex II to the Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the Union 1 , could be eligible for EU support. The proposal is now subject to negotiations in the European Parliament and the Council. 1 as approved by the Council on 18 March 2025 and with reference ST 6728/25 ADD1.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-05-26 “E-002097/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU and the High Representative/Vice-President acknowledge the critical role of the United States (US) in providing essential support to Ukraine, including military aid, intelligence sharing, and logistical support, in close cooperation with the EU and Member States and many likeminded countries, notably through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for the EU to boost its defence readiness. By taking greater responsibility, the EU responds to calls for Europe to play a stronger role in its own defence. The European Council, in its conclusions of 6 March 1 and 26 June 2025 2 , stressed the need for greater sovereignty, reduced strategic dependencies, and better capabilities to act autonomously, while complementing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and contributing positively to global and transatlantic security. Military mobility is a key priority, as outlined in the joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 3 . A Military Mobility Package will be adopted by year-end. The ongoing participation of non-EU NATO allies, including the US, in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 4 project on military mobility brings significant added transatlantic value. Initiatives like SAFE (Security Action for Europe) 5 and the ReArm Europe Plan 6 do not only strengthen Europe’s industrial base but also create opportunities to deepen and elevate cooperation with transatlantic and other international partners. This approach enables the EU to increase its own capabilities while simultaneously promoting interoperability and shared security with partners, including NATO allies. In doing so, it helps build a sustainable and resilient security architecture that serves both European and transatlantic interests. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/06/european-council-conclusions-oneuropean-defence/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/26/european-council-conclusions-26-june2025/. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 4 https://www.pesco.europa.eu/. 5 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6d6f889c-e58d-4caa-8f3b8b93154fe206_en?filename=SAFE%20Regulation.pdf. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en.”
  EU-US relations · EU competences on defence
• 2025-05-06 “E-001826/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not concluded any contract for lobbying activities in the area of Common Security Defence Policy. In line with the competences conferred to it under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Titles XVII (Industry) and XIX (Research and technological development and space), the Commission supports the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the European defence industry. In particular, as a result of the first three annual rounds of European Defence Fund 1 calls for proposals, grant agreements for 162 projects were signed (amounting to EUR 3.117 million) with entities established in 26 Member States (all Member States excluding Malta) and Norway. With the objective to support the ramping up of ammunition production in Europe, 31 projects were signed under Regulation on supporting of ammunition production (ASAP) 2 involving entities from 14 Member States (Germany, France, Finland, Hungary, Sweden, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Latvia, Poland, Romania) and Norway; total grant amount of EUR 513 million). Under the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement 3 programme, which aims at incentivising cooperation in defence procurement, five grant agreements have been signed with national authorities of 17 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia), for a total of EUR 300 million. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092, OJ L 170, 12 May 2021. 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP), OJ L 185, 24 July 2023. 3 Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA) OJ L, 2023/2418, 26 October 2023.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU political integration
• 2025-04-29 “E-001710/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Batteries, which account for 30-40% of value-added of a typical electric passenger car, are a critical battleground for future employment and value creation. Europe needs a costcompetitive domestic cell production and supply chain, also with a view to preparing against supply shocks and crises and protecting economic sovereignty. That would cover a large part of the supply of battery cells and European value-added along the supply chain, including EU production capacities of anode active materials, cathode active material and its precursor, and other relevant battery components. This also requires investments of European players in battery material mining and refining operations in Europe or oversea. As indicated in the Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector 1 published in March 2025 by the Commission, the objective for 2030 is to achieve a European added value of more than 50% along the value chain. Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 2 mandates the Commission to adopt delegated and implementing acts to supplement this Regulation and ensure harmonised implementation across the EU. In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, the Commission follows a stepwise approach with a gradual and cumulative increase in the carbon footprint requirements. For the final step of setting maximum carbon footprint thresholds, the Commission will carry out an impact assessment, including an assessment of the economic impacts of this measure. The aim is to boost transparency and shift the EU market towards batteries with a lower carbon footprint, regardless of where they are produced. As required by Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, the Commission is currently working on developing a methodology for calculating and verifying the carbon footprint of electric vehicle batteries on the basis of Annex II to the Regulation. After publication of a draft delegated act on the ‘Have your say’ portal on 30 April 2024 3 and a dedicated meeting of the Member State expert group on 11 July 2024, the Commission is currently analysing the way forward for the adoption of the delegated act, taking into account the feedback received. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0095. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1542/oj/eng. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13877-Batteries-for-electric-vehiclescarbon-footprint-methodology_en.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · Sustainability of batteries regulation
• 2025-04-15 “E-001541/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Member States that are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have committed to spend at least 2% of their gross domestic product on defence. While not all Member States have reached this target yet, the trajectory over the past years is going in that direction. The White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 1 recognises this positive trend and notes a growth in the defence spending by Member States of more than 31% since 2021, reaching 1.9% of the EU’s combined gross domestic product in 2024. But this is not enough, in particular to compensate for decades of underinvestment in defence. In view of the growing geopolitical challenges EU faces, its security depends on this overall increase of defence spending and defence investments, as well as Member States closely coordinating and working together. The Commission therefore offers support to all Member States in this endeavour, including by offering the possibility to Member States to use the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact 2 for additional expenditure in defence up to EUR 650 billion, in a framed and coordinated manner. Finally, the Security Action for Europe Regulation adopted by Member States on 27 May 2025 3 will provide Member States with loans up to EUR 150 billion. Its recital (8) acknowledges that ‘… there is a growing need to accelerate, in a spirit of solidarity, the provision of Union support to those Member States that are likely to be threatened by serious difficulties due to the massive public investments needed, which may have an impact on their economic situation and that …, such solidarity is especially essential for those Member States which are most exposed to military threats’. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed536485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202501106.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-03-28 “E-001306/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Serious and persistent threats at the Eastern EU border may entail the weaponisation of migration which poses a challenge for national security of the concerned Member States, but also the security of the EU as a whole. This is what the Commission stressed in the Communication on the weaponisation of migration which recalled the legal context in which any exceptional measure to tackle this threat can be taken by Member States, including as arising from case-law 1 . The situation also calls for a resolute EU response which should be comprehensive, addressing both a potential threat of conventional military aggression and hybrid campaigns. The White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 2 acknowledges the importance of defending all EU borders, in particular the Eastern border. The project related to an Eastern Border Shield has been considered a noteworthy exercise by a number of Member States to confront the growing challenges in the region. The Security Action for Europe Regulation 3 , the European Defence Industry Programme 4 (subject to its negotiation by the co-legislators), and dual-use EU instruments (such as the Border Management Visa Policy Instrument) could provide the basis for additional efforts in support of Member States. The Commission has engaged in dialogue with Member States to explore possible options. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0570. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0122. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0150.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-12-19 “E-003067/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1. European External Action Service (EEAS) recruitments and selections are based on merit whilst ensuring adequate geographical and gender balance 1 . While ‘no posts shall be reserved for nationals of any specific Member State’ 2 , current efforts continue to focus on achieving a more balanced representation from Member States, including of those who joined after 2004 (EU-13). Measures include outreach initiatives aimed at attracting qualified candidates, collaboration with national authorities aimed at increasing the quantity and quality of applications as well as a constant monitoring of the geographical balance both at management and non-management level. The share of staff holding EU-13 nationalities reached 23% in the EEAS in 2023, slightly exceeding the EU-13’s 22.6% share in the total EU population. 2. As of 1 September 2024 3 , all Member States but one (Hungary) are represented at the level of EU Ambassador or Deputy Head of Delegation. This is the result of proactive EEAS action, including through steady exchanges with Member States, dedicated outreach events and information sessions aimed at under-represented Member States. 3. The composition of the selection boards for management posts in headquarters and delegations is detailed in the EEAS Decision on the Consultative Committee on Appointments 4 , which provides, inter alia, that its members are representatives of the EEAS, the Commission, the Council and two Member States. 1 As per the EEAS founding Decision: Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. 2 See Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, Article 27 (SR) and Article 12 (CEOS). 3 Taking-up duty date for new Heads of Delegation. 4 Decision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ADMIN(2023) 25 of 10/07/2023 on the Consultative Committee on Appointments to the European External Action Service.”
