Emmanouil KEFALOGIANNIS

Policy topics Emmanouil KEFALOGIANNIS is active on

What Emmanouil KEFALOGIANNIS has said (37)

• 2026-03-12 “Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 10.6.2026 Written question The Commission is closely monitoring developments in the Strait of Hormuz and their impact on fertiliser markets through the EU Fertiliser Market Observatory [1] . While no immediate physical shortages of nitrogen fertilisers are expected in the EU, notably due to limited direct import exposure to the Gulf region and sufficient stock levels, recent geopolitical developments have increased global price volatility, which is already affecting EU fertiliser prices. To mitigate these pressures, the Commission has already taken targeted measures, including a reduced 1% Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) default value mark up for fertilisers and proposed the suspension of customs tariffs within quotas for ammonia, urea and other nitrogen fertilisers to support both farmers and the EU fertiliser industry. The Commission has also recently adopted a state aid Framework on the Middle East [2] to support both farmers and energy intensive industries affected by the current situation. On 19 May 2026, the Commission adopted the Fertiliser Action Plan [3] , setting out short- and long-term measures to improve fertiliser availability, affordability and resilience. Short term actions include mobilisation and possible reinforcement of the agricultural reserve, liquidity support under the Common Agricultural Policy, and flexibility for advance payments. Longer term measures focus on strengthening EU production capacity, supporting low carbon and circular fertilisers, promoting alternative nutrient sources, and reducing dependencies on imported energy and feedstocks. [1] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/data-and-analysis/markets/overviews/market-observatories/fertilisers_en. [2] https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/metsaf_en. [3] Commission presents plan to secure Europe's fertiliser supply and food security: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_1099.”
  Use of fertilisers · Agricultural funding
• 2026-02-02 “E-000411/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of this issue. The EU has repeatedly underlined, most recently in the enlargement report 1 that Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary and among others, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite the positive atmosphere and the ongoing dialogue between Greece and Türkiye, the unresolved dispute over the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones continues to strain bilateral relations. As pointed out in the Commission’s annual report, Türkiye continued to systematically issue general navigational warnings challenging Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction 2 . The Council has noted that the improvements in the relation between Greece and Türkiye underlining its expectations for them to be sustained 3 . The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. Abstaining from unilateral actions which violate international law and the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4bb4ddd1-4f20-4ee0-92db926996ec8dd1_en?filename=t. 2 See above. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question On 29 January 2026 the Commission received an official communication from the Tunisian authorities requesting a revision of the Protocol on agriculture of the Association Agreement with Tunisia . However, the Commission does not envisage additional trade concessions for agricultural products originating in Tunisia including olive oil . The Commission recognises the importance of a high level of protection of human health and the environment in the Vision for Agriculture and Food [1] . Food imported from third countries and food produced in the EU must comply with very strict sanitary requirements. The Commission committed to a stronger alignment of production standards applied to imported products and a strengthening of import controls [2] . The Commission launched an impact assessment with a view to strengthening alignment of the EU’s production standards on most hazardous pesticides with requirements applicable to imported products [3] . Finally, a task force [4] has recently been created to ensure imports meet EU standards, in particular on food and feed safety, pesticide residues and to coordinate monitoring of specific imported products. [1] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/overview-vision-agriculture-food/vision-agriculture-and-food_en. [2] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2979. [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/mex_25_2809. [4] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_207.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2025-08-18 “E-003251/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 1 can be activated by Greece, within 12 weeks of the first damage, if the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds in Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002. It may cover a part of the costs for public authorities’ emergency and recovery operations 2 . In 2021-2027, Cohesion Policy funds support Greece with EUR 344.5 million to address fire risk prevention and management actions 3 . Under the RESTORE Regulation 4 , Greece can also reprogramme part of its Cohesion Policy allocation for reconstruction, repair, and measures mitigating the socio-economic impact 5 . Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan 6 invests in reforestation 7 and fire-prevention to restore ecosystems, protect biodiversity and regulate carbon emissions. The EU Mission on Adaptation supports local and regional authorities 8 to achieve climate resilience. The NATALIE 9 project co-designs nature-based solutions against wildfire and flood risks. The LIFE-IP AdaptInGR 10 initiative and its Greek Climate Adaptation Hub advance national and regional strategies. Horizon 2020 11 supports forest fire risk management through projects like FIRELOGUE 12 , FIRE-RES 13 , SILVANUS 14 , TREEADS 15 , and FirEUrisk 16 . The Commission supports Member States to become more climate resilient. In 2026, it will 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2002/2012/oj/eng; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012. 2 This means, for example, the recovery of essential infrastructure, provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations, and protection of the cultural heritage. 3 ‘Civil protection’ and ’Environment and Climate change’ programmes. 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/3236 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1057 and (EU) 2021/1058 as regards Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction (RESTORE). 5 Member States hit by natural disasters between 1 January 2024 and 31 December 2025 can use this reprogramming option. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en (Measure 16849). 7 A total area of 98 600 hectares of degraded forest ecosystems should be upgraded by 2026. 8 21 regional and local authorities in Greece committed to building climate resilience on the ground by adhering to the Mission. 9 https://www.natalieproject.eu/case-studies/ds1-lelantine-plain-gr. 10 https://adaptivegreecehub.gr/en/. 11 Horizon 2020 projects include Greek partners contributing to innovative solutions for fire prevention and response. 12 https://firelogue.eu/. 13 https://fire-res.eu/. 14 https://silvanus-project.eu/. 15 https://treeads-project.eu/. 16 https://fireurisk.eu/.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-08-04 “E-003173/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and has called on Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good-neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 1 . The EU has noted the recent improvements in relations between Greece and Türkiye in the expectation that de-escalation will be sustainable 2 . To this respect, Greece and Türkiye have activated multiple work strands. The EU has also made clear that Türkiye must respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all Member States, as well as all their sovereign rights in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 3 . Unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, to international agreements and to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nation Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye 4 . In the same context, the EU remains determined to use, if need be, the instruments and options at its disposal to defend its interests and those of Member States. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 4 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/16679fa1-cb73-4481-bc02e3620b8c6dd3_en?filename=Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Council%20%20State%20of%20play%20of%20EUTurkiye%20political%2C%20economic%20and%20trade%20relations.pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-06-23 “E-002509/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU fully supports a comprehensive settlement in accordance with all United Nations Security Council resolutions and the principles on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. In this regard, the EU attaches particular importance to the resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-Türkiye cooperation, as per the European Council conclusions of April 2024 1 . Additionally, the EU has clearly stressed in the 2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy that Türkiye is expected to unequivocally commit to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes 2 . As also outlined in the November 2023 Joint Communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations, this remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye 3 . In its December 2024 conclusions, the Council noted the improvements in relations between Türkiye and Greece and the de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean and stressed that both need to be sustained 4 . The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well as to upholding regional stability. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7c67aed6-e7c2-47de-b3f8b3edd26a3e26_en?filename=COM_2024_690_1_EN_ACT_part1_v11.pdf. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/16679fa1-cb73-4481-bc02e3620b8c6dd3_en?filename=Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Council%20%20State%20of%20play%20of%20EU%20Turkiye%20political%2C%20economic%20and%20trade%20relations.pdf. 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-06-17 “E-002431/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has a strategic interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and in maintaining a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. In the 2024 conclusions on enlargement 1 , the Council emphasised that Türkiye must respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all Member States, as, well as all their sovereign rights, in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Commission has also stressed in the 2024 enlargement report that the inclusion of the doctrine of ‘Blue Homeland’ (Mavi Vatan) in Turkish school textbooks is a cause for concern 2 . Unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, to international agreements and to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye. In its Council conclusions of December 2024 3 , the EU noted the improvements in relations between Greece and Türkiye and expressed its expectations that these improvements will be sustained. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/turkiye-report-2024_en. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-06-11 “E-002338/2025 E-002347/2025 E-002379/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is aware of and continues to monitor the recent developments in Egypt after the Ismailia Court of Appeals issued a ruling linked to the legal status of Saint Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai. In a meeting called by the Arab Republic of Egypt’s Foreign Ministry on 30 May 2025, the Egyptian authorities assured the Ambassadors of the Member States and the EU Head of Delegation in Cairo that the Egyptian government remains fully committed to preserving the monastery’s religious, historical and spiritual status, adding that the current status of the area around Saint Catherine’s is untouchable. They reaffirmed that the monks' access to the site will not be affected by the court ruling. The EU welcomes the commitments of the governments of Greece and Egypt to work together towards safeguarding the rights of Saint Catherine’s Monastery. While continuing to follow the situation closely, the EU will await the result of the discussions between the Egyptian and Greek authorities, insisting on the necessity to preserve the monastery’s religious, historical and spiritual status, in accordance with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Heritage Convention 1 . 1 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization World Heritage convention website, Saint Catherine’s Monastery: https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/954/.”
  EU-Egypt relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-06-03 “E-002209/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Türkiye cannot benefit from the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 loans as only Member States can do so. However, in accordance with Article 2(3), as a candidate country, Türkiye can join Member States in procuring jointly defence products. In addition, the Turkish industry can provide, as any other third country entity, up to 35% of the estimated cost of the components of the end-product. Legal entities established in the EU and controlled by another third country or by another third-country entity may participate in the common procurement if subjected to a foreign direct investment screening or if the country of establishment provides guarantees. Article 17 provides for the possibility for the Turkish defence industry to further participate in procurement actions, subject to the conclusion of a bilaterial international agreement. On 23 June 2025, Türkiye expressed its interest to discuss such an agreement with the EU. Under Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Council may authorise the opening of negotiations and, following the negotiations led by the Commission in the name of the EU, if successful, conclude the agreement. The European Parliament needs to be informed at all stages of the procedure and has to give its consent to the agreement. At any rate, no component shall be sourced from a third country that contravenes the security and defence interests of the EU and its Member States. This provision will have to be applied by contracting authorities of Member States. When it comes to the use of Article 122 of the TFEU as legal basis for SAFE, the Commission and the Council considered it as the appropriate legal basis for exceptional financial assistance to Member States, responding to crises or exceptional events. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  EU enlargement · EU competences on defence
• 2025-05-16 “E-001977/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission In the 2021–2027 period, at least EUR 14.8 billion is allocated from cohesion policy (including the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund and the Just Transition Fund) to investments supporting islands. This funding aims to support all aspects of island development, notably competitiveness, green transition, improved connectivity, housing, sustainable tourism and inclusive growth. In the ongoing transport programme for Greece, the Commission has allocated approximately EUR 144 million from the ERDF to support the development of small island port infrastructure and to improve island accessibility through the establishment of a marine public transport system. The transport equivalent is one of the measures that Member States can finance from their national budgets to mitigate the transport operating costs associated with island insularity. Under the current ERDF and Cohesion Fund Regulation (2021/1058), transport equivalent payments relate to covering the running costs of companies and do not qualify as a productive investment. Therefore, they cannot be directly supported by the cohesion policy funds, except for a limited derogation applicable to the outermost regions 1 . As discussions on the post-2027 cohesion policy framework are still ongoing, it is premature to provide definitive comments on its content or any potential provisions concerning the post-2027 period. The final outcome will depend on the results of negotiations of the colegislators. 1 As per Article 14(2)(b) of the ERDF and Cohesion Fund Regulation (2021/1058).”
  Cohesion and rural funding · Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• 2025-04-29 “E-001709/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Product Environmental Footprint Category Rules (PEFCR) for Apparel and Footwear 1 were developed through an inclusive process led by a group of representatives from the industry, including natural fibre producers, a cotton association, non-governmental organisations and national bodies, being supported by experts in the life cycle assessment. The process was transparent and in line with the Commission Recommendation 2021/2279 2 on environmental footprint (EF) methods which are recognised as the most robust and reliable scientific methods. The PEFCR covers the full product lifecycle, is material neutral and provides a standardised methodology for measuring the environmental footprint of garments and footwear. The Commission acknowledges these rules as balanced and objective. Nevertheless, looking ahead, the EF methods will be updated, and as a result the PEFCR in question, with the possibility of integrating considerations such as microplastics and biodiversity into the single score to enhance its comprehensiveness. The PEFCR is therefore a voluntary set of rules 3 . It also helps companies, regardless the type of fibres they are working with, to reduce the environmental impact of the products by indicating in which segment there is a need for intervention and a potential for improvement. To be noted that, at present, uncarded or uncombed cotton can already be classified as ‘organic’ under the rules of the Organic Production Regulation (EU) 2018/848 4 . In the context of the review of the EU Bioeconomy Strategy 5 , the Commission is working to enhance the use of natural fibres and reduce dependency from fossil fuels. 1 https://eeb.org/library/understanding-the-pefcr-for-apparel-and-footwear/. 2 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/2279 of 15 December 2021 on the use of the Environmental Footprint methods to measure and communicate the life cycle environmental performance of products and organisations, C/2021/9332, OJ L 471, 30.12.2021, p. 1–396. 3 As made clear by recital 32 of the Commission proposal (COM(2023) 166 final) on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims (Green Claims Directive), which also refers to the importance of updating PEFCR for textiles, including on microplastics release. 4 Regulation (EU) 2018/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council on organic production and labelling of organic products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, OJ L 150, 14.06.2018, p. 1. 5 Expected by the end of 2025: https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-launches-consultation-eubioeconomy-strategy-2025-03-31_en.”
  EU framework for voluntary quality and sustainability terms in food marketing
• 2025-04-25 “E-001678/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED) was suspended in 2019 1 in response to the unauthorised drilling activities by Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since then, there has been continuous de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as improvement in the relations between Türkiye and Greece. In line with the European Council conclusions of April 2024 2 and the decision by the Council in December 2024 3 , the HLED with Türkiye was reinstated accordingly. During the HLED on 3 April 2025, the Commission made it clear that EU-Türkiye relations should be guided by values, such as the respect of the rule of law, democracy, media freedom and human rights, which also play a key role in sustaining economic confidence and facilitating the business environment 4 . The Commission passed a very firm message that the recent negative developments in the area of the rule of law and the respect of fundamental rights in Türkiye may negatively affect the implementation of the Joint Communication from November 2023 5 and the ‘positive agenda’ with Türkiye. Since then, the Commission has taken further steps to strengthen this message. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41183/st11260-en19.pdf. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_969. 5 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/202311/Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Council%20%20State%20of%20play%20of%20EUTurkiye%20political%2C%20economic%20and%20trade%20relations.pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Trade relations with Turkey
• 2025-02-12 “E-000659/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission received an application for the registration of the name ‘Κρήτη / Kriti’ as protected designation of origin (PGI) on 28 July 2021. Each new application for registration is subject to examination by the Commission as foreseen in the applicable legislation, in this case Regulation (EU) 1151/2012 1 . The process has no impact on the capacity of producers to continue marketing their product. In addition, Member States have the possibility to grant transitional national protection to a name while the registration is pending at Union level. The examination at Union level involves exchanges between the Commission and the competent authorities in Greece so that the application meets the necessary legal requirements and is ready for publication for opposition. The Commission operates under the legally prescribed deadlines, and the competent authorities of the Member State submit a revised application according to their own timeline as the Commission has no legal means to impose an expedited process. If the examination is successfully concluded, the Commission will publish the name ‘Κρήτη / Kriti’ for opposition in the Official Journal of the European Union. If no opposition is received within three months from the publication, the Commission will proceed with registration of the name. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/1151/oj/eng”
  EU framework for voluntary quality and sustainability terms in food marketing
• 2025-02-03 “E-000454/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Great Sea Interconnector (formerly known as ‘EuroAsia Interconnector’) is recognised as a project of common interest (PCI) of the EU in the field of energy, notably under the fifth EU list of projects of common and mutual interest adopted in 2021 1 . The project has been received a EUR 657 million EU grant under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and has also been awarded a EUR 100 million grant from the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility 2 . The EU has repeatedly expressed its expectation by Türkiye to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean 3 . In particular, the Commission has underlined in the 2024 enlargement report on Türkiye 4 that, as stemming from obligations under the Negotiating Framework, Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes including through the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is essential to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye 5 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R0564&qid=1663087079030 2 https://commission.europa.eu/news/commission-participates-launch-euroasia-electricity-interconnector-202210-14_en 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 4 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8010c4db-6ef8-4c85-aa06814408921c89_en?filename=T%C3%BCrkiye%20Report%202024.pdf 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6157”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-01-27 “E-000338/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has stated repeatedly its deep concern about such statements, expressing its expectation by Türkiye to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean 1 . In particular, the Commission has underlined in the 2024 enlargement report on Türkiye that, as stemming from obligations under the Negotiating Framework, Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 2 . This is essential to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye 3 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8010c4db-6ef8-4c85-aa06814408921c89_en?filename=T%C3%BCrkiye%20Report%202024.pdf 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6157”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-01-23 “E-000305/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission reiterates the importance of the Prespa Agreement between North Macedonia and Greece, which is binding under international law and sets an example of reconciliation for the Western Balkans and beyond. As recalled in the December 2024 Council Conclusions and in the 2024 Commission enlargement package on North Macedonia, the Prespa Agreement needs to be implemented in good faith by all parties and tangible results need to be achieved 1 . Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process. The Commission regrets statements and actions from political leaders contesting the Prespa Agreement. The Commission continues to actively address the matter with the authorities of North Macedonia. All parties have to date publicly confirmed their commitment to abide by the Agreement. The Commission will continue to call for full adherence to the implementation of such bilateral agreements. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf; SWD(2024) 693 final”
  EU enlargement · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-01-09 “E-000056/2025 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) reflects in large parts customary international law and sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the ocean and seas must be carried out. In accordance with the Convention, it is for each coastal State to establish and delimitate its maritime zones including with other States in case of adjacent waters. This also applies to Member States, which are competent to establish and delimit their maritime zones. The delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones among the States concerned should be addressed through dialogue and negotiations in good faith, in accordance with international law, including as reflected in UNCLOS, and any dispute settled peacefully, including through the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must respect the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all Member States. While the delimitation of the maritime zones is a matter falling under the competence of the Member States, in case of unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international law by a third country or countries, the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal, including in accordance with Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 , in order to defend its interests and those of the Member States. Since 2019, the EU has in place a regime of restrictive measures 2 in view of Türkiye’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sanctions apply to individuals or entities responsible for or involved in drilling activities not authorised by Cyprus (in its territorial sea, its exclusive economic zone or on its continental shelf). The regime has been prolonged every year since and is now valid until 30 November 2025. 1 EU restrictive measures (sanctions) are a tool of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy to defend EU values and interests, preserve peace and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law as well as strengthen international security. Decisions on sanctions are adopted by the Council by unanimity based on proposals by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (High Representative) or by a Member State. Regulations give effect to these decisions and are adopted by the Council by qualified majority on a joint proposal of the High Representative and the Commission. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41313/st13262-en19.pdf”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-12-30 “E-003088/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The European Council conclusions of 12 December 2019 1 clearly stated that the Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states. The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. In this context, the EU continues to expect Türkiye to respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all Member States and to unequivocally commit to and promote good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones should be addressed through dialogue and negotiations in good faith, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 2 , having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41768/12-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-12-06 “E-002799/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly stated, including at the highest level, that it expects Türkiye to fully respect international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good neighbourly relations in a sustainable way 1 . Türkiye needs to respect the sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all Member States, as well as all their sovereign rights. Delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones should be addressed through dialogue and negotiations in good faith, in accordance with international law, including as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and any dispute settled peacefully, including through the International Court of Justice. Unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, to international agreements and to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter, as well as abstaining from unilateral actions which run counter to EU interests, violate international law and the sovereign rights of Member States, remains an essential requirement to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye 2 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/16679fa1-cb73-4481-bc02e3620b8c6dd3_en?filename=Joint%20Communication%20to%20the%20European%20Council%20%20State%20of%20play%20of%20EUTurkiye%20political%2C%20economic%20and%20trade%20relations.pdf”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-11-14 “E-002537/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Directive (EU) 2024/1438 1 amending Council Directives 2001/110/EC relating to honey, introduced mandatory origin labelling for honey blends and new provisions on traceability and authenticity. In particular, the Commission is entrusted with the task of adopting, by 14 June 2028, implementing acts laying down the methods of analysis to detect adulterated honey. Technical work is in progress to that end. Through an amendment to Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2292 2 , EU import requirements were reinforced with an authenticity requirement for exporting countries and the obligation to import honey only from listed establishments. The EU provides financial support to apiculture under the Common Agriculture Policy Strategic Plans implemented by Member States. Beekeepers can benefit from various support measures, in particular apiculture support with an annual EU budget of EUR 60 million. This is at least doubled with national co-financing to support interventions such as training and advisory services, investments to improve production, combat beehive invaders and diseases, prevent damage caused by adverse climate, research actions, laboratory analysis and promotion and marketing actions. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32024L1438 2 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2652 of 15 September 2023 amending and correcting Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/2292 with regard to requirements for the entry into the Union of honey, meat, highly refined products, gelatine capsules, fishery products and requirements for private attestation and amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/630 as regards private attestation requirements for composite products exempted from official controls at border control posts: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202302652”
  EU policy on country of origin food labelling · Agricultural funding
• 2024-11-11 “E-002489/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Since 2023, market management and exceptional measures providing for emergency support adopted under Articles 219-221 of the Common Market Organisation (CMO) 1 are financed through the agricultural reserve. This implies that the funds are distributed in such a manner that the reserve can cover different crises occurring in the course of the whole year, including natural disasters. The criteria used are presented to delegates and experts participating at the committee or expert group meetings leading to the adoption of the Commission regulations. They take into account the respective weight of beneficiary Member States in the Union’s agricultural sector and other elements relevant for the crises concerned, such as the damage caused, in particular by natural disasters, and the degree of severity. Extreme weather events will increasingly affect EU agriculture. Alleviating farmers’ vulnerability requires a resilient, competitive and sustainable farm sector capable to absorb the shocks. Crisis response tools as the emergency support from the agricultural reserve can address catastrophic events in the short term, but should not replace risk prevention, nor discourage farmers to insuring themselves or switching to more resilient farming practices. Policy coherence between crisis response and risk management tools should be promoted, including in the future Common Agricultural Policy. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1308/oj”
  Agricultural funding
• 2024-10-30 “E-002349/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission has deplored the invitation to the so-called ‘president’ of the Turkish Cypriot entity, the so-called, internationally not recognised, ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’), to attend the Extraordinary Summit of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) in Shusha on 6 July 2024 1 . The presence of the so-called ‘TRNC’ at the OTS summit runs counter to the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter. The EU has actively expressed its preoccupations to the members of the OTS at all levels and has rejected the attempts by the OTS to legitimise the so-called ‘TRNC’ as an observer in the OTS. This decision, pending ratification by the OTS members, is regrettable and is contradicting the fact that several OTS members have expressed strong support to the principle of territorial integrity and the UN Charter. The EU’s principled decision on this matter was again reiterated on the occasion of the OTS summit held on 6 November 2024 in Bishkek 2 . The EU recognises only the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions 3 . The EU expects the same from its partners. This message has been clearly conveyed to the Azerbaijani authorities. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ots-statement-high-representative-participation-prime-ministerorb%C3%A1n-informal-summit-organisation_en 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/cyprus-statement-spokesperson-observer-status-turkish-cypriot-secessionistentity-organisation_en and https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ots-statement-hrvp-josep-borrell-attemptslegitimise-turkish-cypriot-secessionist-entity_en 3 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/58970?ln=en&v=pdf, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/67600?ln=en&v=pdf”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU-Azerbaijan relations
• 2024-10-28 “E-002276/204 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen On behalf of the Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 aims to address illegal and harmful activities online. The DSA does not define which content is illegal, but it defers to EU or national laws for that purpose. The DSA imposes on online platforms the obligation to have in place effective systems to precisely limit arbitrary content moderation decisions, while Very Large Online Platforms, such as Meta’s Facebook are obliged to assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from the design and functioning of their service, including in relation to the exercise of freedom of expression online. The measures put in place must be reasonable, taking into account the impact that they may have on fundamental rights. However, the Commission does not have the competence to intervene in individual content moderation decisions. Under the DSA, platforms can participate in codes of conduct. Adherence to and compliance with code commitments may constitute risk mitigation measures. Currently, the Code of Practice on Disinformation 2 and the Code of Conduct on Countering Hate Speech Online 3 are being assessed. The Commission has two investigations pending in relation to Meta’s services 4 . In relation to one of those pending cases, on 30 April 2024, the Commission opened formal proceedings against Facebook and Instagram to assess whether Meta may have breached the DSA 5 . The suspected infringements cover, among other areas, Meta’s policies in relation to disinformation campaigns. If the investigations confirm the Commission’s concerns, further steps may be taken, such as interim measures and noncompliance decisions. This may lead to the imposition of fines which may be up to 6% of the worldwide annual turnover of the platform. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022R2065 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fen/ip_24_2373”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-10-24 “E-002242/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission In case of outbreaks of Category A diseases 1 , such as sheep and goat pox (SGP), costs incurred by the Member States for emergency measures for disease control which must be implemented under Regulation (EU) 2016/429 ‘Animal Health Law’ 2 , can be co-financed under the Commission’s Single Market Programme. This includes in particular the costs related to culling or slaughtering of the animals in the affected farms (which include the compensation for their owners) and cleaning, disinfection and disinsectisation of the affected premises. Those control measures are eligible for EU co-financing of up to 30% according to Regulation (EC) No 2021/690 3 and Commission Implementing Decision C(2023) 8926 4 , Annex 3 5 . Further EU financial support for SGP surveillance in high risk areas is available through two co-financed programmes, the Transboundary Animal Diseases and the Trans-boundary High Risk Area Coordinated Epidemio-surveillance Programme. In addition, in line with Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 6 , Greece may provide support for investments in preventive actions and restoration of agricultural potential, through their Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plan 2023-2027 7 or by allocating funds to enhance the biosecurity of livestock through their CAP Strategic Plan 8 . SGP control measures at EU level are laid down in Regulations (EU) 2016/429 and (EU) 2020/687 9 . Additional measures for SGP in Greece are laid down in Commission Implementing Decision 2024/2207 10 . Imports of sheep from Türkiye are not possible as Türkiye is not listed in annex II to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/404 11 . Furthermore, SGP is present in Türkiye and outbreaks have been reported for many years now, mostly in the Anatolia region. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2018/1882/oj 2 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/690/oj 4 C(2023) 8926 final, Commission Implementing Decision of 21.12.2023 on the financing of the Programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European Statistics and the adoption of the work programme for 2024-2027 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6150e32-3fa5-4276-923ba36faf4fec1e_en?filename=C_2023_8926_F1_COMMISSION_IMPLEMENTING_DECISION_EN_V3_P1_311 9489.PDF 5 Annex 3 to C(2023) 8926 final https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/c69d5f53-6966-420f-86287ff84bf91646_en?filename=C_2023_8926_F1_ANNEX_EN_V2_P1_3132789.PDF 6 Article 73 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R2115#:~:text=Regulation%20%28EU%29%202021%2F2115%20of% 20the%20European%20Parliament%20and,Regulations%20%28EU%29%20No%201305%2F2013%20and%20 %28EU%29%20No%201307%2F2013 7 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/6i-grapti-diadikasia-epitropis-parakolouthisis-ss-kap/ 8 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/ 9 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj 10 http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2024/2207/oj 11 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0404&qid=1732203032147”
  Agricultural funding · Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
• 2024-10-22 “E-002211/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategic Plan Regulation 1 already includes a number of interventions that may help farmers to perform preventive actions, especially to prevent crises and build on medium and long-term resilience. For mitigating short-term impacts, the available tools include direct payments to support farmers’ incomes, risk management tools helping farmers managing production risks due to adverse events, including severe drought, sectoral interventions supporting replanting or restocking, and investments in the restoration of production potential. Under the CAP Strategic Plan 2023-2027 2 , Greece envisages also support for investments to restore agricultural and forestry potential following natural disasters, adverse climatic or catastrophic events. On 19 December 2024 3 , the co-legislators adopted the Commission proposal to amend Regulation (EU) 2020/2220 4 to allow Member States to support with liquidity beneficiaries who were affected by a destruction of at least 30% of the relevant production potential. It is up to the Member States to decide if they will use this possibility. If justified, the Commission can also use resources from the agricultural reserve to provide some support. Greek authorities may also support farmers affected by adverse climatic conditions in line with EU State aid rules (without the need for prior notification to the Commission if based on provisions of the Agricultural Block Exemption Regulation 5 or, with prior notification, under the Agricultural Guidelines 6 ). Limited support can also be granted under the Agricultural de minimis aid Regulation 7 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AL%3A2021%3A435%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2021.435.01.0001.01.EN G 2 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/ 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R3242 4 OJ L, 2020/2220, 28.12.2020. 5 OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 1–81: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02022R2472-20231213 6 OJ C 485, 21.12.2022, p. 1–90: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:02022XC1221(01)-20240305 7 Regulation 1408/2013. OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 9–17 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R1408) amended by Regulation 2024/3118. OJ L, 2024/3118, 13.12.2024 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403118).”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · Agricultural funding
• 2024-09-30 “E-001865/2024 Answer given by Mr Wojciechowski on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) supports farmers, including small ones, to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) tools by providing financial support for the adoption of precision farming, skills development and access to advice, including through a Farm Sustainability Tool for nutrients management. It supports broadband expansion to rural areas ensuring the necessary infrastructure for the use of digital technologies. Horizon Europe 1 and Horizon 2020 research projects 2 also empower small farms to use AI and robotics. GenAI4EU initiative 3 promotes generative AI in sectors like agrifood, while the DIGITAL Europe Programme supports the creation of the Common European Agricultural Data Space 4 . The Commission’s foresight report 5 , provides a vision framework for a fair digital transition for EU farmers and rural communities underlining the role of the public sector to this regard. In the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture 6 , EU agri-food stakeholders recognise digitalisation as an opportunity for the transition to more sustainable agri-food systems. 2. Support under CAP Strategic Plans 7 focuses strongly on digitalisation acknowledging its benefits to strengthen environmental protection and climate action. In the Plans, Member States support precision farming under eco-schemes and agri-environment-climate commitments to reach these objectives. Several Horizon Europe research projects 8,9 further explore the benefits of these technologies in addressing the climate crisis. Remote sensing, machine learning and AI can also reduce the costs of certifying climate and environmental benefits of farming practices under the EU Regulation on Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming 10 . 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 2 Farmtopia (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101083541), Guardians (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101084468), Phito (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101084332), ROMI (https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/773875). 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_383 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/work-programmes-digital 5 https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC134571 6 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/agriculture-andgreen-deal/strategic-dialogue-future-eu-agriculture_en 7 Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj 8 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101086461/results 9 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101084468 10 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-removals-and-carbon-farming_en”
  Digital and precision farming
• 2024-09-13 “E-001702/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. In her political guidelines for the next Commission 2024-2029 1 , the Commission President highlighted the need to step up the EU’s action on climate resilience including water resilience in agriculture, as also recommended in the report on the strategic dialogue on the future of agriculture 2 . In the first 100 days the next College will present a ‘Vision for Agriculture and Food’ looking at how to ensure the long-term competitiveness and sustainability of the farming sector including also Guidance on Climate Resilient Landscapes to help farmers retain more rainwater in soils. The Commission also supports research and innovation on water resilience 3 through different Horizon Europe 4 programmes, for instance on improved irrigation techniques. 2. Building resilience of the agricultural sector, including water resilience, will clearly require strong attention under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 5 post 2027. As outlined in the mission letter to the Commissioner-designate for Agriculture and Food 6 , appropriate instruments for enhancing climate risk preparedness and crisis management will be developed. Certain tools are available under the current CAP to support sustainable resource use, efficient water management and climate adaptation, as well as risk and crisis management tools and should be used to their full potential. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/towards-new-commission-2024-2029/presidentelect-ursula-von-der-leyen_en 2 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/cap-overview/main-initiatives-strategic-dialoguefuture-eu-agriculture_en 3 Of particular relevance are the partnerships ‘Water Security for the Planet’ (https://www.water4allpartnership.eu/), the Partnership on Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA), https://primamed.org/) together with the Missions ‘Restore our Ocean and Waters by 2030’ (https://research-andinnovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe/eumissions-horizon-europe/restore-our-ocean-and-waters_en), ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’ (https://researchand-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizoneurope/eu-missions-horizon-europe/adaptation-climate-change_en). and ‘A Soil Deal for Europe’ (https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/soil-deal-europe_en#what-are-eu-missions). 4 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 5 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy_en 6 https://commission.europa.eu/document/2c64e540-c07a-4376-a1da-368d289f4afe_en”
  GMOs
• 2024-08-13 “E-001508/2024 Answer given by Mr Lenarčič on behalf of the European Commission The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) can be activated at the request of Greece if the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 1 . The EUSF may cover part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities. The region of Attica can also benefit from the regional programme ‘Attica 2021-2027’ 2 , which allocated EUR 8.2 million for fire risk prevention and management actions. Furthermore, the region can benefit from funding through two thematic programmes of the 2021-2027 period, namely the ‘Civil protection’ programme 3 and the ‘Environment and climate change’ programme 4 . The budget for fire risk prevention and management under these programmes amounts to EUR 327.7 million and EUR 57.1 million respectively. Under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 5 , the production of 12 firefighting planes to make up the permanent rescEU fleet was launched in August 2024, following governmentto-government agreements signed by a number of Member States with the Canadian Commercial Corporation. The planes will be financed by the Commission and will become the backbone of the EU's crisis response capabilities to tackle wildfires. The Commission also works with national civil protection authorities to support, complement, and coordinate their efforts in wildfire risk management. This includes peer reviews 6 to assess a country’s wildfire risk management system. Wildfire prevention is also supported through UCPM grants 7 under the Technical assistance for disaster risk management 8 and the Knowledge for action in prevention and preparedness 9 . In May 2024, the Commission also published good practices in wildfire risk awareness and communication 10 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32002R2012 2 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/in-your-country/programmes/2021-2027/el/2021el16ffpr017_en 3 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/in-your-country/programmes/2021-2027/el/2021el16rfpr001_en 4 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/in-your-country/programmes/2021-2027/el/2021el16ffpr003_en 5 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en 6 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/disaster-prevention-and-risk-management/ucpm-peerreview-programme 7 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/projects/fireprime and https://civil-protectionknowledge-network.europa.eu/projects/b-fireprep 8 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/UCPM-Track-1-grants 9 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/knowledge-action-prevention-preparedness 10 https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/news/new-good-practice-guide-wildfire-risk-awarenessandcommunication#:~:text=Wildfires.%20The%20new%20publication%20underscores%20the%20urgency%20to% 20strengthen%20wildfire”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-08-06 “E-001482/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission took note that the repeat municipal election took place in Himara on 4 August 2024. Holding transparent, inclusive and credible elections in line with international standards is a key requirement for any country aspiring to join the EU. The Commission also took note that the Central Election Commission’s Sanctions and Complaints Committee ruled to reject the request to invalidate the results of the Himara byelections, since no discrepancy was identified between the electoral material and the number of people who turned up at the voting centres. The EU will continue to follow electoral developments in Albania and encourage Albanian authorities to address all outstanding recommendations from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and from the Venice Commission. The Commission attaches the highest importance to the respect of rule of law and fundamental rights, including the protection of property rights in Albania. Through the stabilisation and association process and the enlargement process, the Commission closely follows the consolidation of property rights in Albania and assesses progress through its annual report 1 . 1 SWD(2024) 690 final, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a8eec3f9-b2ec-4cb1-87489058854dbc68_en?filename=Albania%20Report%202024.pdf”
  EU enlargement · EU-Albania relations
• 2024-07-24 “E-001411/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia, signed in June 2018, resolved a long state dispute between the two countries and aimed at strengthening cooperation. The Commission reiterates the importance of the Prespa Agreement, which is binding under international law and sets an example of reconciliation for the Western Balkans and beyond. The Commission regrets statements and actions in violation of the Prespa Agreement, notably statements that were made by the authorities of North Macedonia not using the constitutional name of the country. As recalled in the December 2023 Council conclusions 1 and in the 2023 Commission enlargement package on North Macedonia 2 , the Prespa Agreement needs to be implemented in good faith by all parties. All parties have to date publicly confirmed their commitment to abide by the agreement. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process. The Commission recalls the importance of full respect for existing, legally binding agreements, including the Prespa Agreement with Greece. The Commission will continue to call for adherence to such bilateral agreements. The EU is actively addressing the matter with the authorities of North Macedonia 3 . 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16707-2023-INIT/en/pdf 2 SWD(2023) 693 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=SWD:2023:693:FIN 3 European External Action Service, Statement by the spokesperson on the use of the constitutional name by the new President in her address at the swearing in ceremony, 12 May 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/northmacedonia-statement-spokesperson-use-constitutional-name-new-president-her-address-swearing_en”
  EU enlargement
• 2024-07-22 “E-001394/2024 Answer given by Ms Ferreira on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations (UN) framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded and the EU acquis. Türkiye is expected to actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework 1 . The EU has repeatedly called for the speedy resumption of negotiations and expressed its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal. The EU does not recognise the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ and is bound by UN Security Council resolution 541 2 . The EU remains fully committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States and to ensuring that the UN Security Council resolutions and generally recognised principles and norms of international law, particularly with respect to the sovereignty, independence and integrity of states, are fully upheld. The Commission’s key instrument to support a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue is the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community 3 . The overarching objective of the programme, since its creation in 2006, is to facilitate Cyprus’ reunification. Since 2006, the EU has allocated over EUR 700 million to the programme. Reunification can be also fostered through increased trade across the Green Line, as it not only contributes to economic integration but also builds trust. The Commission is responsible for the implementation of the Green Line Regulation 4 . While this trade stood at around EUR 4 to 5 million per year until 2019, it reached a record of EUR 16 million in 2023. 1 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/eb90aefd-897b-43e9-8373bf59c239217f_en?filename=SWD_2023_696%20T%C3%BCrkiye%20report.pdf 2 UN Security Council resolutions on Northern Cyprus (UNSC Resolution No 541 of 18 November 1983 and UNSC Resolution No 550 of 11 May 1984). 3 https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/support-turkish-cypriotcommunity/aid-programme-turkish-cypriot-community_en 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1481620173103&uri=CELEX:02004R0866-20150831”
  EU-Turkey relations
• “My dear colleagues, recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean remind us of a simple truth. When a member state is under threat, then Europe is under threat. The security of Cyprus is a European matter. The. Assistance by European member States in the area such as Greece and France, show that European solidarity reflects the very essence of article 42, paragraph seven of the treaty of the European Union. For solidarity in areas of increased tension, Europe needs to provide real means to protect the state's people and shipping. So the centers for European defence are necessary. This is the foundation of a Europe that can defend itself. Thank you for your attention.”
  EU competences on defence
• “And always in the framework of the United Nations. Europe cannot be an observer in this new reality. Europe has to be the star. Finally, in the European Union, we need now already a serious institutional discussion concerning whether the whole institution. The European institutions are protected sufficiently. For artificial intelligence, the. The governance of artificial intelligence may be. Tries. The efficiency of the treaties of the European Union. Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues, in the era of artificial intelligence, democracy and the elections are not only threatened by the lie and populism. They are also threatened by targeted, algorithmically supported misinformation. For example, deepfakes. They're not just a side phenomenon is a weapon trying to manipulate the public opinion, and it tries to destabilize the democratic procedure. That's why we need clear rules, operational readiness, and technological tools in order to be able to spot these problems like watermarking, i.e., to be able to have traceability, to have a stamp of the contents produced by artificial intelligence as defined in the AI act. This is an important first step of progress. Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues, in the era of artificial intelligence, democracy cannot be without being remain without being strengthened. Europe has to move ahead with rules, with institutions, with responsibility, with transparency. Thank you very much for your attention.”
  Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• “Thank you. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues, artificial intelligence doesn't concern only technology. It concerns the way in which we govern. We legislate and we get informed. And finally, the way in which the same democracy itself works in the European Union. Our report is based on four basic axes. First of all, artificial intelligence should remain aligned with the fundamental values of the European Union with article two of the treaty as a compass. The article that defines the fundamental values of the European Union. Artificial intelligence should serve the human being and not to replace the human being. It should support and strengthen The democracy. And because in democracy the decision should be based on the popular vote and will. And not to be replaced by algorithms. Artificial intelligence has to work with transparency with respect to the rule of law and to the fundamental rights. Second, we we propose to increase the parliamentary control and accountability. We propose to create a European observatory of artificial intelligence in the European Parliament, not in order to regulate or to oversee, but to support the parliamentary work. The institutional memory and the democratic control without any economic cost for the European taxpayer. Thirdly, concerning the artificial intelligence, we need a wider global framework of rules. We need an international convention for artificial intelligence. As we had in the past. At the end of the decade of the 60s with International Convention for Nuclear Arms.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “Thank you very much. The Common Agricultural Policy is living history. It's part of European identity. It's one of the keystones of European integration. It's a question of food security for Europe. The Common Agricultural Policy cannot simply be a more national policy. It has to be interoperable. It has to allow rural areas to survive. Common. The Common Agricultural Policy should not be weakened and should not be combined with other funds. We should not forget the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy. We have to strengthen this policy. Cut red tape and make sure that farmers have what they need. That really is the future for the Common Agricultural Policy from 2029 2034. The proposals of 2024 are from the Commission have been adopted by Parliament.”
  Agricultural funding
• “Thank you chair. Thank you all for being here today. Dear guests, dear colleagues, we find I we face once one central political question, will Europe control its digital future or others control it for us? If we want sovereignty, we need our own AI, our own cloud, our own infrastructure. We need institutions that can act fast. We need to innovate to deploy technologies across union. That requires a governance model that works and fewer administrative burdens. Digital sovereignty must be at the heart of our discussion. Europe cannot rely on technologies built elsewhere. We cannot have 27 different systems, 27 interpretation, 27 delays. Lace. Europe will not win this race simply by regulating these leaders. As you said to the digital. Omnibus face different rules in every member state face procedure than slow them down. Cost money, block growth. If we want to compete with us and China, we need one digital market, not 27. Simplify rules. Reduce bureaucracy. Give European innovators a room to grow. We must act without delay. Europe must support its own companies if governments continue buying foreign core technologies. If we say Europe must be sovereign, then European administration must lead by example. Dear colleagues, let's be clear AI is not only about economy, it's about democracy. Elections are at the center of this. Ai can spread mis information faster than any human can correct it. It can multiply opinions, influence voters, distort public debate. Europe must protect election integrity in 2025 and beyond. We need strong transparency rules, mechanisms against deepfakes. As you said, no democracy can survive if its information become a battlefield of automated manipulation. We also must protect young people. Ai system shapes what they see, how they think, how they interact. For this reason, our political priorities are clear. Digital sovereignty. First, pass a digital omnibus. Now protect elections and democracy with strict safeguards. Support European innovators through clear rules. Build a digital Europe that acts with unity, speed and ambition. Thank you for your attention.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Thanks, chair. Dear colleagues, I would like to thank chairs for their organisation and the remarks of today's debate. Ai is increasingly affecting democratic processes, public debate and the integrity of the elections in the European Union. Ai is shaping the way information circulates, the way public opinion is formatted, and is affecting the way democracy itself operates. For this reason, AI is an institutional and constitutional issue of the European Union. For the Committee of Constitutional Affairs. The key question is, one how do we ensure that AI strengthens rather than weakness, democratic accountability, transparency and electoral integrity? The Artificial Intelligence Act is an important step for the European Union, but the rapid development of AI systems raises broader questions. Ai already affects access to information, shaping public opinions and the credibility of democratic debate with AI. New risks emerge deepfakes, both networks digital influence operations. Protected elections in the digital era is a matter of resilience. Our response must be guided by three principles. First, the governance of AI must remain full alliance with the values of the European Union in accordance to article two of the treaties of the European Union, AI must remain human centred, transparent and accountable. Second, we must strengthen parliamentary scrutiny. The European Parliament has a specific responsibility to ensure democratic accountability and institutional balance. In accordance to article ten, 13 and 14 of the treaties of the European Union. Therefore, an observatory would help the European Union and the European Parliament to understand the institutional and democratic implications of AI on fundamental rights. Finally, the governments. The governance of AI must be addressed at a global level. Ai requires stronger international cooperation. It is a systemic technology with geopolitical implications. Dear colleagues, democracy cannot function when citizens no longer knows whether what they see is real, what they hear is authentic, and whether political messages are produced by human or by algorithms. Ai can strengthen democracy, but it can also be used to manipulate it. Our task is therefore clear. In Europe, technology serves democracy. Thank you for your attention.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms