Liudas MAŽYLIS

Policy topics Liudas MAŽYLIS is active on

What Liudas MAŽYLIS has said (21)

• 2026-06-17 “Thank you. Colleagues. Europe is facing a range of hybrid threats. And today we're looking specifically at Lithuania. The number is simply staggering. Disinformation campaigns, instrumentalization of migration, deployment of contraband balloons and drones. This is just part of the list of threats, of course. On top of that, you have a data breach that recently occurred at the center of registers, where more than 600,000 records from legal entities and property registers were leaked. There's a increasing threat to cybersecurity infrastructure, and that's certainly not the case only in Lithuania. There have been attacks to European institutions as well. And it's difficult to put a value on these breaches. Often the stolen data becomes enemy intelligence. You might have the private records or judges, diplomats, military personnel and civil society representatives. And these individuals then can face direct threats, which can also lead to state threats and reputational damage. Now, we cannot have legal and technical measures that do not keep up with the threat. Modern cybercrimes are often decentralized. They're across many servers. Different jurisdictions, jurisdictions. It's very difficult to identify the perpetrators. And this leads to impunity. Also digital evidence is often quickly destroyed or can disappear very quickly. So it's very difficult to carry out a coherent investigation as well. So the response needs to be as quick as the attack. Investigators must not just have legal authority, but they must have the technical tools as well to act quickly and together. The European Union must create a united defense and action must be coordinated. We should not just create bureaucratic coordination, but quick tools. Thank you.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-06-17 “Thank you. Presidents, colleagues, Europe is facing a range of hybrid threats. And today, we're looking specifically Lithuania. The number is simply staggering. Disinformation campaigns, instrumentalization of migration, deployment of, contraband balloons, and drones. This is just part of the list of threats. Of course, on top of that, you have a data breach that recently occurred at the center of registers where more than 600,000 records from legal entities and property register were leaked. There's a increasing threat to cybersecurity infrastructure, and that's certainly not the case only in Lithuania. There have been attacks, to European institutions as well, and it's difficult to put a value on these breaches. Often, the stolen data becomes enemy intelligence. You might have, the private records of, judges, diplomats, military personnel, and civil society representatives. And these individuals then can face direct threats, can also lead to state threats and reputational damage. Now we cannot have legal and technical measures that do not keep up with the threat. Modern cybercrimes are often decentralized. They're across many servers, different jurisdictions. It's very difficult to identify the perpetrators, and this leads to impunity. Also, digital evidence is often quickly, destroyed or can disappear very quickly, so it's very difficult to carry out a coherent investigation as well. So the response needs to be as quick as the attack. Investigators would not just have legal authority, but they must have the technical tools as well to act quickly and together. The European Union must create a united defense, and action must be coordinated. We should not, just create bureaucratic coordination but quick, tools.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-12-20 “P-005036/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In line with the Council conclusions of 19 February 2024 1 and 12 October 2020 2 , the EU’s policy towards Belarus aims to apply pressure on the Belarusian authorities while supporting the people of Belarus and their democratic aspirations. The EU welcomes the recent releases of political prisoners, following diplomatic engagement by the United States. Nevertheless, more than 1 100 political prisoners remain arbitrarily detained, repression continues, and no substantial improvement in the overall human rights situation can be observed. Since August 2020, the EU has adopted several rounds of restrictive measures against Belarus 3 in response to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, misconduct of the electoral process, the incitement and organisation of illegal border crossings, human rights violations, the diverting of a passenger flight, hybrid activities against Member States and the regime’s involvement in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Decisions regarding restrictive measures rest solely with the Council, by the unanimity of Member States. The EU will remain steadfast in its support for a democratic Belarus. The EU will continue to condemn the illegal actions of the regime and to call for the release of all political prisoners and end to repression. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6737-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46076/council-conclusions-on-belarus.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32025D1471.”
  EU-Belarus relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-11-11 “E-004463/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission, in coordination with Member States, European development banks and international partners, is delivering financial and technical assistance to Ukraine through wellestablished mechanisms. Since February 2022, the EU has provided over EUR 3 billion specifically to strengthen Ukraine’s energy security. Through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 1 , with coordination and operational support provided by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre 2 , the Commission is facilitating the donation of in-kind energy-related assistance to Ukraine from Member States and UCPM Participating States. This includes material for repairs of the electricity grid and large equipment, such as decommissioned power plant parts, generators and transformers, in addition to EU-fully financed rescEU stockpiles. The UCPM also supports donations from private and third country partners via its rescEU Private Donations Scheme. The Ukraine Facility 3 via the Ukraine Energy Support Fund focuses on physical protection and urgent repairs, particularly in vulnerable regions. Higher electricity export capacity increases Ukraine’s security of supply during winter. The Commission has also allocated an extra EUR 40 million in humanitarian funding to help with solid fuels, heating appliances and insulation. The Ukraine Facility recently mobilised close to EUR 1 billion of loans and grants for emergency gas purchases to cover the deficit caused by targeted attacks. Following the adoption of the 19th sanctions package against Russia on 23 October 2025, work has already begun on the 20th sanctions package. 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordinationcentre-ercc_en. 3 OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2025-11-11 “E-004462/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission condemns the measures announced by the Chinese authorities against two financial entities based in Lithuania. The Commission is following the situation closely and is currently engaging in bilateral discussions with China to address the issue. While the Commission is considering its next steps at the EU level, it is not in a position to disclose the details of the actions under consideration. The Commission will remain vigilant to ensure that third countries’ financial and credit institutions do not frustrate EU sanctions or support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.”
  EU-China relations · Trade relations with China
• 2025-11-06 “P-004394/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Recent airspace violations over several Member States are being monitored in close cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and within the Council Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats. Primary legal responsibility for countering hybrid threats rests with individual Member States. The Commission and the EEAS support Member States in their efforts. The EU legal framework for critical energy infrastructure consists of the Critical Entities Resilience Directive 1 and the Network and Information Systems Directive 2 (NIS 2) 2 , with the Commission developing guidelines for their implementation. Regarding drone incursions into the airspace, the Commission proposed a European Drone Defence Initiative, as well as the European Air Shield, European Space Shield and Eastern Flank Watch initiatives 3 . Member States’ endorsement will enable the Commission to proceed with their implementation. The European Defence Drone Initiative, in conjunction with Member States' capability coalition on drones and counter-drones, could significantly enhance Europe’s collective response. The Commission also plans to present soon an Action Plan on drone and counter-drone security covering areas such as security, aviation, research, critical infrastructure protection and civil-defence synergies. Furthermore, the ProtectEU Strategy tackles internal security threats, including hybrid threats. The EU supports Lithuanian efforts to develop and test, jointly with other European authorities and innovators, systems to detect, identify and mitigate unauthorised aerial threats used for smuggling, and/or hybrid threats 4 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022L2557&qid=1767776918378. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022L2555&qid=1767777141903. 3 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9db42c04-15c2-42e1-836460afb0073e68_en?filename=Joint-Communication%20_Defence-Readiness-Roadmap-2030.pdf.. 4 See projects FOLDOUT: Through-foliage detection, including in the outermost regions of the EU, https://foldout.eu/; NESTOR: aN Enhanced pre-frontier intelligence picture to Safeguard The EurOpean boRders, https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101021851; BorderForce: Flexible system extending automated border surveillance by increased situational awareness adaptable to uncertain times with unforseen events, https://borderforce-horizon.eu/; and CROSSMARE: Advanced Cross-Border And Multi Domain Interoperability Framework For Improved Collaborative Operational Efficiency For Secure Maritime Borders, https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/101225981; EU-HYBNET (Empowering a Pan-European Network to Counter Hybrid Threats, https://euhybnet.eu/).”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2025-10-02 “E-003880/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission works closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and financially supports its missions to all Ukrainian nuclear facilities 1 (including at Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants (NPPs)). It regularly exchanges information with the IAEA and with the Ukrainian authorities to assess the most appropriate forms of engagement in support of nuclear safety in Ukraine. In this context, the Commission remains committed to providing financial, technical and equipment assistance to Ukraine, in close cooperation with the IAEA. The Commission operates the European early‑warning and information system for radiological emergencies (ECURIE), providing rapid alerting, data exchange and coordinated response among the participating states 2 . Member States, or any other country, affected by a radiological incident can request assistance from the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 3 . Based on this request, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) would coordinate in-kind assistance offered by UCPM Members and Participating States. The Commission can also deploy European Civil Protection Pool 4 modules, rescEU 5 chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) stockpiles and capacities as a last resort. The European Union has adopted 6 an unprecedented set of restricted measures – most recently the 19 th package of sanctions – in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. These sanctions have been progressively intensified 7 . In the nuclear sector, comprehensive export control restrictions limit Russia’s access to nuclear-related goods and technology, including by Rosatom and Atomflot. Any new sanctions require unanimity among all Member States in the Council. 1 IAEA experts have maintained a continuous rotation at the Chernobyl NPP, with the 50 th rotation carried out on 7 October 2025. See: https://chnpp.gov.ua/en/infocenter/news/6440-the-50th-rotation-of-the-iaea-mission-tookplace-at-the-chornobylnpp#:~:text=On%20the%207th%20of%20October%2C%202025%20the%20new,the%20IAEA%20permanent% 20monitoring%20mission%20at%20the%20site. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-energy/emergency-preparedness-and-response_en. 3 See also: https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/eu-overview-risks/human-inducedrisks/nuclear-and-radiological-accidents. 4 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/european-civil-protection-pool_en. 5 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/resceu_en. 6 Sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-andworld/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-againstukraine_en. 7 Including tight export control measures curbing Russia’s access to goods and technology that might contribute to Russia’s military and technological enhancement or its industrial capacities.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2025-06-16 “E-002422/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of public statements by Rosatom officials indicating an intention to restart reactors at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The Commission is closely following the developments at ZNPP since its illegal seizure by Russia. It has made it clear that no restart of the ZNPP is possible under occupation and without the corresponding licensing decision by Ukraine’s competent nuclear safety authority as well as without an in-depth assessment of the nuclear safety situation of the power plant. For detailed information on this matter, the Honourable Member is kindly invited to liaise with the Commission. The Commission and the European External Action Service weight very carefully the impact of any potential sanctions against Rosatom and the Russian nuclear energy sector. All decisions related to EU sanctions are taken by the Council, by unanimity. The High Representative/VicePresident will continue to work with Member States in order to further strengthen EU sanctions and their impact, including individual designation.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-06-16 “P-002423/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU, in coordination with its partners, is closely monitoring the upcoming joint strategic military exercise Zapad-2025, scheduled to take place between 12 and 16 September 2025. The EU continues to call on Russia and Belarus to fully comply with the 2011 Vienna Document of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which requires prior notification for military activities involving more than 9 000 troops, and mandatory observation for those involving over 13 000. Belarus has announced its intention to notify OSCE member states and invite international observers on the ground. The Zapad‑2025 exercise also raises serious concerns in the cybersecurity and information domains. Recognising the potential for parallel cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, the EU is taking steps to strengthen the EU’s resilience, particularly in Member States, which have historically been more exposed to Kremlin-linked influence operations. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) closely monitor and expose Russian foreign information manipulation and interference. In particular, the EUvsDisinfo platform 1 , created under the auspices of the EEAS and led by the East Stratcom Task Force, remains a key instrument in this regard, building on its successful efforts during Zapad‑2021, when it identified and debunked multiple false narratives. The Rapid Alert System 2 , launched in 2019, continues to allow Member States to share information and coordinate fast responses to emerging disinformation campaigns. The EU is actively engaged in preparing for hybrid threats, including the potential security, cyber, and hybrid threats surrounding Zapad‑2025. 1 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ras_factsheet_march_2019_0.pdf.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Relations with NATO
• 2025-04-09 “E-001472/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The EU continues to monitor the impacts of the termination of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s programmes as well as the US wider international support. The EU will also continue coordinating efforts on identifying and, where possible, meeting the most acute needs and key priorities in the region, including in Ukraine and Moldova. Regarding Ukraine, the impact has been significant in several areas including energy, capacity gaps in key institutions (where US-embedded experts were common), civil society and media, as well as social sectors (veterans’ mental health and psycho-social support, and economic reintegration). In Moldova, USAID programmes covered sectors such as justice, energy security, support to independent media, civil society and election monitoring. The EU will continue to support Moldova in these sectors with the aim to ensure there are no gaps for key priorities, notably for vetting and justice reform as well as energy security. The EU humanitarian funding for Ukraine and Moldova currently stands at EUR 1.214 billion (EUR 1.13 billion for Ukraine and EUR 84 million for Moldova) since February 2022. The EU will continue its humanitarian and emergency assistance to Ukraine for as long as needed, irrespective of the cuts in funding by other major donors. The Commission will not step back from its humanitarian commitments. On healthcare, it will continue supporting programmes related to primary healthcare, medical supplies and equipment, light repairs of health facilities, as well as sexual and reproductive health.”
  Funding for EU Neighbourhood · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-04-08 “E-001430/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the dynamic landscape of global health needs and the intricacy of funding allocation. While the Commission cannot fill gaps left by other funders, it is committed to a thorough analysis of the most pressing health issues worldwide, especially those with potential implications for the EU. This strategic approach allows the Commission to identify and prioritise areas for investment to maximise impact, although specific funding amounts and sources will depend on ongoing evaluations and programmatic assessments. In line with its Global Health Strategy, the Commission’s continued partnership at global, regional, and bilateral levels reaffirms its role as a dependable ally in health systems strengthening. More specifically the Commission supports vaccination through significant contributions to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and through the Team Europe Initiative on manufacturing and access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies 1 . The EU is strongly committed to the fight against acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) mainly through the continuous substantial support to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF). The Commission has supported the GF since its creation, and it is currently the seventh biggest public donor to the GF and in the last replenishment (2023-2025) it pledged EUR 715 million. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/team-europe-initiatives/team-europe-initiativemanufacturing-and-access-vaccines-medicines-and-health-technologies-africa_en.”
  Global priorities for international development · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2025-02-11 “P-000637/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Following the Russian military aggression against Ukraine as of 2022, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. The REPowerEU Strategy 1 , adopted in May 2022, aims to accelerate the clean transition, diversify supplies, and enhance EU energy resilience. The EU adopted sanctions to phase out Russian coal imports. Sanctions on oil have also reduced imports from almost a third to 3% of total EU imports. In terms of gas, the EU has reduced its Russian gas imports from over 45% in 2021, to 19% in 2024, replacing it with alternatives like liquefied natural gas (LNG) from trusted international partners. However, Russian energy, particularly gas, remains in the EU energy mix. To address this, the Commission plans to adopt a Roadmap to end Russian energy imports by fully implementing REPowerEU. With the sanctions packages currently in force 2 , the Council has imposed a ban on new investments for the completion of Russian LNG projects under construction and a ban on reloading services for Russian LNG on EU territory for the purpose of transshipment operations to third countries. Any further decisions on sanctions packages are to be taken by the Council. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/key-documents-repowereu_en 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/timeline-sanctions-against-russia/”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2025-01-24 “E-000325/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the concerns regarding the safety of the Astravets nuclear power plan. Given the current political situation, all bilateral relations with the authorities of Russia and Belarus have been suspended. The European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group completed a peer review of the post-Fukushima nuclear safety assessment ‘stress tests’ of the Astravets nuclear power plant in 2021 and issued safety improvement recommendations. The nuclear safety regulator of Belarus drew up a National Action Plan, updated in 2023 1 , to implement these recommendations. The Commission continues to monitor Belarus’s progress in implementing them within the framework of relevant multilateral conventions adopted under the auspices the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it is not currently in a position to restart contacts with the Belarus nuclear safety regulator. The Commission will continue to maintain contacts with the IAEA, which has the mandate to promote the implementation of international nuclear safety standards worldwide, including in Belarus. The Commission intends to use existing international peer review mechanisms, notably the upcoming Eighth Review Meeting of the Joint Convention 2 in March 2025 and the Convention on Nuclear Safety Review Meeting in March 2026 to probe the implementation by Belarus of its obligations under these Conventions, which are relevant for Belarus follow-up of the findings of the stress tests peer review 3 . 1 https://gosatomnadzor.mchs.gov.by/znaniya-dlya-kazhdogo/biblioteka/ 2 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, adopted under IAEA auspices in 1997. In December 2024, the Commission, on behalf of Euratom, analysed Belarus National Report and inquired the Country on several safety aspects of spent fuel and radioactive waste management. 3 The position for the upcoming Joint Convention Review Meeting is coordinated with the Member States in the Working Party on Atomic Questions of the Council.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Belarus relations
• 2025-01-24 “P-000312/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Moldova’s energy security and resilience is a priority for the EU. On 27 January 2025, the EU announced an emergency assistance package 1 of EUR 30 million to tackle the country’s energy crisis. On 4 February 2025, the EU put forward a medium-term strategy 2 for Moldova supported by a financial package with the two-fold objective of decoupling Moldova from the insecurities of Russian supply of energy and fully integrating it in the EU energy market. Under this strategy, overall support for Moldova would account to EUR 250 million, of which EUR 100 million will be provided by the EU by mid-April 2025. In addition, and as part of the same strategy, an offer of EUR 60 million is made available for the people in the Transnistrian region of Moldova subject to conditions. This also builds on the EU's ongoing support for Moldova’s energy resilience. Moldova has been a target of Russia’s hybrid warfare, and this energy crisis, provoked by Moscow, is no exception. The EU is currently extending the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova for another two years, which has been crucial in building the country's crisis management and hybrid threat response capacities. Support to counter electoral interference, enhance cybersecurity, and improve strategic communication will be key components ahead of the parliamentary elections. Finally, while EU accession and Transnistrian conflict settlement are two distinct processes, bridging the divide between Moldova’s two banks of the Nistru River is essential. All efforts must ensure that Moldova's entire population benefits from EU integration. Chisinau is setting up an information sharing mechanism on EU accession with Tiraspol, and the EU stands ready to support Moldova along this path. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_329 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/lt/ip_25_403”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · EU-Moldova relations
• “Thank you president, Commissioner, colleagues and the fact that climate change affects the tick activity is undeniable. There is no doubt that vaccinations save lives. It's sufficient to compare Austria and Switzerland in one. Vaccination against tick borne encephalitis is universal, in the other, in the other it is not. And the incidence of human disease clearly proves that the advantages of vaccination Six flu coronavirus are becoming more active. Vaccination campaigns must also become more aggressive. In many cases, the patient has to demonstrate awareness. But that, after all, is the duty of the health authorities of the member states. We have to have a sufficient number of vaccines. Patients in risk groups must be vaccinated free of charge, and others must be clearly informed. Decisions are needed on a EU wide scale. This would be a suitable contribution to the creation of the European Health Union. Thank you.”
  Vaccination
• “Thank you, Mr. President. Commissioner, colleagues. Nitrous oxide or N2O has a chemical formula almost as simple as H2O, but its effects are anything but harmless. Commonly known as laughing gas, it has a powerful impact on the human body and can lead to serious consequences when misused. It's a powerful anaesthetic, indispensable for inducing general anesthesia or providing pain relief during surgery under medical law. It's a prescription only medicine, and that in itself says a great deal about about its potency. At the same time, nitrous oxide also has a number of non-medical uses. For example, it's used as an additive to fuels to boost the power of car engines or as a foaming or propellant agent in the food industry, and these legitimate uses create opportunities for abuse, allowing some individuals to obtain and use these gas illegally for intoxication. Preventing this misuse by legislation is not straightforward. It's therefore not surprising that the member states tackle it in different ways. Some have banned the sale of that gas in bars and clubs. Others prohibited sales to minors. In some other cases, restrictions have been introduced on packaging, size and design, and in others the substance has been placed on the list of products with a high potential for abuse. In other words, every solution comes at a price. I believe we would all welcome a common European approach to regulating the use of nitrogen oxide. A glass of beer or a wine may remain a matter of personal responsibility, but when it comes to laughing gas, we must ensure that responsibility for the use and prescription lies exclusively with professionals. That is doctors. Thank you. Our next speaker is Mr. Balladur. On behalf of the S&D Group.”
  EU measures on lifestyle-related behaviours (smoking, drinking, eating, etc.)
• “Thank you very much. President. Commissioner. Colleagues. It's a question of competitiveness in sport. And we do have to realize that what we have here, in terms of content, is something which is calling our whole sport into question. We're seeing the Entire system being jeopardized. Two 2023 there were recommendations put forward by the Commission relating to voluntary work between rights holders, platforms and clubs. There was a limit to this and piracy is continuing. So it's not just a question of individual platforms now, but this is something which is systematically occurring. Voluntary measures no longer have the impact they should. They're not adequate. So we need to move forward and tackle the broad organised networks, the criminal networks, the big European sports media are more and more talking about the consequences, the consequences in jobs, etc. and I think that we need a proper legal framework and we need to take appropriate measures as soon as possible.”
  Broadcasting of sports events
• “Thank you, Mr. President. Russia has been active in Africa since the height of the Soviet era, and over time it gained a new military and political foothold there, first through the Wagner Group, now through the Afrika Korps course. Russia also maintains its channels of influence in Africa by recruiting soldiers, young Africans are promised jobs or education opportunities, but in reality they are given weapons. Russia is acting like this in Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. It is estimated that nearly 2000 Africans from 36 countries are fighting on Russia's side. We must condemn Russia's actions unreservedly on clear legal grounds, namely the 1989 UN convention prohibiting the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries. Russia is not only continuing its aggression against Ukraine, it is also exporting its logic of war to Africa. And this is a clear continuation of colonial thinking. Thank you.”
  EU policy on African region
• “Thank you, Madam President. Commissioner, colleagues, I'd like to quote what I said in this chamber on pollinators on the 17th of September, 2019, the prevention of the loss of biodiversity must be based on science and on ambitious but achievable targets. I also strongly suggested that the guidance should be updated, and that new plant protection products should be subject to current toxicity studies. The effect not only of bees but also other pollinators should be studied. In the meantime, the New Deal on pollinators was adopted. The guidance was updated and in 2023 the regulation on the restoration of nature gave pollinators, including bees, legal protection status. This is a significant step that obliges member states to monitor pollinator populations according to a standardised methodology, methodology and to halt the decline of pollinators. With 2030, the European Red list for bees is an important issue. It needs to be updated to reflect current trends in the status of species. Invasive species threaten this objective. Species such as the Asian wasp can wipe out up to 90,000 pollinators per colony per season. It is time to take appropriate action based on risk assessment. In the case of pesticide ring, tests on solitary bees are a step forward, but long term studies at colony level are still lacking. Sublethal and chronic effects remain assessed. Only comprehensive studies will allow science based, science based decisions. I welcome the fact that databases on bees are becoming more widely available, but they must not only be open, but also comprehensive, continuously updated and integrated into decision making. Whether for the European list, red list of bees or for habitat restoration, I repeat that it is not only on the basis of sound scientific data that we can achieve our objective and hold the decline of bees. Thank you.”
  Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• “Administration. Thank you. We need to ensure that scientists are respected. I, as a scientist, am all too well aware of the bureaucratic jungle that is a millstone around the neck of many researchers. They have many bureaucratic hurdles to overcome, and it would be helpful if the Commission could focus on dealing with this. Yes, it's important to support researchers coming from abroad and from Ukraine. And yes, it's important to have seven year budgets. That is excellent. What we want to see more funding and support for young early career researchers. And I would also say that research should be included.”
  EU research funding
• “Thank you. President, Commissioner, colleagues from this chamber. We have condemned Uzbekistan for helping Russia evade sanctions. It was also unpleasant to see the face of the president when he visited Moscow on the 9th of May. We know Uzbekistan's consistent position in supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan sought its place in the new international system. Europe has long built diplomatic and economic ties that are promoting stability in the Central Asian region, which is a strategic area where reliable partners, energy resilience, rules based economy, security and reforms towards modernization are important. The new agreement can open greater opportunities for European companies to develop beneficial cooperation in the areas of education, energy, climate, science and technology. Thank you.”
  EU policy on Central Asia