Thierry MARIANI

Policy topics Thierry MARIANI is active on

What Thierry MARIANI has said (61)

• 2026-06-15 “This trade agreement with The US is not a diplomatic success. Let me tell you what it actually is. For me, it's a shameful capitulation. The only side that wins is The United States. They maintain 50% of their duties on our steel, aluminum machines, electrical equipment, medicines, see increased rates. What have we got in exchange? Well, we got rid of our duties on US industrial goods. We promised that we would buy billions of US energy, etcetera. So where's the reciprocity here? What you can see here is that 1 single sector on the European side has been spared, and that's the German car industry. And The US are basically the big winners, Machinery, spirits, pharmaceuticals, everything's under threat now. We have undermined the entire European economy to save 1 single sector. The European Union was built as an open market, and we're now garnering the results of this disarmament. You call it an open market. I call it being trampled on. Commissioner, if I understood correctly, you 3 times mentioned fact that what's important is predictability. I mean, the only thing that's predictable is that next time mister Trump stands up and, threatens us, we'll give in again because giving in inevitably leads to more demands.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2025-11-07 “E-004412/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission As part of the review of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, Ukraine committed to align by 31 December 2028 its domestic legislation to several EU standards pertaining to the production of agri-food products. These include in particular relevant EU legal acts on the official controls, animal welfare, use of plant protection products and of veterinary medicines. Ukraine must report every year on its progress towards this alignment and by the agreed deadline provide a final report demonstrating that the alignment condition has been met. If the Commission determines that Ukraine has not met this requirement, both Parties must promptly commence consultations. If after these consultations, the Commission still finds that Ukraine has not fulfilled its obligation, the EU may suspend all or part of the preferences granted under the review. These preferences may then be reinstated if Ukraine delivers additional information proving compliance. The Commission will keep the European Parliament and the Council simultaneously informed of Ukraine’s progress in alignment to the agreed production standards.”
  EU policy on pesticides · Import of agri-food products in the EU · Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• 2025-10-17 “E-004112/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is following the case and is concerned about the findings of the United Nations (UN) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in its Opinion No 28/2025, which concluded that the person mentioned in the subject of the question had been arbitrarily detained, subjected to illtreatment and denied the right to a fair trial. The EU consistently calls on all partners, including Qatar, to respect international human rights obligations and to implement in good faith the recommendations of UN human rights mechanisms. The EU Delegation in Doha, in coordination with the French authorities, follows the case and raises its concerns with the Qatari authorities, including in the framework of the regular political and human rights dialogues. The EU Special Representative for Human Rights also engages actively with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries on individual cases of political prisoners. Human rights and the rule of law are central to the EU’s external action and shape its relations with Qatar and the GCC states. Such issues were also discussed at the first EU-GCC Summit in Brussels on 16 October 2024, where both sides reaffirmed their commitment to deepening cooperation on human rights as a key pillar of their partnership.”
  EU relations with Qatar · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-10-17 “E-004113/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Global Gateway (GG) programme was launched to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors, while also strengthening health, education and research systems across the world. The goal of the programme is to diversify EU international partnerships around the world. It is a win-win strategy, whereby the partner countries benefit from investment and creating economic growth and jobs, while the EU promotes competitiveness and economic security 1 . The Joint Communication on GG 2 outlines the guiding principles 3 and five key investment areas of the strategy 4 . Under GG, the Commission strives to identify sustainable, high-impact investments to strengthen EU partnerships. The recently launched GG Investment Hub also provides specific eligibility and assessment criteria to facilitate these investment projects 5 . GG projects and investments are subject to the strict rules that apply to the selection, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and transparency of all projects financed under the EU budget 6 . The Commission also tracks and reports on EU support to GG investment projects through the annual report on the implementation of the EU's external action instruments, and provides information through the Commission’s website 7 , which also includes links to approved action documents. GG flagship projects, which are endorsed by the Council as projects which showcase GG, are monitored by the Council’s Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors. Member States have full ownership in identifying and proposing GG flagship projects, considering their strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests. The relative weight given to factors such as alignment with EU priorities ensures that projects align with overall strategic interests 8 . Additional details and insights into the strategy and flagship projects are publicly available on the GG website 9 . 1 Through the GG strategy, the EU mobilised, together with its Member States, EUR 300 billion in a period 2022-2025 and overpassed the initial plan, which was set for 2027. 2 JOIN(2021)30 final, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/3378e8f6-9d65-4ca0-8ab6ce81399d5db6_en. 3 Democratic values and high standards, good governance and transparency, equal partnerships, green and clean, security-focused infrastructure, and catalysing private sector investment. 4 Digital, health, climate and energy, transport sectors, and education and research. 5 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/investment-hub_en. 6 As per the Financial Regulation, https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en. 7 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en. 8 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/global-gateway/. 9 See footnote 7.”
  Global priorities for international development
• 2025-10-17 “E-004110/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to ensuring transparency and accountability in delivering the Global Gateway strategy. Global Gateway investment mobilisation has reached EUR 306 billion through coordinated action from the EU, its Member States and their development financial institutions, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). EU funding is primarily drawn from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance III, implemented mainly via the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+). Funds for Global Gateway are also drawn from the Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF). For Team Europe contributions, the Commission applies a dedicated methodology to avoid double reporting between the EU, EIB and EBRD and national instruments. A common tracking system distinguishes investments supported by the EU budget from those provided by wider Team Europe actors and maps them across global regions. For investments not supported by the EU, the responsibility for reporting lies with the relevant Member States, EIB and EBRD. A breakdown by type of actor is in the annex. Most actions financed by the EU follow NDICI–Global Europe governance rules and are adopted through comitology and EFSD+ procedures. In addition, support to Global Gateway is provided under the UIF, which contributes to country-specific objectives in Ukraine and is governed by the Ukraine Facility Regulation 1 . A comprehensive reporting of investments mobilised through Global Gateway, which provides an up-to-date overview of aggregated and regional categorisation of amounts mobilised, is publicly available online 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj/eng. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/international-partnerships/global-gateway_en.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Global priorities for international development
• 2025-10-17 “E-004114/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The subject mentioned by the Honourable Member relates to the former responsibilities of the Executive Vice-President for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy as French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs and is not linked to the exercise of the Executive Vice-President’s current responsibilities. The findings of the United Nations (UN) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in Opinion No 28/2025 1 have been taken seriously and the EU has expressed concern about the conclusions reached, including those related to arbitrary detention, ill-treatment and the absence of fair-trial guarantees. The EU engages directly and consistently with the Qatari authorities, both through the Delegation in Doha and in close coordination with the French authorities, raising the human rights implications in political and human rights dialogues. Through these channels, the EU makes clear that it expects all partners, including Qatar, to respect international human rights obligations and to implement in good faith the recommendations of UN human rights mechanisms. EU’s participation in the 11th Conference of States Parties to the UN Convention against corruption will continue to be guided by longstanding commitment to human rights, the rule of law and the fight against corruption. These principles shape the EU’s relations with Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and were reaffirmed at the first EU-GCC Summit held in Brussels on 16 October 2024. Such international fora are opportunities to advance transparency, accountability and respect for international norms. 1 Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 28/2025 (adopted 8 April 2025), concerning the arbitrary detention of Tayeb Benabderrahmane (UN Doc. A/HRC/WGAD/2025/28).”
  EU competences on human rights · EU relations with Qatar
• 2025-10-17 “E-004111/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission Global Gateway investments are accounted for using a methodology developed in collaboration with the Member States, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which ensures consistency and avoids double counting. The Commission accounts for the amounts mobilised through regular reports. At the Global Gateway Forum in October 2025, it was announced that by the end of 2024, we had reached EUR 306 billion of mobilised investments 1 , exceeding the initial target of mobilising EUR 300 billion by 2027. A significant proportion of the figure announced concerns projects in the early stages of structuring or implementation, which also have a long life cycle. The Global Gateway webpage presents to the public a regional breakdown of this amount 2 . As announced at the 7th European Union–African Union Summit in November 2025 3 , more than EUR 120 billion of investments had been mobilised in Africa (North Africa and SubSaharan Africa) under the Global Gateway from 2021 to 2024. The Commission is continuously working to improve the visibility of activities implementing the Global Gateway strategy, with a two-fold objective of ensuring both transparency and accountability. 1 See the attached document. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/international-partnerships/global-gateway_en. 3 Press release, 26 November 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_25_2821.”
  Global priorities for international development · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-10-02 “E-003856/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s position towards Belarus remains guided by the Council Conclusions of October 2020 1 and February 2024 2 . Following the fraudulent 2020 elections and the subsequent widespread repression, the Belarusian authorities have persistently violated human rights and silenced the opposition, civil society, and independent media. Moreover, Belarus has maintained its support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The recent releases of political prisoners are a welcome development noted by the High Representative/VicePresident but do not signal genuine change, as over 1 200 political prisoners remain unjustly detained. The EU continues to call on Belarus to release all political prisoners and to end repression against the people of Belarus. The regime must repeal repressive laws and stop politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary arrests. The Belarusian regime continues to support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically, including through sanctions evasion. The EU is also facing hybrid attacks at its borders 3 , including the instrumentalisation of migrants by the Belarusian regime. Since 2020, the EU has mobilised EUR 170 million to support the Belarusian people, including political prisoners, independent journalists, and civil society, while fostering people-to-people contacts through educational, cultural and professional development initiatives. A Comprehensive Plan of Economic Support of up to EUR 3 billion remains available once Belarus embarks on a democratic path. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46076/council-conclusions-on-belarus.pdf. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6737-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/29/statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-eu-on-belarus-hybrid-actions-at-the-eu-external-border/.”
  EU-Belarus relations · EU relations with Eastern Neighbourhood
• 2025-10-01 “E-003815/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The trilogue discussion on the review of the Generalised Scheme Preferences (GSP) regulation is still ongoing and therefore, it is not possible to anticipate the result of that negotiation. The relevant provision in the Commission legislative proposal of 21 September 2021 1 is largely based on the provisions currently in force 2 establishing an automatic suspension of preferences for certain textile and agricultural products when the total value of such imports from a specific beneficiary country exceeds the relevant share of total GSP imports during a calendar year. The suspension would not apply to countries with a share of relevant product not exceeding a share of 6% of total EU imports of the same products. These provisions would apply both to standard GSP and Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) beneficiary countries. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2021:0579:FIN. 2 See Article 29 of the GSP Regulation:http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2012/978/oj.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-09-17 “E-003605/2025 Reply Under Article 14(5) of the Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the facilitation of the issuance of visas, each Party is entitled to suspend the Agreement in whole or in part for reasons of public order, the protection of national security or the protection of public health. The Council found that actions taken by Georgia breached the fundamental principles on which the Facilitation Agreement was concluded and went against the interests of the Union and its Member States. The Council therefore found it appropriate and proportionate, in order to protect public order in the Member States and in the Union, that Member States require a visa from Georgian citizens holding valid diplomatic passports who travel to the Union, as those persons represent interests that are contrary to those that led the Union to conclude the Facilitation Agreement in the first place.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2025-09-17 “E-003610/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant reforms (i.e. the nine steps) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 were taken 1 . In view of the developments in Georgia, the European Council concluded in June 2 and October 2024 3 that the authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. Visa-free travel to the EU is a conditional benefit, contingent upon the fulfilment of specific criteria set out in Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 4 , including the obligation to uphold and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Commission issues a yearly report to monitor the EU’s visa-free regimes with third countries. In its eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism Report adopted on 19 December 2025 5 , the Commission identified that Georgia had not addressed the recommendations from the Seventh Suspension Mechanism Report 6 regarding compliance with visa liberalisation benchmarks and instead further regressed in key areas of governance and human rights. The report concluded that given the systemic and deliberate nature of the democratic backsliding in Georgia, the Commission will consider appropriate measures under the revised Visa Suspension Mechanism. According to the new rules, in the first phase, the visa suspension could target holders of diplomatic, service and official passports. In the second stage, the suspension could be extended to the entire population if issues are not addressed by the Georgian authorities. Ultimately, Georgia could lose its visa free status entirely and be transferred to Annex I of the Visa Regulation 2018/ 1806 (visa-required third countries list) 7 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-council-conclusions-27-june2024/. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17october-2024/. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1806/oj/eng. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0792&qid=1768565258267. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A571%3AFIN. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1806/oj/eng.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2025-09-17 “E-003609/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU is a consistent and reliable partner to Georgia and reaffirms its unwavering support for the territorial integrity of Georgia as well as its solidarity with the Georgian people. In December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status 1 on the understanding that the relevant reforms (i.e. the ‘nine steps’) set out in the Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 2 were adopted. In view of the developments in Georgia, including democratic backsliding, in June 3 and October 2024 4 the European Council concluded that the authorities’ course of action jeopardised Georgia’s EU path, de facto leading to a halt of the accession process. In November 2024, the Georgian government announced the decision to suspend the EU accession process until 2028. The EU is ready to consider the return of Georgia to the EU accession path if the authorities take credible steps to reverse democratic backsliding. The responsibility lies solely with the Georgian authorities. In terms of public opinion, the recently published 2025 annual survey results on perceptions towards the EU in Georgia indicate trust towards the EU is at 67%. 74% of citizens would vote in favour of Georgia’s membership of the EU and 80% believe that EU membership would bring more advantages than disadvantages 5 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/15/european-council-conclusions-14-and-15december-2023/. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5633. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-council-conclusions-27-june2024/. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17october-2024. 5 More information available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/special-eurobarometer-and-perceptionsurveys-2025-09-02_en, including Eurobarometer survey results among Member States citizens and perception survey results in Georgia.”
  EU-Georgia relations · EU enlargement
• 2025-09-17 “E-003603/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The French Court of Cassation has recently adopted two judgments aiming at aligning its case-law with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to paid annual leave under Directive 2003/88/EC 1 . In its judgment in case ANGED 2 , the CJEU ruled that a worker who becomes unfit for work during a period of paid annual leave is entitled subsequently to the paid annual leave which coincided with the period of unfitness for work. In case Koch Personaldienstleistungen 3 , the CJEU ruled that in order to determine whether a threshold of hours worked granting entitlement to overtime pay is reached, the hours corresponding to a worker’s period of paid annual leave must be taken into account as hours worked. The Commission does not envisage a revision setting aside the Court’s interpretation of the Directive, which establishes minimum standards aimed at improving the protection of the safety and health of workers within the EU. The Directive applies to all employers regardless of the company size. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/88/oj/eng. 2 Judgment of 21 June 2012, case C-78/11, Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Federación de Asociaciones Sindicales (FASGA) and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:372. The judgement regarded the interpretation of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time. 3 Judgment of 13 January 2022, case C-514/20, DS v Koch Personaldienstleistungen GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2022:19. The judgment regarded the interpretation of Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, read in the light of Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”
  EU competences on social policies · EU policy on permanent and fixed-term employment
• 2025-09-17 “E-003608/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Visa-free travel to the EU is a conditional benefit, contingent upon the fulfilment of specific criteria. One of the criteria is upholding and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Every year the Commission issues a report under the Visa Suspension Mechanism to monitor the EU’s visa-free regimes with third countries, including Georgia. The progress on recommendations is monitored with reference to the previous year’s report and points towards areas that still require improvement. In the seventh Visa Suspension Mechanism Report adopted on 6 December 2024 1 , the Commission called on Georgian authorities to, inter alia, ensure the protection of fundamental rights of all Georgian citizens. The Commission recommended to repeal legislation that restricts fundamental rights and freedoms, goes against the principle of non-discrimination and contradicts relevant European and international standards. This includes the Law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and the legislative package on ‘family values and protection of minors.’ In its upcoming eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism Report, the Commission will review to what extent these recommendations have been addressed by Georgian authorities and decide on the possible activation of the suspension mechanism. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024DC0571&qid=1762252659031.”
  EU-Georgia relations · LGBTIQ+
• 2025-09-17 “E-003606/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. The letter of 14 July 2025 was sent in connection with an analysis of Georgia’s contribution to the eighth Visa Suspension Mechanism Report, which is due to be adopted in December 2025. The letter also drew on other information gathered in that context, which showed that Georgia had not followed the recommendations set out in the seventh report. 2. Georgia obtained exemption from the visa requirement in 2017, following a visa liberalisation dialogue. This arrangement will remain in force only if Georgia continues to honour its commitments.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• 2025-07-29 “E-003126/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission noted the recent arrest of Serbian Government Official, Mr Igor Popović, and his subsequent release on 8 August 2025 following a plea deal. The Commission remains supportive of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue facilitated by the High Representative/Vice President and by the EU Special Representative under the Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/144. In recent weeks, there have been arrests and deportations conducted by Kosovo authorities as well as arrests conducted by Serbian authorities. Such actions and similar escalatory rhetoric are unacceptable and must be avoided. The Commission, together with the European External Action Service, urged Kosovo and Serbia to engage constructively in the EU-facilitated Dialogue. For both parties, it is only through the Dialogue that they can advance on their respective EU paths.”
  EU-Kosovo relations · EU-Serbia relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-07-02 “E-002697/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been closely monitoring developments in the renewed judicial persecution of Mrs Ingabire. In coordination with the Member States, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Delegation in Kigali have raised the case with the Rwandan authorities repeatedly and in various settings. The EU Ambassador in Kigali has engaged with the Minister of Justice and the Chair of Rwanda’s Human Rights Commission. The EU Delegation and the Kingdom of the Netherlands have also been present at the court hearings. The Commission has repeatedly called for due process and the full respect of the rule of law in Rwanda, including the right to a fair trial, access to legal counsel, and adequate detention conditions in line with international standards. The EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kigali, in coordination with Member States, will continue to follow Mrs Ingabire’s legal case with great attention. The EU incorporates a human rights-based approach throughout all cooperation with Rwanda, ensuring that respect for human rights is central to design, implementation, and evaluation of all interventions. This ensures that EU interventions consistently support human rights principles such as universality, inclusion, participation, non-discrimination, accountability and transparency. In addition to this integrated approach, the EU allocates specific funding under the Human Rights and Democracy Programme 1 , which supports a number of projects in Rwanda, including ones aimed at advancing freedom of expression, access to information and non-discrimination. The EU maintains continuous oversight of all projects and the broader situation in Rwanda through regular monitoring and reporting. 1 Multiannual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 for Human Rights and Democracy: https://internationalpartnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/peace-and-governance/human-rights_en#human-rights-and-democracythematic-programme.”
  EU-Rwanda relations
• 2025-05-14 “E-001927/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Central Asia Summit, held on 4 April 2025 in Samarkand (Uzbekistan), served as an opportunity to take the EU’s partnership with Central Asia to the next level, deepening trade, strengthening regional collaboration and expanding people-to-people ties. It reaffirmed the shared commitment to a strategic partnership built on common values and interests. At the Summit, the EU launched a EUR 12 billion Global Gateway investment package – strengthening transport links between Europe and Central Asia and deepening cooperation on critical raw materials, digital connectivity, water, and energy. The majority of this funding is leveraged through investments from European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction (EBRD) and other European financial institutions and the private sector, to be invested in projects of mutual benefit for Central Asia and Europe. Out of this amount, EUR 3 billion are a contribution from Team Europe that is dedicated to developing the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. This amount is a confirmation of the commitments made by the EIB and the EBRD at the EU-Central Asia Transport Investors Forum in January 2024. A further EUR 6.4 billion are dedicated to energy, water, and climate initiatives, such as the hydropower plants in Rogun (Tajikistan) and Kambarata (Kyrgyzstan), which are crucial for energy security and sustainable development, supported by blending and guarantees. EUR 2.5 billion, partially guaranteed by the EU, will focus on securing supply chains for critical raw materials, including from Uzbekistan’s Almalyk Copper Mine. Digital connectivity receives EUR 100 million – comprising an EU grant and an EIB loan – to enhance infrastructure and accessibility.”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments
• 2025-03-18 “E-001147/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 1. On 1 April 2023, the former Director-General of the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE) was transferred in the interest of the service as Hors Classe Adviser in the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). In this role, he provides support to the senior management in delivering on key initiatives under the Global Gateway Strategy, with a particular focus on Africa and Central Asia. The Hors Classe Adviser provides high-level oversight for identifying and implementing Global Gateway flagship projects, ensuring alignment with geopolitical and economic priorities. He works under the direct supervision of the Director-General of DG INTPA. 2. The internal disciplinary procedure is ongoing, and the Commission does not provide information on individual cases.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Activities of EU Ombudsman
• 2025-03-12 “E-001071/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission On 17 March 2025, the EU hosted the ninth Brussels Conference on ‘Standing with Syria: meeting the needs for a successful transition’ to support Syria’s transition process and socioeconomic recovery, while also addressing the immediate humanitarian needs, both in Syria and the region. The conference brought together key regional and international partners, as well as members of the Syrian civil society. This being a ministerial event, Foreign Minister H.E. Asaad Hasan Al-Shaibani of the Syrian transitional government was the Syrian representative invited, who attended the Conference 1 . It is worth to remind that he is not listed under the EU restrictive measures against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Da’esh and AlQaeda (United Nations-EU mixed regime). The fall of the Assad regime signals a historic moment for the Syrian people. In this critical period, the EU supports an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition, guided by the respect for international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance among all components of Syrian society. The EU welcomes the interim authorities’ recent first steps towards an inclusive transition, such as the National Dialogue Conference, the announcement of the new transitional government on 29 March 2025 and the agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces. The EU was gravely alarmed by the recent violent events in the coastal areas and strongly condemned the crimes committed against civilians 2 . In this context, it welcomed the swift establishment of an investigative committee to hold all perpetrators accountable. The EU will remain attentive to the statements but more importantly the actions of the new authorities in ensuring the protection and fundamental freedoms of all Syrians, without distinction. 1 See the press release of 18 March 2025: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2025/03/18/brussels-ix-conference-on-standing-with-syria-meeting-the-needs-for-a-successfultransition-joint-press-statement/ 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/”
  EU-Syria relations
• 2025-03-04 “E-000898/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 1 is a tool to help the EU address illicit trafficking and to promote a sustainable and responsible sourcing and processing of raw materials. The MoU was negotiated by the Commission on the basis of a mandate by the Council of the EU and is in line with the EU’s renewed Great Lakes Strategy 2 . The MoU has provided a platform to encourage Rwandan authorities to adhere to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 3 . Its cancelation would remove the basis for this engagement with Rwanda on improving transparency and traceability. The MoU and the Conflict Minerals Regulation 4 are coherent and have the potential to reinforce each other. The main objective of the Regulation is to ensure that EU importers of tin, tantalum, tungsten buy from responsible sources only, in line with the standards set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 5 . The EU has been financing the European Partnership for Responsible Minerals 6 , an accompanying measure to the Conflict Minerals Regulation, while also aiming at improving mineral resources management. The programme ‘Peace and Security for Stability in the Great Lakes region’ 7 , which supports the implementation of a regional certification mechanism, also aims at reducing mineral resources impact on conflict. The Commission takes note of the call expressed by the European Parliament in its plenary resolution of 13 February 2025 8 . Following the Foreign Affairs Council meetings of 24 February and 17 March 2025, several measures have been taken, including the adoption of additional restrictive measures, the suspension of the EU security and defence consultations with Rwanda. The MoU regarding critical raw materials was put under review 9 . In line with the calls from African partners, the EU fully supports the mediation efforts aiming at ending the atrocities and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/58035. 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6631-2023-INIT/en/pdf. 3 https://eiti.org/. 4 Regulation (EU) 2017/821, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32017R0821. 5 https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/an-international-standard-oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-mineralsupply-chains.htm, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-onresponsible-business-conduct_81f92357-en.html. 6 https://europeanpartnership-responsibleminerals.eu/. 7 Details of this programme are available at this link: https://mirego.bi/applications/views/UE.php. 8 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0020_EN.html. 9 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/02/24/.”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
• 2024-11-20 “E-002598/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is well aware of the importance of the United States (US) export market for European spirits exporters. With regard to the aviation dispute, the EU and US have agreed to suspend their respective additional tariffs until 11 July 2026 and there is full alignment between the EU and US suspension. With regard to the steel and aluminium dispute, a sizeable portion of EU steel and aluminium exports continues to be subject to those tariffs. The EU on its side has not collected any duty on US exports since 1 January 2022. The Commission will spare no effort to try to reach permanent solutions with the US on these important disputes. The Commission is also well aware of the importance of the Chinese export market and will continue to work towards opening further market access for EU agri-food products in China. The Commission considers that the three recent trade defence proceedings initiated by China against agri-food imports are unfounded and in breach of World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements. Regarding more specifically China’s anti-dumping investigation against EU brandy imports, the EU has already taken action over the imposition of provisional duties by challenging these duties at the WTO. The Commission has also taken action at the WTO against the initiation of the anti-subsidy investigation by China on dairy products from the EU. The Commission is already strongly engaging with the Member States and relevant industry organisations on the above trade discussions and will continue doing so in the future.”
  Trade relations with China · EU-US trade relations · Export of EU agri-food products
• 2024-11-13 “E-002532/2024 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Since 2014, the Instrument for Pre-accession 1 (IPA II and IPA III) provided EUR 125.5 million for supporting the sector of rule of law and fundamental rights. Programming of IPA 20252027 is ongoing. The Commission has developed a standard set of tools to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of EU assistance, including in the area of rule of law, for example through daily contacts with Kosovo 2 authorities and contractors through the EU Office on the ground. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo also supports specifically rule of law institutions in Kosovo on their path towards increased independence, effectiveness, sustainability, multi-ethnicity and accountability, in line with international human rights standards and best European practices. In addition, the Commission’s external monitoring system, the Results-Oriented Monitoring 3 (ROM), provides external independent assessment of the progress achieved with the EU assistance, and reinforces the practice of results-based management in EU external action operations, as part of the Commission’s commitment to support effectiveness and accountability. In the last 10 years, 75 ROM exercises were conducted, leading to numerous recommendations having been addressed, including in the area of rule of law. The IPA Monitoring Committee, the highest-level EU-Kosovo dialogue on EU assistance, regularly discusses the progress on EU assistance for each sector and globally. It results in recommendations that the beneficiary country has to address; the progress is reviewed at the following meeting. Strategic evaluation of the EU financial assistance in Kosovo was launched in 2024 and the report is expected to be published in 2025. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/overview-instrument-pre-accession-assistance/kosovofinancial-assistance-under-ipa_en 2 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/1999 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence 3 https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/groups/rom/info/what-results-oriented-monitoring_en”
  EU enlargement
• 2024-11-06 “E-002445/2024 Answer given by Ms Brunner on behalf of the European Commission While continuously monitoring the volatile situation in Syria, and in line with the European Council Conclusions of 19 December 2024 1 , the EU is committed to help creating the conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees, as defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in particular by supporting Syrians who voluntarily decide to go home and by stepping up its humanitarian and early recovery support in sectors crucial for sustainable returns. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Syria relations
• 2024-11-06 “E-002442/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s programming of 2024 non-humanitarian assistance aligned with the Council conclusions of 16 April 2018 1 , emphasising that EU aid must benefit Syrian population without benefits accruing to the Syrian regime. The fall of the regime reshaped the situation, making a Syrian-led, inclusive political process in the spirit of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2254 2 a priority for an inclusive and peaceful political transition. The EU support initiatives pipeline is guided by commitment to inclusiveness, respect of human rights, including women’s rights, protection of religious and ethnic minorities and fostering peaceful transition. On 13 December 2024, the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations announced 3 that the Commission mobilised EUR 4 million in additional aid to address the most urgent humanitarian needs of people, bringing total support to EUR 163 million in 2024. The special measure for 2024 4 allocates EUR 36 million to critical areas like health, education, civil documentation, housing, property rights, civil society and justice. Assistance targets areas with acute needs and significant numbers of returning refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as on the creation of conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified returns of Syrian refugees, as defined by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The EU collaborates with UN agencies, Member State agencies, Syrian-led and international non-governmental organisations, maintaining regular dialogue with civil society across Syria and in the diaspora. As the situation evolves, the EU will adjust its approach, if needed, in response to the actions and policies of the new authorities, with the overarching aim of supporting the Syrian people and ensuring an inclusive transition and sustainable peace and stability. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7956-2018-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/814715/?v=pdf 3 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-launches-humanitarian-air-bridgeoperation-syria-deliver-emergency-supplies-and-boosts-2024-12-13_en 4 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/commission-implementing-decision-29112024-financingspecial-measure-favour-syria-2024_en?prefLang=pt”
  EU-Syria relations · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2024-11-06 “E-002444/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Negotiations for the regional EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Free Trade Agreement (FTA) were suspended in 2008, due to different levels of ambition. Exploratory discussions regarding the possibility of re-launching negotiations were held with the GCC counterparts in 2024 and these confirmed that the GCC maintained its reservations on key issues: export duties, trade and sustainable development, public procurement and investment. In this light and in line with the conclusions of the EU-GCC Summit of October 2024 1 , which called for the EU and the GCC to explore tailor-made agreements supporting trade and investments, the EU intends to upgrade relations with the Gulf partners and, in complementarity with the EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement (1989) 2 , establish a comprehensive, legally binding framework at bilateral level by offering bilateral partnership agreements with each of the six Gulf countries, based on the EU Gulf Strategy (2022) 3 . In parallel, the EU would be open to explore preferential trade agreements with those Gulf countries that are interested and share the level of ambition, while aiming to take forward discussions at regional level with a view to reach a regional GCC-EU Free Trade Agreement, including an investment chapter. The EU and the GCC will also work together to advance the scope of the Trade and Investment Dialogue through new areas, i.e. regulatory cooperation, restrictive measures, protection of intellectual property rights including geographical indications. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2024/10/16/ 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A1989%3A054%3ATOC 3 COM/EEAS Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council A strategic partnership with the Gulf, 18.5.2022 JOIN (2022) 13 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022JC0013”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2024-10-17 “E-002131/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attaches high value to its strategic partnership with Morocco, which is longstanding, wide-ranging and deep. Over the years, the EU has established a profound friendship and a solid and multi-faceted cooperation, which it intends to take to the next level in the coming weeks and months. The Commission has taken note of the recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Commission services are currently analysing them in detail. In this context, the Commission takes note that the Court of Justice preserves the validity of the agreement on agricultural products for an additional 12 months 1 . In close cooperation with Morocco, the EU firmly intends to preserve and continue strengthening close relations with Morrocco in all areas of the EU-Morocco partnership, in line with the conclusions of the European Council of 17 October 2024 2 . 1 Judgment of 4 October 2024, Commission v Front Polisario, Joined Cases C-779/21 P and C-799/21 P, EU:C:2024:835. 2 See point 51: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-25-2024-INIT/en/pdf”
  Trade relations with Morocco · EU policy on Western Sahara · EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2024-10-17 “E-002130/2024 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly called on all parties involved in the conflict to exert maximum restraint and to abide by international law, including international humanitarian law. Medical and humanitarian personnel as well as their means of transport and equipment, hospitals, and other medical facilities must be respected and protected at all times. The EU has also advocated for an accountable deconfliction system to allow humanitarian aid workers to provide assistance while guaranteeing their safety. Upon the escalation of hostilities, the Commission mobilised an additional EUR 25 million in humanitarian assistance to Lebanon in 2024 to respond to the needs, including health needs, of the population affected by the conflict. This includes EUR 10 million from the EUR 30 million emergency support announced by the President of the Commission on 3 October 2024 1 , with the remaining EUR 20 million to be implemented by the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf. The total humanitarian assistance for Lebanon in 2024 amounted to EUR 92 million. Over EUR 15 million of which was allocated to the provision of health services to all populations in need in Lebanon, including vulnerable Lebanese, refugees, and other population of concern. Lebanon made a request for health supplies to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism 2 on 18 September 2024. Nine Member States responded positively. In addition, the EU launched a humanitarian air bridge to Lebanon. Between 11 October 2024 and 7 January 2025, 12 flights carried over 395 tons of humanitarian assistance from EU-owned stock into the country. The Commission is increasing its initial humanitarian support in 2025, starting with an allocation of EUR 80 million. 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-boosts-humanitarian-aid-lebanoneu30-million-bringing-total-over-eu100-million-2024-2024-10-03_en 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2024-10-03 “E-001947/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission In line with the Apulia G7 Leaders’ communiqué of 14 June 2024 1 and the European Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 2 , the EU agreed to further support Ukraine’s urgent budgetary needs under the G7 ‘Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans (ERA) initiative. In light of the confirmed contributions of G7 partners, ensuring support proportionate to the size of their respective economies, the EU expects to provide a Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan of approximately EUR 18.1 billion as its contribution to the ERA initiative. ERA loans will be repaid by extraordinary revenues stemming from the immobilisation of Russian Central Bank assets. 3 Russia must end its illegal war of aggression and pay for the damage it has caused to Ukraine in line with international law. The EU fiscal surveillance is based on the principles of national accounts recording. The proposed MFA loan to Ukraine would be made by the Union, and it would not affect the net government expenditure of the EU Member States. 1 See: Apulia G7 Leaders Communiqué https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-LeadersCommunique.pdf 2 See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf 3 See Commission’s press release (26 October 2024): https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5473”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2024-09-26 “E-001835/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission The General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) 1 , like the current General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) 2 , applies to second-hand products except for those products marked as to be repaired or reconditioned prior to their use. The GPSR does not apply to antiques, work of art or collectors’ items 3 . Second-hand products not excluded under one of the above-mentioned categories and made available on the EU market from 13 December 2024 will need to comply with the requirements laid down in the GPSR: distributors must verify that the manufacturer or the importer complied with certain specific requirements of the GPSR on traceability and labelling 4 before making a product available on the EU market, and ensure that they do not jeopardise the safety of the product during storage or transport. Products that were already placed on the EU market before 13 December 2024 can remain on the market with no new requirements linked to labelling, including for resale as second hand after that date, provided that they complied with the GPSD. However, when making products available on the EU markets, distributors of cultural products, such as books, CDs, DVDs or video games will need to ensure that products placed by manufacturers or importers on the EU market as of 13 December 2024 fulfil the applicable traceability and labelling requirements, unless these products fall into one of the categories explicitly excluded from the scope of the GPSR. In accordance with Article 17 GPSR, support designed to facilitate compliance of SMEs with the GPSR will be made available. In particular, the Commission is in the process of adopting guidelines for economic operators, focussing on the needs of SMEs, including microenterprises, on how to fulfil their obligations. 5 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety (OJ L 135, 23.5.2023, p. 1–51). 2 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety (OJ L 11, 15.1.2002, p. 4). 3 Under Article 3 of the GPSR ‘antiques’ means products, such as collectors’ items or works of art, in relation to which consumers cannot reasonably expect that they fulfil state-of-the-art safety standards. In the EU legal framework, works of art are products created solely for artistic purposes usually created by hand. Collectors’ items must be of sufficient rarity and historical or scientific interest to justify their collection and preservation. Antiques are goods other than collectors’ items or work of art which are of an extraordinary age. This definition can be found in Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1). As referred to in recital 18 GPSR. 4 Article 12 of the GPSR indeed requires distributors to verify that the manufacturer and, where applicable, the importer have complied with the requirements set out in Article 9(5), (6) and (7) and Article 11(3) and (4), as applicable before placing a product on the market. 5 In addition to the guidelines and in accordance with article 47 of the GPSR, the Commission is to carry out an evaluation by the end of 2029, where it will assess if the Regulation has achieved its objectives while also taking into account its impact on SMEs.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU (free access) · EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
• 2024-07-24 “E-001420/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The EU's support to Lebanon is not based on a predefined geographical distribution. Instead, it is guided by the needs on the ground, which determine where activities under each program are implemented. The strategic thinking behind these allocations prioritises supporting longterm stability and reforms, addressing access to services for the vulnerable population, and promoting sustainable development across the country. For bilateral support, priorities are set out in the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 1 for 2021-2027, adopted in November 2022. This program focuses on three key priority areas: 1. Enhancing good governance and supporting reforms, 2. Strengthening an inclusive and resilient economy, and 3. Promoting a green and sustainable recovery. The MIP includes an indicative percentage distribution by sector, which can be adjusted if necessary, following consultations with national authorities and other stakeholders. Regarding the EU´s response to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon, the focus is on addressing the most urgent needs—social assistance and access to services—for both Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese. While there is no predefined geographical distribution of this support, it is concentrated in areas with a higher presence of these populations. From 2015 to 2020, this support was provided through the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (MADAD) 2 . Since 2021, EU support has been delivered via special measures under the Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) 3 . 1 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/multi-annual-indicative-programme-european-union-lebanon2021-2027_en 2 https://trustfund-syria-region.ec.europa.eu/index_en 3 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/funding-and-technical-assistance/neighbourhooddevelopment-and-international-cooperation-instrument-global-europe-ndici-global-europe_en”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Funding for EU Neighbourhood
• “We disagree on Mercosur for that reason. But I'm wondering if there isn't something worse than Mercosur when discussing this with agricultural organizations. Agreements signed with Ukraine are opening up quotas on a whole series of products with our free trade agreement, of course, but involving specific measures. I discussed this with producers in Sugar and France saying, we're going to stop. We can't compete anymore. The production costs are not at all the same. The checks are not the same, controls are not the same, and we are destined to fail completely. So I. Address this to the president of the commission and maybe to you. Could we not have an overall vision of where we are at with agricultural agreements with Ukraine, because these individual measures are gaining in importance over the long term, and this is a problem for our French farmers. Third point, even this is not the subject of the agreement with the United States, but we need to really take stock and see what stage we are at. And if there's been a development with respect to the visitor in Washington.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• “It's not just for Moldova, it's more for Ukraine. I can go on. Thanks, president. The commission has once again betrayed the European people. On the basis of the Association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. It's raising the Ukraine agricultural tariffs by 33%. 4%, compared to the pig figures before the war. Milk powder has just disappeared, and we can see that our farmers are going to the wall. Young people are abandoning farming because they can't make ends meet. So why are you making this gift, obviously, to continue the war and subsidize a bankrupt state, but also to march towards the accession of the of Ukraine to the European Union or whatever cost the European people should realize that your hidden objective is going to come at a cost to them. Uh, €186 million, according to a study, um, that's been carried out for reconstruction. So this means less funds for the existing member states, less money in the cap. And it's always the same. The bill, a salary of €400 a month. Ukraine is going to become the dumping Paradise of the European Union. And we know what's going to happen. Mass relocation, de localization, deindustrialization of certain parts of our countries and, uh, ruining bankruptcy for some, some of our territories. The commission has also signed the agreement with Mercosur. So this is twofold, uh, a betrayal of our farmers and another nail in the coffin of European farming. So our farmers are paying the price. They're making a sacrifice for this deadly agreement, which has been negotiated in secret without our citizens being consulted.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• “Thank you. Chairman. Commissioner, you said that on the 30th of October that €9 million would be released and that the D or C is one of the worst situations of our time. However, I think. That at the moment the DRC needs this the most because there was an agreement signed in Washington. And this contrasts with what the reality on the ground in November. Hundreds of people of civilians were killed, among them women. In another city. And there was another incident. You yourself said that the army troops were responsible. What is the commission doing to stop Rwanda and the M23, um, troops? There was a resolution to ask for sanctions against Rwanda. And we're learning that €900 million are actually going to Rwanda in the global gateway. But Rwanda is continuing to to fund these soldiers. How can we have these double standards?”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• “Thank you very much. I listened Listen to all the speakers. I think, uh, regardless of our political group, we agree on transparency and governance. There isn't transparency, but it's been months that have been asking, could the speaker please turn towards the microphone? Governance. You said chair, there are there have been two meetings in four years. Uh, I wouldn't say that. It's humorous, but it's not serious. How many billions of euros we need to have, uh, some results? I think all of the groups agree on this, and I've said that. I say that there's a third point, that there are two schools of thought on that is pragmatic pragmatism. I met a certain number of ambassadors of Asian or African African countries, and three of them said the same thing. When the Chinese, uh, come to us, they say, well, we have so many billion euros, what should we do? Um, when the Europeans come, They say, well, this is what we want for this subject on human rights for minorities. So I understand that everyone has their opinions, but if we prioritize a we need to know, uh, if we want to prioritize, uh, efficiency and effectiveness or subjects that, uh, would be more at home, uh, it's an NGO, human rights, etc.. Um, everyone has their choice, but I think we need to at least be able to make progress on the first two things. And I think for the fifth or sixth time, I'm making the same request here. Uh, I did the same thing in Afit after four years. Can we just have a little table to say, uh, who's paid and how much? Because there was another ambassador that I met said. Uh. Said that there are different, uh, different NGOs, different companies that were giving me this. And then the EU that was giving me something else. And there was sort of a double accounting. Uh, but it was a bit done to kind of cook the books. So, uh, could the speaker please turn back towards the microphone?”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you very much, chairman. Well, this agreement was finished only two hours ago. So I'd like to see the text, of course. But I must say that this is a wonderful chance for our European manufacturers, and we can reinforce our presence in a growing economy in a country which is 1.5 billion people, a country of 1.5 billion people. It's very important for our entrepreneurs, our or SMEs or technology industries. For France in particular, we have now a wider access to this dynamic market with all the tools that that gives us. But we must be vigilant on two essential points. First of all, agriculture. I've noted what has been said by the Commission representative, but Europe cannot accept that our agriculture suffers unfair competition from countries who do not have the correct rules or other doubtful rules. We therefore believe that sensitive sectors of agriculture have to be excluded. Beef, rice, Sucre sugar. Because we've been defending these sectors for a very long time, there has to be an exception for France and for Europe to give our farmers sovereignty. And then mobility and visas, if we want to encourage trade and professional exchange, we must realize that Europe will be faced with the social dumping and salary dumping because of the massive transfer of workers and salaries going down there for in Europe. That's a question that I have for you, and I hope that in this agreement we'll be able to deal with any clandestine worker problems and that we can manage to deal with that.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• “Chairman, the revision of the FTAs with Ukraine and Moldova is not a simple technical update. Uh, to, uh, support a, uh, an ongoing war. The commission doesn't know what else to do with this file. The proposal is to accelerate accession of the two countries to the EU. And that might include, uh, open markets, which could ruin our companies and our farmers. How can we justify this opening of our, uh, markets to, uh, these, uh, countries where there is such a great difference in production cost and where they don't have the same standards in France. Farmers are struggling to survive and they're going to have to, uh, suffer. Low cost, low quality, subsidized Ukrainian Moldovan produce. Your strategy seems, uh, to be a run counter to what the people of Europe want. And nor do they want this endless war.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• “The only action plan for fertilisers that should be implemented by the Commission is to bring prices down and stop adding more red tape to bureaucracy because since 2021, the European Union has been accumulating strategic errors, putting implementing sanctions and penalties against Russia and others. They represent 20% 20% of our nitrogen demand and 40% for potassium. It's not the same as having sanctions imposed on gas or oil. With regard to Belarus, the sanctions began back in 21 before the Ukraine war. As a consequence, an explosion of prices and at the end of the day, profits and benefits for those countries because all they did was redeploy their circuits with higher prices. So at the same time, the Americans know they've never, uh, put, um, penalties or tariffs on Russian fertilizers. Um, they are selling them at the price of gold these days as a result. So all the problems that we talk about that have been mentioned elsewhere are fade in comparison. And the European citizens are paying these exorbitant prices. They can't afford and the poorer countries as well under threat, uh, with regard to famine. All these absurd sanctions, which didn't even penalize the two countries that were targeted. If you want to bring down the prices, that's the answer, because the families in Europe depend on it for their future for ECR.”
  Use of fertilisers
• “Now you wonder, does it make sense? You know, discussing with the GCC, which has six very different members, as you know better than me. You've got Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE. Does it make sense to work with those that are more decisive, that are more advanced, for instance, UAE on this? Again, it's one of the weaknesses of the EU vis a vis the outside world that it's so burdensome, it takes so long. And again, it took them only eight weeks to sign an agreement with India. And my third topic, something I've mentioned many times. So I can just sum it up here. Critical earth critical minerals. The US is getting in the way of the EU in the Great Lakes region. We have had something coming out of this committee with something very critical on Rwanda and the rare earth minerals there. I wonder, are you planning on taking any action on this? The Parliament did ask that this agreement be denounced, because everybody knows that it's going to be one of the big issues and one of the big problems for Congo. Thank you.”
  EU relations with Qatar
• “We also need clear and regular audits, not just internal but independent audits as well, because an instrument that claims to live up to the major international instruments needs to meet the minimum requirements of, uh, readability of control. And without this, it risks being ineffective beyond transparency. There is also, secondly, a strategic coherence problem for four years. The definition of global gateway hasn't been clear. Is it a development instrument, a geopolitical instrument or just a trade instrument? The answer varies depending on the document and the scattered explanations of the DGS or commissioner involved. And this undermines the EU's external effectiveness because it waters down its objectives instead of strengthening them. So we want clarification here. The global gateway needs to be a strategic tool to benefit Europeans, whether this is industry security, geopolitical. And so we need, uh, to understand that, uh, on the ground, competition is fierce. The US is reorganizing its development policy and other actors are creating their own structural and technological paths. And so we can't have a naive approach here. That's why my support, my report, I support the role that Global Gateway can play in securing our supplies, in diversifying our partnerships and in strengthening our industrial base, because global gateway needs, first of all, to open up markets to Europe without paving the way for our competitors.”
  Global priorities for international development
• “Bringing to a close a voluntary partnership agreement without a specific alternative, while still applying budgetary pressure on good forestry management. I think the European Union is compromising its own pcdi its policy coherence and development in abandoning instruments that are meant to guarantee sustainability and good use of resources would be the wrong approach. 2025, for example, as many as 26 million for forestry and competitive and sustainable cacao in Cameroon. We are seeing the ambition set out here, which may be too ambitious, but it's gone through the whole fledged system and the European Union, uh, maybe should have better discussions with their partners in Africa rather than leaving them in the clutches of China, etc. and we should help these developing countries. So we're seeing that Asia and market is taking advantage of that. And you and Cameroon doesn't need us anymore. And our lack of action leaves a bad taste in the mouth. Really. And this lack of coherence, we think, damages the image of the EU and its environmental attempts. The partners and local stakeholders see a gap between words and deeds. Rather than breaking this voluntary partnership agreement, we think it would be better to modify it, set some milestones for cooperation and put in some encouragement, some incentives, rather than just cutting things off in administrative terms. And chair, if I may, maybe I can draw a parallel with another file. I heard the rapporteur talking about the lack of control mechanisms or control mechanisms that aren't enforced yet and not up to scratch, and therefore we need to cancel this VPA. Maybe I can just remind you as an aside, that this is the same as the Rwanda agreement on rare earth minerals, but you're saying we have to keep this because it's better to have a pathway to discuss things than to break off dialogue. I failed to see the logic here. If Cameroon should be treated differently to Rwanda, Wonder. Or is it that timber is a very different kettle of fish? We have an agreement that's not being applied. Both occasions, surely it should be. We should act the same rather than having double standards unturned.”
  Global priorities for international development
• “Mr. Minister, the Hungarian government made a serious mistake. You came forward too fast and some want to make you pay. Fighting illegal immigration and is even a priority for the Socialist chancellor in Germany. Now the efficiency of returns of illegal migrants will be key to this. And often there's a problem with lack of cooperation with countries of origin. The EU spends more than 90 billion on development aid per year, so we're the main providers of public donors for development. Would it not, therefore, be appropriate to set conditions on this aid to genuine cooperation on migration? So what commitments will the presidency enter into to ensure such conditions? Has the Hungarian presidency drawn up a migration index on the basis of harmonised criteria, to a degree to judge the degree of cooperation on countries of origin? France welcomes hundreds of thousands of Algerians. The government refuses to take them back when there's a problem. And that's a typical example.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you. Chair. Well, the digital trade agreement between the EU and Singapore is a really good and strategic opportunity to enhance our exchanges and trade where we're facing a competitiveness, for example. That's digital, the digital sector. So in 2019, we had the FTA, EU, Singapore FTA. And we have to ensure that this continues to be respected. Now there are major partner within Asean and we have they have favourable conditions in this, uh, very advanced market. Some technical points have been called to our attention, such as data source codes and access to those source codes. And discussions, however, have brought us a happy balance. Review clauses have been provided for. And we have the possibility to review this in future in terms of legislation. So the question of checking software for legitimate reasons is important. And protection of data is still covered by our commitments in Europe. This does not tie the hands of the legislators on the quite the opposite. It gives European enterprises more leeway. We need more agreements like this, targeted and balanced with reliable partners, because these are agreements that make sense, strategically speaking. Unlike the Mercosur agreement, which was totally imbalanced both environmentally, socially and economically. So we support consent for this agreement with Singapore, and it is important that we selection our partners carefully and that we support our enterprises throughout the world where the conditions are in place for a stable and fair competition that would be mutually beneficial and beneficial. And this applies to Singapore. Thank you.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• “Mr. Commissioner. The French do not want this agreement. We can see no reason why the European Union should sacrifice French farmers for the benefits of European industry, such as the car manufacturing industry in Germany. We are going to see that we are going to face unfair competition with production standards, which are far below our own. Who can believe that Brussels is going to actually check on the huge farms in Brazil and Argentina? In reality, the commission is essentially offering us or suggesting a microphone for the speaker, please. Unfortunately, we've lost the speaker's microphone.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you. In 1981, I was working in a French steel manufacturing group, and we were told that the Avignon plant had to save the whole of the European industry for 45 years. This is ongoing and the situation has become untenable. Prices are exploding, their highest in the world. And our competitors in China and the US are benefiting from much more competitive tariffs. So what about unfair practices also dumping artificial overcapacities. And we remain a spectator in Europe and our competition competitors are cheating. And we also even go into signing trade agreements with them, opening our borders without any reciprocity. And it is no longer tenable. So if you look at steel, it's gone down by 32% and the sector has lost more than 100 million jobs, 100,000 jobs. And we really need to realize that this is a strategic issue. Um, we have the first European treaty, but we are now incapable of defending our interests. Will we continue to be so in the future? Thank you very much.”
  Trade relations with China
• “In reality, we are essentially being offered the opportunity to give up our food sovereignty, one which I think is already suffering greatly because of excessive regulation. This is a report from the French Senate published in December, which said that between 2019 and 2024, 13,000 rules adopted by the European have been adopted by the European Union in the United States. It's just 6500. How can you expect our farmers and part of our industry to continue to be competitive, if this is the situation the commission is talking about a drop in beef production between 0.7 and 1.2%. I think that is completely. Far below reality. And the beef producers are going to suffer. And then what happens when it comes to the environmental standards in many of the countries in the Mercosur, Mercosur region? These are inexistent. There are risks for European health. Uh products from the Mercosur countries contain pesticides and substances which are banned in Europe, and customs checks will not stop these products from getting in. So how are you going to carry out the checks from far of farm produce in American Latin, in Latin America? And what about the famous mirror clauses that were mentioned but nobody is talking about anymore?”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thank you very much, chair. And thank you very much to the authors of the study. Our group asked for this report, and it is a very interesting one. Let me ask a provocative question. What's the traceability system for if it's not doing its job? We want to know where minerals come from. The studies show us clear things, namely that the systems are contravened and are not effective. The. It's-i system is supposed to follow. Tungsten, tantalum, gold. And in the great Great Lakes region is undermined by double double tagging, corruption and what have you. And it's all been documented turning now to illegally mined minerals in DRC. They're still arriving in Europe, but they've been relabeled as coming from Rwanda. The 2024 agreement between Rwanda and the EU on critical minerals traceability hasn't really led to any serious change in the DRC. However, the population is paying in blood for these resources and its resources are being pillaged. Large part of supposedly Rwandan resources actually come from DRC. Mr. Kagame's country is not a producer country, but it's a hub for laundering minerals. And all of that is happening with consent and complicity. From Europe. Why don't we just suspend the agreement? Chairman, let me remind you that in this committee and in the inter committee, that I'm also a member of the European Commission, lied to us for a year.”
  Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
• “Thank you for 25 years. The Mercosur agreement has been betraying us. It's massively rejected by our farmers and a great portion of our public opinion. Without mentioning part of this European Parliament in 1997 and 2008, Council was clear. The agreement needs to be a global mixed based on the unanimity of member states and ratified by national parliaments. France has recalled this recently. Any other format would be a betrayal of the initial mandate. Today, we see that the Commission could split the agreement and split off the trade part and base it on qualified, qualified majority. That would be dangerous. The Commission has never imposed a trade agreement on member states that are opposed to it. Mr. Benazzi, I would like to ask you clearly, is it the intention of the Commission? Are you going to push this through against the willingness of the people of Europe, or will or will you respect the initial mandate and the spirit of the treaty, and what remains of confidence between the institutions and the people? We need democracy.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Yes. Dear chair, the national French Radio this morning was talking about the refugees who are going from Lebanon to Syria. Um, it would have been the equivalent of 22 million refugees if we're talking about France, Because we're talking about a third of their population at 2 million in total, out of a hole of 6 million for the total Lebanese population. We see that this dramatic situation is going to move to Syria. As my colleague was saying, in Syria, the whole area that is controlled by the legal government which won the war, whether we like it or not, is out of humanitarian aid coverage, and they're going to be more and more refugees in this area. So the question is, what are you going to do for this region of Syria where there are more and more? I know that we have these different regions. The we have the Kurdistan region where many of the refugees are are Kurds. But here in this region. This is under the control of the legal government. And what can we actually do to protect populations here in this area? Thank you.”
  EU-Syria relations
• “And there's one point I'd like to insist on, and that's this there's no hostility towards other countries. The approach is simple. Partnerships need to be mutually beneficial here. We need to support local development, the creating value on the ground, industrialisation and job creation in partnership partner countries. But we also need to create opportunities for European companies, in particular for SMEs that are underrepresented in major external projects of the EU. In terms of conditionality, The reports report doesn't pose a moral and ideological conditions. We know that this is often not effective and poorly perceived, but we have a strategic conditionality based on concrete goals that affect Europe combating criminal networks, stabilising borders, security of infrastructure, cooperation on illegal immigration, and protecting supply chains. It makes sense that a country that doesn't, that refuses to cooperate on these issues that are essential for European security shouldn't benefit automatically from financing. This is a basic principle of coherence. So these are the three main lines transparency, pragmatism and coherence that I think it would be useful to clarify if we really want to guarantee that global gateway is effective and understandable. So thank you.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• “Thank you. Chair. I have three completely different questions to ask. I'll just ask them quickly. First Mercosur. You are familiar with the French position on this, which is shared by the vast majority of political parties in France. So I don't need to dwell on this, but there is some concern on the part of French farmers with respect to being the main victims of this agreement. So three small questions on that one. Where are we at in terms of possible compensation for damages for farmers that will be falling victim to this agreement? Two. Are is there any progress that's been made? Any possible movement on the mirror clauses. And three. Do you think this is something that's going to be adopted before the end of the year? I mean, you just said that, so I'm wondering what sort of a timetable there might be. What? So what form will that agreement take? None of the second topic. Gulf cooperation. You know, there's six members on the Gulf Cooperation Council. There's United Arab Emirates. We were on a mission, and we were told there that the UAE had a negotiated agreement with India in eight weeks, and they were wondering why it was taking the EU so long.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Mr. president. Thank you very much. Thank you to the authors of this study for their work. It shows clearly that farmers today are stuck between the growth of our markets, of imports and then an increasing regulatory burden. And we're they're suffering from the farm to fork strategy. The Brussels ideas look good on paper, but they haven't led to a great loss in competitivity for our producers and their incomes. Their revenues are going down. There are imports then also from countries that do not respect our standards nor our restrictions, but are still benefiting from comparative advantages in terms of labor costs, access to markets and tax regimes. And the result is a silent decrease in growth. Although there are sometimes farmers protests in Brussels. We have seen that the defensive strategies are collapsing for sugar and beef and other crops and chicken. We have a big problem with at the moment, and I'm not sure whether your study took account of the various measures that were recently accepted by the European Union. But when we discuss this with people in the sector, it's clear. So this is unfair and suicidal in terms of this decrease in growth. And if you look at the European trade policy, it is not. It is not. It's something that is intending to promote food security and creativity, but big mistakes are being made. So if we really want to reconcile this with competitivity and production, then we need a Green deal. We need to protect the producers with mirror clauses that are absolutely solid, because sometimes we put things into the text that do not work on behalf of the producers. We also need to put all of this at the heart of our policies.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “It said to us that the agreement would guarantee a traceability to later admit in Inter that there was no traceability at all. But never mind. You can lie to the Parliament. That's perfectly normal. So let me say a few things. Mr. Marshall, you talked about due diligence and collaboration, but in technical terms, how is that going to work? Mr. Kopp, you said 220 tons of coltan. So $800 million worth enters Rwanda every year. My apologies. I'll slow down. I thought time was limited. Mr. Karp, you talked about 220 tonnes coming from Rwanda. I beg your pardon? Coming from DRC and being sold by Rwanda each month. Now, you said that Luxembourg is buying. That's an EU member state. I'm quite sure that this has nothing to do with the fact that Luxembourg vetoed the application of sanctions on Rwanda. And I'm quite convinced also that there is no link between the fact that Luxembourg and Rwanda have an agreement setting up a financial platform in the Great Lakes region.”
  EU-Rwanda relations
• “Without Russian gas. Europe is showing how blinkered it is. Sanctions as a political instrument. Conditional. Reversible. Adaptable is one thing. This regulation is devastating because in legal terms, it is putting a decision in place without any review clause, without any possibility for Europe to adapt. And that is true even if the geopolitical situation changes and a peace agreement is concluded with Russia. Historic. It is dramatic. We have never broken our energy links with the Great East at any point in history. Even at the historical low points, it's a strategic lever for peace and for Europe. Freezing Russian assets for an indefinite period is putting Brussels into a position of contempt of history and of its own continent. The classic Sanctions type regime. The spirit and letter of the treaty have not been respected. There is not the standard legal basis and there are no safeguards for individuals and companies. We now become dependent on us, and we are sacrificing our competitiveness and doing away with a diplomatic leader for the future. We're approaching signature of a peace agreement. This irreversible decision is placing Europe in a terrible political impasse. What are you doing now is a legal coup which is ongoing against people and nations circumventing the treaties.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “This agreement with Uzbekistan is good. It's a good thing for the EU. It's a good thing for Uzbekistan. We're talking about a region of the world that is really starting to thrive and where we should be happy to have a presence. Uzbekistan has changed considerably with since 2016, when Musayev took power. Unfortunately, there is a resolution that goes with this agreement that unfortunately is trying to tell a sovereign country what it should do. They have their geopolitical interests. They have a culture. They have certain links with Russia, economic links and cultural links which go back in history and are totally understandable if you just look at the map. But this Parliament unfortunately cannot, it seems, void when it agrees on something, adding to it a whole list of requirements. And we cannot deal with sovereign states like that. We have to show respect to the Uzbeks who have known 16 different empires, and I don't think it's too bright up to Brussels to tell them what they should be doing and talk to them about sovereignty.”
  EU policy on Central Asia
• “Thank you. Chair. Let's be crystal clear. This is not a technical debate. This is a political debate. The Commission and Council quickly reacted following the 4th of October rulings from the court. I, of course, would have preferred the Parliament to be consulted as well. But in any case, this judgment, handed down in 2024 by the Court of Justice, requires consent from the Sahrawi People. The critical aspect here is about ensuring the stability of our shared interests. We need to say that this is a Moroccan region managed by Morocco. The guarantees of protection and stability are given by its government. There are arguments from the Polisario Front behind this. This is not a legitimate actor. It's a militia, an armed militia pilot piloted by Algeria that uses Western Sahara as a political lever against Morocco. We're talking about groups involved in trafficking terrorist attacks. We saw one of those in 2023. It's linked to al Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb. That's the reality. These amendments to the EU Morocco Association agreement, we think are heading in the right direction. They include Western Saharan products under Moroccan control while complying with EU standards. Of course, I also want to speak about our farmers and French cherry tomato producers. Morocco says it is ready to stick to quotas, timelines and European standards. Moroccans are very clear on this point. They say that they do not want to destabilize our market. Indeed, we do need to protect our farmers. Our farmers are facing challenges. That's not because of Morocco, but because of the the piling up of EU standards, our bureaucracy and expensive inputs. We need protection mechanisms during key seasons when tomatoes are being grown, quotas and timelines and standards are good. Morocco is a stable and reliable ally. It's a key partner in the fight against terrorism, against illegal immigration, and for cooperation with Africa. And if we continue to distrust our allies and side with our adversaries, we will be powerless. And that's why we want to call on you, not to allow us to be trapped by certain Islamist groups. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Morocco
• “Thank you. President. The politburo of this parliament is Continuing to focus on Georgia with outrageous words, political pressure, blackmail, financial threats from Brussels against this country, and this time an attack against Georgian dream party. Clear manipulation because you cannot discredit a political movement that was supported by more than 50% of the population in 2024 at in the elections, and has a solid parliamentary majority. They have a political legitimacy which is lacking for a lot of countries in the European Union. These shameful neo colonial methods need to stop, particularly when it comes to manipulating legitimate legal processes, as is the case with Miss Khoshtaria, where the Georgian judges should not be receiving instructions from Brussels. Since 2024, you've been doing your utmost to undermine a legitimately elected government. Stop this interference, pressure and blackmail in this democratic country.”
  EU-Georgia relations
• “The truth is that the Americans will end up being hated by everyone, even by their more most unconditional allies. It's by listening to you that this sentence from 1963, spoken by general de Gaulle, came to my mind, uh, in the Deutsche Zeitung recently. You honestly said that to speak about this summer between America and Europe, you couldn't talk about true negotiations, and that the president that President Trump simply dictated the conditions, the commercial, the trade relationship between the EU and America have never been this unequal. From the first of aught, we have risen to a 15% import tax for most of the, uh, the import. And that's many times higher than before, especially for, uh, automobile pieces. The tariffs have been applied, have gone up to can be up to 15% if we accept, uh, to lower our own duty costs towards American import spirits. Uh, traders are already living a catastrophe. Uh, in 2019. I remembered the declaration on the future of Europe after Brexit, uh, which was spoken by the 27 heads of member states, saying that, uh, together we are stronger, but in front of the United States, we are weak and we've accepted everything done to us. The Brits have been able to, uh, get a 10%, uh, price as opposed to the 15% that we did. These international duties are not a fairy tale. We are now paying Very much for our reliance on the United States. And the Commission has meticulously built this reliance over the past 30 years, whenever it could, it would. It kneecapped the sovereignty of the member states, and now we see the consequences. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you. Chair. Global gateway has been one of the projects, one of the most ambitious projects announced by the EU for four years and we need to recognize this. The idea of presenting a credible European alternative to the major global infrastructure strategies and face, uh, the competition in developing countries. This ambition is legitimate. It's necessary if EU really wants to remain a driver, uh, here. But to be effective, the global gateway and its strategy needs to evolve towards three paradigms that are clearly lacking today. First of all, more transparency, then more coherence, and finally, more pragmatism. This is the subject of my report, uh. What all of the political groups have been saying for a year, uh, the commission spoke about. Uh, 3 billion that's been mobilized. But no one really knows what this figure is. Is it, uh, you funding? Is it private funding or is it money that's being moved from existing projects underway? And so it's not enough to have global announcements and aggregated figures, because the European citizens and companies need to know where public money is being invested and with results and with what results and how. And that's why we really need to insist on transparency requirements, uh, project by project, systematic reports of partnerships involved and the results achieved are vital.”
  Global priorities for international development
• “Thank you very much, chairman. As the European Parliament website says, the Sakharov Prize honours people, groups and organisations that have made an exceptional contribution to defending freedom of thought. And this is why the Patriots of Europe group has given me the honourable task of presenting our candidate for the Sakharov Prize 2024. As a result, I suggest we award it to Elon Musk. He's a visionary entrepreneur. Yes, of course, but he's also an ardent defender of freedom of expression. This is a fight that he is pursuing, and this is why we need to nominate him for the Sakharov Prize. He has shown to the world the serious problem of digital censorship since he bought Twitter in 2022. He has relentlessly tried to make the platform a place for free. Independent debate. In 2004, he openly opposed cancel culture by re-establishing accounts that had previously been censored, saying that even the most controversial opinions must have a place in public debate. As a whistleblower, he's via the Twitter files. He's also denounced the censorship on other digital platforms, thereby underlining the need for transparency and the right the protection of users rights. Musk has also always said that digital regulation should not become a tool for control, but a framework for protecting diversity of opinion. In addition to his action for freedom of expression, he's also been very firm on the existential risks of radical Islamism, Islamism and Wokeism with Starlink. He has also significantly reduced inequalities in access to information, especially for isolated communities and individuals. Colleagues choosing Elon Musk for the Sakharov Prize 2024 means recognising the freedom of expression is the foundation of all our democracies, and that this fight for this freedom is unfortunately, a permanent battle now. This is important for our collective freedom. Thank you.”
  EU competences on human rights
• “In 1997, there was the first independent prime minister of Azerbaijan who won the war in Karabakh, and he set out the future of the region. Will the future at Karabakh be said. Will it be solved by war or by negotiations, or will it be able to maintain it in in the long term? And if there's not mutual concessions, who will be the beaten party? So we said the status quo cannot continue and war needs to be excluded. And because he also added that the trend to try and achieving the maximum rather than possible is will lead to a complete collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh. Now, this is someone who won war and understood the possibility of what was possible. But he was thrown out. But his prophecy was been proved. Proved prescient. Now there's the Karabakh land has been taken back. But it was the military advanced up to the borders. But this is something that's important to note. And now we are at a historic moment. Armenia of President Aliyev sorry, the Azerbaijan from President Aliyev and Prime Minister of Romania are negotiating. As in 1963, de Gaulle and other signed an agreements in relation to friendship. So this would not find reconciliation. And this is what people thought would never happen, but is now happening in the Caucasus. And what does the European Parliament doing with voting resolutions and which just throw more petrol on the fire? Azerbaijan wanted to have cordial and constructive relationships with the European Parliament, but they've just closed the door on us because of their legitimate concerns. We are acting irresponsibly. And if we react to this to every geopolitical event, and then we will just see the results. The peace in the caucuses will not be achieved by interference from the European Parliament, but by negotiations in the region. We can support this process, but we should not poison it.”
  EU-Azerbaijan relations