Danilo DELLA VALLE

Policy topics Danilo DELLA VALLE is active on

What Danilo DELLA VALLE has said (30)

• 2026-06-17 “(10:36:17 – 10:37:27): Council will be another failure, the umpteenth failure, especially when it comes to peace, 0 diplomacy, arms and infinite war in Ukraine, a failure when it comes to the economy, high energy press prices, no investment, and difficulties for households and businesses. In a multipolar world, Europe should talk to everyone and be a bridge between the East and West. We use the BRICS countries and China as our our enemies in order to please The US that want a clash to stop their decline. Let us look at the reality in the face. Trump humiliated us when it comes to tariffs and the whole issue of Russian gas being replaced by, liquid natural gas from The US that is pushing us towards recession to see China's strategic rival and to kowtow to the genocide, perpetrated genocidal government of Israel is folly. So replacing masters with new masters, we, Europeans, need leaders that will protect our interest, and you're not doing that. Thank you.”
  EU stance on BRICS cooperation
• 2026-03-11 “Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission 18.6.2026 Written question The protection and restoration of cultural heritage remain a national responsibility. The Commission has no say on which sites are granted protected status by Member States, neither what sites are stripped from their protected status. Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates that EU action focuses on encouraging cooperation between Member States and supporting and supplementing their actions, with a view to conserving and safeguarding cultural heritage of European significance. The Commission has implemented various policies and programmes to support the safeguarding and promotion of cultural heritage in Europe. These include the designation of European Heritage Label sites, which are recognised for their symbolic value and role in European history; the European Heritage Days; and the annual European Heritage Awards. However, this does not in any way pre-empt the protection of cultural heritage at national level. In the context of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Commission encourages Member States and regions to ensure that restoration and preservation of cultural heritage is done in accordance with best practice, including the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) European quality principles for EU-funded interventions with potential impact on cultural heritage [1] . In line with the shared management approach, national and subnational authorities may decide to incorporate such guidance in the implementation of relevant ERDF support as outlined in the respective Cohesion Policy programmes. This cultural heritage project did not receive any ERDF financing. [1] https://publ.icomos.org/publicomos/jlbSai?html=Pag&page=Pml/Not&base=technica&ref=AB6E9D6130FB6ED4A9B386BA22DADF90.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2026-03-03 “Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 8.5.2026 Written question The Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (EIAD) [1] requires the competent authority to be satisfied that the reasoned conclusion on the significant effects of a project is up to date when taking a decision to grant development consent. If the state of the environment has changed between that conclusion and the time a consent is granted, the assessment may need to be updated. Hence, new information on significant environmental effects of the project must be considered during the development consent procedure. Regarding changes in environmental characteristics after development consent has been granted, the EIAD does not set a specific timeline for the implementation of the project. As outlined in the Water Resilience Strategy [2] , Member States must identify the most appropriate options to ensure water supply, based on an integrated strategy that balances demand and supply while considering climate impacts. They must also meet the objectives set out in the Water Framework Directive [3] (WFD). If the hydropower project in question is expected to lead to negative impacts, including on the Campolattaro reservoir [4] , it can only be authorised if justified according to the criteria set out in the WFD [5] . Regarding NextGenerationEU [6] funding, the Commission’s monitoring of the implementation of the Italian national recovery and resilience plan (RRP) is based on the requirements outlined in the annex to the Council Implementing Decision (CID) on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Italy [7] . Accordingly, the Commission assesses the specific characteristics of a given intervention in the context of the assessment of the milestone or target pertaining such intervention only where explicitly required by the CID Annex. [1] Article 8a(6) of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (codification), OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, as amended. [2] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. [3] Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p.1. [4] The Campolattaro reservoir (water body ITF015LWLAGODICAMPOLATTARO) is reported under the Water Framework Directive as in unknown ecological potential in Italy’s third river basin management plan for the river basin ‘Appennino Meridionale’, with pressures due to urban wastewater, diffuse agricultural pollution, as well as damming and abstraction for agriculture, public water supply and industry. [5] Article 4(7) thereof, including all practicable mitigation measures. [6] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/nextgenerationeu_en. [7] ST 15106/25 + ADD 1 COR1- Annex to the Council Implementing Decision amending Implementing Decision of 13 July 2021 on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and resilience plan for Italy.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · EU policy on water management
• 2026-02-25 “Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission 20.5.2026 Written question In 2026, the Commission announced EUR 124.4 million in humanitarian funding for Palestine [1] . This brings the total of EU humanitarian aid to Palestine to almost EUR 675 million. The EU is also delivering on its commitment to provide the Multiannual Comprehensive Support Programme (2025-2027) worth up to EUR 1.6 billion to foster Palestinian recovery and resilience [2] and to support the Palestinian Authority’s reform agenda. The EU has therefore been the largest international donor to the Palestinian people, both in humanitarian and development assistance. Regarding the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument -Global Europe (NDICI-GE) emerging challenges and priorities cushion, the remaining amount until the end of the Multiannual Financial Framework is of EUR 159 million until the end of 2027 [3] . The Commission stands ready to use, once conditions allow and access to the Gaza Strip is possible, additional funding under the remaining part of the cushion to further support efforts in Palestine, to address the most pressing early recovery and infrastructure needs in Gaza. At this stage, the situation remains fluid. The Commission is monitoring the situation on the ground to ensure it can adapt its response, including to support humanitarian needs and early recovery. As reiterated during the European Council of 19 March 2026 [4] , the EU stands ready to work on the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2803 endorsing the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict [5] . [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_611. [2] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-announces-multiannual-programme-palestinian-recovery-and-resilience-worth-eu16-billion-2025-04-14_en. [3] As per the notification to the European Parliament on the NDICI cushion mobilisation. [4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/lwhk3itd/en-20260319-european-council-conclusions.pdf. [5] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-01-28 “E-000343/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Postal Services Directive 1 requires Member States to ensure that users enjoy the right to a permanent provision of a postal universal service at all points of the territory. However, the Directive does not specify the exact number, form or location of branches, the determination of which is a national competence. The Commission has announced in the Single Market Strategy 2 that the regulatory framework for postal services including the Directive will be revised and a new EU Delivery Act is envisaged for the second half of 2026 3 . A call for evidence 4 closed on 14 November 2025 and a public consultation will close on 5 March 2026 to enable stakeholders to provide feedback on the future regulatory framework including issues to which the Honorable Member refers to in his question. An impact assessment in line with the Better Regulation principles will be prepared to support the elaboration of this initiative and inform the Commission’s decision on postal services fit for a modern era. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01997L0067-20080227. 2 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/single-market-our-european-home-market-uncertainworld_en. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategy-documents/commission-workprogramme/commission-work-programme-2026_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14821-New-EU-Delivery-Act-EU-toreform-postal-rules_en.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-11-13 “E-004508/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Since the onset of the Israel/Hamas conflict, the EU recognised Israel’s right to defend itself, but consistently urged Israel to do so in line with international law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The EU has also clearly emphasised its expectation that Israel complies with rulings of international courts, including the order of the International Court of Justice of 26 January 2024 1 . This order neither addresses nor sets out any obligations for third states and organisations. Further to the findings of the review launched by the High Representative/Vice-President in May 2025 on Israel's compliance with its human rights obligations, which are an essential element of the EU-Israel Association Agreement 2 by virtue of its Article 2, and in response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza, the President of the Commission announced in her State of the Union 2025 address 3 in September 2025 a package of measures designated to exercise pressure on Israel. Those proposals are currently discussed in the Council. Regarding the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) 4 , Member States have until July 2029 to ensure its transposition into national law and to designate their respective supervisory authorities 5 . The Commission will issue guidelines on the application of the CSDDD, and it will set up the European Network of Supervisory Authorities to coordinate their enforcement efforts. 1 https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203447. 2 https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en. 4 Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859. 5 Following the preliminary political agreement reflected in the position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 16 December 2025 with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2025/… of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/43/EC, 2013/34/EU, (EU) 2022/2464 and (EU) 2024/1760 as regards certain corporate sustainability reporting and due diligence requirements.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-10-28 “E-004229/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Member States may restrict the freedom of movement of EU citizens on grounds of public policy or public security, including by adopting expulsion measures. In particular, it is within the competence of the Member States to apply public policy and public security measures to prevent violence and hooliganism at sports events. Such measures must respect the substantive and procedural safeguards set out in the Free Movement Directive 2004/38/EC 1 . The Commission does not have evidence of a general practice by the Netherlands consisting of adopting expulsion measures without respecting the above-mentioned requirements. As regards the individual measure at hand, it is for the competent national courts to establish the facts and assess whether the national authorities correctly applied EU law. The Netherlands has reintroduced border control at internal borders under Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code, enabling it to carry out entry and exit checks. However, this reintroduction does not affect the rights of EU citizens under Directive 2004/38/EC, who can enter and exit a Member State upon production of a valid passport or identity card and provided they do not constitute a danger to public policy or public security. The Commission works closely with Member States to monitor and promote the correct application of EU free movement law and the Schengen acquis, including by providing guidance 2 and fostering cooperation and exchange of best practices between Member States in dedicated fora 3 . 1 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, pp. 77–123. 2 See, for example, Commission Notice – Guidance on the right of free movement of EU citizens and their families, http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1392/oj. 3 For example, in the expert group on the right to free movement of persons, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-groups/consult?lang=en&groupID=2397.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-14 “E-002865/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Defence Fund (EDF) 1 supports the EU’s strategic autonomy by funding entities established in the EU and Norway. Israel-based entities are therefore not eligible 2 . EU-based entities controlled by non-EU entities, such as Intracom Defence, may participate if robust safeguards are in place 3 . EDF rules require submitting guarantees, approved by the Member State of establishment, ensuring that the non-EU parent company cannot access sensitive information and that results and intellectual property rights remain with the EU entity. The Commission assessed the submitted guarantees and concluded to compliance with the EDF Regulation 4 . Any transfer of ownership of results of EDF actions outside the EU or Norway requires prior notification to the Commission and may trigger recovery of funds if it conflicts with the security and defence interests of the EU, its Member States or the EDF objectives 5 . Ethical screening is systematically conducted at project-level, focusing on project-specific activities, not on participants corporate structure. Compliance with international law is also evaluated at project-level. The ACTUS project also underwent this screening. The Commission holds the right to audit projects, launch investigations of the European Anti-Fraud Office, terminate grants and recover funds in case of non-compliance with applicable rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/697/oj/eng. 2 Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/697. 3 Article 9(4) of the EDF Regulation. 4 Ibidem. 5 Article 23 of the EDF Regulation.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · Arms export from the EU
• 2025-07-03 “E-002726/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities is one of the values on which the EU is founded, enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which are binding for Member States 1 . Freedom of expression is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and constitutes one of the essential foundations of our democratic societies. Furthermore, Article 21 of the Charter prohibits any discrimination including on grounds of ethnic or social origin, language or membership of a national minority. However, according to its Article 51(1), the Charter applies to Member States only when they are implementing EU law. From the information provided by the Honourable Member, the national measures in question do not appear to involve EU law. It is for Member States, in full respect of the values on which the EU is founded, to ensure compliance with their constitutional order and their obligations under international law and to use the legal instruments available to them to guarantee that the fundamental rights of minorities living on their territories are respected. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF”
  EU competences on human rights
• 2025-06-25 “E-002559/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The control on arms export by Member States is subject to national legislation, the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 1 and the Arms Trade Treaty 2 (ATT). The authorities of Member States take final decision on whether to authorise or deny an individual export or transit license of military equipment 3 , in accordance with that legal framework. Under the Common Position, each Member State is solely responsible for assessing arms export licences against eight criteria, including Criterion 2 and 6, and to ensure compliance with applicable laws. Under the abovementioned legal framework, the Commission does not have the competence to assess whether individual licenses by Member States are compatible with the Common Position, nor to recommend or enforce a formal review of licences under its Article 5. The Common Position applies to all exports of military technology and equipment originating from Member States, irrespective of them taking place under military agreements or not. In the context of military arrangements or transfers of technology from third countries, under Articles 21 and 24 of the Treaty on the European Union and Article 205 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States are required to ensure that their actions in external relations are consistent with the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action. At the same time, there is no legal obligation in the Common Position itself or elsewhere to apply its criteria, directly or mutatis mutandis, to cases other than those mentioned in its Article 6 (dualuse goods and technology), nor to goods imported from a third country to a Member State. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02008E0944-20250415. 2 https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884. 3 The EU Common Military List (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1499/oj/eng) which also covers all items to which the ATT applies.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-06-03 “E-002211/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The grant of nationality is a prerogative of the Member States. According to settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is for each Member State, having due regard to international law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of its nationality 1 . In situations covered by EU law, Member States’ rules in the sphere of nationality must, however, have due regard also to EU law 2 . The definition of the conditions for granting the nationality of a Member State does thus not fall within the competence of the EU, but within that of each Member State, which has a broad discretion in the choice of the criteria to be applied, provided that those criteria are applied in compliance with EU law. The Commission cannot intervene in the legitimate exercise of powers by Member States in this area but can act only if a Member State’s rules on the acquisition and loss of nationality breach EU law. While the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establish democracy as one of the founding values of the EU and provide EU citizens with a right to participate in the democratic life of the EU, among others through the right to vote in European Parliament elections and municipal elections in a host Member State, none of the relevant provisions provides for voting rights in favour of nationals of a third country or stateless persons residing in a Member State. 1 See judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Cases Micheletti and Others v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, C-369/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:295; Kaur, C-192/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:106, para. 19; Rottmann, C-135/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104, para. 39; Tjebbes and Others, C-221/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:189, para. 30; V.М.А., C-490/20, ECLI:EU:C:2021:1008, para. 38; Wiener Landesregierung, C-118/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:34, para. 37. 2 C-135/08, Rottmann, para. 41 and 45; C-221/17, Tjebbes and Others, para. 32; V.М.А., C-490/20, ECLI:EU:C:2021:1008, para. 38; C-118/20, Wiener Landesregierung, para. 37; Commission v Malta, C-181/23, para. 81.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-04-30 “E-001740/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice-President, Members of her Cabinet and members of staff may use instant messaging tools on their corporate devices for informal communication purposes. A data protection impact assessment is required only if there is a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons in accordance with Article 39(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 1 . This is not the case when Signal is used, given that the scope of personal information shared via Signal is limited. The European External Action Service and the Commission have already issued guidelines on the use of instant messaging and group chat tools. Use of publicly available non-corporate tools is limited to the exceptional cases when corporate solutions cannot be used. The guidelines stipulate that only nonconfidential information should be shared and discussed when using, for example, Signal. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj/eng.”
  Digitalization of public governance & administration
• 2025-02-19 “E-000763/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Concerning implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, EU Member States – Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights – are responsible to implement these judgments in their jurisdictions. In relation to the implementation of EU legislation, in 2015 the Court of Justice of the European Union 1 ruled that Italy had to pay a daily penalty of EUR 120 000 for failure to establish the infrastructure necessary for the treatment of the municipal waste generated in the Campania region 2 . The Commission is closely monitoring the implementation of the ruling and the payment of the penalty. In 2021, progress has been made in Campania on the incineration capacity and the daily penalty has been reduced 3 . Discussions are currently ongoing on the regional capacity for landfill and the organic fraction. So far, Italy has paid EUR 325 760 000 in fines. The Commission will pursue its enforcement action to ensure that the Italian authorities take all the necessary measures to comply with the Court’s ruling. Under the current cohesion policy 4 , the European Regional Development Fund 5 allows for investments in soil decontamination and remediation, rehabilitation of industrial sites and contaminated land, including old and illegal landfill sites, provided the investment does not increase the capacity of the landfills 6 . State aid rules and the ‘polluter pays principle’ 7 must be respected. Disposal of waste in landfill is legally excluded from support 8 . More specifically, the Campania Regional Programme 2021-2027 9 promotes interventions for the remediation and environmental protection of areas concerned with waste abandonment and illegal disposal in accordance with the priorities laid down in the regional remediation plan (around EUR 35 million). 1 Case C-653/13, in the framework of infringement INFR(2007)2195: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62013CJ0653 2 The decision also covers the treatment of the historical waste (known as ‘ecoballe’). 3 To EUR 80 000 per day. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/what/investment-policy_en 5 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/erdf_en 6 Article 7(1)(f)(ii) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund PE/48/2021/INIT OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 60–93. 7 Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. According to this principle, those responsible for environmental damage should pay to cover the costs. This applies to prevention of pollution, remediation, liability (criminal, civil and environmental liability) and the costs imposed on society of pollution that does happen. 8 Except for investments for decommissioning, reconverting or making safe existing landfills provided that such investments do not increase their capacity. 9 https://europa.regione.campania.it/en/approvazione-del-programma-regionale-pr-campania-fse-2021-2027/ https://europa.regione.campania.it/en/programma-regionale-campania-fesr-21-27/”
  Water pollution · Environmental crimes and justice
• 2025-02-03 “E-000459/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The current EU occupational safety and health (OSH) regulatory framework providing protection for workers exposed to hazardous chemicals on industrial sites consists of the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC 1 and its related Directives in the area of chemicals, i.e. Directive 98/24/EC 2 and Directive 2004/37/EC 3 . The latter provide adequate protection for exposed workers and are updated when there is need to reflect new scientific findings concerning dangerous chemicals, or as a result of the five-yearly ex post evaluation of the health and safety at work Directives 4 , which may signal any needs for improvement. Member States are however allowed to adopt more stringent and specific provisions in this regard. Safety and health at work of temporary agency workers is regulated under Directive 91/383/EEC 5 which ensures that temporary agency workers are afforded, as regards safety and health at work, the same level of protection as that of other workers in the user undertaking and/or establishment. Directive 89/391/EEC and the related EU OSH Directives apply fully to all workers in the EU including temporary agency workers. It is primarily for the Member States’ competent authorities to ensure that the national legislation transposing these directives is properly enforced. The Senior Labour Inspectors’ Committee 6 assists the Commission regarding the enforcement aspects of the EU OSH legislation at the national level. The Commission monitors the correct implementation of these Directives by Member States and may decide to take appropriate action if the Member State fails to fully or correctly transpose EU rules, or if the Member State fails to fulfil its obligations under the relevant EU legal provisions. 1 Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, p. 1; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A31989L0391 2 Council Directive 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks related to chemical agents at work, OJ L 131, 5.5.1998, p. 11; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1998/24/oj/eng 3 Directive 2004/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work (Sixth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Council Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 50; https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/37/oj/eng 4 See Article 17a of Directive 89/391/EEC. 5 Council Directive 91/383/EEC of 25 June 1991 supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of workers with a fixed- duration employment relationship or a temporary employment relationship, OJ L 206, 29.7.1991, p. 19–21; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1991/383/oj/eng 6 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/rights-work/health-and-safetywork/senior-labour-inspectors-committee-0_en”
  EU rules on hazardous working conditions · EU policy on employment subcontracting
• 2024-12-20 “E-003077/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The 3 rd River Basin Management Plan (RBMP) for the Southern Apennines mentions that Basilicata is revising its 2008 Water Protection Plan 1 . The Water Framework Directive (WFD) 2 requires the production and regular update of a RBMP containing the information in Annex VII for each river basin district. The WFD allows the production of more detailed programmes and management plans supporting RBMPs. The WFD requires that water bodies used for the abstraction of drinking water are identified, subject to monitoring according to Annex V and meet the objectives set in Article 4. These water bodies must also meet the quality requirements set in the Drinking Water Directive (DWD) 3 . Non-compliant Member States must take appropriate measures to protect human health and to inform concerned consumers. The DWD requires Member States to assess their water leakage levels and potential for improvement by January 2026. On this basis, the Commission will set by January 2028 a maximum allowable leakage threshold value and Member States exceeding it will have to present within two years an action plan to reduce leakage levels across their territory. Cohesion funds 4 support Member States and regions in improving sustainable water management systems and infrastructures. Under the Regional Programme Basilicata European Regional Development Fund 5 2021-2027, EUR 16 million of EU funds are allocated to support investments in wastewater treatment systems, while interventions on water supply 6 are to be covered with national funds 7 and the National Recovery and Resilience Plans 8 . Managing authorities and beneficiaries implementing water-related projects can apply for technical assistance under the Cohesion For Transitions (C4T) Community of Practice 9 . 1 https://www.distrettoappenninomeridionale.it/wpcontent/uploads/2024/01/Relazione_PdG_Acque_III_Ciclo_rev_11_PC_compressed.pdf, p. 15. 2 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p.1. 3 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption, OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1–62. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/cohesion-fund_en 5 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/erdf/ 6 Including leakage reduction. 7 ‘Fondo Sviluppo e Coesione’. 8 ‘Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza’. 9 A new call for support will be opened in 2025.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-18 “E-003035/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. According to the EU Treaties 1 Member States are primarily responsible for the management of disasters 2 , including forest fires. The Commission supports coordination and complements Member State actions through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 3 and its early warning tools, including the Copernicus’ European Forest Fire Information System (EFISS) 4 . The Commission also encourages the use of the Galileo Emergency Satellite Warning Service and supports the development and maintenance of Member States response capabilities to wildfires through rescEU 5 and the European Civil Protection Pool 6 . The Commission encourages the share of best practices in prevention and preparedness with a variety of tools 78 . 2. As announced by the President of the European Commission in the Political Guidelines 2024-2029, the Commission intends to put forward a Quality Jobs Roadmap, developed together with the social partners to support fair wages and good working conditions for all EU workers, including those in the public safety sector. 3. Advanced technologies used in EFISS, and the European Flood Alert System 9 play a key role in the detection and response to potential disasters. The Commission also encourages the use of advanced technologies in this field through multiple instruments, such as the Track 1 technical assistance and the Knowledge for Action in Prevention & Preparedness (KAPP) 10 grants as well as the Horizon Europe 11 programme including its disaster risk reduction activities 12 and the EU Mission: Adaptation to Climate Change areas 13 . 1 Article 196 TEU https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:FULL 2 Whether natural or man-made. 3 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en 4 https://forest-fire.emergency.copernicus.eu/ 5 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/union-civil-protectionmechanism-resceu_en 6 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/european-civil-protectionpool_en#:~:text=The%20EU%20established%20the%20European%20Civil%20Protection%20Pool,European% 20response%20to%20human-induced%20disasters%20and%20natural%20hazards. 7 Including pre-positioning of fire-fighters during fire seasons, advisory missions, and peer reviews of their national disaster management systems, including of Italy’s, published in January 2025 (https://civil-protectionknowledge-network.europa.eu/stories/italy-ucpm-wildfire-peer-review-final-report-published-and-handed-over) 8 Furthermore, the European Regional Development Fund National Programme for Security for Legality 2021 – 2027 in Italy includes a project on smart forest environmental monitoring of EUR 30 Million. This involves the development and deployment of a system to collect, manage, integrate and correlate environmental monitoring data, together with automatic alert mechanisms to support a network for the control and verification of criminal activities in forest, rural and peripheral areas of cities. The aim is to provide the Forestry, Environmental and Agri-food Unit Command of the Carabinieri with adequate control tools for data and information to strengthen legality and combat environmental crime. 9 https://www.copernicus.eu/en/european-flood-alert-system 10 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/knowledge-action-prevention-preparedness-2024 11 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 12 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/cluster-3-civil-security-society_en 13 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/adaptation-climate-change_en”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• “Thank you. Well, in the light of this agreement under its somewhat asymmetrical. And there could be some disadvantages as well as advantages. I have a fundamental question. How can we justify the given the situation in Ecuador when it comes to the question of giving these big multinationals the possibility of influencing environmental rules? And let's imagine that we would be ready to tolerate that type of risk. Would there be any kind of guarantee? To make sure that these investments are really sustainable. And how can we build on this hope and make sure that the investment takes place in a way that can lead to protection of the situation?”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments
• “Thank you. Let me apologize because there's other negotiations in process. I read this report, and to be honest, I'm rather concerned. We want to protect our democracy against hybrid attacks. In four countries Belarus, Russia, China. And we want to build a center with all the necessary competencies and financial resources. That concerns me. Let me explain why. These are significant amounts. And. A significant amount of fake news has been identified. But. Here. Some people may intervene directly in the European Union and others may not. There's no reference to Israel in this report. I think we need to talk about external interference. We need to refer to Israel, which is bombarding Palestine. And Israel has been controlling cyber security in the Maloney government. We have heard of the Pegasus case, which has affected many European journalists. Now talking about the European Democracy Shield, Alexandra Barbaro, an Italian historian, historian, was censured by US multinationals, which. Decide which information our citizens receive.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you, Madam President. Commissioner. We're talking about responsibility and justice today. How does this Parliament dare talk about justice? 20 sanctions packages on Russia. But when the U.S.. Goes death and destruction across the Middle East, we don't hear anything. We look at the impact on the oil prices. Look at what Israel has done in Gaza. Nothing. No sanctions, nothing. For four years now, you've been turning your back on any option of mediation. The EU has done nothing. The Ukrainians are just being sacrificed as a symbol of failure. You're propping up a military machine, propping up Zelensky. That's failing. We need to look at the resources, the foreign policy choices that have led us to recession in Italy and around Europe. Fuel bills are going up while people are talking about wars and sanctions. I do wish people would focus a little bit more on the citizens of Europe.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you. Let me apologize because there's other negotiations in process. I read this report and to be honest, I'm rather concerned. We want to protect our democracy against hybrid attacks. In four countries Belarus, Russia, China. And we want to build a centre with all the necessary competencies and financial resources. That concerns me. Let me explain why. These are significant amounts. And a significant amount of fake news has been identified. But. Here. Some people may intervene directly in the European Union and others may not. There's no reference to Israel in this report. I think we need to talk about external interference. We need to refer to Israel, which is, um, bombarding Palestine. And Israel has been controlling, um, cyber security in the Maloney government. We have heard of the Pegasus case, which has affected many European journalists. Now talking about the European democracy Shield. Alexandra Barbaro, an Italian historian, historian, was censured by US multinationals, which. Decide which information our citizens receive.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. I will speak Italian now. Well, looking at the draft opinion, a few Reflections I'd like to share with you. Calling for caution. Given the complexity of the nature of this package, of agreements and the balance, maybe it's not the appropriate time to conclude a trade agreement that's more broader reaching, covering services, and protection mechanisms for investment. Maybe at this juncture, it would be better for us to consolidate progress that's already been made, rather than adding additional aspects to this. Look at the 2021 agreement and Protection of workers and freedom of movement is something we should focus on as well. On the 11th of February, we had a meeting with the Swiss. I think that shows progress. We certainly don't want any undermining of worker protection. I think we should have further reaching study in that before we move forward and looking at Swiss liberalization in the energy sector, we need to be cautious, looking at public services being undermined at local level, cantonal level. So this is a political aspect that we need to take into consideration when working with the Swiss authorities. We think that we should have more guarantees in place before moving forward, and safeguards need to be in place as well for the labour market. Thank you.”
  EU-Switzerland relations
• “Thank you. You're condemning families and companies to paying the cost of the wars. Thanks to the policies that you are choosing, 300 years at least, is the increase in energy bills. Europe is not ready to cut itself off from Russian gas. We weren't asked to do this by Ukraine. We have signed up for a gradual change by 2015. We are going to stop importing fossil fuels from EU countries. But now all of a sudden you want to turn it into 2027. This is crazy. This is not going to stop the war. This is just propaganda. And all you want to do is buy shale gas from the US, which costs three times as much and causes a huge amount more pollution. I've got two bills here, one from 2021, one from 2025. In four years there's been 150% increase. This is outrageous. And salaries wages are just level. So stop lying to the citizens. They're not stupid. They know that you really are just leading Europe into a car crash. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you. Let me apologize because there's other negotiations in process. I read this report and to be honest, I'm rather concerned. We want to protect our democracy against hybrid attacks. In four countries Belarus, Russia, China. And we want to build a centre with all the necessary competencies and financial resources. That concerns me. Let me explain why. These are significant amounts. And a significant amount of fake news has been identified. But. Here. Some people may intervene directly in the European Union and others may not. There's no reference to Israel in this report. I think we need to talk about external interference. We need to refer to Israel, which is, um, bombarding Palestine. And Israel has been controlling, um, cyber security in the Maloney government. We have heard of the Pegasus case, which has affected many European journalists. Now talking about the European democracy Shield. Alexandra Barbaro, an Italian historian, historian, was censured by US multinationals, which. Decide which information our citizens receive.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Well, thank you because we're not totally convinced. But what we need is greater, uh, autonomy for the EU. And we've not been able to do it from the geopolitical standpoint. We, uh, want to get out of, uh, Russian imports, but we buy natural gas from other countries like the United States. But, uh, we've been in, uh, porting from various countries who've been violating several, uh, several countries in violating human rights. Uh, and also, uh, even, uh, Israel, uh, in the US helping Israel, who's responsible for genocide now? Uh. Uh. Actually, um, we, uh, have been. Plus, if we stop all the gas, we will increase costs for citizens. And we have to know what third countries intentions are if they intend to impose their policies on us. Like if you see the customs duties for the US. We need a plan that would make us independent from all other countries, not just Russia. Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Thank you. President. Yesterday, president von der Leyen spoke here in the chamber and said that she protect the EU's interests with China, but we've been waiting for that for some time now. We like our interests rather than Pfizer or the US as interest to be defended. We're talking about €720 billion per year, 50% growth in trade. Huge potential for further growth. But when we talk about non-aligned countries, countries that are not in line with the US, we simplify it. We oversimplify and talk about good guys and bad guys. If there is a trade war with Trump, defending the interests of Europeans is something that should take account of BRICs importance to European citizens too, and the role that China could play as a mediator in Ukraine and Middle East conflicts. We need to recognise that the world is changing. It's increasingly multipolar. If you really want to defend the interests of Europeans, then you should engage in diplomacy rather than defending a world which is destined to disappear along with those who represent it.”
  EU-China relations
• “The US and Russia are debating a possible peace plan. But we are seeing military mobilization. And we in Europe are dependent on Russian gas and gas, and we are far removed from reality. Otherwise, the war would already be won. Now we're talking about reconstruction as well as strategic independence. But all we have from the US is hypocrisy. So this is the ugly reality. And that is why we have to continue with negotiations. But we find Europe one day paying court to Trump and the next, which is pushing for the continuation of war in Ukraine. And now we're talking about 215 billion going to Ukraine to further the war. But Ukraine will never manage to repay such sims. And that is why we need to work in the interests of Italian, Europeans and Ukraine for years to come, not waste more money on war, which amounts to a political defeat. Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Thank you. Well, in the light of this agreement under its somewhat asymmetrical. And there could be some disadvantages as well as advantages. I have a fundamental question. How can we justify the given the situation in Ecuador when it comes to the question of giving these big multinationals the possibility of influencing environmental rules? And let's imagine that we would be ready to tolerate that type of risk. Would there be any kind of guarantee? To make sure that these investments are really sustainable. And how can we build on this hope and make sure that the investment takes place in a way that can lead to protection of the situation?”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments
• “31:42 – 15:33:26): Thank you, Commissioner. Thank you for that report. So we've had the Board of Peace. It was criticized by Boril. It seems to be a 2.0 colonial project and then I think we had then the Italian government as well there. They were observers but then you need to look at the administration and what's being done. Whenever you're considering what's the genocide in Gaza and the West Bank and when we're looking at the Mediterranean area, we're seeing changes. There are dozens of resolutions on countries there but then when you're looking at relationships with the people on the south of the Mediterranean, we need to consider this. But we're seeing that there are certain things that are being tolerated there, for example in Libya as well. And then we're also seeing that there is the role of Turkey when it comes to the geopolitics as well. But quite often we want to talk about human rights, international law and respect for that but then what about these obligations? They just seem to disappear when you're talking about Israel, for example. There doesn't seem to be any consequence there. There hasn't even been a suspension of the association agreement. But then I have a question here. There was the agreement with Libya and Egypt. So this is something from a while ago. So Egypt continued to ignore the red lines that Italy, for example, had when it came to the murder of Eugenio and there is this work that was hindered by the Italian judicism. It was very difficult then to do anything in there because there was this climate of terror. So what can you do then in that case when it comes to looking at that agreement?”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you. Let me apologize because there's other negotiations in process. I read this report, and to be honest, I'm rather concerned. We want to protect our democracy against hybrid attacks. In four countries Belarus, Russia, China. And we want to build a center with all the necessary competencies and financial resources. That concerns me. Let me explain why. These are significant amounts. And. A significant amount of fake news has been identified. But. Here. Some people may intervene directly in the European Union and others may not. There's no reference to Israel in this report. I think we need to talk about external interference. We need to refer to Israel, which is bombarding Palestine. And Israel has been controlling cyber security in the Maloney government. We have heard of the Pegasus case, which has affected many European journalists. Now talking about the European Democracy Shield, Alexandra Barbaro, an Italian historian, historian, was censured by US multinationals, which. Decide which information our citizens receive.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. I just wanted to raise a specific case. Which we've held a lot of different things this afternoon. But I think there is an important case which is worth remembering or bringing up here, which is George Glass. He was a vice president of the Korea government and now has political asylum in Belgium. And he was arrested, during a raid on the 5th of April in 2024, in the Mexican embassy in Quito, where he had sought an asylum. Uh. This violates the Vienna Convention of 1961 concerning diplomatic um seats. Uh. And. He was held without, uh, contact or allowed medical visits. And this kind of isolation is considered by the international community as psychological torture. Um, there is a maximum limit of 15 days for this. Uh, the this has been documented by the Special rapporteur on the United Nations from the United Nations. The the was documented, uh, Physical harm to Mr. Glass as well. I would like to know what you think about that, and how it is that such serious violations of human rights are not raised, uh, given, uh, a different view of how things are in the country. And that's what seems to come out. Uh, so I wonder what you think about the threats, uh, issued by Trump to do with sovereignty in, uh, uh, Honduras and Venezuela. But since we're talking about, uh, Ecuador, I just wanted to talk about one thing, and that is that during Korea's government, uh. Uh, the war homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Now it's 45, uh, the first, uh, six months of 25 we've got. Again, a significant number. We're talking about some 505,668, uh, in the first six months of 2025. And I think that what that shows is that issues such as human rights and international law are are not things that we can just use as we see fit. Depending on geopolitics, we need to try and use these to try and improve the conditions in which millions of people in South America live in. Thank you.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America