Petras AUŠTREVIČIUS

Policy topics Petras AUŠTREVIČIUS is active on

What Petras AUŠTREVIČIUS has said (25)

• 2026-06-17 “Thank you, mister chair, mister commissioner, council representative. 2026 beginning of 20 26, and I will switch to my mother tongue. So at the start of this year, there was a a register of citizens inhabitants inhabitants, and thousands of thousands of people had their data stolen with people's addresses, their property. Now we have there is the the authorities have addressed from this, and we've seen further data lost lost or rather, this further data which has been taken from the immigrations authorities, and this information has been misused. And and we now have to look at whether all authorities have all authorities in the country have seen any further data stolen. There's over 600,000 people who've had their data stolen, and we need to make sure that this is addressed. So this began at the start of this year. And as at the start of April, the authorities were aware of this loss of data. However, it was only at the end of May when individuals were informed about this loss. So why did the relevant authorities hide these facts? Why did the citizens who were affected, why were they not informed? And that is still a question which has not been addressed. We need to look at geopolitical threats and also the increase in these kind of hybrid attracts we're seeing. There are this is a challenge, which is increasing, and it does not only affect Lithuania. It's an impact across further EU countries. We've seen an increase in number of cyber attacks, and we've seen increased attacks over recent weeks when information about Lithuanian doctors has been stolen as well. They've seen a whole range of attack counts which have been hacked in the interior ministry in Lithuania. Now this is sensitive information, and we've seen people which been gathering this information, and these individual can then use this to, surveil, people. And this is why we need a higher standards new standards, higher standards for cybersecurity, these days in the European Union. We have the GDPR. We have a range of other directives and guidelines in this area. We have guidelines for protection of critical infrastructure, and these date back to 2024. However, the implementation is showing that there are gaps. For example, in March up to 2026, only a 3rd of organizations in Germany who have to implement, any guidelines have done so. So we have a range of directives and guidelines which haven't been implemented, so therefore don't provide the protection, for, this data and for for individuals. Cases cases have to be identified and investigated. We must have a follow-up, and we must be aware when our data has ended up in the hands of criminals. Thank you very much.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• 2026-06-17 “So at the start of this year, there was a register of. Citizens and inhabitants, inhabitants and thousands of thousands of people had their data stolen with people's addresses, their property. Now we have there is the the authorities have addressed from this and we've seen further data lost, lost, or rather further data which has been taken from the immigration authorities. And this information has been misused and that we now have to look at whether all authorities. Have authorities in the country have seen any further data stolen? There's over 600 000 people who've had their data stolen. And we need to make sure that. This is addressed. So this began at the start of this year. And as at the start of April, the authorities were aware of this loss of data. However, it was only at the end of May when individuals were informed about this loss. So why did the relevant authorities. Hide these facts? Why did the citizens who were affected? Why were they not informed? And that is still a question which has not been addressed. We need to look at the geopolitical threats and also the increase in these kind of hybrid attracts attacks. We're seeing there are this is a challenge which is increasing and it does not only affect Lithuania, it's an impact across a further EU countries.”
  Privacy & law enforcement
• 2026-06-17 “We've seen an increase in number of cyber attacks and we've seen increased attacks over recent weeks when information about Lithuanian doctors has been stolen as well. And we've seen a whole range of attack accounts which have been hacked in the Interior Ministry in Lithuania. Now, this is sensitive information and we've seen people being gathering this information. And these individuals can then use this to surveil people. And this is why we need a higher standards, new standards, higher standards for cybersecurity these days in the European Union. We have the GDPR. We have a range of other directives and guidelines in this area. And we have guidelines for protection of critical infrastructure. And these date back to 2024. However, the implementation is shown that there are gaps. For example, in March up to 2026, only a third of organisations in Germany have to implement any asset guidelines have done so. So we have a range of directives and guidelines which haven't been implemented. So therefore don't provide the protection for this data. And for individuals cases. Cases have to be identified and investigated. We must have a follow up. And we must be aware when our data has ended up in the hands of criminals. Thank you very much.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• 2025-09-26 “E-003761/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Council, based on proposals from the High Representative and the Commission, has adopted several restrictive measures to further limit Russia’s energy revenues and constrain the Russian shadow fleet and its enablers. To date, 557 vessels are subject to a port access ban and a ban on the provision of a broad range of services related to maritime transport 12 . The EU has strengthened its restrictive measures related to Russia by adding the possibility to impose assets freezes, prohibiting making funds available and, as appropriate, travel bans on individuals and entities supporting the Russian shadow fleet 3 . Several designations have been adopted since, covering in particular oil traders, shipping and managing companies in Russia and third countries, supportive flag registries as well as a captain of a shadow fleet vessel. The European External Action Service and the Commission remain committed to increase the pressure on shadow fleet networks and will work closely with Member States to develop further measures. Tackling possible circumvention attempts of EU sanctions such as the Oil Price Cap, including through third country jurisdictions, is among the Commission’s key priorities. It is dedicating significant efforts to this – from legislative changes targeting those who facilitate circumvention to closely monitoring suspicious trade flows and organising dedicated outreach. Member States are responsible for the implementation and the enforcement of EU sanctions. National competent authorities (NCAs) must ascertain that EU operators have taken all the necessary steps, in good faith, to ensure oil is purchased at or below the Oil Price Cap. The Commission is monitoring this and stands ready to support Member States and their NCAs. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-againstukraine-eu-adopts-18th-package-of-economic-and-individual-measures/. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russiaeu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/24/16th-package-of-sanctions-on-russia-swar-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-lists-additional-48-individuals-and-35-entities/.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Mr. chairman, Commissioner, dear colleagues, it's time to acknowledge that even the highly increasing individual Member States investments for defence will not achieve what can be achieved by the coordinated EU actions on the EU and NATO level. Europe cannot pretend and expect that the bill for its defence will be paid by somebody else. That lasted for too long. Therefore, we need a new EU defence strategy. We need to think about the security and defence europeanisation, which will not deny the NATO defence cooperation but will contribute to it significantly. Currently, we are discussing as to whether Europe on its own would be capable to ensure the security of the continent. That does not mean the standardisation of the equipment, the defence equipment, etc.. First of all, this is the uniform ambition, leadership and responsible for responsibility for the nearest future. Only this will ensure the security of the Europeans, not on paper, but in real environment. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you for presentation of a very interesting, uh, study. Much appreciated. Um, I have probably three points from my side. Firstly, you rightly say in the conclusion, number two, exploring creative solutions to sustain Taiwan's international relations. Um, you make a reference to EU level. I guess, I mean, individual member states can't replace the European Union in this regard. But if the EU is not really ready to step in and it looks like, I mean, for the time being. So what role for individual member states you would see? And to what extent it might create the result? I mean, you are speaking about my second point is facing very dire security situation globally. Globally. Um. Are you, uh, in a, in a capacity to reply to what extent? Uh, Taiwan is eager to, you know, impose stricter export control policy line, especially when it comes to exports to Russia, more sophisticated, uh, equipment, for example, companies like Buffalo machinery or Akira Seiki are exporting to Russia. Is that an issue in in in the policy line of Taiwan? To what extent it's recognized as creating certain security challenges to the on on the European side. And my third point is if to speak about. More enhanced security cooperation with Taiwan from the EU level, from what we might start. What would be your practical suggestions in this regard? Thank you.”
  Relations with Taiwan
• “All right. Thank you for this opportunity to address on behalf of Karin Karlsbro. So I will speak on, on her behalf, so please take it serious. Unfortunately, I must once again begin by expressing my disappointment over the EU's inability to handle the issue of trade agreements with two of our most important allies in a serious manner. When I meet with representatives from both Ukraine and Moldova. Predictability. Predictability is one of the key words Keywords. They race despite having have have had more than a year to conclude a new agreement. We have failed to do so due to our own incapacity. The Parliament's position has been clear from the very start. Ukraine should be offered a long term and generous trade arrangement, serving as a bridge until the country becomes a full member of the European Union. The same goes for Moldova. I genuinely question whether the Commission understands the signals were sending to Kiev by placing the country in a trade policy limbo. We are making a serious mistake, both in terms of trade and geopolitics. If we continue to stall negotiations on an updated trade deal, we risk undermining the very serious support for the EU in Ukraine, which we should not take for granted. This feeds the Russian narrative that we are not serious about our commitments to integrate Ukraine into our own market and our union in negotiations with Ukraine. The commission is using the outdated Dcfta quotas as a starting point, quotas that were in place before the war, despite the fact that the situation on the battlefield hasn't changed.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• “Thank you. Chair. Colleagues. It's indeed shameful to. It's better to support a friend and a partner than live under the enemy's roof. I think Ukrainians learned it, and they show a good lesson for us. And indeed, I do support those provisions provided by by the loan. I really believe that those 60 billion which are rightly, you know, attributed for military support, for the defense support, because no defense means Russia will take over and will speak the sovereign voice of the Kremlin. Indeed. But once I mean using those 60 billion, should we think in a way as indeed a priority line goes like Ukraine, European? Producers might might be first to provide support, but well, looking to the EU picture is very uneven. Some countries support really by huge efforts, by huge money, but some are completely relaxed. So will you will we use I mean even approach even proportionality by, I don't know, GDP or whatever? Or should we look into the percentage from GDP those countries contributed supporting Ukraine. Are there any thoughts from the Commission side in this regard? Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Thank you. David. Minister, thank you very much for your presentation and clear line on in particular on enlargement and neighbourhood. Two points from my side for how long the EU will be waiting and and decidedly criticizing the Georgian Dream government, but doing really nothing to send a clear message, sanctioning, for example, more responsible authority, leadership of that country and moving probably towards these. Issues as well. And my second point is on Hungary's blocking, enlargement and fighting every time. Something to postpone. So your Prime Minister was clear on article seven. So which way you envisage, by the way, to solve this bottleneck for the time of being unanimity on technical issues towards enlargement? Really? It's a blockage. It's not a solution. So towards Hungary. Do you have a solution?”
  EU enlargement
• “31:09 – 16:35:10): In collegial mode, thank you Chair and dear colleagues. Indeed, our committee on security and defense has a good chance to produce a solid opinion on ITRE's report when it comes to regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Connecting Europe Facility for the period of next MFF. So nothing to be added to emphasize this is an important document and looking towards a long period of time. The title in itself indeed emphasizes a lot of budgetary as well as military mobility dimensions of this. So we're speaking about an essential increase in CEF allocations for twenty-eight thirty-four from thirty, almost thirty-four billion to eighty-two billion. It's plus fifty billion in increase and indeed a heavy focus on military mobility. So that's why the amendments, those twenty-four amendments which are made for your interest mainly focus on improving military mobility as a part of broader strategic objective of enhancing the European defense readiness in full complementarity with NATO. I wish to emphasize this indeed. Secondly, it must be a priority for EU and NATO cooperation because both organizations are heavily involved in and increasingly into military mobility when it comes to reinforcing defense of eastern border regions of the European Union, which are given a certain priority in this regard for obvious reasons. And indeed, it's not just about the physical connectivity and infrastructure, about cyber protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. It is important to have in mind and those amendments have a focus in this regard as well. And indeed, once we speak about military mobility, it's for good partners but we should have in mind counter mobility adversaries to be ready for if any necessity arises. And indeed, synergy since we are speaking about many funding instruments, EDIP, DIPRA, CEFR, as such and so on and so forth, must be complementarity well insured. And indeed, we are speaking and having in mind cooperation with our neighbors because our neighborhood has great importance for our security. So that's why connectivity with our partner countries, not third countries but partner countries, must be well in mind in order to ensure kind of horizontal approach much in this regard. So that's why, Madam Chair, the opinion which draft opinion which I present to this committee having twenty-four amendments and I believe shadows will creatively focus on the amendments in order to have even better text ready as you said by April and I wouldn't spare much of time. We have to focus as much as possible time wise in order to produce as best as possible our opinion complementing the ITRE resolution. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “07:37 – 16:08:42): Mister Strebichos, thank you Chair. Well supporting the Fiddish party representative here in the committee I would really repeat a word stop Putin. I mean that's the best way I mean to stop killing Hungarians in Ukraine, Ukrainians in Ukraine and all over. I mean do it now Madam Kallas. Two points you had just an exchange with the foreign ministers of the European Union is there any magic stick which coming out from your debates concerning possible alternative support for Ukrainian Ukraine? I mean budgetary support it's ninety billion euros as it stands. And secondly you rightly said shadow fleet is a shame. It's a shame forty percent around forty percent of five hundred and so shadow fleet ships are registered and operated in Europe by European countries including the European Union countries. Is there any hope you will get us a certain grip on those countries and ships?”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Thank you Chair and dear Anders Commissioner thank you for your job your engagement and your kind of energy positive energy I mean go along this road as long as you can I mean I know what it takes. I mean two points the partnerships with third countries like minded pro western ideology affiliated well what are the results and what can we more I mean how many you see all in all on a list. And my second question is indeed support to Ukraine and you rightly said I mean who knows I mean who who supports whom more and who needs more I mean we do provide a lot of hardware to Ukraine and rightly so but software even training experience I I mean Ukrainians have a battlefield experience I mean they are indeed a different quality army. Are there any thoughts I mean how we can probably borrow this experience I mean get this experience from the Ukrainian side towards our militaries? Thank you.”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• “(15:54:45 – 15:56:34): Very good. Thank you. My, my question to, the DG's representatives would be, how you would assess, the response from member states? Because member states are those actors who have to take up all the initiatives and follow-up and use all the financing instruments, made available and provided to them. What kind of the, I would say, I mean, progress, picture you see, for the time of being? Are you happy? Is is that even across across member states, what can be, done in order to encourage more cooperation in in this regard and how those partnerships, cross border partnerships and regional, partnerships develop from your point of view. Another point is training. I think drones themselves don't fly. I mean, they have to be managed. Alright? I mean, we we we still speak about a corp of, operators. I mean, the smarter they are, the better usage of drones we can expect. How about training? Will be any special programs on EU level in order to encourage, all those training exercises? And finally, you know, drones can be applicable, and, they can be used in many, many fields, not just in warfare, but, in civil protection, for example, against fires, even search and rescue, border guarding, and so on and so forth. Is there any anything of this kind on EU level programs or initiatives, we can see in coming years? Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “If it's okay with Elena, I go forward. Thank you. Elena. Let me to acknowledge a great change. Thank you, Vice President. Uh, last time we met, it wasn't really as effective and as productive. Discussion. I can congratulate you. And I hope that this is still just the beginning. We can do. And we we we have to achieve much more because security and defense is a long term issue. And we have to probably go along and invent all necessary instruments in this regard. My first question is, if the. Eab accepted as a main lender to compare with other financing sources. Where is your advantage? Interest rates, conditions, kind of technical assistance also. So what? Secondly, can you be more specific? What partner countries are your increasing clients? I mean, any projects to be mentioned in this regard? And thirdly, the European Parliament and other institutions have passed omnibus simplification on defense in industries, regulations and so on and so forth from the banking expertise point of view. Have you noticed any positive change? I mean, did it bring, I mean, to practitioners any value back in this regard? Can you comment? And indeed, I wish you all the best and looking forward for our further meetings. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you to our Czech speaker who made this investigation. I hope it led to some results. I wonder why. I mean, once you mentioned that some cash was brought to Czechia from probably Ukraine or Russia, uh, was any, you know, action taken? I mean, any detentions, uh, happened since it's a crime. Uh, you never know. I mean, what cash might be used for. But you mentioned some very, you know, prolific figures like Medvedchuk. You know that Medvedchuk officially is a godfather of one of the official daughters of Putin. He, uh, he is, uh, he is the one with whom Putin was, uh, meeting once, visiting Ukraine at that time with Yanukovych official president. He spoke or met for 20 or 30 minutes and took two hours and more. So that he was a ruler. He was the Russian representative in Ukraine. That's somebody. I mean, who if he could talk and speak to us, you know, it would be amazing. I mean, what he might, uh, tell us about Russian influences, but with this in mind, I mean, very you know, those channels are indeed, uh, of extreme importance and influence. These are not just occasional. And concentration on Chechnya is not because of some, you know, accidents. No, I mean, big Ukrainian community, uh, certain channels, European channels are located in Prague and so on and so forth. And Czechia is a strong supporter of Ukraine. But was any Diplomatic cover. Diplomatic cover used for those operations. Do you know anything from from your activities in this regard? And finally, was any attempt to influence Ukrainian community, uh, diaspora residing in Chechnya infiltrate and affect them? Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you. Chair. I think we have a very different NATO now. Maybe for good, maybe for bad. I don't know if to look to the declaration from 2023, there have been 90 paragraphs in the final communiqué. Now we have five. Next time will be 1 or 2. Are we so, so concise? Sending a strong and unequivocal message to our partners and the world around. I don't know. Yeah, people like short texts, but sometimes to understand complex situation you need more paragraphs, more discussion, more clear messages to our potential adversaries. I am not sure. I mean, this time the world understood that NATO stands more united and stronger. Well, you mentioned. That we need to invest to the, um, kind of hard core. But, uh, Ukraine's example is that we need something new. I mean, uh, tanks themselves will not change the situation on the battlefield. Was there any good understanding and a shared vision about that? Nato must, you know, embrace something new, adapt to the new situation? To what extent it was shared among the member states? Thank you.”
  Relations with NATO
• “Thank you. Thank you. Co-chairs. Dear colleagues. Welcome back. Indeed. It's a great pleasure to start our new political season introducing so needed and important report on military mobility. If we don't shape geostrategy. Geostrategy will shape us. It's better to make the right choice at the right time. Otherwise we will follow and will be catching up with the leaving train. Indeed, military mobility is a very part is a central element of security and defense policies, and it comes really into the timely reality framework. Colleagues, we have to learn some lessons, if not mistakes, from the past. Firstly, we see decreased financing. We didn't move ambitiously forward. So money means speed and direction. Secondly, coordination. There was not much of a smooth and cohesive coordination before. We have to take stock out of this and look forward with better efforts. And thirdly, we are speaking about military mobility, which is much about infrastructure related issues. So it means that it's long term undertaking. We can't achieve, we can't build everything bridges, uh, passages or whatever in one year time. It's a long term process. So let's take a look into the next MFF, including and indeed finally, a lesson to have it. Uh, since money is always short, let's be very, um, you know, kind of creative in using any possible other funds like regional development, uh, cohesion or even other funds available in order to bring all possible means in order to achieve better results. In fact, infrastructure is important, but sometimes regulations and rules can destroy even the best possible infrastructure projects. If will be no. Any new proper, uh, I would say deregulation based approach towards rules, regulations, customs rules, administrative decisions.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you. You're welcome. Dear Olga, most welcome back to the European Parliament and it's a pleasure to see you. I have two points more on probably coming from your field of responsibility as a minister of justice in a situation of war, of aggression, what you would say about the accessibility of people towards legal services, because probably some lawyers are left markets, I mean, went for frontline and others probably didn't join much. I mean, is there any situation you can describe about us about this? And secondly, I presume that your ministry is in charge of registration of damage made by a Russian aggressor against the state of Ukraine, as well as properties and lives of Ukrainian citizens and population. So how this work is undergoing and what kind of the situation you have. And is there any cooperation you need more in this regard because it's very, very important. I mean, to come on time. Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Thank you, David and the Director General, most welcome to our meeting and thank you for your short overview and looking forward for our further exchange. So let me to be very precise on on points I want to raise firstly Georgia. So did we do everything from our side. You as you consider Georgia as a candidate country is still on our list. Sending our clear message as if things progress as they go in Georgia. I mean, a meeting in particular, Democratic criteria and overall developments in that country. There can be a serious talk about Georgia as a candidate country in as such. Secondly, I would support previous mentioning of the importance of the alignment of candidate countries with common foreign and security policy. Some candidate countries really clearly fall apart from from this path. And although it looks not probably as practical as one might see, it's not about alignment or harmonization with legislation, but overall general tendency might be very dangerous and, you know, bring a certain friction, not just a certain but major friction between us and them. And thirdly, I want to ask you about the general profile the European Union has among the population of the candidate countries. How you would describe the tendency we see. I mean, to what extent populations in the candidate countries see the European Union as a major partner? Thank you.”
  EU enlargement
• “Russia. Russia. Air. Sports. Strategy. Tessema. Tolou. Youssou. Geda. Paralympic. Committee. Sport. Of. Russia. Sports. Organizations and institutions in Russia or the European Commission's. Teams. Savo. Mandurah.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Thank you, chair, and let me to welcome on behalf of the renew Group, our Ukrainian colleagues in Kiev and all around. So we stay in close cooperation and indeed, Ukraine's integration into the European Union. And I have to emphasize that Ukraine is in the accession process right now, not yet in full negotiations, but accession processes firmly anchored, and I wish to see more efficiency and clear strategy from EU side to be extended in order to have a clear process managed in this regard. And, you know, I mean, with no doubts, Ukraine's integration into the European Union will be benefiting a lot into the regional cooperation. So that's why I looking forward towards new Hungarian government to be more effective and more open minded in in this regard. And then changes will follow. Mr. chair Meleshko, may I ask you a couple of questions? Many colleagues of mine are much interested in the military situation on a front line. So congratulations on Ukrainian militaries gaining more territories whatsoever in April. It's a huge gain. But how do you assess the overall military situation by now? Secondly, the Russians are preparing for so-called victory parade on the 9th of May, requested a ceasefire. What will be the response of Kiev in this regard? And finally, you mentioned about sanctions, and you're completely right. We have to impose more and more effective sanctions and not just 21st package I hope will follow, but 22nd and more. But do you still do your military still find some components in Russian missiles and drones coming from countries which do not comply with EU sanctions regime? Thank you and good luck for you.”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• “We are reverting to a pre-war framework. The figures I have seen, meaning the quotas, the most of the key Ukrainian exports would increase by a paltry 1,020% compared to the pre-war situation. In practice, this would lead to a sharp reduction in imports in the order of 70 to 90% for products like wheat and sugar. Only one can easily calculate this. This would mean for Ukraine's exports revenue and ultimately for its ability to finance both its own and Europe's defence against Russia. Instead of using Dcfta quotas as a baseline, we should use actual import volumes under the autonomous trade measures as a starting point for the negotiations. There is a clear risk that the European Union, by putting towards such a limited offer, will weaken Ukraine's incentive to continue the vital reform efforts currently underway to align with European standards. I am deeply concerned that nearly a month after the expiration of the ATM, we still have no concrete agreement on the table. Finally, I would like to ask the commission about the illegal unilateral import bans imposed by Poland, Slovakia and Hungary against Ukrainian products. As I understand, these are still in place. Can the Commission clarify what measures are being taken to ensure that these are finally lifted now and the ATM has expired? Thank you. On behalf of Karin. Thank you chair.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• “(15:53:31 – 15:54:35): Thank you. Thank you, chair. And, indeed, once again, I think the more days pass, after own initiative reports initiated by Iranian Pozniak, mean, the more we see practical impact of of that report and especially following the practical response, on which we hear reports, reporting from DGs responsible of the European Commission. And this is very good exercise. Madam chair, I would encourage only to have, more reporting back, on this most important issue in coming months and years. Probably, it must become a kind of a traditional reporting exercise because situation is changing very, very rapidly, and we have to be up to the speed of all those changes. I'm in competition with somebody.”
  EU-Iran relations
• “Madam chair. Madam Minister. Commissioner, dear colleagues, today marks the 1,525th day since Russia began its full scale invasion of Ukraine. Every day it is a reminder of tens of thousands of lives lost and families torn apart by the abduction of children. It is also a reminder of the ruined cities and the irreplaceable historical and cultural treasures lost. After four years of war, our solidarity with the Ukrainian people only grows stronger. I eagerly await a full establishment of a special tribunal where those responsible for war crimes will be brought to justice. This will happen, I have no doubt about it. I call on the EU and its member states to complete all preparations for the special tribunal's work as soon as possible and to inaugurate the institution. We must continue to increase pressure in every way on the aggressors, the Russian and Belarusian regimes. It also. I also call on the EU to adopt a decision as soon as possible banning those responsible for war crimes for. From entering the EU for life. Their journey must end in The Hague. Thank you.”
  Support for International Criminal Court · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “It's very close to my house, but it's very complicated. I mean, don't worry. Thank you. Chair. Thank you, professor, for your introduction. Uh, in which way? I mean, you consider the country's actions towards frozen Russian assets as a right or responsibility to act. Because Russians are war aggressors, and we have to enact each and every possible defense, mean and defense line in this regard. Secondly, um, well, the Belgian government came out with the kind of the demand a third one among three and third one sounds like ensure the participation of every country where Russian assets are frozen, meaning the loan to Ukraine must be backed by those assets collectively. I mean, not just one, uh, in Belgium, but more member states. I mean, how do you consider this demand a legitimate one or just a political mean to prolong this unclear situation? And finally, have you recently heard about the one of the wealthiest Russian oligarchs, Friedman's attempt to question his big, big money frozen by EU in acting kind of investor state dispute settlement scheme sounds very complicated, but probably there is a certain meaning in it. Um, do you see it as a possible risk that, uh, indeed, those oligarchs have money, uh, investing into the defense and lawyers, Western lawyers, first of all, they might come up with some attempts to break down the defense wall of the European Union and the West. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)