Markéta GREGOROVÁ

Policy topics Markéta GREGOROVÁ is active on

What Markéta GREGOROVÁ has said (39)

• 2026-06-17 “(10:29:29 – 10:30:53): Let us be honest about who we are dealing with. When China wants its leverage, it weaponized rare earths, choking the supply of materials our industries, our defense, and our green transition depend on. When we moved to reform our cyber security, Beijing threatened our businesses. The pattern is always the same. Cooperation is offered when we are useful, and pressure is supplied the moment we act in our own interest. We keep answering this swift dialogue. They answer with coercion, and a partner who only respects strength will keep pushing until they meet some. So we should make their divide and conquer tactics carry a real cost. We should impose tariffs where China dumps and distorts. We should make access to our markets strictly reciprocal, and we should pursue China through the WTO when it breaks the rules and deindustrializes the European Union in the process. China's state run economies is in desperate need of expert markets. The US has closed theirs. We are the only large and rich pillar. If we don't use this immense leverage and instead let a few large companies relocate Thank you.”
  Trade relations with China
• 2026-02-23 “E-000748/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of Google’s announcement to introduce this verification process, starting from September 2026 in some jurisdictions (not including the EU based on publicly available information). The Commission understands that, as a result of this process, Android will require that all applications (apps) are registered by verified developers in order to be installed on certified Android devices. The Commission is also aware of public campaigns such as ‘Keep Android Open’ which have emerged in reaction to Google’s announcement. Article 6(4) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 1 obliges gatekeepers like Alphabet to allow and technically enable the effective distribution of apps on their operating system through third party app stores or the web. At the same time, the DMA also permits Google to introduce strictly necessary and proportionate measures to ensure that third-party software apps or app stores do not endanger the integrity of the hardware or operating system, provided that such measures are duly justified by Alphabet. The Commission is actively engaged in a regulatory dialogue with Alphabet concerning Article 6(4) of the DMA and is diligently monitoring Alphabet's compliance with the relevant legal framework to ensure that apps, including open-source apps, can be effectively distributed on Android outside Google Play. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng.”
  Promotion of open-source softwares · EU rules on digital competition
• 2026-01-23 “E-000267/2026 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU has strongly condemned 1 the violence against peaceful protesters that took place at the end of 2024 and consistently urged the Georgian authorities to respect, protect and uphold the human rights of peaceful protesters. The enlargement reports of 2024 and 2025 2 expressed deep concerns on the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of crowd control measures by law enforcement bodies, as well as persisting reports of torture and other forms of ill-treatment of those participating in protests. The failure of national investigations to bring those committing acts of violence to justice shows serious deficiencies in the justice system and underscores its lack of independence and credibility. Reports suggesting that chemicals were used in water cannons during demonstrations must be properly and independently investigated. While the EU does not have a dedicated mechanism to investigate the use of chemical weapons, it actively supports and cooperates 3 with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which holds the mandate to carry out any potential assessments. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/extracts-georgia-conclusions-council_en?s=221; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/georgia-statement-spokesperson-developments-georgia_en?s=221. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report-2024_en; https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/georgia-report2025_en. 3 The OPCW has consistently received support from the EU through the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget since 2004, currently amounting to a total of EUR 51.4 million.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Georgia relations
• 2026-01-13 “P-000087/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The organisation of national public administrations, including the legal status of civil servants, is the responsibility of Member States. In doing this, Member States must uphold the rule of law and ensure that their administrative systems can effectively implement EU law and policies as well as manage EU funds following the principles of sound financial management, legality and regularity. The Commission reports annually on the rule of law, including on institutional issues related to checks and balances and supports administrative cooperation, dialogue, as well as provides technical support and financial assistance to improve capacity and quality of public administrations. In the context of the European Semester, Czechia received a country-specific recommendation to strengthen the capacity of its public administration to attract, retain and develop talent as well as strengthen strategic steering capacities to improve consistency across policies. In addition, under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Czechia receives support to modernise its public administration, including human ressources management reforms, which will be assessed against the relevant milestones and targets. On cohesion policy, the Partnership agreement for 2021-2027 explicitly references administrative capacity as a key prerequisite for effective EU fund management. The Commission is aware of the legislative proposal at national level to replace the state civil service act and is analysing its implications for the professionalism, stability and institutional independence of the civil service as well as its capacity to implement EU law and policies effectively.”
