European Commissioner for Financial services and the savings and investments union · FISMA · Portugal
- 2026-06-09 “Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
First, I want to thank you, Bruna, for your welcoming words and for the opportunity to take part in AMLA's inaugural conference.
It is really encouraging to see what you and the entire AMLA team have achieved in such a short period of time.
Setting up a new European authority from scratch is no small task, yet AMLA is already establishing itself as a key pillar of our new anti-money laundering framework. That gives me great confidence for the years ahead.
It is equally encouraging to be here in Frankfurt alongside so many experts from across Europe and beyond who share a common objective, that of protecting the integrity of our financial system and strengthening our collective ability to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
AMLA is important for Europe. For the first time, we have a strong centre for the consistent application of EU AML/CFT rules, bringing together expertise, promoting cooperation and helping to build a truly European approach to tackling financial crime.
Today's conference is focused on “Building Trust, Enhancing Integrity”. These two concepts go to the heart of our common work.
Trust is one of the most valuable assets any financial system can have. Capital flows where trust exists. And integrity is crucial to preserve that trust. Investors, businesses and citizens need confidence that our financial system is transparent and protected against abuse.
This is why the anti-money laundering package adopted in 2024 was such an important milestone. It demonstrated Europe's determination to set a global example, by raising standards and improving effective enforcement, reducing fragmentation and reinforcing cooperation.
But legislation alone is not enough. The challenge often lays on implementation. And AMLA is at the centre of that effort.
Today I would like to share my thoughts on the next steps of this journey: on how AMLA can help deliver effective risk-based supervision, support the intelligent use of technology and strengthen cooperation.
The context AMLA faces today is very different from when the Commission proposed its establishment in 2021.
Over the past five years, we have witnessed geopolitical, economic and security shocks that have fundamentally changed the environment in which our financial system operates.
Foreign actors have become more active in seeking to exploit and weaponise vulnerabilities in our financial system. The need to protect the integrity of our markets has never been greater.
At the same time, innovation in areas such as cryptoassets, blockchain, decentralised finance, and artificial intelligence, is transforming the way financial services agents operate, creating new opportunities but also new risks.
In this environment, our objective cannot simply be to keep pace with developments. We must stay ahead of them.
The scale of the challenge is significant. The United Nations estimates that funds worth between 2 and 5 percent of global GDP are laundered each year. According to Europol, 110 billion euro of this goes through the EU, with only 1 percent of criminal proceeds confiscated. A full 99 percent remain at the disposal of criminals.
These figures remind us why your work matters. Financial crime is not a victimless activity. It undermines trust, distorts competition, finances organised crime and threatens the integrity not just of our financial system but of our very society.
The EU's AML framework gives us the tools to have a more consistent, coordinated, and stronger defence against those attempting to exploit our financial system.
The Transfer of Funds Regulation has, since December 2024, ensured better traceability of crypto transactions.
The 6th AML Directive, currently being transposed, will improve the quality of Beneficial Ownership registers, strengthen cooperation between national Financial Intelligence Units, and link bank account registries throughout the EU.
And the AML Regulation, directly applicable from 10 July 2027 – one year and one month from now – further cements the risk-based approach to AML across the Union. It does this by setting out a clear framework for addressing and mitigating risks, conducting customer due diligence, and improving disclosure requirements for beneficial ownership of legal structures.
But legislation is not enough. Effective implementation is key. This is where AMLA comes in.
In many ways, AMLA is the central pillar of the new framework. It brings together supervision, coordination and expertise at European level, helping to ensure that our rules are applied consistently across the Union.
And consistency matters. Fragmentation creates loopholes. Divergent supervisory approaches create uncertainty. Duplication creates unnecessary costs for both authorities and market participants.
AMLA gives us an opportunity to address those challenges and make our framework more effective.
I would like to highlight three areas where AMLA will be making a decisive contribution:
• Promoting smarter, simpler and more risk-based regulation and supervision,
• Supporting the use of technology and data, and
• Strengthening Europe's voice in the global fight against financial crime.
Let me briefly take each of these in turn.
Technology is evolving at a speed that legislation will always struggle to match. Criminals understand this. They exploit complexity, fragmentation and delay.
And if our response is simply to add more layers of detail, applied differently across the Union, we leave cracks in our armour - cracks that technology makes easier to find and easier to exploit.
Many stakeholders hear "simplification" and fear deregulation. But complexity does not necessarily produce better supervision. In many cases, a simpler framework is a more effective framework.
Today, a financial institution operating across several Member States can still face different interpretations of the same rules. This is costly, creates uncertainty and inefficiencies.
In the past, our reaction to varying implementation has been to make our rules more detailed – giving less room for manoeuvre. In the end, this has only added layers of complexity, not effectiveness nor simplification.
AMLA gives us the opportunity for a step-change in Europe's supervisory approach. By moving towards a more consistent and genuinely European approach to supervision, it enables us to move towards the more principle-based rulemaking and risk-based supervision that current times demand.
But good AML supervision rests on effective risk assessment and sound judgement. It is not measured nor necessarily achieved by a (high) volume of reporting.
This is why risk-based supervision and proportionality must remain at the centre of our approach. Our objective is not to create more obligations for the sake of it, but to help authorities and market participants focus their resources where the risks are greatest. Achieving this will take time and will require close cooperation.
To all supervisors here today: when you participate in AMLA's work, you are not only representing your national system, you are contributing to a shared European line of defence. Together, we can build a framework that is stronger, more coherent, more efficient and ultimately more effective in protecting the integrity of Europe's financial system. And necessarily simpler than each one of us operating in isolation.
When operationalising or implementing our rules notably through regulatory technical standards or guidelines, we must remind ourselves that they are aimed at helping industry and national authorities understand and implement the rules and allocate resources in accordance with risks and needs. Risk-based supervision and proportionality need to be the key principles guiding our approach in that regard.
Alongside with simplification, technology will be equally critical for an effective AMLA.
Financial crime is becoming increasingly sophisticated, leveraging new technologies, digital assets and cross-border networks. Supervisors must be able to move at least as quickly as those they seek to stop.
This is where AMLA can make a real difference. By bringing together expertise, data and supervisory experience from across the Union, AMLA can help build a genuinely data-driven and technology-enabled approach to supervision.
Data is the foundation. Gathering high-quality, timely and relevant information in a single hub is essential to identify risks, detect suspicious patterns and allocate resources effectively.
But data alone is not enough. We also need the tools to make sense of it. Artificial intelligence and advanced analytics can help authorities identify connections, detect anomalies and uncover risks that would otherwise remain hidden.
Technology enhances human judgement. Better data and better technology should lead to better detection of risks and patterns, swifter action and ultimately better outcomes.
AMLA is uniquely placed to lead this transformation. By helping to develop common tools, common data standards and a shared understanding of risk, it can strengthen the effectiveness of AML prevention and supervision across the European Union.
Facilitating the secure exchange of information between the different actors in the system will be an integral part of this effort. This includes exchanges between public authorities, but also - where appropriate and subject to robust safeguards – exchanges with and among private sector actors.
Our legal framework contains the necessary legal basis to enable data sharing. I am looking forward to seeing AMLA support the public and private sector in implementing this.
In addition, ‘FIU.net' is an important tool for FIUs in the Union and EEA countries, as well as for Europol, to exchange information. In recent years, the Commission has put significant resources into FIU.net and has turned it into a state-of-the-art tool. Continuous improvements are warranted once it is transferred to AMLA in July next year.
Fighting money laundering cannot be done in isolation. No matter how strong our European framework becomes, financial crime remains a global challenge requiring global cooperation.
The international environment in which we operate is becoming more fragmented, more complex and more unpredictable. This inevitably affects the effectiveness of international cooperation and the ability of global bodies, including the FATF, to set high quality and ambitious standards.
In this context, AMLA has an important role to play in projecting Europe's voice and ambition on the global stage.
First, by leading through example. If we can demonstrate that closer cooperation, better data sharing and more coordinated supervision deliver better outcomes, Europe can help shape international best practices.
Second, AMLA will bring together expertise and resources on a scale that few authorities around the world can match. This puts it in a strong position to take up a leading role in international workstreams, build partnerships with like-minded jurisdictions and support neighbouring and candidate countries in building robust AML/CFT frameworks.
Across all policy areas, the EU needs to be able to play a stronger role among international peers. Our voice is important, and we must make it heard.
Ladies and gentlemen, in little over one year, on 10 July 2027, the AML Regulation enters into force. And a few months after that, in 2028, AMLA will start directly supervising a select set of entities.
Leading up to these key milestones, we will need a collective effort from all stakeholders to achieve a successful outcome.
Firstly, through secondary legislation and guidelines which will ensure that we have a coherent, predictable, flexible, and easy to use legal framework.
We are committed to delivering a risk-based and proportionate regime that avoids unnecessary burden and caters for the realities of the different sectors and stakeholders.
If we are to match this ambition, we also need to hear from you. So, I would very much encourage you to respond to our consultations and other feedback opportunities.
Second, by ensuring compliance with the framework ahead of July next year. It is an ambitious package, and significant effort will be required to change internal policies and processes.
Some of you have been dealing with AML rules for a long time. But for others, some of this is new, particularly for parts of the non-financial sector.
For all those, please know that colleagues within AMLA, within relevant self-regulatory bodies and within supervisors are working to set achievable and clear rules appropriate to your sector.
However, getting there is a two-way street. We need your feedback to guide us in fine-tuning the rules to meet your needs and realities, and we need your engagement to prepare all obliged entities, even if they have never been subject to AML rules before.
To conclude, let me say this - we know the expectations placed on AMLA are high, and rightly so.
But, Bruna, together with the entire AMLA leadership and staff, you have already demonstrated over the past year that this authority has the ambition, expertise and determination to meet them.
The legislative framework is broadly in place. The challenge now is implementation.
That means building a supervisory culture that is risk-based, proportionate and effective. It means making better use of data and technology. And it means ensuring that simplification translates into stronger outcomes.
One year from now, AMLA will be even closer to operating at full strength.
I am confident that it will build a more coherent European framework, strengthen trust in our financial system and reinforce Europe's voice in the global fight against financial crime. And will shape our defences through risk-based and proportionate rules, using data-driven supervision.
Because trust is not a by-product of a well-functioning financial system. It is one of its foundations. And by protecting that trust, AMLA will help protect the integrity, competitiveness and resilience of Europe's economy.
Thank you.”
Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2026-06-03 “Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Many thanks to Jorg for the invitation to be with you this evening, and to Norbert for the kind introduction.
Your invitation suggested that I reflect on what we have done so far under my mandate and what still lies ahead. Looking back to where we were this time last year, I have to say I am proud of the progress we have made.
We have launched important debates and put forward ambitious reforms that, I believe, can help shape a stronger, more competitive and more resilient European economy at a time when geopolitical developments are increasingly influencing our economic choices, creating both challenges and opportunities.
This time last year, we had published our Savings and Investments Union strategy, setting out our vision for a deeper, more integrated and more resilient European financial market.
A market that works for people, finances innovation, supports companies throughout their growth journey, and helps ensure that Europe can match its ambitions with the capital needed to deliver them.
One year ago, we were preparing the first measures to turn the SIU from a vision into reality. We were finalising our first legislative package on securitisation, on which trilogue negotiations will soon begin.
Since then, we have put forward a recommendation on Savings and Investments Accounts and the first European Financial Literacy strategy, which I am pleased to see many Member States are now beginning to implement.
We have also finalised the Solvency II delegated act and presented our pensions package - initiatives that can help strengthen long-term savings and investment while creating new opportunities for the insurance sector to contribute to the objectives of the SIU. And at the end of last year, we delivered the Market Integration and Supervision Package, a major step towards a more integrated, simple and efficient European financial market, provided we maintain the level of ambition during the negotiations ahead.
If I were to describe all these initiatives in a single sentence, while fully recognising the technical complexity behind them, I would say that they share a common objective: to create an enabling regulatory and supervisory environment that unlocks the full potential of Europe's financial system by reducing fragmentation, removing unnecessary complexity, facilitate cross-border activity and investment, and ensuring that resilience, financial stability and consumer protection remain non-negotiable.
We are now also advancing the banking dimension of the SIU. We are currently preparing a report on the competitiveness of the European banking sector, which we intend to publish in July, with legislative proposals to follow in early 2027.
Insurance has been an integral part of our work on the capital markets dimension of the SIU, particularly when it comes to supplementary pensions, incentives for long-term investments and reducing unnecessary administrative burdens. But I also hear calls for us to do more for the insurance sector – and I am open to that discussion.
The question, however, is whether we are collectively ready to be as ambitious for insurance as we are for capital markets. Are we ready to move towards a truly European insurance market? One where companies can operate seamlessly across borders, where citizens enjoy broader choice and greater access to products, and where scale can support innovation, competitiveness and investment?
I ask this question because I firmly believe that building the SIU can only be achieved through a genuine collective effort. The Commission can propose reforms and recommendations, create the right framework and ensure that common rules are respected. But the final decisions rest with the co-legislators, and successful implementation depends on market participants, supervisors and Member States.
We need genuine commitment from all sides. Not only agreement on the diagnosis, but also the willingness to act on the solutions. Europe is not short of declarations of support for the SIU. The challenge now is to translate that support into concrete decisions and tangible results.
The role of the insurance sector in our vision for Europe is difficult to overstate. With trillions of euros available for long-term investment and a critical role in protecting households and businesses, insurers are uniquely placed to contribute to Europe's competitiveness, resilience and economic security.
Let me therefore focus on the steps we are taking to create the right conditions for insurers to invest, innovate and contribute even more effectively to the objectives of the SIU.
When we first began developing the SIU agenda, supplementary pensions quickly emerged as one of its key pillars.
This is essentially about improving pension sustainability, pension adequacy and the financial well-being of European citizens in retirement.
It fully acknowledges Member States' competences and responsibilities for organising their pension systems and does in no way intend to undermine the role of Pillar 1 in European social security systems.
But we must also recognise the demographic realities facing Europe. Longer life expectancy, ageing populations and changing labour markets are placing increasing pressure on public pension systems. Creating more opportunities for citizens to complement their retirement savings is therefore not only desirable, it is becoming increasingly necessary.
As policymakers, it is our responsibility to ensure that the supplementary pension products are trustworthy, transparent and capable of delivering good long-term returns for savers. But it is equally our responsibility to ensure that the regulatory framework makes it easier for providers to offer such products and for citizens to access them.
This is where the insurance sector has a particularly important role to play. Insurers have the expertise, the long-term perspective and the investment capacity needed to help millions of Europeans prepare more effectively for retirement, while simultaneously supporting long-term investment in Europe's economy.
This is the idea behind the review of the pan-European Personal Pension Product or PEPP. Our objective is to make the framework more attractive and workable for providers, while maintaining high standards of transparency, cost disclosure and investor protection.
At the same time, we must be mindful how our own rules shape the growth opportunities. This is why our pensions package seeks not only to improve retirement outcomes for citizens, but also to support the development of stronger institutional investors capable of operating at scale across Europe. In doing so, we can increase the flow of long-term capital into the European economy while helping citizens build greater financial security for the future.
The urgency of reinforcing supplementary pensions is increasingly reflected in policy decisions across Europe, including in Germany's recent reform of its third pillar pension framework this year. However, when it comes to negotiating European solutions, we still encounter significant resistance to change.
I fully recognise that pensions are a sensitive and complex topic, and one that deserves careful consideration. But I also hope that, throughout these discussions, we keep the interest of future retirees at the centre of our decisions.
Europe's needs to finance growth, innovation and competitiveness have put the broader question of long-term investment at the heart of our work on the review of the Solvency II framework.
The revised framework is more proportionate and better reflects both the specific risk profiles of insurers and the long-term nature of their business model. It is also simpler with reduced reporting and administrative requirements, especially for smaller insurers. And we are determined to ensure that the implementing measures remain faithful to that same spirit.
Our reform makes it easier for insurers to benefit from the preferential treatment for long-term equity investments, whether listed or unlisted, including private equity and venture capital.
In addition, preferential prudential treatment will apply to equity investments made alongside public entities under legislative programmes.
We have also improved the risk sensitivity of the prudential treatment of securitisations, introducing substantial changes that can enable insurers to play a greater role in financing the economy while maintaining robust prudential safeguards.
The framework is now in place. We have created new opportunities for long-term investment while preserving financial stability and policyholder protection. The next step belongs to the market. EIOPA has been entrusted with monitoring the use of the incentives provided by the revised framework.
The Solvency II review is also complemented by the introduction of a new Insurance Recovery and Resolution Directive - the IRRD, which will apply from January 2027.
We are working to ensure that implementation goes as smoothly as possible. This includes reducing unnecessary administrative burdens, providing sufficient flexibility where appropriate, and ensuring a gradual and pragmatic transition to the new rules.
The framework has been designed to embed proportionality and reflect the diversity of the European insurance sector, and we will work to ensure that implementation remains faithful to that objective.
Under the IRRD, the Commission has been tasked with the preparation of a report in early 2027 to assess the appropriateness of minimum common standards for insurance guarantee schemes within the Union.
More than half of EU Member States already have insurance guarantee schemes in place - and that number continues to grow.
As part of this work, EIOPA is currently consulting on this topic and will provide technical advice to the Commission. The consultation remains open until 26th of June, and I would encourage all interested stakeholders to contribute if they have not already done so.
Ladies and gentlemen, managing risk is at the heart of what you do every day. You are constantly looking ahead, identifying the next challenge and preparing for it.
In a rapidly evolving world, those challenges are becoming more numerous, more complex and, in some cases, more severe. As a result, we are seeing growing protection gaps across Europe, situations where economic losses are not covered by insurance. This is increasingly evident in areas such as climate-related risks and cybersecurity, but also in cases where certain groups of citizens struggle to access insurance products, including cancer survivors in remission.
These insurance protection gaps are not only created when risks become too large, too complex or too costly to insure. They also arise when people perceive insurance as unavailable, unaffordable or unfair. And when that happens, trust in the system is weakened and resilience suffers. Addressing these challenges requires a collective effort. We have already started engaging with relevant stakeholders to better understand the drivers behind these protection gaps and to identify practical ways to narrow them.
I count on the insurance industry, the supervisory community and EIOPA to be active partners in this work. Because ensuring that citizens and businesses can access appropriate protection against the risks they face is not only a question of market development, it is also a question of economic resilience, social inclusion and fairness.
Still discussing forward-looking agenda, you probably noticed that I am a strong advocate for digital friendly rules that ensure we can move forward with innovation, rather than against it.
That matters because technology is already changing the way people interact with financial services. From how they pay, save and invest, to how they access advice, submit a claim and manage their money.
At the heart of much of this progress is data. Through our proposal for a Regulation on open finance, known as FiDA, the Commission is supporting data-driven business models that put citizens in control of how their financial data is used.
The transformation in how data is used and shared is happening right now, as we speak. And it will continue to develop, with or without the incumbent players.
And this is perhaps one of the most important realities the sector must recognise. Established players are naturally more comfortable with existing structures and business models.
Change brings competition, new entrants and new ways of serving customers, and that can create understandable hesitation. But resisting change does not stop it from happening.
The future will belong to those capable of creating competitive environments, embracing innovation and offering customers simpler, better and more tailored solutions. Those are the firms that will thrive, attract trust and shape the next generation of financial services in Europe.
FiDA also offers a clear business opportunity for insurers. With customer permission, better access to financial data can help insurers develop more tailored products, improve risk assessment, simplify onboarding, and offer services that better reflect people's real needs.
Let me conclude with this.
As we continue building the SIU, I want the insurance sector to be at the heart of our efforts to support competitiveness. Because a more competitive Europe will require more investment, more protection against risk and more long-term thinking, all areas where insurers have a unique contribution to make.
With those thoughts, I hope I have set the scene for our discussion. And I am now delighted to hand over to my old friend, Jörg Asmussen, and to take your questions.”
Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
- 2026-05-26 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The assessment of third-country extraterritorial sanctions on Cuba should be framed within the EU’s commitment to safeguarding legitimate trade and humanitarian access. The EU rejects the extraterritorial application of unilateral sanctions by third countries, as it considers such measures contrary to international law. In this context, the EU has established legislative instruments, notably the ‘Blocking Statute’ [1] , which shields European economic operators from the legal effects of third-country sanctions and to ensure the continuity of lawful business activities, including with Cuba. Member States’ authorities are responsible for implementing the Blocking Statute, including with respect to penalties for possible breaches. EU operators whose economic and financial interests are affected by the extra-territorial application of those laws are obligated to inform the Commission. Since 1994, the Commission has been actively engaged in addressing the most pressing needs of the population in Cuba. In 2024-2025, the Commission released close to EUR 10 million to provide lifesaving health services, as well as emergency relief to hurricane-stricken communities. As an immediate response to the steadfast deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in 2026, the Commission has allocated additional EUR 6 million in humanitarian aid to support the most vulnerable with health and food assistance and potable water. Regarding support in the areas of health and energy, biotechnology and renewable energy are the priority sectors under the EU’s Global Gateway Investment Agenda in Cuba [2] . [1] Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2271/oj/eng. [2] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/cuba_en.”
EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · EU-Cuba relations
- 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The Commission recalls that Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency is subject to restrictive measures (sanctions) under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 [1] , including an asset freeze and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to it, directly or indirectly. Moreover, several outlets of Rossiya Segodnya are also subject to restrictive measures under Article 2f of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 [2] . These measures prohibit the broadcasting or distribution of their content in the EU, regardless of the means of transmission, dissemination or distribution, including via online means. The restrictions on the broadcasting and dissemination of content by certain media outlets (designated entities), including those under the control of the Russian Federation in this sanctions regime, are justified by the designated outlets’ essential and instrumental role in the systematic disinformation and propaganda campaigns in support of the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The implementation and enforcement of restrictive measures primarily fall within the competence of the Member States. The Commission monitors the application of the EU’s sanctions regime in coordination with Member States. Actions that effectively reproduce or systematically republish the above-mentioned prohibited content may, depending on the circumstances, amount to circumvention of the restrictive measures. Where indications of such conduct arise, it is for the competent national authorities to assess the facts and, where appropriate, take enforcement action in accordance with EU and national law. [1] Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32014R0269. [2] Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879 of 3 June 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32014R0833.”
Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2026-05-22 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The qualification of a pension scheme, including whether it provides retirement benefits within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council [1] must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the activities carried out, the characteristics of the scheme, and the nature and purpose of the benefits provided, irrespective of its legal form or designation under national law. Where a scheme falls within the scope of the directive, members should have access to clear and adequate information on their rights and on the management of the scheme. Members are also to be provided with regular, accurate information on that scheme, including on accrued entitlements, contributions and costs and on the financial position and investment policy of the scheme. The Commission does not systematically check individual schemes. Responsibility for ensuring compliance with the applicable requirements of EU law lies with the competent authorities of the Member States, including whether a particular scheme falls within the scope of the directive. The Commission continues to work on strengthening occupational retirement provision at EU level, and notably through its proposal to review the directive [2] . That proposal aims to strengthen trust in supplementary pensions and to support better returns and outcomes for savers by enhancing the framework, improving governance and risk management, and enabling more effective long-term investment of retirement savings across sectors. That proposal also seeks to improve transparency for institutions falling within the scope of that directive and on the information provided to members and beneficiaries, while respecting Member States’ competences. [1] Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) (recast) (OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p. 37, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/2341/oj). [2] COM/2025/842 final.”
EU competences on social policies · EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
- 2026-05-13 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 13.5.2026 Written question The Commission shares the concerns expressed by the European Parliament in its resolutions of 9 July and 11 September 2025. The Commission remains firmly committed to supporting the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a cornerstone of the international system of criminal justice and to safeguarding its independence and proper functioning. The Commission fully supports the ICC’s work, including its investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Commission is assessing all appropriate measures, including diplomatic, legal and financial avenues, that could help ensure the continuity of the ICC’s operations and its ability to fulfil its mandate. For each measure, the Commission, in close consultation with the High Representative/Vice-President and the Member States as well as with the ICC and relevant stakeholders, is carefully assessing its necessity, proportionality, effectiveness and relevant legal and practical implications. While an amendment to the annex to Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 [1] is among the legal measures assessed, at this stage, the Commission considers that diplomatic efforts and dialogue remain the most effective course of action. [1] OJ L 309, 29.11.1996, pp. 1-6.”
Support for International Criminal Court
- 2026-04-29 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 29.4.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to its restrictive measures against Russia, including those aimed at hampering Russian revenue generated from oil exports. The Commission is dedicated to monitoring global developments to ensure the robustness of the EU’s policy framework and upholding the effectiveness of sanctions. Currently, there is no review planned for the EU sanctions policy in relation to the recent US measures. The Commission remains convinced that the Oil Price Cap and existing sanctions are well-targeted and continue to be effective, even amid current market volatility. These measures have successfully reduced Russian oil export revenues while maintaining the stability of oil markets, with export volumes from Russia remaining broadly stable. The Commission continuously engages in constructive dialogues with several partners, including the US, to ensure energy security and support diversification. In this respect, the EU has made substantial progress since 2021, with Norway (31%), the US (26%) and North Africa (13%) being the EU’s top suppliers of gas, while oil imports are well diversified with over 10 main suppliers, none of them providing more than 18% of total supply. The Commission has also launched a series of reforms meant to accelerate clean energy deployment to reduce energy prices, home-grown clean energy being the best solution to lower prices and protect the EU from the volatility of global fossil fuel markets.”
EU-US relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2026-04-28 “E-000798/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Central securities depositories (CSDs) are currently required to settle the cash leg of securities transactions through ‘accounts opened with a central bank’ or, under restrictive conditions, ‘through accounts opened with a credit institution’ pursuant to Article 40 of the Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSDR) 1 . With the aim of fostering innovation, the proposal to amend the CSDR as part of the Market Integration and Supervision Package 2 enables CSDs to settle the cash leg of securities transactions with certain electronic money tokens (EMTs) regulated under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) 3 . EMTs 4 are subject to specific rules, including requirements on reserve assets and how EMTs must be issued. Holders of EMTs have a claim against the issuers which have therefore a liability towards holders. In addition, a definition of ‘central bank money’ is included in the proposal in order to further differentiate between the possible means of settling the cash leg of securities transactions including in the context of distributed ledger technology (DLT)-based settlement. The proposal is currently under negotiation in the European Parliament and Council. The proposal to amend the CSDR also includes legal empowerments 5 for the European Securities and Markets Authority to draft technical standards on how to operationalise DLTsettlement. The DLT Pilot Regulation 6 provides that Article 5 of the CSDR applies, which does not preclude same-day settlement models, as it specifies that the settlement should occur no later than two business days after the trade. Regulation (EU) 2025/2075 7 will shorten that period to one business day from 11 October 2027. 1 Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/909/oj. 2 COM(2025) 943 final. 3 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, pp. 40–205. 4 EMTs are defined in Article 3(1)(7) of MiCAR as ‘a type of crypto-asset that purports to maintain a stable value by referencing the value of one official currency’. 5 Articles 6(5) and 45a of the proposal to amend the CSDR set out the mandate for the European Securities Market Authorities to take into account the use of new technologies, including DLT, in the drafting of technical standards pertaining to communication protocols used by issuers, CSDs and other market infrastructures and the mandate to draft technical standards in relation to the mitigation of the risks stemming from the use of DLT for the provision of CSD services outside of an outsourcing arrangement. 6 Regulation (EU) 2022/858 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on a pilot regime for market infrastructures based on distributed ledger technology, and amending Regulations (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 909/2014 and Directive 2014/65/EU, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/858/oj. 7 Regulation (EU) 2025/2075 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 October 2025 amending Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 as regards a shorter settlement cycle in the Union, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2075/oj.”
Regulation of crypto · Digital euro scope (retail vs wholesale) · Financial regulation
- 2026-04-24 “E-000856/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council (MiCA Regulation) 1 was drafted based on an impact assessment, which included a dedicated section for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). That impact assessment demonstrated that the MiCA framework would likely increase non-bank sources of funding for SMEs through the development of initial coin offerings and securities token offerings, providing an opportunity for start-ups to raise substantial amounts of funding at an early stage of development. Different provisions of the MiCA Regulation aim at limiting costs for SMEs, exempting for instance, for crypto-assets other than stablecoins, small offerings below a certain threshold and crypto-assets distributed to small circles of users from publishing an information document describing the issuance of tokens (so-called ‘white paper’). The proportionality principle also applies to all minimum prudential requirements, whether quantitative or qualitative, applying to issuers of asset referenced tokens and crypto-asset service providers. It also allows adapting the content of redemption plans to be drawn up by issuers of asset referenced tokens, and the frequency of their reviews, to the size, complexity and nature of the asset-referenced token, and to the issuer’s business model. By 30 June 2027, the Commission is to issue a report on the application of the MiCA Regulation and on the latest developments with respect to crypto-assets. That report will enable the Commission to assess whether there is a risk that crypto-asset activities relocate outside the EU and whether any legislative amendment is required. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1114/oj.”
Regulation of crypto · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
- 2026-04-24 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 24.4.2026 Written question The Commission acknowledges that robust private reinsurance capacity for maritime war risks plays an important role in supporting the EU’s energy security. The Commission will continue to closely monitor developments, in collaboration with the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, through ongoing market analysis and targeted stakeholder engagement, to assess potential impacts on energy supply chains and broader economic resilience. The availability of maritime insurance capacity in the event of geopolitical disruptions was not discussed at meetings of the Joint EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum (the Forum), including the most recent meeting of 11 March 2026. The Forum is a platform to facilitate structured regulatory cooperation in financial services. The Forum focuses on regulatory matters in areas of mutual interest that fall within its establishing Memorandum of Understanding [1] . Along with the relevant UK authorities, the Commission will consider whether the topic should be included in future Forum meetings. The Commission will continue to monitor developments and remains committed to addressing systemic risks, including those affecting maritime trade and insurance markets, with likeminded jurisdictions. The Commission also supports a number of private sector initiatives that enhance resilience in the context of war related events. The initiatives include guarantee agreements under the Ukraine Investment Framework (the third pillar of the Ukraine Facility), involving international financial institutions and private sector partners. These guarantees are designed to cover a range of risks, including those related to war-related events. [1] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-09/230627-memorandum-understanding-financial-services-eu-uk_en.pdf .”
Financial regulation
- 2026-04-20 “E-000467/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the revelations referenced in the written question through press coverage and publicly available information. The Commission acknowledges the importance of addressing the rights and claims of EU citizens who may have historical entitlements tied to any bank accounts. The EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) 1 and the Terezín Declaration on Holocaust Era Assets and Related Issues 2 , signed by all Member States in 2009 3 , outline several measures towards restorative justice for the victims of Nazi persecution and their descendants. The United States of America and Switzerland are signatories to this Declaration, which includes compensation mechanisms. The responsibility to enforce applicable requirements of EU law and, where relevant, national law transposing the latter, lies with the relevant EU and national authorities. In particular, EU banking supervisors are competent in matters relating to the provision of banking services by the UBS group entities in the EU and cooperate with the Swiss supervisory authority in this context. However, for activities that were or are performed in Switzerland, the relevant Swiss supervisory or judicial authorities are in charge. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2021:615:FIN&pk_campaign=doc&pk_source=EURLex&pk_medium=tw&pk_keyword=No2Antisemitism . 2 https://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/terezin_declaration/index.html. 3 See also: https://www.lootedart.com/web_images/pdf2018/1.1.3%20Joint_Declaration_EU_CZ_final.pdf .”
EU policy on victims' compensation rights · Jewish culture and antisemitism
- 2026-04-16 “E-000543/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (MiFID II) 1 does not regulate how foreign-currency dividend income shall be paid. At the same time, MiFID II sets out rules on disclosures of all costs and charges of financial instruments that investment firms offer or market to clients, including costs and charges related to foreign exchange, where relevant to those financial instruments. According to Article 50(3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 2 , where any part of the total costs and charges is to be paid in or represents an amount of foreign currency, investment firms are required to provide an indication of the currency involved and the applicable currency conversion rates and costs for any part of the total costs and charges. Investment firms shall also inform about the arrangements for payment or other performance in that regard. While MiFID II requires investment firms more generally to act in accordance with the best interest of their clients, the rules on best execution, as set out in Article 27 of MiFID II, relate specifically to the execution of clients’ orders. Consequently, those rules do not regulate how investment firms shall proceed with subsequent payments of dividend income, including foreign-currency dividend income, resulting from holding financial instruments. 1 OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, pp. 349–496. 2 OJ L 87, 31.3.2017, pp. 1–83.”
Financial regulation · Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
- 2026-04-16 “E-000554/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Moldova is moderately prepared in the area of free movement of capital 1 , which includes the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). The Commission recommends the country to continue strengthening the institutional capacity of the Office for Prevention and Combating of Money Laundering. Addressing technical deficiencies identified in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations remains essential, alongside reforms to facilitate AML/CFT regulation and supervision of virtual asset service providers. In June 2025, MONEYVAL 2 upgraded Moldova’s ranking for recommendations 22, 24 and 25 from partially compliant to largely compliant. Moldova is now rated compliant or largely compliant on 37 out of the 40 FATF Recommendations. However, Moldova’s monitoring of compliance by non-profit organisations with requirements of recommendation 8 is not riskbased 3 . Moldova should continue implementing MONEYVAL’s recommendations and further strengthen its system for the detection, investigation and prosecution of latent financial crimes, including money laundering, to ensure an effective and proactive response to financial criminality. The Commission monitors closely Moldova’s reforms on financial crime and compliance with EU and FATF standards, notwithstanding MONEYVAL's decision to cease enhanced monitoring. Regular EU accession reporting continues, guided by policy recommendations from annual enlargement reports and specific benchmarks on financial crime. In addition, the Moldova Reform Agenda outlines steps for each disbursement tranche related to Chapter 32 – Financial Control. The Commission will evaluate the progress of Moldova towards these steps twice a year. 1 Commission’s assessment, conducted in context of the EU accession process, see Commission Staff Working Document Republic of Moldova 2025 Report - Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy, SWD/2025/758 final: https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025SC0758&qid=1773248999590. 2 https://www.coe.int/en/web/moneyval/. 3 According to the MONEYVAL’s report.”
EU relations with Eastern Neighbourhood · EU-Moldova relations
- 2026-04-13 “E-000503/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Between 2013 and 2015, the Commission investigated preliminary concerns that certain investment banks had coordinated to foreclose moves to establish exchange-based trading of credit default swaps (CDS) derivatives products but closed this investigation due to lack of sufficiently conclusive evidence 1 . In 2016, the Commission adopted a decision that rendered legally binding commitments to license inputs for CDS, offered separately by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and information service provider Markit 2 . The Commission had competition concerns relating to the licensing of intellectual property that is needed to offer trading services on the market for CDS. These concerns related to the ‘final price’, which is used to value CDS if there is a default, and to the licensing of specific CDS indices. Monitoring trustees have assisted the Commission in monitoring the compliance of ISDA and Markit with the commitments. The Commission does not have any indications of any speculative activity in the CDS market. 1 https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.39730. 2 https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/AT.39745.”
Financial regulation · Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
- 2026-04-09 “E-000419/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission supports private sector initiatives in the retail payments market and notes the positive impacts expected from the recent partnership between the national mobile payment solutions mentioned by the Honourable Member. Creating an environment supporting the emergence of such types of initiatives was one of the key objectives of the Commission Retail Payments Strategy and related initiatives, in particular the open banking under the Payment Services Directive 1 and the Instant Payments Regulation 2 . In syntony with the digital euro, which creates a pan-European retail payments infrastructure, such private initiatives are a step in the right direction, contributing to further integration of the European retail payments market, and dependences on non-European payment players. The digital euro and private solutions are complementary and can jointly foster the development of home-grown, cross-border, pan-European payment solutions. The digital euro, as a public good, fulfils important policy goals as a digital form of public money. In particular, the digital euro will provide digital central bank money for retail use across all euro area Member States in both online and offline functionalities, ensuring universal access for citizens and businesses. The European Central Bank will develop standards and infrastructure that private sector may utilise to scale-up their retail payment solutions across the EU. The digital euro will also support resilience, strategic autonomy and monetary sovereignty, and strengthen the role of the euro. Therefore, the Commission stands by the proposal for the digital euro Regulation 3 . In sum, the digital euro and private payment solutions will have complementary roles and strengthen the EU retail payment markets. The Commission continues to support both public and private sector efforts in this regard. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L2366. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R0886. 3 COM(2023) 369 final.”
Means of payment (cash vs digital) · Digital euro
- 2026-04-09 “E-000650/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Addressing circumvention of sanctions, which is now a crime under EU law, is a key priority for the EU. The Commission monitors trade flows, especially goods on the Common High Priority 1 and Economically Critical Goods 2 lists, from the EU to third countries considered to be at high risk of being used as a platform for circumvention, and from these countries to Russia. The EU has several anti-circumvention tools at its disposal. These include imposing sanctions on individuals and entities facilitating circumvention of EU sanctions as per Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 3 , strengthening export controls towards entities involved in the circumvention of sensitive items to Russia 4 , or the prohibition on export of sensitive goods to a country whose jurisdiction is used to circumvent EU sanctions 5 . The Commission remains determined to fight sanctions evasion and will continue its rigorous monitoring of trade flows and targeted outreach on the issue of sanctions circumvention and will not hesitate to propose any measures considered necessary. Particular importance is placed on monitoring trade flows which show that EU exports of sensitive goods to third countries are at high risk of re-export to Russia, thus circumventing existing export restrictions. In this context, the Commission can propose to activate the Anti-Circumvention Tool (Article 12(f) of the Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014). The Council decides unanimously on the amendment or adoption of new sanctions. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/list-common-high-priority-items_en. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/list-economically-critical-goods_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/145(1)/2025-12-15 and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/269/oj/eng. 4 Annex IV of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng. 5 Article 12f of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2026-04-07 “E-000705/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Article 107(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (Payment Services Directive - PSD2) 1 establishes, subject to limited exceptions, the principle of maximum harmonisation of the rules laid down in the Directive. PSD2 sets out rules governing the allocation of liability for authorised and unauthorised payment transactions. In this context, the possibility for Member States to introduce national liability or reimbursement regimes for authorised push payment (APP) fraud would need to be considered in light of the harmonised framework established by PSD2. The Commission has proposed new provisions in the ongoing revision of the EU payment services framework (the Payment Services Directive 3/Payment Services Regulation package) to strengthen protection against APP fraud, including enhanced fraud-prevention and reimbursement measures 2 . These proposals are currently under negotiation by the colegislators. A provisional political agreement was reached on 26 November 2025 3 , marking an important step in advancing the legislative process. 1 OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, pp. 35–127 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L2366. 2 COM/2023/367 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0367. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-an-economy-that-works-for-people/file-revision-of-eurules-on-payment-services.”
Financial regulation · EU regulation on financial data access
- 2026-04-07 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question The adoption of EU restrictive measures against individuals is decided unanimously by Member States in the Council of the European Union, acting on a proposal from the High Representative. These deliberations are confidential. The positions of individual Member States are not disclosed. The implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions fall primarily under the responsibility of Member States. The Commission’s role is to monitor compliance and ensure the uniform application across the EU. The Commission actively engages with Member States to clarify implementation practices and address any inconsistencies. It offers Member States technical and legal assistance to strengthen national frameworks and prevent circumvention. Cyprus complies with Regulation (EU) 2019/452 [1] (‘EU FDI Screening Regulation’), which currently does not oblige Member States to have a mechanism to screen foreign direct investments (FDI). The Commission welcomes that Cyprus adopted, on 14 November 2025, Law 194/2025 that establishes a framework for the control of foreign direct investments. The EU FDI Screening Regulation is being revised. Under the political agreement reached in December 2025, Member States will be required to have a screening mechanism, and the revised Regulation will also cover investments made in the EU by foreign investors through an EU subsidiary. [1] OJ L 79I, 21.3.2019, pp. 1-14.”
EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Transparency requirements for interest groups
- 2026-03-31 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 31.3.2026 Written question Anti-money laundering rules require obliged entities to apply customer due diligence measures, including identifying and verifying customers and beneficial owners as well as examining the source of funds where appropriate [1] to prevent the integration of illicit proceeds into the financial system . The qualification of conduct as money laundering depends on the criminal origin of the funds, not on the formal legality of the subsequent transaction [2] . Member States are required to ensure that such conduct is punishable as a criminal offence [3] . The Commission does not hold information on individual assets or their ownership and is not competent to investigate specific cases of money laundering. The initiation of investigations and the application of criminal measures fall within the responsibility of Member States. National authorities may rely on EU tools such as joint investigation teams and the European Investigation Order, and the support of the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation and the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, which play a key role in coordination, information-sharing and cross-border investigations. The EU Financial Intelligence Units’ Platform (FIU.Net), which is part of the EU Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework, enables EU Financial Intelligence Units to exchange and crossmatch suspicious transaction information swiftly and securely, facilitating the early detection of cross-border illicit financial flows and improving follow-up by competent authorities [4] . The Anti-Money Laundering Authority supports and coordinates national AML/CFT supervisors and FIUs, including by fostering joint analyses of complex cases and promoting convergence of supervisory practices across Member States [5] . [1] Article 13(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, pp. 73-117. [2] Article 1(3) of Directive (EU) 2015/849. [3] Article 3(1) of Directive (EU) 2018/1673, OJ L 284, pp. 22-30. [4] Article 51 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 . [5] Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024.”
Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2026-03-27 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 27.3.2026 Written question The Commission has consistently maintained that the extra-territorial application of sanctions is incompatible with international law, in particular with the UN Charter, international humanitarian law and due process. The Commission raises concerns whenever third country measures that are contrary to international law risk undermining the functioning of EU backed institutions or the protection of humanitarian and legitimate economic activities. Unless otherwise provided for in law, credit institutions have the freedom to decide with whom they want to enter into a contract or maintain a business relationship. That said , to ensure financial inclusion, the Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) [1] ensures all EU consumers [2] have the right to a payment account with basic features (PABF) and sets out only a limited number of reasons that can justify a refusal to open a PABF [3] or that would allow the unilateral closure of a PABF by the bank [4] . The Commission has carried out compliance checks of PAD to ensure that the right to a PABF has been correctly transposed by Member States. The Commission is also assessing any relevant complaints and takes action if needed. In addition, the European Banking Association (EBA) has issued guidelines for credit institutions to facilitate access to financial services and tackle unwarranted de-risking [5] . The new Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework applying from July 2027 also include rules to prevent derisking. The Commission does not have evidence that the closure of bank accounts would currently affect political discourse in the EU. [1] Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, pp. 214-246. [2] PAD does not apply to companies and individuals acting in a professional capacity. [3] This includes for example where the opening of the account would infringe anti-money laundering rules. [4] This includes for example that the consumer is no longer legally resident in the EU or has used the account for illegal purposes. [5] https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document_library/Publications/Guidelines/2023/1054144/Guidelines%20on%20MLTF%20risk%20management%20and%20access%20to%20financial%20services.pdf .”
Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2026-03-11 “P-000386/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes a comprehensive approach to protect the EU’s financial system. The fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive 1 mandates the Commission to identify third countries posing a significant threat. The anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) package adopted in 2024 2 further strengthens these efforts. Türkiye’s removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring in June 2024 followed a rigorous process, including verification of both legislative reforms and their effective implementation, on an on-site visit to the country. While FATF removed Türkiye from its ‘grey list’, the Commission agrees that close monitoring of the effectiveness of Türkiye’s AML/CFT framework remains essential. Türkiye will continue to be monitored on this basis, including in light of future findings. As a candidate country, Türkiye remains subject to regular and structured assessments by the Commission, including through the annual enlargement country report, the latest one being issued in November 2025 3 . While accession negotiations with Türkiye have remained at a standstill since 2018, the Commission continues to closely assess developments relevant to the protection of the EU’s financial system. Against this background, and as part of its overall risk-assessment framework, the Commission keeps its list of high-risk third countries under regular review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj/eng. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-update-anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorismlegislative-package-2024-04-24_en. 3 SWD(2025) 756 final.”
Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2026-03-09 “E-000069/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the assessment made in the 2025 Report on payment fraud 1 regarding the need for more effective redress mechanisms available to users for the costs of payment fraud, which continue to be largely borne by users. The data in the report confirm the importance of strong customer authentication (SCA), with overall lower fraud rates in transactions where SCA is applied. The Commission shares the expectation expressed in the report that additional safety measures such as VoP 2 , which became mandatory 3 for all credit transfers in euro in October 2025, will further reduce fraud. The Commission’s proposal for a Payment Services Regulation (PSR) 4 included measures to improve the application of SCA and extend the application of VoP to all credit transfers in any currency in the EU. It also proposed a new refund right for consumers where they fall victim to fraudsters pretending to be payment service providers (PSPs) 5 and an obligation for providers of communication services to cooperate with PSPs to prevent spoofing fraud. In November 2025, co-legislators provisionally agreed to strengthen the refund rights of users, including where security credentials are fraudulently obtained, or where PSPs do not block suspicious payments. The provisional agreement, which remains subject to final approval by co-legislators, would also attribute secondary liability to intermediaries such as online platforms towards PSPs, subject to conditions, where the content they store gives rise to fraudulent transactions. Provided the provisional agreement is approved by the co-legislators, with fraud prevention and redress rules set out in a regulation, a more harmonized application is expected under the PSR compared to the current framework 6 . 1 EBA/REP/2025/40 2025 Report on Payment Fraud, European Banking Authority and European Central Bank; available here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/intro/publications/pdf/ecb.ebaecb202512.en.pdf. 2 Verification of payee, or service ensuring the verification of the payee. 3 Pursuant to Article 5c of Regulation (EU) 2024/886 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 amending Regulations (EU) No 260/2012 and (EU) 2021/1230 and Directives 98/26/EC and (EU) 2015/2366 as regards instant credit transfers in euro. 4 COM/2023/367 final. 5 In November 2025, co-legislators provisionally agreed to include this new refund right in the Payment Services Regulation. Under the current Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (PSD2), payers are protected from losses resulting from unauthorized payment transactions. Subject to confirmation of the provisional agreement by the co-legislators, the new refund right would extent the protection of consumers to cases where a consumer is deceived into authorizing one or several payment transactions by a third-party impersonating the consumer’s payment service provider. 6 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35).”
Financial regulation · Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2026-03-09 “E-000157/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Article 32(2) of the Non-Performing Loans Directive (NPLD) (EU) 2021/2167 1 provides a derogation for Member States, according to which they may allow entities providing credit servicing activities under national regimes equivalent to or stricter than that established by NPLD to be automatically recognised as authorised credit servicers under the national rules transposing NPLD. Pursuant to Article 32(3) and (4), when adopting measures transposing the Directive, Member States are required to make an explicit reference thereto and communicate to the Commission the text of the principal provisions of national law. This reflects the general obligation on Member States to notify transposition and implementation measures to the Commission in compliance with the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. They have a responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. The Commission monitors the situation and may decide to take action. NPLD expressly allows Member States whose pre-existing national regimes are stricter than or equivalent to the regime established by NPLD to automatically recognise entities already carrying out credit servicing activities, to avoid the imposition of unjustified administrative burdens on service providers already subject to those regimes. Cyprus notified the complete transposition of NPLD on 12 November 2024. The Commission has opened an informal dialogue to seek clarifications on various issues arising from national transposition measures. The Commission may raise questions concerning the implementation of authorisation regimes as part of this broader verification exercise. 1 OJ L 438, 8.12.2021, pp. 1–37.”
Financial regulation
- 2026-02-26 “E-000026/2026 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Unless otherwise provided for in law, credit institutions have in principle the freedom to decide with whom they want to enter into a contract or maintain a business relationship. Thus, credit institutions are in principle free to terminate relationships with clients. However, they need to comply with relevant requirements, in particular rules for the termination of payment accounts provided for in the Payment Services Directive (PSD) 1 . The Commission has no indications that US regulations result in bank account closures for clubs, political parties or individuals that are operating lawfully within the EU. To ensure financial inclusion, the Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) 2 gives every consumer legally resident in the EU the right to a payment account with basic features. The PAD sets out only a limited number of reasons which can justify the refusal for opening the account, such as that the opening of the account would lead to an infringement of anti-money laundering rules 3 . However, the PAD does not apply to companies or entities not acting in their private capacity. The Commission is aware of issues relating to account closures of individuals, businesses in different Member States 4 . In this context, the European Banking Authority has issued guidelines for credit institutions to facilitate access to financial services and tackle unwarranted de-risking 5 . Measures to combat de-risking are also included in the new AntiMoney Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism framework applying from July 2027. 1 Article 55 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015. 2 Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, pp. 214–246. 3 Unilateral closure of a Payment Account with Basic Features (PABF) by the bank is also only allowed for limited reasons. This includes for example that the consumer is no longer legally resident in the EU or has used the account for illegal purposes. 4 Debanking issues have for example been raised in previous parliamentary questions such as E-003413/2025 and E-004082/2025: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html . 5 https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document_library/Publications/Guidelines/2023/1054144/Guideline s%20on%20MLTF%20risk%20management%20and%20access%20to%20financial%20services.pdf.”
Financial regulation · Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2026-02-02 “E-004675/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU has adopted a wide range of restrictive measures (sanctions) on Russia, including farreaching trade restrictions in the energy sector, such as an import ban on Russian seaborne crude oil and any refined oil products. In addition, a new ban on imports into the EU of refined oil products 1 produced in third countries using Russian crude oil took effect on 21 January 2026. These sanctions are aimed at maximising the impact on Russia’s ability to conduct and finance its war of aggression. The effective enforcement of EU sanctions and the prevention of circumvention are top priorities for the European Union. The Commission monitors the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions by Member States and supports them in those tasks. In this context, the Commission published guidance in the form of frequently asked questions (FAQs) 2 to assist operators and national competent authorities to comply with the new import ban on refined products obtained from Russian crude oil, including the necessary due diligence and evidence. According to this guidance, as of 21 January 2026, operators must exercise enhanced due diligence when importing refined petroleum from third countries, including Georgia, to make sure that those products are not obtained from Russian crude oil. As a candidate country, Georgia is subject to heightened expectations and scrutiny regarding its alignment with the EU acquis, including the Common and Foreign and Security Policy and EU restrictive measures. It is for the Council to decide unanimously on the amendment or new adoption of sanctions in line with EU law. This applies also to possible listing of refineries and other entities in third countries like Georgia. 1 Falling under CN code 2710. 2 Updated on 16 October 2025: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/dc76791c-72aa-4fd5-b82fae13a42e93c0_en?filename=faqs-sanctions-russia-oil-import-ban_en.pdf.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Georgia relations
- 2026-01-26 “E-004480/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Addressing circumvention of sanctions, which is now a crime under EU law, is a key priority for the EU. The Commission monitors trade flows, especially goods on Common High Priority (CHP) 1 and Economically Critical Goods (ECG) 2 lists, from EU to third countries considered to be at high risk of being used as a platform for circumvention, and from these countries to Russia. The EU has several anti-circumvention tools at its disposal. These include imposing sanctions on individuals and entities facilitating circumvention of EU sanctions 3 ; strengthening export controls towards entities involved in the circumvention of sensitive items to Russia 4 ; or the prohibition on export of sensitive goods to a country whose jurisdiction is used to circumvent EU sanctions 5 . Jurisdictions monitored include Georgia. Latest data from Georgian authorities indicate that no exports of CHP items from Georgia to Russia were reported between January 2024 and October 2025. In November 2025, Georgia committed to halt re-export of ECG. Nonetheless, re-export of these items from Georgia to Russia remains a concern for EU and the Commission has called on Georgia to step up efforts to prevent that its territory or operators are used to circumvent EU sanctions. As a candidate country, Georgia is subject to heightened expectations and scrutiny regarding its alignment with EU acquis, including Common Foreign and Security Policy and EU restrictive measures. As a result of the Georgian authorities’ course of action, leading to democratic backsliding and human rights violations, Georgia’s EU accession process has come to a standstill. The Commission will continue rigorous monitoring of the situation on the ground and targeted outreach on the issue of sanctions circumvention. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/list-common-high-priority-items_en. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/list-economically-critical-goods_en. 3 As per Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. 4 Annex IV of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. 5 Article 12f of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014.”
EU enlargement
- 2026-01-23 “E-004648/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is working to ensure that citizens throughout the EU have access to financial services. While digitalisation has increased access to financial services online, the rise of digital banking and the high branch costs have led to a reduction of the number of bank branches and ATMs, impacting in particular geographically remote areas. The Commission aims at enhancing financial inclusion through various initiatives. The EU financial literacy strategy 1 includes measures to improve the digital financial skills as an important element for enabling access to financial services and promoting financial inclusion. The Payment Accounts Directive 2 obliges Member States to ensure that payment accounts with basic features are offered to consumers including by those credit institutions that only provide online accounts. To improve access to cash, the Commission proposed measures to improve the availability of cash in shops and via ATMs through the Payment Services package, on which co-legislators reached a political agreement 3 . The Commission proposed to safeguard acceptance of and access to cash 4 . Member States can take additional measures to address the needs of their citizens as far as they are compatible with EU law. Profits allow banks to innovate and invest in activities that support the EU economy, thereby contributing to the overall competitiveness agenda. To that effect, banks allocate their resources according to their business strategy and resilience level. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/consumer-finance-and-payments/financial-literacy_en. 2 OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, pp. 214–246. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/11/27/payment-services-council-and-parliamentagree-to-step-up-the-fight-against-fraud-and-increase-transparency/. 4 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/use-euro/euro-legal-tender_en.”
European Banking Union · EU policy on banks profits
- 2026-01-21 “E-004462/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission condemns the measures announced by the Chinese authorities against two financial entities based in Lithuania. The Commission is following the situation closely and is currently engaging in bilateral discussions with China to address the issue. While the Commission is considering its next steps at the EU level, it is not in a position to disclose the details of the actions under consideration. The Commission will remain vigilant to ensure that third countries’ financial and credit institutions do not frustrate EU sanctions or support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.”
Trade relations with China · EU-China relations
- 2026-01-21 “E-004454/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Delegated Regulation 2025/1393 1 introduced an obligation for the Commission to conclude by the end of 2025 the assessment of third countries not listed by the Financial Action Task Force but suspended from that organisation. Russia falls under the scope of this review. The Commission has taken into account relevant information from various sources, which indicate circumstances raising serious concerns regarding the state of Russian’s system for combatting money laundering and terrorist financing and pointing to strategic deficiencies in the same. Consequently, the Commission proposed to list Russia as a high-risk country for money laundering and terrorist financing. This proposal was transmitted to the co-legislators for scrutiny on 3 December 2025. Neither of the co-legislators objected to the proposal. Consequently, the delegated Regulation was published in the Official Journal on 9 January 2026 2 . It will enter into force twenty days after publication. 1 OJ L, 2025/1393, 21.8.2025. 2 OJ L, C/2025/8435, 9.1.2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2026/46/oj.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2026-01-15 “E-004530/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not possess the specific data regarding the total number of aircraft currently grounded in the EU due to the application of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 1 . Consequently, it is unable to provide a breakdown of these numbers by Member State. Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 establishes the legal framework for EU's restrictive measures. However, the responsibility for the enforcement and monitoring of compliance with these sanctions lies primarily with the competent national authorities of the Member States. Each Member State is tasked with implementing and ensuring adherence to the sanctions within its respective jurisdiction. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2026-01-15 “E-004027/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission EU sanctions regulations are directly applicable in all Member States and, accordingly, the freezing of assets is usually carried out by relevant EU economic operators. In accordance with the applicable legal obligations, reporting about the frozen assets is made first to the national competent authorities of Member States and, second, by those authorities to the Commission. When considering the value of frozen assets, it is important to bear in mind that for certain types of assets (e.g. securities) the value can be particularly affected by market fluctuations. In parallel, EU sanctions provide for several derogations, with the ensuing effect that where national competent authorities decide to grant an authorisation to that end, the overall value of frozen assets decreases. Overall, the variations observed in the total amounts frozen are thus not necessarily indicative of funds ‘disappearing’ but can instead reflect the outcome of market fluctuations and possible authorisations granted to release funds under the available derogations. As far as interest is concerned, as a rule, interest owed to the owner of the frozen funds continues to accrue to the owner but remains equally frozen. As part of its regular contacts with Member States on frozen assets reporting, the Commission has reached out to the Danish authorities on the matter raised.”
Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2026-01-06 “E-004152/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU has adopted a wide range of sanctions on Russia, including far-reaching trade restrictions in the energy sector, such as an import ban on Russian seaborne crude oil and any refined oil products 1 . These sanctions are aimed to maximise their impact on Russia’s ability to conduct and finance its war of aggression. Before 2022, Russia accounted for more than 25% of EU imports of crude oil and more than 40% of refined products. Since then, the EU’s dependency on Russian supplies has fallen to 2% for crude oil and virtually 0% for refined products. The Commission is continuously monitoring the scale and routes of EU imports of petroleum products possibly obtained from Russian crude oil. An important step towards blocking such imports was the adoption of a ban on imports into the EU of refined oil products (falling under CN code 2710) produced in third countries using Russian crude oil. This ban will take effect on 21 January 2026. In light of this upcoming measure, the EU has already analysed detailed customs data and identified imports from third countries possibly containing Russian crude oil. The Commission has also contacted relevant Member States’ authorities to enhance checks and to ensure that adequate awareness and due-diligence practices are put into place. Data analysis with Member States to monitor these specific flows will continue in a working group set up for this purpose. From the outset, EU sanctions have been designed and implemented to impose a heavy price on Russia, whilst minimising adverse effects on the EU, its citizens and businesses. When developing sanctions packages, the Commission carefully considers their impact. It is for the Council to decide unanimously on the amendment and new adoption of sanctions in line with EU law. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasionukraine/sanctions-energy_en.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-12-19 “E-004295/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have any information suggesting that the closure of the bank accounts of the person mentioned in the subject of the question would be linked to the court proceedings mentioned in the question. Credit institutions, like other economic operators, have in principle the freedom to decide with whom they want to enter into a contract or maintain a business relationship. Yet, the Payment Services Directive (PSD) 1 provides certain rules for the termination of payment accounts for example that payment service providers are only able to terminate payment accounts if this possibility is provided in the contract with the client and are obliged to give at least a 2month notice to the client. To ensure citizens have access to basic banking services, the Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) 2 provides all EU consumers the right to a payment account with basic features (PABF) and sets out only a limited number of reasons which can justify the refusal for opening a PABF, such as that the opening of the account would lead to an infringement of anti-money laundering rules. In addition, unilateral closure of a PABF by the bank is also only allowed for limited reasons such as that the consumer is no longer legally resident in the EU or has deliberately used the account for illegal purposes. 1 Article 55 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015. 2 Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, pp. 214–246.”
Transparency requirements for interest groups · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
- 2025-12-16 “E-004007/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission notes that many technologies needed for the green transition rely on the use of substances that present certain health hazards. To avoid that excessively strict requirements prevent from investing in crucial transition technologies, urgent changes to Appendix C 1 were needed. The requirement for substances ‘self-classified’ to display one of the hazard classes mentioned in Article 57 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 2 has been repealed. Undertakings reported major difficulties or even impossibility to show proof of compliance with this requirement. The proposed changes will reduce the administrative burden and improve the usability of EU taxonomy in practice which supports the aim of scaling up sustainable investment. The Commission deleted the separate templates on fossil gas and nuclear activities as they were considered burdensome, especially for companies with limited exposures to those sectors. Non-financial undertakings will still report on those activities in the ‘per activity' template and financial undertakings in an aggregated form in their standard template. The flexibility of the cumulative materiality threshold of 10% will allow companies to focus their reporting on core business activities. It will reduce the cost and administrative burden of Taxonomy reporting where assessing the alignment of non-material assets would be overly complex. Transparency is ensured as non-financial undertakings will have to separately report in the templates the proportion of turnover, CapEx 3 , or OpEx 4 that was not assessed as a result of being considered non-material. This applies also for financial undertakings which will report non-material assets separately as non-material exposures in the templates. 1 OJ L 442, 9.12.2021, pp. 1–349, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R2139. 2 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, pp. 1. 3 Capital expenditure. 4 Operating expenditure.”
Green Taxonomy
- 2025-12-03 “E-004011/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission reiterates that EU sanctions are always targeted and carefully calibrated and are designed to avoid unintended consequences for those not responsible for the actions leading to the adoption of sanctions. EU sanctions do not target food, medicine, emergency supplies or humanitarian aid. Furthermore, EU sanctions provide for humanitarian exceptions under which humanitarian operators can continue to deliver necessary humanitarian aid to those in need. EU sanctions operate often in complex landscapes. There are many reasons outside sanctions leading private sector operators, including suppliers and banks, to be hesitant to involve themselves with countries subject to sanctions e.g. reputational risks, counter terrorism financing efforts or anti-money laundering considerations. The Commission engages in frequent dialogues with the European businesses and the financial sector in particular to address overcompliance practices and to provide guidance on the content of EU sanctions. The adoption of EU sanctions is the sole responsibility of the Member States in the Council acting unanimously. All EU sanctions undergo review by the Council at least every 12 months. During this review, the appropriateness of the sanctions in place, as well as the appropriateness of maintaining sanctions, is assessed. EU sanctions are flexible and react to developments on the ground. The regular review of EU sanctions ensures that they remain relevant and proportionate.”
EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
- 2025-12-02 “E-004155/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission On 26 February 2025 the Commission adopted the Omnibus I proposal to simplify the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), as well as the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive 1 . If agreed by co-legislators, it will result in significant burden reduction for smaller companies. According to the proposal, the reporting requirements would only apply to large undertakings with more than 1000 employees. This would reduce the number of companies subject to the reporting requirements by about 80%. It would remove the reporting requirements on listed small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Other SMEs have never been in the scope of the CSRD. The proposal also strengthens protections for companies in the value chain by prohibiting companies subject to the CSRD from asking for more information for the purposes of reporting sustainability information, than what would be contained in a future voluntary standard for smaller companies that will be developed based on the Voluntary sustainability reporting standard for SMEs produced by EFRAG 2 . The co-legislators have already agreed on the so-called ‘Stop-the-clock’ Directive 3 , which postpones by two years the application of all reporting requirements for companies that do not have to report in 2025 for financial year 2024. It ensures that listed SMEs will not have to start reporting for financial year 2026 while co-legislators consider the Commission’s proposal to take them definitively out of scope. The postponement of reporting deadlines through the ‘Stop-the-clock’ Directive, the narrowing of the CSRD scope, and the introduction of protections for SMEs in the value chain represent the main instruments through which the Commission seeks to alleviate the regulatory and administrative burden on SMEs and other smaller companies. 1 COM(2025) 81 final and COM(2025) 80 final. 2 C(2025) 4984 final: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-presents-voluntary-sustainabilityreporting-standard-ease-burden-smes_en. 3 OJ L, 2025/794, 16.4.2025.”
Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Sustainable corporate governance
- 2025-11-27 “E-004012/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission EU sanctions vis-à-vis Iran have been imposed in response to Iran’s nuclear activities, human rights violations, destabilising activities in the Red Sea region, and its support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The recent reintroduction of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran emanates from a United Nations Security Council Resolution. EU sanctions are always targeted and carefully calibrated and are designed to avoid unintended consequences for those not responsible for the actions leading to their adoption. EU sanctions are never aimed at the civilian population and do not target food, medicine, emergency supplies or humanitarian aid. EU sanctions do not prohibit the export of medical or pharmaceutical products to Iran. Furthermore, EU sanctions vis-à-vis Iran provide for humanitarian exceptions under which humanitarian operators can continue to deliver necessary humanitarian aid to the population in need. EU sanctions are one aspect of a complex landscape in Iran. There are many reasons beyond sanctions that may lead private sector operators, including suppliers and banks, to be hesitant to engage with Iran, including reputational risks or anti-money laundering considerations. The Commission engages in frequent dialogues with European businesses and the financial sector in particular to address overcompliance practices and to provide guidance on the content of EU sanctions.”
EU-Iran relations
- 2025-11-26 “E-004086/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s securitisation package has been carefully designed to maintain solid standards for the European securitisation market and for the banks involved. Through targeted measures it aims to eliminate undue obstacles, while preserving key safeguards established after the financial crisis. The package also builds on the advice of the European Banking Authority and the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities. Regarding capital requirements for banks, the package continues to uphold robust standards. It increases risk sensitivity, where capital requirements are reduced only for securitisations with demonstrably lower risk levels. All in all, capital requirements ensure that overall standards remain strong and reliable. The European Central Bank President has repeatedly called for a strong securitisation market as an essential component of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). For example, in her November 2023 speech she emphasised that ‘A genuine CMU would mean building a sufficiently large securitisation market, allowing banks to transfer some risk to investors, release capital and unlock additional lending’ 1 . Securitisation indeed serves as a critical link between the banking system and capital markets. It allows to increase bank lending to EU households and businesses, including small and medium-sized enterprises, while also enabling investors to diversify their investment opportunities. The Commission’s proposal is designed with a forward-looking perspective, to encourage banks to issue resilient securitisations going forward, fostering growth in the market within a sound framework. 1 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2023/html/ecb.sp231117~88389f194b.en.html.”
European Banking Union · Financial regulation
- 2025-11-26 “E-004005/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The definition of gold bullion of Article 4(1)(60a) of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) 1 makes clear that not all kinds and forms of gold can receive the 0% preferential riskweight and be used as collateral for prudential purposes. Only physical gold with uniform purity and mass such as gold bars, ingots, and coins to be treated as a commodity meets the CRR definition, because its standardisation and, consequently, fungibility makes it easily and speedily valued and traded on the market (also in bulk and without physical delivery through gold certificates), thereby reducing its risk profile. As gold jewellery is not subject to uniform purity and mass standards across the globe that would make it valued and accepted as a commodity, it is not generally traded in the bullion market and, accordingly, it does not meet the definition of Article 4(1)(60a) of the CRR. The fact that the gold contained in jewellery can be extracted and transformed in e.g. gold bars is not sufficient because it would still need to go through refining during the melting process to meet the standard purity and mass necessary to be considered as a commodity and thus be traded on the bullion market. Such a prudential treatment does not hinder the ability of the borrowers to pledge gold jewellery according to the applicable property law. However, such a pledge will not allow the lending bank to reduce its prudential capital requirements according to Articles 134(4), 197(1)(g), 207(1-4) of the CRR. 1 OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, pp. 1–337.”
Financial regulation
- 2025-11-25 “E-003986/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Directive (EU) 2015/849 1 requires enhanced due diligence measures for all business relationships or transactions involving high-risk third countries 2 . While obliged entities can outsource certain functions to third parties, they cannot rely on third parties established in high-risk third countries, except for branches or majority-owned subsidiaries under certain conditions. This will continue to apply under the new framework in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 3 . Furthermore, under the new framework, the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) will issue guidelines on supervisory practices and anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements for obliged entities on outsourcing. These guidelines are to define the conditions under which outsourcing may occur and clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of all parties involved. They will also aim to ensure consistent oversight across the EU by providing guidance to supervisors on how to assess outsourcing arrangements and verify that such practices comply with AML/CFT obligations. Lastly, AMLA will also be required to carry out cost-benefit analyses in relation to the measures, guidelines and technical standards it proposes. This obligation, set out in Article 49 and subsequent provisions of the AMLA Regulation 4 , aims to ensure that AMLA’s regulatory initiatives are proportionate and take into account both the expected effectiveness of the measures and their potential impact on obliged entities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015L0849. 2 Risk-based exemptions are provided for branches or majority-owned subsidiaries of obliged entities established in the EU and located in high-risk third countries. 3 OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj.”
Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2025-11-21 “E-003966/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU taxonomy 1 aims to provide transparency on activities that promote energy and ecological transition and ensure that greenwashing is prevented. While the EU taxonomy aims to act as a catalyst for investments into the most environmentally sustainable companies and for the transition of other companies towards environmental sustainability, it does not prevent investment in activities that are not covered by its framework. In 2024, capital investments into Taxonomy-aligned activities have reached EUR 273 billion. This brings the total to EUR 742 billion over the financial years 2022, 2023 and 2024. This demonstrates that companies are using the Taxonomy to guide and showcase their capital investments in key sectors contributing to the green transition and more sustainable economic growth, in particular energy. However, and notwithstanding the use of the EU Taxonomy by stakeholders, the Commission is committed to enhance its usability as part of increased focus on EU competitiveness. The Omnibus package adopted on 26 February 2025 2 represents an unprecedented simplification effort, through the reduction of reporting obligations. In addition, the Commission is currently conducting a comprehensive review of the Taxonomy criteria to simplify and enhance their usability. Particular attention is paid to simplifying the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) criteria. The review will be evidence-based and will respect the principle of technological neutrality. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en . 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/omnibus-package-2025-04-01_en .”
Overall simplification of regulation in the EU · Green Taxonomy
- 2025-11-19 “E-003734/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU has adopted a wide range of sanctions on Russia targeting its ability to conduct and finance its war of aggression 1 . Import restrictions on iron and steel are one of the most stringent sanctions of the EU. Most of them entered into force in March 2022. All EU steel imports from Russia are under sanctions. Two specific types of semi-finished products are subject to a quantitative gradual declining limit (quota) until September 2028. This allows EU industry to find alternatives. Diversification requires investment on new semifinished units across the globe. EU sanctions cover a number of liquefied natural gas (LNG)-related restrictions but do currently not prohibit to service tankers transporting Russian origin LNG unless they are designated by the EU. The EU has designated 557 vessels, including 15 LNG tankers. The designation of a vessel entails a port access ban and the prohibition to provide services, irrespective the flag of the vessel. EU sanctions also prohibit access to ports for Russiaflagged vessels, including vessels that flew the Russian flag before February 2022. The EU has imposed sanctions on more than 2500 individuals and entities in view of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, including Russian leading businesspersons. Those measures include freezing their assets in the EU. EU sanctions are kept under regular review; adoption is decided solely and unanimously by the 27 EU Member States under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions is the competence of the Member States. EU sanctions are applicable to all legal and natural persons falling under EU jurisdiction. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russiasmilitary-aggression-against-ukraine_en.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-11-18 “P-004043/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission EU sanctions on Russia prohibit access to EU ports and locks for vessels flying the Russian flag, as well as those that have reflagged from Russia after 24 February 2022. A number of derogations are foreseen. The responsibility for assessing whether a specific operation qualifies under one of the derogations lies with the competent national authorities who remain competent to interpret and apply a possibly relevant derogation. In this case, the Italian authorities are responsible for evaluating the logistics operation and determining the applicability of the relevant provisions. Moreover, it is important to clarify that the FAQ published by the Commission 1 , and referred to in the question, does not concern this specific case. The Commission services remain available to support Member States in the implementation of the sanctions regime and to provide technical guidance where appropriate. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/66e8fd7d-8057-4b9b-96c2-5e54bf573cd1_en?filename=faqssanctions-russia-consolidated_en.pdf.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-11-18 “E-003761/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Council, based on proposals from the High Representative and the Commission, has adopted several restrictive measures to further limit Russia’s energy revenues and constrain the Russian shadow fleet and its enablers. To date, 557 vessels are subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport 12 . The EU has strengthened its restrictive measures related to Russia by adding the possibility to impose assets freezes, prohibiting making funds available and, as appropriate, travel bans on individuals and entities supporting the Russian shadow fleet 3 . Several designations have been adopted since, covering in particular oil traders, shipping and managing companies in Russia and third countries, supportive flag registries as well as a captain of a shadow fleet vessel. The European External Action Service and the Commission remain committed to increase the pressure on shadow fleet networks and will work closely with Member States to develop further measures. Tackling possible circumvention attempts of EU sanctions such as the Oil Price Cap, including through third country jurisdictions, is among the Commission’s key priorities. It is dedicating significant efforts to this – from legislative changes targeting those who facilitate circumvention to closely monitoring suspicious trade flows and organising dedicated outreach. Member States are responsible for the implementation and the enforcement of EU sanctions. National competent authorities (NCAs) must ascertain that EU operators have taken all the necessary steps, in good faith, to ensure oil is purchased at or below the Oil Price Cap. The Commission is monitoring this and stands ready to support Member States and their NCAs. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-againstukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russiaeu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/24/16th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-swar-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-lists-additional-48-individuals-and-35-entities/.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-11-17 “E-003413/2025 E-004082/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the issue of debanking. Credit institutions, like other economic operators, have in principle the freedom to decide with whom they want to enter into a contract or maintain a business relationship. Yet, the Payment Services Directive (PSD) 1 provides certain rules for the termination of payment accounts 2 . To ensure financial inclusion, the Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) 3 provides all EU consumers the right to a payment account with basic features (PABF) and sets out only a limited number of reasons, such as that the opening of the account would lead to an infringement of anti-money laundering rules, which can justify the refusal for opening a PABF. Unilateral closure of a PABF by the bank is also only allowed for limited reasons 4 . A ‘reputational risk’ for the bank or ideological beliefs of the consumer cannot as such justify the closure or refusal to open a PABF. In order to tackle instances of debanking and following the European Banking Authority (EBA)’s opinion on the scale and impact of de-risking in the EU, the EBA has issued guidelines for credit institutions to facilitate access to financial services and tackle unwarranted de-risking 5 . The new Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework applying from July 2027 requires institutions that decide to terminate a business relationship to keep records of the grounds for such a decision. This will allow supervisors to assess whether institutions have appropriately calibrated their customer due diligence practices. Furthermore, AML supervisors will be required to cooperate with financial supervisors responsible for the PSD and the PAD to reduce de-risking practices. 1 Article 55 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 337, 23.12.2015. 2 In particular, payment service providers are only able to terminate payment accounts if this is provided in a contract and are obliged to give at least a 2- month notice to the client. Moreover, Member States’ laws and regulations governing the rights of the parties to declare the contract unenforceable or void are applicable. 3 Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features Text with EEA relevance. 4 This includes for example that the consumer is no longer legally resident in the EU or has used the account for illegal purposes. 5 https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document_library/Publications/Guidelines/2023/1054144/Guidelin es%20on%20MLTF%20risk%20management%20and%20access%20to%20financial%20services.pdf.”
Financial regulation · Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2025-11-17 “E-003426/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) is accountable to the European Parliament and the Council and is subject to the transparency obligations laid down in the EIOPA Regulation 1 . Pursuant to Article 3, EIOPA is obliged to publish an annual report on its activities, and the EIOPA chairperson is obliged to participate in public hearings before the European Parliament on EIOPA’s performance, to report to the European Parliament in writing on EIOPA’s activities, including any relevant information requested by the European Parliament on an ad hoc basis, and to reply orally or in writing to any question addressed to it by the European Parliament or by the Council. Only when professional secrecy and confidentiality obligations 2 are to be warranted, the European Parliament can request – and EIOPA is obliged to- hold confidential discussions with the Chair, Vice-Chairs and Coordinators of the competent committee of the European Parliament. Article 3 of the EIOPA Regulation also refers to the European Parliament’s right to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry as foreseen in Article 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 1(6) of the EIOPA Regulation sets out that EIOPA will act independently and objectively and in the interests of the EU. Given EIOPA’s status as an autonomous agency, it is for the European Parliament and the Council to exercise the above-mentioned prerogatives. The Commission is committed to ensuring that the EIOPA Regulation is applied in full. The EIOPA Regulation sets accountability and transparency requirements, and the European Parliament and the Council have the prerogative to demand information and clarifications at any time. 1 Namely Articles 3, 43a and 72 of EIOPA Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010. 2 Pursuant Article 70 of EIOPA Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and Article 339 TFEU.”
Discharge of EU institutions and agencies
- 2025-11-17 “E-003496/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 1. This fourth quarter of 2025, the Commission intends to issue recommendations on, pension tracking systems, pension dashboards and auto-enrolment. These will set out lessons learned from across the EU and recommend the development of such tools. Additionally, the Commission will review the existing EU frameworks for institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) and the pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP), with the aim of increasing participation in supplementary pensions to promote adequate retirement income. 2. In 2017, the Commission issued a recommendation to Member States on the tax treatment of the PEPP 1 . In particular, it encouraged Member States to grant PEPPs the same tax relief as the one granted to national personal pension products or, where Member States have more than one type of personal pension products, to give PEPPs the most favourable tax treatment available to those products. The Commission is taking stock of how Member States have addressed this recommendation. In the context of the review of the PEPP Regulation 2 , the Commission intends to ensure that the PEPP is a genuinely simplified instrument, capable of complementing national statutory pension schemes together with occupational pensions. 3. The Commission will launch in 2026 the first ever comprehensive Anti-Poverty Strategy, that will take a life-cycle approach to poverty and aim at addressing the root causes of poverty at different stages of life. The Commission is also monitoring and supporting the use of care credits in national occupational pensions and invites Member States (and social partners) to implement pension care credit policies, which support pension adequacy for women. 1 C(2017) 4393 final. 2 OJ L 198, 25.7.2019, pp. 1–63.”
EU policy on aging workforce and pensions · EU competences on social policies
- 2025-11-17 “E-002801/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The 2020 Methodology for the identification of high-risk third countries 1 provides a transparent and predictable framework underpinning EU listings and de-listings. While the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) lists constitute the baseline for the EU list, the Commission also has the possibility to put forward a listing based on an autonomous assessment. The Commission always strives to reflect FATF decisions as soon as possible, by proposing an amendment to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 2 . It is noted that a limited number of jurisdictions, while de-listed by FATF, are required to implement additional actions in the form of ‘EU benchmarks’, the completion of which is a pre-requisite for their de-listing from the EU list. The Delegated Regulation is then submitted to co-legislators for their scrutiny. Beyond this legal requirement, the 2020 Methodology also provides for structured engagement with Member States experts, reporting to the European Parliament and Council, as well as exchanges with the country under assessment. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f745b6e8-735b-4855-b050f52276356fe6_en?filename=200507-anti-money-laundering-terrorism-financing-action-planmethodology_en.pdf. 2 OJ L 254, 20.9.2016, pp. 1–4.”
Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2025-11-14 “E-003731/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Savings and Investments Union Strategy (SIU) 1 seeks to strengthen, deepen and integrate further EU markets. Integration does not mean that local markets disappear. On the contrary, their activity remains vital, brings diversity to the trading landscape and facilitates access. The Strategy furthermore proposes an approach where EU-level workstreams can be complemented by coordinated actions of Member States 2 . The Commission also aims to reduce fragmentation and foster cross-border activities, thereby widening investment and financing options for individuals and companies. Smaller capital markets will benefit from an integrated EU capital market through broader and deeper pools of capital, also fostering local investment. Companies will be able to tap into funding from larger pools of capital without being restricted to their domestic market. Similarly, households will be able to access cheaper and better investment opportunities across the EU. Conversely, a more integrated market can help productive investment flow into smaller capital markets. Effective supervision is vital for an integrated European financial system. The European Securities and Markets Authority’s enhanced role would provide consistent oversight thus increasing confidence in the financial system and facilitating cross border activities. However, for all other entities, the national competent authorities would remain in charge, ensuring national specificities to be taken into account. Harmonisation in selected areas (e.g. insolvency) would be evidence-based and respect subsidiarity and proportionality. It aims to achieve legal certainty and a level playing field. Progress nevertheless relies on joint EU and Member-State action. 1 COM(2025) 124 final, Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU, 19 March 2025. 2 This includes addressing recommendations to Member States on savings and investment accounts, supplementary pensions and a financial literacy strategy, as detailed in the SIU strategy (see reference 1 above). Additional information on these initiatives is available here: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/eu-boost-financialliteracy-and-investment-opportunities-citizens_en.”
EU Single Market harmonisation · Financial regulation
- 2025-11-13 “E-003491/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Under Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards, jurisdictions are required to implement targeted financial sanctions (TFS) related to proliferation financing (PF) in line with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1 . TFS means asset freezing and prohibitions to prevent funds or other assets from being made available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of designated persons and entities 2 . UNSCRs are much broader and prescribe also other types of sanctions, with some outside of the scope of FATF Standards 3 . The FATF Methodology emphasises the role of obliged entities in complying with TFS. While flag-hopping towards registries with poor diligence may contribute to sanctions evasion, the Methodology does not explicitly require flag registries to screen against TFS 4 . There is very limited precedent of mutual evaluation reports 5 analysing shipping registers, based on the specific country’s context and exposure. For a more systematic approach in assessing the role of shipping registers in sanctions screening in FATF mutual evaluations and follow-up processes, an explicit requirement may be necessary. In FATF, the Commission has consistently championed strong beneficial ownership transparency requirements. Such efforts led to the adoption of strengthened Recommendations 6 . Under the FATF Standards underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance are activities falling within the definition of Financial Institution, the obligation to apply TFS is erga omnes and thus also covers any other actor in the insurance industry. 1 See FATF Recommendation 7 for the relevant UNSCRs in scope of the FATF Standards. 2 FATF Glossary. 3 Footnote 19 to Interpretative Note to Recommendation 7. 4 Nor does the FATF Guidance on this issue: See FATF, Guidance on Proliferation Financing Risk and Mitigation, June 2021, available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/GuidanceProliferation-Financing-Risk-Assessment-Mitigation.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf. At the same time, recent FATF typology work on Proliferation Financing complex evasion schemes looks into the exploitation of the maritime and shipping sector. See FATF, Complex Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion Schemes, June 2025, available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Complex-PFSanctions-Evasions-Schemes.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf. 5 Reference is made to the Mutual Evaluation Report of the Marshall Islands, available here: https://www.fatfgafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/Marshall-Islands-MER-November-2024.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf and the Mutual Evaluation Report of Nauru, available here: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrbmer/Nauru-MER-APG-November-2024.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf. Those are reports by the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), a FATF-Style Regional Body. 6 Revised Recommendations 24 on transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons (https://www.fatfgafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/R24-statement-march-2022.html ) and revised Recommendation 25 on transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements (https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatfgafi/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/R25-public-consultation-oct22.html ).”
EU foreign policy approach · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-10-28 “P-003571/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of difficulties of cancer survivors to access certain financial services, including life insurances requested by mortgage providers, but does not have specific statistical data on this topic. The Mortgage Credit Directive 1 (MCD) has been effective in raising consumer protection and has helped to harmonise mortgage lending practices across the Member States. To date no decision has been taken on the need to revise MCD. Should the decision to revise the MCD be taken in future, the Commission would then need to assess whether or not it should address the ‘right to be forgotten’. One of the actions that the Commission presented in Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan 2 is for relevant stakeholders - cancer and consumer organisations, the medical community and the financial sector - to engage in dialogue and develop a Code of Conduct that ensures cancer patients’ fair access to financial services. The Commission organised an event in May 2024 taking stock of the progress of this dialogue 3 . It is up to those stakeholders to continue the dialogue and find compromises. The Commission continues to encourage them to do so as a means to advance the ‘right to be forgotten’ across the EU. A code agreed by all relevant stakeholders would likely win swift traction in all Member States, while leaving freedom to adapt to national specificities. 1 OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, pp. 34–85. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2021%3A44%3AFIN. 3 https://health.ec.europa.eu/events/cancer-survivorship-advancing-right-be-forgotten-2024-05-14_en.”
EU competences on health
- 2025-10-28 “E-003377/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The President of the European Commission has publicly announced 1 that the Commission has proposed to include the use of crypto currencies within the scope of the prohibitions in its proposal for the 19th package of sanctions on Russia. As the proposal is currently under negotiation in the Council, the Commission is not in a position to comment on specific details at this stage. The Commission would like to recall that it is the prerogative of the Council to determine the content of Council Regulations. The Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, remains fully committed to combating the circumvention of sanctions, including through the use of crypto currencies, wherever such practices can be identified. Finally, while the Commission contributes to the development of sanctions policy and provides guidance on implementation, Member States have the primary responsibility to monitor the application of Council Regulations and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_2138.”
Regulation of crypto · Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2025-10-20 “E-002949/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Panama has been removed from the EU list of high-risk third countries since 5 August 2025. Panama’s removal is a direct result of improvements in its Anti-Money Laundering / Countering The Financing Of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework and a recognition of Panama’s efforts as the country is no longer considered high-risk. According to the methodology for identifying high-risk third countries under Directive 2015/849 1 , any third country representing a risk to the international financial system identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is presumed to represent a risk to the EU internal market and will in principle also be listed by the EU. When that country is delisted by the FATF, and provided there are no remaining strategic deficiencies, the Commission services will initiate the necessary procedure with a view to updating the EU AML/CFT list, as appropriate. Although Panama was delisted by the FATF in October 2023, it remained listed by the EU due to remaining strategic deficiencies. In January 2024, after further exchanges with Panama, the Commission concluded that Panama had addressed these deficiencies. On 14 March 2024, the Commission adopted a Delegated Regulation 2 to remove Panama and other countries from the EU list, but in April 2024 the European Parliament objected to the set of countries to be delisted. On 10 June 2025, following engagement with several third countries to address the concerns raised by the European Parliament in the April 2024 resolution, the Commission adopted a new Delegated regulation with a view to updating the EU list. That Regulation has been published in the Official Journal on 16 July 2025 as Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 and has entered into force on 5 August 2025 3 . 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f745b6e8-735b-4855-b050-f52276356fe6_en. 2 C(2024) 1754 final. 3 OJ L, 2025/1184, 16.7.2025.”
Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2025-10-16 “E-003232/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The case-law of the Court of Justice confirms the principle of freedom to set rates in the nonlife insurance sector 1 . The Commission has been in contact with the Romanian authorities regarding this specific measure, which was introduced as temporary measure. It is the Commission’s understanding that the cap on motor third party liability insurance premiums has not been renewed following its expiry on 30 June 2025. 1 See, to that effect, the judgment of the Court of Justice of 7 March 2013, C-577/11, paragraphs 21 and 22.”
Regulation of vehicles insurance
- 2025-10-01 “E-003081/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Sanctions (restrictive measures) are an important tool of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. Adopted by the Council of the EU in line with Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, they are used to defend universal values and international law and to preserve peace, security, and human rights in line with the principles of the United Nations Charter, which can lead to saving people’s lives. Sanctions are a peaceful measure of last resort, which is always part of a broader policy approach to a specific situation that includes diplomatic efforts and other tools at the disposal of the EU and its Member States. EU sanctions are temporary, proportionate and fully compliant with international law. They are always designed in a way that minimizes negative impacts on humanitarian activities and unintended consequences for the civilian population. EU sanctions never target the civilian population, nor food, medicine, emergency supplies, or humanitarian aid. In addition, they contain specific derogations and exemptions that facilitate humanitarian efforts and ensure that public health and safety are not negatively affected. When negative outcomes cannot be entirely avoided, the EU makes every effort to mitigate them to the greatest extent possible. Recognizing the importance of assessing public health and socio-economic impacts, particularly in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), the Commission actively monitors and evaluates, together with Member States, the broader implications of EU sanctions as well as their impact and effectiveness.”
EU foreign policy approach
- 2025-09-25 “E-002976/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission While certain pension funds are subject to EU prudential rules, others operate almost entirely under national law. Supervision rests with the competent authorities of each Member State, and no harmonised EU reporting framework covers all EU pension funds. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) collects data on institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) within the scope of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 1 . For the fourth quarter 2024, IORPs total investments amounted to EUR 2.8 trillion, including EUR 568 billion in USD-denominated assets. The European Central Bank (ECB) gathers data on euro area pension funds as defined in Regulation (EU) 2018/231 2 , showing total assets of EUR 3.6 trillion. However, neither EIOPA nor ECB publishes data on the geographical allocation of assets. The Commission has not conducted calculations on the potential impact of hypothetical changes to the allocation of pension funds assets. It is not possible to draw a definitive link between pension funds’ fragmentation and their share of investment in the United States, as other factors may be at play. To tackle broader capital market fragmentation, the Commission launched the Capital Markets Union in 2015 3 . Under the Savings and Investments Union 4 , the Commission is committed to address remaining fragmentation in capital markets. The Commission will also review the EU frameworks for supplementary pension provision and assess possible measures to address, amongst others, the limited scale and fragmentation of pension institutions. A consultation was launched in June 2025, and proposals are expected by the fourth quarter 2025 to strengthen supplementary pensions. 1 OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p. 37–85. 2 OJ L 45, 17.2.2018, p. 3–30. 3 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-building-capital-markets-union_en. 4 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/regulation-and-supervision/savings-and-investments-union_en.”
Financial regulation · EU Single Market harmonisation
- 2025-09-24 “E-003135/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The request refers to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)’s guidelines which aim to ensure a harmonized application of certain aspects of the suitability requirements (updated in April 2023) and the appropriateness requirements (updated in April 2022) foreseen by Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (MiFID II) 1 . These requirements have been in application since January 2018. MiFID requires investment firms to assess their clients’ knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or services recommended, offered or demanded. This implies in particular that firms must assess their clients’ understanding of the risks and features of the financial instruments they will invest into. The ESMA guidelines emphasize flexibility in methods (e.g., digital questionnaires, client discussions) but stresses the need to test actual knowledge, as many retail clients overestimate their understanding or do not appreciate properly how products may behave under different circumstances. Investments firms are thus required to apply proportionate yet robust procedures to ensure the protection of retail investors in accordance with EU law. The rules governing the distribution of investment products to clients, including avenues for simplification, are the object of ongoing legislative negotiations in the context of the retail investment strategy. Where appropriate, the ESMA guidelines will be updated to reflect the outcome of those negotiations. 1 OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, pp. 349–496.”
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
- 2025-09-19 “E-002975/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission As laid down in Article 12(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 1 , part of the ‘Ukraine Territorial Integrity’ sanctions regime, the Commission and the Member States inform each other regarding funds and economic resources (assets) frozen under the said Regulation. The applicable regulations, including the aforementioned Regulation, specify that any information that the Commission receives in relation to such frozen assets can be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received. Therefore, the Commission is not in a position to provide information on the breakdown of assets frozen in each individual Member State. Nonetheless, the Commission can confirm that the total amount of assets frozen in the EU under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 is about EUR 28 billion. In addition, some EUR 210 billion worth of reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia are currently immobilised in the EU, in line with Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 2 , part of the ‘Russia economic sanctions’ regime. 1 Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 078 17.3.2014, p. 6). 2 Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 229 31.7.2014, p. 1).”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-09-16 “E-003082/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Under Article 62(4) of the second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) 1 , Member States must ensure that payees do not request charges for the use of payment instruments for which interchange fees are regulated under the Interchange Fees Regulation (IFR) 2 . The IFR sets caps for interchange fees for debit and credit card transactions, which are not applicable, among other things, to transactions with commercial cards or with cards issued by three party payment card schemes. The Commission does not have enough information to evaluate if the situation described by the Honourable Member is compatible with PSD2. Whether or not any fees levied via the Italian pagoPA platform for card payments is compliant with PSD2 can only be established in full knowledge of the facts of the case. The Italian national authority designated to enforce PSD2 and the IFR – the Italian Central Bank - is responsible to enforce the PSD2 provisions on surcharging. Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for their enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35–127. 2 OJ L 123, 19.05.2015, p. 1–15.”
Financial regulation · Means of payment (cash vs digital)
- 2025-09-12 “E-002564/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission As set out in point (a) of Article 2(1)(6) of Regulation 2024/1624 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing 1 (AMLR) the activity of providing account information services is excluded from the scope of activities that qualify an entity as a financial institution for the purposes of the AMLR. This means that entities that exclusively provide account information services are not obliged entities under the anti-money laundering (AML) framework. For obliged entities that provide account information services together with other regulated services that are in scope of the AMLR, the provision of account information services does not as such trigger specific AML requirements, such as conducting customer due diligence on the customers, monitoring the customer activity or record-keeping related to the account information services. 1 OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024.”
Anti-money laundering regulation · EU regulation on financial data access
- 2025-09-12 “E-003118/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU does not impose any constraints as to the counterparties or the activities that credit institutions may choose to provide financing to, as long as those counterparties and activities comply with existing EU legislation. Authorising the taking up and supervising the pursuit of banking activities in the EU is an administrative and regulatory process that is handled by competent authorities, not the Commission. While the Commission monitors developments in Member States related to the funding of national political parties, including in the context of its annual Rule of Law Reports 1 , it does not have a general power to intervene in such matters. Member States are competent to lay down the rules regarding the functioning and funding of national political parties, and national authorities are responsible for ensuring compliance with national legislation, international standards and the values enshrined in the Treaties. The Commission supports Member States in their efforts to ensure the fairness and integrity of elections through its European Cooperation Network on Elections 2 , including by promoting a level playing field among political parties in the electoral process. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en . 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eucitizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en.”
EU political integration
- 2025-09-12 “E-002543/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Member States have jurisdiction and discretion to regulate the real estate markets. In doing so, however, they must respect the basic principles of the EU Treaties, first and foremost the fundamental freedoms. The right to acquire, use or dispose of real estate falls notably under the free movement of capital principle set out in Articles 63 et seq. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), or, depending on the purpose, under freedom of establishment pursuant to Article 49 TFEU. As a rule, these freedoms prohibit any restrictions on the acquisition of real estate as well as direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality unless they are justified by legitimate reasons of public interest as recognized in the Treaties or in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The State aid rules, including Article 107 (1) TFEU, only apply where the beneficiary of a measure is an entity engaging in economic activity. If the activities carried out in the forest constitute exercise of public power, State aid rules do not apply. The Commission has indeed been made aware, through complaints, of the existence of a right of first refusal under Slovenian law. However, it has, at this stage, not yet finalised its assessment as to whether the provisions in question infringe EU law.”
State Aid · Trade impact on forests
- 2025-09-11 “E-002846/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of public reports about the sale of three Airbus A330-200 aircraft to Belavia. EU sanctions on Belarus 1 prohibit EU operators from providing services, like maintenance, and from making any other economic resources available to listed persons or entities, including Belavia. Sale or supply of aircraft to or for use in Belarus is also prohibited. These sanctions apply to EU operators and persons doing business within the EU. Based on reports available to the Commission, it seems that the sale was conducted outside of EU jurisdiction. Member States are responsible for implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, including conducting investigations into potential non-compliance cases, including for sanctions circumvention, should information available to them point in that direction. In general, tackling the circumvention of EU sanctions through third countries is a top priority for the EU. The Commission continuously monitors trade flows of sanctioned goods to third countries and works closely with the Member States to identify suspicious transactions. Together with the EU Sanctions Envoy, it actively engages with third countries to ensure their jurisdictions are not used as platforms for circumvention. Where appropriate, the Commission, together with High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, can propose new sanctions. This includes the imposition of sanctions on new targets, such as persons responsible for circumvention. Adoption of sanctions requires the unanimous approval of all 27 Member States. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.”
EU relations with United Arab Emirates · EU-Belarus relations
- 2025-09-10 “E-002665/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Following the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. To put pressure on Russia to cease its war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted 18 packages of massive and unprecedented restrictive measures 1 , including sanctions to ban coal and oil imports from Russia and to target the ‘shadow’ fleet 2 . Ensuring the full and effective implementation of sanctions as well as tackling their possible circumvention, including through third country jurisdictions, is a matter of priority. The EU continues to adjust the sanctions frameworks and has adopted numerous measures to counter circumvention. Additionally, the EU has intensified outreach to countries at risk of being used as platforms for circumvention, through diplomatic outreach of the EU Sanctions Envoy and capacity-building. In May 2025, gasoil imports from Marocco accounted for 5% of total Spanish gasoil imports, reflecting that imports from Morocco constitute only a minor share of Spain’s overall gasoil imports 3 . Member States are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions. National authorities are in charge of following up on possible breaches and conducting investigations. The Commission is in close contact with the competent authorities in the Member States and readily provides support in sanctions implementation. The 18 th package of sanctions introduces a prohibition to import into the EU refined petroleum products made from Russian crude. This obliges operators and national authorities to verify the non-Russia origin of the crude oil for imports of refined products. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russiasmilitary-aggression-against-ukraine_en. 2 The ‘shadow’ fleet is composed of vessels practicing irregular and high-risk shipping practices as set out in the International Maritime Organisation General Assembly resolution A.1192(33). 3 CORES (Corporación de Reservas Estratégicas de Productos Petrolíferos), ‘Importaciones de productos petrolíferos por países’, https://www.cores.es/es/estadisticas (accessed 23 July 2025).”
Trade relations with Morocco · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-09-02 “E-002743/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Gibraltar made significant progress to improve its Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, which led to its removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of ‘jurisdictions under increased monitoring’ in February 2024. As FATF member, the Commission was closely involved in assessing Gibraltar’s progress against its FATF action plan. Following the completion of Gibraltar’s action plan and considering that no additional concerns had been identified, Gibraltar was considered to no longer pose a threat to the Union’s financial system. The Commission therefore proposed to remove Gibraltar from the EU list of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes. As both the European Parliament and the Council did not object to the entry into force of the Delegated Act from 10 June 2025 removing Gibraltar from the list, the Delegated Act has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 16 July 2025 as Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 1 . The Commission will continue to closely monitor developments in Gibraltar's AML/CFT regime. A commitment to maintaining a level-playing field on anti-money laundering is also an important component of the future EU-UK Agreement on Gibraltar, on which a political agreement was reached on 11 June 2025 2 . 1 OJ L, 2025/1184, 16.7.2025. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/statement_25_1481.”
Tax Havens · Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2025-08-19 “E-002306/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission stated in its opinion 1 of 8 November 2019, ‘Article 215 TFEU is the only appropriate legal basis to ensure the implementation of sanctions regimes adopted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy within the competences covered by the TFEU with regard to economic and financial measures, and notably the internal market, in order to avoid potential distortions. This is done through the adoption of Council Regulations, which are immediately applicable in the Member States, and ensure a harmonised implementation of the regimes in an area without internal borders’. Therefore, Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) serves as a bridge between the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the actions of the EU involving restrictive measures falling within the scope of the TFEU. In this regard, the Commission notes that the EU has the exclusive competence in certain areas, i.e. for the adoption of common commercial policy measures according to Article 3(1)(e) TFEU and Article 207 TFEU. In accordance with Article 2(1) TFEU, in an area of exclusive competence Member States may legislate only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts. 1 Commission opinion C(2019) 8007 final: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ef856827-f61942ad-9543-0df6451040b2_en.”
EU competences on foreign affairs
- 2025-08-18 “E-002250/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 1 or the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR) imposes transparency requirements on certain foreign legal entities and on foreign legal arrangements that interact with obliged entities in the EU. Third country legal entities belonging to a high-risk category or operating in high-risk sectors and foreign legal arrangements must register their beneficial ownership information in the central register of the Member State in which they have established a business relationship with an obliged entity. Third country legal entities and legal arrangements must also register their beneficial ownership information when they purchase property or certain luxury goods and when they are awarded a public contract for goods or services, or concessions by a contracting authority in the EU. This allows competent authorities to know who is behind structures even when transparency standards in third countries are lower than those in the EU. The Regulation will apply as of 10 July 2027. The Commission does not have the legal power to impose taxation. European banks which transact with companies located in jurisdictions that feature on the EU list (Annex I) of noncooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes 2 are subject to tax defensive measures in the EU Member State where they are established. Member States have enacted legislation and operate at least one such defensive measure (e.g. controlled foreign company rules, withholding tax, no taxdeductibility of business expenses, etc.). 1 OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024. 2 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/news/update-eu-list-non-cooperative-jurisdictions-tax-purposes-2025-0218_en.”
Tax Havens · Anti-money laundering regulation
- 2025-08-14 “E-002651/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The EU has detected and exposed several foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations from the Russian state or pro-Kremlin actors. The EU is aware of ongoing campaigns and the modus operandi of the Russian government. In response to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has taken steps to combat Russian FIMI operations in the territory of the EU. The EU has restricted the broadcasting of content from outlets, including RT, engaging in continuous and concerted propaganda actions supporting the war 1 . The EU has also prohibited providing advertising services to the Russian government or Russian legal persons 2 . EU non-government orgnaisations and media service providers are also prohibited from accepting Russian financing, in order to counter Russian efforts to interfere with EU democratic processes 3 . Member States must ensure that violations of these prohibitions are criminalised 4 . Russian FIMI campaigns are analysed and findings are published in the European External Action Service’s FIMI Threat report 5 and on the EUvsDisinfo platform 6 . Investigations of activities potentially violating EU restrictive measures (sanctions) fall within the competence of the Member States. Sanctions against broadcasting outlets and other actors are implemented and enforced by their authorities. In addition, the European Media Freedom Act 7 provides a regulatory coordination mechanism on media services from outside the EU that prejudice public security. The Commission closely monitors the transposition of Directive 2024/1226 to ensure the effective application of sanctions. It also works with Member States to prepare for the application of Regulation 2024/900, which sets out common transparency and accountability standards for political advertising 8 . 1 Article 2f of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20241029. 2 Article 5n of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014. 3 Article 5t of Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014. 4 Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures and amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1226/oj. 5 The 3 rd FIMI Threat Report can be found here: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/3rd-eeas-report-foreigninformation-manipulation-and-interference-threats-0_en. 6 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/. 7 Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1083f the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj/eng. 8 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng.”
EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe · Disinformation & online freedoms
- 2025-08-11 “E-002449/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Tackling sanctions circumvention is a top priority for the EU. The EU maintains an active dialogue, including with Kyrgyzstan, to tackle circumvention of EU sanctions, asking third countries to cooperate in preventing the re-export of battlefield items in the Common High Priority list (CHP) 1 , list of specific prohibited dual-use goods and advanced technology items critical to the development, production or use of Russian military systems. The EU Sanctions Envoy travelled to Kyrgyzstan in 2023. He has also met with Kyrgyz authorities during their visits to Brussels. Kyrgyzstan committed to control the re-export of CHP items to Russia. The Commission continues to monitor the situation regarding third country entities that may contribute to the circumvention of sanctions against Russia. Sanctions have been imposed on several such entities, including two companies from Kyrgyzstan. In August 2024, Kyrgyzstan introduced two restrictions in its financial sector: (1) decree prohibiting Kyrgyz banks from operating with sanctioned Russian banks; (2) decree prohibiting Kyrgyz banks from processing transactions for goods which do not arrive in the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Since the 14th sanctions package against Russia 2 , the EU has in place a ban for EU banks to use the financial messaging system SPFS 3 . The measure also allows the EU to draw up a list of non-Russian third country banks connected to such system; those banks will be banned from doing business with EU operators. In addition, the 14th package also introduced a ban on transactions with banks and crypto assets services, in Russia and third countries, that facilitate transactions supporting Russia's defence-industrial base. These measures have been expanded in the recent 18 th package. 4 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/list-common-high-priority-items_en. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russiasmilitary-aggression-against-ukraine_en. 3 System for Transfer of Financial Messages, Russian equivalent of the SWIFT financial transfer system 4 among others by making it possible to prohibit transactions with listed third country banks and other financial institutions that frustrate the EU sanction measures or support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501494.”
EU-Kyrgyzstan relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU policy on Central Asia
- 2025-08-01 “E-002396/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission On 26 February 2025 the Commission adopted the so-called ‘Omnibus 1’ proposals to simplify the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), as well as the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive 1 . If accepted by the co-legislators, the omnibus package should result in very significant burden reduction for companies without undermining the essential policy objectives of each directive. The Commission’s proposal also strengthens existing protections for companies in the value chain by prohibiting companies subject to the CSRD from asking for more information than what would be contained in a future voluntary standard for smaller companies. In the explanatory memorandum accompanying the omnibus proposals, the Commission committed to adopting a delegated act to revise and simplify the existing European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) that must be applied by companies subject to the CSRD. The revised standards will, amongst other things, substantially reduce the number of datapoints, clarify provisions deemed unclear and improve consistency with other pieces of EU legislation. The Commissioner for Financial Services and the Savings and Investments Union has asked EFRAG 2 , the Commission’s technical advisory body for sustainability reporting standards, to submit revised draft ESRS by the end of November 2025. EFRAG will launch a public consultation on the draft revised ESRS in early August 2025. It is therefore not possible at this stage to indicate exactly which datapoints will be deleted. In view of the different purposes and target audiences of different reporting requirements related to sustainability, the Commission is not currently considering merging all such requirements into one legal act. 1 COM(2025) 81 final and COM(2025) 80 final. 2 EFRAG was formerly the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group but is now just ‘EFRAG’.”
Sustainable corporate governance · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
- 2025-07-31 “E-002287/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission While the Commission is not in a position to evaluate specific products referred to in the question, the Insurance Distribution Directive 1 provides a general obligation for insurance undertakings to ensure that their insurance products are aligned with the needs, objectives and characteristics of the target market. Products need to offer sufficient value for money with reasonable and proportionate costs and charges in relation to the benefits provided. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority has issued guidance on the assessment of value for money of unit-linked insurance products to help competent authorities in supervising compliance with these rules. It is up to the national competent authorities to ensure that investment products provide sufficient value for money to their target market and to use, if needed, in an effective manner their supervisory tools to enforce the application of the legislation. The Commission’s proposal for the retail investment strategy included measures to ensure that investment products offer value for money to retail investors, to improve the quality of advice and to ensure transparency of costs. The negotiations are currently on-going and their outcome is open. The Commission plans to issue a recommendation to Member States in the third quarter of 2025 on setting up retail savings and investments accounts (SIAs). The primary objective will be to facilitate retail savers access to capital markets. The Commission considers of utmost importance that investments through SIAs are in the best interest of customers. To that effect, the Commission is reflecting on what features would best accomplish this objective, including in terms of eligibility of assets and competition among providers. 1 Article 25 (Product oversight and governance requirements), Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution, OJ L 26, 2.2.2016, p. 19–59.”
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) · Financial regulation
- 2025-07-31 “E-002276/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The exercise of property rights by public owners is not, as such, restricted under EU law provided that all applicable rules are respected, including the rules on State aid and competition rules, and the integrity of the internal market is maintained. To ensure the integrity and stability of the single market in banking services, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 1 includes robust safeguards to ensure that the prospective shareholders do not endanger the sound and prudent management of EU credit institutions. In particular, any acquisition of a qualifying holding in a EU credit institution is subject to prior supervisory approval based – inter alia – on the assessment of the acquirer’s suitability and the proposed governance structure (Articles 22 and 23 CRD). In the countries participating in the Banking Union, this supervisory approval falls under the competence of the European Central Bank. The Commission remains committed to ensure compliance with the EU acquis in cooperation with national and EU authorities. 1 OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338–436.”
European Banking Union · Financial regulation
- 2025-07-31 “E-002171/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission referred to in its answer to written question E-1918/2024 1 , ‘the Mortgage Credit Directive 2014/17/EU (MCD) provides a number of safeguards’ for the borrowers and ‘enables Member States to introduce more stringent provisions’, as for example in the Greek insolvency code 2 . Regarding the possible granting of full protection of primary residences and support measures for borrowers in difficulties, there are currently no plans to regulate these matters at EU-level. As the Commission pointed out in its answer to written question E3366/2022 3 , the auctioning of property ‘falls exclusively within the competence of the Member State’. As regards measures on the transfer of mortgage loans when they become non-performing, Directive (EU) 2021/2167 4 harmonises the rules for credit servicers and credit purchasers of a creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement. This Directive ensures that the sale of such loans does not undermine borrowers’ rights. The Commission does not currently intend to propose further measures in this regard. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 2 Law 4738/2020 transposing Directive (EU) 2019/1023, as amended by law 4818/2021 and law 5024/2023. The new sale-and-leaseback regime aims to avoid past moral hazard behaviour and the adverse impact it has had in the cost of credit in Greece. Until said mechanism becomes operational, law 4916/2022 provides for the protection of the primary residence of eligible vulnerable debtors by means of a state subsidy and the suspension of liquidation measures. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 4 OJ L 438, 8.12.2021, p. 1–37.”
EU housing policy · Non-performing mortgages
- 2025-07-30 “E-002163/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the cornerstone of international justice and the fight against impunity. It holds perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern to account and gives victims a voice. The Commission is closely following the developments related to the imposition of United States sanctions on the personnel of the ICC. The Commission deeply regrets recourse to such actions. The Commission is in close contact with ICC representatives, as well as with EU Member States, in order to assess the impact of United States sanctions. The Commission is ready to provide its full support and contribution to ensure the protection of the ICC and its personnel against external pressures or threats. In that context, the Commission is considering effective measures as appropriate to ensure the ICC’s operations remain unimpacted and its mandate fulfilled.”
Support for International Criminal Court · EU-US relations
- 2025-07-29 “E-001174/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission EU sanctions have restricted but not totally banned the sale of oil tankers by EU operators. Sales to Russia or for end-use in Russia are prohibited (with a derogation possible) while sales to third countries are subject to a notification. The fast-evolving nature of the shipping industry and frequent ownership changes of vessels must be noted, as well as the fact that, under EU sanctions, Russian oil exports may continue if undertaken below the oil price cap. Through its sanctions packages, the EU has designated specific vessels for contributing to Russia’s warfare against Ukraine, including vessels part of Russia’s shadow fleet and engaging in deceptive and high-risk shipping practices contrary to international standards. Such vessels are subject to a port access and services ban. The 17 th package brings the total of listed vessels to 342. Further, the EU can subject individuals and entities that own or operate shadow fleet vessels to an asset freeze. It is prohibited to provide funds or economic resources to listed individuals or entities. The Commission is continuously monitoring the developments relating to vessels belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet as part of its efforts to combat the circumvention of EU sanctions. It also pro-actively reaches out to third countries providing flagging services, raising concerns of environmental protection and maritime safety. Furthermore, the Commission adopted Delegated Directive 2025/811 1 requiring Ship Reporting Systems (SRS) to include reporting of insurance certificates. This will ensure that all vessels operating in EU vicinity are properly insured and improve the EU’s ability to monitor and investigate maritime activities, thereby addressing risks posed by uninsured or unsafe vessels. 1 OJ L, 2025/811, 28.4.2025https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500811.”
Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
- 2025-07-11 “E-001837/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission With the Omnibus package on sustainability 1 , the Commission proposed to reduce the reporting burden for a significant number of undertakings in the EU. In so far as credit institutions are subject to obligations under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) 2 and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) 3 , they will benefit of such simplification. Under the prudential framework (Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive-CRR/CRD) 4 , credit institutions are subject to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)-related obligations in relation to their exposure to climate risk. The European Banking Authority (EBA) is mandated to prepare uniform reporting and disclosure formats specifying how credit institutions need to comply with such prudential obligations. The EBA has already published guidelines on ESG matters 5 , which guide credit institutions towards compliance with prudential requirements. The EBA’s implementation of other related mandates in CRR and CRD is catering for and adjusting to the simplification introduced by the Omnibus package, ensuring appropriate proportionality. The Commission sees therefore no need to amend CRR and CRD at this stage. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-simplifies-rules-sustainability-and-eu-investmentsdelivering-over-eu6-billion_en. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/company-reporting-andauditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting_en. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/doing-business-eu/sustainability-due-diligenceresponsible-business/corporate-sustainability-due-diligence_en. 4 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/banking/banking-regulation/prudential-requirements_en. 5 https://www.eba.europa.eu/activities/single-rulebook/regulatory-activities/sustainable-finance/guidelinesmanagement-esg-risks.”
EU regulation on financial data access · Climate efforts
- 2025-07-09 “E-000957/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission agrees on the importance of a thorough assessment of competitiveness in impact assessments. This is why a compulsory competitiveness check is implemented with a stronger focus on sectorial impacts, to better reflect the impacts on sectors, particularly those exposed to international competition. New consultation approaches, such as implementation dialogues and reality checks with stakeholders that are impacted by regulatory initiatives are also being implemented to seek their views, including on the best possible ways to shape these initiatives to secure the competitiveness of Europe’s economy. They come on top of the Commission's existing consultation tools, ranked first by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 1 . The original legislative measures that the Omnibus package adopted on 26 February 2025 2 aims to simplify were subject to comprehensive impact assessments 3 and preceded by extensive stakeholder consultation. However, the multiple and complex crises and events happening in the meanwhile have strong impact on the competitiveness of Europe’s economy. A recalibration is now needed to address areas where EU companies may be at a competitive disadvantage. This approach clearly signals that the Commission intends to stay the course on building a greener and fairer society and economy, but to do so in the simplest manner possible and by boosting the competitiveness of our economy at the same time. If these first Omnibus proposals are adopted and implemented, conservatively estimated total savings in annual administrative costs of around EUR 6.3 billion can already be achieved 4 . 1 See the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-regulatory-policyoutlook-2025_56b60e39-en.html. 2 See https://commission.europa.eu/publications/omnibus-i_en. 3 See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018SC0264, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021SC0150 and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52021SC0643. 4 See Staff Working Document Accompanying the documents COM(2025) 80 - COM(2025) 81, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1da93ca2-7911-4e1f-9ce6cecd09a85250_en?filename=SWD-Omnibus-80-81_En.pdf.”
Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights) · Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) · Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
- 2025-07-08 “E-001751/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the importance of financial literacy as a critical life skill, including for young Europeans. The 2024 Council Conclusions on financial literacy 1 also call for the integration of financial education into national school curricula. However, Member States have a sole responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems. Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides the EU only with a supportive role in education. In light of these considerations, the Commission focuses on supporting initiatives that promote financial literacy for youth. In 2023, the Commission published the EU/OECD financial competency framework for youth 2 . Through existing EU programmes such as Erasmus+ 3 and the European Social Fund+ 4 , the Commission also encourages projects aimed at enhancing financial literacy. In the Savings and Investments Union Communication 5 , the Commission committed to adopting a strategy on financial literacy by the 3 rd quarter of 2025. This strategy will have a broad scope, aiming at enhancing various aspects of financial literacy. The strategy will focus on communication and awareness raising, coordination of best practices, monitoring and evaluation, and increasing funding opportunities. It will facilitate the exchange of best practices among Member States also as regards initiatives linked to financial education. The recently adopted Union of Skills 6 , recognises that financial and entrepreneurial skills gaps exist in Europe and that promoting further STEM 7 approaches are important to facilitate digital and financial literacy by endowing students with the skills needed to understand how the digital and financial systems work. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9930-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-09/230927-financial-competence-framework-childrenyouth_en.pdf. 3 Financial literacy projects with adults, schoolteachers and adult education teachers are funded as part of Erasmus+, for example: https://epale.ec.europa.eu/en/resource-centre/content/financial-literacy-adult-education. 4 The European Social Fund Plus (ESF +) also finances projects that include improving financial literacy, for example: https://european-social-fund-plus.ec.europa.eu/en/social-innovation-match/case-study/projekt-domov. 5 COM(2025) 124 final. 6 eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0090. 7 Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics.”
Focus of EU policy on education (shaping workers vs citizens)
- 2025-07-07 “E-001484/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. Directive 2014/17/EU 1 on mortgage credit agreements introduced specific rules to protect consumers where the credit is denominated in a foreign currency (e.g. explanations on the implications for consumers, right to convert the credit agreement into an alternative currency or other arrangements in place to limit the exchange rate risk). The directive only applies to mortgage credit contracts concluded as from 21 March 2016. Directive 93/13/EEC 2 on unfair contract terms requires Member States to ensure that terms in all consumer contracts are fair and intelligible, and that consumers are not bound by unfair contract terms. The Commission does not intervene in contractual agreements between lenders and borrowers. In case of legal disputes, it is for Greek authorities and courts to assess, based on the circumstances of each case, whether Greek banks complied with their obligations regarding the fairness and transparency of contract terms, such as exposing the borrower to a foreign exchange risk 3 . Regarding enforcement actions, the Commission does not have powers to intervene in individual consumer disputes or to review decisions of national authorities and courts. 1 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34-85. 2 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29‐34. 3 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-186/16 Andriciuc.”
Non-performing mortgages · Financial regulation
- 2025-07-03 “P-002270/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the cornerstone of international justice and the fight against impunity. It holds perpetrators of the world’s gravest crimes to account and gives victims a voice. The Commission is closely monitoring the developments related to the imposition of the United States’ sanctions on the personnel of the ICC and continues to be in close contact with the ICC to monitor the impact of the sanctions on the Court’s operations. The Commission deeply regrets recourse to such actions and is ready to provide its full support, in coordination with Member States, to ensure the protection of the ICC and its personnel against external pressure or threats. The Commission is considering effective measures, as appropriate, to ensure the ICC’s operations remain unimpacted and its mandate fulfilled.”
Support for International Criminal Court · EU-US relations