Kaja Kallas

Policy topics Kaja Kallas is active on

What Kaja Kallas has said (80)

• 2026-07-13 “Yes. First on fish. I must say that before I was, you know, in this job, I didn't know that fish are so job analytical. You know, all the like, fish are really, really something that are hindering all important job analytical processes. But yes, there are different things put forward by different member states that have to be removed from the package. Of course, it's always good to come as strong, you know, the proposals are as strong as possible. So we always know that some things are taken out. So eventually, we still have a strong package. When it comes to ex-combatants, the work will continue on this because clearly, this is a risk to our own security, and we should not let these people come to Europe. In Ukraine, we have programs where we help with the veterans, I mean, psychological support, also the support that they are reintegrated into society. Russia does not have anything like this. These are dangerous people. We have to see and work how we really live post-war in post-war area because these people are presenting a risk. But like I said, this is the first step, and we are definitely working with that for more. Then, yes, overall, I think we have put so many packages. And, of course, in some countries, maybe, you know, the political consensus is somewhere else, and we see also elections coming. But again, I want to stress that for our economy, whether it's member state from the East, West, South, or North, it is best when this war ends to all of us. So we need to increase the pressure still to stop it and help Ukraine at the same time so that Russia would see that they come to the negotiation table. We have this opportunity window right now considering that Ukraine is in a stronger position than they have been, and Russia is in a weaker position than they have been before. And we need to really take this short term pain for a long term gain.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-07-13 “Yes. Again, I can't single out any element of this sanctions package. Our aim is to have agreement. If we don't have agreement, then we start to work on plan B. But right now, we work on plan A for Wednesday. On this note, have a lovely evening, and we will see you at the next opportunity. Thank you very much.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-07-13 “Well, Commission or College is also a collegial body. So where we have representatives from all the member states. And I think sorry. I've been talking too much today. Sorry. And so in the Commission, the member states' views are equally reflected like we see them in the Council. So this is, unfortunately where we are, as Europe. We need to have unified position. And so far, we have not been able to have that unified position. You know, there is a legal opinion that we can do this also with the qualified majority. I mean, the Council legal service has said that. And, you know, if there is a will, then we can move forward. I think that's your answer.”
  EU political integration
• 2026-07-13 “Thank you. We have just concluded a long meeting of foreign ministers. First, on Ukraine. We started with breakfast, where we had, together with Ireland, when we go hosted a session on the fate of Ukrainian civilian detainees. Thousands are being held illegally in Russian prisons, including in Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. The evidence of torture, sexual violence, and complete denial of due process is overwhelming. Testimonies we heard today were a powerful reminder that behind every statistic is a human life. And on the territories, that we are talking about in the peace process, also, it's a question of human fate. The EU continues to pursue accountability. Ministers adopted sanctions targeting Russia's prison system and agreed to increase support to the NGOs helping victims and their families. We also launched a new informal group, to coordinate international action, for their release. Together with Minister Sebiha, we discussed the battlefield situation and strengthening Ukraine's energy resilience. Next winter, Russia is likely to strike the Ukrainian power grid again, so we are preparing. Ukraine needs generators, spare parts, and funding for repairs. Air defense also remains a priority, and I called on those member states who have stocks to make them available to Ukraine. The United States' decision to let Kyiv produce Patriot missiles under license is a positive step even if it takes time. Today was the 9th time in a row that the Foreign Affairs Council imposed new sanctions on Russia. We're sanctioning Russia at unprecedented speed and scale. Today's measures, together with the upcoming 21st sanctions package, hold over 250 listings. This constitutes our biggest round of individual sanctions since Russia's 2022 invasion. The financial backbone of Russia's war machine is the main target. Now I want to single out one issue specifically. Russian cyber attacks are increasing in scale and severity. For the first time, the EU and the UK simultaneously sanctioned the broader ecosystem that enables these attacks, including criminals, hacktivists, and companies operating on Moscow's behest. This is the largest EU cyber sanctions package ever adopted. The EU will also summon a Russian representative to the European Union over Moscow's cyber campaign. Reducing Russia's capacity to wage war is one thing. Preventing it from being shrugged off as normal is another. The International Olympic Committee's decision to invite Russian athletes back to international competitions is blind to reality. Ministers strongly condemn such decision as it coincides with Russia killing a record number of Ukrainian civilians. So it looks like the International Olympic Committee is rewarding such attacks. The Commission is ending the funding to Vienna's Venice Biennale. Culture and support must not become vehicles of whitewashing aggression. It's a long day. Ministers also reviewed the EU Black Sea strategy since launch last year. The EU has initiated 65 projects worth around €200 million across the region. The Black Sea Maritime Security Hub led by Romania and Bulgaria together will help enhance maritime situational awareness and protection of critical infrastructure. We also put forward an ambitious connectivity agenda worth billions. Both Armenia and Moldova face external coercion. Last week, the EU announced a major economic support package for Armenia to help counter Russian pressure. Ministers today gave a go ahead for our new EU mission to begin its work on the ground. EU experts will support the Armenian authorities in dealing with cyber threats, disinformation, and countering illicit financial flows. Ministers also adopted an additional €120,000,000 under the European Peace Facility for Moldova. This is the biggest support package to date and will strengthen the country's air defenses. On the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus raised Turkey's plan for a gas pipeline with the island. The EU expects Ankara to respect the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU member states. The wider Middle East is stuck in a dangerous cycle of attacks, counterattacks, and fragile ceasefire. Iran strikes on commercial shipping violate international law and the memorandum of understanding. Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz was open to shipping without tolls. After the end of the war, the Strait must be open to shipping without tolls. Ministers were clear that navigation must be unimpeded, and Iran must never have a nuclear weapon. Our Gulf partners play a vital role in regional stability, and it was good to be joined by the GCC representatives. Iran's attacks against Jordan, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain are unacceptable and risk a total collapse of the peace deal or interim peace deal. EU seeks closer ties with the Gulf. Last night, EU and Bahrain launched negotiations of new strategic partnership agreement with the GCC partners. We discussed the latest development and how we can protect the freedom of navigation both in the Gulf, but also in the Red Sea. The Houthi threat persists, and operational speed has continued to make an important contribution to protect international shipping. And this week, in coming days, I will also travel to the region to inspect the mission myself. In Gaza, the peace process has stalled. Yesterday, I had discussions with the Palestinian Prime Minister, Mustafa, on the state of play. The Palestine donor group today raised 900,000,000 euros. The EU is the most credible supporter for the Palestinian people. We are the largest donor and the strongest backer of the two-state solution. And this leads me to the West Bank. All the 27 member states agree that Israeli settlements are illegal under international law. Currently, the EU applies a so-called differentiation policy under which products from the settlements are identified. However, this policy has not done much to limit trade with settlements because implementation is inconsistent. Following a request of the European Council in June, the Commission presented options to further restrict trade with illegal Israeli settlements. These include full or partial ban on imports of settlement products, stricter export licensing requirements, and the possible use of tariffs. These are not options against Israel. These are options against the illegal settlements that undermine the two-state solution. Taking action against the trade with settlements got the most support from the member states. We tasked the ambassadors to take this work forward and probably we'll also have an extraordinary meeting on this. Then our ministers also touched upon EU-UN relations and agreed our priorities ahead of the September General Assembly. As the UN enters into a period of leadership changes, the choices we make will shape the organization for years. We want to maximize EU influence in the international fora. On Bosnia and Herzegovina, I briefed the ministers on my trip and also the developments regarding the appointment of the new High Representative. Sorry. We are determined to have a European candidate who can help move the country closer to the EU. And ultimately, the success of the High Representative will be measured by the day when it's no longer needed. And finally, Sudan, the humanitarian situation is rapidly deteriorating. Atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces against civilians in El Fasher must not be repeated in El Obaid. Today, EU is expanding its sanctions by banning imports of gold and restricting mining chemicals. This will help cut off key funding sources for the conflict. I will also travel to Ethiopia to discuss the crisis with regional partners. So as you can see, we covered many issues, and that's why the meeting was so long. But I will stop here and take your questions.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-07-13 “Thank you. Yes. I also regret that we don't have agreement on the 21st package, although I must say that we are quite close. But focusing on the positive, we had 250 listings, which are also very important under different regimes. So still, I mean, all focusing on putting more pressure on Russia. Of course, member states have various reasons. This war has been going on for years and more. And, of course, it has effect on all, but the best effect on our economy, all the member states in all the member states would be if this war would end. And that's why we would have to make the necessary efforts in the short term that we wouldn't have this war. So today, also, we had these intense discussions, and the call was to really focus on ending this war that we are trying to do with putting more pressure on Russia.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-07-13 “Thank you. Yes. So as the preparation for the meeting was that ministers were to express clear thoughts how they see the work forward, and that's why we saw that this is all the options, the option that got the most support. So we tasked the corporate ambassadors to take this work forward. And also ministers agreed that if necessary, we can also reconvene in, you know, extraordinary meeting if necessary. When it comes to legal opinion, then, European Council has a legal opinion that trade issues are QMV decisions. But it is always so with anything, you know, you can always find different lawyers who come up with different ideas. So two lawyers, three opinions.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-06-16 “45:25 – 10:48:38): Honorable members, thank you for your interventions. 1st, on sanctions against Iran, they will remain. This is our, economic leverage, that we have to, very carefully also take into account whatever is agreed. Otherwise, I mean, we have to make our own decisions. Then to the MEP, Sanchez Amor, I've always represented European position. And it is true that in in the case of of Russia, we have a unified position. In case of Middle East, we also have a unified position on many issues like, you know, support for the 2 state solution, support for the humanitarian aid, that the humanitarian aid should not be politicized, all these things, also are asked to the Israeli government. But, when it comes to the trade issues, we don't still have a common position, and that is what I'm, also, representing. To, also, you and and MFP, Coils, I absolutely agree that the fundamental issue of the of the Middle East is is Israeli, Palestine issue. So, it is true that all these other wars are related to this. So if we don't have agreement, on on this or normalization of this process, then, we will have these wars over and over again. And and there, I also agree what, MEP, Voortmans was saying about, you know, accountability. I think, you know, these peace agreements do not address 2 fundamental issues. 1 is accountability. If you don't see anybody held accountable for the injustice that has been done to your family, then, you know, you will seek revenge and retaliation, and this vicious circle will just continue. And the other issue is the issue of refugees. All those people who have been driving off, you know, West Bank and and they have nowhere to go. So so, really, I mean, this needs to be addressed as well. To, MEP Boylan, EU is 27 member states. So it is also clear that, we need to talk about our decision making procedures because the current world is showing us that we are not up to our task because we are not able to make decisions. And to MEP, sell, we have a European, peace plan, for Ukraine. I mean, it was discussed in with the foreign ministers in in Cyprus. It is very clear, what is our plan. We are, continuing also to support Ukraine and pressure, Russia and the peace plan we have in order to have a long and and sustainable, peace so that, Russia would not attack countries. But it's not the topic of this, debate, really.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-06-16 “26:22 – 10:31:55): Dear president, honorable members, for the past 2 days, there have been grounds for cautious optimism regarding the situation in The Middle East. The announcement of the deal between United States and Iran, to end the war and reopen the Strait Of Hormuz could be a breakthrough. It has the potential to create space for deeper talks on other critical issues, including Iran's nuclear program and regional stability. And once fully implemented, this agreement should also contribute to easing pressures on global energy market. While the details regarding the scope and timeline of the MOU are still emerging, 1 thing is clear. For any settlement to be sustainable, it must be fully consistent with the international law and implementation must be verifiable. The Strait Of Hormuz has to become again open and toll free. I commend the mediation, efforts led by Pakistan and Qatar as well as the constructive engagement of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. Their diplomacy has been essential in preventing an all out war and arriving at the deal. Honorable members, in recent days, I've been speaking with many of my counterparts from these countries to explore how the EU can contribute to the next phase. From economic leverage and technical expertise on nuclear issues to broader diplomatic engagement, the EU stands ready to, support a sustainable resolution and that advances regional stability while protecting our interests and the security. It is evident, however, that the most difficult phase of this process still lies ahead. The EU rejects any measures that would impose additional costs to the maritime shipping in the Strait Of Hormuz. Moreover, we coordinate with partners worldwide to maintain a cohesive front against any attempt to limit freedom of navigation and weaken international law. Just last week, the council adopted new listings targeting those involved in Iran's actions threatening freedom of navigation. In parallel, our defensive naval operation, Aspidus, continues to protect shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf Of Aden, another key area to assert the freedom of navigation. Yemen's Houthis continue to pose a dangerous threat to shipping. And this is why we now have a record number of ships on patrol in the area, and we will remain vigilant. Beyond Iran, the situation in Lebanon remains highly fragile and requires continued international attention as a comprehensive deal is implemented. The ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel must hold as it is an opportunity to end the conflict, give diplomacy a chance, and create the conditions for sustainable de escalation. We will continue to support the Lebanese authorities, in particular, in their determination to disarm Hezbollah. Civilian populations in Israel and Lebanon deserve peace and stability. We must also maintain our full attention on the situation in Gaza and in the West Bank. Israel's latest plan to rapidly expand West Bank settlements are not in line with the international law and further undermine the prospects of a 2 state solution. Regarding the trade with illegal settlements, yesterday at the Foreign Affairs Council, a large number of member states called for concrete proposals from the commission, and several said that they would want to work on proposals which give clarity on different possible ways forward. I will convey this request, at the college meeting and ask the commission to prepare ahead of the next foreign affairs council a list of options for possible trade measures, including measures aimed at preventing imports of goods originating from illegal settlements. I will also seek the commission assessment on the scope of issues related to the rules of origin, another point raised by the member states. The EU remains steadfast in its support for the 2 state solution as the only viable path to sustainable end to the Israeli Palestinian conflict and to lasting peace and security in the Middle East. Regional normalization is a powerful incentive and should be accompanied by progress between Israelis and Palestinians. We see no progress in implementation of the Gaza peace plan, but the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is growing. We cannot wait longer. That is why the EU calls for the immediate and unhindered flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza and will support early recovery as soon as conditions allow. Hamas needs to decommission its weapons and border crossings need to be reopened fully in line with the comprehensive plan. Dear president, honorable members, from Gaza to Lebanon, from Red Sea to the Strait Of Hormuz, the EU will continue working, with all partners to advance peace, security, and prosperity for the benefit of our citizens and the people of the Middle East alike. I thank you for your support and look forward to the debate. Thank you.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-06-16 “40:28 – 11:43:18): Thank you, colleagues for this round of debate. I will just address some of the issues. MEP Montanero, glad you're here. We are not celebrating anything. Like I said in my speech as well, the 60 days that lies ahead is actually the more difficult time, to, address all these issues of, of nuclear about, you know, issues in the region. So so we are definitely not celebrating. Like I said, we are cautiously optimistic, but we have seen that these ceasefires also don't hold. So, we are worried, of course. On MEP Andrews, regarding the labeling of, settlement goods or mislabeling of settlement goods, we had the discussion with the foreign ministers yesterday. Course, I'm not the trade expert, but, the agreement was that, the commission should come, with the proposal so that, member states, can also discuss. Then on EU is not seen in The Middle East. We have been, constantly engaged with the regional actors, and and they are also interested in us being part of the security architecture of The Middle East because clearly balancing also the situation there. And when it was, you know, EU coordinated the consular, response to get people out of the region, we have done a lot. But, yes, maybe it's not that visible, as as some other parties have been doing. Then, on the also somebody mentioned you mentioned that you meant, with the, young people from Palestine and and Israel. I also met them in the 2 states conference, what we had in Paris on Friday. And and what they were really stressing there, I mean, like, MEP Demiral was saying, people need peace. This is what what, they are saying. I mean, they might have a different past, but they have a common future. How to make it sure? And I totally agree with those who say that, you know, deciding to start the war, these people who decide, don't really pay the price. I mean, it's paid by regular people on the ground who who lose their lives and and who lose their homes. And then, you know, the issue of refugees comes, in place. If you have nowhere to go, then, it comes to us. On on Lebanon, we actually have a common stance. We are supporting the Lebanese armed forces. I'm over time okay. So I can't answer to to all of these questions, but I say that, these are difficult times, and we try to do what we can. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-06-10 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 10.6.2026 Written question Plans to establish a structure such as an ‘intelligence cell’ are subject to exchanges between the Commission and the European External Action Service, in full compliance with relevant Treaty principles. Currently, the European External Action Service hosts the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre which has a specific mandate. The European Union pursues its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it by the Treaties.”
  EU competences on defence · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2026-06-08 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 8.6.2026 Written question Developments in Iran and the wider region threaten regional and global security. The EU welcomes the ceasefire agreed upon by the US and Iran and will contribute to all diplomatic efforts to pursue a comprehensive strategy for lasting peace across the region. The EU remains committed to safeguarding freedom of navigation, in line with international law, as reflected in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), and the security of global maritime trade routes, including through Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES [1] . Responding to the rising and volatile energy prices and energy security concerns, the Commission published a communication AccelerateEU [2] that lays out a series of measures in support of governments and EU consumers. The EU is also implementing policies to boost the domestic production of critical raw materials (such as the Critical Raw Materials Act [3] and the RESourceEU Action Plan [4] ), and to diversify its supply with trusted partners, notably via the 16 partnerships it has signed on critical raw materials. The EU has not observed any increase in migratory movements towards the EU as a result of the Middle East crisis. However, the EU is closely monitoring the situation, including of migrant workers and of Afghan migrants and refugees in the region, and it is in continuous contact with Member States, partner countries and all relevant stakeholders. The Commission is encouraging Member States to prioritise preparedness and contingency planning, in line with the Pact on Migration and Asylum [5] . The EU Foreign Affairs Ministers have agreed that the Iran sanctions framework will be broadened to also be able to target those responsible for a possible prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz [6] . [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-aspides_en?s=410381. [2] COM(2026) 370 final: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7fac9eea-5717-4182-a368-bd68c427ff4c_en?filename=Communication.pdf. [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj. [4] COM(2025) 945 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0945. [5] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. [6] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/05/11/.”
  EU-Iran relations · Asylum & border control
• 2026-06-05 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 5.6.2026 Written question In relation to the Israeli interception of the flotilla on 30 April 2026, the EU has made clear that no attacks or any use of force against the flotilla, including drone strikes or seizures, are acceptable. The EU reiterates its call on Israel to respect international law, including international humanitarian law and international maritime law. The freedom of navigation under international law must be upheld. What the activists wish to achieve is raising awareness about the catastrophic situation in Gaza and delivering much needed aid to a people in desperate need. However, while the EU respects the humanitarian commitment of those aboard the flotilla and recognise the challenges in delivering aid to Gaza, the EU discourages flotillas as a form of aid delivery, as they risk the safety of their participants. The EU, including through outreach by the High Representative/Vice-President, remains in regular contact with Member States and with Israel regarding the humanitarian situation in Gaza and reiterates our consistent call for rapid and unimpeded delivery of aid. In light of the catastrophic situation in Gaza and following a review of Israel’s obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement [1] which the High Representative/Vice-President conducted with the support of a majority of Member States, the President of the Commission proposed a package of measures during her State of the Union address in September 2025. Discussions continue in the Council on the package of measures presented by the Commission following the review. Any decision to suspend the Association Agreement requires unanimity in the Council, meaning the agreement of all 27 Member States. [1] https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-06-03 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 3.6.2026 Written question The EU has repeatedly expressed its deep concern regarding Israel’s offensive in Lebanon and the devastating humanitarian consequences thereof [1] . The EU stresses that attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, healthcare personnel and facilities, as well as on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) personnel are unjustified, unacceptable and in breach of International Humanitarian Law. The EU calls on all parties to respect the recently agreed temporary ceasefire, fully supports the continuation of bilateral dialogue between Israel and Lebanon and encourages negotiations as a path to lasting stability and de-escalation in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 [2] . We have continuously called upon Israel to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and on Hezbollah to stop its attacks on Israel. The EU will continue to stand by Lebanon, its authorities and its people and has provided EUR 100 million in humanitarian assistance to answer the basic needs of the most affected populations supports the government-led emergency response under the EUR 1 billion package for 2024-2027. The EU supports the government’s efforts in reforms to strengthen the state institutions and services and in implementing its decision to disarm all non-state armed groups, notably via substantial support to the Lebanese Armed Forces, through the European Peace Facility and to the Lebanon’s security sector through the Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/foreign-affairs-council-press-conference-high-representative-kaja-kallas_en. [2] https://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1701/.”
  EU-Lebanon relations · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2026-06-03 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 3.6.2026 Written question The EU is closely following developments in north-east Syria, including reports of the disappearance of two journalists in Raqqa. Consular assistance to EU citizens remains an exclusive national competence. The EU consistently recalls that all parties must respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including the protection of journalists and the prohibition of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance. The reported disappearance of these two journalists underscores the broader issue of missing persons across Syria, and the need for efficient investigations. The EU calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to conduct prompt, transparent and impartial investigations into all such cases, in cooperation with the National Commission for Missing Persons as well as relevant international mechanisms, such as the International Commission on Missing Persons and the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The EU will continue to advocate for a safe and enabling environment for independent reporting and media in Syria, in line with international standards, and to support efforts that uphold freedom of expression.”
  EU relations with Kurdish people · EU-Syria relations
• 2026-05-27 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question The EU takes very seriously the threat posed by extremist radical views sowing social division, polarisation and radicalisation in Europe. In close cooperation with Member States, the EU monitors the evolving risks linked to organisations trying to unduly influence the EU institutions, including radical and extremist non-state actors, as well as interference from third countries. The legal prerequisite for the listing of new individuals, groups or entities, under Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 of 26 February 2026 [1] , is a decision by a competent authority as defined by Article 2(3) of the decision. Such a decision should concern the involvement of the individual or entity in question in a ‘terrorist act’ as defined by Article 1(1) of the aforementioned Decision. On that basis, the Council decides on a listing pursuant to Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 [2] , acting by unanimity. The Commission remains committed to preventing and combatting all forms of radicalisation, as well as hatred, racism and discrimination, including those related to actual or perceived religion or belief. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600455. [2] please see footnote 1.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · EU policy on Islam
• 2026-05-27 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question 1. The presence of the United Kingdom (UK) Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus is a matter for Cyprus. 2. The EU Treaties do not apply to the UK SBAs as these areas are the territory of the UK, except a limited application by virtue of Protocol No 3 [1] and of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement [2] , notably the Protocol relating to the SBAs of the UK in Cyprus. 3. The European Council of 19 March 2026 acknowledged the intention of Cyprus to initiate a discussion with the UK on the UK bases in Cyprus and expressed readiness to provide assistance as needed. The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure Eastern Mediterranean. [1] Protocol No 3 on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Cyprus annexed to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, Official Journal L 236, 23/09/2003 P. 0940 — 944. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12020W/TXT.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-UK relations
• 2026-05-26 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The EU stands firmly and unequivocally in support of any Member State in the face of any threat. The EU strongly condemns the indiscriminate military strikes by Iran. In the context of the overall security situation within the continent and its neighbourhood, discussions on implementing Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union are ongoing. Invocation of the mutual assistance clause is the sovereign prerogative of a Member State that is the victim of an armed aggression. Moreover, it is the attacked Member State that communicates the type of assistance it requires in a given situation. This could include support at EU level, whether in terms of EU instruments and tools, or coordination support, if so requested. In this context, there is a need to develop a common understanding of the article’s implementation, specifically what could be done concretely in a situation where the article is invoked, in order for a Member State to ask for and receive help and what instruments and tools can be used in such an occasion, including at EU level, should the attacked Member State(s) so request.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU competences on defence
• 2026-05-26 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. In this context, the EU attaches the greatest importance to safeguarding the sovereign rights of all Member States, in full respect of international law. Unequivocal commitment to international agreements and the UN Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. The Commission is aware of reports regarding the alleged obstruction of cable-laying activities under the SEA-SPINE project co-funded by Connecting European Facility (CEF Digital) [1] , which aims to enhance digital connectivity between Greek islands and it is a strategic priority for the EU’s digital transition. Following inquiries via European Health and Digital Executive Agency , the consortium confirmed that the Ocean Link vessel completed its scheduled works between Amorgos and Astypalaia without disruption. While no formal notification of hailing was received, the Commission underscores that all EU-funded infrastructure projects operate in full compliance with international law (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [2] ). The EU rejects any unilateral actions that impede lawful activities . Given the critical role of submarine cables in securing the EU’s digital resilience, the Commission is in close cooperation with Member States to ensure the smooth completion of the project and will continue to monitor closely the situation and the project’s implementation. [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-makes-available-eu200-million-submarine-cable-and-digital-infrastructure-projects. [2] https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-05-26 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The EU has a strategic interest in a secure and stable environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. A comprehensive settlement of the Republic of Cyprus issue would significantly contribute to sustainable stability and security in the region. The EU continuously calls on Türkiye to normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all Member States, as well as all their sovereign rights, in accordance with EU and international law. The EU has welcomed the support provided by Member States through the deployment of military assets in the Eastern Mediterranean and in support of the Republic of Cyprus and remains determined to defend its interests and those of its Member States.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-05-26 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question Ukraine has successfully repaired and reopened on 23 April 2026 the Druzhba oil pipeline which was previously damaged by Russia’s attacks. Ukraine has therefore restored the flow of crude oil to Hungary and Slovakia. The EU’s priority is to ensure energy security for all European citizens. That’s why the Commission engaged in intense discussions with Member States and Ukraine at all levels to help restore the flow of oil to Hungary and Slovakia [1] . The EU also played a role by offering Ukraine technical support and funding. The EU will also continue to work on alternative routes for the transit of non-Russian crude oil to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. [1] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_26_624.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-05-22 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The EU is a strong supporter of international law, including International Humanitarian Law, and the integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention [1] . The use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time and under any circumstances is a violation of international law. The EU recalls that the use of herbicides is regulated by the UN Environmental Modification Convention from 1976 which prohibits military or any hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The EU will continue to reaffirm its commitment to the applicability of international human rights and humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territory, Lebanon and Syria. The High Representative/Vice-President conducted, with the support of a majority of Member States, a review of Israel’s compliance with its obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement [2] . The conclusion of the review was that there are indications that Israel would be in breach of its obligations. Following the review, the Commission’s President announced a set of proposed measures for the EU to address the catastrophic situation in Gaza. It includes a reinforced package of sanctions, and a partial suspension of the Association Agreement on certain trade-related matters. Discussions continue in the Council on those measures. The EU has suspended its bilateral cooperation with Israel, without impacting the support to civil society and Yad Vashem — the Holocaust Remembrance Centre. The EU urges all external actors, without exception, to fully respect Syria’s and Lebanon’s unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU further condemns any attempts to undermine Syria’s stability and prospects for a peaceful and inclusive transition. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/disarmament-non-proliferation-and-arms-export-control-0_en. [2] https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf.”
  EU-Lebanon relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2026-05-21 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question The Commission takes very seriously the threat posed by extremist radical views sowing social division, polarisation and radicalisation in Europe. In close cooperation with Member States, the Commission monitors the evolving risks linked to organisations trying to unduly influence the European institutions, including radical and extremist non-state actors, as well as interference from third countries. The legal prerequisite for the listing of new individuals, groups or entities, under Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 of 26 February 2026 on restrictive measures to combat terrorism, repealing Articles 2, 3 and 3a of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism [1] , is a decision by a competent authority as defined by Articles 2(3) of the decision. Such a decision should concern the involvement of the individual or entity in question in a ‘terrorist act’ as defined by Article 1(1) of the aforementioned Decision. In addition, the Council may decide on a listing pursuant to Decision (CFSP) 2026/455, acting by unanimity. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600455.”
  EU policy on Islam
• 2026-05-21 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question There are serious doubts about a number of elements in the charter of the Board of Peace related to its scope, its governance and its compatibility with the UN Charter. The EU is ready to work together with the US on the implementation of the comprehensive Peace Plan for Gaza, with the Board of Peace carrying out its mission as a transitional administration, in accordance with the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2803 (2025) [1] . The EU welcomed the adoption of the UNSC resolution 2803, which refers to the Board of Peace, and it has called on all parties to implement the Resolution in its entirety. The EU has been clear about the readiness to work together with partners on the implementation of the comprehensive Peace Plan for Gaza in accordance with UNSC resolution 2803. In relation to the third question, the Commission does not take a position in this regard. [1] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4093207?v=pdf.”
  EU-US relations · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2026-05-19 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The EU has repeatedly expressed its deep concern regarding Israel’s offensive in Lebanon and the devastating humanitarian consequences thereof [1] . The EU stresses that attacks on civilians, civilian infrastructure, healthcare personnel and facilities, as well as on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) personnel are unjustified, unacceptable and in breach of International Humanitarian Law. In light of the deteriorating situation in Gaza, and with the support of a majority of Member States, the High Representative/Vice-President has conducted a review of Israel’s compliance with its obligations under Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement [2] . The conclusion of the review was that there are indications that Israel would be in breach of its obligations. Discussions continue in the Council on the package of measures presented by the Commission following the review. The fight against impunity and the pursuit of justice for international crimes and violations of international law are cornerstones of the EU’s foreign policy, regardless of where conflicts occur. These principles are non-negotiable and reflect the EU’s dedication to a rules-based international order. The EU reiterates its strong and steadfast support for the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, both of which serve as indispensable pillars of the global justice system. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/moldova/foreign-affairs-council-press-conference-high-representative-kaja-kallas_en. [2] https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf.”
  EU-Lebanon relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-05-18 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 18.5.2026 Written question The President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP), have been in continuous contact with partners in the Middle East and other relevant interlocutors to coordinate the EU’s response. These engagements were also used to express solidarity with the countries affected by Iran’s attacks, urge de-escalation, call for all parties to comply with international humanitarian law, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, and call on Iran to end destabilising activities in the region and ensure freedom of navigation and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz [1] . This diplomatic outreach included a high number of phone calls with a broad range of interlocutors. [1] At leadership level, that included — but is not limited to: • The videoconference co-hosted by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission with leaders from across the Middle East and neighbours (Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf states, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Türkiye and Armenia) on 9 March 2026; • President of the European Council visit to United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar on 14 and 15 April 2026. Ministerial and other engagements included — but are not limited to: • EU and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened together for a videoconference on 5 March 2026 that resulted in a joint statement: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/05/joint-statement-by-gcc-eu-ministers-meeting-on-recent-developments-in-the-middle-east-iran-s-attacks-against-gcc-states/; The HR/VP travelled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on 8 and 9 April 2026; the EU Special Representative for the Gulf visited all six GCC countries in March 2026. The Commission applies strict transparency rules concerning interest representation and publishes information on meetings held with interest representatives on the dedicated transparency webpages of the Members of the College [2] . Information on such contacts may also be made available through other channels, including press releases and social media. However, as set out in Article 4(2) of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 [3] and Article 3(b) of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 [4] , these rules do not cover meetings held with representatives of public authorities of the Member States or representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, or intergovernmental organisations. There is therefore no obligation to publish meetings held with such representatives. As regards exchanges within the Commission, it should be recalled that, pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, discussions in the meetings of the Commission are confidential [5] . [2] https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/president/transparency_en and https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/kaja-kallas_en#transparency. [3] Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register, OJ L 207, 11.6.2021: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2021/611/oj. [4] Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 of 4 December 2024 on transparency measures concerning meetings held between Members of the Commission and interest representatives, and repealing Decision 2014/839/EU, Euratom, C/2024/11500, OJ L, 2024/3081, 5.12.2024: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3081/oj. [5] Article 14 of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080 of 4 December 2024 establishing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission and amending Decision C(2000) 3614, C/2024/10000, OJ L, 2024/3080, 5.12.2024: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-05-13 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) has been in continuous contact with partners in the Middle East to call for maximum restraint, urge all parties to comply with international humanitarian law and to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as to ensure freedom of navigation and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. On 9 April 2026, the HR/VP on behalf of the European Union, welcomed the ceasefire [1] agreed by the US and Iran. The statement stressed that diplomacy is key to resolve all outstanding issues and parties should continue engaging in good faith in efforts to reach a sustainable agreement on all areas of concern. The EU contributes to all diplomatic efforts in this endeavour, taking into consideration its full range of interests and concerns, in coordination with partners. EU restrictive measures (‘sanctions’) as tools of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are adopted by the Council with unanimity. The Council is empowered to decide on the possible extension of any measure, while Member States are responsible for the effective implementation and enforcement of sanctions. It is for the Member States to decide their own policies within NATO. Membership of NATO, including participation in its integrated military structures, is a national prerogative and decision. As regards the use of military bases by individual Member States, this also remains their prerogative; decisions are taken by national governments in line with their sovereign authority. NATO is a strategic partner for the EU and plays a key role in territorial defence for the 23 common members, while providing crucial deterrence against external threats to Europe’s borders. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/09/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-ceasefire-agreed-by-the-united-states-and-iran/.”
  EU-Iran relations · Relations with NATO · EU-US relations
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The EU has a principled stance on freedom of navigation, in line with international law. It urges all involved in the conflict to fully ensure a toll-free and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The closure of the strait disrupts the global economy and threatens global energy and food security. The EU is engaged in the region through operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES ensuring safe passage through the Red Sea. Its extended mandate [1] until 28 February 2027 comprises strengthening links with other EU initiatives, including (CRIMARIO) [2] , the EU’s critical maritime routes project, and collecting and sharing information on suspicious activities related to critical submarine infrastructure. It further contributes to capacity building by training Djiboutian maritime forces and by cooperating with the Yemeni Coast Guard . The first summit between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council in October 2024 highlighted the joint commitment to freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Red Sea [3] . The EU implements the UN sanctions on Yemen through its Council Decision 2014/932 [4] . In 2024, the EU designated individuals and entities for their support to the Houthis under its sanction regime regarding Iran’s military support to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region [5] . The EU monitors the evolving risks linked to organisations trying to unduly influence democratic institutions, including radical and extremist non-state actors, as well as interference from third countries. The Digital Services Act (DSA) [6] requires providers of very large online platforms and search engines to diligently identify, assess, and mitigate systemic risks on their services, including the risk of dissemination of terrorist content. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202600439. [2] https://crimario.eu/. [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/k3wf2ewp/eu-gcc-joint-statement-final-2.pdf. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0932. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02023D1532-20241118. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU relations with Gulf countries
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question EU engagement with Cuba is guided by its values and interests. Since 2017, the EU/Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement [1] (PDCA), agreed by the European Parliament and Member States, has been the basic framework for EU/Cuba relations. The Agreement is not a way to ignore differences, but a way to address them including sensitive topics such as human rights on the island and Cuba’s position in relation to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The Agreement, through an increased critical but constructive engagement, is expected to deliver further and more concrete results. The best possible option to achieve this goal is to make its implementation and working methods more effective, rather than to abandon it. It is currently analysing ways towards this end, in order that the PDCA can better respond to expectations in promoting reforms, encouraging human rights, and supporting Cuba’s economic and social modernisation, while protecting European interests, including EU’s security. In relation to EU cooperation, including humanitarian relief, it aims at enhancing the well-being of Cuban citizens. EU funds are not transmitted to the Cuban authorities. EU-funded projects in Cuba are implemented by United Nations’ agencies, Member States’ agencies and EU non-governmental organisations. As with all EU cooperation projects worldwide, a variety of tools are used to ensure the proper execution, monitoring and auditing of EU projects in Cuba. Cuba was not a topic of the January 2026 Foreign Affairs Council. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2016056.”
  EU-Belarus relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Cuba relations
• 2026-05-11 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The EU believes divergences should be resolved through diplomatic means. In this context, the EU supports ongoing diplomatic efforts, including dialogue between the US and Cuba towards diplomatic solutions. The EU recalls that, under all circumstances, the principles of international law and the UN Charter, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, must be upheld. The EU’s policy toward Cuba is guided by a principled commitment to human rights, international law, democratic values, and multilateral engagement. Cuba faces a severe socioeconomic crisis that risks becoming a humanitarian emergency. In view of the worsening humanitarian conditions in Cuba, the Commission has released an additional EUR 2 million in humanitarian aid in April 2026. This funding will contribute to provide logistics support to humanitarian partners delivering urgent relief to the most vulnerable, due to the current energy crisis and related difficulties on the distribution of food, health services and drinking water. This funding adds to the EUR 4 million already approved for 2026 to address the most urgent humanitarian needs of the Cuban people.”
  EU-US relations · EU-Cuba relations
• 2026-05-07 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question Russia is known to have taken steps that militarise the Arctic such as upgrading existing military bases and opening new ones, installing military equipment and facilities, conducting exercises, commissioning new nuclear submarines, testing nuclear-powered cruise missiles, as well as enlarging its fleet of icebreakers. The EU has put in place strict export controls on the relevant technologies, including dual-use technologies, to prevent the Russian military from using them.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Relations with NATO
• 2026-05-07 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Delegation of the EU in Argentina have been following the developments related to law No 27.802 (the ‘labour reform’ or ‘labour modernisation’ law). The EEAS and the Delegation have taken note of the recent decision of the Labour Court No. 3 to declare this law unconstitutional and of the Government’s intention to appeal against the Court’s decision. The EU uses a wide range of instruments (cooperation, investment, training and trade conditionalities) to encourage compliance with international labour standards. In addition, both the EU-Mercosur interim Trade Agreement [1] and the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement [2] link cooperation between the Parties to their mutual respect for democratic principles and human rights, and include labour-related commitments such as decent work, core labour standards, effective labour protection, social dialogue, labour inspection and non-discrimination. The EU also provides funding for vocational training in line with international labour standards and cooperates with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), follows its recommendations and funds projects with the ILO involvement. The framework Agreement for Cooperation of 1990 [3] sets the legal framework for bilateral relations between the EU and Argentina. Within this framework, the Joint Committee meets regularly, with the next one scheduled for the first week of June 2026. This will be the occasion to discuss important topics in different policy areas, including this one. [1] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/text-agreement_en. [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_113. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1990/530.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2026-05-07 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question The EU continues to be worried about the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza and remains the largest provider of humanitarian aid in the Strip (over EUR 674 million since 2023). The EU has repeatedly called on Israel to allow immediate, unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale into and throughout Gaza; to enable the UN and its agencies, and humanitarian organisations, to work independently and impartially to save lives and reduce suffering; to reopen Gaza border crossings and to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law. This call was recently reiterated at the highest level in the European Council conclusions of 19 March 2026 [1] . The EU continues to call on Israel to reverse its decision regarding the new international non-governmental organisation (INGO) registration framework, echoing the joint statement issued by the High Representative/Vice-President, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean and the Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management in January 2026 [2] . The EU continues to raise this issue at all levels with Israeli counterparts and supports the operations of the INGOs affected. It will continue to follow the developments regarding the INGO registration framework, including the latest decision of the Israeli Supreme Court following the petition of the Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA) and its partners. The EU is committed to continuing its political and financial support to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) [3] . [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/lwhk3itd/en-20260319-european-council-conclusions.pdf. [2] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representative-kallas-and-commissioners-lahbib-and-suica-registration-2026-01-06_en. [3] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/statement-commissioner-lahbib-demolition-unrwa-compound-east-jerusalem-2026-01-21_en.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-05-07 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.5.2026 Written question The Commission expects all partners, including candidate countries, to act in line with the principles of the UN Charter and to communicate responsibly. In this sense, the Commission underlines that any suggestion of the use of force against Member States or their political leaders is incompatible with the principles of the UN Charter. The EU’s partnership with Ukraine is based on shared commitments to international law and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Commission will maintain close cooperation and trust with all Member States. At the same time, the Commission recalls that the EU remains committed to supporting Ukraine, in the face of Russia’s war of aggression, which is a clear violation of international law and of the UN Charter, and European values such as peace, respect for sovereignty and the rule of law. In addition, Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine gravely undermines European and global security.”
  EU enlargement · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question Human rights and the rule of law are an essential part of EU-Azerbaijan relations, as outlined in the EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement [1] . The EU was made aware of the reports about a police raid on a LGBTIQ-friendly night club in Baku in December 2025, during which more than 100 persons were reportedly detained. Reports about alleged ill-treatment during the detention are particularly concerning. All allegations of ill-treatment or torture need to be independently investigated. Discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is unacceptable. In Azerbaijan, the human rights situation for LGBTIQ individuals remains fragile and characterised by inadequate legal safeguards and institutional protection. The EU will continue to closely follow the human rights situation in the country and will maintain dialogue with the authorities on such issues. Human rights, democracy and the rule of law will remain central to the future development of EU-Azerbaijan relations. The EU Delegation will continue to co-host and participate in events dedicated to supporting human rights defenders in Azerbaijan. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/azerbaijan/.”
  LGBTIQ+ · EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2026-05-05 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The EU Delegation in Colombia has participated in the sessions of the National Roundtable on Guarantees since its creation, including at Ambassador level, and will continue to do so. During the participation, and through regular political dialogue with national authorities (both spontaneously and within established formats such as the annual EU-Colombia Human Rights Dialogue) it has systematically been highlighted the importance of maintaining this space between civil society and authorities as a permanent forum to strengthen guarantees for human rights defenders. It is also called for high level participation and for follow up on commitments to translate into effective protection actions in the territories. The EU Delegation in Colombia stands ready to take part in regional round tables upon invitation. For example, the Delegation participated in the establishment of the Caquetá Territorial Roundtable on Guarantees in 2024. In addition, the Delegation maintains regular contact with the Human Rights Directorate of the Colombian Ministry of the Interior, the Ombudsman’s Office and civil society organisations participating in the Roundtable at the national and regional levels to follow up on the commitments made. The EU human rights cooperation portfolio in Colombia includes actions to strengthen and facilitate civil society participation in both the national and regional roundtables, by helping civil society to prepare their participation.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2026-04-30 “E-000978/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice President and the European External Action Service are following closely the recent suspension of the Revolución Ciudadana political movement. The respect for democratic principles and protection of fundamental freedoms underpin relations between the EU and Ecuador. The deployment of an EU Electoral Observation Mission (EOM) for the 2024-25 elections in Ecuador was part of the EU effort to strengthen the rule of law and electoral transparency in Ecuador 1 . In its final report, the EOM noted that Ecuador’s Election Law included the possibility of suspension of political rights from six months to four years, which exceeded the period foreseen under Ecuador’s penal code 2 . The EOM cautioned that such a suspension could impose disproportionate restrictions on political rights and recommended a review of the sanctions for electoral offences foreseen by the Election Law. The EU considers that dialogue and cooperation with Ecuador remain the most effective means of preserving and strengthening the country’s rule of law. The EU regularly raises its concerns through diplomatic channels and in formal dialogue mechanisms such as the EU-Ecuador HighLevel Political Dialogue and EU-Ecuador Human Rights Dialogue. EU cooperation in support of the rule of law in Ecuador includes activities to fight transnational organised crime, support for human rights, strengthening the country’s judiciary, and support to independent institutions, civil society and human rights defenders that monitor, report on, and advocate for the rule of law in Ecuador. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eom-ecuador-2025/about-eom-ecuador-2025_en. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ecuador/european-union-election-observation-mission-presents-itsfinal-report-15-recommendations-support_en.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2026-04-30 “E-001036/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU condemned the atrocities perpetrated by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, following the seizure of El Fasher. The EU Foreign Affairs Council adopted restrictive measures against the Deputy Commander of the RSF on 20 November 2025 and sanctioned another five RSF affiliated individuals on 29 January 2026 1 . Ensuring accountability is at the heart of the Council Conclusions on Sudan 2 . The EU supports the International Criminal Court (ICC), the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission and their investigations of crimes including those committed by the RSF in El Fasher. The ICC recognised that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been and are continuing to be committed in Darfur 3 . On 19 February 2026, the UN Fact Finding Mission published its report ‘Sudan Hallmarks of Genocide in El Fasher’ on the siege and fall of the city. On EU restrictive measures to combat terrorism, in accordance with Article 2(2) and (3) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 4 , the legal prerequisite for the listing of new entity is a competent authority decision for the involvement of that entity in terrorist acts, as defined by Article 1 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/455. Listing decisions are adopted by the Council, acting unanimously. The EU action should focus on those who suffered through El Fasher, to support their pursuit of justice and accountability, and to prevent perpetrators to repeat these crimes elsewhere in Sudan. This includes EU support to implementation of reparations orders issued by the ICC through support to the Trust Fund for Victims programmes. The EU is funding EUR 20 million, under the Individual Measures 2024, support in Sudan to strengthen the protection of human rights and improve living conditions for vulnerable groups affected or displaced by the armed conflict. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/29/sudan-council-sanctions-sevenindividuals-in-view-of-the-dramatic-escalation-of-violence-in-the-country/. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14231-2025-INIT/en/pdf. 3 https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-deputy-prosecutor-nazhat-shameem-khan-united-nations-securitycouncil-situation-1. 4 Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 of 26 February 2026 on restrictive measures to combat terrorism, repealing Articles 2, 3 and 3a of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2025/1577 and Decision (CFSP) 2026/421 (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/455/oj).”
  EU policy on Sahel and Sudan
• 2026-04-30 “P-000872/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU takes any violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its Member States with the utmost seriousness. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression, it has the possibility to invoke Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1 , which would lead to other Member States to provide aid and assist it. This invocation of Article 42(7) TEU remains the sovereign prerogative of Member States. The Commission and High Representative/Vice-President stand ready to support and coordinate any request for assistance from a Member State. The European Council has confirmed its determination to ‘deliver at pace and at scale’ to ensure Europe is equipped to act autonomously, in a coordinated way, and with a 360 degree approach against all threats. The Security Action for Europe instrument spearheads the EU’s response, with its EUR 150 billion defence loan scheme available for Member State to invest in priority capability areas including air defence. The Preserving Peace Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, presented in October 2025 2 , is another clear signal that the EU is strengthening its capabilities to deter and defend against aggression. Nine capability coalitions, including one specifically for air and missile defence, have been stood up to close critical gaps through joint development and procurement. It also proposes a set of European Readiness Flagships including the European Air Shield 3 and the European Drone Defence Initiative 4 . The former project aims to develop an integrated, multi-layered air and missile defence shield, fully interoperable with NATO's Command and Control system. The latter focuses on creating multi-layered, technologically advanced counterdrone detection, tracking and neutralisation capacities across Member States. In February 2026, the Commission presented a dedicated Counter-Drone Action Plan 5 with a focus on enhanced preparedness, coordinated responses and industrial defence readiness. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_42/oj/eng. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/readiness-roadmap-2030_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_812. 4 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/commission-publishes-action-plan-drone-and-counter-dronesecurity-2026-02-11_en. 5 Idem.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2026-04-30 “E-000897/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU shares NATO’s assessment that Russia constitutes a primary direct threat to EuroAtlantic security, particularly along the eastern borders, but also more widely as it engages in hybrid activities in other regions, and resorts to cyber threats, foreign information manipulation and interference and disinformation. The EU will continue working on its broader defence efforts to strengthen the security of its Member States, in cooperation and full complementarity with NATO. The EU remains steadfast in its commitment to protecting the security and safety of its Member States and citizens. In recent years, the EU has taken unprecedented steps to counter hybrid threats and to reinforce its resilience, preparedness and defence readiness, including on its eastern flank. For instance, the Eastern Flank Watch, one of the flagship proposals in the Defence Readiness Roadmap 1 , aims to enhance situational awareness and enable the EU to respond to emerging threats more quickly and effectively. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/readiness-roadmap-2030_en.”
  Relations with NATO · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2026-04-29 “E-000773/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Countering Russian propaganda targeting the EU, its Member States and its partners is a priority for the High Representative /Vice-President and the Commission. The Council has taken significant measures to curb Russia’s propaganda machine. In March 2022, under the third sanctions package 1 , the Council has adopted a broadcasting ban prohibiting any content of the Russian state-sponsored media outlets Russia Today and Sputnik 2 . With the following packages, the broadcasting ban has been extended to more than 30 media outlets spreading and supporting Russian propaganda about the war against Ukraine within the EU and beyond. Additionally, the Council has listed more than 120 individuals and 30 entities involved in disseminating Kremlin-aligned disinformation, including media actors targeting European and global audiences with manipulated narratives. To address broader hybrid threats, including Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, the EU established a dedicated sanctions regime in 2024. It targets individuals and entities undermining EU values, security, and stability, including activities affecting third countries and international organisations. The latest listings, covering four individuals, were adopted in March 2026 3 . Imposing any additional restrictive measures require a unanimous decision by the Council. Negotiations on new sanctions are confidential and neither the European External Action Service nor the Commission can comment on them. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-ownedoutlets-rtrussia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/. 2 Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/351, amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP and imposing new restrictive measures against Russian media outlets engaged in propaganda actions. 3 Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/646 of 16 March 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Georgia relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2026-04-29 “P-001313/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not aware of any judicial proceedings currently under way in Uruguay where EU institutions and/or EU-funded non-governmental organisations are involved. The Commission does not intervene in foreign proceedings where it is not a defendant or plaintiff, or where no EU institution is involved. The EU’s funding is based on the Articles 2, 3 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union 1 and aims to promote human rights, rule of law and international law. EU funding for external action is provided mainly through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and includes, inter alia, support to civil society organisations, in line with the Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union 2 . In Uruguay, civil society funding covers the areas of human rights, social inclusion, advocacy and participation in public policy debates. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 2 please see footnote 1.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2026-04-28 “E-001020/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In January 2026, while brutally repressing peaceful protests, the Iranian authorities had implemented a large‑scale internet shutdown following a well-known pattern observed during the periods of unrest, that became even tighter, without precedents in terms of breadth and duration, since the beginning of the conflict with US and Israel. In parallel, the so-called ‘antiespionage law’ expanded Iranian authorities’ control over social media and online activity with harsh penalties for censorship circumvention. The EU’s response has been strong, both in statements denouncing the situation and in concrete acts. In her statement on behalf of the EU condemning the crackdown, the High Representative/Vice-President also called ‘for ensuring the right of access to information, including by restoring access to the internet for all’. In March 2026, the Council adopted restrictive measures targeting among others the head of Tehran’s cyber police, which plays a key role in filtering the internet, censorship, controlling the social media content and unjustly prosecuting citizens. The EU’s commitment extends to multilateral fora: At the Human Rights Council session on 16 March 2026, the EU reiterated its call for Iranian authorities to restore all communications, including full access to the internet, and to ensure the right of free access to information for all. The EU recognizes the internet access needs of Iranian citizens and the sensitivities involved, especially in light of the ‘anti-espionage law’, which increased Iranian authorities' control over social media and online activity and imposed severe penalties for censorship circumvention. The EU will therefore consider options that prioritize the safety of beneficiaries and partners.”
  EU-Iran relations · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-04-27 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 27.4.2026 Written question EU restrictive measures have played a significant role in reducing the EU’s energy dependency on Russia. The EU ‘s share of Russian energy revenues fell to less than 9% in 2025 from almost 60% in 2022. The import of Russian crude oil and petroleum products into the EU is prohibited since June 2022 [1] . To ensure energy security during a transitional phase, certain EU Member States — including Hungary — have been granted temporary exemptions for specific pipeline imports of Russian oil. The Commission welcomes the efforts taken by a number of Member States to decouple from Russian oil, which have already allowed for the lifting of such exemptions. The latest packages of sanctions imposed further restrictions on energy imports from Russia [2] [3] , and additional measures have been proposed [4] . Member States are required to fully respect the restrictive measures in force and ensure that any bilateral engagements do not contradict the EU’s common foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, following the REPowerEU roadmap proposed by the Commission [5] , in January 2026 the European Parliament and the Council adopted a permanent ban on Russian natural gas imports [6] . The Druzhba disruptions underscore the strategic importance of diversifying energy supplies. Hungary and Slovakia have the possibility to further reduce their dependence on Russian oil by making greater use of the Adria pipeline through Croatia. The Commission is strongly supporting Hungary’s and Slovakia’s diversification efforts and stands ready to facilitate necessary arrangements with relevant partners. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions/. [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures. [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-eu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/. [4] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/statement_26_318. [5] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/repowereu-phase-out-russian-energy-imports_en. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/261/oj/eng.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-04-24 “E-000468/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is aware of the referred statement attributed to the Chief Justice of Iran, which however has never been communicated via official channels. The EU has a comprehensive policy approach towards Iran and uses all tools at its disposal, including sanctions, to defend its citizens and interests. On 16 March 2026, the Council adopted new restrictive measures against 16 individuals and three entities responsible for serious human rights violations, including prominent figures such as the Deputy Minister of Interior and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commanders 1 . In addition, on 19 February 2026, the Council finalised the listing of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation 2 . The regulation and supervision of non-governmental organisations operating on the territory of Member States fall primarily within the competence of the Member States, in accordance with national law and applicable EU law. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/16/iran-council-sanctions-an-additional-16persons-and-three-entities-over-serious-human-rights-violations/. 2 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-04-24 “E-000757/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU remains committed to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, while also maintaining close cooperation and trust with all Member States. In this context, it is important to distinguish clearly between official positions of the Ukrainian government and statements made by individual commentators or former military personnel. The Commission underlines that any suggestion of the use of force against the territorial integrity of Member States is incompatible with the principles of the UN Charter. The EU has seen no indication that the Government of Ukraine supports such views. On the contrary, the EU’s partnership with Ukraine is based on shared commitments to international law and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU remains attentive to developments in the regional energy situation caused by Russia’s attacks on civilian infrastructure. The EU’s response has been further intensified, including efforts to enhance the resilience and recovery of Ukraine’s energy system. In addition to largescale infrastructure support, the EU is focusing on assisting the most vulnerable regions and cities. Part of the 2026 winter support package under the Ukraine Facility will be implemented through the Ukraine Energy Support Fund and will focus on the physical protection of energy infrastructure as well as urgent repairs.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-04-21 “E-000474/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has repeatedly underlined 1 that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Commission continues monitoring the situation. No flights of Turkish military jets over Greek inhabited areas have been reported since February 2023. Nevertheless, Türkiye continued to systematically issue general navigational warnings challenging Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 2 . The Council has noted the overall improvements in the relation between Greece and Türkiye, underlining its expectation for them to be sustained 3 . The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. The main aim of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) within the European Defence Industry Programme 4 is to enhance the EU's defence industrial sovereignty and readiness. EDPCIs are large, multi-state programs led by at least four Member States and supported by EU instruments under certain modalities. These projects focus on EU capability priorities and aim to pool demand, streamline supply chains, and reinforce the European defence technological and industrial base, while addressing urgent defence needs. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. 2 See footnote 1. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202502643.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2026-04-17 “E-000683/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU reiterates its strong opposition to Israel's settlement policy and actions taken in this context, including demolitions, forced displacement and settler violence. Widespread demolitions of Palestinian homes and structures by the Israeli authorities coupled with a rapid expansion of settlements in the occupied West Bank through the advancement of a record number of housing units in the settlements during 2025 and into 2026 are seriously undermining the viability of the two-state solution. As noted in the EU’s position for the 13th EU-Israel Association Council, the EU strongly condemns the demolitions of structures funded by the EU or its Member States and expects that Israel makes good the damage in accordance with international law 1 . Israel has been requested to return or compensate for EU-funded assets on every occasion that it demolished, dismantled or confiscated such assets, including via 12 joint letters addressed to Israeli authorities since 2020 and co-signed by representatives of EU institutions, concerned Member States and other donors. Through these letters, the EU has requested compensation amounting to EUR 1 790 064 for demolished or confiscated property, covering losses recorded between 2015 and 2025. In addition, the EU has reported further losses of EUR 242 335 related to settler violence (2023-2025) and EUR 1 071 113 related to forced abandonment (2024-2025). While the EU continues to use a variety of diplomatic and political channels to enhance its stance and the effectiveness of the overall EU support, Israel has not paid financial compensations for the EU-funded assets it has demolished, dismantled or confiscated. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2025/02/24/.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-04-14 “E-00334/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The 15 trainees from Benghazi who attended the course in Taranto last September were officers and petty officers from the Libyan Coast Guard part of the Libyan Navy, which is the sole Libyan military institution operating as a unified entity at operational level, under the umbrella of the Joint Military Committee. 2. The EU engages with authorities throughout the country in line with its ‘one Libya’ policy and in accordance with the UN Security Council, which ‘noted the importance of progress towards the unification of all institutions, including military and security institutions’ 1 . 3. All reasonable measures to mitigate such risks have been taken. Every candidate is subject to a vetting process which involves an initial screening by Libyan authorities, followed by further checks by Member States, International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) prior to the start of the training. EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) does not train personnel belonging to militias, nor individuals with a proven criminal record or a record of human rights violations. 1 Press statement on Libya, 3 March 2026 https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16309.doc.htm.”
  EU policy on Sahel and Sudan · EU foreign policy approach
• 2026-04-13 “E-000900/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission International law is applicable to outer space, including the UN Charter and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) and other relevant UN treaties, as well as international law of armed conflicts and consensual principles developed in the UN framework. The OST, as well as the guiding principles, constitute the cornerstone of the global governance in outer space. Outer space has witnessed a surge in security challenges over recent years. As technological advancements often outpace the development of law and policy, the international community needs to discuss on a variety of instruments and measures. The EU is an active participant in the UN Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). In the Commission’s view, dealing with contemporary challenges is best achievable by a combination of legally binding and non-binding instruments and measures. The Commission believes that developing norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours is a more realistic and practical way to deal with immediate threats. The Commission’s approach is that instead of reopening existing legal instruments or drafting new ones with a lengthy procedure, developing norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours is the most pragmatic and immediate way forward to contribute to PAROS and to tackle the most pressing threats. Many legally binding instruments drew from previous non-binding commitments and principles or resolutions in the UN framework. With no initiative on the table currently aiming to amend the OST, it is the Commission’s conviction that initially non-legally binding rules, norms and principles are the most appropriate measures to set guardrails to the behaviour in outer space in short and medium term.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU competences on space policy
• 2026-04-13 “E-000496/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has closely followed the case of the Global Sumud Flotilla. The EU generally discourages flotillas as a form of aid delivery. The EU delivers aid through proven and effective structures, with its partners on the ground. However, it respects the intention of those on board of the flotilla ships to draw attention to the humanitarian plight of the population of Gaza. Everyone has the right to exercise such activism and freedom of assembly; attacks against such flotillas are not acceptable. Such acts constitute the grave breach of humanitarian law. While the authorities responsible for ensuring consular protection to the members of flotillas are the states to which the citizens belong, the EU supports independent investigations into all alleged violations of international law, including international humanitarian law. The High Representative/Vice-President has conducted – with the support of a majority of Member States – a review of Israel’s compliance with its obligations under Article 2 of the EUIsrael Association Agreement 1 . The conclusion of the review was that there are indications that Israel would be in breach of its obligations. Following the review, the President of the European Commission announced a set of proposed measures for the EU to address the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza. These include a reinforced package of sanctions, and a partial suspension of the Association Agreement on certain trade-related matters 2 . Discussions continue in Council on those measures. As part of the package, the Commission also put on hold its bilateral financial support to Israel, without adversely affecting work with civil society or Yad Vashem. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/772892/EPRS_ATA(2025)772892_EN.pdf. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2112.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU competences on human rights
• 2026-04-13 “E-000835/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has been deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza. The EU has called on the Israeli authorities, including on humanitarian access, dual-use policy and international non-governmental registration, to address the enormous needs of the population. The EU is totally opposed to forced displacement of the Palestinian population or to geographical or demographic changes in Gaza. The EU strongly condemns the ongoing extremist settler violence in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and recalls that Israel has the duty to protect civilians and hold perpetrators accountable. The EU is not a member of the Board of Peace and its participation as an observer at the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace in Washington, District of Columbia, focused on Gaza’s reconstruction, is to be seen as part of the EU’s commitment to the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza and international efforts for recovery and reconstruction. The EU welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2803 and stands ready to work together with the US on the implementation of the comprehensive Peace Plan for Gaza. The EU has an important role to play in this context, being the biggest provider of external assistance to the Palestinians, including EUR 124 million in humanitarian aid confirmed for 2026 1 . The EU is committed to lasting and sustainable peace in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions, on the basis of the two-state solution, with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign and viable State of Palestine living side-by-side in peace, security and mutual recognition, and Jerusalem serving as the future capital of both states. The EU supports the diplomatic efforts anchored in international law. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_26_612.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-04-10 “P-000854/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU follows developments in Iran and the Middle East with utmost concern. Since the beginning of hostilities, EU pledged firmly to support regional stability and the protection of civilians. As the hostilities have serious consequences across but also beyond the Middle East, the EU is working with its partners towards de-escalation. At the European Council on 19 March 2026, Member States called for de-escalation and maximum restraint, the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure and full respect of international law by all parties as well as a moratorium on strikes against energy and water facilities 1 . It is up to the Iranian people to decide their own future. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/19/european-council-conclusions-on-middleeast/.”
  EU-US relations · EU foreign policy approach · EU-Iran relations
• 2026-04-09 “E-000630/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU remains committed to supporting the Syrian people through their challenging transition. This includes financial assistance to address the urgent humanitarian and socioeconomic needs they face in Syria and neighbouring countries. The pledge of EUR 5.8 billion at the ninth Brussels Conference in March 2025 by the EU, Member States and international partners focuses on responding to humanitarian needs and supporting the country’s inclusive political transition and recovery after 14 years of civil war and most of the funds are dedicated to support all Syrian people. The President of the Commission and the President of the European Council have strongly reiterated during their visit to Damascus in January 2026 the request that transitional authorities commit to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Syrians without any kind of discrimination. There can be no peace and stability in Syria without a genuinely inclusive transition, capable of fulfilling the aspirations of all Syrians, and in which everyone is protected and represented within the state institutions based on equal rights as citizens. The recent developments in North-East Syria further expose the country and the region to the risk of Da’esh resurgence. The EU has called on the Syrian Transitional Authorities to take ownership of the situation, prevent further escapes or uncontrolled releases from camps and prisons, protect all civilians and the internally displaced persons who should return to their homes and cooperate with the Global Coalition to counter Da’esh threat. The EU will continue following the situation in Syria, remaining vigilant about the respect for human rights, and supporting comprehensive accountability efforts for all perpetrators of violations regardless of their affiliation.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU relations with Kurdish people · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2026-04-09 “P-000127/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 of 13 November 2017 1 established the following restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela: an embargo on arms and equipment which might be used for internal repression, an asset freeze on the persons listed in Annex IV of the Regulation and a ban on entry into and transit through the territory of Member States applicable to the same listed persons. Annex IV of the Regulation currently lists 69 natural persons directly responsible for undermining democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The EU stands ready to use every tool at its disposal to support a transition towards democracy in Venezuela. The EU has not imposed restrictions on EU exports to and investment in Venezuela. These activities were never discontinued by way of an EU Regulation. The Commission will engage with the Venezuelan authorities with a view to create a more favourable economic environment for trade and investment and, if conditions allow, seek to provide support for specific investments with public policy objectives. The Commission and the European External Action Service will also aim to ensure that European companies in Venezuela do not operate at a disadvantage compared to companies from Venezuela, the United States or elsewhere. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2063/oj/eng.”
  EU-US relations · EU-Venezuela relations
• 2026-04-08 “E-000769/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the information referenced by the Honourable Member. The Commission continuously monitors developments that may contribute to Russia’s ability to sustain its war of aggression against Ukraine. Where credible information emerges regarding activities that may circumvent or undermine existing EU restrictive measures (sanctions), the Commission engages on the matter carefully together with Member States as well as with relevant third countries. The EU has adopted an extensive set of individual and sectoral sanctions – across 19 packages – in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including measures targeting Russia’s military industrial complex and entities involved in supporting it 1 . The EU also maintains sanctions against Belarus for its role in facilitating Russia’s aggression. The EU continues to engage with China at all levels, calling on China to stop any support which directly or indirectly strengthens Russia’s military capabilities. To this date, the EU has taken different restrictive measures against more than 100 Chinese companies and individuals supporting Russia’s war effort. The Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President will continue to monitor the situation closely and propose additional measures where necessary to safeguard the effectiveness of EU sanctions and to address any activities that contribute to Russia’s ability to wage its war against Ukraine. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/.”
  EU-China relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-04-08 “E-000379/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Despite the positive atmosphere and the ongoing dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, the unresolved dispute over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones continues to strain bilateral relations. As pointed out in the Commission’s annual report, Türkiye continued to systematically issue general navigational warnings challenging Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 1 . The Commission has repeatedly underlined, most recently in the Enlargement Package 2 , that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, and among others, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. Unequivocal commitment to international agreements and the UN Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. 2 Ibidem.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-04-07 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question The reasons for every listing are public and contained in the annex to the legal acts [1] . Those reasons are underpinned by ample open source evidence which, following the data protection regulations, is at the disposal of the listed persons or their legal representatives upon request. These restrictive measures were adopted by the Council acting in unanimity. Every person designated by the Council can bring forward a legal challenge and contest their listing in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is independent, and ensures that any listing is lawful. Where the Court decides that a listing does not comply with the EU law, it has the power to annul the listing. The European External Action Service maintains regular contact with the Swiss authorities. Following the adoption of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2572, Switzerland was provided with additional clarifications. [1] Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2572 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202502572 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/966 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/966/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2026-04-07 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question The EU is following developments in Tunisia very closely. The rule of law and human rights form the basis of EU’s partnership with Tunisia , as enshrined in the Association Agreement [1] . The EU expects Tunisia to live up to its international commitments and continues to work to strengthen dialogue and positive action in this regard. Since 2021, the EU has expressed concern over the deteriorating human rights situation including a shrinking civic space, continued repression towards civil society actors and intensified crackdowns on migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. The EU continues to recall the importance of upholding human rights and the rule of law, including freedoms of expression and association, respect for the right to a fair trial and due process guarantees. These concerns are raised in direct conversations with the Tunisian authorities, in the framework of the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement, including in thematic subcommittees and in the Association Committee in September 2025 [2] . The EU also expressed concern publicly through statements and declarations of the High Representative/Vice-President on behalf of the 27 Member States [3] . The EU is firmly committed to a migration policy rooted in human rights principles, with human rights safeguards integrated across all sectors. In response to the European Court of Auditors' 2025 report, the Commission is actively enhancing human rights risk management and complaint documentation in EU-funded migration programmes. T he Commission has also put in place several monitoring tools for its programmes, notably implementing partners reports which provide comprehensive and frequent monitoring and analysis of operating environments in the country, including the human rights situation. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/euro-mediterranean-association-agreement-between-the-eu-and-tunisia.html. [2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2025/0578/COM_COM(2025)0578_EN.pdf. [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/11/statement-by-the-hreu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-third-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-directed-against-certain-persons-and-entities-in-view-of-the-situation-in-tunisia/.”
  EU-Tunisia relations · EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU competences on human rights
• 2026-04-01 “E-000470/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Following the political agreement reached by the Foreign Affairs Council on 29 January 2026, the Council adopted on 19 February 2026 Decision (CFSP) 2026/421 1 which added the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the list of groups and entities subject to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (CP931) 2 . Following that listing, the IRGC also became subject to the restrictive measures in Articles 2 and 3 of CP931, namely the freezing of its funds and other financial assets or economic resources, as well as the prohibition for EU operators to make funds and economic resources available to that group 3 . Those restrictive measures are temporary and do not entail a confiscation of assets. The Council may maintain those sanctions in force for as long as there is an ongoing risk of the IRGC being involved in terrorist activities. The IRGC had already been subject to those restrictive measures following its listing under the Iran weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sanctions regime, on 25 October 2010 4 . The listing of the IRGC under CP931 sends a very strong political message. As regards the enforcement of those measures, it falls within the remit of each Member State. The diplomatic presence of Iran in Member States is delimited by bilateral agreements in line with the provisions of international law. 1 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/421/oj. 2 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj. 3 On 26 February 2026, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 on restrictive measures to combat terrorism (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/455/oj). That Decision repealed the CFSP part of CP931, but reproduces the substance of CP931, which will continue to be applied in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. At the same time, that Decision also repealed Decision (CFSP) 2026/421, but maintained all previous listings under CP931, including that of the IRGC. 4 Council Decision 2010/644/CFSP of 25 October 2010 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L 281, 27.10.2010, p. 81, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/644/oj).”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-04-01 “E-000411/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of this issue. The EU has repeatedly underlined, most recently in the enlargement report 1 that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary and among others, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite the positive atmosphere and the ongoing dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, the unresolved dispute over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones continues to strain bilateral relations. As pointed out in the Commission’s annual report, Türkiye continued to systematically issue general navigational warnings challenging Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 2 . The Council has noted that the improvements in the relation between Greece and Türkiye underlining its expectations for them to be sustained 3 . The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. Abstaining from unilateral actions which violate international law and the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. 2 See above. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-04-01 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1.4.2026 Written question The EU’s position towards Belarus remains guided by the Council conclusions of October 2020 [1] and February 2024 [2] . The EU continues to call on Belarus to release and rehabilitate all political prisoners and to end repression against the people of Belarus. The regime must repeal repressive laws and stop politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary arrests. The European External Action Service is aware of the case of Belsat journalist Katsiaryna Andreyeva [3] and remains in regular contact with human rights organisations and accountability platforms, including Viasna and the International Accountability Platform for Belarus (IAPB), closely following their reporting. In addition, the EU Delegation in Minsk monitors politically motivated trials where possible and maintains contact with political prisoners and their families. The EU regularly raises the situation of Belarusian political prisoners, in relevant international human rights fora and ensures that Belarus remains high on the EU’s agenda. The issue was also addressed in the high-level conference ‘Building Foundations for Democratic Change’ held in the European Parliament in December 2025. Regarding restrictive measures, Natallia Buhuk [4] is listed under EU sanctions for involvement in politically motivated rulings against opponents of the Belarusian authorities, and responsibility in serious human rights violations and the undermining of the rule of law. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46076/council-conclusions-on-belarus.pdf . [2] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6737-2024-INIT/en/pdf . [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belarus-statement-spokesperson-escalating-repression-journalists_en . [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023R0419 .”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-04-01 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1.4.2026 Written question The High Representative/Vice-President is aware of the matter raised by the Honourable Member. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is the mandated authority in the buffer zone, managing civilian activity in this zone. It conducted an investigation into the incident. According to the latest report of the UN Secretary General on the UN Operation in Cyprus, [1] managing authorised and unauthorised civilian activity in the buffer zone to prevent possible civil-military tensions has increasingly taken outsized attention and resources from the mission. From 2 June to 15 December 2025 the mission held 35 outreach meetings with the local communities and published regular media campaigns to raise awareness on the parameters and conditions to enable safe farming in the buffer zone, and escorted farmers in some sensitive areas. In several instances, Turkish Forces reacted to Greek Cypriot hunters and farmers coming too close to the northern ceasefire line. In November 2025, Turkish Forces entered the buffer zone on five occasions to challenge the presence of Greek Cypriot farmers and to contest the delineation of the ceasefire line in Déneia, an area west of Nicosia. UNFICYP presence on the ground quickly defused the situations on all occasions. [1] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n25/359/79/pdf/n2535979.pdf.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-03-31 “E-000287/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission International law and the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter must be upheld under all circumstances. Members of the UN Security Council have a particular responsibility to uphold these principles. This message was underscored in the 4 January 2026 statement 1 by the High Representative/Vice-President supported by 26 Member States, as well as by President of the European Council and President of the Commission in their public reactions to the US intervention in Venezuela. The EU has repeatedly stated 2 that Nicolás Maduro lacks the legitimacy of a democratically elected president and has advocated for a Venezuelan-led peaceful transition to democracy in the country, respectful of its sovereignty. The right of the Venezuelan people to determine their future must be respected. The Commission is in close contact with the US, as well as regional and international partners to support and facilitate dialogue with all parties involved, leading to a negotiated, democratic, inclusive and peaceful solution to the crisis, led by Venezuelans. Similarly, the EU remains ready to continue engaging constructively with the US on creating the conditions for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. The EU will continue to uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders together with other fundamental tenets of international law. These principles are essential for Europe and for the international community as a whole and will continue to guide the EU action. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-statement-high-representative-aftermath-us-interventionvenezuela_en. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/venezuela/.”
  EU-US relations · EU-Venezuela relations · EU foreign policy approach
• 2026-03-31 “E-000529/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The rights of indigenous peoples are an integral part of the EU’s human rights policy, as spelled out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Council conclusions on Indigenous Peoples of May 2017 underline the importance of addressing ‘the threats to and violence against indigenous peoples and individuals as well as to human rights defenders’ 1 . The EU is actively engaging in and directly supporting – through dedicated projects – all efforts to enhance the full, effective and meaningful participation of indigenous peoples’ representatives and institutions in relevant UN bodies as well as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties. As stipulated in the European Council conclusions of 21-22 March 2024 2 , the EU calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners in Russia and an end to the persecution of the political opposition, as well as a stop to prosecutions of indigenous people, persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minority communities. On 27 May 2024, the EU decided to adopt a sanctions regime in view of human rights violations and abuses in Russia 3 . Currently, 72 individuals and one entity are sanctioned under this regime. The EU continues to support Russian civil society, human rights defenders and independent media. Trial observation by diplomats has been an important instrument. The Delegation of the EU to the Russian Federation representative observed the first hearing of the trial against Daria Egereva at Moscow City Court on 11 February 2026. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8814-2017-INIT/en/pdf. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/22/european-council-conclusions-21-and-22march-2024/. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-human-rights/.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU competences on human rights
• 2026-03-31 “E-000505/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have the competences to decide on the organisation of the military conscription in the Member States, this remains a national competence. The Commission, together with the High Representative/Vice-President, put forward the White Paper for European Defence - Readiness 2030 1 . It focuses on how to support Member States in filling their most urgent and critical capability gaps, backed by funding options presented by the President of the Commission on 4 March 2025 through the ReArm Europe Plan 2 . In this regard, it proposes actions and instruments in particular to financially support Member States, increase the European defence industrial readiness and work more closely with Ukraine and other partners. On 19 November 2025, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice President adopted the Military Mobility Package 2025 3 , a comprehensive set of measures to ensure the swift, coordinated and secure movement of military personnel and equipment across the EU. The package seeks to strengthen Europe's defence posture by addressing barriers to military mobility across regulatory, infrastructure and capability dimensions - critical areas that currently hinder military transport across borders. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/white-paper-for-european-defence-readiness-2030_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_673. 3 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-themes/military-mobility_en.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2026-03-31 “E-000383/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly underlined, most recently in its 2025 annual report on enlargement policy 1 , that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite the positive atmosphere and the ongoing dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, the unresolved dispute over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones continued to strain bilateral relations. As pointed out in the 2025 annual report, Türkiye continued to systematically issue general navigational warnings challenging Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 2 . The Council noted improvements in relations between Greece and Türkiye in its conclusions of 17 December 2024 and underlined its expectation that these improvements will be sustained 3 . The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. Unequivocal commitment to international agreements and the UN Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. 2 Please see footnote 1. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-03-30 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 30.3.2026 Written question The EU is closely monitoring developments in north-east Syria. The EU has repeatedly called on all parties to fully implement the ceasefire, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid (see statements of 10 [1] and 19 [2] January 2026). The EU calls for the full implementation of the agreement reached on 30 January 2026 [3] between the Syrian transitional authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces, to avoid further escalation and advance an inclusive political transition. The full respect and protection of the rights of the Kurdish people is key to the success of such efforts — an aspect which is constantly reiterated in the diplomatic contacts with interlocutors in the region. In this regard, the adoption of Legislative Decree No 13 is a step in the right direction. The EU remains vigilant about the respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in Syria and supports comprehensive accountability efforts for all perpetrators regardless of their affiliation. The EU constantly monitors the conduct of groups subject to sanctions, in view of the Council’s periodic reviews. The continuation of the sanctioned conduct will impact whether those groups are kept on the list or will be subject to further measures. Stability in the region further hinges on preventing a Da’esh resurgence. The EU calls on all sides to ensure the security of the camps and detention facilities in north-east Syria, and stands ready to support the transitional authorities in the framework of the Global Coalition against Da’esh. The EU will also spare no effort in supporting an inclusive transition and national reconciliation, free from any harmful foreign interference, which meets the aspirations of all Syrians without any kind of discrimination. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-latest-developments-0_en. [2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-high-representative-vice-president-kaja-kallas-ceasefire_en. [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-agreement_en.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations · EU relations with Kurdish people
• 2026-03-27 “P-000845/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU Delegations are closely coordinating with Member States, the Commission and partners to support and, where necessary, facilitate the repatriation of EU citizens affected by the crisis in the Middle East. Information and needs assessments are shared in real time via the Consular Working Party, the secure Consular Online platform and local consular cooperation networks. Since 2 March 2026, 23 Member States and Participating States have activated the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, requesting repatriation support. Nearly 90 flights were completed through the Mechanism (including the first-ever planned use of rescEU capacities), bringing close to 11 000 European citizens back to Europe. The EU institutions are closely monitoring security developments in the Middle East and their impact on the EU’s internal security, notably on the basis of threat assessments produced by the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre and Europol. While the security and terrorist threat was already high, the Commission adopted on 26 February 2026 the ProtectEU Agenda to prevent and combat terrorism 1 . It sets out a comprehensive framework, fully taking into account the external dimension, and proposes measures to address spillover effects of geopolitical developments on the EU’s terrorism threat landscape. The EU is also stepping up diplomacy to safeguard Member States’ interests and regional stability. On 5 March 2026, EU and Gulf Cooperation Council Foreign Ministers 2 agreed to work jointly to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon and to curb missile and unmanned aerial vehicle proliferation. The EU and its Member States support de-escalation at the UN and prioritise maritime security. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions ProtectEU: Agenda to prevent and counter terrorism; COM/2026/101 final. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/05/joint-statement-by-gcc-eu-ministersmeeting-on-recent-developments-in-the-middle-east-iran-s-attacks-against-gcc-states/.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2026-03-26 “P-000870/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU uses all tools at its disposal to protect its interests and address key concerns, including Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programmes, its military cooperation with Russia, hybrid attacks on European soil, and the human rights situation in the country. This approach has been confirmed after the start of the military escalation on 28 February 2026, with the statement by the High Representative/Vice-President 1 on behalf of the EU reiterating that the EU ’will continue to contribute to all diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions and to bring about a lasting solution to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon’. The EU confirms its commitment to a comprehensive policy approach vis-à-vis Iran considering all tools at its disposal. The diplomatic presence of Iran in EU Member States is delimited by bilateral agreements in line with the provisions of international law. At this stage, Iran has not expelled any specific categories of diplomatic staff of Member States. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/01/statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-european-union-on-developments-in-the-middle-east/.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-03-24 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 24.3.2026 Written question The EU is closely monitoring the situation in Aleppo and North-East Syria, including through its Delegation in Damascus, and remains vigilant about respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. The EU is also in close contact with the United Nations and its agencies as well as other international and local partner organisations active in Syria. The EU has repeatedly urged all parties to fully implement the ceasefire, halt any hostilities, ensure the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid (see, for example, statements on 10, 19 and 30 January 2026 [1] ). The EU and its humanitarian partners already active in North-East Syria remain on high alert to continue providing assistance where needed and access allows. The recent escalation underscored the urgent need for the Syrian Transitional Authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces to implement a sustainable political agreement that would ensure the unity of the country as well as the meaningful political and local participation of all Syrians. In this regard, the EU has consistently reiterated in its diplomatic contacts with the Syrian Transitional Authorities and interlocutors in the region, that the full protection of the rights of Kurdish people is crucial. The EU will continue supporting a peaceful and truly inclusive transition and national reconciliation, which upholds the human rights of all Syrians without any kind of discrimination, and enables the restoration of Syria’s social fabric in all its diversity. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-latest-developments-0_en; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-high-representative-vice-president-kaja-kallas-ceasefire_en; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-agreement_en.”
  EU relations with Kurdish people · EU-Syria relations
• 2026-03-20 “E-000338/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief is one of the key priorities of the EU’s international human rights agenda. The EU addresses violations of this human right through presenting resolutions at the United Nations’ human rights fora; condemning any discrimination, persecution, hatred or violence against any person based on religion or belief; reaching out to partner countries and international organisations, including through bilateral human rights dialogues; and funding projects outside the EU to improve the respect, protection and fulfilment of this human right. Human rights clauses are an essential element of the EU’s cooperation and trade agreements with partner countries. Based on standard clauses in all EU contracts, where human rights violations occur, funding can be suspended or terminated. The European External Action Service and the Commission follow closely the human rights situation in third countries, not least through the extensive network of EU Delegations across the world, and work for improving the protection of human rights of all people worldwide. When violations of human rights occur, including attacks against persons belonging to religious minorities, the EU uses all available diplomatic tools, including private and public and quiet diplomacy, instruments established in the international agreements and autonomous restrictive measures, as appropriate.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU foreign policy approach · EU competences on human rights
• 2026-03-18 “E-000290/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The President of the US has communicated the interest in obtaining control over Greenland via social messages and other public statements. It has been made abundantly clear by the Government of Greenland and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark that the future of Greenland is to be decided by them. The EU has stated its unequivocal support to the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland. It has called for respect of international law, territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark in various instances and notably through a Joint Statement of the President of the Council and the President of the Commission on 17 January 2026 1 . This message was clearly reiterated by the High Representative/Vice-President (HRVP) in front of the European Parliament in its plenary session on 22 January 2026 2 . The HRVP welcomed the fact that a diplomatic track had been opened between Denmark, Greenland and the US. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/17/joint-statement-by-president-costa-andby-president-von-der-leyen-on-greenland/. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/vod.html?mode=unit&vodLanguage=EN&internalEPId=2017056456 363&providerMeetingId=20260120-0900-PLENARY#.”
  EU-US relations · EU foreign policy approach
• 2026-03-18 “E-004481/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has not been made aware through official channels of the allegations by the Israeli authorities linking Hamas with the Global Sumud Flotilla. Any eventual corroboration of the documents, potential disciplinary action against Members of the European Parliament (EP) is a matter for the EP in accordance with its ethics rules. In line with the staff regulations 1 , EU civil servants are bound by a strict code of conduct and ethical standards designed to ensure independence, integrity, and impartiality in conducting EU foreign policy. The EU’s position regarding Hamas is very clear and consistent. The Hamas military wing was listed by the EU under its counterterrorism sanctions regime on 27 December 2001, while Hamas in its entirety has been on the EU terrorist list since 12 September 2003. Following the brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, the EU established a new and dedicated sanctions regime against Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad on 19 January 2024 2 . There are currently 11 individuals and three entities subject to restrictive measures under that framework. The EU has not listed the ‘Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad.’ As regards flotillas, the EU respects the intention of those on board the flotilla ships to draw attention to the humanitarian plight of the population of Gaza. In the EU, everyone has the right to exercise activism and freedom of assembly, this is a core pillar of EU values. The freedom of navigation under international law must also be upheld. At the same time, the EU discourages flotillas. They risk the safety of their participants and carry the potential for escalation. The authorities responsible for ensuring consular protection are the states to which the citizens belong. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A01962R003120260101&qid=1771326223355. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-terrorism/.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-03-16 “E-000275/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Cyprus has been a Member State since 2004 and, as such, has access to all the financial tools available for the Members of the EU. In addition, the Commission implements the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community (EUR 761 million allocated since 2006), which seeks to facilitate Cyprus’ reunification, including by financing confidence-building measures between the two Cypriot communities and promoting EU standards and values as well as alignment with the acquis in the Turkish Cypriot community. Full respect of international law, including the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, is at the core of the EU’s approach. In their international relations, all states are obliged to refrain from the threat or use of force, to respect international humanitarian law and to resolve conflicts peacefully. The Commission remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis and the relevant European Council Conclusions 1 . The EU is ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. The EU has repeatedly underlined, including in the last Enlargement report published in November 2025 2 , that it remains crucial that Türkiye commits and actively contributes to such a comprehensive settlement, including its external aspects, normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus and respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all Member States. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 2 Türkiye 2025 Report, 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy, 4.11.2025 SWD(2025) 756 final.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-03-16 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 16.3.2026 Written question The EU has reacted firmly to Georgia’s serious democratic backsliding, including violence against protesters, opposition figures, journalists and civil society, the adoption of repressive legislation and the instrumentalisation of the justice system. These actions are fundamentally incompatible with EU values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. In response to the country’s democratic backsliding, the EU has downgraded political contacts with the Georgian authorities and suspended bilateral financial assistance directly benefitting them. The EU has also repeatedly called for the release of all journalists, activists and others unjustly detained and continues discussions among Member States on further measures, including sanctions, which require unanimity in the Council. As a consequence of Georgian authorities’ course of action, Georgia’s EU accession process has effectively come to a standstill. In its 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy [1] , the Commission concluded that in light of Georgia’s continued backsliding on the fundamentals since then, it considers Georgia a candidate country in name only. Recently, the Commission has initiated procedures to activate the revised Visa Suspension Mechanism in reaction to non-compliance with visa liberalisation benchmarks in key areas of governance and human rights, as observed in the Seventh [2] and Eighth [3] Suspension Mechanism Report. The EU remains ready to support the Georgian people’s European aspirations, while underlining that a return to the EU accession path is fully in the hands of Georgia’s authorities and requires a genuine and irreversible commitment to EU values. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/2025-communication-eu-enlargement-policy-extract-about-georgia_en?s=221. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A571%3AFIN. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0792&qid=1768565258267.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2026-03-16 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 16.3.2026 Written question International law and the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter must be upheld under all circumstances. Members of the UN Security Council have a particular responsibility to uphold these principles. This message was underscored in the 4 January 2026 statement by the High Representative/Vice-President supported by 26 Member States [1] , as well as by President of the European Council and President of the Commission in their public reactions to the US intervention in Venezuela. Territorial integrity, national sovereignty and inviolability of borders are universal principles. Greenland is an autonomous territory in the Kingdom of Denmark. Decisions about the future of Greenland are for Greenlanders and Danes to decide. Mutual assistance in case of an armed attack on the territory of a Member State is an obligation within the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In case of need, the mutual assistance in accordance with Article 42.7 of the TEU will be addressed, among Member States, ensuring a close coordination with key partners including NATO. [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-statement-high-representative-aftermath-us-intervention-venezuela_en.”
  EU-US relations · EU-Venezuela relations · EU-Cuba relations
• 2026-03-16 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 16.3.2026 Written question The EU condemns the threats received by the Chaldean Patriarch of Baghdad following a homily delivered in Saint Joseph’s Cathedral in Baghdad. Iraq’s religious diversity is intrinsically linked to the country’s identity and cultural heritage. The EU expresses its unequivocal support to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, with full respect to its ethnic and religious diversity. The EU Delegation is in regular contact with representatives of Iraqi religious communities, including the Chaldean Patriarch of Baghdad. Messages on respect of all minorities and protection of freedom of religion or belief are consistently conveyed by the EU in its exchanges with Iraqi officials at all levels and feature on the agenda of bilateral institutional bodies such as the EU-Iraq Subcommittee on Democracy and Human Rights. Moreover, the substantial EU support package for Iraq [1] — ranging from humanitarian assistance and development aid to a security mission on security sector reform- is designed to benefit all aspects of Iraqi society, including minorities. [1] https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/middle-east-gulf/iraq_en.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2026-03-16 “E-000261/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The promotion and protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) for all individuals around the world remains an essential priority of EU’s external action, as highlighted in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2027) 1 . The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 is one of the Conventions falling under the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) 3 regulation and therefore part of the GSP+ monitoring exercise in Sri Lanka. During the annual EU-Sri Lanka working group on Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights the issue of minorities, including religious minorities, is extensively discussed. The last one took place on 5 May 2025 in Colombo back-to-back with a GSP+ monitoring mission. The Delegation of the EU to Sri Lanka is also in regular contact with civil society organisations and human rights defenders on FoRB. There are also specific EU funded programmes 4 on freedom of religion and empowerment of minority communities. The EU will continue to follow the situation very closely and raise it with the Sri Lanka authorities. 1 EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2027): https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/Action-Plan-EN_2020-2027.pdf. 2 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instrumentsmechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights. 3 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/generalised-scheme-preferences-plus-gsp. 4 Two relevant grants related to the empowerment of minority communities are the following: (i) The Minority Rights Group grant on ‘Minority Empowerment for Democracy and Pluralism in Sri Lanka’; (ii) the National Peace Council grant on ‘Active Citizens for Elections and Democracy in Sri Lanka and the Maldives’.”
  EU competences on human rights
• 2026-03-06 “E-000113/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission On 9 January 2026 1 , on behalf of all Member States, the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) firmly condemned the use of violence, arbitrary detention and intimidation tactics by security forces, and expressed the solidarity with the Iranian people that voiced their legitimate aspirations for a better life, freedom and dignity. The HR/VP also called for the release of all those unjustly detained for exercising their human rights. The rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, as well as the right of access to information, are universal and binding obligations for Iran under international law. The Council adopted new restrictive measures against perpetrators of serious human rights violations in the context of the recent nationwide protests, including prominent figures such as the Minister of the Interior 2 , and reached a political agreement to list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation under the Council Common Position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 3 . The EU stands in full solidarity with the Iranian people that voice their legitimate aspirations for a better life, freedom and dignity. The EU commitment to human rights extends to the UN fora. The EU urges Iran to allow free and unhindered access to the country for UN mandate holders and to cooperate fully with the independent, international Fact-Finding Mission and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran. At the Special Session of the Human Rights Council on 23 January 2026, the EU strongly supported the work of UN mechanisms and the extension of their mandate. The EU is a strong supporter of the UN accountability mechanisms. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/09/iran-statement-by-the-hr-on-behalf-of-theeu-on-the-situation-in-the-country/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/29/iran-council-adopts-new-sanctions-overserious-human-rights-violations-and-iran-s-continued-support-to-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine/. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Iran relations
• 2026-03-06 “E-000080/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s foreign policy is firmly anchored in international law, including the UN Charter. National sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of borders are non-negotiable principles, and should be applied consistently and universally. This approach is guided by the same rules-based order the EU upholds globally, whether in Europe or beyond. Greenland is an autonomous territory in the Kingdom of Denmark. Decisions about the future of Greenland are for Greenlanders and Danes to decide. They are essential not only for the EU, but for nations around the world and EU will keep defending them. Even more if the territorial integrity of a Member State is questioned. The EU has shown impact and resolve through a strong and united European position in defending our values and interests, in support to Denmark and Greenland. Dialogue remains essential. The establishment of the high-level working group between the United States, Greenland and Denmark was a positive move away from threats and towards the negotiating table. Guided by the universal values and principles embedded in the UN Charter and international law, the EU remains the best defender of the rule of law throughout the world, including international law. This is reflected in much of its actions at multilateral level, including in various UN fora, but also through specific public statements when these rules are violated. Furthermore, the primacy of international law is also raised in many high-level bilateral engagements and dialogues.”
  EU foreign policy approach · EU-US relations