  Conditions to access EU budget · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-09-24 “E-003714/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission considers that the messenger application Signal fulfils the criteria of Article 2(5) of the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) and hence is to be considered a ‘interpersonal communications service’. Firstly, services such as those provided by Signal are ‘normally provided for remuneration’. The fact that users of the app do not pay for its service does not exclude the categorisation as ‘interpersonal communications service’. Most, if not all, competing messaging services are either paid for directly or at least indirectly. As further explained in Recital 16 of the EECC remuneration also exists within the meaning of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union if the service provider is paid by a third party and not by the service recipient. The fact that it is not transparent how Signal is financing its service (e.g. by donations, public money or other) does not exclude its classification as a ‘interpersonal communications service’. Even under the assumption that Signal is providing its service as a charity, such services are ‘normally provided for remuneration’. Consequently, all relevant rules of the EECC for electronic communications service or interpersonal communications service would then also apply to Signal.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-01-31 “E-000435/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has followed closely the work of the Committee to investigate the use of Pegasus surveillance spyware (PEGA) conducted during the previous parliamentary term. Based on the report and the recommendations, as well as its own fact-gathering exercise, the Commission will decide on the most appropriate way forward. The Commission's position is very clear: any attempts to illegally access data of citizens, including journalists and political opponents, is unacceptable, if confirmed. Even where the use of spyware is linked to national security, and in instances where it falls outside the scope of EU law, national checks and balances need to ensure that safeguards are in place. The Commission has followed up on developments concerning the alleged illegal use of intrusive surveillance software in its annual Rule of Law Reports, in particular as regards the functioning of national checks and balances in response to such allegations. The EU data protection and privacy acquis offers comprehensive protection to the confidentiality of communications and users’ personal data and terminal equipment. EU data protection law is applicable to the processing of personal data by private entities, even where such processing is required for national security purposes. Under the provisions of the ePrivacy Directive 1 , the interception or surveillance of communications by public or private bodies is prohibited without the consent of the user. While restrictions to these provisions are permitted for important public objectives, they are subject to strict conditions and safeguards. The Law Enforcement Directive 2 is also applicable when competent authorities process personal data for law enforcement purposes. Processing of personal data under these instruments is subject to control by supervisory authorities, which have effective powers to examine any allegations of misuse, as well as subject to judicial review. 1 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37. 2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89–131.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2024-11-06 “E-002449/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Article 83(7) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 1 leaves a margin for national legislation to define whether and to what extent administrative fines may be imposed by the data protection authorities (DPAs) on public authorities in that Member State. By making use of this provision, Member States are allowed to decide on their own that fines cannot be imposed on controllers or processors in the public sector, in view of their national procedural law and the ways of funding public authorities. Nevertheless, such national rules shall be ‘[w]ithout prejudice to the corrective powers of supervisory authorities pursuant to Article 58(2)’ (Article 83(7) GDPR). This means that, even if public authorities are exempted from fines in a Member State, the DPA still has at its disposal all the other corrective powers provided in Article 58(2) GDPR to follow up data protection infringements in the public sector. This includes, among others, issuing warnings, reprimands or imposing a ban on processing. Such measures may cause reputational damage to the public authority concerned and disturb its operations in case of a ban on processing. Thus, the Commission considers that the practice of not imposing fines on public authorities does not prevent DPAs from effectively enforcing data protection compliance in the public sector. In accordance with Article 97 GDPR, the next Commission’s report on the application of the GDPR is due for 2028. At this stage, the Commission cannot pre-empt what would be the issues raised therein. The European Data Protection Board has issued numerous guidelines on the interpretation of the GDPR 2 , which can be used by public authorities to help them to comply with the GDPR. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 2 European Data Protection Board webpage: Guidelines, Recommendations, Best Practices: https://www.edpb.europa.eu/edpb_en”
  GDPR
• 2024-10-10 “E-002017/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to a swift enforcement of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 1 (Digital Services Act, DSA) and is aware of the importance of this transparency exercise. The Report on the overall annual costs incurred for the fulfilment of the Commission’s tasks under the DSA for the period 16 November 2022 to 31 December 2023 was transmitted to the European Parliament and to the Council on 6 November 2024, and published on the Commission’s website on 13 November 2024 2 . The delay in the publication of the report was due to the need for setting up the novel budgetary processes and internal decision-making procedures at the Commission, and in particular as regards the supervisory fee, which was levied by the Commission for the first time for the year 2024. 1 OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/report-overall-annual-costs-incurred-fulfilment-commissionstasks-under-digital-services-act-dsa”
  EU rules on digital competition
• “Thank you. Dear colleagues. Every euro that still flows to Moscow through energy trade is a euro funding Russia's war machine. We have heard today from the far right. So much about funding the war, funding the war. These flows are funding the war and funding we are. In 2024, the EU still imported almost 22 billion worth of fossil fuels from Russia, more than the aid paid to Ukraine. In the same period, in the ongoing negotiations on phasing out Russian gas and oil, the council has included several loopholes. These carve outs undermine the effectiveness of our sanctions and prolong the war in Ukraine, something everybody in this room claims they do not want. The union already has the instrument to support this transition for Slovakia. For Hungary, it is including the Repower EU plan, large scale investments in renewables and improved interconnections between member states. We as Czech Republic are very happy to help Slovakia and to continue as we are is to fund the aggressor. So it is time to close the loopholes, stop the money flows, and prove that the EU speaks and acts without hypocrisy. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Maybe a little bit. Sorry. Thank you Dear colleagues, Commissioner, our entire internet economy is dominated by US and Chinese monopolistic platforms, and these platforms breach our privacy rules regularly, and the fines that we impose on them are irrelevant and embolden them to only ignore our rules further. Tiktok and meta have cornered the market for our digital attention. They are manipulating our elections for money and for their ideology. The US has explicitly named the destruction of the EU as its goal, and Chinese counterparts did not shy away from the same idea. Platforms do not comply under the DSA. We do not use our existing tools, and the Democracy Shield honestly gives us nothing for this commission. Breaking our privacy and mass surveilling us is a yes. Stopping digital oligarchs and their addictive designs a hard no. These online monopolists are all sitting in the US or China. The only way to protect our public space is to create our own European digital champions that follow our rules. That means we require that hardware cloud capacity to run our own companies. And that means we require to mobilise enough private investment, paired with public money, to scale our own companies. For a market of 450 million people, a European capital markets union, then, must be our answer. No more irrelevant fines and no more pretending that we do not have a problem. And please commission if you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Dear colleagues, China's strategy has shifted 180 degrees from biding their time and hiding strength. China is now in a full on global trade war. We are collateral damage, and we are also seen by Beijing as weak, divided and expendable. Otherwise, the recent rare earth restrictions would not hit EU companies and force our commissioner to ask for fast track licences in the way they did. Our trade and trade defence system has been built for a world that does not exist anymore. If the two largest trade partners are hostile and mercantilist, we must adapt. I urge my colleagues from the Council and Commission to help Parliament to adjust our defences. Concretely, we should make the ECI less political and allow the Commission to initiate it. We must reform our export control system to meet China and the US on an equal footing. That means no more national fragmentations. That means building up deterrence, and that means attaching a high cost for coercing European trade globally. Thank you.”
  EU-China relations
• “It's okay. Thank you. Thank you and thank you to the speakers very much. I would also divide it among you what I want to ask. Uh, good day to you, Miss Carrasco. Uh, we, of course, know each other. I would like to ask you first about our designed offensives. I feel like we do, mostly with ease with DSA even. It's sort of designed as an offensive towards Russia. Do you think from your perspective that all of these designs that you already uses to counter this information is applicable also to China, or is there something missing from our designs? Uh, secondly, I would like to know, uh, whether you think that China's approach to disinformation evolved in Europe compared to Russia's, how do their tactics differ so that we can then apply better ones? And last but not least for you, which topics, which narratives do you see that currently China is exploiting in Europe? Is it the EU Eu-us relationship? Is it the climate policy? Is it migration? What are they using to target us for Mr. Gunther? Just a quick question about Greentech Investments. Do you think that China is deliberately using them? You know, I mean, EVs or batteries to reshape our industrial policy priorities. And last but not least, to Mr. Villig, thank you very much for your inputs. I think that they were great. I would like to know, how effective do you think that the EU's de-risking approach has been in practice, our member states are actually reducing our technological exposure. Spoiler alert I don't think so, but I would really like to know your opinion. And also, I would like to know your opinion on our, you know, technological autonomy. We all talk about it all the time. Do you think it's realistic really? Or just rhetorical? Especially, of course, given China's speed of innovation. Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Dear colleagues. After four long years of investigation of Google's surveillance empire, sorry, they call it advertising. The commission finally acted a final €3 billion for Google, for suffocating European competitors and abusing its dominance. But let us be real. €3 billion for Google is nothing. The company made around $1.3 trillion in ad revenue during those years. That's not a penalty. It's a parking ticket. It's not a tearing. It's not dissuasive. It's barely a rounding error. Our full dependence on single foreign monopoly in any industry is an unacceptable risk. Unacceptable Acceptable, whether it's online advertising or rare earths. We are putting our economy, our innovation and our sovereignty in someone else's hands. It's time we get serious about breaking up monopolies so that European companies can finally compete, and Europe can stand on its own feet again. Thank you.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• “Yes. Uh, thank you very much. Uh, by mistake. I didn't speak in the first round, but trust me, the Greens EFA group finds these files very, very important. And me personally, given that I only have 60s and not 90, I will try to shorten it. Uh, we really consider cybersecurity on the foreign policy basis because really these considerations have to be taken into account because, uh, compliance alone does not address risks stemming from foreign state influence. Of course, its ownership structures, its extraterritorial legislation, governmental control that all matters for our European security. And there were already colleagues asking about this a little bit, but I would like to go more in depth and ask, uh, you know, if, uh, we are really or how do you want to really strengthen the European industry without strengthening the already existing, uh, vendors on the global market? Because we know that in this field whose first stays first. Then it snowballs. So how do we not support the oligopolies and monopolies of certain companies that we all know, which we are talking about when they are already first and really support the European industry? What does the Commission envision for that? And secondly, what's your view on including geopolitical risk criteria when we are talking about third country government control of topics here we are talking about one specific country, of course, as you probably know, but this can broaden up to other countries in this current geopolitical setup. Thank you.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Dear colleagues, did you know that not only ChatGPT, but also Facebook and LinkedIn have all at some point trained their AI models on your personal data without your consent? And guess what? This is exactly what the Commission intends to make. Intends to make a general rule with its digital omnibus. You may have noticed that none of these companies are European. It is a sell out of our values to American pressure. Big tech gets exclusive rights to our personal data, while European companies struggle to get access to quality data. In parallel, the Commission has decided to delay important rules safeguarding our rights and ensuring that AI systems are safe when they involve high risk for our societies. We are talking of AI for biometrics, education, employment, law enforcement while other pathways were available. The commission decided to go along with the biggest players demands, and the commission has also extended the possibilities to test high risk AI in real world conditions. Kids could be faced with real world testing of AI toys. You fold it to the pressure of the big ones and the rich ones, and we will make sure that we will not give up on our standards because Trump asked us to. Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “We are also not trying to, you know, relay from Russia to one another source, but to more of them. So what do you think about that in the realm of, uh, digital dependencies? And the second point, maybe not so much of a question, although I would like to hear more of your thoughts on that. Uh, just the point. Also for colleagues, the open source remarks, are extremely, extremely important because that's really underinvested in infrastructure, but also the community future where we can really heavily rely on our volunteers, which would again reduce the potential costs. We just hosted in Brussels, uh, you know, the Fosdem conference and also open source awards, and there has been so many projects and some of you might have last mandates in a lot of, uh, Lux Awards. Advertisement. On flow, the really cute movie with the black Cat animated. That was all done in blender. Blender. Blender is completely open source and it won an Oscar, you know? So just so that, you know, even in real life, this has real impacts and we can use it. Thank you.”
  Promotion of open-source softwares
• “Dear colleagues, the arrest and detention of party leader Elena Khoshtaria marked another troubling step in Georgia's democracy downfall. Elen was detained for writing protest messages against the ruling party, and now she is facing years in prison if prosecuted. She is again one of many others who are part of politically motivated processes in intensifying repression of any protesters, civil society and media. This has turned into a complete erosion of democracy and the consolidation of anti-democratic forces. In addition, there is another legislation sweeping through Georgian parliament banning even basic activism and organized civil society. The EU must finally respond with targeted sanctions against those responsible. And I don't care if two member states block that in the council. What about the 25 other member states? Can't they apply the sanctions? What's preventing them? Otherwise, silence and inaction only embolden the anti-democratic forces and send a dangerous signal that the Europe leave repression of former candidate countries citizens without consequences. Thank you.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• “Dear colleagues Council Commission, the upcoming EU China summit is more than a diplomatic event. It is a test of Union's credibility. We often hear, and we have heard it today from the Commission, that the EU should engage with China as an equal partner, but it is time we actually behave like one. We allow our markets to be flooded with heavily subsidised Chinese goods and also allow blocking our companies entering Chinese market. Undermining them, and most gravely. We ignore China's support for Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine. Yes. Ignore. I have heard you saying we are very concerned. We will continue criticizing. When have you ever done that? That has never been done. What is the success of the Commission? Has any heavy machinery not been sent from China to Russia thanks to your doing? I've never seen that. You know, and China runs a massive trade surpluses. And after a trade war with the United States, it really needs the European market. And, you know, what's that called? Leverage. So I thus urge president von der Leyen, or, please, Mr. Shevchuk, if you could convey that message, because she left to stand firm in Beijing and defend our strategic interests and our strategic interests are buying our Ukraine, not German cars.”
  EU-China relations · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• “(16:46:00 – 16:47:31): Yes thank you very much one second and thank you to the report for the work. We will propose of course some amendments to strengthen even the report but overall we very much agree with what has been said and written down. The areas where we want to slightly strengthen it the rapporteur recognizes uneven access to AI tools between large corporations and smaller actors. We should go further and explicitly support open source AI solutions because this would reduce market concentration and prevent structural dependency on a handful of dominant providers. Europeans SMEs deserve fair access to digital infrastructure. We also see dangerous trend where trade secret clauses are used to block access to source code and algorithmic logic. We must firmly oppose any provisions that shield automated decision making systems from public oversight. If an AI system impacts European consumers then our regulators researchers and civil society must have right to audit it. And we also welcome the report stands that GDPR safeguards remain the primary mechanism for personal data transfers. However we must be explicitly clear cross border data flows provisions in free trade agreements must never be weaponized to bypass our data protection standards. The fundamental rights of our citizens are not bargaining chips for market access. Thank you and I look forward to cooperation.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “Dear colleagues, Commissioner, who controls our digital future and under which values, who controls our critical infrastructure and our sensitive technology in peacetime and in conflict. Cybersecurity today is inseparable from sovereignty. Europe's hospitals, energy grids, public administrations and democratic institutions depend on digital systems. If those systems rely on opaque technologies, foreign dependencies or standards written elsewhere, then our sovereignty is fundamentally undermined. At the same time, security cannot come at the expense of fundamental rights. A Europe that protects its network by undermining privacy, enabling unchecked surveillance or weakening encryption would betray its own legal and moral foundations. The Cybersecurity Act must strengthen European capabilities, not lock us into permanent technological dependence or any outside technological power. Certification schemes must promote accountability and genuine security by design, not merely compliance. On paper, this law is really an opportunity. Done right, it can anchor cybersecurity in European values. Open standards. Trusted technologies and strategic autonomy. Let us work on it together. Thank you.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• “(15:45:28 – 15:48:16): Thank you very much. First, some comments and questions to mister Volman. So first of all, you've just mentioned in reply to my colleague, missus Strejonova, that, you cannot imagine how facial recognition could be faulty. I was super surprised by this. But because first of all, facial recognition is famously faulty. It is racist. It is discriminatory. It's not working in many cases. We also, of course, know, and you just mentioned it yourself that, or your colleague mentioned it, that the companies are setting it up in a way that's bypassable. And also we know from the case of Australia where 7 out of 10 minors are on social media anyway that these days it's super easy to bypass them, for instance, through AI facial filters, which you can apply to both your ID card and to your face. So that's the answer for miss Ostrejonova, which I'm surprised you didn't give, and you can maybe answer to me why you didn't give it because you should be the 1 knowing that. Secondly, I know we are talking about new think per se, the new, for France, but the new, age verification app. But I need to go back to DSA because DSA is stating that miners protection shall not oblige providers of online platforms to process additional personal data in order to assess whether the recipient of the service is minor. But your guidelines on DSA are going against this provision in DSA. Why is that? Thirdly, why don't you prioritize investigations regarding the business models, algorithms, and everything that's still not concluded? We have DSA. Why do we need another thing that was easily hacked in the first day of its use? I'm sorry. I have to mention that, because it was. And, instead, don't focus on the actual toxic business models and algorithms and designs that we should already be able to resolve on the DSA? It just seems like we are afraid to actually use the DSA, which is like a bazooka against the digital platforms. Why are we just, you know, using new ways of giving data to the big tech? And, yeah, I've already mentioned that. Heck, you can react to it or not. And to miss, Tubiana, in France, ARCOM has published recommendations on how to implement age verification in relation to the law enforcing age verification on porn platforms. And 1 of the principles in these guidelines is double anonymity. And the fact that this option has to be available for users. Can I ask you how have the platforms comply with this if they did? Thank you. Thank you, missus Greorova. Mister”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• “Yes, thank you Chair. You Commissioner in your implementation report of twenty seven November you claim there are no indications that the derogation is not proportionate. Let me correct that there are no indication that chat control itself is proportionate. In twenty twenty three Microsoft scanned eleven point seven billion images and videos and reflect only thirty two thousand so a fraction so tiny it's barely quantifiable and the Council wants to make this regime permanent but while I'll welcome the protection of encryption it contradicts the Commission's mandatory scanning approach and exposes the disproportionality of your proposal. We have detailed this in a letter I will be handing you but the system you are proposing would in the offline world be the equivalent of forcing every citizen to hand every letter to the police to be opened and read before it is allowed to be sent and we refuse such a model of society. That is why I will hand you this letter from my party Czech Pirate Party in the traditional way after this and leave you to read it in private just as it should be. Let's face it voluntary or not mass scanning is still mass scanning of private communications and it does not help minors. Follow ups to flex are extremely low. The detection technologies are unreliable especially for new abuse and grooming and your report relies on self reporting by companies while highlighting only what supports scanning. And before you became Commissioner you came to this same committee and I ask you one question during your hearing are you on the EP side preventing mask scanning or would you defend the Council approach of mandated mask scanning? Question to which you didn't answer. So now that Council shifted its position it's crucial to understand since both the EPA and the Council have decided to question your approach will you play an honest broker in the negotiations in the upcoming trial locks or will you be pushing for more scanning? That's my only question. Thank you.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Okay. Thank you. Thank you. Um, and thank you Mr.. Uh, well, first of all, because we are here, all, uh, the shadows, I would just like to, based on the report and its contents, really support in our negotiations in the trilogues currently happening, uh, to support the covering of greenfield investments, because based on this report and based on China's hostile activities, I think it's really important that we include it. But to the report itself and to you, Mr. President, I would have just a few questions. Um, I agree with, uh, my colleague, uh, which mentioned the numbers of member states. You know, the numbers look dire. It's really small amount of, uh, member states that publish their annual reports, and it's really hard to do our job and for public scrutiny, uh, if, uh, you know, and public accountability, of course, uh, especially in these days when there are so many hybrid operations targeting, uh, the trustworthiness of our governments and of our democracy. So public scrutiny is immensely important. So I would just like to know if the Commission is discussing binding transparency obligations. And secondly, um, of course, uh, emerging technologies need to be protected in real time and not only after market entry, and several member states still do not screen sensitive digital and data intensive sectors. So do you. Or as the Commission think, that mandatory coverage of crucial sectors such as AI, cloud, cybersecurity, infrastructure, quantum and biotech is necessary? Thank you very much.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• “Yes, absolutely. Sorry to not give a chance to my Spanish colleagues, but I will talk about systemic approach rather than national. But we need to, of course, acknowledge the specific case, because the Spanish government defends this contract by stating that the servers are watertight, isolated from external networks, and certified by National Cryptologic Centre. But while we respect national security assessments, independent security audits routinely demonstrate that firmware layers and remote maintenance protocols can harbour latent vulnerabilities, and we cannot operate in a union where one member states actively strips high risk vendors from its networks, while another entrusts them with the crown jewels of its law enforcement. Lawful intercept systems like CTL are not peripheral. They are the core of counter-terrorism, organised crime and counter-espionage operations. And when you introduce a high risk vendor at the storage layer of this architecture, we do not just risk localised data breach, we risk poisoning the well of European intelligence sharing. And if our partners in Europol and NATO cannot trust the hardware housing, Spanish intelligence, the operational trust that underpins our collective security is severely compromised. So two specific questions. Mr. Speaker, if I may what immediate and specific technical measures is the Commission recommending to ring fence European intelligence sharing mechanisms from potential compromises originating within the CTL system. And how does DG connect plan to address the enforcement gap where member states bypass EU risk assessments by categorising highly sensitive infrastructure under purely national cost driven procurement rules. Thank you.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• “Dear colleagues, Commissioner, when my homeland reached independence on Russian fossil fuels, they still paid Putin for it with the argument that it is cheaper. I was baffled by this. Phasing out Russian gas is not just energy policy. Europe is at war. This is a security decision. Russia will now lose almost EUR 1 billion euros every month because of Parliament's negotiations. There is an immediate, tangible and measurable impact. The European Parliament shows it is not here just to vote on temporary sanctions that get renegotiated every six months on banning Russian oil. We have not gone as far and fast as we could have. The commission is committing to phasing out Russian oil in the near future. There is, however, too slow. At least we ended constant abuse of sanctions by certain member states, and that uncovers the true strength of the European Union. Together we can do what no member state could achieve alone. It is never cheaper if it is paid by human lives. Peace, international rule and democracy. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Imagine waking up to discover your body stripped and shared online for the pleasure of strangers. Imagine it is your 12 year old daughter who wakes up to her AI generated nude, displayed for the whole vast world to see. No consent, no dignity. Just violence. This is what men do through Musk's tool grok to children and women. This tool should have never existed. But instead of removing it or even pausing it, Elon Musk chose to monetise it by locking it behind a paywall. And to make it worse, he made fun of the victims by posting a picture of himself in a bikini. What a disgrace. That is why I am calling on the commission and users and advertisers to join me in boycotting X. The platform has become a space dominated by extremism, violence and far right propaganda. Europe must build its own alternatives. The EU is already a leader in digital rights. Now let us turn it into a competitive advantage. Thank you.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• “Yes. Thank you very much. And thank you for the briefing. It was very sobering. Of course, I am one of those that do know about these dependencies. Sorry. And so I expected what you were talking about. But still, I think that it's very important reminder to this House, especially now when we will be working on various parts of our digital infrastructure, including Cyber Security Act, that if we are attempting to secure a digital house that's dependent on in somewhere like 80% of external actors and factors, then this could be considered a strategic vulnerability. And of course, the first thing that I've always heard when talking about securing our infrastructure was costs. Um, so you of course mentioned in your presentation various means of dealing with it. But all of that is, let's say, more costly, even so. So I wanted to ask you or not one thing, but I will come back to it about your opinion on diversification. Um, which would potentially mean we are not doing everything ourselves, not make Europe great again. And not just European sovereignty, but really doing what we are trying to do in the realms of fossil fuels currently.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Yes. Thank you very much. And thank you for the briefing. It was very sobering. Of course, I am one of those that do know about these dependencies. Sorry. And so I expected what you were talking about. But still, I think that it's very important reminder to this House, especially now when we will be working on various parts of our digital infrastructure, including Cyber Security Act, that if we are attempting to secure a digital house that's dependent on in somewhere like 80% of external actors and factors, then this could be considered a strategic vulnerability. And of course, the first thing that I've always heard when talking about securing our infrastructure was costs. Um, so you of course mentioned in your presentation various means of dealing with it. But all of that is, let's say, more costly, even so. So I wanted to ask you or not one thing, but I will come back to it about your opinion on diversification. Um, which would potentially mean we are not doing everything ourselves, not make Europe great again. And not just European sovereignty, but really doing what we are trying to do in the realms of fossil fuels currently.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Yes. Thank you chair. And thank you all for your work as I represent the committee, I want to focus on the narrow GDPR amendments. My main concern with this file is the fact that the Commission has decided on such amendments to the GDPR, with no impact assessments. Even more concerning for GDPR assessments, the Commission has put forward a very short analysis on how much companies would save with the reduction of records of processing obligations. But the figures are baseless, even though they were used in communications. And that sets a bad precedent for interinstitutional trust. The amendments put forward by the rapporteur on the GDPR part are lowering even more the standards, which is regrettable. Setting a threshold as high as 1500 employees and keeping records of processing only for certain processing basically amounts to a total wipe out of the provision, and deleting it would have been faster. Honestly, and I don't think this is the way to go. I want to simplify the work of SMEs, not big corporations, but I also want to enable accountability of companies whose business models rely on personal data, regardless of their size. And the records of processing are helping. We know that. Finally, I don't think the commission should be granted powers to lower GDPR standards by delegated acts. Thank you.”
  GDPR
• “Dear colleagues, George Orwell once warned us about the world where surveillance becomes normal, at least for now. We can still treat this book as a warning, not as a manual. There was always a better way. Law enforcement focusing on real suspects, on targeted investigations, and on bringing criminals to justice and Parliament today chose this way. Thank you colleagues, but mainly thank you, citizens, for fighting for your rights. We did not give in to pressure or blackmail. That suggests the only way to protect children is through indiscriminate mass surveillance. Protecting children and protecting our fundamental human rights are not opposites. They can and should always go hand in hand. And today, Parliament showed that both are possible. Thank you. And stop chat control.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “We are also not trying to, you know, relay from Russia to one another source, but to more of them. So what do you think about that in the realm of, uh, digital dependencies? And the second point, maybe not so much of a question, although I would like to hear more of your thoughts on that. Uh, just the point. Also for colleagues, the open source remarks, are extremely, extremely important because that's really underinvested in infrastructure, but also the community future where we can really heavily rely on our volunteers, which would again reduce the potential costs. We just hosted in Brussels, uh, you know, the Fosdem conference and also open source awards, and there has been so many projects and some of you might have last mandates in a lot of, uh, Lux Awards. Advertisement. On flow, the really cute movie with the black Cat animated. That was all done in blender. Blender. Blender is completely open source and it won an Oscar, you know? So just so that, you know, even in real life, this has real impacts and we can use it. Thank you.”
  Promotion of open-source softwares
• “Thank you very much, chair. And thank you, Mr. Rapporteur and your colleagues. I definitely thank you for your proposal. I agree with many of your proposed changes, notably on strengthening the data protection, because we must really align the design with key data protection principles and legislation to safeguard fundamental rights, especially when discussing personal data processing for border control, and there must be strict data retention limits with automated deletion. Once the border processing is completed or border crossing, and all data processing must be done with revocable consent at any time, and withdrawal must trigger complete data erasure. I think we are quite on an agreement on that. Our group definitely supports digitalisation and the use of digital travel app as a means of travel. However, the current envisaged architecture with essentially an intermediary system has not convinced us that the users extremely sensitive data will be protected and the traveller router itself contradicts that. No centralisation adding another layer for possible data exposure and the system architecture seems to focus on identification rather than authentication. So while having the possibility of digital travel application can be desirable for some citizens, we still believe that we must ensure that current options remain fully available and equally viable without extended delays, which I hope I have heard in the speech of rapporteurs. So that's very favorable. In our view, there are many legal and ethical requirements that have to be upheld and changed. Architecture. If we want this application to function as a trustworthy and rights respecting tool in this set up architecture. So with that, we will go into negotiations. Thank you.”
  Electronic identity
• “We are also not trying to, you know, relay from Russia to one another source, but to more of them. So what do you think about that in the realm of, uh, digital dependencies? And the second point, maybe not so much of a question, although I would like to hear more of your thoughts on that. Uh, just the point. Also for colleagues, the open source remarks, are extremely, extremely important because that's really underinvested in infrastructure, but also the community future where we can really heavily rely on our volunteers, which would again reduce the potential costs. We just hosted in Brussels, uh, you know, the Fosdem conference and also open source awards, and there has been so many projects and some of you might have last mandates in a lot of, uh, Lux Awards. Advertisement. On flow, the really cute movie with the black Cat animated. That was all done in blender. Blender. Blender is completely open source and it won an Oscar, you know? So just so that, you know, even in real life, this has real impacts and we can use it. Thank you.”
  Promotion of open-source softwares
• “Thank you and your colleagues. Of course Ukraine is facing another critical year with an alarming financial situation. We have estimates that by spring 2026, Ukraine risks running out of funds due to high budgetary and defence needs. Since Russia doesn't show stops of stopping or easing the intensity of its attacks on Ukraine, which is why we are supporting Ukraine. And that comes at a moment when European political parties and their support is limping. And of course, US support is reduced to a minimum. So we support the proposed Ukraine support loan. But it's also regrettable that because of the member states, member states support is declining. They haven't agreed to the commission's proposal for a reparations loan based on accumulated profits from frozen Russian assets. So we wouldn't have to have this conversation. Ukraine will need more support, and that option remains the fairest and most sustainable path forward for all of us. Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “(18:05:02 – 18:06:35): Yes. Thank you very much, sir. I will make comments on behalf of the Greens' Ifa Shadow, MEP Hannah Neumann. So illegal firearms are a real threat to people's safety in Europe. They are used in serious crimes like drug dealing and gang violence and have also been used in terrorist attacks. What's worrying is that they are getting easier access to these weapons leading to more violence. At the same time, wars and conflicts close to Europe make the situation worse as weapons can end up on the black market and find their way into our communities. New technologies add another risk with tools like 3D printing, it is becoming easier to produce firearms and harder to control who has them. That's why as Greens IFA, we supported the goal of this directive, setting minimum rules on criminal offenses and penalties for illegal firearms, improving cross border cooperation, and strengthening data collection on seized weapons. We do, however, have one key question on the legal basis. The directive relies on Article 83 and 212 of the treaty found in European Union covering illicit arms trafficking, but it also includes possession of firearms and blueprints and we would like to clarify whether this is fully covered. We will also closely look at whether the proposed penalties are proportionate. Overall, Hana is looking forward to working constructively on this file. Thank you.”
  EU policy on criminal justice
• “Colleagues. The commission promised to President Trump more than €1 trillion in purchases and investments into the US without any binding nature. Any way to measure them, and without even distinguishing them from plans already in place. What happened on July 27th was presented to the public as necessary damage control and to me as an MEP, as a hidden win for European industry because we supposedly avoided 30% tariffs. In truth, it was little more than performative politics. It was a petty shakedown by a hostile American administration, and the costs should haunt us for years. We can play the same game. We can fairly tax US digital monopolies and support our own digital champions. We can stop relying on US weapons and build our own military capacity, and the US undermines its global trade and monetary role. And in that case, we shall be ready to step in when the dollar falters. Otherwise, what were we really expecting from giving the bully our lunch every day? Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Stetz, I would like to ask. Well, you talk about Serbia a lot. I will talk about Western Balkans in general, but yes, it is applicable to Serbia. Very much so to whether you think that the growing presence of China in that area is complementing or competing with Russia's influence in that region and in Serbia. This is a huge question. And last question, I'm very sorry, but there's no other colleagues, so I hope you can allow me. You know, we you spoke about EU enlargement yesterday. There was a huge EU enlargement document and an outline. I would like to know whether you think, you know, if these candidate countries whether if they, you know, really get embedded into Chinese infrastructure, for instance, especially in digital ecosystem, whether it will impact their potential joining of the EU. Thank you.”
  EU enlargement
• “Dear colleagues, mostly from EPP, as you initiated this resolution, if you truly want to tackle cyberbullying, let me give you one piece of advice. Call your fellow party member, Ursula von der Leyen, and tell her to enforce the DSA properly. Tell her that we need to have social media with safety by design, where safety comes before profit, and where our values are reflected in platforms algorithms. Tell her that age verification and banning minors from social media is not the solution to all of our problems. But most of all, remind her that economic interests like Germany selling more cars to the US, must not come before our safety when she negotiates with Trump. Call your numerous ministers across Europe and tell them this. Stop cutting funds for education and NGOs fighting against this issue. Enhance education, empower parents and don't push back on banning new fires. And finally, don't spread hate. Make sure that women, the queer community and everyone else feels safe and welcome in Europe. Thank you.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• “Yes thank you very much. And thank you for the debrief. I have several questions. We now know that China has state guided and mandated overcapacity, especially in some industries. And of course, that's threatening our domestic industry. And the current multilateral and other instruments, even our own European tools, appear to be badly designed or out of date to address this existential issue. So my question would be, how much should we rely on the current WTO framework? And whether you do see a policy inside this framework to stop Chinese dumping, or whether that will take too long and require too much political unity. And what's the other direction that the Commission would take? Secondly, we of course know that one possible instrument is our anti coercion law from the last mandate. However, one of the considerable flaws in this instrument is that it's kept entirely in Member States hands to decide what is economic coercion with a qualified majority. And we of course, saw already that China is very good at picking off certain member states with sweetheart deals or direct investment. So do you think the ASI is fit for purpose to deal with Chinese dumping in your opinion? Also, I would like to ask you, how feasible do you see the option for harsher cyber security standards? Because in terms of connected vehicles, energy infrastructure. Overall, the whole EV discussion we can keep it to we can use it to keep Chinese companies out of the EU. So again, wondering how that could go. And last but not least, there will be the EU-China summit this July. China still has sanctioned several members of this House of the European Parliament. Will these sanctioned MEPs be allowed to join this summit? Thank you.”
  Trade relations with China · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · EU-China relations