Marieke EHLERS

Policy topics Marieke EHLERS is active on

What Marieke EHLERS has said (80)

• 2026-03-20 “Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission 5.6.2026 Written question In its judgment in case Shipova [1] , the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) recalled that as EU law currently stands, a person’s status, which is relevant to the rules on changing the family name, patronymic, first name or legal gender identity of a person, is a matter which falls within the competence of the Member States. EU law does not detract from that competence. Nevertheless, in exercising that competence, each Member State must comply with EU law, in particular the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the right conferred on all EU citizens to move and reside within the territory of the Member States . In that judgment, the Court found that legislation of a Member State that does not permit, in civil registers, changes of gender data [2] of one of its nationals who has exercised the right of free movement is contrary to Article 21 TFEU and Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC [3] , in light of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Commission is committed, as guardian of the Treaties, to ensuring the correct application of EU free movement law as interpreted by the Court. [1] Judgment of 12 March 20216, K. M. H. v Obshtina Stara Zagora , C-43/24, EU:C:2026:183. [2] Data such as the sex, family name, patronymic, first name and personal identification number. [3] Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · LGBTIQ+
• 2026-03-11 “Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question 1. and 2. The general provisions on the Union’s external action in the Treaty on European Union provide that the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action [1] . The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, cooperate to that effect. This is without prejudice to the fact that, with the exception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is for the Commission to ensure the external representation of the Union [2] . 3. The Team Europe approach focuses on joining forces, delivering more effectively, increasing global impact and avoiding duplication of efforts, while respecting the division of competences under the Treaties. It aims at bringing together the European Union, its Member States — including their implementing agencies and public development banks — as well as the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. [1] Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union. [2] Article 17(1) of the Treaty on European Union.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2026-03-11 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 3.6.2026 Written question The ‘ProtectEU: Agenda to prevent and counter terrorism’ [1] is a non-legislative policy document. The terms used in this communication are analytical descriptors reflecting trends as outlined, among others, by the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation [2] , observed in Member States and practitioners’ assessments as well as research stemming from the Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation — these do not create new legal categories or offences. References to ‘anti-system ideologies’ or ‘rejection of democratic values’ concern narratives that legitimise violence or seek to replace democratic processes by violent or terrorist means. The Commission is committed to fighting anti-Muslim hatred as defined by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance Recommendation [3] . EU action is grounded in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU [4] and applicable legislation. Expressions of opinion, including criticism of religions or public policies, are protected under Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter. Intervention is justified only where conduct meets the thresholds set by law, such as incitement to violence, terrorism, hatred or discrimination, as defined in relevant EU and national legislation. Directive (EU) 2017/54 on combating terrorism [5] defines terrorist offences and offences related to terrorist activities, including the public provocation to commit a terrorist offence. [1] COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS ProtectEU: Agenda to prevent and counter terrorism, COM/2026/101 final. [2] https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU_TE-SAT_2025.pdf. [3] European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) General Policy Recommendation No 5 (revised) on preventing and combating anti-Muslim racism and discrimination : https://rm.coe.int/ecri-general-policy-recommendation-no-5-revised-on-preventing-and-comb/1680a5db32. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/541/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on Islam · Privacy & law enforcement
• 2026-02-11 “E-000592/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission firmly rejects unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations made by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in its report of 3 February 2026. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined purely by national law or other EU laws. The Commission cannot order providers of intermediary services to remove specific online content from their services. The DSA does not regulate political speech or debate. It requires providers to assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from their services to fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, and to electoral processes. Engaging with providers on how their systems and practices operate across jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Interpreting such exchanges as a means to influence political debate misrepresents the nature of regulatory dialogue. Freedom of expression is at the core of the DSA, which lays down rules ensuring that such freedom as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 2 , is effectively protected. The DSA brings unprecedented transparency on content moderation and DSA compliance by mandating online platforms to make their annual risk assessments and audits public 3 . It also requires the Commission to publish all key enforcement decisions, which is done on a dedicated website 4 . Thanks to the unparalleled standards set by the DSA for user empowerment, fundamental rights safeguards, and accountability of providers, almost 50 million decisions affecting users’ content or accounts have been reversed in just two years 5 . The Commission’s role and powers as an enforcer are laid out in the DSA itself. All enforcement decisions are subject to judicial oversight. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-brings-transparency#ecl-inpage-lsets8qr. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/two-years-digital-services-act-allows-50-million-contentmoderation-decisions-platforms-be-reversed.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-02-05 “Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission 2.6.2026 Written question Transparency [1] remains the guiding principle in the management of the EU budget. Actions under the Global Gateway strategy are funded by the external financing instruments, notably the NDICI-GE [2] [3] . The Financial Regulation [4] , notably Articles 36 and 38, requires the Commission to publish information about recipients of EU funding in direct management, including those funded by the external financing instruments. EU-funded activities are subject to EU laws and contractual obligations, including restrictive measures, exclusion rules and relevant security and procurement provisions, which are supported ex ante controls, such as eligibility checks and, where appropriate, ex post controls such verifications and audits safeguarding the EU’s financial and strategic autonomy. The strategy promotes sustainable prosperity, jobs and services rooted in democratic values, rule of law, and strong human and workers’ rights, which is to the direct benefit to the local population. The ‘360° approach’ combines public-sector expertise [5] with policy support, institutional strengthening, technology transfer, and inclusive engagement of civil society and local authorities. In implementing Global Gateway, the Commission complies with the general principles set by the Treaties, including Articles 3(5), 8 and 21 of the Treaty on European Union [6] , as well as with the rules laid down in the basic acts establishing the funding instrument. NDICI-GE contributes to the reduction and, in long term, the eradication of poverty, the promotion of the principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and the respect of human rights. The Commission’s proposal for the next external financing instrument [7] is designed to support inter alia the implementation of the Global Gateway strategy ‘from start-up to scale-up’ in a Team Europe approach. The Global Europe proposal also promotes EU engagement with partner countries on the basis of a comprehensive approach towards migration, in particular to prevent irregular migration, and forced displacement, including their root causes. The proposal includes provisions to suspend implementation of programmes with a partner country that faces serious shortcomings in readmitting its own nationals from the Member States [8] . The assessment would be based on a comprehensive approach, considering the EU’s overall relations with the country concerned as well as the principle of proportionality. Suspension decisions would not affect humanitarian assistance. [1] See also explanation of the Financial Transparency System available at https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. [2] Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument-Global Europe. [3] Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument — Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1). [4] Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1. [5] for example: Twinning, TAIEX. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. [7] Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing Global Europe, COM/2025/551 final: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0551&qid=1753799711782. [8] see Recital 59 and Article 12(3) of the proposal: see footnote 7.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-02-05 “P-000463/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act 1 (DSA) sets specific obligations for providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOPSEs), whose average monthly active recipients in the EU are equal to or higher than 45 million. This is because VLOPs and VLOSEs may cause societal risks different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms. Providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs are notably required to assess and mitigate systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning and use of their services, such as risks associated with the dissemination of illegal content through their services. Non-consensual sexually explicit deepfakes of women and minors enabled by Grok on the VLOP X, as corroborated by independent public reports, are unacceptable and are far beyond comparison with what was enabled by software that are several decades old. On 26 January 2026, the Commission initiated new proceedings concerning X, which will determine whether the provider of X properly assessed and mitigated risks associated with the deployment of Grok’s functionalities into the X service in the EU. This includes assessing and mitigating risks related to the dissemination of illegal content in the EU, such as manipulated sexually explicit images, including content that may amount to child sexual abuse material. The Commission is committed to enforcing the DSA fairly and proportionately to ensure a safe and open online environment for all citizens in the EU. The Commission applies the DSA’s criteria objectively and uniformly to all designated VLOPs and VLOSEs, regardless of their origin. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2026-01-09 “E-000053/2026 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission supports stakeholder participation in policy discussions in line with the Treaties and the applicable programme regulations and financial rules. The policy objectives, scope and eligibility conditions of this support is defined in the sectoral basic acts adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. For example, Article 11 of the Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) regulation 1 , as adopted by the co-legislator, specifically indicates that ‘operating grants shall support the functioning of non-profit making entities which are involved in the development, implementation and enforcement of Union legislation and policy’. The Commission observes full impartiality and does not require beneficiaries to undertake advocacy activities, nor does it instruct them to support specific positions 2 . Funding is awarded through transparent and competitive open calls for proposals. Applicants submit proposals describing their work programmes or activities in the areas indicated in the call. The work programme may mention, among others, applicant’s advocacy activities. Any opinions expressed and activities carried out remain the sole responsibility of the nongovernmental organisations. Civil society entities remain fully autonomous and free to establish their own views on all policy matters. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783. 2 The Commission guidance on funding for activities (https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-funding-dev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eulaw_en.pdf) clarifies that the EU does not require or mandate, as a condition for EU funding, carrying out specifically detailed activities directed at EU institutions or their members.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · EU engagement with civil society · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-11-26 “E-004702/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission On 18 November 2025, the Commission held the EU Enlargement Forum as a flagship initiative to elevate the conversation on EU enlargement as a shared political, societal, and generational project. After discussions on the geopolitical imperative for enlargement and the perspective of Member States, Panel III focused on EU enlargement from the perspective of citizens. It brought together voices from civil society to reflect on how the EU is perceived beyond its borders and how those perceptions are shaped by experience, aspiration, and identity. It also provided a platform for citizens in candidate countries to discuss their perceptions of the EU and their countries’ accession prospects, and how mutual understanding can be improved, noting that opinion polls in Member States and candidate countries show that citizens do not feel sufficiently informed about enlargement. The final panel of the Forum ‘Getting to YES!’ reaffirmed the current momentum for enlargement, discussed shared priorities and candidate countries’ ambitions to conclude accession negotiations and join the EU and the importance of public support as one of the necessary elements for EU enlargement. Applying for EU membership is a sovereign decision that only the candidate can take; in doing so, candidate countries and potential candidates have voluntarily chosen an EU path aligning with the EU’s priorities, policies and shared values. EU support for civil society in candidate countries and potential candidates as well as in the Eastern Neighbourhood is an explicit objective of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Regulation 1 , with a view to fostering an enabling environment that allows for a plurality of views to be heard, which is in turn vital for an open democratic debate. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III).”
  EU enlargement · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-11-26 “E-004703/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not collect data on, nor estimate, the costs incurred by online platforms when reinstating content. Under the Digital Services Act (DSA), platform providers remain fully responsible for their content moderation decisions and for the organisational choices and costs linked to compliance with EU law. The DSA’s trusted flagger mechanism is expressly designed to improve the accuracy and quality of notices submitted to platforms. Trusted flaggers are designated by national Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) only where they demonstrate proven expertise, independence, diligence, accuracy and objectivity in identifying illegal content, in accordance with Article 22. Trusted flaggers do not take moderation decisions. Their notices must be treated with priority, but the assessment and final decision remain with the platform, which must apply its own safeguards and respect its own legal obligations. This reflects the DSA’s core principle that platforms retain accountability for moderation outcomes. Article 22 provides clear incentive and control mechanisms. Trusted flaggers are subject to ongoing monitoring by DSCs and transparency obligations, including annual public reporting on the volume and outcome of their notices. In addition, Platforms must inform DSCs where a trusted flagger systematically submits insufficiently substantiated notices. Where designation conditions are no longer met, DSCs are empowered to suspend or revoke trusted flagger status. Accordingly, the DSA does not create an imbalance but establishes proportionate oversight ensuring high quality notices while preserving platform responsibility.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2025-11-22 “E-004671/2025/rev.1 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has taken note of the views expressed by Signal on the proposal for a Regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 1 . The Commission recognises that encryption and other cybersecurity measures play an important role in protecting information systems from espionage and disruption and securing communications, privacy and personal data 2 . The availability of end-to-end encrypted interpersonal communications services is therefore important, and it would be regrettable if such legitimate service providers were to cease offering services in the EU. Legal measures to combat child sexual abuse, currently under negotiation, should safeguard the fundamental rights at stake outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 3 , including by addressing need to effectively prevent and combat such crimes which violate victims’ fundamental rights, and the need to safeguard the right to respect for private and family life. The Commission has launched an Expert Group to assist the Commission to elaborate a Technology Roadmap on Encryption 4 . The group is asked to identify technical options to address encryption challenges in the context of criminal investigations and assess their suitability while ensuring observance of fundamental rights, including privacy and data protection, and without undermining cybersecurity. When assessing the impact of such technologies on cybersecurity, the roadmap should examine among other elements risks posed by sophisticated threat actors, also including nation state actors. Where no tools currently exist, the roadmap should provide recommendations on their development and on how to both ensure compatibility with the EU legal framework and guarantee cybersecurity. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. COM/2022/209 final. 2 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Roadmap for lawful and effective access to data for law enforcement. COM(2025) 349 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0349. 3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expertgroups/consult?lang=en&groupID=4005.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• 2025-10-29 “E-004256/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The statistics referred to by the Honourable Members do not contain information on the demographic breakdown of minors involved in crime. At EU level, Europol 1 may process such personal data in respect of persons under the age of 18 only when strictly necessary and proportionate for preventing or combating specific cases of serious and organised crime that fall within Europol’s mandate. While minors can be both perpetrators and victims, their young age makes them vulnerable to be drawn into crime, including through online means. As laid down in the ProtectEU 2 Strategy, the Commission commits itself to reducing the vulnerability of young people to recruitment into organised crime and will present an Action Plan for the protection of children against crime and a legislative proposal for modernised rules to combat organised crime in 2026. The risks of negative impact on the wellbeing of children must be mitigated, notably with the enforcement of the Digital Services Act 3 , the Victims’ Rights Directive 4 and its proposed revision 5 and the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 6 . In addition, Member States are required 7 to ensure that when children are suspected or accused of crimes, their specific needs are taken into account throughout the criminal proceedings, to foster social integration and prevent recidivism. The Commission condemns all forms of online recruitment for the purpose of violence and is working closely with Member States and online service providers in the EU Internet Forum to prevent the dissemination of violent extremist content, radicalisation and recruitment online. In addition, the Terrorist Content Online Regulation 8 provides a powerful tool for Member States to prevent the dissemination of terrorist content online. 1 Article 30 of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), OJ L 135 24.5.2016, p. 53. 2 COM/2025/148 final. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services, OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, pp. 1-102. 4 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, pp. 57–73. 5 COM (2023) 424 final. 6 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (Codified version) (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj). 7 Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings, OJ L132, 21.5.20216, pp. 1-20. 8 Regulation (EU) 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online, OJ L 172, 17.5.2021.”
  EU policy on criminal justice · Privacy & detection of online child abuse · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2025-10-29 “E-004250/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission As regards transparency, the Commission acts in accordance with the Treaties and the applicable rules adopted on their basis. Those include in particular Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 1 , and the Annex to the Rules of Procedures of the Commission 2 , which sets out detailed rules for access to documents of the Commission, on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and Article 15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. The Commission has consistently set out, including in replies to previous written questions, how the transparency framework applies to different types of documents and forms of communication. The Commission also cooperates constructively with the European Ombudsman, in line with its institutional role. In its judgment in case T-36/23 3 , the General Court found that the Commission should have provided a more detailed explanation in its decision that it does not hold the text messages requested by the applicants but did not put in question as such the Commission’s policy on registration and retention of documents. The Commission has implemented this judgment by adopting a new decision C(2025) 5429, providing a more detailed explanation, which has not been challenged. The Commission recalls that respect for the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights is a founding value of the EU and underpins all the Commission’s actions. In light of the above, the Commission considers itself in full compliance with the rule of law. 1 OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, pp. 43–48. 2 Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080 of 4 December 2024 establishing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission and amending Decision C(2000) 3614. 3 Judgment of 14 May 2025, Stevi and The New York Times v Commission, T-36/23, EU:T:2025:483.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Activities of EU Ombudsman
• 2025-10-22 “E-004166/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The EU unemployment rate is at a record low with 6.0% (September 2025), with regional disparities: over 16.5% in some Spanish and oversea regions and under 2% in some Czechia regions in 2024. Addressing labour and skills shortages demands action in several policy areas: supporting underrepresented groups’ labour market activation; skills, training and education; improving working conditions in certain sectors and occupations; enhancing fair intra-EU mobility; and attracting talent from outside the EU 1 . Cohesion policy and the Talent Booster Mechanism 2 provide support to skills, education and labour market to address demographic challenges, labour shortages and ensure social and territorial cohesion. The legislative proposal for an EU Talent Pool establishes the first online EU-wide platform facilitating international recruitment by matching job vacancies of EU employers with the profiles of jobseekers from third countries residing outside of the EU across all skills levels needed in EU-wide shortage occupations. Employment rates are available from the EU Labour Force Survey for 243 out of 244 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS2) regions 3 . The available data is not divided by public, private or subsidised sectors. The quoted item refers to the fact that 113 out of the 243 NUTS2 regions for which data is available achieved an employment rate of 78% or higher (EU 2030 employment target). 1 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/3-30102025-bp. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information-sources/publications/communications/2023/harnessing-talentin-europe-s-regions_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/lfst_r_lfe2emprtn__custom_18270107/bookmark/table?lang=en& bookmarkId=2c23a807-50ae-4b8f-b080-6bbdc08450c4&c=1759498385000.”
  Youth employment & training · EU competences on social policies
• 2025-10-22 “E-004165/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean 1 (the Pact) builds on the collective input gathered through extensive consultations to ensure genuine ownership and mutual benefit for Member States and southern Mediterranean partners. The Commission has carefully taken into account the contributions from Member States in the drafting of the Pact. In that framework, Member States have largely emphasised the need for the Pact to focus on comprehensive migration management by addressing the root causes of migration and strengthening the migration governance capacities of partner countries, while making full use of existing EU instruments and policies. In line with the external dimension of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , the Commission aims, under the third pillar of the Pact for the Mediterranean, to continue supporting a comprehensive approach to migration including through the prevention of irregular departures, the fight against smuggling and trafficking, and work on effective readmission of those with no right to stay. All this work paves the way for more legal pathways to address labour needs which are challenging EU competitiveness, notably through the first pillar. This two-fold approach ensures that mobility serves as a driver for growth, while preventing irregular migration and pursuing an effective return and readmission policy, among other aims. The Pact will be based on the principle of flexibility, which will allow for variable participation of Member States and partners in the implementation of the various initiatives, while taking into consideration their specificities. Furthermore, Member States will be involved in monitoring the implementation of initiatives. 1 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-pact-mediterranean_en. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum/implementingpact-migration-and-asylum_en.”
  Legal migration · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2025-10-22 “E-004167/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Pact for the Mediterranean 1 promotes a comprehensive, end-to-end and rights-based approach to migration and mobility, which includes pursuing an effective return and readmission policy, as well as promoting legal pathways in line with EU and national competences. When applying for visas, including for study purposes, third-country nationals go through thorough security checks. As part of the general conditions set out under Article 7 of Directive 2016/801 2 , where third-country nationals are considered to pose a threat to public security, they should not be admitted. 3 Southern Mediterranean partners already benefit from existing opportunities under the international dimension of Erasmus+, funder under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument. As an instrument for brain circulation, not migration, Erasmus+ allows students from the Southern Mediterranean region to study in the EU for a limited period (2 to 12 months) as part of their studies in their home country and students typically return to their home country to finalise their studies. No additional funding is foreseen, and current funding allows to finance around 6 000 students per year. The Commission is legally bound to ensure that organisations and individuals that do not respect EU values, including the rule of law and respect for human rights, do not receive EU financial support. The Financial Regulation 4 includes an exclusion ground under the Early Detection and Exclusion System for entities engaged in activities contrary to the EU values. Should the Commission become aware of such activities, it may take appropriate action. 1 JOIN(2025) 26 final (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0026). 2 OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, pp. 21–57 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/801/oj/eng). 3 Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. 4 OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng).”
  Governance of academic priorities within the EU · EU policy on Islam
• 2025-10-21 “P-004144/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on media reports. Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 1 establishes a mandatory and flexible solidarity mechanism that gives discretion to contributing Member States to choose between relocations, financial contributions or alternative solidarity measures. If a Member State has been identified in a decision as facing a significant migratory situation, the Member State may request a partial deduction of its pledged solidarity contributions. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202401351.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-10-02 “E-003873/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) empowers individual citizens and protects their fundamental rights – including the right to free expression – when using digital services. The DSA does not regulate content, nor can it be used as a legal basis to censor any specific viewpoint online. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; that is determined by national law that is in compliance with EU law or, exceptionally, by other EU laws. The DSA sets a regulatory standard for platform providers to respect users’ rights to free expression, and to ensure their services address the systemic circulation of illegal material – such as child sexual abuse material, or terrorist content. It mandates transparency, clear explanations for removals, and robust appeal mechanisms. It holds platform providers accountable for their claims on how they protect users. When European companies do business in other countries, they have to respect their rules. This is a globally applicable principle. Equally, the DSA and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) apply to all companies that offer their services to recipients established in the EU and these laws apply exclusively within the EU. They have no extraterritorial jurisdiction, neither in the United States nor in any other non-EU country. The Commission has repeatedly clarified these laws to the United States administration. While it remains open to dialogue, it will continue to enforce the DSA and DMA, with maximum transparency and due process with all procedural safeguards of the parties, as has been done from the start.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-10-01 “E-003804/2025 Reply The listing of a person, group or entity under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘CP 931’) has to satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 1(2) to (4) of that Common Position, which provides a definition of persons, groups and entities ‘involved in terrorist acts’ and a definition of ‘terrorist acts’ for this purpose, and which specifies the requirements related to the adoption of a decision by a national competent authority in respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned. The ‘competent authority’ means a judicial authority, or, where judicial authorities have no competence in the area covered by this paragraph, an equivalent competent authority in that area. Currently, there are 13 individuals and 22 groups and entities on the so-called ‘EU terrorist list’, which are active both within and outside the EU. The Council reviews the list at regular intervals and at least every six months. The issue of listing Antifa raised by the Honourable Members has not been discussed in the Council.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-09-24 “E-003700/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the Commission As indicated in the Action plan on integration and inclusion 2021-2027 1 and in its mid-term review, efficient integration policies should be built upon reliable evidence 2 . Improving the availability and consistency of migration-related data across Member States is essential to support evidence-based policymaking. Understanding migration motives and regions of origin can enhance the development of effective, evidence-based migration and integration policies. The migration and asylum statistics 3 collected by the Statistical Office of the EU provide harmonised EU data on immigration, asylum and residence permits broken down by factors like birth country and citizenship, helping with patterns identification and policy development. The EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) survey is primarily a general socio-economic survey, not a dedicated migrant survey. It does not specifically capture detailed migration motives and countries of origin. The sample size and methodology are tailored to provide reliable statistics on broad population groups, but are not structured to capture smaller, specific groups. This affects the ability to provide detailed breakdowns without compromising the statistical reliability and validity of the data. The Commission is exploring avenues to enhance the availability and granularity of migration-related data. For instance, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights conducts surveys focused on experiences and conditions of migrant populations in the EU, like the EU survey on immigrants and descendants of immigrants. These surveys can supplement the information provided by general surveys like EU-SILC. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0758. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0162. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/migration-asylum.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · Legal migration
• 2025-09-02 “E-003358/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The enforcement of criminal law falls within the sole competence of Member States. The Commission is therefore not in a position to comment on this point. The Commission’s policy priorities are guided by the need to address all forms of terrorism effectively, irrespective of ideology. Therefore, as announced in ProtectEU 1 , the Commission is currently working on a new EU Agenda on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. It will provide a comprehensive strategic framework to address new and emerging terrorist threats, such as the online dimension or the evolving global security landscape, and to take a stronger approach to address terrorist financing and radicalisation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0148.”
  Privacy & law enforcement · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-07-22 “E-003030/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission According to the European Border and Coast guard Agency (Frontex) 1 , between 1 January and 31 July 2025, 26 212 irregular border crossings along the Eastern Mediterranean route, including into Crete and islands in the Aegean Sea, were detected, a decrease of 16% compared to the same period in 2024. Despite the decrease, the number of irregular arrivals from Libya to Crete reached over 10 000 in the same period, more than four times the total compared to 2024. The Commission continues to monitor the situation very closely and will remain in close cooperation with the Greek authorities. The 1951 Geneva Convention is the cornerstone of the international protection system, and the EU’s asylum policy is aligned with its principles. The Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , which will enter into application in June 2026, includes several innovative and complementary measures to ensure preparedness, contingency planning and crisis response across the EU. It also addresses the cases where a Member State is confronted with a disproportionate number of arrivals. Under EU law, individuals have the right to seek asylum within the territory of a Member State. The safe third country concept allows Member States to reject applications for international protection if applicants can receive effective protection in a third country that is considered safe for them. The Commission proposal to revise the safe third country concept 3 aims to facilitate the application of this concept by providing more flexibility while maintaining strong safeguards. 1 https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-external-borders-irregular-crossings-down18-in-the-first-7-months-of-2025-ArNz2R. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final. 3 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept, COM(2025) 259 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-16 “P-002904/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Under the current rules, when Member States decide to apply the safe third country (STC) concept, Directive 2013/32 1 requires a connection between the applicant for international protection and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that third country. Member States do not systematically report disaggregated statistics on inadmissibility decisions or subsequent transfers under the STC concept, and no EU legal act currently provides for the collection and transmission of such data to Eurostat. The Commission has recently proposed amendments to the Asylum Procedure Regulation 2 that are aimed to provide Member States with greater flexibility in applying the STC concept. Under the proposal, Member States would be able to apply the STC concept where a connection exists, as well as where the applicant has transited through the safe third country, or where neither of those apply and an agreement or arrangement has been concluded with the third country concerned requiring the examination of the merits of the requests for effective protection made by the persons concerned. In parallel, the Commission has also proposed a new Regulation establishing a common system for return 3 , to ensure swifter, simpler and more effective return procedures across the EU. These initiatives aim to improve the coherence and enforceability of the EU’s asylum and return systems. 1 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 60, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/32/oj), article 38 paragraph 2 point a. 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept, COM/2025/259 final. 3 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM/2025/101 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-08 “E-002768/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act 1 (DSA) aims to contribute to a safe, predictable and trusted online environment that protects fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It does not define what type of content users may or may not post online nor what content constitutes disinformation. It also does not regulate speech. The DSA obliges providers of very large online platforms and very large online search engines to assess and mitigate systemic risks, including to civic discourse, electoral processes and public security stemming from their services while protecting fundamental rights, including freedom of expression. The DSA contains the world’s strongest safeguards of users’ rights online and protects EU users against removal of lawful content, e.g. by requiring platforms to publish online statements of reasons 2 for any content moderation decisions by platforms, internal and external complaint mechanisms for appealing content moderation decisions, allowing users to contest decisions and ensuring due process. The Code of Conduct on Disinformation has been integrated into the DSA framework from 1 July 2025 and serves as a benchmark for DSA compliance. The Code is a voluntary tool developed by its signatories. The Code is notably not geared towards content removal, but towards providing users with more context information and tools and allowing them to make informed decisions, fostering transparency and trust in online information. The Code embraces the definitions of misinformation and disinformation set out in the European Democracy Action Plan, 3 which distinguishes disinformation from misinformation based on the intent to deceive or secure economic or political gain. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://transparency.dsa.ec.europa.eu/?lang=en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0790.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-07-07 “E-002758/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Article 226(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in the course of its duties, the European Parliament may, at the request of a quarter of its component Members, set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate, without prejudice to the powers conferred by the Treaties on other institutions or bodies, alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of EU law, except where the alleged facts are being examined before a court and while the case is still subject to legal proceedings. The exception contained in the last part of this provision requires committees of inquiry to cease investigations into facts that are subject to pending court procedures. This includes situations where such facts are subject to an appeal procedure before the Court of Justice against decisions of the General Court. Indeed, while, in accordance with Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, appeals against rulings of the General Court are limited to points of law, it is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in appeal procedures to assess facts where facts had been allegedly distorted by the General Court. In addition, in case, on appeal, the Court of Justice annuls a judgement of the General Court, it either decides the case itself or sends the case back to the General Court. In both cases, the judge might, as the case may be, have to reexamine the facts, taking into account the judgement of the Court of Justice on appeal.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2025-06-13 “E-002399/2025 Reply It is not within the Council’s remit to answer questions concerning the President of the European Council, as the European Council is a separate institution. Nonetheless, please note that the Code of Conduct applicable to Charles Michel in his capacity as the former President of the European Council contains the following provision: ‘If the former President intends to engage in an occupation within eighteen months after ceasing to hold office, he/she will inform the incumbent President of the European Council in good time, as far as possible with minimum four weeks notice. The incumbent President of the European Council will examine the nature of the planned occupation and, if he/she deems it appropriate, inform the European Council. (…)’ 1 . In accordance with this Code of Conduct, Charles Michel informed President of the European Council Antonio Costa of his intention to take up a teaching position at the China Europe International Business School in China. In accordance with the said Code of Conduct, President Costa examined the nature of the planned occupation, and did not deem it appropriate to inform the European Council. 1 See the following on the European Council website: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45515/code_of_conduct_pec_en.pdf”
  EU-China relations · Trade relations with China
• 2025-06-11 “E-002360/2025 Reply It is not for the Council to comment on articles appearing in the press. The Council also has no information on the Commission having provided funding to NGOs for the purpose of taking legal action against European firms. The Council considers that the Directive provides for all safeguards to ensure full respect for fundamental rights, as set out in the Charter and the corresponding articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’).”
  Environmental crimes and justice · Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• 2025-05-21 “E-002046/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers to its replies to the European Court of Auditor’s (ECA) Special Report 11/2025, relating to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in internal policies 1 . As acknowledged by the ECA 2 , the co-legislators only agreed on the introduction of a definition of an NGO in the Financial Regulation in September 2024 3 , while the audit scope covered funding for EU internal policies for the 2021-2023 period. In the light of the 2025 recommendations of the ECA, the Commission will explore whether this recent definition of an NGO should and could be further clarified. Any clarification should be proportionate, given there is no indication that the NGO status poses a higher risk for the EU budget, compared to other types of entities. When it comes to receiving EU funding, NGOs are no different from other applicants. They are subject to fulfilling the necessary eligibility requirements and having an NGO status does not entail any preferential treatment, nor is it an eligibility criterion in itself, aside from a few very specific cases. Therefore, having or not the status of an NGO is in principle not relevant for receiving EU funding. 1 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECAReplies/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11_EN.pdf. 2 https://www.eca.europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/annualreport-performance-2021/annualreport-performance2021_en.pdf p. 162, and https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-11/SR-2025-11_EN.pdf paragraph 5. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-05-21 “E-002052/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission The study 1 on fiscal impact of migration is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre, which provides evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed therein does not imply a policy position of the Commission. It highlights that legal migrants play a key role in the EU economy and society. As Member States face labour shortages in areas like construction, engineering, healthcare and ICT, legal migrant workers are essential in filling these gaps, given the ageing and shrinking working population of the Member States 2 . The study examines the fiscal contribution of natives, intra-EU migrants and extra-EU migrants in the EU in the past and future. It notes that migration moderately impacts the economy, emphasizing the need to consider taxpayer characteristics, which can vary significantly across countries and over time 2 . The study also finds that removing obstacles to the full labour market integration of migrants can produce considerable positive fiscal benefits for hosting countries in the future. No updated version of the study is planned, as the net fiscal impact of natives vs. immigrants does not vary substantially from one year to the next 3 . The need for future updates should also be gauged against the significant data gathering work required. The study used the EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) data 4 because it is the only source giving a detailed overview and comparable statistics about benefits received and taxes paid by individuals/households in all Member States. This data makes the distinction between natives, intra-EU and extra-EU migrants. However, a more granular analysis by country of origin or migration motive is not possible as this type of data is not included in the EU-SILC data. 1 Bélanger, A., Christl, M., Conte, A., Mazza, J., Narazani, E., Projecting the net fiscal impact of immigration in the EU, EUR 30407 EN, Publications Office of the EU, Luxembourg, 2020, ISBN 978-92- 76-23423-4, doi:10.2760/582639, JRC121937. 2 Cf page 17 ‘For the OECD (2013), immigrant families in 27 OECD countries contributed on average 0.3% of GDP to national budgets between 2007 and 2009. Immigrants tend to have a less favourable net fiscal position than natives, but their net contribution is generally positive. […] The socio-economic and demographic profile of the taxpayer once again explains the national results’. and page 18 ‘The results of the static analyses discussed in this section are strongly dependent on the demographic unit of analysis (i.e. individuals or families), age structure, education and labour market performance of the different population groups, as well as the budget items and years analysed. The estimated impact is either positive or negative depending on the case considered but it is generally moderate’. 3 See Fiorio, C. V., Frattini, T., Riganti, A., & Christl, M. (2024). Migration and public finances in the EU. International Tax and Public Finance, 31(3), 635-684. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-statistics-on-income-and-living-conditions.”
  Legal migration · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-05-06 “E-001815/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission In the run-up to the formation of the College of Commissioners, the Commission Presidentelect had extensive exchanges of views with representatives of the European Parliament, including party leaders. These exchanges covered both policy priorities and organisational issues and were held with all political groups that shared the conditions outlined by the President for a stronger Union: being pro-European, pro-Ukraine and pro-rule of law. The recruitment of staff in the Commission is conducted through a transparent and meritbased process, with appointments made based on qualifications, experience and ability to contribute to the Commission's work, without regard to political group affiliations. Commission staff, including those in Cabinets of Commissioners, are selected on their professional and personal qualities, as well as their ability to adapt to the Commission's working methods. In line with the duty of loyalty, they must perform their duties solely with the interests of the Union in mind, taking no instructions from anyone external to their institution and always remaining impartial. The Appointing Authority verifies that all new staff members meet the requirements outlined in the Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment 1 , as well as the specific rules governing Cabinet composition 2 . More specifically, at the time of recruitment, the Appointing Authority examines whether the candidate has any personal interest that could impair his/her independence or cause any conflict of interest, and if necessary, implements appropriate measures. 1 Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ P 045 14.6.1962, p. 1385 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A01962R0031-20250513. 2 President’s Communication to the Commission P(2024)7 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/ef4cd545-2fa4-445c-83748dce9e10acf5_en?filename=Rules%20governing%20the%20composition%20of%20the%20Cabinets%20and%2 0SPP.PDF.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Recruitment policies in the EU
• 2025-05-06 “E-001816/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The two European Court of Auditors’ (ECA) special reports had different scopes: the 2018 report focused on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in external action, while the 2025 report focused on NGOs in internal policies. The Commission refers to its replies to the 2018 ECA Special Report 1 . The Commission accepted three out of four ECA’s recommendations and, in 2021, ECA assessed that those recommendations were fully and timely implemented 2 . The Commission did not accept one of the four recommendations and justified why its funding to NGOs was sufficiently transparent, especially given that the regulatory framework at the time did not provide for an accepted definition of NGOs at an international or European level. As acknowledged by ECA 3 , the co-legislators only agreed on the introduction of a definition of an NGO in the Financial Regulation in September 2024, while the audit scope covered ‘funding for EU internal policies for the 2021-2023 period’ 4 . In the light of ECA’s 2025 recommendations, the Commission will explore whether this recent definition of an NGO should and could be further clarified. Such clarification should not increase administrative burden for NGOs, nor should it limit access to EU funds, considering that, as acknowledged by the 2025 ECA report, only six Member States have such a definition in their national legislation. Besides, any additional clarification should be proportionate, given there is no indication that the NGO status poses a higher risk for the EU budget, compared to other types of entities. This is particularly relevant since the NGO status is generally not a prerequisite for receiving EU funding. More detailed explanations may be found in the Commission replies to the ECA’s Special Report 11/2025. 1 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_35/SR_NGO_FUNDING_EN.pdf , pp. 38-48. 2 https://www.eca.europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/annualreport-performance-2021/annualreport-performance2021_en.pdf, p. 122. 3 https://www.eca.europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/annualreport-performance-2021/annualreport-performance2021_en.pdf , p. 162 and https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-11/SR-2025-11_EN.pdf, paragraph 5. 4 https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-11/SR-2025-11_EN.pdf, annex 1, paragraph 14.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-05-03 “E-001800/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission 1. To select the participants for the European Citizens’ Panels (ECPs), the Commission employs a randomised door-to-door selection process in 150 EU locations, providing a pool of participants representative of EU diversity 1 . The Commission has successfully implemented measures to limit self-selection bias and ensure that the diversity of attitudes towards the EU found in Eurobarometer surveys are reflected 2 . To recruit participants in the Youth Policy Dialogues (YPDs), the Commission relies on multiple channels 3 , the support of different EU bodies 4 , and open calls, to minimise bias arising from a single recruitment method. In order to promote an open and inclusive environment, the Commission remains attentive to improving its practices and draws on participants’ feedback to enhance future selection efforts. 2. A Knowledge Committee, composed by external independent experts and an expert from the Commission, accompanies the Panels. The Committee enhances the integrity of the deliberative process ensuring the quality, objectivity, diversity, and comprehensibility of the information provided to participants, following the panel from the preparatory stages until the adoption of citizens’ recommendations. 3. Experts 5 come from diverse backgrounds (e.g., academia, think tanks and civil society), depending on the topic. 1 The six socio-demographic criteria considered are the following: geography, gender, age (with one third of participants being between 16 and 29 years old), level of education, occupation, and the attitude towards the EU. 2 Among the citizens who participated in the recent Panel on the New European Budget, 14.5% declared to have a negative attitude towards the EU, 33.8% marked their attitude as neutral, and 51.7% as positive; these numbers are very close to the diversity targets set for the selection of the participants (17% negative, 39% neutral, and 44% positive), which are based on the data of the Standard Eurobarometer 102 – Autumn 2024. 3 Including databases of Erasmus+, DiscoverEU and European Solidarity Corps beneficiaries, National Youth Councils. 4 Including the Commission’s Representations, the European Parliament Liaison Offices, the Eurodesk Network, EU Delegations, the European Committee of the Regions, and the European Youth Forum. 5 The full list of the Knowledge Committee members is available in the final reports of each panel, published on the Citizens’ Engagement Platform (https://citizens.ec.europa.eu/index_en).”
  EU engagement with citizens · EU engagement with youth
• 2025-04-02 “E-001351/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The mechanism under Article 25(a) of the Visa Code 1 and the ‘visa suspension mechanism’ 2 target different types of third countries. Under the Article 25(a) mechanism, the Commission assesses readmission cooperation of visa-required third countries, and it may propose to the Council to adopt specific temporary restrictions on short-stay visa processing where a third country is not cooperating sufficiently. Experience of the mechanism’s implementation indicates it is effective in enhancing readmission cooperation. The Commission is currently preparing the sixth assessment report on readmission cooperation in 2024. The fifth Commission’s report on third countries' readmission cooperation classified at Restreint UE/EU Restricted level 3 was provided to the European Parliament on its adoption date (23 July 2024) and is accessible under the European Parliament’s internal procedures for classified information access. Under the ‘visa suspension mechanism’, the Commission assesses cooperation on readmission of visa-free third countries, in particular those third countries that obtained the visa exemption following the successful completion of a visa liberalisation dialogue (Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries) and presents its assessment annually in a report 4 to the European Parliament and the Council. The visa exemption for Vanuatu was first suspended, and eventually terminated, due to the security risks deriving from the investor citizenship schemes operated by Vanuatu, and not because of problems in cooperation on readmission. 1 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). 2 Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (codification). 3 According to Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 on protecting EU classified information, access to such documents is restricted on a need-to-know basis as determined by the originator. 4 Latest report: Seventh Report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism, COM(2024) 571 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-03-14 “E-001100/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The statistical data collected by the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA) and by the statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat) have different scope and cover different time periods 1 . The data collected by eu-LISA include return alerts entered in the Schengen Information System (SIS) 2 ; Member States may refrain from entering such alerts in some cases 3 . The statistics on SIS hits only cover the cases where the person subject to a SIS return alert left the territory of the Member States through a different Member State than the one that issued the alert. Teams composed of Commission and Member States’ experts evaluate the application of the Schengen acquis by Member States in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922 4 , including in the areas of return and of the large-scale information systems supporting the application of the Schengen acquis, such as SIS. While, according to eu-LISA’s annual statistics for 2023, all Member States that participate in Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 created return alerts, some experienced delays and, in some cases, return decisions were not systematically followed by a SIS alert. As follow-up to the Schengen evaluations, the Commission is working with Member States to ensure a seamless connection between return case management systems and the SIS to avoid delays and inconsistencies. The Commission does not collect statistics on the number of cases where a Member State executes the return decision issued by another Member State. 1 Eurostat statistics cover the period between 1 January 2023 and 31 December 2023 while the eu-LISA statistics cover the period between 7 March 2023 and 31 December 2023. 2 Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1860 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 1-13. 3 Article 3(2) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1860. 4 Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922 of 9 June 2022 on the establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013, OJ L 160, 15.6.2022, p. 1-27.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-03-12 “E-001076/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Member States are responsible for decisions to admit third-country nationals, within the framework of resettlement programs. The recently adopted Union Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Framework Regulation 1 in its Article 6 sets out exhaustive grounds to refuse the admission of identified candidates, including on security grounds. Furthermore, Member States must thoroughly check all persons entering the Schengen area in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 8 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) 2 . This includes ensuring that persons do not pose a threat to public policy, public health, or internal security, in accordance with Article 6 of the SBC 3 . Regardless of any entry requirements (including security requirements) provided for under national law, Member States are required to consider potential security implications for the whole Schengen area. Member States are also required to make use of EU-level instruments such as the Schengen Information System and national databases. The EU supports Member States in their counter-terrorism efforts and provides legal and policy frameworks such as Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism 4 and the EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda 5 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1350 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a Union Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Framework, and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147; http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1350/oj. 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1–52); https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0399. 3 Ibid. 4 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA (OJ L 88, 31.3.2017, p. 6); https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/541/oj/eng. 5 Communication from the Commission: A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0795.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-03 “E-000452/2025 Reply The Council has not discussed the issue raised by the Honourable Member during the Polish Presidency. As recently highlighted by the European Council, the EU faces a new geopolitical reality and increasingly complex challenges. Current challenges, the EU’s priorities and its strategic orientations are identified in the Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 adopted by the European Council on 27 June 2024 and in recent European Council conclusions.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU political integration · EU competences on taxation
• 2025-01-27 “E-000349/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Enhancing return and readmission cooperation is a priority for the EU and its Member States. Readmission of own nationals is an established norm of customary international law. In this spirit, the Commission expects partners to cooperate on readmission, which is necessary for the effective prevention of irregular migration. The European Council has repeatedly called for determined action at all levels to facilitate, increase and speed up returns from the EU, using all relevant EU policies and tools, including diplomacy, development, trade and visas. To this end, the Commission leverages all available instruments in formulating the most effective policy mix on a case-by-case basis, making sure that the whole toolbox is used in a strategic, coordinated and inter-linked way. It should be recalled that the proposal for the new generalised scheme of preferences (2021) 1 introduced the lack of cooperation on readmission as one of the grounds to withdraw trade preferences from the beneficiary countries. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, COM/2021/579 final.”
  Asylum & border control · EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2025-01-20 “E-000229/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. Former Commissioner for the Internal Market, Mr Thierry Breton, was not exempted from notifying his envisaged post term of office activity with the Global Advisory Council of the Bank of America and he has complied with his obligation to notify the above-mentioned activity. 2. The answer is No. 3. The Decision adopted by the Commission in reply to Mr Breton’s notification 1 contains the appropriate conditions and restrictions to ensure that Mr Breton’s activity for the Bank of America complies with the principles of integrity, discretion, confidentiality and collegiality to which he remains submitted. In particular, Article 2(3) rules out any Commission lobbying from Mr Breton, on behalf of the Bank of America, for a period of two years after ceasing to hold office. Article 2(5) of the Commission Decision specifically recalls Mr Breton’s obligation to inform the President of the Commission, in a timely manner, if and when he has a doubt with regard to the application of the Commission Decision or the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission 2 , before acting on the matter in relation to which the doubt may have arisen. 1 Decision C(2025) 9000 of 15 January 2025, https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-andprinciples/ethics-and-good-administration/commissioners-and-ethics/former-european-commissionersauthorised-occupations_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-goodadministration/commissioners-and-ethics/code-conduct-members-european-commission_en”
  Budget for EU politicians
• 2024-12-17 “P-002983/2024 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission In the run-up to the formation of the College of Commissioners, the Commission had extensive exchanges of views with representatives of the European Parliament, including party leaders. These exchanges covered both policy priorities and organisational issues.”
  Recruitment policies in the EU · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-12-16 “E-002965/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission On 18 December 2023 the Commission opened formal proceedings 1 to assess whether X may have breached the Digital Services Act 2 focusing, among others, on the effectiveness of X’s measures against information manipulation, particularly the ‘Community Notes’ system. The Commission is currently assessing whether Community Notes effectively help users identify disinformation and mitigate risks to public debate and electoral processes. Transparency, media literacy and critical thinking are among the tools supported by the Commission to equip citizens to identify disinformation. The Commission Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections 3 encourages Member States to support projects aiming to build resilience and develop public awareness, media literacy and critical thinking to address information manipulation, interference and disinformation. The Regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising 4 will ensure from October 2025 that political advertisements are labelled, accompanied by a transparency notice and subject to strict requirements when targeted. The DSA is complemented by a voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation. Signatories of the Code have committed to reduce the spread of disinformation on their services, through user empowerment, transparency of political advertising, measures against manipulative behaviour, as well as cooperation with independent fact-checkers and researchers. The upcoming Democracy Shield will aim to protect and promote democracy in the EU. The Shield will look at ways to reinforce digital and media literacy and prevention through prebunking. The Commission intends to strengthen a European network of fact-checkers and make it available in all languages. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6709 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC. 3 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 of 12 December 2023 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament. 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-12-12 “E-002913/2024 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to citizen participation and engagement as part of its policymaking process. Citizen engagement is underpinned by a robust methodology, based on established criteria. The participants in the European Citizens’ Panels are selected based on a fully randomised selection process with the aim to compose a group representative of EU diversity. The following elements are taken into account to ensure diversity: origin from one of the 27 Member States, gender, age (with one third of participants being between 16 and 25 years old), residence in an urban or rural area, level of education, professional activity, and the image held of the EU. The last element guarantees that the same diversity of views found in Eurobarometer surveys (negative, neutral, or positive image of the EU) is reflected in the Panel. In addition, the panels are keenly observed by a range of experts and interested parties. For the selection of participants in the Youth Policy Dialogues, the Commission also aims for diversity in the groups. It has made efforts to achieve balance in terms of gender, nationality and geography (including from rural areas and cities), and to mix participants from youth networks and from outside such networks. Both the Panels and the Dialogues are accessible for people with disabilities.”
  EU engagement with youth · EU engagement with citizens
• 2024-12-12 “E-002916/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Entities implementing EU funds must comply with EU restrictive measures 1 . In June 2024, the European Council reiterated its strongest condemnation of the brutal terrorist attacks conducted by Hamas and other terrorist groups against Israel on 7 October 2023 2 . Hamas is listed on the EU terrorist list 3 . In January 2024, the EU established a framework for restrictive measures against those who support, facilitate or enable violent actions by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 4 , and has since designated 12 individuals and three entities. The latest recast 5 of the EU Financial Regulation approved in September 2024 includes a new exclusion ground under the early detection and exclusion system for entities, as well as individuals that engage in activities contrary to EU values where such misconduct has an impact on the entity’s integrity that risks to negatively affect its performance of a legal commitment. As regards student visas, Member States are responsible for the issuance of visas and residence permits for students from third countries, and for carrying out the necessary security checks on those arriving in the EU in accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/801 6 . Article 7 of the Directive determines that third-country nationals who are considered to pose a threat to public policy, public security or public health shall not be admitted. Posing a threat to public security is also listed in Article 21 as a ground for withdrawal or non-renewal of an authorisation of residence. 1 Article 215, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT:en:PDF 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02001E0931-20240221 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02024D0385-20240119 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/801/oj/eng”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · Legal migration
• 2024-12-12 “E-002911/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission In 2023, the EU provided EUR 318 million to address migration challenges in North Africa, building on actions funded under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 1 (EUTF) and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) 2 . By December 2024, the entire budget was fully contracted, supporting assistance and protection to forcibly displaced persons, strengthening asylum and migration governance and management, fostering return, readmission and sustainable reintegration, and promoting legal migration and mobility. In 2024, EU efforts yielded positive results, including a significant decrease in arrivals to the EU (minus 60% on the Central Mediterranean route) and an increase in assisted voluntary returns to countries of origin (nearly 4 600 returns from January to November 2024, representing a 229% increase compared to the same period in 2023). EU assistance also contributed to bolster protection capacities in North African countries, enhancing access to basic services (such as education and health) for people in need. Additionally, the EU has developed programmes to improve labour migration governance and established mobility schemes from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt to Europe under the Talent Partnerships framework 3 . The new phase of the regional programme ‘Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa’ 4 (funded under NDICI-GE), aims to increase the number of new mobilities in 2025-2028. 1 https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/index_en 2 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/funding-and-technical-assistance/neighbourhooddevelopment-and-international-cooperation-instrument-global-europe-ndici-global-europe_en 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/legal-migration-resettlement-andintegration/talent-partnerships_en#:~:text=The%20Talent%20Partnerships%20aim%20to%20provide%20a%20c omprehensive,and%20skills%20between%20the%20EU%20and%20partner%20countries 4 https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/our-programmes/towards-holistic-approach-labour-migrationgovernance-and-labour-mobility-north-africa_en”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2024-12-12 “E-002912/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission, in collaboration with Member States, continues to follow the fate of EU citizens who travelled to conflict zones like Syria to join terrorist organisations and have not returned or whose deaths remain unconfirmed. Member States are primarily responsible for matters of citizenship and border control, and they share pertinent information with EU agencies to address security threats effectively. The EU supports coordinated efforts through Europol, Frontex, and intelligence-sharing mechanisms. EU citizens, in principle, cannot be barred from returning unless their nationality is revoked. For those who return and constitute a security threat, prosecution is a primary tool. The EU Counter-Terrorism Directive 1 obligates Member States to ensure that acts of terrorism and the support thereof are punishable as criminal offences. Evidence collection, including battlefield materials, is increasingly coordinated to strengthen cases. Rehabilitation and reintegration programs are also employed, particularly for minors and lower-level affiliates. Frontex enhances border security by providing operational support to migration management 2 , while Europol facilitates intelligence sharing. Together, these measures aim to prevent re-entry of high-risk individuals and ensure accountability for their actions. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017L0541 2 Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on European Border and Coast Guard, Article 40, paragraph 4.”
  Asylum & border control · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-12-12 “E-002917/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission In line with the provisions of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, national courts and tribunals, in collaboration with the Court of Justice of the European Union, are entrusted with the interpretation and application of EU law 1 . As such, national courts and tribunals act in a double capacity, as national and as EU courts. The national and EU legal systems form a common legal order 2 , providing EU citizens with complete and effective legal protection. 1 See, inter alia, Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 24 June 2019, case C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, Commission v Poland, para. 71. 2 Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 16 February 2022, case C-156/21, Hungary v Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2022:97, para. 127.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts
• 2024-10-16 “E-002107/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The EU provides humanitarian and development assistance in line with the European Joint Strategy in support of Palestine 1 . However, contacts established in this framework are not per se relevant in view of operational cooperation on readmission. The possibility for identification, issuance of travel document and carrying out return operations depends on the situation on ground. The Qualification Directive 2 allows Member States to revoke refugee status based on several grounds, including if the person has committed serious crimes or poses a threat to national security. If after an individualised assessment, the Member State authorities decide that an individual satisfies the afore-mentioned conditions and revoke the refugee status, it will be possible to return the individual to the country of origin if this does not violate the principle of non-refoulement. The Return Directive 3 requires an individual assessment deciding on the issuance of a return decision. This decision needs to respect certain safeguards, including the respect of the principle of non-refoulement. The Return Directive provides for the possibility to apply firmer rules for third-country nationals representing a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security (such as no granting of a period for voluntary departure and issuance of an entry ban longer than five years). The Commission has proposed a new Regulation on a European approach to return that would provide for stricter rules for such cases, including mandatory forced return, longer entry bans, and a separate detention ground. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/European%20Joint%20Strategy%202021-2024.PDF 2 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast). 3 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.”
  Asylum & border control · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2024-10-16 “E-002106/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The European Council Conclusions of 17 October 2024 reaffirmed the need to achieve conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified returns, as defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Commission is closely monitoring the currently evolving situation in Syria, as developments unfold, and remains in contact with UNHCR.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-10-03 “E-001946/2024 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes the view that treaty change is needed where it can improve the EU, as the President of the Commission made clear in her political guidelines 2024-2029. As regards the procedure set out in Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission is ready to fully play its institutional role, and in particular to give its opinion if and when consulted by the European Council, which received concrete proposals from the Parliament in December 2023. The Commission thinks that the EU needs an ambitious reform agenda to ensure the proper functioning of a larger EU and the EU must use enlargement as a catalyst for progress in terms of its capacity to act. Both the EU and future Member States should be ready at the time of accession. The Commission recalls that the accession process is merit-based and fully dependent on the objective progress achieved by each enlargement partner. Therefore, there are no predetermined timelines. Furthermore, accession treaties are based on Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union and regulate the conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties, which such an accession entails.”
  EU political integration (free access)
• 2024-09-27 “E-001856/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission stands ready to support the Georgian people on their European path. At the same time, in reaction to the developments in Georgia, including targeting civil society and restricting the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people, and in line with the European Council’s conclusions 1 , the Commission launched a review of its bilateral financial assistance portfolio benefiting Georgia. As a result, over EUR 120 million from the 2022-2024 envelopes were withheld or will be reallocated. Ensuring and upholding human rights, including the rights of LGBTIQ people, is at the core of the enlargement process, annually assessed within the Commission’s enlargement report. The Commission has repeatedly stressed that the legal initiatives targeting LGBTIQ people undermine the fundamental rights of Georgians, risk further stigmatisation and discrimination of part of the population and are not in line with Georgia’s stated aim to join the EU 2 . In 2022, the Commission referred Hungary to the Court of Justice of the EU over violation of LGBTIQ rights 3 . It also found that provisions of the so-called child-protection law have a concrete and direct impact on the compliance with the horizontal enabling condition on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 4 , based on the criteria under Annex III of the Common Provisions Regulation 5 . Therefore, the reimbursement of payment requests related to certain specific objectives of three Cohesion Policy programmes are partly suspended. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-spokesperson-legislative-package-family-values-andprotection-minors_en?s=221 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2689 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_6466 5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of 24 June 2021.”
  LGBTIQ+ · EU-Georgia relations
• 2024-09-26 “E-001837/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not able to answer the questions raised by the Honourable Member, as the matter concerns the Report from the Commission to the Council on the assessment of third countries’ level of cooperation on readmission in 2023 (COM (2024) 340 final) adopted on 20 July 2024, which is a document classified at RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED level. In line with the protective measures for RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED information and in compliance with Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 of 13 March 2015 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information, access to such documents is limited on a need-to-know basis, assessed by its originator. Until a document is declassified, the handling rules for the level of classification remain applicable. The Commission reminds the Honourable Member that the above-mentioned Report has been transmitted to the European Parliament on the day of its adoption and can be consulted in accordance with its internal procedures on access to classified information.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-09-26 “E-001839/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Ensuring cooperation from third countries on readmission is a priority for the EU. To this end, relevant policies, tools and instruments of the EU and Member States should be pulled together in a strategic way, with a tailor-made approach. Under Article 25a of the Visa Code 1 , the Commission has proposed visa measures towards six third countries due to insufficient cooperation on readmission. The Commission proposal for a revised General System of Preferences (GSP Regulation) 2 includes a withdrawal criterion related to cooperation on readmission of own nationals. Talent partnerships with third countries can enhance legal pathways while supporting broader strategic engagement on migration management. The Commission is not able to answer the other questions raised by the Honourable Member, as the answers are part of the Report from the Commission to the Council on the assessment of third countries’ level of cooperation on readmission in 2023 3 adopted on 20 July 2024. This is a document classified at RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED level. In line with the protective measures for RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED information and in compliance with Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/444 of 13 March 2015 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information, access to such documents is limited on a need-toknow basis, assessed by its originator. Until a document is declassified, the handling rules for the level of classification remain applicable. The Commission recalls that the above-mentioned report has been transmitted to the European Parliament on the day of its adoption and is accessible in accordance with the European Parliament’s internal procedures on access to classified information. 1 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02009R0810-20200202 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on applying a generalised scheme of tariff preferences and repealing Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0579&qid=1682417318608 3 COM(2024) 340 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-09-26 “E-001838/2024 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission In line with the measures in place to protect classified information, access to such documents is limited on a need-to-know basis, assessed by its originator. Until a document is declassified, the handling rules for the different levels of classification remain applicable. The unauthorised disclosure of this document on a public website is currently being investigated by the relevant security services. With a view to ensuring the necessary protection of such information, the Commission has put well calibrated mitigating measures in place, such as robust security policies, procedures, infrastructures and security awareness measures. The Commission makes relentless efforts to enshrine a solid security culture and cooperates with the other EU institutions and the national competent authorities entrusted with investigative powers in case of incidents. While the Commission does not generally target specific websites, it actively monitors and, if necessary, responds to unauthorised disclosures of sensitive information across various platforms and takes necessary measures.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-09-04 “E-001619/2024 Reply The Honourable Member is informed that, in accordance with Article 48(2) TEU, on 18 December 2023 the Council submitted to the European Council the proposals for amendment of the Treaties received from the European Parliament on 23 November 2023; the national parliaments have also been notified of these proposals. In accordance with Article 48(3) TEU, following this submission, it is for the European Council to decide whether or not the proposed Treaty changes must be examined by a Convention. No decision on this matter has yet been adopted by the European Council. It is also recalled that the Treaties do not prescribe any time limit for the European Council to consider the European Parliament’s proposals for Treaty change.”
  EU political integration (free access)
• “Is this the round for. For the shadow rapporteurs to speak, or is it general remarks that we should have? Because I'm speaking on behalf of the Patriots shadow rapporteur.”
  EU political integration
• “(15:11:32 – 15:14:05): Thank you very much, chair, commissioner Brunner, minister Ioannidis. Thank you very much. I note that both of you are extremely positive about this pact, but maybe I could flag a disclaimer that I don't share that positiveness because Europe is suffering under the massive swathes of immigration, so we should have a very strong immigration policy. But that's a thorn in the side of leaders. People should just pay their taxes and keep their mouth shut and to fob them off. You've come up with this idea of the migration pact. This has been negotiated over the course of more than 10 years, and in a couple of weeks, it's gonna come into effect. But the implementation, as we predicted, just not gonna work. I can state the facts. The countries of reception don't have their systems in order. The ICT system to screen illegals is chaos. And three, there's quite simply not enough human resources to be able to apply the procedures in any sensible way. Chair, this is not something I'm making up. This is printed in black and white on the implementation report of the European Commission itself. And I can predict here and now that this pact is going to fail. Even a child could see this is gonna happen. Imagine that in Greece, they're gonna let somebody within 12 weeks to note whether that person is of age, b, where they come from, c, what their sexual orientation is, and d, that this has all gone through and been checked by a legal expert and judge is very naive. Because in The Netherlands, this sort of procedure without appeal takes at least 75 weeks. But the Brussels bureaucrats believe that after the June 12, suddenly, they can do this within 12 weeks. Now reality, I think, is going to come to fruition, they believe, but the reality is different. Perfect implementation or not, this pact is doomed to failure. Hence, my question is, what sort of tangible, measurable results can we measure the application this pact by? And if this is not working, are you going to stop this pact and move to the only real solution, and that is to close the borders? Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Yeah, exactly. Thank you. Thank you, Madam President. Whilst the commissioner is talking about strategic autonomy and territorial integrity, at the moment one member state has the presidency, which has has been divided for over 15 years and is occupied by an alliance partner of NATO. Nato this has had no consequences so far for Turkey, which is still an official candidate country for the union. If you talk about territorial, territorial integrity shouldn't be ignore that, because if we want to be credible, We must draw consequences at the same time. Turkey is playing an active role in the destabilisation of the region and is contributing to new migrant flows coming into Europe. The motto of the Cyprus presidency is an autonomous Europe which is open to the world. But in recent years we have been too open. What is the result? Living together in a way which is under pressure. So we must have efficient border controls with strict and implementable return procedures. Because if we want to be open, we must have borders.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Turkey relations
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. In recent years, the European Union has increasingly positioned itself as a guardian against so-called foreign disinformation and propaganda. Yet a troubling paradox emerges. While condemning propaganda, the EU itself engages in practices that closely resemble the very phenomena it criticizes. Across several candidate countries, and even within its own member states, the EU funds communication campaigns, media partnerships and public information initiatives that often blur the line between neutral education and political persuasion. These campaigns routinely highlight the EU's EU's achievements while downplaying legitimate criticisms, structural shortcomings, or contested policy outcomes. The intention may be to foster cohesion, but the effect is to privilege a single narrative of European integration. The EU must stop criticizing others while engaging in the dissemination of propaganda itself. Transparency, pluralism and critical thinking are the cornerstones of a healthy public debate in this context. How do you assess state funded or institution funded communication campaigns, such as those produced by the EU, that may not fit traditional models of disinformation, but nonetheless shape public discourse in one direction? Thank you.”
  EU public communication strategy
• “Thank you chair. Also happy on behalf of the Patriots to contribute to the gender balance in this committee. Uh, I will speak in Dutch. However commissaires in that forum. Commissioner, during the previous mandate, this commission made energy and affordable with its disastrous Green Deal. The working citizen has been forced into poverty by this climate policy. And now, in this new mandate, the aim seems to be to destroy freedom of expression. We're talking today about the European Democracy Shield. The title implies that it will protect democracy. But let's be honest about the nature of the project. It is a shield to protect the failing political elite against citizen criticism from its own population. You're talking about fighting foreign interference, meddling, disinformation. You're setting up a European centre for democratic resilience. You're financing fact checking networks and forcing tech giants to carry out censure through the DSA. But for months now, I've been asking the same question again and again. Can you give a legal definition of disinformation? I'm asking the question again today, although I know that I'm unlikely to receive an answer because in your eyes, disinformation is anything at all that deviates from the Brussels consensus. Orwell warned us decades ago about the Ministry of Truth, an authority that decides what is fact and what is fiction in order to control the population. With this democracy shield, you are doing exactly that. You're censoring the debate, you're distrusting your own citizens, and you are undermining democratic resilience. It's time to withdraw this disastrous plan and work as quickly as possible on solving the real problems of real people. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “At the European elections in 2025, the right 1 and the left lost a double victory, you might say. But despite the clear voters mandate for rights realism here in the European Parliament, we were structurally excluded. The patriots were not unable to head up any committees and were kept outside the bureau. The left thinks that democracy is great as long as it votes for their parties. Otherwise, the will of the people seems to be a serious problem for them. And you still are pointing out Brussels, signing Brussels as the capital of democracy for 2027. You have selected Brussels even though tens of millions of, of voters have been excluded because of, Cordon sanitaire and that billions are being, spent and sent to and used to promote their own crazy agendas. You're trying to control people, and Ursula von der Leyen is the kind of dictator who is giving us the finger through the, Pfizer, situation, keeping that a secret, for instance. So my question to you is, is this your democratic ideal?”
  Von der Leyen
• “Germany. Thank you very much. My question is to Mr. Michael. Um. Um, many years ago said that, um, Rome was responsible for what was called then, um, disinformation. At the time, Galileo was seen as a threat to truth or actually to their truth at the time. Ladies and gentlemen, uh, history is repeating itself in a very recognizable pattern. And what we're seeing now is a clear example of that. The current establishment is doing everything it can to put forward a dominant version of truth, and to establish that as truth. Anything that varies from that is called disinformation and is dangerous to society. But it's the fight against disinformation that is actually a threat to democracy, because the understanding of disinformation and hate speech have become so broad and so broadly applicable that they're often used to put pressure on undesirable opinions. And differences of opinion are a very important part of democracy. Terms that can't be used are called hate speech. But this makes us think of Orwell's 1984, Um, where, uh, critical thinking, um, was made impossible through what he called Newspeak terms such as, uh, irregular migration instead of illegal migration. As an example, this is, um, a euphemism that hides the truth. Do you believe that without clear legal definitions from terms such as, uh, misinformation and hate speech, um, we just have censorship and that this is, um, in tension with our understanding of democracy. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Many thanks, chair, and thank you, Madam Minister, for presenting the priorities. We spoke at the Libe committee as well, and we're pleased to have you today at the Afco Committee. Last week, a majority in the European Parliament asked the European Court of Justice for an opinion on the Mercosur agreement and whether it meets European law, which means that the parliament cannot approve it while a decision is pending. Some sources have said that just after this vote, the council put pressure on the commission to bring some amendments to the Mercosur agreement. Where the European Parliament's majority was ignored and we're deviating from the European justice system. What's your view of this trend and the role of the European Parliament in trade policy and the position of the European Court of Justice on this matter. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you. Thank you. President. Commissioner. The European Union claims to be a global moral compass, but in front of our very eyes, we have seen scandal after scandal hit the European Union. Look at how the Commission under Timmermans paid NGOs taxpayer money to promote the agenda of that very same commission. Look at the Commission refusing to publish von der Leyen's Pfizer text messages. What about Qatar? Great Gate. Left wing MEPs caught with suitcases stuffed with cash. Time and again, the same pattern. No transparency, no responsibility. And it is hardly surprising that we in the Parliament will try to root out the truth. But time and again, our proposals, such as that move by the Patriots to set up a committee of inquiry, are voted down not just by the left of this House, but also with the support of the EPP. Ladies and gentlemen, true democracy requires courage. Courage to stand up to foreign interference, but above all, courage to take a good look in the mirror.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Commissioner, during the previous mandate, this commission made energy and affordable with its disastrous Green Deal. The working citizen has been forced into poverty by this climate policy. And now, in this new mandate, The aim seems to be to destroy freedom of expression. We're talking today about the European Democracy Shield. The title implies that it will protect democracy. But let's be honest about the nature of the project. It is a shield to protect the failing political elite against citizen criticism from its own population. You're talking about fighting foreign interference, meddling, disinformation. You're setting up a European Centre for democratic resilience. You're financing fact checking networks and forcing tech giants to carry out censure through the DSA. But for months now, I've been asking the same question again and again. Can you give a legal definition of Information. I'm asking the question again today, although I know that I'm unlikely to receive an answer because in your eyes, disinformation is anything at all that deviates from the Brussels consensus. Orwell warned us decades ago about the ministry of truth and authority that decides what is fact and what is fiction. In order to control the population with this democracy shield, you are doing exactly that. You're censoring the debate, you're distrusting your own citizens, and you are undermining democratic resilience. It's time to withdraw this disastrous plan and work as quickly as possible on solving the real problems of real people. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “I just have a question to the Commission. I mean, in terms of, let's say, the consistency of what is now brought forward. Do we have on the one hand the CEF with CHF thirty billion where I think the Parliament might consider compared to the pretty much unknown Competitiveness Fund whether the proportionality of the budget in terms of what is invested in the grid and what is announced in more general terms, for example for net zero technologies within the European Competitors Fund, is really proportional? The second question I have, I mean, we talk with SETH with fairly conventional European projects, cross-national, but most of it is not distribution and there is no separation between the distribution nets and the digitalization of distribution nets. So the fund, European funding, goes in transnational infrastructure but the big bottleneck in correlation to that is the digitalization of the distribution net. So my question is, is the Commission considering also to back up investment, national investments in the distribution net because that is not an isolated issue? And my third question is, what could we expect from the digital package? I mean, we had been opening and you have been referring to that to the Net Zero Act where we had been opening together with the member states the possibility of fasten permitting but also we tried to refer a little bit to European content or European distributors. But on the other hand, we heard that procurement is difficult. So is, in your view, also the procurement we had been agreeing on the Net Zero Act part of the complexity of the procurement process or is it really going in the right direction? So the question is simply connecting European facility, what comes with the grid net, and can we use this Net Zero as a blueprint for permitting and is it a good blueprint also for the question of backing up national European Net Zero industries? **Giorgio GORI @Chair (Italy, S&D): Thank you Mister Tonin.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• “Thank you very much Mrs Gregori for your presentation of the report. The report brings out quite a number of different problems. There's pressure on the migration chain when it comes to the procedures and there's a lack of solidarity and effectiveness. The report has got quite a lot of interesting data in it but what these figures actually mean. Last year a million people entered a first request. The percentages are falling but is that because most of the people requesting are not real refugees? It seems that there are structural levels of abuse. Even faster processing times will not deal with the migration crisis and it remains a crisis, an asylum crisis especially if you look back to twenty fifteen when Missus Merkel received, seems like half of the population of the earth. Well, of one million asylum requests only forty two percent were actually accepted. That's to say that there were four hundred and eighty five hundred thousand people who were rejected. If they have received an order to leave the territory or a return order, very few people actually get sent back. So that's another half million people who end up living illegally in the EU. I think that we need external procedures, more faster procedures and better returns. I think that's quite clear. Arriving illegally should not mean that you're allowed to stay in the European Union. The vast majority of these requests are being rejected so why is the agency still giving priority to speeding up procedures rather than calling for measures that actually prevent arrivals, illegal arrivals in the first place? Would you agree that the current asylum system is obsolete and urgently needs modernizing?”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you very much indeed. Well, um, obviously today we could talk for hours about, uh, what's happening with, uh, agreements, readmissions and all. But to be honest, these agreements are basically not being implemented. They're just, uh, bells and whistles. So your mandate, the political restrictions there are. You know, we need to have actual implementable agreements, but we do need to look at what's happening on the ground. And what's happening on the ground is we have a lot of paper. We have a lot of dialogue. We have lots of working groups, but we only have a handful of readmission agreements without very many. Without too much enforcement measures. So we need to intensify things. I think the message to third countries is very clear. They get our development help and they enjoy supple visa regimes, but at the same time they don't take their citizens back. And in the Union, we continue to talk and pay and we say, yes, but that's not a partnership. The instruments that we do have article 25 A of the visa code. They are implemented inconsistently. Member states are played off against each other by third countries. We have to change. I think optional sanctions that time is in the past. And if we are serious, we need to come up with serious policy. First of all, harmonized, transparent data collection. We need to exactly know which countries are cooperating and which are refusing to take back their citizens. Article 25 A of the visa code isn't enough because it's not transparent. Secondly, and this is key, we need automatic consequences. We don't want to have extra committees, extra discussions behind closed doors. If the data shows the country isn't cooperating, we have to be have direct and automatic sanctions. So, Mr. Luckner, are you ready? Commissioner, are you going to. Are are you are you ready to bring in automatic consequences if countries don't cooperate? Thank you.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Colleagues, we live. In some of the most tolerant, open and free. Societies. The world has ever known. Societies built on equality between men and women, on the freedom to love whom we choose. On the freedom to speak freely and on the absolute rejection of anti-Semitism. And yet, in the name of this tolerance, we have invited intolerance. This is the real discrimination we should be addressing, not some vague, outdated, resuscitated directive that undermines our sovereignty and only paves the way for even more judicial activism. Because the truth is simple we welcomed people into our countries without demanding that they respect the values that we hold dear. The result is that the very discrimination we fought once so hard to eliminate has returned to our streets openly and violently. This is not diversity. This is failure. Failure to protect our citizens and failure to defend our democracies. When Christmas markets in Germany must be guarded by concrete barriers, when New Year's Eve celebrations in Paris are cancelled, when Jewish people are once again threatened on the streets of Europe. Something has gone profoundly wrong. When people are afraid to celebrate their traditions, speak freely or live openly. Our tolerance has been exploited. Our compassion must never come at the expense of our civilization. If we refuse to defend our values, we will lose them. Thank you.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• “Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Also, thank you to the speakers. I think from the first two questions, what we can deduct is that what we're really looking into is, is the financing of NGOs. And I have not heard much from the two speakers on, on those two on those issues. So I hope that in terms of the answers, we will get back to what it seems that so far the first three groups are interested in, which is the financing of NGOs. I will continue my contribution in Dutch. For those of you who would like to put on the, um, translation. Unwanted foreign interference, for example through financing of the Muslim Brotherhood is a direct threat to our democracy. We felt that we were often blind to this threat from within here, from Brussels, to be very precise. The European Commission, specifically Mr. Timmermans, has actively used tax to realise his green dream developed, says that the commission is even even paid NGOs to bring court cases against certain companies. So then you could send the bill to the Belmont to influence MEPs? Well, for hours in the committee we debate about Russian interference correctly. Incidentally, there's interference and corruption from Brussels systematically, which has turned a blind eye to the commission when it comes to democratic process within the EU institutions or in member states, it actively undermines democratic process. So I'm wondering what we're actually doing here. We're trying to deal with other people's business while we don't have our own affairs in order. So I would like to ask Miss Ska, could you indicate what the effects are of such internal influence and interference? For example, the erosion of trust. Citizen trust, as you said in your own presentation, do you think it's possible to regain that trust so long as political representatives don't set up? Step up to the plate. Thank you.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm happy that the foreign influence by Turkey, a NATO partner, is being discussed and is still an accession candidate to the EU. The accession shouldn't take place. The facts speak for themselves. These aren't cyber attacks we're talking about. Dianette, which is a control and instrument. This religious affairs office. They're not preachers in Dianette. They are spies. There is presumed espionage. Names of dissidents are collected. Turkey Turkish conflicts. Are taken into the Turkish community in the Netherlands. Member of Parliament. Was attacked. This MP was attacked because she didn't vote the way that Ankara expected it to. So. So our people's representatives have to be attacked because a foreign government is cause for hate against them. That crosses a line. We can't accept a partner, which. Erodes democracy in our countries. We shouldn't deepen our ties. Rather we should end the accession negotiations. The question to the speakers how can the European bodies differentiate between justified cultural and religious interests and interference in the and intimidation of the diaspora in the EU? For the.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Sometimes you hear nothing from me, and other days I will take the floor on every point that we have. I think I'm the only member left in the room that participated in the mission. I would like to extend my gratitude to the Secretariat, who really organize the wonderful mission. Um, it was extremely interesting, obviously, also very concerning, because there are deep institutional and constitutional issues still remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But definitely an interesting mission. And that is all I have to say about that. Thank you very much.”
  EU enlargement
• “The state of our union can be summed up in one word untenable. Instead of tackling the true problems. The commission is tweaking and messing around with bottle lids and paper straws. Our citizens are not looking for more Europe, but rather less fewer rules, less meddling, and above all, less migration. Without effective returns, then no migration policy is worth the paper it's written on. Those that are not entitled to stay must actually leave. That is the bare minimum. Now, on the Multiannual Financial framework, at least 2 trillion. While families are struggling to make ends meet, Brussels is throwing cash around like confetti at a parade. It is irresponsible and divorced from reality. The Dutch people are looking for their money back. Quite rightly. Mrs. von der Leyen, you're calling for more money, more EU. But our citizens want less, less, less. And that is the job we are here to do.”
  Size of EU budget
• “Thank you all for coming. Thank you very much. Rising food prices are making it impossible for more and more people to make ends meet, and these sky high food prices are not something which simply arises as a matter of course. They are actually the result of a toxic cocktail of overregulation, green delusions and interference from Brussels. The results of the European elections last year practically caused the Eurocrats to choke on their matcha latte with genuine oat milk, which they paid at least €8 for. And then they thought they'd found an apparent solution. They came up with the Draghi report and the competition compass, and they thought that this was a magic formula, which was going to be a panacea, but far from it, because the Green Deal is still an absolute millstone round the neck of our farmers, and it threatens food security. Indeed, it threatens the very future of farmers. They're not farmers anymore. They are climate accountants in Wellington's boots. The energy transition is costing energy. It is generating excessively high energy costs. And whilst we are importing this marvellous Japanese matcha, the ordinary man in the street can't even afford to buy a dry crust of bread. It's so expensive. So it's high time that the commission realised what was going on. There is a right wing majority in this house. You just need to have the courage of your convictions and work together with the Patriots. You on the right, because that's how we can protect the purchasing power of people. So my message is clear. Get rid of all this bureaucracy. Free the farmers and stop the climate. Crazy policies because food is not a luxury product. Thank you.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “Thank you very much chair. Also thanks to the representative from Reporters Without Borders. Thank you for your efforts in highlighting global threats against press freedom. Um, and of course, I agree with you that physical attacks and even assassinations on journalists are abhorrent. I am happy that you focused on economic pressure, because my questions also relate more to the subtler forms of pressure on media outlets within our own union, because we now see increasing calls for so-called responsible journalism, algorithmic filtering, disinformation information. Registries and even funding structures that reward editorial alignment with certain EU values. Are we not, in some cases, drifting towards a system where only officially sanctioned narratives receive visibility or money, and those who hold alternative views are at least indirectly, indirectly, but effectively silenced? How do you assess the risk of soft censorship, where media that diverge from consensus views, be it on migration, climate or health policy, are marginalised? Perhaps not by law, but by funding rules, platform visibility and regulatory chilling effect. And finally, in your view, does real media freedom require not just protection from state interference, but also institutional neutrality, especially when public money is involved? Because many of us fear that what starts as promoting quality journalism Realism ends as quietly, quietly filtering out dissent. Thank you very much.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “The work programme of the commission is called Europe's independence moment. A more apt description would be operation more bureaucracy in fancy wrapping paper, because nothing says freedom like being buried under a mountain of new rules dressed up as simplification, the Commission promises new ambition for Europe. You promise to cut red tape and then you wrap us in even more of it. But people have had enough of pacts, visions, plans, shields and reports. This endless cycle of document production is the very definition of a competence creep. The steady expansion of EU control without accountability or measurable results. And this culture of paperwork can be found in almost every sphere of EU influence. The truth is that the EU never simplifies. It multiplies. It multiplies rules and regulations until progress grinds to a complete halt. The people of Europe don't need more bureaucratic window dressing or another glossy brochure. What they need is real deregulation and simplification. Fewer obstacles for entrepreneurs, simpler rules for citizens, and the freedom to compete and create. Because people act on incentives and Brussels keeps offering the wrong ones. The dream of the EU federalists has become the worst nightmare of ordinary people. And it's time to wake up. Thank you.”
  EU political integration
• “Colleagues. Good morning. The council conclusions are clear. We need to do everything in our power to improve cooperation on returns. But the current proposal is silent on the external dimension, and this is more than a missed opportunity. It is a strategic mistake. Without securing cooperation by third countries through visa, trade and aid conditionality, any return system will fail. Now, many here, of course, want exactly that failure because they do not want illegal migrants to be returned. But let me remind you that there is a working right wing majority in this House and it is working for our citizens, and now it needs to work for returns. If the EP sides with the left on this. They will end up with a regulation that is weaker than their own commissioners proposal, and now is not the time for weak compromises. It is time to take a chainsaw to the bureaucracy and inaction that have paralyzed our return system for years, and this is only possible with the help of the Patriots.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you very much, Mr. Brandstaetter. I have never denied that disinformation and foreign interference is a serious threat to our democracies. What I am concerned about, what I am concerned about, is that the policy that the Commission is proposing will do nothing to fight Russian or Chinese interference into our societies, and it will only target our own citizens, and that we have to avoid at every cost. Thank you very much.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you all for coming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Brunner. I'll just give you a few moments to get your headphone on. It's good news that we finally have an EU visa strategy. However, as far as I'm concerned, far more is needed. Member states are faced with an enormous problem with third countries who refuse to take back their nationals. So the EU must do everything possible to ensure that we can create powerful and robust leverage. You said it yourself a visa is a privilege, not a right. If a specific country refuses to cooperate on returns, we should then automatically instigate visa sanctions. However, we should also dare to think beyond visa restrictions. If a country refuses to cooperate, we should bring an end to cooperation, development, cooperation and freeze partnerships. Finally, Commissioner, I've been reading about the facilitation of labour migration. Let me be crystal clear. We have to bring an immediately end to these so-called legal pathways. The idea that we desperately need these people for our economy is nothing more than a fairy tale. If we look at figures from the statistics office in the Netherlands, we see that half the people receiving income support from outside Europe. Moreover, we have plenty of people filling available vacancies. We don't have to open the doors using so-called legal routes. Commissioner, my question are you willing to roll out an enhanced automatic procedure for sanctions and to suspend development aid as a sanction? I don't think we can wait any longer. And we can't just deal with everything via this regulation when it comes to returns. Thank you.”
  Legal migration · Asylum & border control
• “I will read our position. Thank you very much, chair, for this important exchange. I would like to apologise on behalf of Mr. Vidal, who cannot be here today, and I am here to present his position. Thank you also for your work on behalf of Mr. Vidal as negotiator during this procedure. First, implementation matters more than wording. While the framework agreement is a step forward, its value will depend entirely on how the Commission applies it in practice. Commitments on information, presence and accountability must lead to a real change in behaviour and not remain formal declarations. Secondly, exceptional procedures must remain exceptional. Repeated reliance on emergency legal bases and soft law risks undermining ordinary legislative procedures. Crises cannot become a permanent government's method and exceptional tools must not be normalised. Thirdly, the need for regular and transparent political follow up cannot be underestimated. The framework agreement should be accompanied by systematic and public monitoring of its implementation, particularly regarding commissioners attendance, information flows and respect for national competencies. Thank you.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you very much, chair. And also, many thanks to the rapporteur for the efficiency and swiftness with which he has prepared his draft report. Easter marks a new beginning, and so I might be as surprised as you are that I agree with the rapporteur on many elements that he has included in his proposed amendments. I appreciate the emphasis that is being placed on the important aspects of privacy, specifically the deletion of data as well as the voluntary nature of the application. I also appreciate the fact that safeguards have been included in the report to ensure that people who choose not to make use of the digital identity, and, by extension, the application, are not discriminated against. The amendments that I will table will also focus on similar aspects. And in addition, I think we need to be very certain that the digital version of identity cards and passports that we use in the EU, as well as the application, meet international standards, and that we also ensure that these digital options are always based on a physical document. Any change in this regard as to go fully digital would require an entirely new proposal by the commission. I am not entirely convinced about the proposed minimum age. Um, this is perhaps something that we could rather leave up to the member states. Like with the E gates, you can see that member states have different minimum ages, and I think we should leave the member states with the flexibility to determine that themselves. And we also need to keep in mind the burden that this process will place on member states and local authorities in particular. And we need to make it as easy as possible for them to process requests for digital versions of the identity cards. And then in conclusion, while I am at this stage not entirely convinced about the real added value for our citizens to have this application or the digital travel credentials, I am looking forward to working constructively with the rapporteur and other shadow rapporteurs on this file. Thank you very much.”
  Electronic identity
• “Yes. Thank you very much. Chair. Unfortunately, Mr. Burrows cannot be here today. As shadow rapporteur for the Patriots, and I thank you for your understanding in this regard. So I will be the one who briefly presents his position. Firstly, we would like to thank the rapporteur for the preparatory work and for sharing the priorities in advance. We recognise the effort invested in this complex and important topic. However, the strategic direction outlined in the working document raises serious concerns for the Patriots group regarding the proposed reform of the European electoral law. The Patriots shadow believes that it goes far beyond a technical update and risks introducing a political and ideological shift. Ai is already addressed under the AI act. Electoral law lies at the core of democratic legitimacy and should not be used to pursue broader regulatory or ideological goals. The democratic legitimacy of elections continues to derive from the nation states, and the Patriot group rejects any attempt, even if indirect, to reshape the European electoral system at the expense of member state competence. For similar reasons, the Patriot shadow rapporteur cannot support the establishment of a European Parliament AI observatory. Creating additional bureaucratic structures will not solve fragmentation or improve oversight. What is needed is clarity, restraint and accountability within existing frameworks. Finally, any reflection on future treaty reform is premature. The treaties are the constitutional foundation of the Union and must be approached with careful, evidence based analysis and political balance before any discussions of change in conclusions. Our shadow recognises that AI presents significant policy challenges, but it must not be used as a pretext for competence creep. Additional bureaucracy or rushed constitutional ambitions? Thank you very much.”
  EU political integration
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. Two weeks ago, the European Commission began its attack on our freedom of speech with this proposal for a so-called democracy shield. They are trying to fight disinformation, but no one knows exactly what disinformation is. Uh, certainly not the commission itself. And if a word can mean everything, then any government can misuse it for anything. If you have questions about a climate or immigration policy, that's misinformation. If you criticise Islam, That's misinformation. If you have doubts about Commission President von der Leyen's misinformation. And now the commission is coming out with the idea of a European center for democratic resilience. This is downright Orwellian, because what we see here is the beginning of a ministry of truth, complete with the tools it needs to gag the media and to punish citizens for their opinion. Perhaps it's worth pointing out that in 1984, Orwell tried to warn offer a warning, not a handbook. And so that's why I would like to give the commissioner a copy of the book as a gift today.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms