Virginie JORON

Policy topics Virginie JORON is active on

What Virginie JORON has said (76)

• 2026-07-16 “(10:34:34 - 10:36:52): Yes. And so it's important. Our speaking time, 1 minute, 2 minute, it really does make a difference in our debates. Now we had a tweet from Thierry Breton about the season of interferences. You know, Musk supports Marie Le Pen. The idea is that action should have an algorithm. It shouldn't spoke to specific politicians, although he said that she is the last take for France, he is right. So we're talking about, algorithms, polarization, democracy. The commission itself, I think, is a fracture of reality. It's you talk about people being closed in to echo chambers, prejudices, disinformation, so they only end up, believing lies and have antidemocratic reflexes. I think it's similar to the report from the French senate that invents the concept of the fight against, domestic interference. You talk about, disinformation when it comes to climate and health. Have you also talked about disinformation from Brussels and Pfizer? You say that the right wing populists spread disinformation. You use Wikipedia, American fact checking, sources, for this study, not even, TFN, which is 1 of the main sources of media in France. So what do you understand by polluting, content? Are you really looking at the critical spirit of this? Secondly, if you look at statistics on the use of social media in France, there's 8,000,000 users on x. Now we are all, lawyers. We write, legislation here. How would you, specifically, describe the effect of these algorithms on, when people can't cast their votes? No. I, was watching the TV a lot. I was being told to go vaccinate all the time, and I never got a vaccine. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-07-14 “Thank you, Madam Chair. Today we are talking about AI models in the US. And as we do so, we are seeing a major paradox in Europe. On the one hand, we have a very powerful tool mythos and on the other hand, what is our reflex in Europe? It's the stick. It's to we've seen things that have happened since the 2nd of August. We've seen the plan of the commission to stop us having access to this model. So as a representative of the Patriots for Europe, I defend the sovereignty of European nations. Faced with Brussels bureaucracy and the domination of technology from abroad, the EU AI act places cumbersome burdens on European business and allows American giants to prosper on this market. What do you think of this technological and legislative approach, which we feel is bad for business rather than protecting our citizens? We want a sovereign Europe which can be technologically independent and is able to have a proper partnership between countries, rather than going through the EU institutions. We want to protect our values and strategic interests in practice, would you be willing to localize your operations in Europe to some extent so that they. And ensure that they serve the prosperity of our people? For you, Europe can't just be a playground for American big techs. What's your response? What's your opinion on digital sovereignty in Europe? It's a big topic here.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-02-25 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 15.6.2026 Written question 1. In 2025, 27 air-chartered services were used by the President of the Commission or other Commissioners. Information on missions of Members of the Commission is available on the European Commission website [1] . The Commission does not provide information on behalf of other institutions. 2. The Commission publishes an overview of mission expenses and purpose per Member every two months in accordance with the Code of Conduct [2] . Information on missions of former Vice-President of the European Commission, Commissioner responsible for ‘Promoting our European Way of Life’ is publicly available [3] . 3. The clause ‘Terms of contract: The execution of the contract must be performed within the framework of sheltered employment programmes: No’ means that the contractor is not required to apply a specific type of work arrangement designed to fit the needs of persons with disabilities and to have a minimum number of employees with disabilities. However, according to the tender specifications, the contractor shall establish, maintain and promote an open and inclusive working environment, notably through the removal of all obstacles to recruitment and all potential discrimination based on disability. [1] S ee the Transparency section of the webpage of each Member: https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners_en. [2] Commission Decision of 31 January 2018 on a Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission (2018/C 65/06) C_2018065EN.01000701.xml [3] Mission expenses of the Commissioners”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Budget for EU politicians · Climate efforts
• 2026-02-11 “E-000587/2026 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission The Commission rejects the unfounded allegations made by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in its report of 3 February 2026. 1. Under Article 38 of the Financial Regulation 1 the Commission makes available on a centralised website (‘Financial Transparency System’ 2 ) information on recipients of funds from the budget, including on remunerated experts contracted by the Commission for above EUR 15 000. Pursuant to Article 49 (3) of the Horizon Europe Regulation 3 ‘the names of independent external experts evaluating grant applications’ are published on the Funding and Tenders Portal 4 , under section ‘Guidance & Documents’, subsection ‘Reference documents’, ‘Experts’ lists. 2. The European Research Council has funded a Starting Grant of EUR 1 479 515 to Dr. Helberger for the project ‘Personews’ 5 , and a Consolidator Grant of EUR 2 million to Dr. de Vreese for the project ‘EUROPINIONS’ 6 . The organisation University of Amsterdam has received in total for H2020 and Horizon Europe (data until mid-May 2026) EUR 387 532 951. 3. The attendance of Commission officials at events related to the Digital Service Act is part of the Commission’s actions to foster capacity building and knowledge development for its enforcement. Public conferences are not meetings with interest representatives which require the registration of the interest representatives concerned in the Transparency Register under Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3082 7 . For the conference organised by the Digital Service Act Observatory on 16-17 February 2026, conference video recordings are publicly available on the organiser’s webpage, including the intervention made by the only participating Commission official holding a management position. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/referencedocuments?programmePeriod=2021-2027&frameworkProgramme=43108390. 5 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/638514. 6 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/647316. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403082.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-01-12 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 29.4.2026 Written question The Commission has extensively invested in the EU’s technological sovereignty including in semiconductors and AI Chips. The Chips Act (CA) [1] has resulted in EUR 80 billion in announced investments in semiconductor manufacturing capacity since 2022. Furthermore, through the CA, the EU has invested in over EUR 1.8 billion in pilot lines that are ensuring that the research required to manufacture the most advanced chips is done in Europe. Further investment has been made in setting up semiconductor competence centres across the EU, equity investment in start-ups and the launch of a Design Platform. More investment is expected through the future revision of the CA. Furthermore, via Horizon Europe, the EU and Member States are investing over EUR 239 million in the development of European chip solutions for High-Performance Computing and AI data centres [2] . Cohesion policy supports critical technologies, including semiconductors, through programmes agreed with Member States and regions, which are responsible for project selection and implementation. In 2025, EUR 8.8 billion was allocated by Member States to the specific objective covering semiconductors and other technologies critical to EU technological sovereignty. Over the course of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, EUR 4.8 billion was allocated by Member States to semiconductor-related measures, including through the Important Project of Common European Interest on Microelectronics and Communication Technologies [3] . The last available data by the Commission on the EU’s market share in semiconductors is the 2025 State of the Digital Decade report, which showed a market share for Europe of 10.5% in 2024 that is projected to reach 11.5% by 2030 [4] . From 2022 to 2030, manufacturing capacity should increase by 30% in absolute terms if announced CA investments materialise. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1781/oj/eng. [2] https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101202459. [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3087. [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/state-digital-decade-2025-report.”
  EU industrial funding · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2026-01-06 “E-000019/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Environmental Noise Directive (END) 1 is the main EU legislative instrument for addressing excessive noise pollution mainly caused by transport traffic, as well as from industrial activities listed in Annex I of the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) 2 . As electricity generation from wind turbines is not listed in the Annex I of IED, there are no specific noise requirements for them under the END. Wind projects 3 are subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment 4 before authorisation, which includes a description of the emission of noise, and of the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce or, if possible, offset any adverse effect. Member States are required, every five years, to adopt strategic noise maps showing noise exposure from major sources 5 . In this process, the END refers to the use of A-weighted equivalent sound levels as primary regulatory metrics in line with the guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO) 6 . It is however noted that wind turbines generate infrasound or lower frequencies of sound than traffic sources which may not be fully addressed by standard noise metrics. As outlined in 2023 Implementation Report 7 and the Zero Pollution Mid-Term Review 8 , the Commission is committed to improving the implementation of the END. In the EU programme for the environment and climate action 9 , noise and vibrations from wind turbines is a priority topic 10 and in Horizon Europe 11 several projects have investigated noise from wind turbines 12 . The Commission has also accepted the recommendations of the 1 Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise, OJ L 189 18.7.2002, p. 12. 2 Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (integrated pollution Prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste, OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024. 3 Annex II, point 3(i) of the Directive 2011/92/EU. 4 In accordance with Directive 2011/92/EU as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU. Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014. 5 Articles 3 and 7 of the Environmental Noise Directive. 6 https://www.who.int/europe/publications/i/item/9789289053563. 7 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Environmental Noise Directive in accordance with Article 11 of Directive 2002/49/EC, 20.3.2023, COM(2023) 139 final. 8 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/mid-term-review-zero-pollution-action-plan_en. 9 LIFE, https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en. 10 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/life/wp-call/2025/call-fiche_life-2025sap-env_en.pdf, para.2.4 noise. 11 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en. 12 Examples: Wind In My Backyard: Using holistic modelling tools to advance social awareness and engagement on large wind power installations in the EU (https://doi.org/10.3030/101083460); Understanding of the Physics of Wind Turbine and Rotor Dynamics through an Integrated Simulation Framework (https://doi.org/10.3030/763990); Closed-Loop Flow Control to Enhance Aerodynamic and Aeroacoustic”
  Energy (green transition) · Air quality policy
• 2025-11-14 “E-004549/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission does not exempt media companies from registering in the Transparency Register 1 . The rules governing the eligibility to register in the Transparency Register are set out in the applicable Interinstitutional Agreement 2 . The Transparency Register covers interest representation activities including organising communication campaigns or preparing communication or information materials. Where a media company is acting in its own interest with the objective of influencing EU policy or legislation or the Commission’s decision-making process, it is expected to register in the Transparency Register. Registration is mandatory, however, for holding any related meetings with the Commission. Press interviews or individual activities exclusively related to academic or journalistic purposes, or to exercise a right (including to petition the European Parliament), are not interest representation activities covered by the Transparency Register. 2. The Commission requires that all EU co-financed news media projects are transparent and mention EU co-financing on project communication and promotion materials. The journalistic work should be done in line with journalistic standards and with complete editorial independence, as set out in grant agreements. All recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge the origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received. 1 https://transparency-register.europa.eu. 2 OJ L 207, 11.6.2021, pp.1-17, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2021/611/oj/eng.”
  Transparency requirements for interest groups · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-11-07 “E-004406/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission European Medicines Agency (EMA) is a legal entity of the EU, endowed with its own separate legal personality and proper autonomy. Its Management Board – compromised of 35 Members from Member States, institutions as well as patient and doctor’s organisation – is the integral governance body. It has a supervisory role with general responsibility for budgetary and planning matters. The Commission ensures the sound financial management of the EU budget, including through its contributions to the decentralised agencies, through its proposed contribution in the draft annual budget proposal. Moreover, the agencies are being regularly externally audited by the European Court of Auditors. The discharge for the implementation of these agencies’ budgets must be given by the European Parliament on the recommendation of the Council 1 . Regarding EMA’s former premises in London, the figure mentioned corresponds to the theoretical maximum liability in the hypothetical scenario that the building remained vacant. This does not reflect the current situation. Since its relocation in 2019, EMA secured a subtenant. The Commission is closely monitoring any developments and carefully examining them to ensure effective resolution, if needed. EMA treats all reports of a death following the use of a medicine with utmost seriousness. These reports are routinely screened to detect any possible safety issue. The continuous safety monitoring of COVID-19 vaccines has enabled the detection of side effects, which, in very exceptional circumstances, may have contributed to the death of a vaccinated individual. The vaccines’ product information highlights when a serious side effect could potentially lead to death. Apart from these very exceptional cases 2 , there is currently no evidence suggesting that other reported deaths may be linked to COVID-19 vaccination. Only a thorough scientific evaluation can determine a possible link with the vaccine 3 . 1 According to Article 70(4) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union; OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. Moreover, agencies’ directors, who legally represent the agencies, are accountable to the European Parliament and the Council, according to the Common Approach. 2 Safety of COVID-19 vaccines: https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory-overview/public-healththreats/coronavirus-disease-covid-19/covid-19-medicines/safety-covid-19-vaccines. 3 All safety-related information and data are published on EMA’s key facts page on Covid’s vaccines: https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory-overview/public-health-threats/coronavirus-disease-covid19/covid-19-medicines/covid-19-vaccines-key-facts.”
  Transparency of EU medicines governance process · Vaccination
• 2025-11-04 “E-004334/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The European Cloud Sovereignty Framework 1 in its published form summarises the criteria by which cloud solutions will be evaluated in the ongoing competition for Sovereign Cloud under the ‘Cloud III’ Dynamic Purchasing System. Access to the detailed specifications is limited to the participants of that competition pursuant to applicable procurement rules. As the document explains in its first paragraph, the Sovereignty Objectives were drafted with a direct view of the different European initiatives and frameworks, including Gaia-X policy rules and architecture. At the same time, applicable law concerning access to EU public contracts is respected. Furthermore, while each Sovereignty Objective counts towards a global ‘Sovereignty Score’, a cloud solution must also achieve a certain minimum threshold in each objective. Insufficient performance in one objective cannot simply be compensated by higher scores in others. The Sovereignty Framework is an evaluation model for a concrete procurement procedure. The criteria used in this competition do not introduce a binding definition of ‘sovereign cloud’ that would restrict or pre-empt other definitions in different contexts of legislation, policy or others. The purpose of this competition is to make available particularly secure and resilient cloud services to the Commission and other institutions. Which precise system would be deployed on the sovereign cloud services is not subject of this competition and remains the decision of the department in charge of that system. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/09579818-64a6-4dd5-9577-446ab6219113_en.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2025-10-22 “E-004149/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have any information additional to what is publicly available regarding this case. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is responsible for conducting administrative investigations concerning fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the EU, as well as suspicions of serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the EU institutions. OLAF does not have the authority to conduct criminal investigations. OLAF is independent from the Commission in the exercise of its investigative function. OLAF does not usually issue comments on cases that it may or may not be treating. This is in order to protect the confidentiality of any possible investigations and possible subsequent follow-up procedures, as well as to ensure respect for personal data and procedural rights. Finally, the Commission recalls that the European Data Protection Supervisor, whose mandate is set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 1 , is tasked with monitoring and ensuring that EU institutions and bodies process personal data in compliance with the applicable data protection framework. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj/eng.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-08-25 “E-003285/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission An exploratory stakeholder consultation on the draft Digital Services Act guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes was opened from 8 February 2024 to 7 March 2024 and gathered 77 contributions. The Financial Transparency System (FTS) 1 makes available to the public information on recipients of funds financed from the EU budget and implemented under direct and indirect management mode. Annex I includes an extract from the FTS detailing the funding awarded to the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) in 2023, amounting to EUR 6 168 555. The annex provides a breakdown of the funding by programme name, the purpose of the expenditure and the department responsible for awarding the funds. The sum of EUR 14 680 000 identified by the Honourable Member in the FTS indicates a significant discrepancy, as it reflects total payments consumed at the commitment level for entire projects in 2023, some of which include multiple beneficiaries. To determine the portion specifically awarded to EPD, one should refer to the beneficiary’s contracted amount (i.e. EUR 6 168 555), which represents the amount of the budget reserved to cover the costs of a single legal entity for the implementation of a given project based on the beneficiary’s role and responsibility. Differences between commitments contracted and effectively used can happen during the lifespan of the project, depending on the conditions established in the contract. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-08-25 “E-003280/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. In order to improve compliance by air carriers with the obligations as regards baggage under Regulation (EC) No 889/2002 1 the Commission proposed in 2013 2 to entrust the National Enforcement Bodies for Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 with the enforcement of Regulation (EC) No 889/2002. This proposal is currently being discussed by the co-legislators 3 . 2. The Commission acknowledges the potential inconvenience and uncertainty for passengers which may result from the many different hand luggage policies in place at different airlines and for different classes of tickets. The Commission notes that stakeholders have divergent views on what would constitute ‘reasonable’ dimensions and weight for hand baggage as referred to in the judgment in Case C-487/12 4 . In the Commission’s view, hand luggage beyond that minimum ‘reasonable’ allowance is subject to the air carriers’ pricing freedom, as enshrined in Article 22 of the Air Services Regulation 5 . As part of the legislative negotiations on the air passenger rights proposals, both the Council 6 and the Parliament 7 have proposed minimum standards for hand luggage. If this issue is not resolved as part of the current air passenger rights negotiations, the Commission will consider it in the context of the upcoming review 8 of the Air Services Regulation for which the public consultation is currently open. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32002R0889. 2 COM/2013/0130 final. 3 Interinstitutional file 2013/0072 (COD). 4 Judgment of 18 September 2014, Vueling Airlines (C-487/12), EU:C:2014:2232. 5 Regulation (EC) 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast), OJ L 293, 31.10.2008, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1008/oj. 6 Council document 9795/25 ADD 1. 7 Parliament procedural file 2023/0437(COD). 8 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14620-Aviation-EU-air-services-rulesrevision-_en.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-07-30 “E-003141/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The definition of a non-governmental organisation (NGO) and the obligation to indicate in the grant applications under direct management whether the entity is an NGO only came into effect in September 2024 with the Financial Regulation recast 1 . Having an NGO status does not entail any preferential treatment, nor is it an eligibility criterion for receiving funding, aside from a few, very specific cases. Therefore, the NGO status as such is not checked and validated by the Commission. Only two of the NGO 2 attributes are systematically checked as part of the standard beneficiaries’ validation, notably whether an entity is a private body and whether it is a nonprofit organisation 3 . The entity France Terre d’asile is classified as an NGO in the Participant Register 4 . The Commission has no evidence that the NGO status of this entity is questionable. Registrants in the Transparency Register 5 are required to provide complete financial information about the current financial year or most recent financial year. The Transparency Register Secretariat, composed of staff from the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, monitors the content of the register, with the aim of achieving an optimal level of data quality therein, on the understanding that registrants are ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the information they have provided. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509. 2 In accordance with the validation rules of the EU Funding & Tenders Portal, ‘non-governmental organisations’ are organisations which are voluntary, independent from government and non-profit, and which are not a political party of trade union: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/20212027/common/guidance/rules-lev-lear-fca_en.pdf. 3 Definition of non-profit entity from the validation rules of the EU Funding & Tenders Portal: ‘entity that is non-profit making by its legal form or legal purpose (e.g. charitable organisations), or that has a legal or statutory obligation not to distribute profits to its shareholders or members: https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/rules-lev-lear-fca_en.pdf. 4 PIC 920504975 in the EU Funding & Tenders Portal – Participant register: https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/orgdetails/920504975?order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=lastModified&keywords=terre%20d %27asile&isExactMatch=true&type=ORGANISATION&orgType=participant. 5 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-06-26 “E-002587/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission imposed combined anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on imports of tubes and pipes of ductile cast iron from Electrosteel Castings Ltd. (ECL) following an interim review in November 2023. In that investigation, the Commission discovered discrepancies in the reporting of the weight of the imported product. Despite a withdrawal of the review request by the company, the Commission did not terminate the investigation given the findings on false and misleading information provided by ECL. The Commission disregarded the misleading information and relied instead on facts available in line with the legislation. This Commission decision resulted in higher anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties than those that would have been applicable had the Commission used the false information provided by the company. The Commission confirms that the firm mentioned was not supported by the European Regional Development Fund. Concerning the last question, Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU 1 lists fraud 2 among the grounds for exclusion of an economic operator from participation in a procurement procedure. While dumping is not listed as ground for exclusion, bidders can be excluded for abnormally low tenders resulting from dumping. At the same time, bidders from third countries with which the EU has no international commitments on procurement can be excluded from procurement procedures in the EU. Where there is no EU measure concerning access of such third countries, it is for each contracting authority/entity to determine whether it admits, or not, such operators (see Guidance on the participation of third-country bidders and goods in the EU procurement market 3 and ECJ cases C-652/22 4 and C-266/22 5 ). 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj/eng. 2 ‘within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests’. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019XC0813(01)&from=EN. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0652. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0266.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-06-25 “E-002575/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Third-country economic operators, products and services can access the EU market on equal terms with EU-based firms if procurement is covered by international procurement agreements to which the EU is a party, such as the World Trade Organisation Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) or a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). For suppliers from countries not covered by such agreements, without specific EU legislation governing such access, contracting authorities may decide on a case-by-case basis whether to admit or exclude them from a procurement procedure. This approach has been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the EU 1 . To allow EU contracting entities to see which bidders are eligible to participate in public procurement procedures in EU Member States, based on provisions of the GPA and bilateral EU trade agreements, a dedicated Procurement for Buyers Tool 2 was developed. It is accessible via Access2Market Database 3 . Member States implementing cohesion policy funds should follow EU public procurement rules and procedures to ensure a level-playing field and effective cohesion policy investments. Within this obligation, and in the absence of specific provisions in the relevant funds’ rules, it is up to the individual buyer in the Member State to decide on participation of bidders from countries for which concerned contract is not covered by GPA or FTA and, if yes, on what conditions. The Political Guidelines 2024-2029 4 announced a revision of the 2014 EU public procurement Directives 5 . The Commission is carrying out an evaluation of these Directives 6 to assess whether EU public procurement rules work as intended. Once evaluated, the Commission will consider concrete measures and options to shape the new proposal, including on international aspects. 1 Cases C-652/22 Kolin and C-266/22 Qingdao, para. 64. 2 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/procurementbuyers/#/procumementlocation. 3 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/home. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/about/commission-2024-2029_en. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/23/oj/eng; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj/eng; https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/25/oj/eng. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14427-Public-procurement-directivesevaluation_en.”
  "Buy European" provisions · Trade relations with Turkey
• 2025-06-25 “E-002574/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The following Member States purchased COVID-19 vaccines from European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds, partially using their respective REACT-EU envelopes: Estonia, Hungary, Luxemburg, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. France did not use ESI Funds for the purchase of COVID-19 vaccination doses in 2023. The Commission does not have information on other EU instruments being used for vaccine purchases in Member States. The target value of COVID-19 vaccination doses for 2023 amounts to around 221 million doses 1 . Member States will transmit the end-2023 final cumulative values of actual purchases only by 2026 to the Commission. This is due to a prolongation of the deadline to relieve the administrative burden on Member States’ programme managing authorities. Until then the only values available are until the end of 2022, which is close to 110 million doses delivered in total. The Advance Purchase and Purchase Agreements concluded between the Commission, on behalf of the Member States, and the vaccine manufacturers foresee that Member States order the vaccines under these contracts from the manufacturer, who issues invoices at the time of delivery. Hence no national or EU funds are engaged for vaccines that would not be delivered. 1 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/2014-2020-Indicators/COVID-19-vaccination-doses-CV63-2014-2020/kk2iuh5n.”
  Joint EU procurement of medicines · Covid-19 vaccines procurement
• 2025-06-10 “E-002315/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Under Article 22(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 1 (Digital Services Act, DSA), providers of online platforms must prioritise notices of illegal content from trusted flaggers through the notice and action mechanism, pursuant to Article 16 of the DSA and take a decision on them without undue delay. As clarified in Recital 52 of the DSA, in respect of the processing of all the notices submitted, the providers should act in a timely manner by taking into account the type of illegal content and the urgency of taking action, such as a threat to life or safety of persons, which should also be considered when processing the notices submitted by trusted flaggers. Under Article 22(2) of the DSA, trusted flagger status may be granted, to any entity that demonstrates expertise and competence in detecting, identifying and notifying illegal content, acts to submit notices diligently, accurately and objectively, and is independent from any online platforms provider. The status is awarded, by the Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) of the Member State where the applicant is established, following an assessment of these conditions. As required by Article 50 of the DSA, DSCs must act independently, impartially and transparently. Furthermore, robust safeguards, including the reporting obligations of trusted flaggers laid down under Article 22(3) of the DSA, ensure transparency and accountability of trusted flaggers. If an entity no longer meets the criteria, the DSC must suspend and revoke the status in line with Article 22(6)–(7), which allow online platforms to submit information on inaccurate notices and require the DSC to suspend the status during investigation and revoke it if the conditions are no longer met. The Financial Transparency System 2 offers an overview of EU funds awarded under direct and indirect management, showing who receives funding and for what purpose. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2025-05-16 “E-001982/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The contract was awarded in the context of the dynamic purchasing system for cloud services and according to the public procurement rules of the EU Financial Regulation. The procurement procedure was conducted among registered economic operators, all of whom were exclusively EU-based entities, including European providers without corporate ties to non-EU countries. The contract was awarded to the most economically advantageous tender, following a technical and financial evaluation focusing mainly on technical quality (70% of the final score) covering 20 technical fields with more than 1 200 questions, and on price (30% of the final score). The Commission is not bound to spend the full amount of the contract awarded, which represents the maximum value for all participating EU entities. Looking ahead, the Commission remains committed to leveraging forthcoming legislative and procurement instruments to strengthen EU digital sovereignty and foster innovative EU services. The Cloud and Artificial Intelligence Development Act 1 will ensure secure EUbased capacity for critical needs, backed by a single cloud policy for the public sector. As of 2024, approximatively 55% of software publishers used by the Commission are EU companies. Regarding cloud services, currently 85% of workloads run in the Commission’s private cloud. The remaining 15%, managing non-confidential data, are equally distributed among Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL and Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited and, to a lesser extent, OVHcloud. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14628-AI-Continent-new-cloud-andAI-development-act_en.”
  Ownership of strategic assets · EU industrial funding
• 2025-05-08 “E-001866/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission’s digital transformation is guided by its cloud strategy 1 , prioritising a secure hybrid multi-cloud approach. The hybrid aspect is delivered through private cloud infrastructure under full Commission control, as the key part of its digital autonomy. The multi-cloud dimension ensures resilience and mitigates vendor lock-in, with operators awarded via procurement procedures compliant with EU laws, data protection and cybersecurity legislation and international agreements. Contracts have been awarded to a variety of providers, all of which are EU-based entities. The Commission has included European providers without corporate ties to the United States and makes extensive use of open-source software. Currently, in line with the objective to avoid dependency, 85% of workloads run in the Commission’s private cloud. The remaining 15%, managing non-confidential data, are equally distributed among Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL (AWS) and Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited, and – to a lesser extent – OVHcloud. Contracts concluded with AWS and Microsoft are valid until 2030 and 2031 respectively, with no volume commitment in usage. Since 2014, successive cloud and software framework contracts 2 have incorporated award criteria reflecting European digital sovereignty initiatives such as references to SecNumCloud that resulted in a contract awarded to OVHcloud. Looking ahead, the Commission remains committed to leveraging forthcoming legislative and procurement instruments to strengthen EU digital sovereignty and foster innovative EU services. The upcoming Cloud and Artificial Intelligence Development Act 3 will ensure secure EU-based capacity for critical needs, backed by a single EU-wide cloud policy for the public sector. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/european-commission-cloud-strategy_en. 2 For example, Cloud III or SIDE III. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14628-AI-Continent-new-cloud-andAI-development-act_en.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · International data transfers
• 2025-04-30 “E-001730/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 1. Information on EU budget funding awarded to specific recipients, such as European media outlets, is publicly available through the centralised Financial Transparency System (FTS) web page 1 . This tool provides detailed information at individual project level, allowing to conduct searches across multiple dimensions. 2. Grants for news media are provided on the basis of open calls. The applying entities are free to propose the activities to be implemented based on the objectives and expected deliverables set out in the calls. Such calls include provisions to make sure that beneficiaries apply journalistic and ethical standards, while operating with full editorial independence. 3. Free and fair elections are at the core of democracy. The conduct and the organisations of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional rules and legislation, subject to EU law and their international obligations. All EU grants must be implemented by beneficiaries in full respect of applicable EU and national law. Hence, applicants have to comply with electoral rules in the given Member State. Direct EU funding falls outside the scope of the EU State aid rules. Moreover, direct EU funding is governed by rigorous rules designed to prevent distortions of competition and there is no evidence of a breach of the EU’s competition rules. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1–239), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, information on recipients is not disclosed in specific cases outlined therein.”
  Size of EU budget · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-04-30 “E-001729/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission EU funds allocated to development assistance outside the EU, including humanitarian aid, are implemented in accordance with the principle of transparency enshrined in the Financial Regulation 1 applicable to the EU Budget. Detailed information on amounts funded are available in the Financial Annexes of the Report on the Implementation of the EU's External Action Instruments that the Commission publishes on a yearly basis 2 . These annexes provide a breakdown of the development assistance funding across multiple dimensions. In particular, Table 11B provides a breakdown of disbursements by sector (i.e. the specific area that the aid is intended to support) and by instrument. The sectorial classification is made in accordance with the categories developed by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The top three humanitarian non-governmental organisations receiving Commission’s humanitarian funding are the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC-NO), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC-DK), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC-DE). In 2024 (financial year), NRC-NO received approximatively EUR 119 million, DRC-DK EUR 86 million, and IRC-DE EUR 62 million of humanitarian funding. The Commission does not receive information regarding the salaries of directors of its partner organisations. 1 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/990fe2a6-8f52-11ef-a130-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 2 For 2023’s activity, the Financial Annexes can be found in Section 8 of the Commission Staff Working Document (SWD(2024) 267 final) accompanying the 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union's External Action Instruments in 2023 (COM(2024) 548 final); https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=SWD:2024:267:FIN, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/bfc002cc-bdca-11ef-91ed-01aa75ed71a1/languageen#:~:text=This%20is%20the%20staff%20working%20document%20accompanying%20the,international%20pa rtnerships%2C%20humanitarian%20aid%2C%20foreign%20policy%20and%20enlargement.”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2025-04-22 “P-001591/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission would like to clarify that the sum of EUR 795 million disclosed on the Financial Transparency System (FTS) 1 represents the amount consumed on commitments in which Oxfam was one of the recipients (direct management) or an implementing partner (indirect management), considering all beneficiaries and the project as a whole. Within this amount, in the period 2014-2023, 26 entities, residing in 19 countries, having the word Oxfam in their name, have been awarded EUR 636 million (direct management) and two of them have also implemented EUR 1 million (indirect management 2 ). In accordance with the validation rules 3 , ‘non-profit entity’ means an ‘entity that is non-profit making by its legal form or legal purpose (e.g. charitable organisations), or that has a legal or statutory obligation not to distribute profits to its shareholders or members’. This status is systematically checked against supporting documents and validated by the Central Validation Service of the Commission. The Commission refers to its replies to the European Court of Auditor’s Special Report 11/2025 4 , where it mentioned that ‘carrying out an economic activity is compatible with the nature of a non-governmental organisation (NGO), for as long as any profits it generates from its activities are not distributed to its members’. In this sense, engaging in commercial transactions or the salary level of employees of an entity do not prevent a 'non-profit' status of an entity. If the activity of the NGO qualifies as economic, the NGO can be subject to State aid rules. Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 5 (TFEU) generally prohibits State aid by Member States to prevent distortions of competition in the internal market. However, exemptions from this general ban exist based on the TFEU. Member States are required to notify the aid to the Commission, unless their measure is covered by a block exemption 6 or is too low to raise competition concerns 7 . For EU funding, State aid rules do not in principle apply. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html (The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation whereby data on recipients is not disclosed for very low value contracts below EUR 15 000 and where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the persons or entities). 2 The Financial Transparency System (FTS) discloses information on the implementing partners of EU funds managed under indirect management mode since year 2020. The information for the period 2014-2019 is not available on the FTS portal. 3 EU Funding & Tenders Portal validation rules : https://ec.europa.eu/info/fundingtenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/rules-lev-lear-fca_en.pdf. 4 https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications?ref=SR-2025-11. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E107. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A0802_4. 7 De minimis aid (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3A0802_2).”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-04-01 “E-001329/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission did not run corporate communication campaigns in 2024 before the European elections. In general, corporate communication campaigns conducted by the Commission are designed to inform and raise awareness among European citizens, without interfering in any electoral process. An advertising campaign, launched by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs to communicate on the proposal for a Regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse submitted in May 2022 1 , ran from 15 to 28 September 2023. The total amount spent on the advertising campaign, which ran in eight Member States, was EUR 7 496.89 with cost per view of EUR 0.008. These advertising expenses were not declared to election authorities. This campaign was unrelated to any national or European elections. 1 COM/2022/209 final.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU public communication strategy · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-03-19 “E-001156/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Member States remain in the driving seat for defence whilst benefitting from the added value offered by the EU programmes and instruments supporting cooperation between European defence industrial players and between Member States, and incentivising investment in defence capacities. In that respect, the Commission is particularly vigilant in ensuring the respect of the allocation of competences, as enshrined in the Treaties. The Commission is fully aware of the responsibilities of the individual mentioned in the parliamentary question within RTX Corporation, as both the organisation and the individual are registered in the Transparency Register 1 . However, the Commission respects the freedom of every professional organisation to be represented by whomever it considers fit for this purpose. As regards their relation with external stakeholders, Commission Members and staff members are bound by stringent rules and internal control standards, included in particular in the treaties, the Staff Regulations 2 and the Conditions of employment of other servants of the EU, as well as the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 3 . These rules aim, in particular, at ensuring the independence, impartiality, objectivity and loyalty of Commission Members and staff members in the exercise of their duties. This includes the protection of any sensitive or classified information. Finally, the issue of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is very high on the agenda of the Commission, especially in the context of recent Russian attempts to undermine the EU and its Member States’ democratic processes. FIMI is one of the key aspects of the recently adopted European Preparedness Union Strategy 4 and will be addressed in the upcoming European Democracy Shield. 1 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/searchregister-or-update/organisation-detail_en?id=87564644126-75. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2014-05-01/eng. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-good-administration/goodadministration/code-good-administrative-behaviour-and-complaints_en. 4 JOIN/2025/130 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0130.”
  EU-US relations · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-03-13 “E-001094/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission On 11 March 2025, the High Representative/Vice-President issued a statement 1 on behalf of the EU, which condemned in the strongest terms the horrific crimes committed against civilians, including summary killings, many of which were allegedly perpetrated by armed groups supporting the security forces of the transitional authorities. The EU called for a swift, transparent and impartial investigation to ensure that perpetrators are brought to justice. It welcomed the transitional authorities’ commitments, in particular the establishment of an investigative committee. It further called on the transitional authorities to allow the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to investigate all violations. Everything must be done to prevent any such crimes from happening again. The EU calls for an end to violence across Syria and urges all parties to protect Syrians from all ethnic and religious background without discrimination. The EU is in contact with the interim authorities and local actors, including civil society, and consistently advocates for an inclusive, peaceful, Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political transition grounded on the respect of international law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, pluralism and tolerance as well as on the values of rule of law and accountability. Furthermore, the EU continues to be a staunch supporter of accountability mechanisms working on Syria, including the Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the Commission of Inquiry, and the new Independent Institution on Missing Persons. Over the past 13 years, the EU and the Member States have mobilised nearly EUR 37 billion in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance, supporting Syrians both inside the country and across the region. 1 Syria: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the recent wave of violence, 11/03/2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/”
  EU-Syria relations · EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU
• 2025-01-21 “E-000255/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission 1. The precise amount of the Bank of America’s reimbursement of the former Commissioner for Internal Market participation to the two-days Bank of America’s Global Advisory Council, to be held twice per year, has no bearing on the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of the former Commissioner’s post term of office activity with the Bank of America, which is based on Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Code of Conduct for Members of the Commission. The former Commissioner for Internal Market has not informed the Commission about the precise amount of his reimbursement and the Commission has not asked to share this information with the Commission. 2. The Commission’s assessment of former Commissioners’ envisaged post term of office activities is based on the compatibility of the notified activity with the principles of integrity and discretion enshrined in Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and with the Code of Conduct for the Members of the Commission, irrespective of the Commission’s use of its prerogatives in the context of the implementation of EU policies.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-01-14 “E-000107/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Banks and credit institutions, like other economic operators, have in principle the freedom to decide with whom they want to enter into a contract or maintain a business relationship. To ensure the right of consumers to have access to financial services, Article 16 of the Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) 1 gives all consumers legally resident in the EU the right to open and use a payment account with basic features (PABF), subject to certain derogations, including in view of anti-money laundering rules. Article 19 of PAD also lays down the specific circumstances under which a PABF can be unilaterally terminated 2 . The Commission is also committed to safeguarding non-discrimination of citizens with regards to their access to a payment account. Article 15 of PAD requires Member States to ensure that credit institutions do not discriminate against consumers legally resident in the EU by reason of their nationality or place of residence or of any other ground as referred to in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (including political opinion) when consumers apply for or access a payment account. The responsibility for the enforcement of these provisions in individual cases lies with the national authorities and courts. The Commission, in case of suspicion of a breach of EU law by the national authorities, may decide to investigate the matter further and contact the national authorities to obtain further information. 1 Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214–246. 2 Including the deliberate use of the account for illegal purposes, no transaction for more than 24 consecutive months, incorrect information provided where the correct information would have resulted in the absence of such a right, the consumer is no longer legally resident in the EU, the consumer has subsequently opened a second payment account.”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices
• 2025-01-14 “E-000114/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission Given the levels of coverage achieved, current epidemiology and country demand, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance’s funding to the routine COVID-19 vaccine programme will be discontinued at the end of 2025, as recommended by the Gavi Board. Potential COVID-19 vaccine needs for a worst-case scenario after 2025 will be addressed through Gavi's emergency response mechanisms. The pledge of EUR 260 million (USD 290 million) announced by the President of the Commission 1 in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2024 is directed to support the next five-year strategic cycle called Gavi 6.0 (2026-2030) and covers the first two years of it (2026-2027) under the current EU multi-annual financial framework (MFF) 2 . The above-mentioned EU pledge for Gavi 6.0 has been made in full compliance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) 3 . According to Article 45 of the Regulation, the Commission shall be assisted by the NDICI committee 4 , which is composed of representatives of all Member States. The Committee is involved in all decisions within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 5 , including the ones related to the EU pledge made for Gavi 6.0 2026-2030 in September 2024. This EU contribution concerns only the EU budget within the limits of the current MFF. 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/european-commission-pledges-eu260million-gavi-2026-2027-and-over-eu200-million-additional-2024-09-29_en 2 https://www.gavi.org/our-alliance/strategy/phase-6-2026-2030 3 OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1–78, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj 4 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/comitology-register/core/api/integration/ers/rulesProcedure/C84400 5 OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-01-09 “E-000058/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Following on a call by the European Council, the Spanish government, the Belgian government, and the Commission have asked Mr Enrico Letta to write an independent HighLevel Report on the future of the Single Market in 2023 1 . The Commission did not conclude a contract with Mr Letta and did not pay him any allowances or remuneration. The Commission did not award grants to institutes or experts specifically for this report. The Senior Expert in the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, was seconded from November 2023 to June 2024 at the request of the Belgian government, to support the work on the independent High-Level Report on the future of the Single Market. The Belgian presidency of the Council selected him on the basis of his academic and professional experience on Single Market policies and Better Regulation. 1 See also the Commission’s press release of 15 September 2023, IP/23/4495.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU political integration (free access)
• 2025-01-09 “E-000061/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs), including Meta as provider of Facebook and Instagram, to have mechanisms in place to mitigate the risks posed by the dissemination of illegal content, including illegal hate speech and unlawful discriminatory content. The DSA does not impose general monitoring obligations, nor does it regulate online content. It defers to EU or national laws to define what is illegal content, based on which judicial or administrative authorities may issue orders to act against it. The DSA sets clear rules for transparency, accountability and user protection, and respects freedom of expression. It requires hosting services to set up notice and action mechanisms for users to report illegal content, including illegal hate speech. The DSA also requires providers of VLOPs like Meta to assess systemic risks stemming from their services and put in place effective measures to mitigate such risks related to the dissemination of illegal content, gender-based violence, fundamental rights including the right to freedom of expression and information and to non-discrimination, and civic discourse and electoral processes. The Commission opened formal proceedings 2 in relation to Meta’s services Facebook and Instagram to assess whether Meta may have breached the DSA. The current proceedings focus on deceptive advertising and disinformation, the over-suppression of political content, the non-availability of an effective real-time election monitoring tool and the notice and action mechanisms. The European Media Freedom Act 3 will further strengthen media pluralism and independence in the EU. The Commission remains fully committed to upholding freedom of expression. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) 2022 OJ L277/1. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) OJ 2024 L 17.4.2024.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2025-01-07 “E-002698/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The European Medicines Agency’s (EMA) Pharmacovigilance Risk Assessment Committee (PRAC) is responsible for monitoring the safety of all authorised medicinal products in the EU, including COVID-19 vaccines. The EU’s pharmacovigilance system was further strengthened during the COVID-19 pandemic with enhanced real-world safety monitoring. The PRAC may establish contacts on an advisory basis, with representatives of patient organisations and relevant health-care professionals' associations 1 . Given this framework, a new task force is unnecessary. 2. The Commission acknowledges the importance of addressing concerns about COVID-19 vaccines and fostering trust through ongoing safety monitoring and transparent communication 2 . EMA and national authorities rigorously monitor vaccine safety, and rare side effects are published with updates to product information 3 where necessary to mitigate risks. Healthcare access, including diagnosis and treatment, remains the responsibility of Member States. The Commission supports them by ensuring healthcare professionals and patients have access to up-to-date safety information via public reports. 3. The COVID-19 vaccines contracts have not changed the EU liability rules and patients' rights are fully preserved in line with the EU Product Liability Directive 4 . The contracts for the purchase of COVID-19-vaccines contain clauses that outline in detail the obligations and responsibilities of the parties involved regarding potential losses, damages, liabilities, or legal claims arising from the COVID-19 vaccines. However, the application of such clauses falls under the remit of the Member States as they have purchased the vaccines. 1 https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/documents/other/prac-rules-procedure_en.pdf 2 European public assessment reports: https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/what-we-publish-medicineswhen/european-public-assessment-reports-background-context Periodic safety update reports (PSURs): https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory-overview/postauthorisation/pharmacovigilance-post-authorisation/periodic-safety-update-reports-psurs 3 https://ec.europa.eu/health/documents/community-register/html/index_en.htm 4 Directive (EU) 2024/2853 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on liability for defective products and repealing Council Directive 85/374/EEC OJ L, 2024/2853, 18.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2853/oj”
  Vaccination
• 2024-12-16 “E-002952/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission COVID-19 vaccines have been authorised to protect against COVID-19. Vaccines are not authorised with the primary goal of reducing disease transmission, which is challenging to assess in clinical studies and requires large-scale real-world data. Post-authorisation studies indicate that COVID-19 vaccines can reduce virus transmission, though their effectiveness varies over time and across regions due to circulating virus strains and preventive measures 1 . The first COVID-19 vaccines received conditional marketing authorisation based on shortterm efficacy, with the duration of protection still being determined. By 2021, real-world data showed reduced protection over time, particularly with new variants. Ongoing recommendations for booster doses and vaccine updates aim to maintain protection as the virus evolves. The COVID-19 vaccine contracts that the Commission concluded on behalf of the Member States were based on products which were considered safe and efficacious according to EU pharmaceutical law requirements and authorised based on the European Medicines Agency’s advice. Studies indicate that vaccine protection declines over time and that this is due, among other factors, to the emergence of new variants. COVID-19 vaccines authorised in the EU are regularly updated to maintain protection as SARS-CoV-2 evolves. The vaccine contracts allowed and continue to allow Member States to order updated vaccines, once authorised and made available by manufacturers. According to the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, all vaccines authorised in the EU were highly protective against hospitalisation, severe disease, and death, and delays in their availability could have had severe public health consequences 2 . 1 https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory-overview/public-health-threats/coronavirus-disease-covid19/covid-19-medicines/covid-19-vaccines-key-facts 2 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/interim-analysis-covid-19-vaccine-effectiveness-againsthospitalisation-and-death”
  Vaccination · Covid-19 vaccines procurement
• 2024-12-12 “E-002921/2024 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission Under the EU vaccines strategy 1 , the Commission concluded on behalf of Member States an Advance Purchase Agreement (APA) 2 with CureVac in November 2020 in order to secure up to 405 million doses of their CVnCoV vaccine and made an upfront payment to the company in December 2020 as per the contractual provisions. In October 2021, CureVac notified the Commission of its inability to start the provision of the vaccine. In accordance with the contract provisions, CureVac presented to the Commission a Financial Statement of the total expenses incurred and commitments made for the CVnCoV project costs and investments. The Commission is in the process of assessing the company’s declaration to verify the correctness and eligibility of the expenditures in the Financial Statement (including the EUR 19.6 million of commitments referenced in the European Court of Auditors (ECA) report) against the provisions of the APA. After the mentioned upfront payment to CureVac, the Commission did not make further payments to CureVac nor to other manufacturers of COVID-19 vaccines in 2023. The Financial Statement of CureVac was subject to the ECA Report 2023 because the period under examination by the Court of Auditors in the Annual Report 2023 3 also covers retroactively periods before 2023, as explained in footnote 10 on page 25 of the report. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/coronavirus-response/public-health/eu-vaccines-strategy_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2021-01/curevac_-_redacted_advance_purchase_agreement_0.pdf 3 https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/AR-2023/AR-2023_EN.pdf”
  Pharma transparency · Covid-19 vaccines procurement
• 2024-12-12 “E-002920/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Fines for air passengers not having checked in online by a certain time before departure are usually stipulated in the relevant airline’s terms and conditions of carriage. Under Council Directive 93/13/EEC 1 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, standard contract terms are regarded as unfair ‘if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, they cause a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer’. Unfair contract terms are not binding on consumers. The indicative list of unfair terms in the Annex to the Directive mentions disproportionately high penalties that consumers are requested to pay when failing to comply with their obligations. Under current EU consumer law, the Member States are responsible for the enforcement of consumer law. Whether or not a specific contract term is unfair under Council Directive 93/13/EEC is therefore assessed by national authorities and courts. Depending on their assessment, Member State authorities may take appropriate action against the use of such terms. In the event of a suspected widespread infringement of consumer law, Member State authorities may also activate the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network 2 established under Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 3 . 1 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29–34. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-complaints/enforcement-consumerprotection/consumer-protection-cooperation-network_en 3 Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, p.1-26.”
  EU Competition policy
• 2024-11-27 “– (début de l'intervention hors micro) ...voté aujourd'hui l'immunité pour Ursula von der Leyen. Nous sommes une semaine avant le procès au pénal des SMS cachés pour l'achat de vaccins contre le COVID. Cette ingérence est inadmissible. Est-ce que le clan autour d'Ursula utilisera ce vote d'approbation de la Commission pour mettre la pression sur la procédure judiciaire? Ne pouvait-on pas attendre une semaine avant de valider une personne propre, compétente et consensuelle? Ce vote à l'agenda du Parlement européen, c'est un procès des complices. Aujourd'hui, certains députés ont approuvé quelqu'un qui a évité de s'expliquer publiquement devant les députés sur les contrats de Pfizer, malgré les décisions de la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, de la Médiatrice et le rapport de la Cour des comptes européenne. Quelqu'un qui a refusé de se présenter devant les électeurs aux élections européennes en 2019 et en 2024, pour défendre son bilan; qui veut aussi appliquer un programme présenté par Mario Draghi, un ex-Premier ministre minoritaire en Italie – un programme publié après les élections qui a fait le bilan du passif de cette Commission. Minoritaire en France, en Espagne, en Belgique, en Tchéquie, en Slovénie et en Hongrie, Ursula n'a pas non plus vraiment convaincu les députés polonais, grecs ou chypriotes, ce qui représente un total de près de 200 millions de personnes. Pour ma part, aujourd'hui, je suis fière d'avoir voté contre cette Commission.”
• 2024-09-20 “E-001775/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) 1 , indeed requires providers of marketplaces to comply with a number of specific obligations from 13 December 2024. Amongst these, and notwithstanding their obligations under the Digital Services Act 2 , these providers need to design their online interface in a way that enables traders offering the product to provide key safety and product-related information and ensure that this information is displayed on the product offers. The same information would also be required from businesses if they offer their products in distance sales, for example via their e-shops. The consistent and effective enforcement of the GPSR will be a priority for the Commission as of its entry into application. The Commission will provide guidance to support businesses’ compliance with the GSPR, taking into account the needs of smaller businesses 3 . Businesses will not need to comply with additional labelling requirements for products which were originally placed on the internal market before 13 December 2024, and are then made available on the EU market for resale, provided that they complied with the General Product Safety Directive 4 . Antiques, such as works of art or collectors’ items are excluded from the scope of the GPSR. Works of art are products created solely for artistic purposes, usually by hand. Collectors’ items must be of sufficient rarity and historical or scientific interest to justify their collection and preservation. Antiques are goods, other than collectors’ items or work of art which are of an extraordinary age 5 . Whether CDs, DVDs and video games fall under one of these categories will need to be assessed by economic operators and market surveillance authorities on a case-by-case basis. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety (OJ L 135, 23.5.2023, p. 1–51). 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102). The DSA's horizontal rules apply to all intermediary service providers in the EU, including online marketplaces. The DSA sets due diligence obligations for all online platforms to address illegal content, including illegal goods, focusing on preventing illegal activities and harmful content online. Specific rules for online marketplaces (Articles 29-32) apply only to providers facilitating distance contracts between consumers and traders, excluding online sales by natural persons. 3 In accordance with Article 17 GPSR, support designed to facilitate compliance of SMEs with the GPSR will be made available. In particular, the Commission is in the process of adopting guidelines for economic operators, focussing on the needs of SMEs, including micro-enterprises, on how to fulfil their obligations. Furthermore, in accordance with article 47 of the GPSR, the Commission is to carry out an evaluation by the end of 2029, where it will assess if the Regulation has achieved its objectives while also taking into account its impact on SMEs. 4 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety (OJ L 11, 15.1.2002, p. 4–17). 5 These definitions stem from the Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (tax (OJ L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1), as referred to in recital 18 GPSR.”
  Liability for online marketplaces · EU competences on consumer protection and product standards
• 2024-09-18 “E-001753/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission On 11 August 2024, Mr Musk announced a likely increase of X’s user traffic for a specific date due to a planned live-streamed event. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires designated very large online platforms and search engines, including X, to have adequate measures in place to address potential systemic risks, which may be caused by traffic increase. This can, for example be done through the adoption of measures mitigating risks of amplification of posts by its millions of users containing illegal content, disinformation or which are contrary to the terms and conditions. In this respect, it is noteworthy that X’s terms of service ban hateful content and set rules on the moderation of violent content and to ensure civic integrity. The letter was sent to X by Mr Breton on 12 August 2024 in his capacity as the Commissioner responsible for implementing the DSA, without involvement of the College of Commissioners. That letter did not raise any issues with the live broadcasting of the interview itself. It also took no view on the context of the interview nor the political views of the participants in that interview. The Commission strictly follows a non-interference policy in third-country electoral processes and remains committed to upholding electoral neutrality. All acts and decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of the DSA are taken within the limits of the Commission’s powers and are subject to judicial review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022R2065”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-09-18 “E-001752/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Contrary to the impression given by the Honourable Member’s question, the Commission was not operating in caretaker mode during the period she refers to as the ‘campaign’ period, nor was this the case from 26 April 2024, the date of the last plenary session of the European Parliament, to 16 July 2024, when the constitutive sitting of the newly elected Parliament was held. In accordance with Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, the Commission’s term of office lasts 5 years, ending on 31 October 2024. It is only from that date onwards that the Commission might operate in a caretaker capacity until the new Commission is appointed.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Recruitment policies in the EU
• 2024-08-29 “E-001569/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission The Commission did not give any instructions in 2020-2022 to providers of online platforms such as Facebook, YouTube or Twitter, to remove or hide content concerning specific scientific products or publications. In its policy to mitigate the spread of disinformation, the Commission has always followed an approach that promotes fundamental rights and provides full transparency. This is why, upon request by the Commission to give greater transparency about their actions against COVID-19 disinformation and misinformation, signatories of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation 1 issued regular reports on these actions between August 2020 an April 2022 2 . 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/2022-strengthened-code-practice-disinformation 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/covid-19-disinformation-monitoring”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-08-27 “E-001562/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission 1. Disclosure of data by platforms in the framework of criminal proceedings is currently regulated by national law. As of 18 August 2026, law enforcement and judicial authorities will be able to send European Production Orders to designated establishments or legal representatives of electronic communication service providers to seek information relevant as evidence for criminal proceedings concerning various types of crimes, including those related to terrorism or child sexual abuse, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 1 and Directive (EU) 2023/1544 2 . The Regulation provides for safeguards, including a judicial authorisation and limitations in terms of types of offenses when requesting traffic or content data. 2. The Commission does not comment on individual cases before the national courts. Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States have the primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. 3. In April 2024, the Belgium Presidency of the Council activated the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) 3 . This is however completely unrelated to Telegram. For clarity, Telegram has appointed its legal representative in Belgium, as required by Article 13 of the Digital Services Act (DSA). As a consequence, the Belgian Digital Services Coordinator is competent for the supervision of Telegram under the DSA. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and the European Council of 12 July 2023 on European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings. 2 Directive (EU) 2023/1544 of the European Parliament and the European Council of 12 July 2023 laying down harmonised rules on the designation of designated establishments and the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering electronic evidence in criminal proceedings. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/04/24/foreign-interference-presidencyreinforces-exchange-of-information-ahead-of-the-june-2024-european-elections/”
  Privacy & law enforcement · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-08-27 “E-001556/2024 Answer given by Ms Kyriakides on behalf of the European Commission On 16 January 2024, the Commission published a call for tender for the supply of mRNA COVID-19 vaccine under the Joint Procurement Agreement (JPA). 18 countries expressed interest to participate in the joint procurement to contribute to their preparedness and security of supply. The Commission also launched a call for tender for protein-based COVID-19 vaccines under the JPA on 16 July 2024. Both calls for tender specifically target COVID-19 vaccines tailored to the latest circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants. This is in line with European Regulatory 1 and the World Health Organization (WHO) 2 recommendations for updating COVID-19 vaccines strain composition. The primary purpose of the two calls for tender was to bolster contracting authorities' preparedness and supply security, while guaranteeing access to adapted vaccines. The calls did not apply a comparative criterion for safety or efficacy between adapted mRNA vaccines and other COVID-19 vaccines, with marketing authorisation in the EU, but both target two different vaccine technologies, based on the needs expressed by the parties to the JPA. The COVID-19 vaccine contracts enabled Member States to have access to COVID-19 vaccines adapted to SARS-CoV-2 variants as they received a marketing authorisation within the EU. 1 https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory-overview/public-health-threats/coronavirus-disease-covid19/covid-19-medicines/public-health-advice-covid-19-medicines#advice-on-covid-19-vaccines-13334 2 https://www.who.int/groups/technical-advisory-group-on-covid-19-vaccine-composition-(tag-co-vac)”
  GMOs
• 2024-08-27 “E-001555/2024 Answer given by Ms Kyriakides on behalf of the European Commission Data on excess mortality in EU/EEA (European Economic Area) countries is collected in the context of the EuroMOMO project and by the European Statistical Office (ESTAT). EuroMOMO is a European mortality monitoring activity based on overall mortality, but not cause-specific, aiming to detect and measure excess deaths related to seasonal influenza, pandemics and other public health threats, supported by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and hosted by Statens Serum Institut, Denmark 1 . ESTAT publishes an excess mortality indicator, which is based on data from National Statistical Institutes on weekly deaths on a voluntary basis since April 2020 2 . In the years 2020-2023, the excess deaths rates correlate with the COVID-19 waves and are inversely correlated with vaccination coverage, as highlighted by the WHO 3 . The Commission supports ongoing studies on post-COVID and its link to various disease outcomes, such as heart disease, diabetes, cancers, or neural dysfunctions 4 . The Commission would like to emphasise the known methodological problems 5 of the British Medical Journal (BMJ) paper 6 , on which the parliamentary question is based. The BMJ alerts its readers to misreporting and misunderstanding of this study 7 , as it does not establish any direct causal link between COVID-19 vaccination and mortality. The researchers looked only at trends in excess mortality over time, not its causes. The academic institution of three of the four authors has distanced itself from this publication 8 . A critical discussion on tracking excess mortality across countries during the COVID-19 pandemic with the World Mortality Dataset was published in 2021 9 . 1 https://www.euromomo.eu/ 2 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?oldid=509982#Recent_data_on_excess_mortality_in_the_EU 3 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05522-2 4 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/research-area/health/coronavirus_en 5 https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/covid-19/commentary-misleading-bmj-public-health-paper-covid-19-excessmortality-needs-be-retracted 6 https://bmjpublichealth.bmj.com/content/bmjph/2/1/e000282.full.pdf 7 https://bmjpublichealth.bmj.com/content/2/1/e000282eoc 8 https://www.prinsesmaximacentrum.nl/en/news-events/news/the-princess-maxima-center-distances-itself-frompublication-excess-mortality-during-covid-19-pandemic 9 https://elifesciences.org/articles/69336”
  Vaccination
• 2024-08-27 “E-001558/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission The importance of safeguarding the most sensitive European data is widely recognised. President-elect's political guidelines 1 and mission letters to the new College echo the Commission’s intention to pave the way towards a more resilient, competitive and harmonised European digital market, including through the development of a single EU-wide cloud policy for public administrations. The recent report titled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ further emphasises the need to continue these efforts 2 . The draft European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services (EUCS) is being developed by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). The EUCS aims to provide a coherent set of security requirements and conformity assessment methodologies thus addressing the current market fragmentation and lowering the financial barriers for cloud providers to offer secure cloud solutions across the EU. This change will be particularly beneficial for small and medium-sized providers, the drivers of innovation. The draft EUCS candidate scheme will be further discussed among the Member States’ experts in the European Cybersecurity Certification Group. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/881 3 , once the draft scheme's text has been stabilized, ENISA will transfer the candidate scheme to the Commission. The Commission will then be responsible for preparing an implementing act based on the scheme. The adoption of this act will be controlled by the Member States through the comitology procedure defined in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 4 . 1 European Commission: von der Leyen, U., Political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 – Europe’s choice, 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf 2 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strengthening-european-competitiveness/eu-competitiveness-lookingahead_en 3 OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 15. 4 OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13–18.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2024-08-27 “E-001557/2024 Answer given by Ms Kyriakides on behalf of the European Commission In August 2020, the Commission, acting on behalf of participating Member States and the company AstraZeneca, entered into an Advance Purchase Agreement (‘EU APA’) for the supply of 300 million doses of the COVID-19 vaccine under development by AstraZeneca. The APA remained in force until March 2022, when the final doses purchased under the APA were delivered to the Participating Member States. The withdrawal of the marketing authorisation for Vaxzevria in March 2024 did not affect the implementation of the APA. The date of the marketing authorisation withdrawal does also not impact the company’s liability or obligation to provide compensation for side effects from vaccines administered prior to the withdrawal, in line with the terms of the APA.”
  Covid-19 vaccines procurement
• 2024-08-27 “E-001559/2024 Answer given by Ms Kyriakides on behalf of the European Commission The global outbreak of Mpox clade II prompted the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) between July 2022 and May 2023. Some cases of clade II still occur in the EU 1 . The WHO declaration of a PHEIC due to Mpox in August 2024 was prompted by a surge of cases in Africa due to both clades I and II as well as the detection of a new subclade (Ib). The vast majority of Mpox cases are occurring in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2 . The only case of Mpox in Europe caused by Clade Ib was reported by Sweden in a person returning from Africa 3 . No secondary cases have occurred to date among the patient’s contacts. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control published a risk assessment 4 and guidance documents 5 including the recommendation to raise awareness among travellers and to upgrade the surveillance systems for early detection of imported cases. The decision of whether to implement systematic screening of travellers falls within the competence of national authorities, which exchange views on a regular basis in the Health Security Committee 6 . Public research can contribute to the development of new medicines and other medical countermeasures, both for off-patent compounds and new developments. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) offers scientific and regulatory support to public research to ensure high-quality evidence, including in the case of Mpox. Moreover, over the past years, the Commission and EMA have made efforts to facilitate the repurposing of authorised medicines. The aim is to support not-for-profit organisations and academia in gathering or generating sufficient evidence on the use of an established medicine for a new indication 7 . 1 https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/mpox; https://monkeypoxreport.ecdc.europa.eu/ 2 https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/mpox-monkeypox 3 https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/communicable-diseasecontrol/disease-information-about-mpox/one-case-of-mpox-clade-i-reported-in-sweden 4 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/risk-assessment-mpox-epidemic-monkeypox-virus-clade-iafrica 5 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/mpox 6 https://health.ec.europa.eu/health-security-and-infectious-diseases/crisis-management/list-authoritiesrepresented-health-security-committee/health-security-committee-reports_en 7 https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/news/repurposing-authorised-medicines-pilot-support-not-profit-organisationsand-academia”
  Vaccination · EU competences on health
• “Thank you very much. Madam president, Vice president of the Commission. Madam Minister, if you read the title of the debate. I thought a miracle had occurred. I thought finally the European Commission realized how it's harmed our competitiveness. Too much paperwork or red tape, as you just said. But the reality is different. You list ten, the ten terrible tens. But the worst barrier is actually or obstacle is Brussels bureaucracy. With 27 Sherpas in committees that won't help us in any way. Uh, Brussels always thinks it's never its fault. And as if that weren't enough, you want to centralize with the umpteenth surveillance authority, Mr. Sigourney. Brussels is never responsible for the shipwreck. Your software says more Europe, more Europe. And in the last few years, a US wealth has gone up. And yet it's only 21% in Europe. It's in the report, 13 percentage points. Different point difference. Now look at what's happening to the car industry. It's collapsing. The solution is simplification. But we have to stop this mentality of I regulate. Therefore I am.”
  EU political integration
• “Madam President. Thank you, chair, and thank you to the rapporteur. I think we all know a bit about this dossier. There's lots of points. And so security information needs to be provide provided digitally or on paper or directly on the product. And for information That's only about the security. We can move towards digitalization. But when the manufacturer chooses to provide digital information, the consumer also needs to be able to directly act or access all of the machine readable code, uh, directly, without the need to provide personal data or download anything, or use uh, applications, or sign up for a, an account. Uh, the digital access to legal information needs to be possible throughout the use of the product. So, uh, more than, uh, ten years or more than 50, uh, Wawa, uh, fridges work for 30 years. Uh. Um, so, uh, 30 to 50 years could be good for long term use products and, uh, and paper copy of the instructions should be obtainable on request. Uh, I know that some of you still have some difficulties with small type on screens and on the common specifications. I share the concerns with some members of industry and colleagues about the Commission standards, and I'd like to thank you, and I'm happy to work with you on this file. Thank you.”
  Radio equipment (common charger)
• “Thank you very much. Chair. Vice president of the Commission, you have just presented the initial intermediate report on the implementation of the DMA. And I would like to ask you about the provisions of the text, which have really been a hot topic for the last few months. In 2026, the Commission has presented its infringement on it on Google. But you didn't want to look at clicks and classifications with it's competition. It's the famous article six, paragraph 11 of the DMA, and this is an open issue. The Google spokesperson, Mark Phillips, says that this affair seems to be, at least in part, motivated by open AI, which is trying to use some of the DMA to collate a Google data. In terms of transparency, we discover that some members of your cabinet have met open AI. That happened in September 2020 to talk about the DMA vice president. What was the exact content of this meeting? Open AI is not a gatekeeper. The company is not even subject to the DMA, so why are they interested in it? Above and beyond the suspicions of lobbying, there's an issue of security here.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• “Thank you. President, colleagues. Commissioner. In Europe, we spend over €2 trillion on public procurement, which is thrown to the winds. Um, nuclear power plants in the Czech Republic, the metro and portal have all been won by Koreans and Chinese. How? The EU can do this without knowing how much they gain. Well, check the Commission website. Access to market its comprehensive information in English. French taxpayers are paying for these tools. But in Brussels, no one thought to translate the website into French, which is symbolic as Europe is crumbling and Americans are acting. We finally have a report which mentions reciprocity and European preference in strategic sectors, which is something we've always suggested. A first step is for public procurement, and that is a small step for Europe when opening up to our allies. Let's go further and allow transfer of technology in Europe. The Commission needs to set the example by buying primarily from European suppliers. Thank you. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Chair: The floor goes to Mr. Sandro Gozi”
  "Buy European" provisions
• “Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you to the experts for their contributions. We are in a hearing which I think is very useful for everyone. What we ask as MEPs, for the reasons of transparency, is that whenever there are people involved and files being dealt with, there's no conflict of interest. I see that this American think tank gets money from the commission, so I would have thought that before we started this hearing, it would have been useful for who was paying whom for what. I think it would have been useful for everybody to have an appropriate debate. The commission is not allowed to transfer that sort of money. They paid 2.2 million a few years ago to them. Miss Havlicek has talked about malevolent actors and authoritarian states for reasons of transparency. It would be useful for us to have access to this data so that we can understand how these studies are carried out, where these lists come from, what are the criteria being used to compile them and understand how they are being deemed malevolent? And specifically, what is an authoritarian state when it comes to the current debate on telegram, I'm turning to Mr. Fedorovich here. We saw this weekend Pavel Durov said that the French state had put a CEO of telegram under pressure. When it comes to all the Patriot, accounts in Romania were meant to be restricted so they couldn't carry out their actual profession. Now, if telegram accepted to get rid of all these accounts of the Patriots, how can you justify that trend? And this manipulation must have had an effect on the result of elections in Romania. Thank you. Thank you for the question, terrace.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “What is that exactly? Why is there just one on there? And why did this public procurement fail? And then finally we're looking at 50 million Errors in 2024. Let me give you one example that belongs in that 50 million. Your delegation in Russia. At, uh, bought €10,000 worth of wine. If more than €10,000, in fact. Well, I mean, I'm French, I'm all for that. But I would just like to know exactly what was happening here. This wasn't France, it wasn't Spain, it wasn't Italy. It was a Danish company instead. And so I was just wondering whether that, um, tells us something about nationality and importance of that. Now, I was wondering whether we might be able to get greater transparency on this kind of thing in the future. I'm also very much in favor of using Signal and Telegram. However, when we're talking about financial interests, I think we need to have better transparency. We saw this with FISA gate in the past, otherwise we end up with problems. Thank you.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you very much. President colleagues, sexual images which are non conceptual generated by AI just like all forms of exploitation on the networks. And these are a scourge that affects women and girls. We need to condemn this fully. The platforms need to react to unacceptable content that is marked out to them. Grock and Social Network X has been showing these burkini images as shown in the study by forensics. Now, this calls for a calm and proportional debate, not a hysterical reaction. There are some difficult users out there. Let's be clear. Revenge porn and a nonconsensual sexual images are intolerable and have to be severely condemned and prosecuted. However, preventing uses of AI would be unacceptable. We've never banned, uh, photography and just because it's used for sexual purposes. So there's a lot of indignation and there's a lot of emotion linked to new technologies. But nevertheless, law has to remain consistent. We need to get the right balance. Platforms need to indicate when images are artificially created. Victims need to be protected, and law needs to be applied, uh, without hypocrisy or any excesses. Anyone who uses AI for harassment or sexual exploitation should be prosecuted. It's a question of individual responsibility and not, uh, banning a technology that should guide our action.”
  Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• “Thank you, madam. And thank you, Vice President. I was going to talk about the crisis in the car manufacturing industry, but now the sanctions against Apple and Meta are a priority. We want to reassure that sector because the car manufacturing sector is in crisis. Uh, given the decisions are taken, I would like us to tackle these decisions and not destroy the digital sector in the EU. We know that the transatlantic dialogue is vital for our trade discussions with the US. Recent decisions by ourselves within the context of the DMA, um, lead us to great worry. They threaten threaten European businesses, small ones and online users without evaluating the economic impact. For consumers, this becomes a problem. You criticize the binary advertising while YouTube offers that same, uh uh, arrangement. So are you going to investigate YouTube? Could you clarify the decision making procedure and the expected economic benefits? I think a strengthened dialogue with the US is crucial for to align, uh, our. How do you justify, uh, the these, um, uh, the the sanctions within this transatlantic, uh, context, are you going to meet our transatlantic partners and is is matter part of your, uh, intentions.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• “Now, we've had to wait until the month of August to have a new application or use guide. But let me just give one example. I used AI about a week ago for a video to show that Strasbourg is a dirty city and its generative AI that I use, so it's on the basis of content that exists. I then wanted to generate an image that corresponded to the video. Now that threw up, uh uh, that gave, uh, cause to a media storm and outrage. I made it clear that I used AI, but certain media feel that that's going too far already. And they said that I shouldn't have used AI there. But I do think it's urgent to clarify, uh, and to to have transparency in guidelines in particular when it comes to these platforms. Again, to give you an example. Normally platforms through the DSA have the obligation to indicate that they're using artificial intelligence, but you have to click on it. It's not an automatic notification. And. You know. It's up to the user to click to find the information. And I believe that that's not visible enough. And maybe we can start giving some thought to how we can educate and inform users. Because on the one hand we impose rules on platforms. And as you said, there is room for improvement. But our platforms are open to negotiating with you. Are they open to the criticism that you have of them? And how do you plan on putting in place further safeguards with these platforms, in particular when it comes to high risk AI applications?”
  Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• “Um, I don't think anybody has. I don't see why we need to have a study in France. We tried to limit the access to Pornhub, and this was limited to 18, uh, and, and, uh, that was sent to, the courts. Now we're waiting for a European decision. A European decision from an EU level. So you can see there is a desire from a certain member states to, uh, to address this now, uh, parental control. But who is responsible here? There's two articles on this in your file. You're seeing that, uh, platforms are responsible. But I think the major point missing here is parents. We also need to look at the study that comes from the commission and take the correct decision. Now, uh, harmful effects as well. If there are real harmful effects, are we going to categorize, uh, telephones such as cigarettes or, or alcohol and restrict access to the telephone? So many questions remain unanswered. Lots of desire to find a balance between access to platforms and, uh, and apps as well. And striking the balance with that and responsibility. Agility and finding the balance between, um, accountability between parents and platforms. Now, we tried to legislate in France and we were unsuccessful. And we need to be careful in not sending out the wrong signals.”
  Regulation of pornography in the EU
• “So there's a problem when it comes to administering the data that's registered. And also when it comes to defining NGOs, we have the 2024 regulation, which says it needs to be a charity organization independent of the of public authorities. Now, if we look at the governance of these NGOs, we really this notion of not for profit, not for profit or charity, that is really what's called into question. Oxfam sells secondhand products, for example. It says it should be non-profit, but here there really are problems when it comes to defining these organizations and applying these rules. You said that this is a problem in the EU, but it's also in member states. I think it's very unfortunate that France does not have a definition. This leads to a lack of clarity, and this is also a risk. This is a potential reputational risk as well. This report shows all of these problems very well. And here I've also done research in commission documents. Yes. You say in your report there are more than 30 NGOs that receive the majority of grants, €3.3 billion. Why don't you publish that list? Why do we not have access to these NGOs? Because these are the ones that are receiving the most money. And the Commission must release this information. We need to force the commission to do so. This is the money of European taxpayers. And. We want to have access to these contracts, to the public funds which are spent sometimes to organizations that are not NGOs.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• “Thank you. Chair. Mr. Sigourney, going back to the public procurement final, we have new legislation planned for 2026. And we know that some third countries do not play by the rules. They keep their markets, they prioritise their own strategic and economic interests. I asked your predecessor about the ten biggest markets, uh, about our competitors and how that fits in with EU consumption. I didn't get an answer back then, and they seemed not to be interested by this. And I hear my colleagues today speaking about this European preference, and I thank them for this. But back then when we were looking at public procurement in defence, we spoke about the European preference, but that was boycotted. And it is good to see that there is a change. This is an urgent situation and as was recalled on Monday morning, a colleague said something along the lines of we could, uh, remove all American companies from the EU market, uh, because some services are forced to pick US companies, particularly in the IT sector. And some cloud professionals are proposing, uh, EU alternatives. I know that you're still looking at this, perhaps not going too far, too far into the future. But if you look at what the commission has already said relating to cloud, our European providers need to be heard. They need to be included in this market. So in your assessment, you think, do you think that some kind of work on contracts is possible here? And what are your plans for cloud.”
  "Buy European" provisions
• “Thank you. President. Colleagues. Madam Kyriakidis, the commissioner who was responsible for such a crisis under Covid, is now a participant in Davos without declaring her revenue. She also received money from the Bill Gates Foundation. Now it seems that all roads lead to Davos. Let me remind you of von der Leyen's speech on disinformation saying it was worse than climate change or the war in Ukraine. Yesterday Brussels wanted to intervene in elections on all levels. Today they were attacking democracy. When I look at the text on transparency, on lobbying, we can see who's behind this. It is Qatar to protect Soros. And now we look at the Specter Foundation's Madame Louise's organization's Oxfam and other NGOs, such as we can see how they are being targeted so that our business is the victims. We are looking at who financed the New Observer in 2014. And why are we suddenly interested in that when the commission provided €1.8 million on behalf of energy efficiency or to pay for new creches, it seems that this doesn't correspond to the stated goal of increasing democracy. Well, it seems that all we're doing now is supporting Opus Dei and Soros Foundation.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you very much, Commissioner, for the presentation. Thank you very much to the Court of Auditors. Border control and immigration are topics which are very close to the hearts of our citizens. Mr. Bruno, you said yourself here we are talking about public money. We are talking about taxpayer money and something which we need to ensure that we use it very carefully. I was listening very carefully. And you said that the commission is funding, um, taking funding from Italy and Cyprus and going to other countries, €10 million, in fact, in October 2025, the estimate was 700,000 illegal immigrants. That was the figure we had in France. And so we know this number now is increasing. I was wondering whether you could give us a figure of what you imagine the Commission believes this will be by 2026. Now, you were talking about key performance indicators, and the commission was saying how it ensures that EU funds are managed in terms of border management and immigration, and how we ensure that we get measurable results. You were saying that when it comes to the success percentage for expelling criminals outside EU borders, that there are no indicators ensuring that these people actually do go back to their countries? Now, could you perhaps clarify the in 2024 what the process was for securing agreements with third countries for repatriation.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you very much. This is a very important issue. Yes. Yesterday we talked earlier today we talked about, um, protecting minors online. And this is another form of, uh, on line issues. Now, Shane. And these investigations, you said that you send letters, but what tools have been used to carry out these investigations? Is it based on because of unlawful products? Is it because of addiction? Is it because of counterfeit goods? So for Shane, really, what are the reasons behind this investigation being launched? And in the negotiations on the customs union. How do you. Plan to implement this, given the difficulties we have today when it comes to exempt products below €150? So how could you say a little bit more about that? Thank you.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• “The Court of Auditors needs to mention various different references. So where is 4.1 when it comes to France? When it comes to the country by country report? And we look at France in particular, it's very difficult to follow. We have things highlighted in red. When there are problems, we'd like to be able to check which ones those are. And the problem here is that I have had to look at the report from the council in July 2025 and been able to see that the commission is involved in many different areas, and that the Commission's assessment is even worse whenever it comes to French debt, because it has 118% for 2026. Now, in some cases, some kinds of expenditure is going to an unknown number of beneficiaries. So this means that you have this total for the spending. And it means that there are terrible consequences. We need to improve access to clean water and sanitation, and that needs to be done in Mayotte in particular. So I'd like to thank you very much, ladies, for this excellent report. And I'd like to hear from my colleagues as well. And I'd like to thank you very much for this discussion.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you very much. President. Commissioner. 4.6 billion low value products, a value of under €150 imported into Europe in 2024. So 4.6 billion. That was the same number of Covid vaccine doses ordered during the Covid crisis. And we're calling for transparency with regard to these giant contracts as well. Hence the motion. Um. Keenly awaited by our citizens. And you're just treating us as conspiracy theorists. It's very difficult to halt this traffic and to ensure consumer safety. We will support this report on e-commerce. We want to see more security and more checks to benefit European consumers, of course. But, colleagues, I haven't heard you denouncing Pfizer and all the billions that they took in from the commission between 2021 and 2024. Now the Chinese company Qai is being targeted. But what you haven't said is that our colleague, Mr. Castaner, a former minister under Macron, is now working for shine. And he knows that the so-called yellow vest movement, one which he clamped down, but he has now switched to the other side. That's why we're calling from greater transparency from the commission. Nobody wants to talk about FISA gate or this kind of revolving door policy. And we've got Ettinger from Ursula's party doing lobbying for shine and for others. Now, of course, the Santa Commission had to stand down 20 years ago. And I think it's very difficult in a case in which nobody wants to take a shred of responsibility for this situation.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “And my final question, and I think this relates to the for the Commission and for the Court of Auditors, both I was particularly interested on the agency based in Malta and here the action of pro-immigration groups. There's a specific example here in relation to article 2.49 of the rules of funding. There's a very specific definition of an NGO. It needs to be independent. Um, and that's very important. However, when we're talking about we know that they received around €5 million, but that this is a politicised NGO because, um, this is connected to a socialist, um. Minister very close to Francois Hollande's government. And so I think we haven't really had a very good response from this from the commission. And I think what we can see from your answer is that the new criteria are not being taken into account. And that concrete example shows as much. Thank you.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• “And when you say to, what are you going to do when you say to people, change your cars in 2030? Are they going to listen when you tell them that they've got to change their driving permits and reset their exams every 15 years? When you say to a Romanian, oh, well, after the elections, there was interference. That's the problem. At the end of the day, you're trying to make people accept a report or make us accept a report on elements that you've taken from literature. And I think that you'll be honest. I hope that you'll be honest about what is the ultimate goal of this report. Are you giving more teeth to the to the commission to dictate the kind of democracy we have tomorrow? Be careful, because that's not what the people want. The people want true democracy. And the only positive.”
  EU political integration
• “And then in France, unfortunately, we have figures that are worse than those for Greece. And it really is a very shocking change here. 88% of these companies say that this administration is a problem whenever they're trying to carry out business in France. So I have a question here and I have a comment as well. Point 42 is when where you say that the French plan only had one investment and no reforms. The sub CSR can't be fully implemented until the investment is made by the French authorities. Could you explain in very simple terms what this means? Did we have a bad plan and then nothing after that? Is that the way we're supposed to take this? And then more generally, I'd have to say that it's very difficult to try to find documents and to read through all of these acronyms in this kind of report, even though it is a very effective one. And it does show us that there are still problems. You've mentioned them in your recommendations, and the commission has said this as well. It was supporting its recommendations. And I think that this collection is less accessible and less useful than the standard Thundered special reports in its annex.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “Thank you very much indeed, Madam Chair. And thank you also to the Commission, of course, for their presentation, because artificial intelligence is, of course, major progress. But it does throw up problems that we see on a day to day basis. Now, as with the internet in 2000, some will be on board and others will be left behind. But as with all technical technological advancements, AI can be used for lawful purposes but also give rise to abuse. The deepfake technology is very worrying, in particular deepfake pornography, which affects women and women's images, can be used to make women say or do things that they never intended. But we shouldn't demonize AI either. There is a framework that was supported by a majority of members in this House, too, and it became it's become a major instrument to many. And it's not AI in itself which is good or bad. It's the use made of it by humans. Now, it might seem banal what I'm saying, but I do think it's worth reminding. And yes, the online platforms need to shoulder their responsibility. But in parallel, we shouldn't forget that we need to educate people about artificial intelligence. Now, AI content that's created can be detected and deleted quickly, and we can work on that further. And there is a lot of abuse, but we shouldn't have systemic, systematic censorship either. It's really about striking, striking a balance between sanctioning and controlling Trolling and allowing for these developments. Does the AI act, which was supported and voted through the DSA in place as well? And I think in using AI, there are a couple of points of criticism that I would raise.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “Thank you very much, chairman. Yes, indeed. This is a very important topic because today we have heard the decision which condemns the commission for lack of transparency. I'd like to really thank the Court of Auditors. And you, Miss Andrea Kayani. It's very courageous. It's not easy because really it is about putting a spanner in the works. Now, there's been a lack of transparency. You've talked about that, but I'm sorry, but when it comes to the definition of NGOs, which should have been redefined and wasn't because of Qatar gate, we saw there were fake NGOs involved in Qatar gate. Yes, there are these phony NGOs that operate around the commission. And to give you an example, because this is a very good report, contains a lot of statistics and it allows me to ask specific questions. But I have one example. I've done some research on Oxfam NGO fighting poverty around the world. And you can see there's the transparency Register and the the FT's register. On the one hand, some funding is declared and on the other hand on the other side zero. I have the figures here that in the document and it's the commission that publishes these. We have Oxfam International which says that under grants from the EU na this means there are none. And then look at Oxfam Belgium, we have um, 6.4 million that's been announced. And there's also some kind of problem with the figures. And there's a and as you can see, there's more co-financing there. And where can you find that. It's in the Ft. And that's €900,000 that have been spent by the commission there.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you very much. Mr. President. Commission vice president. The abuse of market by Google results from Brussels strategic failure. Yes, this fine of €3 billion announced on the 5th of September is a positive step. And allow me to say clearly that during the negotiations on the DMA, we did push for heavy fines when they are justified, of course, and also structural measures. But unfortunately we're familiar with these huge announcements which actually cover up shortcomings in the judicial approach. A few remind the if you remember the fine of 2 billion that was imposed in 2019 after 15 years of legal processes, the European Court cancelled this, and then the 2019 fine of 1.5 billion was also annulled by the European Court of Justice. So why should we believe this one? Do we also believe that it will change the Google approach approach and adtech in Europe. The fact is that Brussels is always fighting yesterday's war. For 20 years. It has been investigating Google for self preferment, but it overlooked the acquisition of YouTube in 2006 and also failed to recognise the financial thresholds which are necessary to address the risks. The merging of data of intention through Google's search and interest via YouTube is being ignored. They have a 360 degree coverage of consumers creating a monopoly over them, and it seems now that the commission is turning its attention towards YouTube so late in the day. If you compare it with competitive competition, uh, rules applied to European enterprises such as GDF and EDF, How are we supposed to make market market giants when we have this approach? And the approach which is being taken shows that European needs are being neglected. We want contextual advertising, which reflects and respects anonymity. Thank you.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• “Thank you. Chair. Thank you for those complimentary presentations. And we're talking about report 21, the support for the recovery and resilience and improving the business environment. Now, this fund was set up in February 2021. And we remember it was €650 billion. To get support, member states had to present national plans and they had to be validated by the Commission for France. The plan had been criticized because. They had to pay back Payback 70 to 80 billion. And that was in light of our spending strategy. So I'd like to thank you for your report, because you have shown that not much has changed for companies in terms of the administrative burden and the access to financing. In France in particular, the bureaucracy here means that there is still this maze. And on page 24, it says that the majority or most of that progress was made during the recovery. Now, you were saying that the Commission has said that it hasn't clearly defined or consistently applied the measures that could help the companies. Now, what concerns me here is that when I look at page 26, that there is this map showing progress and you can see countries like Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece are one case.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “A number of experts said that there is a risk, a massive risk in terms of sharing data, in terms of privacy. I'll give you a very concrete example to conclude, I quote, um, ensuring that there is an a request that means that people can engage in finger pointing, because the combination of rare terms, geo localization and pattern and behavioral patterns will enable you to identify individuals. And there is a risk of pure and simple espionage here. Lucas has shown on his blog to what extent it will be difficult to get around this system, and he explains that a hostile service could actually create a parallel society. Which would be based on regional search results. These these bodies would have a legitimate channel to monitor. Searches made by individuals and companies give you a very concrete example. In Strasbourg, someone was arrested because the FBI. Thanks to OpenAI, AI, had alerted the French police and this person was held in custody for two days. So my question is, given these security shortcomings, how can you ensure the protection of privacy and personal data for citizens?”
  Privacy & law enforcement
• “We can see that behind all of this, what's hiding is a will to cause harm to democracy. At the end of the day, I have to say, because you define this by saying, oh, you know what a autocratic discourse is and mention a few elements. But what I'm afraid of is the fact that you, uh, are denouncing, um, the fact what's going on at the commission, because I think that we've got an autocratic drift with the commission going on here that the commission is implementing, and you're part of these tools that are peddling this for years now, since the building of the European Union, we've tried to reach out to the Commission and to try and get them to accept the unacceptable. And I have to say, when we see that this report is based on, uh, studies that are behind closed doors, carried out behind closed doors, that's just not right. You need to campaign, reach out to people, you need to go to the grass roots level.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “President. Merci la Commission. Thank you very much. And thanks to the Commission for the presentation, this is a strategy to relaunch, um, innovative and sustainability, uh, in this sector. And I think we need, first of all, to take stock. There are some pretty negative, uh, figures in Europe. We know that the automotive sector is in crisis. There is, as you've said, uh, a loss of jobs. So before we come up with the strategy, maybe we need to ask what's wrong? What's not working? Some carmakers have said that the strategy over the last five years has disappeared from sight. And certainly, uh, the desire for everything to become electric, uh, is an issue. There's not actually the infrastructure available. So there's an ideology behind that that needs to be, um, made clear. Ultimately, you see that the makers are able to meet that demand. And above all, consumers haven't been able to acquire these new types of car. Now it's all well and good. Talk about self-driving. Um, it's, uh, not something consumers want, however. It's just getting hold of the car that's at the top of their minds. The question, therefore, is have you consulted carmakers? What do they think about the plan? Because before you come up with the strategy, before you produce these plans, it's all the car manufacturers that need to be asked. They need to be seen and to be heard, to have clarity. And as you'll be aware, there's an awful lot of money required by way of investment. But we continue to have open doors to China, and we're seeing that the tariffs are going to change with the US. So we're trying to set up a strategy or a plan for 15 to 20 years. But this is a sector which is in difficulty right now for ECR.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “Thank you very much, Madam Chair and shadow Rapporteurs. The protection of young people online is something that affects us all, but we should not demonise the platforms or take the responsibility away from the parents. The EU already has a robust legal framework. Asking for a new text from the commission is not necessary. Article 28 of the DSA already deals with protection of minors. We do not need overregulation that will stop innovation and development. Unfortunately, the Commission has used this tool to censure public opinion. What we need is to have dialogue with companies that are on the front line when it comes to protecting children. We need to stop children that are too young being exposed to this online world, working together with parents. There should be, um, settings on tablets right from when you buy them to help this. And obviously tackling child pornography is a major challenge that needs to be. Age verification. Rather than simply clicking on a link that says you're over 18, I think it gives young people a very negative relation image of sexual relations. Uh, there's a lot of harassment and bullying online for young people. We have tabled a number of amendments, uh, going in this direction. I hope they will be retained. Thank you very much.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• “Thank you. First off, I'd like to commend you for setting up a working group, um, to examine financing of NGOs. Everyone here is aware of Qatar Gate. Some have already forgotten. Forgotten about it, um, at the time. But we all know what happened. I'm wondering about the assessment. There was a supposed, um, British lobby which was active in Brussels. But what about the financing? Where did it come from? We're all questioning the lack of transparency and the neutrality. We're seeing that the European Commission is financing Qatar. You've got Rothschild, Bill gates, Goldman Sachs, etc., Oxfam or other names on the list. They're being funded. In an transparent manner. So how do you tell good from bad NGOs. Thank you.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe
• “Thank you. I have noted the rule. I am going to mention both matters of substance and form. We have this report. Uh. I flipped through it quickly, and I do think that it's a tool that the commission once again, is putting into place to peddle its propaganda narrative that's been in place for years now. Uh, there's an article that dates back to the 70s from Le Monde diplomatique that talks about how the commission peddles its propaganda to uphold its interests. So I come back to I'll come back to the matters of substance at the end. Now, on the form of this, the format your study, um, supports on page nine, uh, semi-structured studies that have been carried out with funds from the European Union working on behalf of the eeaS, the Commission and civil society, etc.. And when I read that, what comes to mind is, I think to myself, where are the citizens of all of this? Did you reach out to political parties? I get the impression, really, that you've biased the vision of the reporter? My colleagues have already stressed this.”
  EU public communication strategy
• “Thank you very much, chair. Colleagues. Commissioner. Well, have you seen any leap forward in our economy? No. Have you had a look for the Sms's from Ursula von der Leyen? No. Who can believe that strategy for the European economy that we call the single market is going to work well. It's, uh, you care about as much about the economy as you care about the sms's. You just basically imposing green rules that end up with closed factories and imports from abroad. Well, let's put a stop to these unreasonable policies. Stop to the free trade agreements that are putting an end to production in Europe. We need to protect Europe's companies. That's something that you simply refuse to do. Europe has to defend its economy and its sovereignty. But no, it wants to get rid of cows and diesel cars as promoted by NGOs that are paid by the European Commission. Rather, we need to support Europe's companies. Amazon. Pfizer. All of these companies end up taking European money as competitors of Europe.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)