Ioan-Rareş BOGDAN

Policy topics Ioan-Rareş BOGDAN is active on

What Ioan-Rareş BOGDAN has said (32)

• 2026-02-11 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission 10.6.2026 Written question Relocation decisions tend to be intertwined with other drivers of output and investment, such as energy prices, demand, financing conditions, competition and industrial subsidies in third countries, making it hard to isolate a gross domestic product (GDP) loss from relocations by EU firms alone. Yet, economic indicators show pressure consistent with relocation and deindustrialisation risks [1] . The European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) [2] reports some 100 cases of offshoring to non-EU countries since 2020 [3] , primarily to India, China, the US and Türkiye [4] . The observed trends are concentrated in the manufacturing industry [5] , putting more than 30 000 EU jobs at risk [6] . Around 1300 announced job redundancies [7] are associated with offshoring to the US. Prosperity and quality jobs are cornerstones of the Commission’s agenda. The Competitiveness Compass [8] , the Clean Industrial Deal [9] , the Single Market Strategy [10] and sectoral action plans [11] aim to strengthen the EU’s industrial base and competitiveness, thus fostering quality jobs in Europe . The Union of Skills [12] , the Quality Jobs Roadmap [13] and the planned Quality Jobs Act further contribute to protecting quality jobs. Finally, the Commission has proposed amendments to the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund [14] to make sure that workers at imminent risk of losing their job can benefit from EU financial support to access training. [1] For example, output in energy intensive industries is around 10% lower than pre-2022 levels and in the chemicals sector, firms report accelerated plant closures and slowed investments — developments expected to weigh on GDP. For further information and sources, see Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship & SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) Chief Economist Team, March 2026 Quarterly Bulletin https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/a261b325-749c-4eef-9b1f-0c70adb52171/download and Roland Berger (commissioned by the European Chemical Industry Council), European chemical closures and investments radar 2022-2025 https://cefic.org/app/uploads/2026/01/European-Chemical-Closures-and-Investments-Radar-2022-2025.pdf. [2] https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/surveys-and-data/european-restructuring-monitor. [3] These cases concern restructurings with a significant employment impact, as only events that meet certain conditions on the size of the affected workforce are monitored in the ERM. For more details on the ERM dataset, see the Eurofound website: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/surveys-and-data/european-restructuring-monitor. [4] India (16 cases), China (12), US (7) and Türkiye (6). [5] In particular in manufacturing of electronics, textiles, transport equipment, machinery and chemicals. [6] Commission calculation based on ERM dataset. [7] I.e., 0.000645% of total employment in the EU in 2025. [8] COM(2025) 0030 final. [9] COM(2025) 85 final. [10] COM(2025) 500 final. [11] COM(2025) 125 final (steel and metals); COM(2025) 530 final (chemicals); COM(2025) 95 final (automotive sector). [12] COM(2025) 90 final. [13] COM(2025) 944 final. [14] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202601139.”
  Climate efforts · EU-US trade relations · State Aid
• 2026-02-05 “E-000468/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is aware of the referred statement attributed to the Chief Justice of Iran, which however has never been communicated via official channels. The EU has a comprehensive policy approach towards Iran and uses all tools at its disposal, including sanctions, to defend its citizens and interests. On 16 March 2026, the Council adopted new restrictive measures against 16 individuals and three entities responsible for serious human rights violations, including prominent figures such as the Deputy Minister of Interior and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commanders 1 . In addition, on 19 February 2026, the Council finalised the listing of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation 2 . The regulation and supervision of non-governmental organisations operating on the territory of Member States fall primarily within the competence of the Member States, in accordance with national law and applicable EU law. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/16/iran-council-sanctions-an-additional-16persons-and-three-entities-over-serious-human-rights-violations/. 2 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-01-30 “E-000387/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union lays down the right for EU citizens to move to another Member State for the purpose of employment and be treated in an equal way for that purpose as the nationals of that Member State. The Court of Justice has defined a ‘worker’ as a person who undertakes genuine and effective work for which he or she is paid under the direction of someone else, to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary 1 . As ‘marginal and ancillary’ is not defined in EU law, the assessment is to be done on a case-bycase basis by the national authorities. It cannot be ruled out that an activity may be considered to be real and genuine, independently of the limited remuneration and the number of hours 2 . The conditions for legal residence of EU citizens in another Member State are found in Directive 2004/38/EC 3 . One way of qualifying for residence longer than three months is to be a worker, as defined by the Court in the above-mentioned case law. EU citizens who do not meet the residence conditions set out in Directive 2004/38/EC are not entitled to benefit from equal treatment with nationals of the host Member State under Article 24(1) of that Directive, including when it comes to access to social assistance. In addition, Member States may expel from their territory EU citizens who no longer satisfy the requirements for a right of residence. In such a case, the relevant safeguards of the Directive apply. The Commission is not aware of a systematic failure to correctly apply the relevant EU legislation by Germany. The Commission cannot comment on individual situations, which are for national courts to review. Moreover, the Commission has not proposed any legislative changes to the underlying legal framework at EU level. 1 C-138/02, Collins, ECLI:EU:C:2004:172, paragraph 26; C-456/02, Trojani, ECLI:EU:C:2004:488, paragraph 15 or C-46/12, LN, ECLI:EU:C:2013:97, paragraphs 40-42. 2 C-14/09, Genc, ECLI:EU:C:2010:57, paragraph 26. 3 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, pp. 77).”
  EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers · EU competences on social policies
• 2025-11-19 “E-004622/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The extension of the scope of Regulations (EC) No 561/2006 1 and (EU) No 165/2014 2 to Light Commercial Vehicles (LCVs) engaged in international transport operations or cabotage 3 was adopted in the context of ‘Mobility Package I’ in 2020 4 . Its objective is to level the playing field in international road transport between operators of heavy-duty vehicles and light commercial vehicles. It will, as a result, also contribute to providing better working conditions for the drivers of these vehicles, including when such drivers are posted. By the time this provision starts applying on 1 July 2026, the undertakings concerned will therefore have had six years to organise themselves to comply with this obligation. The Commission therefore has no intention to propose a postponement of the deadline of 1 July 2026. The Commission remains in close contact with the road transport sector in this respect. It is the responsibility of the equipment manufacturer to fix any bugs or errors in a typeapproved smart tachograph version 2. Where such errors are manifestly not the responsibility of the driver, enforcers should keep this in mind in their enforcement practices and should not penalise drivers for this sole reason. 1 Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85, OJ L 102, 11.4.2006, p. 1. 2 Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport, OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 1. 3 Article 2(1)(aa) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 4 Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 as regards minimum requirements on maximum daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and daily and weekly rest periods and Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 as regards positioning by means of tachographs, OJ L 249, 31.7.2020, p. 1.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-11-11 “E-004447/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission In the EU, all medicinal products must be authorised, either at national or at EU level, before they can be marketed and made available to patients. There are no double standards for the authorisation and monitoring of medicines. All authorised medicines, whether authorised nationally or centrally, and whether reference medicinal products, generics or biosimilars, must comply with the same requirements for quality, safety and efficacy. International standards, called good clinical practice 1 , apply to the study design, recording and reporting to ensure that studies supporting a marketing authorisation are conducted according to the EU requirements. The type of evidence needed to determine the benefits and risks of a medicine are defined by EU legislation and are valid for authorisation and monitoring in all EU Member States. Inspections are conducted nationally and can also be requested by the European Medicines Agency to verify compliance with these standards. Furthermore, the EU has a strong legal framework for the licensing, manufacturing, centred around legally binding good manufacturing practice standards 2 , and distribution of medicines. In this respect, the Directive on falsified medicines for human use 3 , ensures that only licensed pharmacies and approved retailers are allowed to offer medicines for sale, including legitimate sale via the internet. 1 https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory-overview/research-development/compliance-researchdevelopment/good-clinical-practice. 2 Good manufacturing practice https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory-overview/researchdevelopment/compliance-research-development/good-manufacturing-practice. 3 Falsified medicines https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/falsified-medicines_en.”
  Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU
• 2025-10-29 “E-004253/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission ReFuelEU Aviation 1 (RFEUA) provides a framework for scaling up sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) production and uptake across the EU. It also provides uniform rules for all operators (EU and non-EU) across all Member States, ensuring a level playing field. SAF is a key measure to decarbonise the sector. The Commission remains fully committed to RFEUA’s legal framework. Its full implementation will allow aviation sector to grow in a sustainable manner. Moreover, investing in SAF production in the EU can secure the EU's global leadership, while also promoting a more energy-independent, and competitive Europe. The EU is in early days of RFEUA implementation, and it is already visible that it is delivering. It has significantly boosted the aviation biofuels production from virtually nothing in 2023 to around 1.4 million tons in 2025, which is well above the 2% target under RFEUA. The Commission presented on 5 November 2025 the Sustainable Transport Investment Plan 2 (STIP). The STIP outlines a strategic framework to boost investments in renewable and lowcarbon fuels in the aviation and maritime sectors. The EU already supports a transition to SAF with the EUR 20 million of SAF allowances under the EU ETS 3 (EUR 1,6 billion), which will help to narrow the price gap between SAF and fossil kerosene in the transition period. The Commission is also conducting a study on aviation competitiveness to assess the extent to which EU environmental policies might lead to additional costs on EU airlines compared to those based in non-EU countries. Based on the study, the Commission will analyse whether EU action is needed. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/2405 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on ensuring a level playing field for sustainable air transport (ReFuelEU Aviation). 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Sustainable Transport Investment Plan (COM(2025) 664). 3 Directive (EU) 2023/958 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 amending Directive 2003/87/EC as regards aviation’s contribution to the Union’s economy-wide emission reduction target and the appropriate implementation of a global market-based measure.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• 2025-10-29 “E-004252/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Based on evidence 1 from the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and its scientific committees, the Commission considers that only the combination of the different risk management measures set out in the Appendix to the draft restriction is effective to contain lead gunshot in outdoor sports shooting ranges. pH monitoring and treatment of gunshot impact zones would not be sufficient. However, for some of the proposed lead containment measures (such as walls, nets, berms or surface covering), stakeholders have the possibility to choose those measures that are better suited to the conditions of the shooting range. The Commission is proposing to recover spent lead gunshot at least every 5 years, regardless of whether the quantity accumulated covers the cost of collection. This is because spent lead shot that accumulates in shooting ranges poses an environmental risk due to potential ingestion by birds that is not addressed by regulating soil’s pH. ECHA has documented these environmental risks, which persist as long as lead pellets from gunshot remain accessible to avian species on the range. The Commission is currently discussing the proposed restriction with the Member States in the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Committee. 1 https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/2c82ef18-ce5d-4b4f-8ff0-002932154acc; https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/48f14c85-b0ca-874e-9c88-ee386f251b06. https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/14c4fceb-31b4-aea2-a9b5-75cdccf8013f; https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/5b8bb5ca-e0fd-519b-6e00-9625404a0ead.”
  Mercury
• 2025-07-02 “E-002715/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission In line with its Political Guidelines 1 , the Commission adopted in January 2025, a European action plan on the cybersecurity of hospitals and healthcare providers 2 . The action plan sets out a range of measures and practical tools, strengthening the security of our healthcare systems. For example, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) should develop a comprehensive service catalogue for the needs of hospitals and healthcare providers, outlining available services for preparedness, prevention, detection and response against cybersecurity threats, including ransomware attacks and disruptions of critical medical services. It also sets out measures for financial support to hospitals and healthcare providers. The European Cybersecurity Competence Centre has opened a call for proposals for a dedicated action to reinforce hospitals and healthcare providers 3 . Member States are encouraged to take measures like Cybersecurity Vouchers for micro, small and medium-sized hospitals and healthcare providers, which could draw from EU funds. For future actions, the Commission proposal for the European Competitiveness Fund 4 includes a focus on a high level of cybersecurity and on the digital transformation of healthcare. Health is also a critical sector under Directive 2022/2555 5 , which involves cross-border cooperation between Member States in various forums 6 . The action plan calls on ENISA, working with national authorities and drawing from the experiences of hospitals and healthcare providers, to develop a repository of available instruments at European, national and regional levels. The Commission is committed to these efforts and intends to come forward with recommendations to further refine the action plan. 1 Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024–2029 https://commission.europa.eu/document/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en. 2 COM(2025) 10 final. 3 DIGITAL-ECCC-2025-DEPLOY-CYBER-08-CYBERHEALTH. 4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the European Competitiveness Fund. COM(2025) 555 final. 5 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2 Directive). 6 For example through the Network and Information Systems Cooperation Group. See https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis-cooperation-group.”
  Medical devices · EU competences on health
• 2025-06-25 “E-002570/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU Drugs Agency’s early warning system is at the core of the EU response to new psychoactive substances 1 , together with a European drug alert system, health and security threat assessment capabilities and a network of forensic and toxicological laboratories. The Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health (EU4Health Program) 2 supports actions to complement Member States’ efforts in improving the health of children 3 , and capacity-building 4 to improve mental health. Horizon Europe supports research aimed at better understanding addiction, building resilience, and improving lives through drug rehabilitation 5 . 2. The Framework Decision on illicit drug trafficking 6 requires Member States to criminalise drug trafficking, regardless of whether committed offline or online. The Commission is currently evaluating this framework decision. Based on the result, the rules could be amended, modernised and strengthened. Moreover, the Digital Services Act 7 includes obligations for providers of intermediary services to tackle the dissemination of illegal products, including illegal drugs, online. 3. The new EU Drugs Strategy and the drug trafficking Action Plan announced in ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy 8 will reinforce EU preparedness to drug market threats. The strategy will aim to set the framework for leveraging EU and national efforts to disrupt drug trafficking routes and modi operandi, detect and dismantle production of illicit drugs, especially synthetic drugs and its precursors, and reduce societal harms derived from these illicit activities. 1 Regulation (EU) 2023/1322 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2023 on the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006, OJ L 166, 30.6.2023, pp. 6–47. 2 https://health.ec.europa.eu/funding/eu4health-programme-2021-2027-vision-healthier-european-union_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/sante/items/863796/en. 4 https://eu-promens.eu/eu-promens. 5 https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101155881. 6 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2004/757/2022-08-18. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 8 COM(2025) 148 final.”
  Regulation of drug precursors in the EU · Cannabis consumption
• 2025-06-17 “E-002430/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to ensuring that the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging technologies are inclusive and accessible to all, including persons with disabilities. It recognises the significant opportunities that these technologies can offer, while acknowledging the risks, such as algorithmic discrimination. To address these concerns, the Commission is taking concrete measures to ensure that AI systems, including those used by public authorities, are accessible and free from bias against persons with disabilities. The EU funded AEQUITAS 1 project developed a Multi-Stakeholder Approach to AI Fairness (MAP) involving underrepresented and discriminated groups in the design and development of AI systems, and the Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment for Fairness (FRIA-F), that specifically evaluates risks to fundamental rights such as nondiscrimination (Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2 ) and integration of persons with disabilities (Article 26 of the Charter 3 ). Last but not least, the Commission supports inclusive, accessible AI that empowers underrepresented communities through EU funding programmes. AEQUITAS is one of four Horizon Europe projects 4 that collaborate directly with advocacy groups and marginalised communities to tackle bias and discrimination in AI, while fostering inclusive AI solutions. Additional calls for proposals are published and are to be found from the Funding and Tender Portal 5 . In conclusion, the Commission remains committed to ensuring that development and deployment of AI and emerging technologies is inclusive and accessible to all, including persons with disabilities. 1 https://www.aequitas-project.eu/. 2 https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter/article/21-non-discrimination. 3 https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter/article/26-integration-persons-disabilities. 4 https://aifairnesscluster.eu/. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/calls-forproposals?isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSiz e=50&sortBy=startDate Cluster 2 topic: ‘Good practices for increased autonomy of persons with disabilities, including physical, mental, intellectual and sensory disabilities’ explicitly mentions AI (HORIZON-CL2-202501-TRANSFO-09: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topicdetails/HORIZON-CL2-2025-01-TRANSFO09?isExactMatch=true&status=31094502&frameworkProgramme=43108390&callIdentifier=HORIZON-CL22025-01&order=ASC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=identifier).”
  Artificial Intelligence · EU policy on accessibility of digital infrastructure
• 2025-03-24 “E-1217/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not aware of any official reports on the specific issue of the exposure of minors to the dark web. However, the broader issue of cybercrime and the dark web is covered, among other things, in Europol’s latest Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 1 . This report covers criminal activity linked to minors on the dark web. Similarly, while there are no comprehensive official statistics on the scale of trade in illegal and harmful goods on the dark web, Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre has coordinated enforcement actions against illegal dark web marketplaces 2 . Europol will continue to enforce actions against cybercrime into this area in coordination with other authorities. The Commission focuses on enforcing the Digital Services Act (DSA) 3 , where Protection of Minors is an enforcement priority 4 . Specifically, the Commission is preparing guidelines for the protections of minors of the DSA 5 . Furthermore, the European strategy for a better internet for kids (BIK+) 6 promotes responsible technology use among children, carers and teachers through Safer Internet Centres and the BIK platform 7 . The proposal for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 8 would require companies to systematically detect, assess, prevent, report and block online child sexual abuse. The recast of the Directive on combating sexual abuse 9 introduces a new offence: operating online services for the purpose of online child sexual abuse, including on the dark web. The Commission plans to propose a Digital Fairness Act to address gaps in EU consumer 1 https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/internet-organised-crime-threat-assessmentiocta-2024 2 Against the so-called Wall Street marketplace and Silkkitie Marketplace: https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/international-sting-against-dark-web-vendorsleads-to-179-arrests https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/double-blow-to-dark-web-marketplaces 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (Text with EEA relevance). 4 The Commission has initiated proceedings against TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook based on suspicions that they may have breached DSA in areas related to the harmful effects on minors of their systems. Find all information here: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-launches-call-evidence-guidelines-protection-minorsonline-under-digital-services-act 6 COM/2022/212 final. 7 https://www.betterinternetforkids.eu 8 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse, COM/2022/209 final of 11.05.2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A209%3AFIN 9 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child sexual abuse material and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA (recast), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0060”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online · Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• 2025-03-03 “E-000887/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Over the last years, the Commission has conducted various studies to assess the impact of free trade agreements with Mercosur and other trade partners, including on the agricultural sector 1 . These studies converge to the conclusion that the trade agreement with Mercosur provides significant opportunities for the EU and the Mercosur economy, while presenting some challenges for a number of sensitive EU agricultural products. Dairy products are among the agricultural commodities for which the EU is expected to benefit from the agreement, whereas sugar counts among sensitive products. The impacts in terms of additional EU sugar imports are estimated to be limited, given that concessions to Mercosur consist of a small additional quota to Paraguay and the elimination of the in-quota duty for a portion of the volume of an existing World Trade Organization quota for Brazil. The impact on the EU cereal sector is expected to be very limited. The Commission has held numerous and regular meetings with specific sectors and sector associations to discuss the potential impact of the agreement, both during the negotiations and after their conclusion. The Commission intends to continue this dialogue in private or public forums with respect of transparency rules. 1 Sustainability Impact Assessment on the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-pub\\lishes-final-sia-and-position-paper-eu-mercosur-tradeagreement-2021-03-29_en. Cumulative economic impact of upcoming trade agreements on EU agriculture, https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC135540.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2025-02-05 “E-000523/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware and concerned about the situation in the automotive industry. Challenges stem, among others, from shifting mobility patterns, increasing competition and global supply chain risks, new technologies and a volatile geopolitical context. Underscoring the commitment to safeguarding the future of this vital sector, the Commission President launched in January 2025 the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the European Automotive Industry 1 , which brings together industry, social partners and civil society representatives 2 . The objective of the dialogue is to contribute to policy design, including in the skills and social field, to address the challenges facing the sector. This has fed into the Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector, published on 5 March 2025. The Action Plan addresses a broad range of issues to maintain a strong European production base and support a thriving car industry that creates jobs, drives growth and protects the environment. While the Commission cannot interfere in company decisions on restructuring, several Directives 3 stipulate minimum requirements on workers’ rights and involvement. This is supported by the Quality Framework for Restructuring and Anticipation of Change 4 . The main instruments to support workers affected are the European Social Fund (ESF+), which helps in an anticipative way, including by supporting up- and reskilling 5 , and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) 6 , activated by major restructuring events. The Action Plan proposes an extension to the EGF to support companies in restructuring processes to protect employees at risk of unemployment. One in five workers offered EGF support so far belongs to the car industry. 1 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/dialogues/dialogue-future-automotive-industry_en 2 A list of participating organisations, including representatives of the automotive industry and infrastructure providers, is available here: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/attachment/880307/List%20of%20participating%20organi sations.pdf 3 Directive 98/59/EC on collective redundancies, Directive 2001/23/EC on transfer of undertakings, Directive 2002/14/EC establishing general framework for informing and consulting employees and Directive 2009/38/EC on European Works Councils. 4 COM/2013/0882 final - 13.12.2013. 5 Upskilling, reskilling, attracting talent, ensuring the right skills at the right place, are among the priorities supported by the ESF+. The funding is available, with a significant budget for skills development, the administration is in place, implementation of the 2021-2027 period is in full swing. 6 See Regulation (EU) 2021/691 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1309/2013, OJ L 153, 3.5.2021, p. 48–70 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2021.153.01.0048.01.ENG”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions · EU policy on forced redundancies · European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
• 2025-02-05 “E-000524/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has undertaken several initiatives to protect democracy in the EU, in particular with the European Democracy Action Plan of 2020 and the Defence of Democracy Package of 2023 1 . Their success is reflected, among other things, in the general satisfaction of respondents to standard Eurobarometer surveys with the way democracy works in the EU 2 . As regards transparency of financial flows, several pieces of EU legislation are relevant. Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising 3 , which will enter into full application on 10 October 2025, will support national oversight of funding of political advertising and minimise the risk of information manipulation and foreign interference by requiring the provision, among others, of oversight authorities and recordkeeping of information on the amounts received for political advertising services. As part of the Defence of Democracy package the Commission presented a legislative proposal that aims to enhance transparency and democratic accountability of interest representation activities on behalf of third countries which seek to influence policies, decision making and the democratic space. The proposal is currently being discussed by the colegislators. In terms of following the money in general, Member States’ competent authorities will have better access to the information they need with the application of the anti-money laundering package 4 , which was adopted by the co-legislators in 2024, and will enter into application in July 2027. In 2025, the Commission will propose a European Democracy Shield, which will, among other things, set out steps to combat foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6453. 2 Standard Eurobarometer 102 - Autumn 2024 - November 2024 - Eurobarometer survey https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3215; Standard Eurobarometer 100 - Autumn 2023 - December 2023 - Eurobarometer survey https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3053; Standard Eurobarometer 98 Winter 2022-2023 - February 2023 - Eurobarometer survey https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2872. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32024R0900. 4 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-eulevel_en#policy-making-timeline.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-02-05 “E-000522/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of this phenomenon, which is addressed by legal instruments governing the protection of citizens’ personal data, namely the ePrivacy Directive 1 and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2 . Article 13 of the ePrivacy Directive, which has been transposed into the national legislation of every EU Member State, requires governments to take appropriate measures to ensure that unsolicited communications for the purposes of direct marketing are not allowed without the consent of the individual concerned or in respect of individuals who do not wish to receive these communications. The processing of personal data, such as those included in direct marketing databases and transfer of a database to a new owner, falls under the rules of the GDPR 3 , and requires amongst others a legal basis as set out in Article 6 GDPR. Without prejudice to the competences of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, the enforcement of the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive in individual cases lies primarily with the competent national authorities and courts. Citizens should raise any suspected violations of national provisions with those authorities. It is up to those authorities to take appropriate measures against the companies in breach of national and EU law. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02002L0058-20091219) 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng 3 See also C-621/22 on sharing of data with third parties for marketing purpose.”
  GDPR · Privacy & digital economy
• 2024-12-27 “E-003086/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Although most EU Member States have achieved universal coverage for a core set of health services, the range of services covered and the degree of cost-sharing vary, potentially raising affordability issues for some population groups. According to Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 , Member States are responsible for the organisation and delivery of their health services and medical care. Principle 16 of the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan 2 underscores the right to affordable healthcare of good quality. The Commission supports Member States in upholding this principle through funding projects, which provide support to improve affordability of healthcare 3 , ensure fairer distribution of health benefits 4 , and address barriers in access to healthcare for persons with disabilities 5 . Given the share of competences and differences in health systems across the EU, the Commission does not intend to propose a ‘European Health Guarantee’ and minimum standards in access to healthcare. The Commission works through the European Semester to provide country-specific policy advice and promote health systems reforms improving access to healthcare. The Recovery and Resilience Facility and Cohesion Policy Funds provide investments to address gaps in access to healthcare according to national challenges. The EU legislation, such as Directive 2019/882 contains accessibility requirements that are relevant for health services for persons with disabilities. In the 2021-2027 programming period, investments of EUR 7.6 billion, under European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 6 and Interreg provide support among other to health infrastructure and services. 1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=en 2 https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/european-pillar-social-rights-buildingfairer-and-more-inclusive-european-union/european-pillar-social-rights-action-plan_en 3 HS-g-14.1.1 Supporting Member States in improving access to healthcare and effectiveness of health coverage, taking into account vulnerabilities of specific groups and targeted intervention; https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/024cb1cb-44ab-44be-a21e56757550eb05_en?filename=com_2022-5436_annex1_en.pdf 4 HS-p-23-46 The role of healthcare in reducing poverty; https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ff17bd26-4cdd-4351-a4e3e2ca85aa3e84_en?filename=wp2023_annex_en.pdf 5 HS-p-22-14.02 Guidelines on access to healthcare for people with disabilities; https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/331c4ac5-492d-4359-a708c0a7e2cfa363_en?filename=c_2023_5052_1_annex_en.pdf 6 ERDF support is primarily programmed under Policy Objective 1(PO1), A More Competitive and Smarter Europe, and Policy Objective 4 (PO4), A More Social Europe.”
  Public and private sectors role in healthcare services · EU competences on health
• 2024-11-13 “E-002514/2024 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The ‘Healthier Together’ initiative 1 provides a strategic framework for the Commission’s support to Member States in reducing the burden of cardiovascular diseases. Financial support under the EU4Health programme has been provided for collaborative actions between Member States on health determinants, such as nutrition and tobacco, and on mental health. These actions aim at reducing health inequalities and focus on vulnerable groups such as children. The Commission will continue to work with Member States and stakeholders to provide solutions to facilitate healthier food choices. Together with United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Commission is developing a prevention toolkit for children to support policymakers in promoting their mental and physical health. In line with the political guidelines and mission letter to the Commissioner for Health and Animal Welfare 2 , the Commission will step up its work on preventive health with a focus on improving cardiovascular health in the EU, and will propose a European cardiovascular health plan. 2. Ensuring a high level of public health is a fundamental principle of EU food law legislation. Under the General Food Law Regulation 3 , all food placed on the EU market must be safe, i.e. not injurious to health or unfit for human consumption. To this end, the General Food Law Regulation lays down the responsibilities of the various actors along the food supply chain and of the Member States’ competent authorities to ensure that food placed on the EU market complies with these requirements. Furthermore, strict EU import rules with respect to food and feed hygiene, consumer safety and animal health status in place aim at assuring that all imports fulfil the same high standards as those required for products originating within the EU. 1 https://health.ec.europa.eu/non-communicable-diseases/healthier-together-eu-non-communicable-diseasesinitiative_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b1817a1b-e62e-4949-bbb8ebf29b54c8bd_en?filename=Mission%20letter%20-%20VARHELYI.pdf 3 Regulation (EC) 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1).”
  GMOs
• 2024-11-12 “E-002505/2024 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. Food prices have increased as a result of changing market conditions derived from the Russian war on Ukraine and resulting surge in input prices in 2022-2023, especially for energy and fertilisers. Prices were influenced by external factors, including the geopolitical situation and the impact of severe weather events on production capacity. 2. EU rules require all imported agri-food products to comply with EU health and food safety standards. The Commission maintains its commitment to act multilaterally, bilaterally and autonomously to strengthen the alignment of imports with EU production standards, and ensure that applying standards to EU producers does not lead to social and environmental leakages. 3. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remains essential for supporting farmers' income, rewarding ecosystem services, compensating for work on land with natural constraints, and investing to improve competitiveness and resilience. Several concrete steps were taken to improve farmers’ position, including an ambitious simplification proposal 1 in 2024 to alleviate some of the burden. In the second week of taking office, this Commission immediately put forward two new proposals to strengthen farmers' position in the agri-food supply chain, and to enhance cross-border enforcement against unfair trading practices 2 . The forthcoming Vision for Agriculture and Food will address the sector’s long-term attractiveness, competitiveness, resilience and sustainability. 1 Simplification Regulation (EU) 2024/1468, see also Commission Staff Working Document ‘Simplification measures for farmers’, SWD(2024) 360 final. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6321”
  GMOs
• 2024-11-12 “E-002497/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Under Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan 1 , the Commission has conducted a study on job retention and return to work for cancer patients and survivors 2 , which was published in October 2024. The study maps policies and frameworks in EU Member States and countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) and of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and has identified remaining gaps and challenges as well as best practices. Additionally, it includes recommendations to be followed up at local, national and EU level. The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) contributed to the study, building on previous research on rehabilitation and return-to-work instruments and practices. Besides the recommendations stemming from the above-mentioned study, EU-OSHA’s project ‘Rehabilitation and return to work after cancer — instruments and practices’ explores the occupational safety and health challenges that employers and employees face when workers return to work after a diagnosis of cancer. A report 3 on this matter published by EUOSHA provides national examples of successful instruments and practices that help prevent long-term sickness absence and unemployment. The Commission will continue to disseminate the findings of the study on job retention and return to work for cancer patients and survivors, including to the cancer sub-group under the Expert Group on Public Health. 4 The good practices identified and recommendations developed in the study include flexible working arrangements. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-waylife/european-health-union/cancer-plan-europe_en 2 https://op.europa.eu/publication-detail/-/publication/b6dd313d-8528-11ef-a67d-01aa75ed71a1 3 https://osha.europa.eu/en/publications/rehabilitation-and-return-work-after-cancer-instruments-and-practices 4 https://health.ec.europa.eu/non-communicable-diseases/expert-group-public-health_en”
  EU competences on social policies · EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility
• 2024-10-29 “E-002290/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission EU law protects the equal treatment of young people in the labour market by means of Council Directive 2000/78/EC (the Employment Equality Directive) 1 , which prohibits discrimination based on the ground of age in the area of employment and occupation. The Commission supports Member States and relevant stakeholders to modernise vocational education and training (VET) systems to cater for current and future labour market needs in line with the 2020 Council Recommendation on VET 2 , through mutual learning and EU funding. This includes the Erasmus+ programme which co-funds cooperation partnerships, including the Centres of Vocational Excellence. Erasmus+ also supports the skills acquisition of young Europeans through learning mobility abroad, with specific funding rules providing additional support to participants with fewer opportunities. The Commission supports the implementation of the Youth Guarantee 3 which was reinforced in 2020 to better address the most vulnerable young people, and to guarantee equal treatment for all young people, regardless of their background or where they are in the European Union. In addition, it supports the implementation of ALMA (‘Aim-Learn-Master-Achieve’), which is a social inclusion initiative helping vulnerable young people who are not currently engaged in employment, education, or training (NEETs) integrate into society and the labour market through mobility. EU cohesion policy supports equal access to inclusive and quality opportunities, including in employment, education and training. Particular focus is on helping vulnerable groups, including young people, in all regions, in particular in the less developed ones. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020H1202%2801%29 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2020.372.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2020%3A372%3ATO C”
  EU engagement with youth · Funding for vocational training · Youth employment & training
• 2024-10-29 “E-002291/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission 1. Ensuring that people have the skills needed for the green and digital transition is a priority for the Commission, as reflected by the European Pillar of Social Rights, the European Skills Agenda, the European Year of Skills, the Digital Education Action Plan, the Council recommendation on vocational education and training 1 and the European strategy for universities 2 . The Digital Decade policy programme set a target of 80% of people with at least basic digital skills and 20 million Information and Communications Technology (ICT) specialists by 2030. By mobilising stakeholders through the Pact for Skills and promoting individual learning accounts 3 and micro-credentials 4 , the Commission is boosting up- and reskilling, especially in areas linked to the digital and green transition. The President of the Commission has announced in her political guidelines a Union of Skills, focusing on investment, adult and lifelong learning, skill retention and recognition. The Commission works with the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) to provide evidence about the skills implications of the transition. 2. The Commission is supporting Member States in the implementation of Council recommendations in this area 5 , also to adapt education and training systems, through exchanges on good practices in the European Education Area working groups 6 . 3. The EU is mobilising several funding programmes, such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the Digital Europe Programme 7 , Erasmus+ 8 , the European Regional Development Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+). The ESF+ funding to education, skills and training amounts to EUR 42 billion. Funded initiatives aim to develop skills for the transition in schools, training centres and universities, and among the workforce. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020H1202%2801%29 2 https://education.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-01/communication-european-strategy-for-universitiesgraphic-version.pdf 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022H0627%2803%29 4 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9237-2022-INIT/en/pdf 5 The 2023 Council Recommendation on improving the provision of digital skills and competences in education and training invites Member States to take measures to promote a quality, coordinated and coherent approach to the development of digital skills at all levels of education and training (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023DC0206). The 2022 Council Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality 5 includes specific policy guidance on education, training and lifelong learning (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022H0627(04)). The Council Recommendation on learning for the green transition and sustainable development aims at supporting Member States to equip learners across all education and training sectors with the understanding and skills towards creating a socially just and sustainable future (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022H0627%2801%29). 6 More information about the European Education Area strategic framework working groups: https://education.ec.europa.eu/about-eea/working-groups 7 The Specific objective 4 of the Digital Europe Programme (https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/activities/digital-programme ) is dedicated to support the increase of the number of ICT graduates and ICT specialists in Europe by funding different education and training programmes to equip the current and future workforce with the adequate advanced digital skills, including green digital skills. 8 Erasmus+ supports the development of green and digital skills across all sectors of education and training (https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/), including through Centres of Vocational Excellence.”
  European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training · Funding for vocational training · Youth employment & training
• 2024-10-01 “E-001894/2024 Answer given by Ms Simson on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of the new EU regulatory framework for the energy transition, including the revised Energy Efficiency Directive 1 and Renewable Energy Directive 2 , with new targets for renewables in heating and cooling, simpler and shorter permitting processes, the promotion of renewables-based district heating and local energy planning requirements aim to address the main barriers to the deployment of geothermal energy. The Commission will work with Member States and regional and local authorities to support good implementation of these provisions. Geothermal energy is part of the strategic approach to decarbonising heating and cooling in a context of energy system integration. Geothermal projects are eligible for support under many existing EU programmes and many projects have already received support, including from LIFE 3 , Horizon 2020 4 and Horizon Europe 5 , Innovation fund 6 , and the European Regional Development Fund. The total amount of funds granted by the EU to geothermal energy in the period 2004-2023 is EUR 622 million, for 140 projects, with more than half of them under directly managed programmes. As Member States have been putting in place promising new financing and derisking schemes, the exchange of best practices is also essential in order to design effective schemes that are best adapted to the specificity of each national context. 1 Directive (EU) 2023/1791 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast) (Text with EEA relevance). 2 Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652. 3 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en 4 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-2020_en 5 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 6 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/innovation-fund_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-25 “E-001817/2024 Answer given by Mr Wojciechowski on behalf of the European Commission 1. Energy prices have significantly surged in 2021 and 2022, affecting farmers directly and through energy-intensive inputs like fertilisers. While energy prices remain higher than before the war in Ukraine, energy costs have decreased substantially since 2023. To mitigate the impact of high energy prices on the agricultural sector and rural areas the EU adopted a Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework that allows Member States until 31 December 2024 to provide financial support. The EU also adopted two exceptional support packages in 2022 and 2023 of EUR 850 million for farmers. 2. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 1 aids farmers and rural areas in transitioning to sustainable production and energy use. Investments in the production of renewable energy and in energy efficiency can be supported under the CAP. The CAP also includes support to reduce mineral fertiliser use, including through the use of organic fertilisers. The EU heavily invests in increasing industrial interest in areas such as organic fertilisers produced from recovered residues and by-products. The Cohesion policy also dedicated EUR 45 billion to the energy transition up to 2027, focusing on less developed regions, vulnerable groups and territories. 3. Under the CAP, Member States can and do plan in their CAP Strategic Plans interventions to increase sustainable generation and use of renewable energy and reduce energy consumption. Other support instruments exist for energy efficiency and renewable energy production, both at EU level (e.g. Cohesion Funds) and at national level. Looking ahead, the Commission will set up a Citizen Energy Advisory Hub to support rural communities to set up sustainable energy projects and will establish an Energy Communities Action Plan. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy_en”
  Agricultural funding
• 2024-09-25 “E-001815/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the threat posed by synthetic opioids. The EU Drugs Agency (EUDA) 1 2024 European Drug Report 2 points to growing public health concerns regarding synthetic opioids, including fentanyl. On 30 September 2024, the EUDA Executive Director launched a call for action against synthetic opioids to Member States and all EU partners 3 . The EU Drugs Strategy 4 and Action Plan 2021-2025 5 already identify synthetic drugs as one of the priorities for the EU drug policy. They aim to reduce the use of illicit drugs and increase evidence-based targeted prevention efforts for vulnerable groups. This includes young people, disproportionately affected by synthetic opioids 6 . The Commission's comprehensive approach to mental health 7 supports Member States in addressing the mental health needs of young people affected by drug use, focusing on early intervention and prevention. Acknowledging these threats, the Commission intensified its activities in this area with the EU Roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organised crime 8 , stepping up law enforcement action against synthetic drug production and the organised crime groups behind it. The EU takes part in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, which allows exchange of best practices and global cooperation on this matter. Cooperation with China is key to address the threat of synthetic opioids. The EU currently pursues three dialogues: - The EU-China Dialogue on Drugs covering synthetic drugs, drug demand and harm reduction, among others. The last meeting took place on 23 April 2024. - The EU-China Joint Follow-up Group meeting on Drug Precursors 9 , which last met on 22 April 2024. - Customs cooperation with China to help preventing the entry of Drugs Precursors in the EU. 1 The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addictions (EMCDDA) became the European Union Drugs Agency on 2 July 2024 with the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/1322. 2 EU Drugs Agency, European Drugs Report 2024: Trends and Developments, https://www.euda.europa.eu/publications/european-drug-report/2024_en 3 https://www.euda.europa.eu/news/2024/euda-executive-director-issues-call-action-new-synthetic-opioidseuropean-parliament_en 4 EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025, OJ C 102I, 24.3.2021. 5 EU Drugs Action Plan 2021-2025, OJ C 272, 8.7.2021. 6 Also see the Commission’s replies to Parliamentary questions E-001333/2024 and E-001422/2024. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-waylife/european-health-union/comprehensive-approach-mental-health_en 8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organised crime, COM/2023/641 final. 9 Substances that are used for the manufacture of drugs.”
  Regulation of drug precursors in the EU
• 2024-09-25 “E-001813/2024 Answer given by Ms McGuinness on behalf of the European Commission From the outset, EU sanctions have been designed and implemented to impose a heavy price on Russia, whilst minimising adverse effects on the EU, its citizens and businesses. When developing sanctions packages, the Commission always carefully considers their impact on the EU economy and internal market, including on specific industries and Member States. Overall, the data confirms the EU’s longstanding principle: that sanctions hurt the other side far more than they hurt us. It is true that EU sanctions on Russia can – and sometimes do – have significant financial consequences for some of our companies and industries that have exposure to that country, in spite of best efforts to mitigate undesired impacts. The EU does not provide compensation for losses of EU operators resulting from sanctions. Should a Member State wish to compensate its operators affected by EU sanctions financially, this should be done in full compliance with EU state aid rules (in particular the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework) providing for a level-playing field for operators in all Member States.”
  EU industrial funding
• 2024-09-24 “E-001809/2024 Answer given by Mr Wojciechowski on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not favour farmers in third countries: all imported agri-food products must comply with EU health and food safety requirements about products characteristics. Non-compliant products cannot be sold in the EU, whether produced domestically or imported. In addition, imported products must also comply with certain EU production requirements, to raise standards globally and to avoid social and environmental leakages. The same maximum residue levels of pesticides apply to all food and feed products placed on the EU market, regardless of origin. In some cases, producers in third countries with production conditions and pest pressures different from those in the EU might need to use substances not authorized or not submitted for authorisation in the EU, but residues must remain below strict public health safety levels set by the European Food Safety Authority. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) accompanies EU farmers in the shift towards sustainable food systems, provides them income support, assists them in the production of safe, healthy and affordable food, and rewards them for delivering public goods, such as taking care of the countryside and the environment. The distribution of CAP funding for direct payments (the largest support element of the CAP) is part of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027. It provides for an external ‘convergence’ of the direct payments, which over time, will lead to a reduction of historically based differences in the amounts available per hectare between Member States. For Romania, this mechanism leads to a gradual increase in the amounts available per hectare during the MFF period.”
  GMOs
• 2024-09-05 “E-001628/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission would like to underline that, in accordance with the Air Services Regulation 1008/2008 1 , airlines are free to set their own airfares. However, air carriers must also provide information to passengers on the elements of those fares, particularly as regards optional price supplements such as ‘priority boarding’ services. As regards the boarding process, it is up to air carriers and airports to design and implement it. It should be however emphasised that accordingly to EU rules on consumer protection and a common principle of consumer contract law, the customer can request a refund if a service has been paid for but is not provided. Furthermore, if an airline expects that the flight will be delayed beyond the scheduled departure time, passengers are entitled to assistance depending on the length of the delay and distance of the flight. Finally, while the Commission has no power to intervene in individual disputes between passengers and air carriers, passengers who believe their rights under the regulation have not been respected can contact the body in the country where the incident took place 2 or contact a European Consumer centre when it comes to general consumer rights 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32008R1008 2 List of National Enforcement Bodies : https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/d7b5dd33-4083-4faa8132-b6dc8b3a1c07_en?filename=2004_261_national_enforcement_bodies.pdf 3 List of European Consumer Centres Network : https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumerrights-and-complaints/resolve-your-consumer-complaint/european-consumer-centres-network-ecc-net_en”
  EU Competition policy
• “Your Excellencies, unless Europe wakes up, we won't survive. What's more valuable than our family? Well, our friends, but can we quickly say, who are the friends of Europe today? No, because we're alone. In every country. There are protests against the decisions made in Brussels. Are they all ordered by Russia? Probably not. Let's face it, Brussels is ready to provide plenty of ammunition for failing to communicate properly. Manfred Weber once said that if fake news gets 1 million clicks and only 10,000 people see the country statement, then you have a structural problem. We have a saying in Romania there's a price to be paid for being silly. Now look at the farmers. They don't know about the standards that are included in the Mercosur agreement. They know nothing about the safeguards. They don't know. They know nothing about the maximum quotas and the limits to imports in the EU. The farmers have not been properly informed. They don't have the basic information and all they can do is to protest. The same situation happens in the case of our car manufacturing industry. The commissioners are silent. The whole commission prefers defiance to information. I honestly believe that there are lots of farmers who don't have enough information. And that's because of the failure of the European Commission. If the farmers are manipulated, then come out in public, Mrs. von der Leyen, and speak plainly and speak the truth. How much would it cost to dismantle the lies of extremists? It might cost you your position and the public image of the union. Unless we communicate efficiently, the extremists will take us down.”
  EU public communication strategy
• “Excellencies. We're trying now to repair what ignorant politicians have done in the past. We can't just leave this up to chance now. We depend on China for these critical raw materials. This started in the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping was talking about rare earths. And they have then transformed that into a way to pressurise us. This was something that Clinton mentioned. And in 2010, Obama was frightened when prices went up in Japan. This has been used as a political weapon against us and the pact that we have at the moment. The Green Deal means that we're going to be on our knees. China really is imposing this dictatorship and slavery on us. In Romania, ironically enough, then we refused these kind of exports because we didn't want them.”
  Trade relations with China
• “The agenda for.The Council's agenda. We have economic resilience in Europe. But what resilience are we talking about? When the backbone of the EU farmers are victims of the Commission? That doesn't seem to understand that the new UN budget fuels extremist. Uh, and it's, uh, saying about the art of war that you don't have to destroy your opponent physically, you just have to destroy the will to fight. Uh, and this means not voting. This fuels the extremists. If plans about agriculture will, uh, leave farmers out of the job, the future will look differently. Until now, the EPP has managed to keep the disaster at bay. Without us, the biggest group in the European Parliament, the European farmers, would be growing chamomile and God knows what else. Which protects the soil? Yes, but it's useless if you cannot live off your soil. And you can't do that if you lose your subsidies because you cannot meet the requirements of the council, some say, or the commission, some say, it's okay. We have meat from Argentine and New Zealand and so on. And the European Commission needs to understand that they are not God sent on earth and that they have to work with us, with the Parliament because, um, we have a relationship with them. We've saved her three times already. I know what you're saying. Uh, farm farming represents only 2% of GDP. But by this reasoning, we'll say that the democracy is too expensive and so is the free press. Don't play with fire. Don't play with farmers money. Wipe their tears off their faces. Give them faith back in the system and and respect their work. Because they are the first ranks that protects us against people who try to undermine our safety and security.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “Your excellencies, we cannot hold discussions with Iran, diplomacy talks. All of that is in the past. Now in the Gulf. It's weapons that talk. I mean, what will we talk about anyway? We need to support the United States and Israel and shouldn't get blocked in semantics, as Brussels all too often does. The situation is changing very rapidly. Iran no longer has any allies. China and Russia are just looking on. There's no draft resolution in the UN Security Council to criticize the destruction of Iran's critical infrastructure. And I think that speaks clearly. China is withdrawing. It doesn't support the current regime. There are negotiations in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh with regard to oil, but Russia has called it force majeure. It's understood that the regime that supplied its drones has been decapitated. But nevertheless, we're seeing lots of propaganda and fake news. Iranian sources are weakened. So what's Europe going to do? Are we going to sit here and wait for dialogue. Our only option is to join the US UK coalition. We need to act rapidly without hesitating, as Brussels so often does. We have 3000 citizens in the region and thousands of businesses that are active in the region. Terrorist cells that will be activated by Iran in on European soil will cause us massive problems. They will lead to a nightmare. So we need to act by the side of the US and the UK. Otherwise, we have to accept the consequences of a regime that's going to bring terror to Europe, as it has done in the Gulf region. Thank you.”
  EU-Iran relations
• “Honourables. Right. Let's look at where we are. 450 million citizens are awaiting solutions at the cost of fuel. And energy is so high that, uh, use has fallen. The average European citizen is only surviving. We need a solution to a crisis that's getting worse and worse. The conflicts in the Middle East are going to lead to further influx of migrants to the EU. This will give rise to a further weakening of labour market. We need to tackle the migration crisis. Many migrants in Europe have not adopted our Christian habits. They don't adopt our values or the values of our society. But a lot of pressure is applied by the enemies of a of the EU and those who want to be politically correct. The EU has decided to uproot the. Those Christians who are who are too scared to leave their house after 9 p.m.. These inclusive policies are damaging Europe and we can see no solution to the oil crisis. Perhaps. But let's not forget who we are. Let's not, uh, we will welcome those who are our friends, but we have to remain a Christian continent. For years we have worshiped Christ and the Virgin Mary. We are a dome that covers all of the Christian churches of Europe.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination