Waldemar BUDA

Policy topics Waldemar BUDA is active on

What Waldemar BUDA has said (11)

• 2026-02-18 “E-000701/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission According to the eligibility criteria under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 , contractors and certain subcontractors must be established and have their executive management structures in a Member State, a European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) State, or Ukraine. These entities must not be subject to control by a third country other than EEA EFTA States or Ukraine or by one of their entity or, where they are subject to such a control, they must present security guarantees verified by Member States. All infrastructure, facilities, assets, and resources used for the purposes of the common procurement must in principle be located within the territory of a Member State, an EEA EFTA State, or Ukraine. Accordingly, the eligibility criteria under Article 16 of the SAFE Regulation are defined from an EU (including EEA EFTA States and Ukraine) wide perspective, rather than from the standpoint of any individual Member State. The Commission is responsible for assessing European defence industry investment plans to ensure compliance with the Regulation's conditions in particular those of Article 4, 7(2) and 16. During the implementation, Member States will provide information and evidence of progress in fulfilling the plan. The Commission will assess that conditions under the Regulation are fulfilled before disbursement of the loan instalments. The Regulation on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the EU budget 2 applies to all EU funds, including SAFE funds. Furthermore, the SAFE Regulation requires that the loan agreement will contain provisions on the protection of the financial interests of the EU, and on audit and control. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj/eng.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU competences on defence
• 2025-04-09 “E-001455/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is pursuing consultations with Ukraine to review the reciprocal tariff liberalisation under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 1 in accordance with Article 29 of that Agreement. This review will lead to a well-balanced solution that will allow for reciprocal trade between the EU and Ukraine in agricultural goods, while at the same time protecting EU farmers and addressing interests flagged by some Member States and Members of the European Parliament. Furthermore, the Commission is proposing that the negotiated solution would also include a safeguard clause that would be triggered to prevent any adverse impacts of trade flows on the EU market, including one Member State. The Commission is working in view of having an outcome in place in time to provide a smooth transition after the expiry of the autonomous trade measures (ATMs) Regulation 2 . If this is not achievable the above-mentioned Association Agreement will provide a bridging solution. The Commission does not intend to propose the prolongation of the current ATMs Regulation. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj. 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1392/oj.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• 2025-03-14 “E-001106/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The term ‘migratory pressure’ 1 is defined in Article 2(24) of the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 2 (AMMR). The term ‘significant migratory situation’ is defined in Article 2(25) AMMR as ‘a situation different from migratory pressure where the cumulative effect of current and previous annual arrivals of third-country nationals or stateless persons leads a well-prepared asylum, reception and migration system to reach the limits of its capacity’. According to Article 10(1) AMMR, when the Commission assesses whether a Member State is under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure or confronted with a significant migratory situation, it has to use the European Annual Asylum and Migration Report assessing the asylum, reception and migratory situation over the previous 12-month period and any possible developments. The Commission shall also take into account the information listed in Articles 9(3)(a) and 10(2) and, in the case of a significant migratory situation, in Article 10(3) AMMR. This information includes, among others, the number of applications for international protection, the number of third-country nationals disembarked following search and rescue operations, the number of third-country nationals or stateless persons enjoying temporary protection, the number of persons apprehended in connection with an irregular crossing of an external border, possible situations of instrumentalisation of migrants as well as scale and trends of unauthorised movements of third-country nationals or stateless persons between Member States. 1 Migratory pressure is defined as ‘a situation brought about by arrivals by land, sea or air or applications of third-country nationals or stateless persons, that are of such a scale that they create disproportionate obligations on a Member State, taking into account the overall situation in the EU, even on a well-prepared asylum, reception and migration system and require immediate action, in particular solidarity contributions pursuant to Part IV of this Regulation; taking into account the specificities of the geographical location of a Member State, ‘migratory pressure’ covers situations where there is a large number of arrivals of third-country nationals or stateless persons or a risk of such arrivals, including where such arrivals stem from recurring disembarkations following search and rescue operations, or from unauthorised movements of third-country nationals or stateless persons between the Member States’. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401351”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-03-14 “P-001105/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Council Implementing Decision 2022/382 1 , establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine and having the effect of introducing temporary protection, specifies in Article 2(1) and (2) the categories of persons who receive temporary protection and their rights. Member States must ensure that beneficiaries of temporary protection on their territory enjoy these rights. For further information on the obligations of Member States, the Commission refers the Honourable Member to the guidance documents and operational guidelines 2 . According to Article 64(1) of the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR) 3 , financial contributions consist of transfers from the contributing Member States to the EU budget. Pursuant to Article 64(2) of the AMMR, the benefitting Member States shall identify actions eligible for funding, and the Commission shall collaborate closely with them to ensure that those actions correspond to the objectives of the Annual Solidarity Pool (Articles 56(2)(b) and 56(3)) of the AMMR. The Commission is working on the assessment of migratory pressure, risk of migratory pressure and significant migratory situation. The assessments of these situations will be based on both quantitative and qualitative data, in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the AMMR. 1 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection, OJ L 71, 4.3.2022, p. 1–6 (https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2022/382/oj/eng). 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/asylum-eu/temporary-protection0_en?prefLang=da#obligations-of-eu-countries-towards-persons-enjoying-temporary-protection. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024 (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1351/oj).”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-05 “E-000547/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation 1 foresees a mandatory but flexible solidarity mechanism, whereby each Member State has full discretion to choose between the available forms of solidarity, namely relocation, financial contributions and alternative measures (in-kind support). A reference key, based on the size of the population (50% weighting) and of the Gross Domestic Product of the Member States (50% weighting), should be applied in accordance with the mandatory fair share principle for the operation of the solidarity mechanism enabling the determination of the overall contribution of each Member State. The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation also foresees possible deduction of solidarity contributions for Member States facing migratory pressure or a significant migratory situation. The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation also requires that each year, by 15 October, the Commission adopts an implementing decision determining whether a particular Member State is under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure during the upcoming year, or facing a significant migratory situation. In doing so, the Commission will take into account qualitative and quantitative indicators, in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the Regulation, including the number of beneficiaries of temporary protection in a given Member State. Military assistance provided to Ukraine is not among the indicators set by the Regulation. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-12-05 “E-002800/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) will ensure that the carbon price of cement imported into the EU is equivalent to the carbon price of domestic production under the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Under the EU ETS, the number of free emission allowances declines over time for all sectors. For CBAM sectors like cement, the decline accelerates as from 2026 to maximise the impact of the ETS in fulfilling the EU’s climate goals. In line with the phase-out of the allocation of free allowances under the EU ETS, the CBAM financial adjustment is phased in gradually. As required by the CBAM Regulation, a report on the application of the CBAM is foreseen in 2025 before the end of the transitional phase 1 . In view of the expiration of the Autonomous Trade Measures for Ukraine in June 2025, the Commission is working on a review of reciprocal trade liberalisation under Article 29 of the Association Agreement. However, since cement was already fully liberalised by the original Association Agreement, it was not affected by the Autonomous Trade Measures nor is it within the scope of the review. The Commission is aware of the challenges that companies and households face due to high energy prices. The EU has jointly responded to Russia's energy market manipulation and the subsequent high inflation. The energy dimension of the Clean Industrial Deal and the forthcoming Action Plan for Affordable Energy will address the high energy prices and aim at unlocking all possible decarbonisation pathways for EU industries. Further fuel switches and energy efficiency improvements can also help to reduce energy costs. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/956, Article 30(2).”
  Climate efforts
• 2024-11-14 “P-002536/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) are independent assessments produced by external consultants on behalf of the Commission. These usually analyse the impact of trade agreements on the EU as a whole. Similarly, the Commission is currently analysing the economic impact of the negotiated outcome which is expected to be concluded before the proposal for signature and conclusion is sent by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Member States are free to carry out their own SIAs based on their perceived exposure to the agreement. For instance, the Irish government requested an independent economic and sustainability impact assessment for Ireland of the EU-Mercosur Agreement 1 . The Belgian government commissioned an independent economic impact assessment for Belgium of the EU-Mercosur Agreement on the impact for Belgian economic sectors 2 . Another study was carried out by Wageningen Economic & Research 3 assessing the impact of the EU-Mercosur Agreement on the Netherlands. Now that a final political agreement has been reached between the EU and Mercosur, and after completion of the legal verification and translation into all official languages, the Commission will transmit a proposal to the Council and the European Parliament for signature and conclusion of the agreement. In that context, the Commission will present its proposal for the legal basis and architecture of the deal after an assessment of the outcome of the negotiations. 1 https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/1c8a6-economic-and-sustainability-impact-assessment-for-ireland-of-the-eumercosur-trade-agreement/ 2 https://economie.fgov.be/fr/publications/accord-de-libre-echange-entre 3 Wageningen University & Research - Report 2020-065: Effecten van het EU-Mercosur akkoord op de Nederlandse economie: https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/effecten-van-het-eu-mercosur-akkoord-op-denederlandse-economie”
  Trade relations with Mercosur · Free trade agreements (FTAs) · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• “Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the ECR Group, I would like to present our position to the opinion prepared by the author. And I have to be radical here. We oppose directly the direction proposed by the European Commission, and we are completely against what our colleague has proposed here. I think it's worth of a madhouse here, because the only objective here for farming should be protection of climate. This is what we read here. If we go down this road, then of course we will protect the climate totally if we reduce to zero Farming in Europe. So, you know, it is a crazy talk. It's it's like turbo green deal proposed by the European Commission. And our colleague, it has been even turned up a notch. So I think we have to change the author because I don't know whom you are, whom you represent here, because we sit here representing farmers, and we should be reducing the burden imposed on the farmers. And you want to burden the farmers even more with additional environmental conditions. If we want to have the agriculture in Europe. The first condition we have to impose would be more competition, more production, more experts. And what you talk here about is only climate protection. And before we have 35%. Now you propose 50. We are completely against this. We will propose amendments, and I suggest we change the author of the opinion because this direction is just crazy talk.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “Ladies and gentlemen, I have a question to everyone here. Can. Are you able to respond to? Well, I'd like to react to one specific point, if I may. What's the logic behind an economic and trade policy on the part of the EU in this current period? On the one hand, we have climate rules that limit our own production. And on the other hand, we're moving production to other parts of the world or we're importing. Is that a true economic policy? Where will it take us in the long run? And. 20 years ago, we opened up trade with China. We exported our factories there, destroyed markets. And what's the upshot? Well, we lose a couple percentage points every year. Our markets are under pressure. Our producers are struggling. And the same will happen with South America and Brazil. First will seldom cars produced in the EU. And then what will have factories there. Job losses here. They will have the technology. In the meantime, we'll kill our agriculture. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen. All of the preceding speakers have talked, have talked about doubts and fears. And we see the true commissioner might be the person to open the way forward to something that your predecessor, um, prevented. Uh, do we want to go down in history as. Do you want to go down in history as the person who accepted the unfair competition from Mercosur and from Ukraine? We've seen the farmers protests in the streets. We have to force the commission to take action. We all have our doubts about, uh, this new direction of things next week. Really important decisions have to be taken. So. If you have doubts, you shouldn't be supporting Mr. von der Leyen's commission. Do you really think that we should be importing food from all over the world? Uh uh, we might be surviving now, but, uh, next year. Perhaps some of that food from outside Europe won't be able to enter our region because of, uh, blockades or embargoes. Has Covid taught us nothing? Surviving on food from outside is no solution. We are giving a yellow card today for the von der Leyen team. The ambition of the commission should be considerably higher. The world is changing and the EU has to change too.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU
• “Mr. Commissioner, ladies and gentlemen, before us, there should be a black coffin placed today. Ladies and gentlemen, we discuss about the budgetary proposals for the next financial perspective, with the cohesion policy reduced by 50%. This is like a clinical death. This is a disaster. And of course, I have no, uh, grievances to, uh, to Commissioner Fitto. This budget was prepared by a Polish citizen, Piotr Serafin. And we can, of course, agree on certain shifts, but not at the expense of cohesion policy and regional policy. Not at their expense. These funds should be duly allocated in Poland. The funds are um, um, uh, lost on yachts, on techno music. And I invite you, Commissioner, to look at the spending of the resilience and recovery funds in Poland when I was in charge. Uh, it was really, uh, driving our economy. Now it's just a scandal.”
  Cohesion and rural funding