Ana Miguel PEDRO

Policy topics Ana Miguel PEDRO is active on

What Ana Miguel PEDRO has said (33)

• 2026-06-16 “Thank you, Madam Commissioner. An e u decision has called into A question. Scientists and researchers asked access to AI. This is something that supports energy, health, defense amongst many other sectors. It is a strategic geopolitical issue. It's an issue of sovereignty. And we have to ask the following question. Can Europe accept that access to critical resources for the 21st century depend on a third country government, a small European company that might have integrated advanced artificial intelligence into its systems, discovers from one day to the next that it no longer has access to the technology that it depends on. Can a public administration run essential services that might be suspended or conditioned by external services? Is it possible for Europe to be a leader in the digital transition if it does not control its infrastructure, its data, its value chain? All of this, which would make the transition possible. The answer is no. We have rules, we have values. But Europe cannot be a regulatory power without having its own critical technologies. It is not sufficient to say that artificial intelligence has to be governed. We need to develop it, to control it, to protect it. We need to be able to make it available in Europe. It is not enough to be tough on the rules if we are weak when it comes to capacity. Madam Commissioner, the technological sovereignty package presented by the Commission is welcome. We need semiconductors. We need data centers, supercomputers, a European cloud, a greater capacity to train its own artificial intelligence models. Europe has learnt in the recent energy crisis, the risks of dependency. And we cannot repeat those same mistakes with artificial intelligence.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you, madam commissioner. An EU decision has called into question. Scientists and researchers act access to AI. This is something that supports energy, health, defense amongst many other sectors. It is a strategic geopolitical issue. It's an issue of sovereignty. And we have to ask the following question. Can Europe accept that access to critical resources for the 21st century depend on a 3rd country government? A small European company that might have integrated advanced artificial intelligence into its systems discovers from 1 day to the next that it no longer has access to this technology that it depends on. Can a public administration run essential services that might be suspended or conditioned by external services? Is it possible for Europe to be a leader in the digital transition if it does not control its infrastructure, its data, its value chain? All of this, which would make the transition possible. The answer is no. We have rules. We have values, but Europe cannot be a regulatory power without having its own critical technologies. It is not sufficient to say that artificial intelligence, has to be governed. We need to develop it, to control it, to protect it, and we need to be able to make it available in Europe. It is not enough to be tough on the rules if we are weak when it comes to capacity. Madam commissioner, the technological sovereignty package presented by the commission is welcome. We need semiconductors. We need data centers, supercomputers, a European cloud, a greater capacity to train its own artificial intelligence models. Europe has learned, in the recent energy crisis, the risks of dependency, and we cannot repeat those same mistakes with artificial intelligence.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-03-23 “Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 10.6.2026 Written question The Commission is closely monitoring the impact of the current geopolitical situation on fertiliser markets, including through the EU Fertiliser Market Observatory [1] . The impact on the EU remains limited due to low direct reliance on Middle East imports, sufficient stocks and unaffected production in key supplier countries such as Egypt and Algeria. While no immediate shortages are expected for the 2026 harvest, increased global volatility is affecting fertiliser prices for farmers. To mitigate pressure, the Commission has already taken targeted measures, including a reduced 1% CBAM default value mark up for fertilisers. In addition, to support both farmers and the EU fertiliser industry, imports of ammonia, urea and other nitrogen fertilisers will benefit from duty suspension, within given quotas, for a period of one year. The Commission has also recently adopted a state aid Framework on the Middle East [2] , to support both farmers and energy intensive industries. On 19 May 2026, the Commission adopted the Fertiliser Action Plan [3] , setting out short- and long-term measures to improve fertiliser availability, affordability and resilience. Short term actions include the mobilisation and possible top-up of the agricultural reserve, liquidity support under the CAP and greater flexibility for advance payments. The Plan also supports biogas and biomethane projects to reduce energy and nutrient dependencies and foresees the possible activation of emergency tools under the internal market Emergency and Resilience Act [4] , if necessary. [1] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/markets/overviews/market-observatories/fertilisers_en. [2] https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/metsaf_en. [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_1099. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402747.”
  Use of fertilisers
• 2026-03-04 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 5.5.2026 Written question The Commission shares the concerns about organised value added tax (VAT) and customs duty fraud and their impact on Member States and, indirectly, the EU budget, economy and security. Europol’s 2025 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment confirms [1] that fraud remains a serious and persistent threat. As announced in ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy [2] , the Commission will propose to reinforce the mandates of Europol and Eurojust and modernise the rules to fight against organised crime in 2026. In addition, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office investigates and prosecutes criminal offences affecting EU’s financial interests, while the European Anti-Fraud Office conducts administrative investigations into irregularities against the EU budget. The Commission also supports the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats operational action plan on VAT and Missing Trader Intra-Community fraud [3] . The Commission is currently reviewing the EU’s Anti-Fraud Architecture, to strengthen the protection of the EU’s financial interests. The aim is to modernise the EU’s anti-fraud framework and, thus, strengthen the EU’s capacity to detect and combat crimes affecting the EU budget, including VAT and customs fraud. To implement the follow-the-money approach, the Commission calls for swift transposition of the directive on asset recovery and confiscation [4] . Once operational, the new EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub [5] will better equip customs to perform risk analysis and further improve cooperation between all law enforcement bodies. Together, these measures will better equip the EU and Member States to disrupt criminal networks and better protect Europe’s security, economy and financial system. [1] https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148. [3] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/law-enforcement-cooperation/empact-fighting-crime-together_en. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1260/oj/eng. [5] https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/customs/eu-customs-reform_en.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Anti-money laundering regulation
• 2025-11-05 “P-004347/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Violence takes many different forms and cuts across ethno-religious boundaries. This systemic insecurity affects, among others, Christian individuals, communities and places of worship. The EU and its Member States, being among the main partners of Nigeria, have funded many projects on prevention of violence, peacebuilding and support to populations affected by violence, in particular internally displaced persons. More specifically, in 2025, the EU allocated over EUR 46 million in humanitarian assistance for vulnerable populations in conflict and violence affected areas in the Northeast, Northwest and Northcentral regions where needs are the most acute. This humanitarian assistance comprises support in protection, food and nutrition, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene and education in emergencies. It is channelled to the affected populations, regardless of their race, ethnic group, religion, gender, age, nationality or political affiliation through partner organisations. Sudan remains a top priority on the EU’s agenda. In 2025, the EU allocated EUR 161 million to the humanitarian response related to the crisis in the country. The EU supports a principled needs-based humanitarian response in the country with all the tools at the disposal: through funding, air bridges and sea freight, but also with an increased advocacy. Protection of civilians is at the heart of the humanitarian response that the EU supports inside Sudan. The EU complements its programmes with diplomacy, focusing on the protection of civilians and the compliance with International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law through demarches, senior official meetings, and peace dialogues urging transparent investigations, including into religious-based violence.”
  EU policy on Sahel and Sudan · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-10-20 “E-004121/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In Nigeria, violence is systemic and cuts across ethno-religious boundaries. It affects, among others, Christian communities and places of worship. In this context, well-documented incidents show Christian communities, churches, schools, and clergy being deliberately targeted in the country. The EU and its Member States have funded many projects on prevention of violence, peacebuilding and humanitarian support to populations affected by violence. The assistance does not specifically target groups over religious criteria, but according to needs and is guided by neutrality and impartiality. The EU was particularly reactive after the Yelwata attack, in Benue State, which occurred in the night of 13-14 June 2025 - leaving 210 civilian deaths and displacing 4 685 persons to Makurdi, the state capital. It represents one of a series of violent attacks across the Middle Belt, driven by competition over access to land between herders and farmers and overlapping ethnic and religious divisions. The EU Ambassador visited the victims in Makurdi on 25 June 2025 together with the Federal Minister for Humanitarian Affairs. The EU provided rapid support (EUR 1.75 million in total), which was appreciated by the Federal and State Government. The EU has been calling on Nigerian authorities to tackle violence in many areas of the country, and to step up their initiatives to address the main drivers of systemic insecurity. Through demarches, senior official meetings, and peace dialogues, the EU has been calling for transparent investigations, including into religious-based violence. The EU has continuously advocated for further protection of civilians irrespective of their religion, and for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights laws.”
  EU policy on African region · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-09-24 “P-003705/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 1 can only be activated at the request of Portugal which has a deadline of 12 weeks as from when the first damage occurred, demonstrating that the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002. The EUSF is not a rapid response instrument. Aid can only be granted following an application, assessment and budgetary process, which includes the approval of the European Parliament and the Council. This process takes several months to complete. The EUSF may cover a part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities. This means, for example, the recovery of essential infrastructure, provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations and protection of the cultural heritage. Private damage is not eligible. To support farmers and livestock producers affected by the fires, the Commission highlights the availability of measures under the Common Agricultural Policy. These measures include risk management tools and interventions to restore agricultural and forestry potential. The Commission works with the Portuguese authorities to ensure that these measures are effectively implemented to address the needs of the affected farming communities. In addition, EU State aid rules offer several possibilities for Member States to compensate farmers for losses caused by natural disasters, for instance under the Agricultural Block Exemption Regulation 2 or the Agricultural State aid Guidelines 3 . Aid to farmers may also be granted under the Agricultural de minimis Regulation 4 . 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012. 2 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/2472 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 1). 3 OJ C 485 of 21.12.2022, p. 1. 4 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector (OJ L 352, 24.12.2013 p. 9).”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-08-31 “P-003338/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU continues to support Mozambique to stabilise the situation in Cabo Delgado province, where violence from insurgents continues to affect and displace the local population. The EU’s integrated approach, blending development, humanitarian, peacebuilding and security actions, continues to be at the core of EU’s actions in Mozambique, with specific budget under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) envelope of the multiannual indicative programme for Mozambique destined for specific projects in the North of the country. In addition, the EU budget dedicated to humanitarian aid support stability and peace in Cabo Delgado and surrounding areas contributes to provide relief and assist the people forcibly displaced in these last waves of attacks, and addresses the root causes of violence and armed conflict in the region, including preventing the recruitment and radicalisation of the most vulnerable groups. The EU’s support is destined to all vulnerable groups, irrespective of religious belief. In terms of security support, the EU Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM Mozambique), combining advising, mentoring and specialised training, provides support to strengthen the capacity of the Mozambican armed forces to address the insurgency in the North in accordance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It already trained 1 500 Mozambican special forces. Under the European Peace Facility (EPF), support for a total of EUR 89 million in non-lethal equipment has been provided to the Mozambican armed forces.”
  EU policy on African region · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-07-14 “E-002856/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission currently lacks sufficient information to determine whether the recent observations of white foam and odour formation on River Ul constitute a breach of obligations under the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 1 or Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) 2 . Portugal submitted its third River Basin Management Plans with significant delay in March 2024 3 . The Commission assessment of the Portuguese plans is hence still ongoing. According to the third River Basin Management Plan, the River Ul and River Antuã are reported as a single surface water body. The ecological status is moderate, and the chemical status fails to achieve good status, indicating non-compliance with the WFD’s goals for good surface water status 4 . The Commission will initiate structural dialogues with Member States to enhance implementation and tackle root causes. According to the 2020 data reported by Portugal under the UWWTD, the Salgueiro urban wastewater treatment plant serving Oliveira de Azeméis and S. Joao de Madeira is compliant with the requirements of the Directive. The compliance assessment of 2022 data is currently ongoing and the results should be available in autumn 2025. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU law, including verifying individual cases of potential breach of the relevant rules. In line with its strategic approach on enforcement action the Commission focuses on systemic non-compliance 5 . 1 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35. 2 Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment, OJ L 135, 30.5.1991, p. 40–52. 3 The deadline for submitting the third RBMPs was March 2022. 4 Surface water body status can be viewed here: https://discomap.eea.europa.eu/wise-freshwaterviewer/. 5 Communication from the Commission - EU law: Better results through better application, OJ C 18, 19.1.2017, p. 10–20, and Communication from the Commission - Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers, 13.10.2022, COM(2022) 518 final.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2025-07-07 “P-002759/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission To fight the infiltration of organised crime in ports 1 , the ProtectEU 2 Strategy announces an overhaul of Europol's mandate, reinforcing law enforcement and judicial cooperation between Europol, Eurojust, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office. Building on the European Ports Alliance Public-Private Partnership, the Commission will propose measures to increase ports security across the EU in the upcoming EU Ports Strategy, and a new EU Drugs Strategy and an Action Plan against drug trafficking 3 to disrupt criminal business models. Moreover, the implementation of the Directive on information exchange will strengthens cross-border intelligence sharing on key information to combat serious and organised crime. Once into force, the EU-Brazil Agreement will provide a legal basis for Europol and Brazil to exchange personal data for countering serious crime and terrorism. This will allow the authorities to detect crime threats earlier, identify high-risk individuals and support crossborder investigations. This will reinforce Europol’s analytical systems, enhancing the EU’s capacity to uncover criminal trends and infiltration of logistical hubs. Decisions on restrictive measures, including designations under the EU Terrorist List, which is the EU sanctions regimes targeting terrorist activities and groups, are adopted by the Council, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 1 https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf. 2 COM(2025) 148 final. 3 Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-05-15 “E-001953/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are aware of the reports made public by the Security Service of Ukraine about the alleged uncovering of a spy network in the Zakarpattia region of Ukraine. The Commission services and the EEAS have not received any official request from the Ukrainian authorities to assist in their investigation. As per Article 4 of the Treaty on the European Union 1 , the EU and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c382f65d-618a-4c72-91351e68087499fa.0006.02/DOC_2&format=PDF.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2024-12-05 “E-002782/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The European Peace Facility (EPF) is a EUR 17 billion instrument to assist partners worldwide in military and defence matters. Although it is the successor instrument of the African Peace Facility, the EPF’s geographic scope was never limited to the African continent. Excluding aid to Ukraine, 80% of the value of all EPF assistance measures benefit African partners. Mozambique is one of the largest EPF beneficiaries, with EUR 89 million allocated to nonlethal equipment and training of its armed forces through the EU Training Mission in Mozambique. On 1 September 2024, the mission was renamed EU Military Assistance Mission Mozambique and got an additional allocation of EUR 14.1 million. In addition, the EPF is supporting the deployment of the Rwanda Defence Force to Mozambique with EUR 40 million and has supported the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique with another EUR 15 million. The EPF is a needs-based and beneficiary-driven instrument. Priorities are proposed by the High Representative on an annual basis and agreed by Member States. The equipment to be provided to a given beneficiary corresponds to operational needs and is defined in close cooperation with the end-user units. EPF support to Ukraine is now financed through a dedicated EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund and through extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian assets (windfall profits). As noted above, the EPF is a global instrument and support to Ukraine does not come at the expense of African, or other partners. The standards laid out in the EPF Council Decision 1 apply equally to all EPF beneficiaries. 1 Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 of 22 March 2021 establishing a European Peace Facility, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2015/528, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/509/oj/eng”
  EU policy on African region · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2024-09-12 “P-001692/2024 Answer given by Ms Ferreira on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 1 can only be activated at the request of Portugal which has a deadline of 12 weeks as from the first damage occurred, demonstrating that the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002. The EUSF may cover a part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities 2 . Pursuant to Article 2(3) of the above Regulation, the EUSF may provide support to outermost regions in cases of ‘regional natural disasters’ if the direct damage exceeds 1% of the concerned region’s gross domestic product (instead of the normally applicable excess of 1.5% of direct damage). Support is also available under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 3 for prevention, restoration and resilience against fires, with a planned amount in Madeira of EUR 36.6 million for 2014-2022, and EUR 11.9 million for 2023-2027. 2. In its Communication on the Outermost regions 4 , the Commission has committed itself to supporting actions on risk prevention and resilience as regards natural disasters, fostering knowledge exchange and giving due consideration when implementing the EUSF. The Commission is also fully committed to offer all possible support to Portugal and the outermost regions, including Madeira, in its fight against the wildfires. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012 2 This means, for example, the recovery of essential infrastructure, provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations, and protection of the cultural heritage. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013, OJ L 435/1, 6.12.2021. 4 COM(2022) 198 final.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• “Thank you very much. I'd like to extend my condolences to all the victims and all those who have been affected by the fires, and also pay tribute to the courage of all of those who have fought these fires. We're not only talking about hectares of forests and statistics, we're talking about people who have lost their homes and their livelihoods and have seen farmers who have seen their holdings reduced to ashes. Really hellish scenes. And we have seen land which has been worked for centuries, being reduced to nothing. Now, year in, year out, we come to realise that our summers are longer and hotter and we're really on the front line of climate change, and certain countries are the epicentre of these fires in Europe, and that is where all the preventive measures should be focused. I mean, simply cannot be business as usual. And that is why, Commissioner, we've got to fight Untiringly against these fires. We've got to look at our aerial assets and make sure that aid is channelled effectively to those who bear the brunt of these fires. And we need to use our funds to rebuild ecosystems that have been destroyed, particularly in rural areas. Now, some of these fires, of course, are attributable to criminal actions, and it's important that the perpetrators be brought to account. This is a moral aspect to this whole affair. We have to manage our land in winter. Otherwise we'll have a problem in summer.”
  Management of EU forests
• “Commissioner, over the last few months in Europe, young people were held on suspicion of terrorist acts. They were aged 12, 13, or 14. Many did not have criminal records, just a phone, a computer, and someone on the other side of the screen who knew exactly how to reach them. They were approached, manipulated, recruited in the silence of an app, on a forum, in a game, or an encrypted chat where adults, schools, and the authorities arrived too late. According to your report in 2024, a third of those arrested for crimes related to terrorism in The EU were aged between 12 and 20. The vast majority of these young suspects were already connected to jihadist terrorism, and jihadism continues to be one of the main threats to European security. It has lost territory, but it has not lost its ability to recruit. It had lost ground, but it has gained screens. It has lost the so-called caliphate, but has adapted to the online world where it can find isolated vulnerable young people who are looking for a sense of identity, of belonging, or of acknowledgement. We are faced with a new type of violence, scattered violence, faceless with no clear ideological front, a mix of extremism, hate, racism, antisemitism. We need legal instruments to identify the signs of radicalization and the exposure of young people to violent communities. Police and legal cooperation has to be increased. Terrorist content or incitement to violence has to be flagged up, removed quickly, and kept as evidence. When a child is recruited by these criminal networks, before they're able to be protected by the state, something has failed them. In this case, it's a politics which has failed.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “(16:48:13 – 16:49:39): Thank you, Vichy. Allow me to speak in Portuguese. Europe has got no problem with Islam. It's got problem with ideological fanaticism that's militant, and it's normalized, and protected in the name of political tolerance. We cannot tolerate movements that disrespect the religious freedoms of others, that deny the equality of men and women, that deny freedom of expression, that oppress Christians in some cases and have an illiberal ideology. It's 1 thing to allow people to profess a faith, but when it comes to restricting the freedoms of others and imposing Islamist standards on others, So what will the commission do to guarantee 3 things? 1st of all, that European funds do not directly or indirectly fund organizations which promote Islamist ideology. Secondly, what kind of foreign funding is going to these fanatical organizations and preachers? And when does this stop being a risk management strategy and, an in fact, an attempt to justify the presence of Islamism in our public space and politics.”
  EU policy on Islam
• “There was a recent attack that was committed by a far left group in Italy. Far left groups are attacking the rail networks, paralyzing trains and risking people's lives. These are dangers which are cross border. And no one in this hemicycle should be defending it. It is being promoted by extreme left wing organizations. They say that they serve noble purposes, but they are using chaos to impose their agenda. The far left is as dangerous as the far, far right. In fact, they camouflage themselves more effectively than the far right. And what they are doing is an attack on democracy. Does it matter where they come from, what flags they bear, or what reasons they use to justify their action? What we cannot accept is that there is condemnation of violence when it comes from one side of the spectrum, but nothing is condemned when it comes from the other side. It doesn't matter what color of the politics we're talking about. We must always condemn violence when it happens.”
  EU policy on criminal justice
• “Thank you. Chair. My first question goes to Europol, Mr. Guru. Um, we know that the playbook of these groups class classification means use of legal companies and falsifying documents. Given this is not new, why are you still seeing such a small percentage of these cases leading to charges? It is mainly about a lack of forensic tools for poor cross-border data exchange or political will at the national level to prioritise environmental crime. And the second question to Mr. Melnyk. Poland is both a destination and a transit country for waste. In your view, what is the single most significant gap? Lack of coordination, weak documentation systems or evolving criminal methods that prevent your police forces, but also other member states from quickly dismantling these networks? Thank you.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “If there is one danger we're all too familiar with in Portugal, it is wildfires. Since 2020, over 160,000 hectares have been destroyed by fire and people have lost all. It is time to move from reaction to preventive action. We need a new structure. We need prevention in Portugal and in the south of Europe. Prevention and defense must start in the forests. We need to anticipate these disasters in 2024. Many firefighters in Portugal were deployed. Firefighting planes were deployed to put out fires. This is an issue of importance for integrity. Territorial integrity. Action must be taken before a fire breaks out. We need to manage our forests. We need rescue. We need more airplanes for those on the frontline. Portugal. Spain. Greece. We cannot kick the can down the road. We need action. We need to draw down from the cohesion fund the farm policies. We need prevention rather than firefighting afterwards, we need resilience and education to show that resilience is part and parcel of education.”
  Management of EU forests
• “There are debates in this Parliament that say a great deal about our Priorities and about what we are prepared to tolerate. This is one of those debates. Images of child sexual abuse continue to circulate online. This is a crime without end. Recently, Europol coordinated the greatest operation in its history against one of these networks, and the platform kid flicks almost 2 million users worldwide. This is a subscription platform that contains over 90,000 abuse videos that are being sold and shared and traded as a good. Systems are profiting from this, from these networks that use digital platforms, AI and they produce and circulate new content. Many of these crimes are only discovered because online service providers voluntarily report them. We defend the regime that defends this voluntary protection that maintains essential guarantees and Encryption from point to point. Protecting children is not an artificial problem of privacy. This is our duty. Thank you.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Technique or ideological? Well, colleagues, this is not a technical or an ideological debate. It doesn't belong to either right or left. It belongs to decency. Three children every day in Portugal fall victim to sexual abuse, and many of the attacks take place when children should have much greater levels of protection. And we always put on our boxing gloves to debate this as if there was a margin. Some elbow room. In this there is no more heinous crime, no deeper injury than what we're discussing today. This must be seen as a political priority. We have to stop those gaps which now leave children more exposed than ever before. We're seeing digital industrialisation of child pornography. The. And very often there is impunity. We have to guarantee that victims really are supported and that perpetrators face justice. We would like to see an extension of the statute of limitations. There is nowhere in the text any mechanism to determine what is a legal age of consent. And if we need if there's one thing we need to do, the Parliament needs to show enough victim enough courage, which is deserved by every single victim that they've never received.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “I'm sorry, I apologize on behalf of my colleague. Uh, Martin. She couldn't be here today, so I will I will read a statement on her. Of course, of course. So, so, dear colleagues, thank you once again to the rapporteurs. And let me underline that I fully support the aim of this report. A clear consent based definition of rape. This is about protecting victims, providing legal certainty and strengthening citizens trust and justice. At the same time, it is our responsibility to strike the right balance. We need legislation that is coherent, practical and respectful of subsidiarity. Police officers, prosecutors and judges deserve rules that are enforceable in practice, not overly complex texts. I welcome the amendments that draw on the examples of Member States to follow. Showing that clear definitions lead to fairer prosecutions and greater awareness. And in this period, I support precise wording that prevents misinterpretation of trauma responses such as freezing, and that strengthens prevention by promoting respect for boundaries and empowering victims, victims, women and girls. To know that a clear no will always be respected and upheld by the law. However, some amendments go too far in the opposite direction. While rape is without any doubt an emotional and devastating crime. Our task here is to provide a legal text that is precise, proportionate and effective. If you overload the report, we risk weakening consensus and reducing practical impact. Our goal must be a realistic, legally sound, victim centred outcome that can be implemented across all the member states. While subsidiarity must remain a guiding principle. We will continue to work constructively towards a successful report, one that is not only well intentioned but truly effective. Factually correct and legally enforceable. We own this to the victims. A serious crime like rape requires serious, precise and effective legislation, not overstatement, but solid solutions. Thank you.”
  EU policy on victims' compensation rights
• “Thank you, dear chair. Uh, we are seeing a rise in heating influence operations that are funded through financial channels that appear legitimate. These efforts often take the form of NGOs, front organizations, cultural programs, making them hard to detect Attacked. The networks behind them are carefully designed to avoid oversight by national financial intelligence units, allowing them to quietly undermine the core of our democratic systems. From our point of view, and this I believe it's a question for all the speakers. What are the key blind spots in our national and EU level intelligence systems that let these financial influence networks operate unnoticed? And what steps should we take now to dismantle them before they cause more damage to our democratic sovereignty? Thank you.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• “Commissioner, who can guarantee that the choice about the future of Europe will be free and free from manipulation? That's why this is an urgent debate. We are living in times when algorithms decide what we see before we even know what we're looking for. This is a time when foreign interference has become a constant strategy. It's methodical and highly sophisticated. Today, we are discussing Europe's capacity to continue to be a space for freedom, for choice and for truth. The challenges start here. First, we need to safeguard the information space, because without truth there can be no free choice. And without a free and independent press, no truth can survive. Second, we need to strengthen our institutions from electoral processes to attacks on critical infrastructure. Third, we need to strengthen social resilience with civic participation. Because democracy cannot be defended solely through legislation, we can legislate. We can create centres and mechanisms, but nothing can replace the informed citizen because everything can be manipulated. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you. Chair. My question goes to Mr. Melnick. Um, what are the main challenges faced by the police? Police? Police? But also other member states in investigations related to illegal trafficking of hazardous waste, especially in the context of organized criminal groups. Do issues such as insufficient documentation, evolving criminal criminal methods, or difficulties in identifying perpetrators pose the biggest obstacles in identifying those groups. Thank you.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “Thank you. Chair. I'll use the Portuguese. Commissioner, I'm sure you will agree that the visa system isn't just an administrative system. It's the first line of defense of the Schengen area and as an essential part of our internal security. Recently, there was an operation. That led to 52 entries being rejected, and nine documentary frauds were identified at Porto and Lisbon airport. This shows that cooperation can help identify fraudulent practices. So we have to focus on measures such as restriction on multiple entry visas, avoiding red tape for consular services without affecting criminal networks. What response can the Commission give with its new visa strategy? How are you going to improve the detection of documentary fraud, smuggling, trafficking? How are you going to act with the resources you have?”
  Asylum & border control
• “Yes. I'll try to be brief. Corazon de Lisboa. Thank you. 31 bodies were involved in this, and that shows that we have a lot of support for a new legislative framework for sorting, for storing data and providing access to data in the case of terrorism and organised crime. This is a real risk. And I can give you real examples. We often depend on cooperation between different bodies. However, there are member states where data isn't stored, it isn't retained. And that's a problem because then there might be a query later on and the data no longer exists. And then there are investigations into terrorism and radicalisation. Contact needs to be created after the act. This is absolutely essential. So we need to make sure that the networks have the information so that it doesn't happen too late. So the member states have noted that there are loopholes here, that there are gaps here when they're trying to investigate suspects. So what measures does the Commission intend to take to make sure that it can set specific data categories, which can be used by the law enforcement authorities?”
  Privacy & law enforcement
• “Yes. Thank you. And I apologize for being late. I was in a committee voting. Um, Mr.. Thoughts? Allow me to to use the the Portuguese, if I may. We have different models, Chinese models that are being used By Europeans. So what we're talking about here really are economic issues, but we're also talking about how we can put across narratives, focus on topics. Push person subjects to the fore. It's about exerting influence. And it can have an impact on information ecosystems. I'd like to talk about three vulnerabilities. First of all. Setting function criteria. It's not always transparent. There's a policy that underpins it. The public debate is always about censorship, but are things that are far more subtle than that that affect public opinion. And some of the international community is busy with the future risks of AI. But we shouldn't underestimate the existing risks. We have this AI and the Chinese models. What does NATO think of those? Do they need to be analyzed in technical terms or the strategic aspect? And what can NATO do, together with the EU to promote transparency and democratic, democratic accountability when AI is used in political contexts? Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes
• “(17:01:04 – 17:03:08): Thank you, Richard. My first question goes to DG ECHO. European civil protection, we should be preparing for the fire season. Countries like Portugal face this. Whole communities and families face ever more intense forest fires that are faster spreading and more difficult to control. Portugal has been making an effort, but no member state can deal with simultaneous fires that are caused by arson. So we need to react not only in the moment of the emergency, but also in preparation in terms of getting personnel ready and technical resources. What kind of signs can you give us that Portugal can be supported and will be better prepared for the next fire season? How can we release more resources, respond more rapidly? And so how can the civil protection mechanism respond to ever more intense fires? Further question, fire sorry, cyber attacks, radicalization online, these can have effect on our critical infrastructure, electrical grids, communications. These are obvious targets. Artificial intelligence could seriously worsen this risk. Sophisticated tools could be in the hands of terrorist groups or state actors that could paralyze essential services. So we need to deal with the vulnerabilities. Is the commission ready for this change in the balance of power that smaller actors can have access to more powerful tools? And how can we protect critical infrastructure? Thank you very much.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “(15:55:08 – 15:56:29): Thank you very much, chairman. Commission, it's only 2 weeks before the pact enters into force, and there's growing concern about the way some member states are implementing the pact, particularly Spain. The Spanish government is still postponing the adoption of the relevant law, the law on foreigners. These are commitments that have been made in Brussels, and they're essential for implementing the new pact. But if we imagine the legalization of hundreds of thousands of migrants without any proper legal scrutiny, this is a dangerous precedent for the European Union. In that case, the government reacted using decrees and urgently. So the European pact on migration and asylum cannot be considered to be optional or depend on the political opportunism of any individual government. Does the commission deplore these developments when a member state is ignoring its European, obligations, when it's giving a prize to illegal immigrants? Spain is not complying with its, commitments on the June 12. It should it has to apply. Is there any other member state?”
  Asylum & border control
• “Yes. Thank you. And I apologize for being late. I was in a committee voting. Um, Mr.. Thoughts? Allow me to to use the the Portuguese, if I may. We have different models, Chinese models that are being used By Europeans. So what we're talking about here really are economic issues, but we're also talking about how we can put across narratives, focus on topics. Push person subjects to the fore. It's about exerting influence. And it can have an impact on information ecosystems. I'd like to talk about three vulnerabilities. First of all. Setting function criteria. It's not always transparent. There's a policy that underpins it. The public debate is always about censorship, but are things that are far more subtle than that that affect public opinion. And some of the international community is busy with the future risks of AI. But we shouldn't underestimate the existing risks. We have this AI and the Chinese models. What does NATO think of those? Do they need to be analyzed in technical terms or the strategic aspect? And what can NATO do, together with the EU to promote transparency and democratic, democratic accountability when AI is used in political contexts? Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes
• “Thank you very much indeed. Well, my party Has a long history in all of this, because we've been the first party in our Parliament calling for criminalisation of possession or creation of child pornographic material. Um, you will see the page in the report which is going to be debated in Parliament soon. Thank you.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “These blackouts hit Spain and Portugal. They left millions of people in the dark. Trains ground to a halt. Hospitals had to were only able to work thanks to backup generators. So that was the case. As I said, in Spain and Portugal, the Portuguese government communicated as best as it could. The Iberian Peninsula is somewhat isolated, and I think the blackout showed the risk of this isolation. Tuesday around dawn, the lights started to come back on, but Spaniards were still left in the dark, including the. For the reasons behind the cause of this blackout in Portugal. The government has responded clearly and tried to avoid any kind of chaos. But we want answers. In Spain, our neighboring country, there was an electric and political blackout, and that leads to a prolonged period of darkness, even when the lights have come back on. Thank you.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration