Bart GROOTHUIS

Policy topics Bart GROOTHUIS is active on

What Bart GROOTHUIS has said (29)

• 2026-06-16 “Thank you, chair, dear commissioner. Sometimes it takes a political stunt to get things moving. Kennedy's moonshot speech, of course, creation of Airbus, bold declarations that precede the reality they eventually created. So did the 1st EU chips act. It was ambitious, but it didn't get things moving yet because it forgot to address the demand. Who was going to buy those advanced chips? I'm glad the new cloud and AI development act nudges European governments away from American cloud providers and toward European alternatives, but this at least put some demand at the table. But real demand, colleagues, doesn't come from governments. Real demand comes from the market. And right now, building and training European large language models with the most advanced AI chips is currently effectively impossible within the EU, and at least if you intend to follow laws and rules like the copyright directive or the GDPR. So here's the stunt. Here's the moonshot. Here's the airburst moment of our time. Clear the runway for European AI to grow on European soil and get things moving. Deregulate.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “I think we have to. Think about how we can adapt looking at copyright, for example, when we're building these large linguistic, these large language models. A lot of this is based on that. And when we can't, if we don't deregulate, we won't be able to move forward in this area. So this package is a good first step, but it's not going to fix everything. We need to do a lot more to make things move forward. That is what I would like to see and I hope I would have colleagues.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “think, we have to think about how we can adapt to looking at copyright, for example, when we're building these, large linguistic these large language models. A lot of this is based on that. And when we can't, if we don't deregulate, we won't be able to move forward in this area. So this package is a good 1st step, but it's, not going to fix everything. We need to do a lot more to make things move forward. That is what I would like to see, and I hope I would have colleagues.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-06-16 “Go ahead. You need to turn on the microphone. Thank you very much, Mr. Grothus. You rightly say And that we need to be really ambitious. Shoot for the moon, and we need to work on software as well. And in order to do that, we need to go a lot further than the simplification that we've discussed previously. Could you perhaps expand on that a bit? Now, for us, it's not a fight between environmental protection and sovereignty. It's a matter of timing. Do we invest now? Do we build now? How do you see things.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-06-16 “Thank you. Chair. Dear Commissioner, sometimes it takes a political stunt to get things moving. Kennedy's moonshot speech, of course, the creation of Airbus. Bold declarations that precede the reality they eventually created. So did the first EU Chips act. It was ambitious, but it didn't get things moving yet because it forgot to address the demand. Who was going to buy those advanced chips? I'm glad the new cloud and AI Development Act nudges European governments away from American cloud providers and toward European alternatives, but this at least puts some demand at the table. But real demand doesn't come from governments. Real demand comes from the market. And right now, building and training European large language models with the most advanced AI chips is currently effectively impossible within the EU, and at least if you intend to follow laws and rules like the Copyright Directive or the GDPR. So here's the stunt. Here's the moonshot. Here's the Airbus moment of our time. Clear the runway for European AI to grow on European soil and get things moving. Deregulate. Thank you very much.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• 2026-03-20 “Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission 24.4.2026 Written question The Commission acknowledges that robust private reinsurance capacity for maritime war risks plays an important role in supporting the EU’s energy security. The Commission will continue to closely monitor developments, in collaboration with the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, through ongoing market analysis and targeted stakeholder engagement, to assess potential impacts on energy supply chains and broader economic resilience. The availability of maritime insurance capacity in the event of geopolitical disruptions was not discussed at meetings of the Joint EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum (the Forum), including the most recent meeting of 11 March 2026. The Forum is a platform to facilitate structured regulatory cooperation in financial services. The Forum focuses on regulatory matters in areas of mutual interest that fall within its establishing Memorandum of Understanding [1] . Along with the relevant UK authorities, the Commission will consider whether the topic should be included in future Forum meetings. The Commission will continue to monitor developments and remains committed to addressing systemic risks, including those affecting maritime trade and insurance markets, with likeminded jurisdictions. The Commission also supports a number of private sector initiatives that enhance resilience in the context of war related events. The initiatives include guarantee agreements under the Ukraine Investment Framework (the third pillar of the Ukraine Facility), involving international financial institutions and private sector partners. These guarantees are designed to cover a range of risks, including those related to war-related events. [1] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-09/230627-memorandum-understanding-financial-services-eu-uk_en.pdf .”
  Financial regulation
• 2026-03-19 “Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission 16.6.2026 Written question In accordance with the Treaties, EU procurement directives would require a contracting authority, like the Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, to conduct a procurement procedure under the applicable directives when purchasing goods, such as train cars, of a value equal or higher than the applicable thresholds [1] [2] . These rules would ensure, inter alia , the respect of EU primary law principles applicable to procurement, in particular those of equality of treatment, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality. Such a procurement procedure would provide an opportunity to interested undertakings in any Member State to compete for that contract by submitting a bid for the supply of the goods in question, in conformity with the contracting authority’s technical specifications. The Commission does not see any tension that would result from the possible application of those directives to the situation described in the question. Those directives precisely apply to the purchases of, inter alia , goods by contracting authorities in Member States, including the ministries of defence. The Commission does not see any tension between the application of EU competition law and the potential purchase of decommissioned rolling stock directly from the Dutch Railways by the Ministry of Defence for the transport of wounded military personnel . In particular, the exercise of public power prerogatives such as the provision of military capabilities falls outside of the scope of EU antitrust rules. In addition, purchases by public authorities that do not provide an unfair advantage to the seller would not raise state aid issues. Finally, the Military Mobility Regulation proposal [3] does not provide for the prioritised acquisition of military mobility capabilities. [1] Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj. [2] Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/81/oj. [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0847.”
  "Buy European" provisions · EU competences on defence
• 2026-03-13 “E-001061/2026 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission In response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted a wide range of restrictive measures, including far-reaching trade restrictions which have played a significant role in reducing imports of strategic commodities from Russia. The measures in place reflect a careful balance between the EU’s determination to impact Russia’s ability to finance its war of aggression and to limit to the extent possible negative impacts on Member States and industry, taking into account shortages of certain critical raw materials. As regards aluminium, the 16th sanctions package 1 expanded the restrictions already in place to cover also primary aluminium, resulting in a ban on imports of primary aluminium from Russia as of 26 February 2026 with a remaining small quota of 50 000 metric tonnes to allow imports for contracts concluded before 25 February 2025 (i.e. one-year old contracts) still to be delivered only until the end of 2026. The Commission closely monitors the aluminium market situation, including EU imports of processed aluminium and is ready to consider appropriate actions, if necessary. EU sanctions are kept under regular review. Any decision to amend any of the existing sanctions in place or to add new sanctions is for the Council to take by unanimity. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500394.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Trade relations with Turkey
• 2025-11-12 “E-004479/25 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Action Plan on Cable Security 1 addresses the security of critical communication and energy submarine cables. The Commission has been consulting industry and Member States to better understand their needs regarding optical and power cables repairs. Looking ahead, concrete project proposals for the development of regional cable hubs are expected in 2026, which will aid in improving detection and facilitate repair operations. To structure collaboration on cable security and resilience, the Commission intends to leverage existing maritime frameworks and will integrate a multi-tier approach involving Member States, EU agencies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and private partners. The defence dimension in the hubs proposal will play a crucial role in ensuring military integration for response actions. For optical cables, the Commission will follow up on the announced modular repair equipment capacity ready to be plugged on vessels to increase the responsiveness of the EU, in a cost-effective manner. A first pilot call is expected to be issued in 2026 under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Digital programme, targeting the Baltic Sea, followed by one more CEF call open to all EU sea basins. In addition, dedicated calls to support smart cable systems and cable projects of European interest are expected to be issued in 2026 to address the prevention and detection requirements mentioned in the Action Plan, in cooperation with the deployment of the regional cable hubs, funded via the Digital Europe Programme. The Commission is committed to making sure that funding aligns with strategic maritime and energy objectives to support infrastructure security and resilience, and that such actions are eligible under the upcoming multiannual financial framework. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0009.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2025-09-09 “E-003491/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Under Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standards, jurisdictions are required to implement targeted financial sanctions (TFS) related to proliferation financing (PF) in line with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1 . TFS means asset freezing and prohibitions to prevent funds or other assets from being made available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of designated persons and entities 2 . UNSCRs are much broader and prescribe also other types of sanctions, with some outside of the scope of FATF Standards 3 . The FATF Methodology emphasises the role of obliged entities in complying with TFS. While flag-hopping towards registries with poor diligence may contribute to sanctions evasion, the Methodology does not explicitly require flag registries to screen against TFS 4 . There is very limited precedent of mutual evaluation reports 5 analysing shipping registers, based on the specific country’s context and exposure. For a more systematic approach in assessing the role of shipping registers in sanctions screening in FATF mutual evaluations and follow-up processes, an explicit requirement may be necessary. In FATF, the Commission has consistently championed strong beneficial ownership transparency requirements. Such efforts led to the adoption of strengthened Recommendations 6 . Under the FATF Standards underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance are activities falling within the definition of Financial Institution, the obligation to apply TFS is erga omnes and thus also covers any other actor in the insurance industry. 1 See FATF Recommendation 7 for the relevant UNSCRs in scope of the FATF Standards. 2 FATF Glossary. 3 Footnote 19 to Interpretative Note to Recommendation 7. 4 Nor does the FATF Guidance on this issue: See FATF, Guidance on Proliferation Financing Risk and Mitigation, June 2021, available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/GuidanceProliferation-Financing-Risk-Assessment-Mitigation.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf. At the same time, recent FATF typology work on Proliferation Financing complex evasion schemes looks into the exploitation of the maritime and shipping sector. See FATF, Complex Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion Schemes, June 2025, available at: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Complex-PFSanctions-Evasions-Schemes.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf. 5 Reference is made to the Mutual Evaluation Report of the Marshall Islands, available here: https://www.fatfgafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/Marshall-Islands-MER-November-2024.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf and the Mutual Evaluation Report of Nauru, available here: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrbmer/Nauru-MER-APG-November-2024.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf. Those are reports by the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), a FATF-Style Regional Body. 6 Revised Recommendations 24 on transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons (https://www.fatfgafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/R24-statement-march-2022.html ) and revised Recommendation 25 on transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements (https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatfgafi/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/R25-public-consultation-oct22.html ).”
  EU foreign policy approach · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-09-03 “E-003377/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The President of the European Commission has publicly announced 1 that the Commission has proposed to include the use of crypto currencies within the scope of the prohibitions in its proposal for the 19th package of sanctions on Russia. As the proposal is currently under negotiation in the Council, the Commission is not in a position to comment on specific details at this stage. The Commission would like to recall that it is the prerogative of the Council to determine the content of Council Regulations. The Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, remains fully committed to combating the circumvention of sanctions, including through the use of crypto currencies, wherever such practices can be identified. Finally, while the Commission contributes to the development of sanctions policy and provides guidance on implementation, Member States have the primary responsibility to monitor the application of Council Regulations and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will continue monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_2138.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation · Regulation of crypto
• 2025-05-26 “E-002101/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of media reports on Ivanti vulnerabilities being exploited by threat actors, against organisations from critical sectors including telecommunications. The Commission cannot comment on cybersecurity matters of other entities, including private companies. The Commission works on proactive measures and has invested in state-of-the-art tools for monitoring, detection, and incident response. The Commission relies on high levels of in-house expertise and close collaboration with peers and CERT-EU 1 , which is monitoring the situation and stands ready to provide further support to EU entities as needed. The Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2 Directive) 2 requires entities to report significant cybersecurity incidents. Where public awareness is necessary to prevent a significant incident or to mitigate its effects, under certain conditions, the NIS2 Directive provides that the public could be informed. As of 11 September 2026, the Cyber Resilience Act 3 will require manufacturers of products with digital elements to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe security-related incidents. The EU has publicly condemned such behaviour as unacceptable and contrary to established norms of responsible state conduct in cyberspace. The EU has reiterated its call for China to take appropriate action against cyberattacks emanating from its territory and to adhere to its international obligations. The EU has emphasised that it remains ready to impose costs, including restrictive measures, against individuals or entities responsible for such activities under its cyber diplomacy toolbox and cyber sanctions regime. The EU also continues to strengthen its cybersecurity resilience through coordinated exercises, policy frameworks, and international cyber dialogues. 1 https://cert.europa.eu/. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2025-05-21 “E-002024/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission took note of the findings of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies’ study on Securing European Military Fuels 1 . The Commission is aware that the long-term timely and sufficient supply of liquid fuels from the EU market is crucial for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The strategic nature of fuel and fuel infrastructure was already acknowledged and identified by the Action Plan on Military Mobility of 10 November 2022 2 . The White paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 of 19 March 2025 3 further proposed to identify immediate and future energy supply bottlenecks together with relevant partners, in particular NATO. Exchanges have already taken place between NATO, the European External Action Service and the Commission staffs to identify how the civil sector and the military could work better together on energy, and in particular fuel supply. In addition, military/civil fuel infrastructure and fuel supply, including of liquid fuels is addressed in the EU-NATO Structured Dialogues on Military Mobility and on Climate and Defence. The Commission is currently working on a military mobility package to be presented by 1 December 2025. It will consist of a joint communication, a proposal for a regulation and targeted amendments of existing EU legislation. On 12 June 2025, a targeted stakeholder consultation was launched. Stakeholders can contribute by providing their input. The findings of the study by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies will be a valuable source when it comes to fuel supply. 1 https://hcss.nl/report/securing-european-military-fuels-in-a-tense-security-environment-supply-distributionand-storage/. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/action-plan-military-mobility-20_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120.”
  EU competences on defence · Relations with NATO
• 2025-05-21 “E-002019/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission During the week of 12 May 2025, the Galileo satellite navigation system underwent a programmed in depth test aimed at assessing its integrity, continuity and accuracy. It was not an anomaly. All planned events in the constellation and services are pre-announced by timely publication of notice advisory to Galileo users (NAGU) and service notices, notifications to specific user’s communities, and when necessary, announcement on the webpage of the Galileo Service Centre. In the specific case of this test, NAGU 2025016 1 , also referred to in the Honourable Member’s question, was issued in due time informing about the test. This one-off test involved willfully degrading or interrupting some services. The open service, although subject to a lesser accuracy than usual, was not interrupted. The critical life-saving search and rescue service forward link was never interrupted nor degraded. The situation was under the control of the Commission and EU Agency for the Space Programme at all moments: services and parameters were restored within the planned timeframe. 1 https://www.gsc-europa.eu/notice-advisory-to-galileo-users-nagu-2025016.”
  EU competences on space policy
• 2025-05-15 “P-001967/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission and the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Cooperation Group, with the support of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), have already identified and assessed risks for electricity networks. The subsequent report was published in July 2024 1 , and identified a number of risk scenarios related to ‘product suppliers’ from third countries. Under the Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union 2 , cybersecurity risk assessments are underway in several areas of the sectors of high criticality in Annex I to that directive. The Commission is carrying out a risk assessment for wind under the Wind Package, and a similar assessment will be carried out for solar energy infrastructure. The Commission will follow up with concrete measures. In addition, the NIS Cooperation Group is currently working on the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Supply Chain Toolbox that will establish a common approach to secure ICT supply chains across the Union. The ICT Supply Chain Toolbox will outline key concepts related to ICT supply chain security, identify potential risk scenarios within the Union, and lay down recommendations to help address and mitigate these risks. Photovoltaic (PV) inverters despite not qualifying as critical products with digital elements listed in Annexes III and IV of the Cyber resilience Act, fall under the essential requirements laid down in the Cyber Resilience Act, which need to be fully applied. Finally, the Commission announced in the Action Plan for Affordable Energy a Strategic Roadmap for Digitalisation and Artificial Intelligence for the Energy Sector in 2026 with an in-depth industry specific risk assessments for solar power installations. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/risk-assessment-report-cyber-resilience-eus-telecommunicationsand-electricity-sectors. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/2022-12-27/eng.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · 5G
• 2025-02-12 “E-000656/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Under Article 56 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 , the Commission has powers to supervise and enforce the regulation in relation to providers of designated very large online platforms (VLOPs) and of very large online search engines. Since the DSA does not as such regulate content nor individual content moderation decisions– which are a matter for specific laws and the competent courts to determine – but rather the processes online platforms have in place, these powers do not cover content moderation actions. However, the DSA imposes on providers several obligations to increase the transparency and accountability of their services for all users. For example, Article 17 of the DSA mandates the providers of hosting services, thus including LinkedIn, to provide statements of reasons to any recipients of the service affected by restrictions, such as the suspension of accounts, imposed on the basis of the information shared. In addition, pursuant to Article 15 of the DSA, providers of intermediary services – thus again including LinkedIn – shall make publicly available, at least once a year, transparency reports on their content moderation activities. Those reports shall contain information about the content moderation engaged in at the providers’ own initiative, including the use of automated tools and the number and type of measures taken that affect the availability, visibility and accessibility of information provided by users. LinkedIn transparency reports can be found online. 2 As regards systemic risks, it is for the providers of VLOPs such as LinkedIn to diligently identify, analyse and assess them pursuant to Article 34 of the DSA, and to put in place mitigation measures accordingly pursuant to Article 35, under the supervision of the Commission. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/a1678508?src=or-search&veh=www.google.com.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2025-01-29 “P-000391/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission German edition of Russia’s leading propaganda outlet, Russia Today (RT), had re-established its presence on X as a part of a broader pro-Kremlin strategy to interfere with Europe’s democratic processes. As of now, the RT Germany account on X has been suspended 1 . Since 1 st March 2022, the EU has imposed restrictive measures on RT Germany for its role in systematically spreading disinformation justifying and in support of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Its broadcasting license has been suspended and it is prohibited for operators in the EU to broadcast, enable or facilitate the broadcasting of any content by RT Germany by any means 2 . It is the responsibility of national competent authorities to implement these measures and ensure that any breach is investigated. The Commission closely monitors compliance. On 18 December 2023 the Commission opened formal proceedings 3 to assess whether X may have breached the Digital Services Act (DSA) 4 including in relation to the dissemination of illegal content in the EU and the effectiveness of measures taken to combat information manipulation on the platform. On 12 July 2024, the platform was informed of the Commission's preliminary view that it is in breach of the DSA 5 . On 17 January 2025, the Commission addressed further technical investigatory measures to X 6 , including a request for access to certain of X’s commercial Application Programming Interfaces, technical interfaces to its content that allow direct fact-finding on content moderation and virality of accounts. These steps will allow the Commission services to take all relevant facts into account in the complex assessment under the DSA of systemic risks and their mitigation by X. 1 https://x.com/RTDE_OFFIZIELL 2 Article 2f(2) of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_679 4 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (Text with EEA relevance). 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3761 6 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-addresses-additional-investigatory-measures-xongoing-proceedings-under-digital-services”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2024-12-18 “P-003032/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In response to the intensified Russia’s hybrid campaign, the High Representative (HR) and the Commission have taken forward a number of measures in the framework of the EU hybrid toolbox 1 to deter and respond to these operations. On 8 October 2024 2 , the HR issued a statement strongly condemning Russia’s hybrid campaign against the EU and its Member States. The same day, the Council also adopted a hybrid sanctions regime in response to Russia’s destabilising activities 3 . On 16 December 2024, the first package of restrictive measures 4 was adopted against individuals and entities, involved inter alia in foreign assassinations, sabotage activities, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference, spreading Russian disinformation in Europe, Ukraine, the United States and Africa. In parallel, the HR and the Commission finalised the operationalisation of Hybrid Rapid Response Teams 5 to support Member States and partners to increase their resilience and response to hybrid threats. As part of the response to instrumentalisation of migrants, the Commission adopted the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation in May 2024 6 . As stated in the recent Joint Statement by the Commission and the HR 7 , the EU is also strengthening efforts to protect undersea cables 8 , including enhanced information exchange, new detection technologies, as well as undersea repair capabilities, and international cooperation. More broadly, the EU will continue to work closely with Member States to improve situational awareness, and maritime domain awareness, ensure the resilience and security of critical infrastructure and take additional measures, to further prevent, deter and respond to hybrid activities threatening EU’s security and stability. More so, the EU will continue close cooperation with its international partners via relevant formats such as the G7. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15880-2022-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/08/hybrid-threatsrussia-statement-by-thehigh-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-russia-s-continued-hybrid-activity-against-the-eu-and-its-memberstates/ 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402642 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202403174 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/16/russian-hybrid-threats-eu-agrees-firstlistings-in-response-to-destabilising-activities-against-the-eu-its-member-states-and-partners/ 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202401359 7 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-statement-european-commission-and-high-representative-investigationdamaged-electricity-and_en 8 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-security-and-resilience-submarine-cableinfrastructures”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe
• “Portugal and Spain's meltdown of the electricity grid in April happened because 2.5GW fell off the electricity grid in capacity. Chinese company Huawei only alone alone controls a solar inverter capacity in Europe of more than 100GW. Six Chinese vendors collectively hold more than 200GW worth of inverter capacity across Europe. That is more than enough to destabilize the entire European grid, and it can be done from Beijing remotely, silently and devastatingly fast. Why are we allowing this vulnerability to grow? We already took action in 2021 on risky vendors in telecommunication infrastructure. And now now it's time we do the same for our energy infrastructure. Now it's time we have a binding grid security toolbox that bans risky vendors from our critical infrastructure. Our political assessment is exactly that, Commissioner. There are no quick fixes, but there are alternatives also from Europe. And above all, there is a need for a path out of these unacceptable dependencies. And it's up to you and the Commission to lead us the way out of it. Thank you.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• “One of the worst things that could happen is the AI diffusion rule that Biden set out in his last week in office would be reignited by President Trump. It would mean Europe would get no advanced semiconductors, nothing at all. All our advanced high performance computing centers, all our AI gigafactories would be futile because we would get no chips. Having that in mind, what is your advice for Europe? Like I said, if we're working on a demand policy of things, which is the trend in Europe, the trend across the globe working on demand policies, how should we aggregate demand in Europe in order for advanced manufacturing to come to Europe? Very concrete question. The second question I have is on G7. It's also on export controls, not just in Europe but in G7. There are many discussions about supply chain, the semiconductor supply chain and the trustworthiness of trusty vendors, risky vendors in that supply chain. If we could find a definition there, much of the EU policy would be also what rhodium just said in the previous thing would be carried by a much larger group than just the EU. How are those discussions going? To your knowledge, and I would like to. Last but not least, give a compliment to Mr. Strom saying we need EU component components or we lose our competitiveness. I agree with that. You're one of the few industries in Europe to actually speak out loud and dares to say it. And I agree with you. I would commend other industries to say the same thing. We need European build components in order to be more resilient. That is a mission to us all. Thank you very much.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Thank you. Chair. The commissioner this week. Europe votes to stop buying Russian gas. No more weaponization of energy dependencies. Good. But in doing so, we're behaving like a goldfish. A goldfish swims around its bowl, forgets where it's been, and it starts all over again. In our European fishbowl, we are rightfully electrifying our continent. But 80% of residential grid batteries in Europe are Chinese. Chinese are dumping wind turbines on our market. 80% of Europe's new solar PV inverters are Chinese. And so is their software. Service availability for Europe can be manipulated from Beijing fast at their time of choosing, and it can be done at a massive scale from dependency on one autocrat to another. So I have to ask the commissioner, are we really breaking our dependency this week or are we just changing suppliers? Europe cannot afford to keep swimming in circles. Ban Chinese vendors from our critical infrastructure build European and also invest in a nuclear European grid backbone. Thank you.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “And if you're saying that we will be coerced by by Donald Trump, that we cannot hook up with China in any part because he will coerce us bilaterally, then what kind of position are we in? We should leverage trade defense instruments not just against who coerces from China. But I agree that we should also leverage that against who coerces from the other side of the Atlantic. So I see little gain in hooking up in this way if Trump continues to negotiate with us. The second question I have from the for the commission is this I see a trend, a global trend in when it comes to resilience and trade policies. And that trend is demand policies. You stimulate the demand side and become more resilient. You stimulate, for example, a European cloud that stimulates an aggregated demand. Then you stimulate TSMC to come to Europe. That is the way we think it. Same goes for magnets. Have done nothing. But the Americans have said we need magnets for for the DoD, for the Defense Department. So they open a mine, they mine it, but there's not enough demand. So General Motors makes sure there's plenty of demand. It's demand politics so that the the mine in the US remains open. It remains viable. There's a business case Japan does the same. Where are the demand projects in Europe when it comes to critical raw materials, when it comes to semiconductors. This is the global trend and we're not hooking up with it. So um, bend as you say, time is up. Time is up. But okay, I have plenty more questions. But let's say let's hear about the demand side.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Commissioner, thank you, Commissioner, for putting forward this legislation. It's much, much appreciated what you've done. And I really, really want to thank you for your courage in this one. What struck me most when you just stand here, stood here is that you said we shouldn't be naive on foreign powers switching off critical infrastructure, and I agree. In 1917, the English cut Dutch telecommunication cables to Indonesia. They did it. And in 1918, we built our own sovereign radio transmitter. Radio Katwijk, it's still there. Beautiful. But it can happen. And now, in 2026. All of our critical infrastructure is in the hands of China. And rightfully, you said there's mandatory obligatory rules and provisions in place for telecommunications to cut out Huawei and ZTE. I really commend you for that. But I must be honest, 80% of all PV inverters that we import are Chinese. How about solar panels, batteries and their control panels? All Chinese. I don't see a difference between telecommunications, electrical grid and other critical sectors. So I would like to say from this house, it's not just telecommunications. It's more we should do about love working on it. Thank you very much and thanks again for putting this forward. Cheers.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• “Thank you, Mr. Chair. The commissioner, when China stopped delivering critical raw materials to Japan in 2010, Japan wisely reduced Chinese dependencies within years, and when the United States was confronted with similar restrictions half a year ago, they acted with speed and ruthlessness, co-financing new mines in Brazil, long term offtake agreements across Asia, $8 billion of investment in Australian mines. Tariffs to undermine dumping from China. It created several new long term viable business cases within half a year. And the EU. No tangible results. Not because we're in any better position than Japan or the United States. Europe faces the same intentional and brutal coercion from Chinese controlled rare earths. If a Dutch company wants to trade with a German company and the product contains just 1% rare earths, the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, has to approve that trade. So act or we will industrialize faster than we de-risk. That is why we ask the commission to build a new trade and industrial framework, a high standard free trade marketplace for rare earths within, with partners around the world who do not wish to be coerced by China, but without trade protection. The Commissioner. All of such investments will leak away the resource. Eu plan without trade measures has no chance of success. Long, long term offtake contracts, guaranteed minimum prices and tariffs can together build that new business case like Japan and the US has demonstrated demand politics. So mine refine and define our own future. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with China
• “Chair. Dear Commissioner. Minister, in the past 24 hours, the Islamic regime has put mines in the Strait of Hormuz. Oil, gas and electricity prices will spike even higher for our citizens and for our industry. And Europe has about 100 minesweepers and mine hunters the United States owns only for. Our navies have practiced for such a scenario for decades. So do what needs to be done to secure freedom of movement and freedom of navigation. But a military mission will not suffice to get ships sailing. Insurance companies should issue insurances for transport and they are not. So Europe should take three steps. First, establish an EU shipping risk pool where insurances continue to be provided. Um companies as a standard coverage. And the EU will act as a backstop for extreme losses. And secondly, deploy naval escorts to ensure the physical security of crews and vessels. Thirdly, let the markets know that Europe stands behind continued navigation by providing clear coordination with shipowners, insurance and energy companies. What do you think this is, Europe's war or not? Its consequences are. So deal with the strategic reality. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence
• “Thank you. Chair. Yeah, here I am. Thank you. And thank you. Thanks to the commission to, um, I would like to reflect on what Mr. Aylor said on we share the tactics of this commission and how we deal with the US. I have some questions, though. Um, especially when I reflect towards the UK, US deal. They have a special relationship, have a long standing relationship, and it contains important lessons because it's an empty shell. There's nothing in that deal. When I read it, there's nothing in it. It's full of contradictions. Um, the baseline tariff remains at 10%. Sectoral tariffs remain. It's full of contradictions. It's empty. And the gains that the white House forecasts are really minimal at maximum 5 billion. So the lessons for the EU is that we shouldn't expect really anything from the US when we negotiate with them. Um, despite the trade surplus the UK has with the US or the other way around. Despite the special relationship, the UK has barely achieved anything with Trump and my expectations for the EU deal are therefore quite minimal, and therefore I think that we should also prepare for confrontation and flagging those instruments. Flagging that trade instruments right now is probably a good way to flag. We are serious and that's what I lack. I think that the commission is lacking a serious response to what is happening, and everyone around us with the best relationships with the US is getting in the words that Trump uses screwed. And I am afraid that we will be in the same position. So I would like to ask you also to consider, um, more of a confrontational approach. Thanks, chair. Back to you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you, dear chair. Dear Commissioner, Council, as markets outside Europe is increasingly closing for our entrepreneurs, I would like to ask the Commission to open up new markets for our businesses, finish new trade deals fast. But trade negotiations with the Gulf region have dragged on for 34 years. India 18 years, Latin America 26 years and counting, Malaysia 15 years, etc. that's too slow for this geopolitical storm. The problem is that by overloading trade agreements with additional demands on human rights, environmental or political conditions, we are stopping crucial trade deals from ever reaching the finish line. And as an extra result, ratification is too slow. And let's just stop the translation of each concept trade agreement into 24 different languages. It is used as an excuse for delay. Commissioner, your excellent team in Brussels should become a lean, mean fighting machine. We need to reform faster than markets around us are closing. And reform starts here at home. And you have our support in doing so. Thank you.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• “Europe faces dual coercion from US tariffs. Yes, but far more dangerously from China's strategic chokehold on rare earth exports. Gallium, germanium critical elements are already no longer reaching our industries. Colleagues, remember that no guided missile can be produced without gallium. It's important because the Chinese foreign minister told High Representative Kallas that Russia may not lose the war, but also our economic and our industrial survival is at stake. And as president von der Leyen rightly said, this is about dominance, about building dependency and about state organized blackmail. Some here still claim this is just collateral damage in the US-China rivalry. It's not. It's about showing where's the power? Some here suggest we strike a deal, drop tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in exchange for the withdrawal of Beijing's retaliatory measures. That's appeasement. It won't work. Feeding the beast won't pacify it. Some here argue that European member states should go for themselves and defend their own industries without the backing of the EU. Don't. It will only invite more coercion in the years to come. I argue differently. Economic leverage is there, in Europe, at least theoretically, if we use it. So use every tool in the EU economics toolbox. Close markets, if necessary. Impose export controls. Sanction Chinese banks fuelling Moscow's war of aggression. Leverage what we have or we do not have leverage at all. Commissioner, act with strength for European sovereignty and industrial survival. And above all, don't encourage more coercion. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with China · Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• “Uh, Joe Biden's last act in his in the white House. It's the AI diffusion rule. He refused to send advanced AI chips to parts of Europe. Your country? Denmark, my country. Netherlands. We could have it, but Poland and Luxembourg could not have it. That's exactly the places where we want to build high performance computing centers. Ai gigafactories. Trump withdrew, but he will return with an AI diffusion rule. The chances are that Europe will not get advanced AI chips. So anything we say about AI, what is it worth if we don't have the chips? Ai A manufacturing chip manufacturing should be in Europe. The only chance we have is because we have a sovereign demand from a European cloud. Now, the problem is, what I see in Commission and council is that there's one guy on cloud, one guy on AI and another one on chips, but we need to combine it. And I'm looking forward to the thought leadership of Denmark in this, to create sovereign demand in Europe and bring back manufacturing from TSMC, preferably back to Europe, because we will have our own sovereign cloud, our own demand, and have our own advanced chip manufacturing in Europe. Again, thanks.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty