Rihards KOLS

Policy topics Rihards KOLS is active on

What Rihards KOLS has said (43)

• 2026-06-16 “(10:37:50 – 10:39:04): Dear colleagues, reports of MOU between The US and Iran are encouraging sign. Even a rough framework is better than nothing, and we should welcome any step that reduces the risk of wider war. The devil, however, is in the details. An arrangement with Iran alone will not automatically deliver regional stability. Israel's security cannot be treated as afterthought in any final deal, and that works both ways. And, yes, those who sabotage fragile diplomacy through reckless unilateral action must be held accountable. We must equally consider the Gulf States. They are not bystanders. Their cooperation will be essential to any durable order, and and the European Union should invest more seriously in those partnerships to protect our shared interest in open sea lanes and regional stability. We are not watching this crisis from a distance or at least we have been financially bleeding from this conflict. So, yes, we need de escalation. A de escalation that protects our allies, keep vital trade routes open, and ensures that Hezbollah, Hamas, and other proxies do not use diplomacy as a cover to quietly rebuild.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2025-09-22 “E-003648/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s engagement with the Syrian transitional authorities is grounded in its commitment to the Syrian people and promoting peace and stability, while supporting an inclusive Syrianowned transition that ensures that all Syrians regardless from their ethnic or religious background have a place in the new Syria. The EU expressed its serious concerns about the clashes in Suwayda 1 and strongly condemned the grave violations of international humanitarian law, including the summary killings of unarmed civilians. The EU will continue to call for all perpetrators, regardless of their affiliation, to be held accountable and brought to justice. Relevant international mechanisms, including the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, must be enabled to gain full access and investigate such crimes. In May 2 and June 3 2025, the EU introduced new listings against human rights violators and will continue monitoring the situation on the ground and the actions of the transitional authorities. The EU remains vigilant and will continue to sanction individuals who commit human rights violations and jeopardise the peaceful transition. The EU also encourages the swift implementation of the roadmap announced by Syria, Jordan and the US on Suwayda 4 . Following the humanitarian crisis in Southern Syria, the EU provided emergency humanitarian funding of EUR 1.6 million 5 in additional funding. This enabled emergency interventions providing water, hygiene, health, protection services, medical supplies, and food. The EU’s humanitarian assistance is delivered through certified humanitarian partners in all parts of Syria, regardless of the area of control, based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. The EU systematically calls on all parties to ensure safe and unimpeded humanitarian access and full respect of international humanitarian law. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501110. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501255. 4 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-roadmap-agreed-syria-jordan-and-ussuwayda_en. 5 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/syria/eu-provides-%E2%82%AC16-million-humanitarian-fundingsupport-those-affected-escalation-violence-southern_en.”
  EU-Syria relations
• 2025-07-18 “E-003005/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely followed the 2025 parliamentary elections in Albania and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)’s preliminary findings. The Commission will continue to monitor developments in Albania’s democratic institutions and has encouraged Albania to continue pursuing all reforms required for its future accession to the EU, including the adoption of further electoral reforms addressing all ODIHR's key recommendations, including those that are still outstanding from previous elections. In the context of the accession negotiations, Albania has presented a roadmap on the functioning of democratic institutions. This foresees further progress on effective application in practice of the right to vote, through the enforcement of revised legislation; of the strengthening of transparency through digitalisation and enhanced procedures; and of increasingly ensuring equal treatment before the law and equal opportunity in the electoral process, including the rights of vulnerable groups to be informed on the process. The Commission will closely monitor progress in this regard, including in the context of the accession negotiations related to Cluster 1 – Fundamentals. Building on the assistance already provided (among others, by supporting campaign finance transparency tools, and the monitoring of the electoral process by civil society organisations), targeted technical assistance will continue to be provided where necessary, notably to the Central Elections Committee.”
  EU-Albania relations · EU relations with Western Balkans
• 2025-07-18 “E-003004/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has consistently supported Albania’s efforts to consolidate an independent, accountable, impartial, and professional judiciary. It monitors progress of relevant reforms, providing also technical assistance and capacity-building programs. The Commission has ensured thorough monitoring of the vetting process through the deployment of senior magistrates from Member States in the context of the international monitoring operation. The vetting has been crucial to strengthen integrity across the judiciary, overall having a positive impact on eradicating corruption. The Commission noted that the process has also resulted in capacity gaps. In its 2024 report on Albania 1 , the Commission stressed the need to accelerate vetting appeal procedures and encouraged Albania to fill vacant positions with qualified magistrates, at all levels of the judiciary, through transparent and merit-based processes. The Commission closely monitors the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decisions and assesses the progress made in addressing the shortcomings in access to justice. It encourages the publication of court rulings and providing access to information for citizens. The Commission also continues to support civil society organisations and independent institutions, such as the Peoples’ Advocate and the Commissioner against Discrimination in their efforts to promote access to justice and hold the authorities accountable. 1 SWD(2024) 690 final.”
  EU-Albania relations
• 2025-07-18 “E-003003/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The total amount of unspent cohesion policy funds 1 (in EUR) under the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, broken down by Member State are presented in Annex I to Commission’s reply. Unspent amounts are calculated as the difference between the total cohesion policy funds net allocation for each Member State minus the total net payments made up to 20 August 2025 (net pre-financing and net interim payments). The total amount of uncommitted allocations (in EUR) from the cohesion policy funds, broken down by Member State are presented in Annex II to Commission’s reply. These uncommitted amounts represent the allocations included in the respective programmes’ financial plans for years 2026 and 2027, which will be committed (unless transferred to other funds/instruments outside cohesion policy) in line with Article 86(2) of the Common Provisions Regulation 2 . Information on amounts of already selected operations under Member States’ programmes can be found on the Open Data Portal 3 . Data on selected operations is indicated as “Decided” amounts and is colour coded in green in the chart. The cumulative absorption rates of cohesion policy funds 4 for each Member State from 2014 to 20 August 2025 are presented in Annex III to Commission’s reply. The absorption rates are calculated as the percentage of net payments made from the respective net allocation by Fund and by Member State. 1 European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund, European Social Fund, Youth Employment Initiative, REACT-EU, European Social Fund Plus and the Just Transition Fund. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060. 3 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/cohesion_overview/21-27/#finance-implementation. 4 European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund, European Social Fund, Youth Employment Initiative, REACT-EU, European Social Fund Plus and the Just Transition Fund”
  EU competences on defence · Size of EU budget
• “First and foremost, we ensured that Ukraine will be associated to the European Defence Fund. This was not in the Commission's or council drafts. It came from the Parliament. It recognises Ukraine's growing defence, industrial capacity and anchors it firmly into Europe's security ecosystem. It is both a strategic and symbolic achievement, or one that was achieved at the very last minute of the work. Second, we succeeded in opening the Horizon Europe EIC accelerator to a dual use and defense related innovation. But crucially, while keeping the civilian character of Horizon Europe as a top priority. This was one of the Parliament's key red lines, and it remains fully respected, targeted and limited to its multiannual financial framework and tightly framed around advancing civilian applications. Third, under the Horizon Europe, we strengthened eligibility and security of ownership rules, ensuring that participation is limited to entities under EU, EEA or Ukrainian control while allowing flexibility through national guarantees. This closes potential security loopholes and safeguards European technological sovereignty. For the Parliament achieved significant progress in broadening the scope of Digital Europe programme by inserting clear references to societal resilience, hybrid threat response and AI factories and gigafactories. These additions came directly from our mandates and recognised that the front lines of security today are not only military, they are digital, cyber and cognitive.”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• “Dear colleagues. Europe has come a long way in cutting its dependence on Russia's energy, gas, oil and coal. We reduced it all. But partial progress is not yet a done deal. Every tanker of Russian LNG that still arrives in Europe, every barrel of Relabelled through India, every Rosatom contract operating quietly here in Europe. They all keep feeding Kremlins war machine. Dependence on aggressors is not a market choice. It is a strategic and expensive mistake. And you all know this. Today, around 20% of Europe's nuclear reactors still depend on Russian nuclear fuel. In 2024 alone, over 700 million worth of nuclear materials came from Russia. Rosatom is operating under the radar in critical parts of our energy sector. We must fully phase out all Russian energy imports, including nuclear. We must close loopholes, sanctioned intermediaries and put an end to Russia's role in Europe's nuclear supply chains. We must invest in diversification, hydrogen modular reactors and new nuclear supply chains built with trusted partners, not authoritarian regimes. Energy independence is not just national priority, it is a union wide security imperative. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you chair. And thank you, Commissioner, really for elaborate answers to the very tough questions but timely questions. But I would say that listening to the debate, I have to acknowledge that there is some kind of mysterious crystal ball on all the free trade agreements. When they reached the final negotiations, suddenly the politicians bring it out and they have the the this opportunity to predict the future that is going to damage, that is going to do this and that. Negative. Well, we have to set the record straight. For the past 15 years, all the free trade agreements that the EU has signed has not worsened any member state's situation and hasn't worsened or lowered the living conditions of EU citizens. That is a clear fact. There is no other data that could contradict this. So obviously the Mercosur is an opportunity and here we're talking about opportunities. What is the Commission's vision on to kind of bolster SMEs, particularly from the smaller member states that have no representation in Mercosur countries at all, where Would there be any mechanisms set in place to have, like a platform where the SMEs can actually reach out and actually get to these new markets? Because obviously there's a lot of limitations for numerous member states that have no access so far to the Mercosur countries. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Uh, first of all, thank you, uh, both commissioners, for outlining what the, um, support package includes. On what? Conditionality? Uh, ECR group overall. Um, you can count on our support on this proposal. Uh, but of course, you work on the strict mandate given by the council. This said, of course, we regret to see the once again, we're doing that with EU borrowing that that means taxpayers money while still the frozen assets are being untouched. In no way. In no form. In this regard, I have to remind that this House has given six mandates to the Commission since 2020 3rd November to seize the frozen assets six times. So again, let's put in the weights. Uh, council, Parliament. We are co-legislators. So this kind of ignoring of this House call is also something that should be taken into account. Going into the details. Um, I have to say, it's not only loan right now to Ukraine. Uh, since the war, we are giving shelter to more than 4.5 million Ukrainian refugees. And that is again through our taxpayers who are facilitating that. That amounts up to 150 billion so far. And I can assume another year. Let's add another 50 billion. So. And while still the frozen assets are idly settling and we are making sure that they are not touched.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Sorry. Was in translation. Well thank you, chair from the ECR Group. We really welcome the end of the prolonged uncertainty in the Eu-us trade relations. But as chair said, we have to be honest, this deal raises more questions than it answers. And first, this is not legally binding agreement, at least not yet. Its political statement vague, flexible and lacking enforceability. And yet it's already having a real time consequences for European businesses. Call it a glitch, For example, some member states postal parcel services are suspending deliveries to the US due to regulatory regulatory grey zones. Companies across Europe are navigating uncertainty. That alone should not be acceptable at all. So from the ECR perspective, two things are essential. First, legal clarity. The Commission must provide a detailed public legal framework outlining how this deal functions and what resources businesses have. We cannot build strategic autonomy on legal ambiguity right now. It's ambiguity driven. It's not legal certainty. Second, accountability and transparency. Parliament must not be reduced to a bystander. So the question is what role will play in shaping the implementation? What is the timeline for reviewing the deal? And there must be a formal review clause with a Abiding deadline, be it even until the end of the current US administration, it cannot be stated like as it flows because seeing what's happening, um, again, throwing in two months time another new tariffs, then we experience, uh, these legendary two weeks time after time and there's an uncertainty again in the air. So what is the clear framework for these tariffs to be introduced. But yes, we do support strong transatlantic partnership in the side of what is finalizing the deal legal framework. We should already engage uh, really pushing for genuine free trade zone in the transatlantic I don't know, it was all the time off. Sorry, I didn't push anything. Great. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Um, the same same issue arises with the steel. Aluminum derivatives primarily metals remain heavily protected. But the most significant concern is the treatment of downstream products. Tariffs now apply to the full customs value of many covered, covered metal articles and derivatives, not only to the metal content. That means a European machine component or piece of industrial equipment can be taxed on the value of its engineering, design and technology simply because it contains steel or aluminum. This is not a small technical adjustment. It changes the effective burden on European exporters. And there's also a broader, broader European point here. We cannot ask companies to invest to comply, decarbonise and keep production in Europe while treating these pressures as if they are merely external shocks. At some point, industrial policy has to mean defending their industries. We still have. So the point is not to escalate. The point is to be serious. The Commission should come back with a precise assessment which exporters are hit, which member states, which SMEs, which pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment supply chains? It should pursue exemptions and carve outs where EU. Us supply chains are mutually beneficial, especially in health, defence related industry machinery and critical manufacturing. And it should keep credible options on the table because negotiations work best when Europe knows owns its own interests and is prepared to defend them. So to conclude, of course, transatlantic relationships do matter. Um, but of course we should protect our interests, particularly industry interests in particular. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Chair from the ECR side, we broadly supportive of this proposal. Obviously, the direction is right and clearly there is a real single market problem across borders. We still deal with the separate systems for identification, authentication and document exchange. And particularly SMEs do not have the capacity to navigate 27 different administrative systems. But business wallet can help address that on that only if they delivers a real simplification. The text refers several times to reducing administrative burden, respectively, the recital of five, 11, 13, 19 and 24. But it reads as intention. So what we need to do is to tighten and make it measurable for businesses, especially small ones. The question is very practical does this actually remove steps or does it just add another digital layer on top of what already exists? If national processes remain in parallel, then we are not simplifying. We are just digitizing the burden. And we should tighten this and make it more concrete. Second, on interoperability and design, we support a framework that works across member States and builds on existing ideas infrastructure. But it needs to remain technologically neutral. It should not evolve into a single prescribed model by default. The system has to be flexible enough to reflect different national realities. Otherwise uptake will be limited from the start. On the link with the European Digital Identity Wallet, I think it is important to keep the distinction clear. This is a business tool and it should remain focused on that purpose.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “53:44 – 16:56:23): Well, lots to reflect after last speaker. Well, there's a food overproduction in Europe in general, but on this particular issue I think we should keep it simple. And yes, the raised question, there are real concerns on member states that are bordering Ukraine, and if local farmers are under pressure, that has to be addressed seriously. There is no doubt about that. But unilateral import bans are the wrong answer. And just to clarify again once again, the trade policy is an EU competence, a shared joint competence. It cannot be that when things get politically difficult, the national governments just decide to ignore the rules and act alone. That weakens the single market and creates a bad precedent. And the problem was not the grain itself, and here Miss Gyori, if you can follow me, you will understand. The problem was that goods meant to move onwards got stuck in neighboring countries. That points to infrastructure, transit routes, and coordination failures. That is the main reason. So if the real problem was transit, then the answer was to fix transit, not to break EU trade rules and call it strategy. So instead, members started improvising with national bans, but the focus should have been on moving the goods properly and faster. We gave Ukraine temporary trade liberalization for a reason, not as a favor, because Ukraine is under attack and it needs economy to function. And a country at war needs weapons, yes, but it also needs exports revenue and basic economic stability.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• “Dear Commissioner, dear colleagues, trade agreements aren't just about tariffs and paperwork. They create real opportunities for our SMEs. This means access to 260 million consumer market. So far, all EU trade agreements have delivered benefits while maintaining high standards. It is a fact this deal does the same. Lowering tariffs, cutting red tape and ensuring fair competition. Yes. Concerns exist. That is why the Commission has announced 1 billion fund to support affected farmers. But if we can fund compensation, we should also fund opportunity. A one stop EU platform should be established for Mercosur markets that will help our businesses expand without excessive costs, because access should not be a privilege but a policy priority. Commissioner, you must ensure structured engagement similar to CFSP and CSDp. We should have a CPTPP conference during every presidency where the civil society where national parliamentarians can engage with the European Parliament and with the Commission. This is a chance to expand, compete and lead. And we should take it. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “It's been already three months. Everyone is planning ahead. And this uncertainty is really something that's not giving good out. I welcome all the new trade agreements, announcements, Indonesia and etc. but let's be sure I will repeat us is our strategic partner. It's not just economic trading partner, it's our strategic partners when it comes, for example, Indonesia, let's just put behind our ear that it's a member of bricks, and let's just listen to what the US administration is saying to the BRICs member states, um, that if they're going to impose and probably they're going to impose tariffs to to us, they will retaliate. Anyone who is dealing trading with the Bric countries, that includes potentially European Union. So I think what we need to hear is in two weeks time, what is really manageable to achieve in order for our business to really settle. So we are facing 10% baseline that's going to stick. Are we going to go to 0 to 0 tariffs or US is not even listening to 0 to 0 tariff proposal. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “This is show of weakness. And dear colleagues, I should remind the reading in Moscow is as such. The show of weakness from free people is seen as provocation, as weakness, and that is what provokes the aggressor to do more. So once again, yes, we go ahead with the loan, but that is a weakness that we have shown to to Moscow. And that is again incentive to, to uh, be more aggressive towards, uh, Ukraine in this on the 60 billion for defense. And here I use especially the word defense. Um, Mr. Dombrowski said that it will be available for Ukraine to purchase if Europe cannot provide and look for other suppliers defense. Why not offensive weapon systems? Yes, we call air defense, but we need to give the means for Ukraine to target the aggressor deep inside the enemy military targets that are using to actually launch the rockets and missiles to destroy the critical infrastructure in Ukraine. So I just learned in these days that France is apparently blocking Ukraine's attempts to buy Storm Shadow from UK. So what we are saying we don't have the means to provide these capabilities for Ukraine, but we will not allow for others who are ready to provide these means to do that. So I think something is morally wrong.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you for the updates. Obviously the EU US relationship is of strategic partnership, not just economically. It's much, much larger a partnership that we are having. And of course the overarching aim should should remain zero for zero tariffs. That should be overarching position from EU um point of view. And uh well until recently we, we were negotiating around a 10% baseline tariff. That is actually since what march. That is already we are paying. I think this comes with chairman also asks what is actually already the the impact of these tariffs. So now we are facing beyond 30% in a span of two weeks to be negotiated. Um, so I agree that the commission is right not to escalate for escalations sake. That's absolutely right. But what exactly is the Commission's strategy now? Wait for political agreement in principle with general tariffs and settle for marginal sector gains? Or are we preparing to accept an uneven outcome to avoid failure? And if that's the case, we really need to know. Our businesses need to know. The industry needs to know. Business cannot operate indefinitely in uncertainty.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for the outline of what to expect from the rearm and everything that follows in defence area in Europe. Uh, well, first of all, we have to be very clear that this proposal is about defence, rearmament, industrial capacity and strategic deterrence. What is not? It's not about social policy, nor climate targets, and certainly not about the blending defence with every other political ambition under the sun. If we confuse priorities, we weaken outcomes and we signal to our industry, our societies, our partners and our adversaries that we are still not serious. Rearmament is a strategic necessity and it must be treated as such. So now to in regards to the proposal, it has its obvious strengths. Defences formally added to the Strategic Technology for Europe platform. Dual use innovation and defence SMEs gain access to horizon and the European Innovation Council. That's also good military mobility. Funding is improved and member states can reallocate cohesion funds to defence. But it falls short in two areas. First, it was already mentioned there is no new money. It's all internal reshuffling and the signal is muted because the financial commitment is missing. Second, and this is a structural flaw, the proposal rewards those who have done the least. Yes, all member states can reallocate cohesion funds, but the real financial upside goes to those who delayed. They now access 100% of EU co-financing and generous pre-financing. Meanwhile, countries in Central and Eastern Europe who invested early in defence have less room to benefit. They been effectively being told well done, now step aside while others catch up with help. Well of course support. We support the file, yes, but we have to be honest. It is a technical fix, not a turning point. And this Parliament must stay focused on defence, not diluted with ideological distractions. So my question is to the Commission how you will avert that. Everything that is not related to defence will not be injected in the projects, be it rearm, be it Edip and etc. and etc. that we purely stay on track when its defense capabilities and nothing else. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Dear colleagues, four years of full scale war has left Ukraine facing a reconstruction bill of nearly €500 billion. This month marked Russia's most intense aerial campaign since the invasion began, with 75 civilians killed in one month. Every strike is data point in a depth that Russia will pay not as generosity or conscience, but as a legal obligation under international law. The matter of accountability is straightforward Russia broke it. Russia pays to rebuild every single brick. We must fully confiscate Russian sovereign assets to fund this reconstruction, rather than asking European taxpayers to subsidize the aftermath of Kremlin terror. Accountability also requires confronting the enablers within our own system. Certain officials within this union work very hard to have Russian oligarchs and their relatives to be removed from the sanction list. It is now time for for a full review. Which names were targeted for removal and whether they should be added to the list. Europeans must understand that deferred justice in Ukraine guarantees future aggression on our own borders, and we cannot trade accountability for fragile ceasefire. We must strip Moscow of its resources and ensure the architects of this war face a tribunal. Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “Yes. Thank you chair. And thank you, commissioners, for outlining the proposal on the global Europe. Overall. Of course, the overarching principles transparency, accountability, oversight, conditionality, which is good to hear. The simplification should be at the very core and we are ready as shadows together with the co-rapporteur to fine tune the Commission's proposal. It's good to hear that it's That's the next MFF. The Parliament's involvement will be more than in the previous. But with this, uh, the question, I know the co-chair Andrews, mentioned USAID, and this is also a reflection, uh, reaction to that, but we kind of forget to mention also One Belt, One Road. Uh, we kind of reflecting now on the USAID. But if we look at the US, they're not disappearing. They're choosing different ways to engage. They engage directly bilaterally without intermediaries with the governments. The question is, are we going to cut out intermediaries as well, which is, I think, necessary because out of 200 billion, let's say several hundred billion might be just consumed because there are intermediaries and maybe not very effective. So that is something should be reflected in this new program. Last but not least, the question on the flexibility. Uh, you mentioned this was going to be give the flexibility with the, uh, the ndic as well. We see the conditionality was there. Uh, but often it really existed only in the theory. Do do we expect that in the new, uh, term, there will be conditionality that is automatically switched if the partner countries breaching, let's say, EU sanctions or supporting, let's say, uh, Russia, Iran and etc., that is automatic. That is not something only left for the political decisions reflecting that we actually give these automatic, uh, tools in place. Uh, but overall, of course, the another area that is important that nobody reflected is actually the SMEs. How do we put the business in a global Europe, the European business as well? Thank you.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• “This gives a huge risk when it comes to democracy. Rule of law. Knowing the kangaroo courts in Russia that actually can have, um, whatever businesses from Europe being targeted and then, you know, different arrest warrants and whatnot issued. And then Indonesia is legally obliged to fulfill those extradition request by Russian Federation. Why? Just if I may chair to to mention that me, myself, I have an arrest warrant in Russia, uh, on my name. And there was a delegation visit from European Parliament to Indonesia. I was on that delegation at first, but between the flowers, I was recommended not to travel. So we somewhat are about to sign a trade agreement and deal when it comes to values as well. But we cannot secure that our legislators here from European Union can be protected from autocratic regimes. You know, fake arrest warrants. So this is a really an issue that should be raised for the Indonesian delegation as well during the negotiations, because that is of deep concern for the European citizens in general. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Yes. Apologies, chair. Uh, Mr. Madison, I will replace him in this. In this part. Uh, well, the ECR, we we do support the general approach on the report, but I would like to propose also the question, not just comments. And the question would be, is there any data on how many of the EU public procurements are awarded to the non EU suppliers? And the second one would be how big is the increase in the single bid competition. But on the first question I would like to slightly elaborate. If there is data on the volume of the awarded uh, public procurement to non EU suppliers, how many of those are for the past three years to the suppliers from Russia and Belarus especially? That would be very important to understand where we stand also for the internal market and whom we allow to participate from outside the EU in our procurements. Thank you.”
  "Buy European" provisions
• “Yes, thank you. Thank you, it happens time to time. Thank you Commissioner for being with us today. I will start with a quick question on the recent energy understanding with the United States. So currently intercomities assessing tariffs and reviewing the broader trade package with the new US administration in this large scale energy purchase plan which was announced by Fonda Lee and handshake with President Trump, euros six hundred billion worth of LNG. Is there already a structured commitment to deliver on this or is it still just a political handshake and will remain as such a political stunt and nothing else following or there is a concrete plans for EU to implement actually this political deal as well? On the energy phase out of the Russian energy altogether, we as you mentioned this evening we'll embark on the trialog for the gas but could you please elaborate where Commission stands on the remaining issues when it comes to oil, petrochemicals and nuclear fuels as well? Is there already concrete legislative draft ready and can Parliament expect submitting this draft to the Parliament for scrutiny? Could you please elaborate on the timeframe? And last but not least on the energy infrastructure altogether, what is the capacity for the EU to laying out let's say the new generation electricity cables? Do we have the capacity in the light of shortages on the metals and etcetera? How the Commission is addressing that issue? Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Good evening, dear colleagues. The EU attracted just 6% of global investment in AI startups in early 2024 6%. While our competitors build the infrastructure of the next trade era, we are still drafting frameworks if deployed, right? Ai is a structural equalizer. A family manufacturer can gain the same edge as a massive multinational using AI to navigate red tape and complex supply chains. But if we create compliance regimes so dense that only corporate legal teams can survive them, we actively legislate against our own SMEs. But AI also has a hard edge. We face hostile actors who relentlessly probe our borders. We cannot expect human inspectors to stop sanctions evasion or catch the flood of counterfeit goods by hand. We need AI powered customs to act as sovereign critical infrastructure, flagging fraud and intercepting circumvention in real time. And data must flow with trusted Democratic partners. Because if data cannot move, our experts cannot grow. Open strategic autonomy cannot become protectionism with better branding. We need resilient supply chains with allies who share our values and our rules. Ecr supports this report because it chooses pragmatic opportunity over fear. The WTO is where these goals are. Global rules must be shaped with Europe at the table leading, we should remain vigilant against overregulation. Europe doesn't need to regulate AI into a cage. We need to deploy into a shield. Thank you.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “Dear colleagues, the US tariffs are harsh, but they remind us how critical it is to deepen, not weaken, our transatlantic bond. In a world of fast moving competition, while we debate others, especially authoritarian regimes are moving fast to dominate emerging technologies and critical raw materials. This is a time to align. We need permanent EU trade representation, not just in Washington, but in the wider US to identify, negotiate and remove the barriers that still hold back the transatlantic trade. But we must do so without compromising on our standards, food safety, security, etc.. Targeted coordination on critical sectors and technologies is what we should be locking in on. That includes improving customs processing, elimination of red tape and other measures that slow innovation on both sides of the Atlantic. And while rarely quote Elon Musk, I agree with him on this. Europe and the US should aim for a zero tariff zone, so a stronger, freer trade relationship rooted in trust and common ground is in both of our interests. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you. Chair. Dear colleagues, I guess there is a confusion. We are not talking about the EU, US trade agreement. We are talking about deal political deal. So there is a long way ahead to actually reach the trade deal. So but trade in general is good and freer trade is even better. So this principle really has underpinned decades of Eu-us cooperation. And while this new arrangement is imperfect, a deal even a political one is better than no deal. But we need to be serious. Tariffs are back and they are not balanced 15% of the most EU goods. While US exports enjoy broad exemptions, that is not a sustainable model for the world's two largest democratic economies. We welcome the political will to avoid escalation, but political will must now be followed by structural transparency and enforcement. Our businesses are still operating in the grey zone. Legal ambiguity, regulatory inconsistency. That's not how the strengthened transatlantic supply chains, especially not in a global environment where authoritarian regimes are aggressively consolidating influence. So there are three things must be pushed for. First, a formal review mechanism with a fixed deadline. Second, a clear legal framework that gives EU exporters predictability. And third, but not last on a roadmap ambitious but realistic towards a barrier free transatlantic trade area. That's what will keep the EU, US partnership competitive, resilient and strategic. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “And here's the real risk. If we don't scale up the own production fast, we'll end up importing hydrogen from abroad, including from countries like Saudi Arabia. That would simply swap one energy dependency for another. With all the same strategic vulnerabilities. And I just wanted to really show how exactly ready we are in Europe when it comes to infrastructure. For example, this house, we have the, uh, our car park, uh, among which our hydrogen run cars. And you know, where they fill up their tanks with hydrogen. They have to travel to the airport. That's the only closest tank where they fill up the hydrogen. And that's insane. So our own market is really not ready. The infrastructure is not there. And signing, of course, is good. The partnership B de Chile as well that we talked about in investing, building new um capacities. But if we don't have our own market established and the market is awaiting, but we are burdening already with regulation, the red tape is already there for the market to thrive as well. Um, so we need a policy that enables us to not strangle European hydrogen. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. Um, I will not make a comments. I really are genuinely interested in finding the the answers to questions. And the question would be what? You already reflected on avoiding any discriminatory, uh, regulations in terms of available funds. But then again, the question on the EU budget allocation funds. Um. Are there plans, actually, when it comes to burden sharing? And the big issue within the EU is that when it comes to defence procurement, we have such a chaotic environment. Will be there any plans on conditionality to actually move towards grants at some point for member states? Um, like on conditionality, let's say no less than three member states have a joint procurement, then they are eligible to go for the grant, uh, financing. Is there such a thinking in the Commission as well, or just purely is going to go down with the loans and then again, increasing the external debt for the member States? Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. Um, I want to go straight to the point with the Western Balkans. I understand that there is an exchange of views right now for for today. Obviously, enlargement in Western Balkans is very much connected with overall enlargement as well. We have heard from many member states as well. And you yourself, just today you mentioned that. What are we going to see in coming months? We. Well, the speed up that we haven't witnessed for the past ten years. Well, from our point of view, the biggest struggle when it comes to Western Balkans is the full compliance with the European Union CFSP and CSDp policy. It cannot be cherry picked by the aspirant countries that you know we are going to comply. 70%, 80% has to be 100% compliance with the CFSP and CSDp policy. This said how you envision the Western Balkans and I will not mention which can actually deliver on that, be it when it comes to sanction enforcement and and when it comes to security and defence, Not to have a joint military drills with aggressor country. And that said, there is also the fourth common policy that is at stake, which is the trade policy, and also with the trade policy. How aligned are actually the Western Balkan countries with the EU's trade policy as well? Thank you.”
  EU relations with Western Balkans
• “Yes thank you chair. Well the ECR group as well. We fully support the simplification of the Cbam. And of course the the goal has to be very clear, reduce the administrative burden and provide business with the time and space they need to adopt effectively. So of course we understand the cbam. The full review, maybe sometime in the future. But at this point, cutting the red tape in this area as well is very essential. And in this context, we are recommending the raising the, the, the, the de minimis threshold to 100 tonnes per year. We have also submitted the amendment as well in my person and of course to just to clearly to show this adjustment would still cover 98.81% of emissions compared to 99.27% under the Commission's current proposal of 50 tonnes. But this marginal difference in coverage does not justify the added bureaucracy for smaller operators. And this is particularly for the SMEs. We put too much of the burden and this slight adjustment can really ease up the all the paperwork and bureaucracy that is involved. And we do not stand alone on this. Um, many shadow rapporteurs as well have echoed this. Yes, there are different numbers as well that other groups have submitted, but I think this is very rational to increase from 50 to 100 tons. And the difference in the emissions is not huge margin, but it's huge when it comes to smaller operators. On the, um, getting rid of the the burden that is put from bureaucracy on the, on the paper. So with this, um, please, I welcome when it's going to be voting to support the amendment. Uh, but for the commission I have the question and in particular in which sector is covered by the Cbam. Are really most import dependent and which sectors are the least. This is really essential to assess the impact accurately before we vote. Overall thank you.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Dear colleagues, Moscow likes to present itself as a great anti-colonial champion of the Global South. Yet today it sends recruiters to Nairobi, Havana, Kathmandu with a fake job offers and visa promises, dragging the global South's most vulnerable into colonial war of conquest against Ukraine. This war is a war of aggression, the most serious crime in international law waged to subjugate a sovereign nation and seize its land by force. That is not anti-colonialism. It is textbook imperialism. To sustain this war, Russia runs what is effectively a state backed human trafficking pipeline. Over 18,000 foreign nationals from more than 120 countries have been recruited through deception passports, confiscated a few weeks of training, then straight to the front line. Many come from Africa and Central and South Asia. Thousands of Cubans are fighting for Russia today, while the EU still maintains privileged cooperation with Havana. We cannot claim to defend European security while sending European taxpayer money to a government that actively sells its citizens to fuel Russian imperialism. Turning a blind eye to this reality makes us complicit. Condemnation is not enough. We must sanction the networks and confront the regime's enabling them. Thank you.”
  EU-Cuba relations
• “Thank you, Madam Chair and Commissioner. Well Commission speaks on enabling up to 800 billion in defense investment. And you stressed as well through Draghi report the the task to avoid fragmentation. The well the current version of the defense omnibus looks heavy on simplification which is good but light on enforcement. This said I have set of questions. The first one would be what concrete mechanism does the Commission propose to incentivize or compel member states to engage in joint procurement? Second, can you clarify how the Commission will ensure these efforts move beyond voluntary cooperation to real pan European procurement? Scale up? And will there be conditionality tied to the EU funding or access to the instruments, like the European Defense Fund? And last but not least, um, on national contact points you mentioned, how will the Commission ensure that they are not just procedural checkboxes, but platforms that help aid member states to accelerate industrial output and secure their defense needs. And last point on space and satellites the issue. The EU lacks any command center whatsoever. So we're going to create a lot of rules and traffic rules and whatnot. But we lack a command center. All the data we are purchasing from our partners who are using our satellites. And this is kind of a very odd situation. Thank you.”
  EU competences on defence · EU competences on space policy
• “Great. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. And dear colleagues, first of all, let me start by thanking the A team of the European Parliament, the shadow rapporteurs and teams working at the technical level and of course, our excellent secretariat, all of whom did a truly outstanding work in what has been a complex and fast moving file. Um, really their professionalism and constructive approach to work together with the cooperation with the Danish Presidency and the European Commission, made it possible to reach the result that I am about to report here today in the committee. So last Wednesday night, we reached a provisional political agreement on the Defence Mini Omnibus Regulation, a package that amends several EU programmes to implement the Rearm Europe Plan, redirecting union funding and innovation tools towards defence related dual use and strategic technologies. Through this Regulation, we adopt key programs Horizon Europe, the European Defence Fund, the Digital Europe Programme, the Step platform and the Connecting Europe facility so that they can also support defence related and dual use projects and strengthen the European defence, technological and industrial base. As a rapporteur, I'm pleased to inform you that the outcome delivers on Parliament's priorities. It strengthens Europe's ability to invest in its own security, opens opportunities for innovators and industry, and lays the groundwork for a more resilient European defence base.”
  Defence spending
• “Dear colleagues, the ECR Group stands for strong transatlantic ties and maximum free trade with our closest ally, the United States. Yet what do we see? Endless reports from the commission. But too little real diplomacy apart from Commissioner Sefcovic. Leadership has been passive. Where is the president of the Commission? The Council or this House? Some say the doors are closed. Well, look for the windows. Words won't resolve the tariff. War presence will. So if you want results, go to Washington. Stand firm with and support Sefcovic. Trade tensions are nothing new. We have weathered them before by negotiating hard and standing united when it matters the most. Our standards and values are not for sale. But that does not shut down the doors for the talks. Our principles must be the starting point for the true zero tariff zone that makes both sides wealthier and stronger. Anything less costs our workers and businesses dearly. We must stop sending the wrong signals when talks get tough. Turning to China, a systematic rival is not an option. We stand with our democratic ally across the Atlantic. Some here hide their push for division and protectionism behind strategic autonomy. In reality, barriers hurt our own workers and businesses. First, this extension to August 1st must not be wasted. We need to match words with real political action and secure an agreement that protects Europe's jobs and competitiveness. The alternative is economic self-harm. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Yes. Thank you. Chair. Apologies for being slightly late after it took the toll. Oh no no no no on on on the decisions. But nevertheless, uh, well, just just listening on the commission of of course, there's a lot of wishful thinking. Uh, that is my, my assessment that I was hearing, and it's been several months already, and we don't see a concrete progress. Um, just bits and pieces of information coming out, uh, with this, of course. Uh, as we heard, the the aim is really at some point to move 0 to 0, um, to reach that will be the, I think, the best outcome, um, moving towards, you know, uh, free trade zone between, uh, transatlantic community. But reality is pretty harsh in this 0 to 0 principle. If this is applied, what is from the US side, other pressure points when it comes to EU regulation and standards. This being echoed very, very straightforward from the Washington DC. The dissatisfaction with our regulations and whatnot. So what is still, uh, the US uh, colleagues, um, stressing and saying that this is a stumbling block for any, uh, push forward for, for negotiations. And the second one is actually the China factor.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “I would like to, uh, the commission to elaborate because we heard that, um, and after, uh, Commissioner Sefcovic visited us, stopped by for two days in Europe, then traveled to China, and then we heard the announcement that EU and China will create this regular format of engagement on assessing the impact of tariffs. So what is the how many times does has EU engaged with China on this issue, and how is this interpreted in US, this kind of engagement with China when we understand different policy from the from the US. And last but not least, and I thank Mr. Chair, that will be wise. So 9th of July is the deadline that we actually put the debates at the upcoming plenary. Eu, US trade relations to have an open discussion debate so that our friends in the US also hear the true position of EU because we are ready to engage. We don't want to have a the war on tariffs, and maybe that will give more push for the Commission to to say that it has also the European Parliament backing. That is constructive. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Yes. Thank you. Thank you. Chair. And thanks to commission as well, the ECR. We do welcome the proposal to extend the scope of the Cbam for certain, um, steel and aluminium that are obviously intensive downstream products as well. They identify the closing the existing loopholes, but also introducing temporary support scheme for affected industries. At the same time, it should be noted that Cbam and as it was mentioned by the Commission representative as well, has been entering into force only gradually, and this is already the second occasion on which adjustments to its scope and functioning are being proposed. Um, of course, it is positive to recognise that the Commission listens to the industry feedback and is willing to correct shortcomings. This is also raises a question of whether the mechanism may have been introduced prematurely. And this leads me to the broader concern. Can commission assure us that in years time we will not once again be discussing further extension of cbam to additional products. Um, in other words, is the Commission confident that the current proposal provides a stable and predictable framework for European industry, rather than the beginning of the continuous adjustment and expansion of carbon scope that has been now experiencing? Thank you.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Thank you. Chair. Um, well, it's good to have after the EU, US talk now EU, China and in this regard several points I wanted to to make the course of action and the predatory investment that China practices. Um, right now the, the, the telephone conversation and this term of promising monitoring what exactly we expect that China is going to monitor or we're dumping too much of our goods and we're going to stop. Uh, sorry. China is a regime. It's not a democracy. It's a Communist Party run state. Uh, liberal market is fiction that is somewhat very strictly controlled, state controlled, and in this regard, that poses a huge risk. Why? I'm raising this. Um, we talk that we now have to enhance and build up on the partnerships through free trade agreements that are already existing for the EU. But if we look at the free trade agreements with Japan, with Korea, with Latin America, the number one trading partner is China and China. And now with the US increasing tariffs. And we heard already today remarks on the retaliatory tariffs uh posed by us. So they're going to grow up to 104%. Uh, and it's not stopping there. China said till the end. Uh, they have since it's a regime they can withhold also, you know, big pains, big thresholds. Um, whereas for the EU, the thresholds I don't think are that big. And this said, uh, how we envision that even Japan and Korea will not be tempted and actually, uh, going into partnerships with China, because if you could elaborate, there were at least, uh, remarks made by the Chinese officials that they are in a close communication with Japan and Korea. How to retaliate on US tariffs. So this is somewhat way bigger than we are exposing right now. And what are the safeguards not to lose our principles. Thank you..”
  EU-China relations
• “I propose that Member States be allowed to voluntarily relocate unspent recovery and resilience facility resources towards defense industrial capacity, including the European Defense Industrial Program. This offers flexibility without breaching fiscal rules, and it enables the industrial scale up required to meet our needs. On a Connecting Europe facility. I introduced clarifications to expand eligible infrastructures to include dual use energy infrastructure such as protected fuel storage pipelines and energy grid upgrades. Second, the counter mobility and territorial defense infrastructure obstacles, fortifications and rapid deployment systems to defend external borders and, for example, our critical infrastructure. These updates reflect the real operational needs, particularly along the eastern flank. Commissioner Cumulus has estimated the cost of preparing our transport and energy network for military use at the minimum of €70 billion, and this proposal is a step towards meeting that target and pre-financing in the Connecting Europe facility to accelerate the project deployment under military mobility and dual use infrastructure. I propose increasing the Pre-financing rate from 30% to 40% for Member States, transferring cohesion funds and CFE projects. And Madam Chair, if you allow me really this is important because that wasn't reflected in the Commission's proposal. The financial vetting and transparency. So now let me emphasize a core principle. Security begins with with transparency.”
  Defence spending
• “So we cannot afford to direct the EU funds to entities with opaque ownership, unverified control structures or links to hostile foreign powers. That is why I propose the introduction of mandatory disclosure of beneficial ownership in accordance with the EU anti money laundering definitions for participants in these programmes. All funding flows, including those under indirect or externally managed arrangements, would be subject to anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing. Screening. Additionally, a dedicated Defence Transparency Register would be established, making a registration a condition for both accessing and retaining union funding. From programme to programme there are various safeguards in place, but no overarching rule that would address the need created by the inclusion of defence, a sensitive sector. This is not a red tape. It is a necessary safeguard when the public money is deployed in a sensitive sectors. And dear colleagues. This is a lean, targeted and necessary package. It does not create new bureaucracy. It uses what we have but better and it ensures that union funding is secure, operationally relevant and strategically aligned with our core interests. The time is very short for these amendments regulations to be improved, and I hope for a shared understanding of the necessity of this file to move forward swiftly. And I hope to see the reflected in your amendments as well. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your patience and allowing me to.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “35:56 – 17:39:59): Yes, thank you very much. Well, big shout out to Doctor Stuart. It's a really essential study and not only the in-depth analysis of the shortfalls, caveats in our regulations but also the very concrete recommendations. And I do hope that this study will not just end up here in the European Parliament but it will pass also to the European Commission and if possible also to the member states. But I will start with, I think, a very uncomfortable truth. The problem is not that Europe lacks rules. The problem is that Europe has built a system it cannot properly see or control. That is the biggest issue and this study makes that very clear. For listed dual use items, dual use export controls regulation works. The failure begins where modern wars operate with non listed goods, weak data and fragmented national practice. Russian missiles get their European electronics. We express outrage every time European components are found in weapons hitting Ukraine or elsewhere but many of these components are perfectly legal exports: common microelectronics, sensors, machine tools, and etcetera. So not exotic, not listed but essential to the warfare.”
  Arms export from the EU
• “Thank you chair. Well we as ECR, we really support the development of the green hydrogen in Europe. But setting targets without the infrastructure in place is just really a wishful thinking. First, build the market and then regulate because, well, it seems a lot of initiatives. But then again it, it seems we are building a house starting with the roof, not with the fundaments. And that is what is our internal market and capacities. And what is the regulation and the delegated act on the low carbon hydrogen is really crucial tool for the renewable hydrogen industry. Yet the Commission is really pushing for criteria that are overly strict and out of touch with the current state of development. And the European Court of Auditors has criticized this, calling out the legal complexity and delays that are stalling investment and overreliance on the third country partners, even though the true FTAs and so on. If we don't have a robust market internal market, this is a challenge. And the renewable hydrogen definition is really itself already a burden by red tape. The Low Carbon Act isn't even out yet. That's another factor. Meanwhile, the sector stands still is waiting here in Europe.”
  Low-carbon hydrogen
• “Dear colleagues, in two weeks, the EU lands in Beijing to mark 50 years of relations with China. It looks like celebration in truth, is a stress test. The trade still tops €739 billion, yet our deficit is 292 billion and exports are falling. State subsidised overcapacity floods our market while China stays selectively closed. As commissioner fights in Washington to shield European jobs from blanket US tariffs, Beijing slaps duties on medical devices and cognac rare earth licenses and declares it cannot accept a Russian defeat in Ukraine. Three. The summit is business as usual, and we tell Washington and Moscow that Europe swaps security for cheap batteries. After five decades, China is still no responsible partner. We need thorough de-risking, tightening investment, screening and rebuild critical supply chains with trusted allies and enforce WTO rules wherever Beijing undercuts fair competition for European workers. Business and innovation. Speak with one transatlantic, not transactional, voice. Autonomy built on dependency is not autonomy at all. Thank you.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market · EU-China relations