  EU diplomatic representation
• 2024-10-15 “E-002075/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission In response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has imposed unprecedented restrictive measures (sanctions). The 14 sanctions packages adopted since February 2022 1 include wide-ranging export restrictions on dual-use and advanced technological and industrial goods, to further weaken Russia’s military capabilities. These measures cover many types of machinery that can be used by Russia’s military-industrial complex. Member States are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions. Any credible allegations of sanctions violations must be carefully investigated by the responsible authorities in Germany. Directive (EU) 2024/1226 2 introduced new rules to harmonise criminal offences and penalties for the violation of EU sanctions. It will ensure that such violations can be criminally investigated and prosecuted in all Member States. In the meantime, Member States should apply their existing national rules as necessary. The Commission ensures the uniform implementation of the sanctions and monitors their enforcement by national competent authorities. To this end, the Commission is in constant dialogue with national competent authorities and with industry, and has issued guidance on due diligence standards, in particular for exports. The Commission frequently engages with Member States on the actions they have taken in follow-up to press reports such as the one referred to by the Honourable Member. Any decision to expand or amend sanctions is for the Council to take, acting by unanimity. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russiasmilitary-aggression-against-ukraine_en 2 OJ L, 2024/1226, 29.4.2024.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2024-10-01 “E-001889/2024 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Rules on Special Advisers 1 to the Commission determine whether a special adviser should be paid or not and in the former case also provide the relevant aspects of their remuneration. The higher grade is chosen in duly substantiated exceptional cases, where the political importance is so high that a higher remuneration is justified to get the best services for the Commission. The skills of the chair of the strategic dialogue, his professional experience and knowledge of the subject were determinant for being engaged as a Special Adviser to the President of the Commission. The budgetary authority is always informed by the Commission of the budget foreseen for intended paid appointments. Special advisers are engaged to assist Members of the College based on the level of their professional experience and expertise. The choice of the chair of the strategic dialogue was based on his knowledge of the subject and professional experience, especially when it comes to his ability to navigate as a trusted arbitrator in complex negotiation processes with high level stakeholders and to the proven capacity for consensus-building around complex issues. As chairperson of the ‘Future Commission Agriculture’ of the German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (2021-2024), the chair of the strategic dialogue led the ‘agricultural summit’ discussion with 40 associations and organisations, proving his strong negotiation skills, and established a report on the future of agriculture. This expertise was not available within the Commission. The procedure applied for the designation and appointment of a special adviser is laid down in the Rules on Special Advisers, including rules on prevention of conflict of interests, prior information of the budgetary authority, and specific appointment procedure. 1 Commission Decision C(2007) 6655 of 19 December 2007, as amended by Commission Decision C(2014) 541 of 6 February 2014.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-09-25 “E-001580/2024 E-001814/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission As required by Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 1 , the Commission is currently developing a methodology for calculating and verifying the carbon footprint of electric vehicle batteries. After publication of a draft delegated act on the ‘Have your say’ portal on 30 April 2024 2 and a dedicated meeting of the Member State expert group on 11 July 2024, the Commission is currently analysing the way forward for the adoption of the delegated act, taking into account the feedback received. The development and implementation of the carbon footprint requirements for batteries is based on a stepwise approach in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542. For the final step of setting maximum carbon footprint thresholds, the Commission will carry out an impact assessment, including an assessment of the economic impacts of this measure. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1542/oj 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13877-Batteries-for-electric-vehiclescarbon-footprint-methodology_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-18 “P-001757/2024 Answer given by Ms Ferreira on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is ready to provide assistance to countries that were hit by the recent floods. One of the tools available to countries is the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 1 . The EUSF can only be activated at the request of an affected country, which has a deadline of 12 weeks as from when the first damage occurred, demonstrating that the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002. The Fund may cover a part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities 2 . Private damage is not eligible. The Commission encourages Member States to use all available EU funding sources, such as Cohesion Policy funds, Common Agricultural Policy funds and funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility in complementarity with the EUSF to achieve a comprehensive reconstruction and to proactively build resilience against future floods. Commission services are closely cooperating with the relevant Managing Authorities to find timely solutions that can address the post-flood needs. 2. The recent mid-term revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 3 increased the annual allocation for the EUSF for the years 2024-2027. The Fund now has an annual budget of EUR 1 016 million 4 (in 2018 prices). This is an annual increase of EUR 216 million. A review of the scope of the Fund is not currently planned under the 20212027 MFF. 3. The Commission is not currently planning to create a new, separate fund for the repair or construction of flood prevention infrastructure. However, as announced by the Commission President, the Commission is working on providing additional flexibilities under Cohesion Policy. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012 2 This means, for example, the recovery of essential infrastructure, provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations, and protection of the cultural heritage. 3 Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027. 4 EUR 1 144.1 million in 2024 prices.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• “Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Yet another debate on defense that just confirms what Poland has been saying for a long time. The Russian Federation was never a partner for Europe. Our Reservations and about aggressive behavior being ignored time and time again. And now we can see the error of your ways. These are policies which for years have defended Russian imperial industrial interests. Now we're seeing this multiplication of national ideas. What about Nord Stream as well? This, I think, is a test that unfortunately the European Union has not passed. We have to strengthen defense in the EU. There's no doubt about that. But the commission's direction that they're proposing for us to take is unacceptable. We know that we can feel pressure of competences to be transferred from national level to EU level, and that applies to security and defence as well, unfortunately. And the idea behind it is this single market. But we don't think that defence is an industrial sector, and the idea of applying the single market rules to a sensitive sector like this is dangerous, and it brings with it a risk, a risk that the big armaments industries are being supported here. Other ideas for the defense industry? Well, we could look at certain, um partners being shut out of this. Nato shouldn't be shut out. We shouldn't repeat failures we have committed with Russia because of security. We cannot accept that. We can't accept that Germany and France as the dominant powers, have different visions than the rest of us. We have to see solidarity. We need to see strong support for the eastern flank, who are monitoring and guarding the eastern border. That needs to be dealt with and appreciated better. There needs to be balance as well in the EU programs.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you. I will speak Polish. Thank you very much. That has been very constructive work. The work on the document and compromise proposals. So thank you very much for the ECR. The single market has always been the cornerstone of our competitiveness and one of the biggest achievements, but the potential has yet to be unlocked. Plus we have the problem of red tape and overregulation. The lawmaking process is too complicated, not coherent, and it covers every single aspect of economic activity. Therefore, a priority for our group is to streamline slim down, cut red tape and opt for efficient implementation. Fewer regulations, more common sense, and enforcement of existing provisions. This is the only way to make sure that the single market will be the driving force behind our development. We had too much ideology in the previous term, such as the Green Deal. We need real economic growth, real investments. I hope our message will be clear and unambiguous. Our priorities are as follows. Smes SMEs. Because they bear the brunt of the costs of overregulation and frequent modifications of the law. Soon we will have a simplification package on digital provisions, but we need more than just the removal of overlapping provisions. We also need inclusiveness and transparency. Law making process with the participation of SMEs and many stakeholders. Unfortunately, the Commission tends to use delegated acts a bit too often. We also need technological neutrality. The EU provisions should define objectives but without imposing any specific solutions. And to wrap up the service market, I hope that at the very least, we will maintain the recommendations from the Imco resolution together with my amendment 196, which describes the current catastrophic conditions of the service market. But I hope we can make a step further to facilitate an the life of entrepreneurs. We need entrepreneurship, competitiveness, understandable legal provisions adjusted to the current day and age. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Yet another debate on defense that just confirms what Poland has been saying for a long time. The Russian Federation was never a partner for Europe. Our reservations and about aggressive behavior being ignored time and time again. And now we can see the error of your ways. These are policies which for years have defended Russian imperial industrial interests. Now we're seeing this multiplication of national ideas. What about Nord Stream as well? This, I think, is a test that unfortunately the European Union has not passed. We have to strengthen defense in the EU. There's no doubt about that. But the commission's direction that they're proposing for us to take is unacceptable. We know that we can feel pressure of competences to be transferred from national level to EU level, and that applies to security and defence as well, unfortunately. And the idea behind it is this single market. But we don't think that defence is an industrial sector, and the idea of applying the single market rules to a sensitive sector like this is dangerous, and it brings with it a risk, a risk that the big armaments industries are being supported here. Other ideas for the defence industry? Well, we could look at certain partners being shut out of this. Nato shouldn't be shut out. We shouldn't repeat failures we have committed with Russia because of security. We cannot accept that. We can't accept that Germany and France, as the dominant powers, have different visions than the rest of us. We have to see solidarity. We need to see strong support for the eastern flank, who are monitoring and guarding the eastern border. That needs to be dealt with and appreciated better. There needs to be balance as well in the EU programs.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Madam chair. Mr. Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, I'll start with the obvious. Unfortunately, some European politicians want to replace by illusions. European security and safety is based on independent armies and the NATO. Until 2022, this was the description of reality. Today, however, some are worried about it. And this is a pretext not to protect Europe. Why? Because in Brussels more and more people talk about a European army. This is satisfactory to Federalists and some EU civil servants. From the perspective of the eastern flank member States, it is something very dangerous due to duplication of structures with NATO and undermining security structures, which is crucial for countries of my region. Presenting a EU army is a, you know, a side topic replacing the obvious one for people who do not want to take responsibility for security. Today, we need to fulfill the requirements within NATO and build capacities where they are most needed on the eastern flank, and not come up with political solutions that only seem to come up with a solution, a blue card. No, that.”
  EU competences on defence