Sandra KALNIETE

Policy topics Sandra KALNIETE is active on

What Sandra KALNIETE has said (15)

• 2026-03-11 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question 1. Where national law grants consumers (private persons or companies) standing, they can bring an action before the competent national courts in relation to unlawful aid, including asking to order its recovery. Under EU law, if aid is later approved, it does not have to be paid back. However, interest must still be paid for the time the aid was unlawful, to remove any unfair advantage obligation (Article 108(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) . This interest is paid to the State budget, not to consumers. Consumers may still seek compensation separately under national law. 2. Under EU law, national authorities and courts must remove any unfair advantage gained from unlawful aid. In practice, this means beneficiaries must pay interest for the period during which they wrongly had access to the aid. The exact amount of interest is calculated under national law by the Member State concerned and the Member State must quantify the exact amount of interest to be recovered.”
  Energy transition (state support)
• “Thank you, Madam President. The the the war is not frozen. It is raging. We know it. And therefore Europe must not become a hostage to its own procedures. As EVP Shadow Rapporteur for Ukraine, I fully support moving forward with enhanced cooperation among 24 member States. But as we advance with 90 billion support package, I urge to avoid three serious mistakes. The first one, we must be consistent. We cannot support Ukraine with one hand, while with the other hand we are closing our market to Ukrainian steel. Secondly, if European industry cannot deliver, we must be flexible and Ukraine must be allowed to purchase where it is available. And thirdly, the final bill must be paid by the aggressor. We cannot endlessly ask our taxpayers for solidarity. Solidarity while Russian assets remain frozen but untouched. Ukraine is Europe's security wall. Let's strengthen this wall now.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Honourable members. Cyber threats are growing. They come from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea. These are a huge threat for our democracy. We know that Russia is training AI models with fake data and propaganda. China is developing AI models commensurate with the Communist Party's ideology. In parallel, we have two AI ecosystems emerging globally. Data sets corrupted by disinformation, deep fakes and manipulated content. To protect themselves, democracies must invest in AI. We have seen chronic underinvestment, fragmented, fragmented markets and an overreliance on foreign technology infrastructure. If we do not manage to cut back on red tape, increase investment and prevent the emigration or the move of more promising AI startups to other countries. Then we will weaken our competitiveness and run the risk of becoming globally irrelevant. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Merci, madam. Just a moment. I will get back to my my notes. My first question I will address to European Representative of the European Commission. Uh, you spoke about the tool and the financial resources for that tool. What? I would be interested to know the amount of these financial resources which are. Accorded to that. And then also, um, I was very impressed by by story told by Mr. Miller. Um, it is mostly about the crime, uh, how darknet is used for the crime. And I also, uh, I would say that after what, uh, Europol representative told, I think to sleep tonight will be quite difficult to to learn all the immensity of the area you have to cover. And my question is a very technical one. The first question, uh, your unit, how many human resources do you have in your unit to deal with all that. And then also, um, one part of all this criminality in darknet is mostly also for criminal activities. But I because all these organized crime groups using also cryptocurrencies and different other alternative financial flow flows, uh, to to finance their activities. And part of that criminality is quite closely linked to political activities like to bypass EU sanctions. And my question is to all three representatives how serious. This is the threat to our democracies. What concrete steps Can Europol, and they must take to improve financial intelligence on crypto transactions and partnering with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and how to ensure that cryptocurrencies are fully integrated into sanctions enforcement. This is really a big window which is not fully covered. We have also loopholes in other, uh, control mechanisms of sanctions, but this is the biggest one. Thank you.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• “I am greeting you particularly, and the oral stories you just told us are very inspiring. But I will get back to, to, let's say, past Because much of our EU responds to foreign information manipulation and interference still treats the problem as external, something that comes from outside into our borders. And but increasingly, foreign regimes do not need their own media outlets. They rely on EU based amplifiers, influencers, fringe political actors, alternative media ecosystems. And this allows hostile narratives to circulate under the protection of our own democratic freedoms and laws. And we can ban, ban our sanctions or sanction foreign state media. It is far more difficult when the narrative laundering happens through EU based actors operating legally within our information space. And so my question is to you, are we prepared to confront this grey zone where foreign interference operates through domestic proxies? And it is very important for the elections? And do we have adequate transparency and accountability mechanisms to address it without undermining fundamental rights, or are we still regulating yesterday's threat model? I think you already answered to that. Partially so thank you.”
  Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• “Thank you madam. Madam chair, first of all, I would like to thank both experts for your valuable contribution, which makes me as a person of 70, like I'm listening to completely another dimension and world, but nevertheless, I'm in the politics and I'm very conscious about all different ways of interference via online platforms to our politics and democracy processes. For example, the result of elections in Romania is a crucial victory for pro-European democratic forces, and there we have seen firsthand of effectiveness of foreign Elicited campaign funding and manipulation of TikTok algorithms and the use of telegram to undermine Romania's democratic institutions. The stakes are incredibly high, and Russia is not so far from installing a puppet government in an EU and NATO member state. This should be abundantly clear that Russia will continue to aggressively attempt to influence electoral processes in all EU countries, and our elections will remain prime targets for Russia's influence operation via online platforms. During the previous term of the European Parliament, the parliament established special Inga and Inga two committees on countering foreign interference in Democratic processes in the EU. Produced a wide range of recommendations in domains such as resilience building, cybersecurity, election interference, covert funding and political activities, deterrence, attribution and countermeasures, including sanctions and global cooperation, and also on algorithm transparency. This is a limited progress which has been made in fulfilling these recommendations, including also the respect to enforcement of DSA Digital Service Act. But there still is so much work to do. And we are lagging, uh, very much, uh, backward. We also have to learn and draw the lessons from the case in Romania, because this case certainly will not be the last one. Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Ladies and gentlemen, the European Commission's proposal to completely phase out all energy imports from Russia by 2027 is a major step towards strengthening our independence and security. Russia is and will remain the biggest security threat that we have in on our continent. Russia's rebuilding its military potential and is indeed preparing for a long term confrontation with Europe. We have to be prepared to entertain any scenario that comes our way. We have to get rid of our dependencies Is because they increase our political and economic vulnerability. When we're talking about stopping sanctions, that's only going to help Russia. Any sanction package needs to be put in place to exert more pressure on Russia. And we cannot allow our payments for gas, nuclear and oil to continue funding Putin.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “I am greeting you particularly, and the oral stories you just told us are very inspiring. But I will get back to, to, let's say, past, because much of our EU response to foreign information manipulation and interference still treats the problem as external, something that comes from outside into our borders. And but increasingly, foreign regimes do not need their own media outlets. They rely on EU based amplifiers, influencers, fringe political actors, alternative media ecosystems. And this allows hostile narratives to circulate under the protection of our own democratic freedoms and laws and we can ban ban our sanctions or sanction foreign state media. It is far more difficult when the narrative laundering happens through EU based actors operating legally within our information space. And so my question is to you, are we prepared to confront this grey zone where foreign interference operates through domestic proxies? And it is very important for the elections. And do we have adequate transparency and accountability mechanisms to address it without undermining fundamental rights? Or are we still regulating yesterday's threat model? I think you already answered to that partially. So thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. I was not expecting so early. I thought after all coordinators and so on. Okay. But anyway, I will speak in Latvian. Could you put on your headphones the structure? The structure that Mr. Commissioner just explained to us really is very complicated. So I would like to ask the following question. It is related to G7 countries. Since the presidential elections in the USA are coming up soon, and the results of these elections might impact also the wish of the US to participate in the cooperation mechanism of this loan. What would happen in the case if the United States of America decide not to participate. And what will the G7 countries do in order to help the EU to fill this space? Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “Thank you. I will speak in Latvian. That's why I put please on headphones. Uh, I would like to thank all three speakers. Uh. And I will not speak about what we are not able to see. Uh, our lack visibility. I will speak about obvious infrastructure. And now I, I checked the Latvian, uh. Of course. Russia continues its aggressive actions against our countries. I come from Latvia and we can see Russia's activities in the Baltic Sea. It happens often and it is not just a local problem for the eastern flank. As you know, incidents have happened in Denmark and Belgium, in Poland, in Germany. They happen every day. We do have our experience with these actions. For example, the NATO mission, the Baltic Sentry, it did have a dissuasive effect since it was introduced. We have not seen new sabotage attacks on the underwater infrastructure. Therefore, dissuasive actions and real physical presence, they do work. We have to continue working therefore on our own initiative on the eastern flank. Which would also strengthen our airspace protection. And we also need to develop our anti-drone capacities. We need radars, we need observation capacity to be able to prevent Russia's hybrid actions and sabotage. To conclude, I would like to say that also looking after our external border means looking after our critical infrastructure. Latvia has prevented more than 11,000 attempts to cross the external border illegally. People trying to cross the border are becoming more and more aggressive. We have already spent €1 billion on protecting our external border, which is also a NATO border. We are building infrastructure. We're developing technological Solutions. Our army and border guards have to mobilize additional resources, work overtime, and it is a huge burden for our budget, for our human resources and for the society as a whole. Therefore, we expect solidarity at the union level. Practical support and financial support when it comes to the next MFF. In order to be able to face these challenges, we need resources. Russia's hybrid attacks will continue and they will become more widespread. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you for your report. I will be very strict. Pressure on Russia is not a peace plan. You need to formulate in a single document its own peace plan proposal. My second question is about frozen assets. If there is no agreement on on the 18th December Council, then what? How EU will provide the financial support to which Ukraine needs badly. And my third question is does EU has a plan to support Ukraine if United States will pressure Ukraine to accept territorial concessions to Russia by deciding not to provide intelligence to Ukraine? Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “I am greeting you particularly, and the oral stories you just told us are very inspiring. But I will get back to, to, let's say, past Because much of our EU responds to foreign information manipulation and interference still treats the problem as external, something that comes from outside into our borders. And but increasingly, foreign regimes do not need their own media outlets. They rely on EU based amplifiers, influencers, fringe political actors, alternative media ecosystems. And this allows hostile narratives to circulate under the protection of our own democratic freedoms and laws. And we can ban, ban our sanctions or sanction foreign state media. It is far more difficult when the narrative laundering happens through EU based actors operating legally within our information space. And so my question is to you, are we prepared to confront this grey zone where foreign interference operates through domestic proxies? And it is very important for the elections? And do we have adequate transparency and accountability mechanisms to address it without undermining fundamental rights, or are we still regulating yesterday's threat model? I think you already answered to that. Partially so thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “I am greeting you particularly, and the oral stories you just told us are very inspiring. But I will get back to, to, let's say, past, because much of our EU response to foreign information manipulation and interference still treats the problem as external, something that comes from outside into our borders. And but increasingly, foreign regimes do not need their own media outlets. They rely on EU based amplifiers, influencers, fringe political actors, alternative media ecosystems. And this allows hostile narratives to circulate under the protection of our own democratic freedoms and laws and we can ban ban our sanctions or sanction foreign state media. It is far more difficult when the narrative laundering happens through EU based actors operating legally within our information space. And so my question is to you, are we prepared to confront this grey zone where foreign interference operates through domestic proxies? And it is very important for the elections. And do we have adequate transparency and accountability mechanisms to address it without undermining fundamental rights? Or are we still regulating yesterday's threat model? I think you already answered to that partially. So thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President. Dear colleagues, the Mercosur agreement comes at a crucial moment of the European Union as some of our closest partners turn inward. We cannot afford to close ourselves off. Strengthening our ties with Latin America is not only economically important, it is strategically essential. This agreement opens a market of 270 million consumers, offering real opportunities for our companies, for growth and for long term competitiveness. I understand concerns from our agricultural sector, but the answer to these concerns is already written in the text. The safeguard instrument we are voting next week is designed precisely to address the concerns of our agricultural sector. It provides clarity and security at a time when markets are already under pressure. The text before us is technical, balanced and fit for purpose. But this only works if we adopt it without amendments. Any amendment sends us into trilogue, delays the process and risks leaving a gap between the entry into force of the agreement and the availability of safeguards that would jeopardise the entire deal and undermine the credibility of the House. The council has already adopted the measure as it stands. We should do the same. Let us act responsibly and give our producers the protection they were promised. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “41:48 – 16:45:18): Thank you. I will continue where rapporteur just finished because listening to the report made by the commission I still got all the statistics but there were no indication of what commission is going to do with those countries who are not complying and remain in place unilateral import bans. If we speak, we are used oftenly to speak about strategic autonomy but without functioning single market that can withstand the pressure of the war next door, now two wars maybe even three wars, strategic autonomy is an illusion. Last year we reached the difficult compromise which was also reported now by commission the results of that compromise and we put in place emergency breaks, reduced quotas for sensitive products and tied market access to environmental standards. We did our job, we created legal framework to protect our farmers while supporting a nation at war as much as we politically were ready to do. Yet today we see the same old story, unilateral import bans remains in place in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. This is absolutely unacceptable. This is a direct gift to the Kremlin and these bans create division where we desperately need solidarity. By maintaining in place these national bans, these member states are not just hurting Ukraine's war economy, they are fragmenting the European Union's market from within. They are telling our partners in Ukraine, Moldova and that an EU signature on trade agreement is only as good as the national politics of the day. Ukraine as we all know is underlying is fighting not only for itself, Ukraine is fighting also for Europe's future and now with the Iranian crisis we must be even more aware about that. The least what we can do is to defend the integrity of our union instead of fracturing it with unilateral bans. And I have question to the commission. I just described about how the bans are destroying legal certainty but my question is how does the commission plan to use the lessons learned from these unilateral bans to create the long term structural solution we need for Ukraine's full accession and commission how you will future approve the EU trade policy to ensure that national level protectionism does not become a new normal. Thank you.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports