Petra STEGER

Policy topics Petra STEGER is active on

What Petra STEGER has said (44)

• 2026-03-16 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question The EU remains committed to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression. The Commission has also actively supported EU Member States to effectively address ongoing energy disruptions in the Middle East and on the Druzhba oil pipeline following Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure and it continues to engage closely to ensure security of supply. At the Gas [1] and Oil Coordination Group [2] meetings of 26 and 27 March 2026, EU Member States, including Hungary and Slovakia, reported that there are no immediate risks to the security of their oil and gas supplies. Hungary and Slovakia also indicated that alternative crude oil supplies via Croatia and partial release of strategic stocks have prevented immediate shortages. In a joint letter of 16 March 2026, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission offered Ukraine technical and financial support to repair the Druzhba pipeline, which Ukraine has accepted. Discussions on implementation are ongoing. The Commission will continue close engagement with the concerned countries to ensure energy security in the region. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/gas-coordination-group-confirms-readiness-prepare-upcoming-winter-season-2026-03-26_en. [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-and-eu-countries-discuss-latest-developments-concerning-energy-security-2026-03-27_en.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-03-07 “E-000947/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission published on 31 March 2026 a report 1 on the overall amount of costs incurred for the fulfilment of the tasks under Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 in 2025, in accordance with Article 43(7) of that Regulation. This mandatory annual report covers the entirety of the expenditure, beyond the Commission’s supervisory tasks covered by the supervisory fee pursuant to Article 43(2) DSA 3 . The information requested by the Honourable Members on the number of recruited staff and resulting personnel costs is included in this report in paragraphs 9 and 10. The information on the total personnel costs for the fulfilment of the supervisory tasks under the DSA is publicly available in the staff working document published by the Commission on 27 June 2025 4 . The overall number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) necessary for the fulfilment of the tasks referred to in Article 43(2) DSA is estimated for the year 2026 at 270 FTEs. This figure includes existing staff and further appointments. The associated cost is estimated at EUR 34.82 million. The number of staff working on DSA implementation is set by the authorised staffing levels agreed in the standard budgetary procedure and can evolve subject to budgetary availabilities and anticipated needs, estimated on annual basis, for instance in the case of new designated services. The DSA clarifies that the Commission should be in possession of all the necessary resources, in terms of staffing, expertise and financial means, for the performance of its tasks under the Regulation. 5 None of those tasks involve the moderation of content. 6 The resources allocated to the DSA implementation are annually estimated and subject to the scrutiny of the European Parliament and Council via the above mentioned annual report. 1 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the overall annual costs incurred for the fulfilment of the Commission’s tasks pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 in the period from 1 January 2025 until 31 December 2025 and the total amount of the annual supervisory fees charged pursuant to Article 6(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/1127 in 2025: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2026:147:FIN. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act): https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 3 Article 43(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 4 SWD(2025) 175: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/overview-elements-accounted-estimationamount-external-assigned-revenues-stemming-0. 5 Recital 101 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 6 That is a matter for specific laws and the courts to determine, same as for offline content. The DSA does not determine which content is illegal and the Commission does not have the power to order providers of intermediary services to remove specific content from their services.”
  Digitalization of public governance & administration
• 2026-02-25 “E-000788/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Entry/Exit System (EES) is one of the most modern border management systems in the world contributing to the security of the EU and its citizens. The Commission is aware of media reports on challenges in scaling up biometric registrations under the EES, including alleged delays. While some Member States faced isolated delays, the vast majority of Member States successfully registered border crossings respecting the required thresholds and without significant disruptions or queues attributable to the EES. The Commission diligently monitors the progressive roll out of the EES through daily statistics, close coordination with Member States encountering technical difficulties, targeted support and exchange of best practices on possible solutions. Moreover, the Regulation (EU) 2025/1534 1 provides solutions, such as the full or partial suspension, to address exceptional circumstances, for example extended processing times or technical issues. The Commission is liaising with the sea, air, land and rail carriers, urging Member States to collaborate in ensuring seamless travel for passengers. The legal framework governing the EES requires Member States to submit monthly reports detailing their adherence to rollout plans and identifying deviations or corrective measures. These reports are submitted to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, and the EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems (eu-LISA) 2 . Consequently, the European Parliament receives regular, transparent updates on the operational status of the EES in each Member State, including implementation difficulties encountered during the phased introduction. For precise figures on the number of Member States reporting issues, the Honourable Members may refer to these reports. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1534/oj/eng. 2 Article 3(3), Regulation (EU) 2025/1534 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2025 on temporary derogations from certain provisions of Regulations (EU) 2017/2226 and (EU) 2016/399 as regards the progressive start of operations of the Entry/Exit System.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-02-10 “E-000547/2026 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The stepwise ban of Russian gas imports introduced by Regulation (EU) 2026/261 1 pursues a different purpose than Union restrictive measures (‘sanctions’). Regulation (EU) 2026/261 is a trade and energy policy measure, meant to eliminate essential security risks for the Union resulting from trade dependencies with Russia, and to establish a monitoring and reporting framework to enhance the security of gas supply. The appropriate legal bases for such measure are Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (trade policy) and 194 of the TFEU (energy policy). This purpose is markedly different from the purpose of foreign policy measures, such as sanctions under Article 215 of the TFEU, which are, in the case of Regulation 833/2014 2 , to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and to put pressure to stop the aggression. The Commission, Parliament and Member States have designed Regulation (EU) 2026/261 in a manner that fully respects national sovereignty, enhances economic security in all Member States and avoids any hardship for individual countries. It is fully in line with EU law and obligations under international law. The Commission has been working intensively with Hungary and Slovakia to prepare the phase out of gas trade with Russia, in order to guarantee that the transition to more reliable suppliers can happen without any risks for supply security in both countries. Removing remaining dependencies on Russia will ultimately increase security of supply for all European countries. The Commission will continue its work with both Member States to facilitate the implementation of the Regulation. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/261/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/2026-01-16.”
  Natural gas · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2026-01-26 “E-000289/2026 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges that national security is the sole responsibility of Member States. It also notes that Article 42(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1 foresees that the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy will lead to a common defence, when the European Council so decides unanimously and when all Member States adopt such a decision in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The Commission also acknowledges that under Article 42(2) TEU the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy is not to prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. The Article 23j B-VG of the Austrian Constitution governs its interaction with the provisions on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy in the TEU. Finally, on democratic legitimacy, the Commission emphasises that the Treaties provide for decision-making processes that ensure the participation of Member States and their democratic institutions, including unanimity in the European Council for decisions related to common defence. The Commission remains committed to upholding the above-mentioned principles and ensuring that any future initiatives reflect the collective will of Member States and their citizens. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_42/oj/eng/.”
  EU competences on defence · Relations with NATO
• 2025-09-24 “E-003703/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been closely cooperating with the authorities of Hungary and Slovakia to monitor oil supply disruptions affecting the Druzhba pipeline during summer 2025. According to the information received, these disruptions have not impacted the countries’ security of supply, and no emergency oil stocks have been released. The recent disruptions highlight the strategic importance of diversifying energy supplies. Hungary and Slovakia can further reduce their reliance on Russian oil by increasing the use of the Adria pipeline through Croatia. The Commission strongly supports these diversification efforts and stands ready to help facilitate the necessary arrangements with relevant partners. Russia is escalating its war of aggression in Ukraine. Over more than three years of full-scale invasion, Russia has launched hundreds of massive attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. It is for Ukraine, as a sovereign state, to decide how to defend itself against Russia’s attacks. The EU fully respects Ukraine’s right to self-defence against Russia’s aggression in accordance with international law. The EU and its Member States remain committed to provide Ukraine and its people with all the necessary political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2025-09-20 “E-003643/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Joint Statement on an EU-United States (US) framework on an agreement on reciprocal, fair and balanced trade covers a broad set of commitments and cooperative actions, including in the digital domain. The Joint Statement 1 commits the parties to address unjustified digital trade barriers. The EU also confirms there will be no adoption of network usage fees, and both the EU and the US express a joint commitment not to impose customs duties on electronic transmissions and to seek a permanent moratorium at the World Trade Organisation on customs duties on electronic transmissions. The EU and the US will now engage in work to implement the various aspects of the Joint Statement. In this context, the Commission has repeatedly affirmed, including the President of the Commission in the 2025 State of the Union address, that EU digital regulations are a sovereign matter and not an issue for trade negotiations. EU digital laws and regulations, including the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, are enforced fairly, without discrimination, and are subject to independent judicial scrutiny. There is no basis for the suggestion that the outcome on goods tariffs in the EU-US negotiations that resulted in the Joint Statement depended on an exchange of views on the EU’s digital rules and regulations. There have been no discussions on any kind of joint committee that would give US tech companies a role in applying market rules. 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreementreciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en.”
  EU-US trade relations · International data transfers
• 2025-09-06 “E-003464/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not familiar with the individual case dealt by the Regional Court of Vienna referred to in the question. The rules relating to arbitration, including the enforcement of arbitral awards, are not harmonised at EU level. The Brussels Ia Regulation that deals with the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 1 explicitly excludes arbitration from its scope. As a result, arbitration is governed by national laws and, where applicable, international treaties, such as the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958. According to the Treaties, the national courts have the responsibility to ensure the correct application of EU law. This obligation includes, inter alia, the respect for EU’s fundamental rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental rights of the EU 2 , which is addressed to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. 1 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast). 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.”
  Jurisdiction conflicts between EU and national courts · EU policy on Islam
• 2025-09-04 “E-003423/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The advanced safety systems, mandated by the General Vehicle Safety Regulation (GSR) 1 (not the General Product Safety Regulation (GPSR) 2 referred to in the parliamentary question) in all newly produced vehicles from 7 July 2024, were selected on the base of an in-depth cost-effectiveness analysis of the benefit and feasibility of a range of new technologies 3 . The Commission shall assess the effectiveness of these systems by 7 July 2027 and, if appropriate, propose legislative amendments. The purpose of the safety systems is to support the drivers in performing their driving task and not to replace them. Drivers always remain in full control of the vehicles. Moreover, they have the possibility to switch off the systems in case the input provided is not correct. The event data recorder (EDR) stores crucial vehicle data over a short timeframe during and after a triggering event (e.g. an airbag deployment). It records only crash-related parameters, and the recorded data is anonymised in line with the General Data Protection Regulation 4 . The initial costs for the full set of GPSR measures per vehicle were estimated to range from EUR 516 (car) to EUR 1.013 (truck) 5 . The ever-increasing production costs and consumer prices of vehicles since mid-2021 are markedly a spill-over effect of other factors such as supply chain disruptions (e.g. chips), high energy costs, the war in Ukraine and an upmarket trend rather than the mandatory application of the GSR measures. 1 Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on typeapproval requirements for motor vehicles and their trailers, and systems, components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, as regards their general safety and the protection of vehicle occupants and vulnerable road users (OJ L 325, 16.12.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/2144/oj). 2 Regulation (EU) 2023/988 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on general product safety (OJ L 135, 23.5.2023, p.1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/988/oj). 3 In depth cost-effectiveness analysis of the identified measures and features regarding the way forward for EU vehicle safety - Publications Office of the EU - https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/77990533-9144-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1. 4 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1 - https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=OJ:L:2016:119:TOC). 5 https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2769/497485.”
  Driving licences
• 2025-08-29 “E-003335/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) framework allows for the deployment of up to 5 000 troops, consisting of modified EU Battlegroups on stand-by, as well as of Member States’ additional forces and capabilities, including land, air, maritime, space and cyber components. The Military Planning and Conduct Capability is the preferred EU command and control structure for the EU RDC. Regular live exercises involving EU Battlegroups and Member States’ additional forces play a vital role in enhancing preparedness, improving interoperability, and testing the capacity under realistic scenarios. The EU has so far held live exercises in Spain, Germany and Hungary 1 . The deployment of the EU RDC, as is the case for all EU military missions and operations, requires a unanimous decision of Member States. Any possible future modifications of the RDC are also subject to a unanimous decision by Member States. The EU RDC can be deployed in a swift and flexible manner, enabling the EU to respond to various crises outside its borders. The EU RDC is designed for carrying out/contributing to a variety of missions, such as: stabilisation; rescue and evacuation; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; peace enforcement; conflict prevention and capacity building. Austria participates in the RDC along with other Member States, including by taking part in the military live exercises, and contributing to the EU Battlegroups. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/milex-25_en.”
  EU competences on defence · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2025-08-24 “E-003277/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission On 8 July 2025, a European delegation visited Libya to meet with key actors in Tripoli and Benghazi. The mission took place in a Team Europe approach, along with the Ministers responsible for migration of Greece, Italy and Malta. In Tripoli, the European delegation held fruitful discussions with the internationally recognised Government of National Unity including the Prime Minister. The meetings in Benghazi could not take place. The EU has an interest to cooperate with all key actors in Libya, in a Team Europe approach, to be able to insist on strengthening border management and fight against migrant smuggling, managing work visas issued by Libya and onward movements to the EU, ensuring protection for migrants in Libya and voluntary returns from Libya to countries of origin. The EU remains committed to a lasting political solution and call on all actors to support the United Nations-facilitated and Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process as the only option towards sustainable stability in Libya.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2025-08-06 “E-003186/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission On 2 July 2025, a Chinese frigate (which had been previously observed sailing in the same area of operation), has targeted a German aircraft taking part in Operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES 1 and performing a routine reconnaissance flight over the Gulf of Aden with a laser. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES is an EU maritime operation contributing to ensure freedom of navigation and the protection of commercial ships in the Red Sea. The German aircraft (type Beechcraft 350) is a multi-sensor platform used for reconnaissance mission and has been operating since October 2024 in EUNAVFOR ASPIDES. The Chinese frigate took this hostile action without prior communication. The laser damaged the camera of the plane. The mission flight was aborted as a precaution and the aircraft landed safely at a base in Djibouti. The European External Action Service (EEAS) summoned the Ambassador of China to the EU in order to request clarifications. The EEAS noted that the EU expects China to understand the gravity of the event and prevent any similar event to occur again. The EEAS stressed that as the aircraft concerned was deployed within EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, the event was a direct concern to the EU as a whole. Decisions relating to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, including its missions and operations, are taken by the Council of the EU by unanimity – including Austria. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eunavfor-operation-aspides_en.”
  EU competences on defence · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2025-07-16 “E-002925/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Security in Europe and security in the Indo Pacific are interconnected. Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine is a blatant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. China continues to be an enabler for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; without its support, Russia would be unable to continue waging the war to the same extent. The EU made a clear call for China to live up to its responsibility at the EU-China Summit on 24 July 2025 1 . Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has challenged the European security architecture, with an impact on public opinion. According to the results of the European Parliament’s Winter Eurobarometer survey 2 , there is broad acceptance among the public for EU efforts in security and defence and large majorities of European citizens are looking for an EU that protects them against global crises and security risks. Moreover, in light of the results of the Spring Standard Eurobarometer 103 3 , 77% of European respondents agree that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is a threat to the security of the EU. Under Articles 42–46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is developed by the Council acting unanimously, with all Member States involvement. Cooperation between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is guided by Article 42(2) TEU, successive Joint Declarations (2016, 2018, 2023), and European Council conclusions, which consistently underline that such cooperation takes place ‘in full respect of the security and defence policy of all Member States’. Austria’s constitutional neutrality and national foreign policy is fully compatible with its EU membership and engagement in CSDP. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/24/25th-eu-china-summit-eu-press-release/. 2 https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3492. 3 https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3372.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Relations with NATO
• 2025-07-10 “P-002815/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 and Digital Markets Act (DMA) 2 are key pieces of EU legislation adopted through sovereign and democratic processes, to protect European citizens, to foster competition and strengthen innovation in the EU – in line with democratic values. The DSA sets out rules to ensure that fundamental rights are protected online, and any censorship claims are misguided and misleading. The DSA does not regulate content nor individual content moderation decisions. Rather, the DSA establishes balanced due diligence obligations for providers of intermediary services, defining the responsibilities of these providers and laying down mechanisms to empower users, compatible with the freedom of expression and of information. All decisions taken by the Commission under the DSA and the DMA can be challenged in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Commission is bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 3 to respect the rights, freedoms and principles, including that of freedom of expression and information. The DSA and DMA are not trade related instruments. Therefore, nothing in the supervisory and enforcement role of the Commission under the DSA or DMA or in the substantive rules laid down in these two Regulations is part of the on-going trade negotiations with the United States. 1 OJ L 277 (2022), pp. 1-102 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 OJ L 265 (2022), pp. 1-66 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj/eng. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.”
  US-EU tech coordination · Disinformation & online freedoms · EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-06-30 “E-002623/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is aware of the statements made by the President of Ukraine regarding possible Russian actions beyond Ukraine. While the EU does not comment on intelligence matters, it takes security related information from Ukraine – a country resisting Russia’s illegal war of aggression – seriously. Assessments on military threats and related intelligence fall primarily within the remit of Member States. At the same time, it is important to recall that since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has ramped up sabotage operations across Europe, aiming to destabilise the security situation in Member States and third countries. The EU continues to monitor developments closely and adopt measures on Russia’s hybrid activities in the EU 1 . Under the EU’s competence in security and defence policy (Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty on European Union) 2 , the EU has intensified cooperation with Ukraine in many areas. In particular, EU military assistance for Ukraine aims to strengthen the capabilities and resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces and to protect the civilian population from Russia's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression 3 . The EU is committed to continue providing enhanced political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support for Ukraine and its people. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/15/russian-hybrid-threats-eu-lists-nineindividuals-and-six-entities-responsible-for-destabilising-actions-in-the-eu-and-ukraine/. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/military-support-ukraine/.”
  EU competences on defence · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2025-06-20 “E-002489/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib On behalf of the European Commission The 2023 LGBTIQ 1 survey of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 2 reports that 55% of LGBTIQ respondents experienced hate-motivated harassment in the EU, an 18-points increase since 2019. Against this background, the Commission stands with the LGBTIQ community and participates in public events raising awareness for LGBTIQ equality, including national Pride demonstrations across the EU, in line with the LGBTIQ equality strategy 2020-2025 3 . Following the tragic shooting in Graz on 10 June 2025, the Austrian Government declared three days of national mourning, which ended on 12 June at 19:00. The Pride Parade took place on 14 June and was adapted to show solidarity, respect and remembrance of all those affected by the shooting. The Commission Representation in Vienna contributed EUR 6,840 for promotional items used during the Parade. As regards the FRA’s participation in the event, Article 16(1) of its Founding Regulation 4 provides that the FRA shall fulfil its tasks in complete independence, including communication activities. 1 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer. 2 https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2024/lgbtiq-equality-crossroads-progress-and-challenges. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0698. 4 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, OJ L 53, 22.2.2007, p. 1.”
  LGBTIQ+
• 2025-06-13 “E-002390/2025 E-002218/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The organisation and conduct of elections are the competence and primary responsibility of the EU Member States’ national authorities and courts, in accordance with their national rules and legislation, as well as their international commitments and EU law. The Commission does not have general competence to intervene in the organisation and conduct of national elections. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 requires providers of Very Large Online Platforms (VLOP) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSE) to assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to electoral processes and civic discourse, while protecting fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression 2 . The Commission published guidelines in this area 3 . Under Article 33 of the DSA, Telegram reported fewer than 45 million users and is not designated as a VLOP 4 , thus not under the Commission’s direct supervision of the DSA. 5 The Commission supports EU Member States mainly through the framework of the European cooperation network on elections 6 , hosting exchanges among competent authorities as well as through the application of EU law provisions relevant in national electoral contexts, i.e. the DSA, the General Data Protection Regulation 7 , the Artificial Intelligence Act 8 and the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising 9 (from October 2025). Protecting the integrity of elections is also a priority in the implementation of the DSA. A Working Group has been set up within the European Board for Digital Services (Board) to focus on the integrity of the information space and to discuss elections and civic discourse 10 . The Board also released a DSA Elections Toolkit for national authorities, providing tools, best practices, and lessons learned 11 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1-102: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277. 4 https://telegram.org/tos/eu-dsa. 5 Telegram appointed its legal representative in Belgium, placing the responsibility for compliance monitoring with the Belgian Digital Services Coordinator, the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eucitizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj/eng. 8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng. 9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj/eng. 10 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/working-group-4-european-board-digital-services-integrityinformation-space. 11 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-05-30 “E-002177/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission's authorisation is not necessary for exhibitions to be held on the European Parliament's premises, as this falls under the responsibility of the European Parliament. No funding in support of this exhibition was provided by the Commission. The funding of projects is subject to eligibility criteria reflecting the relevant legal bases. Review processes are employed to ensure that funded projects align with these criteria.”
  Asylum & border control · Regulation of NGOs in Europe · EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination
• 2025-05-08 “E-001868/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has published two calls for expression of interest 1 2 with the aim of reaching 202 Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) by the end of 2025 3 . Their selection was done in compliance with the standard eligibility criteria 4 , according to the selection criteria specified in the calls. The staff working document published on 30 June 2024 5 contains the overview of costs to be incurred in 2025 to be covered by the supervisory fee pursuant to Article 43 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 6 . The total costs for human resources in 2025 are estimated at EUR 29,21 million. This includes existing staff working on the DSA. Such costs are covered by external assigned revenues stemming from the supervisory fees charged in 2024 by the Commission on providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and of very large online search engines (VLOSEs), in line with Article 43 of the DSA. By 31 March of each year, the Commission reports in transparency to the European Parliament and the Council on FTEs and annual costs incurred for human resources in the previous year. The DSA aims to ensure that fundamental rights of users are protected online. The DSA does not regulate content nor individual content moderation decisions 7 . Rather, the DSA defines providers of online platforms’ responsibilities and mechanisms to mitigate risks, including preventing over-removal of lawful content. All decisions taken by the Commission under the DSA can be challenged in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Those taken at national level are subject to oversight in the respective legal systems in the Member States. The Commission is bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 8 to respect the rights, freedoms and principles, including that of freedom of expression and information. 1 Call of 18 June 2024 for 27 staff: https://eu-careers.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_vacancies/202406/Vacancy%20notice%20CA%20FGIV%20EC%20Representations%20%20DSA.pdf. 2 Call of 11 April 2025 for 60 staff: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/join-digital-services-actenforcement-team. 3 SWD(2024) 167: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/overview-elements-accounted-estimationamount-external-assigned-revenues-stemming-supervisory-fee. 4 Article 82 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (CEOS): https://eucareers.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents//general/conditions_of_employment_of_other_servants/en_rules_ ca_comm_en.pdf. 5 SWD(2024) 167: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/overview-elements-accounted-estimationamount-external-assigned-revenues-stemming-supervisory-fee. 6 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1-102: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 7 That is a matter for specific laws and the courts to determine, same as for offline content. 8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391-407: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-05-07 “E-001852/2025 Answer given by Commissioner Brunner on behalf of the European Commission On 16 April 2025, the Commission proposed 1 to frontload two key elements of the Asylum Procedure Regulation 2024/1348 2 : (i) the 20% or lower recognition rate threshold as an acceleration ground and (ii) the possibility to designate safe third countries and safe countries of origin with exceptions. The aim of anticipating the application of these measures is to provide Member States with the possibility to use some of the key provisions of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 3 sooner than their originally expected date of application, providing them with more tools to manage the asylum caseload in an effective manner. The same proposal also puts forward a first EU list of safe countries of origin to support a uniform application of the concept, while helping Member States to process asylum applications faster and more efficiently. The countries proposed for designation were selected using a range of criteria, including the fact that they create a significant asylum caseload in the EU. The assessment of whether a third country is a safe country of origin in accordance with the Asylum Procedure Regulation is based on a range of sources, including information from Member States, the EU Asylum Agency, the European External Action Service, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other relevant international organisations. Third country nationals without a right to stay are subject to Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) 4 . On 11 March 2025 the Commission tabled a proposal for a Regulation 5 establishing a common system for returns, which aims at establishing swifter, simpler and more effective return procedures across the EU. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the establishment of a list of safe countries of origin at Union level, COM(2025) 186 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU; OJ L, 2024/1348, 22.5.2024. 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 4 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98-107. 5 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of The Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM(2025) 101 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-15 “E-001535/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC) is a flagship initiative of the Strategic Compass 1 . It is now operational as a robust and scalable military instrument that can be deployed in a swift manner to respond to crises outside EU borders. The EU RDC is composed of EU Battlegroups and pre-identified forces and capabilities provided by Member States. Over the past three years, preparatory work has focussed on: securing the necessary forces and capabilities; supporting their readiness and interoperability through EU live exercises; strengthening the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (staffing, communication and information systems); and conducting advance planning. The operational readiness, however, requires continuous effort, notably Member States’ commitment. Since the EU RDC is implemented under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, the financing of common costs related to its deployment and live exercises is done through the European Peace Facility 2 . The remainder of the costs related to the EU RDC is borne by Member States on a ‘costs lie where they fall’ basis. The deployment of the EU RDC, as is the case for all EU military operations, will require a unanimous decision of the Member States. More generally, in line with Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU RDC, as all actions conducted in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy, ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States’ 3 . 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en.. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32024D2846. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008M042.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-04-14 “P-001525/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission EU rules governing family reunification comply with the obligation to protect the family and to respect family life, as enshrined in many instruments of international law. Directive 2003/86/EC 1 respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Commission is not in the position to speculate on potential actions of third country nationals in national procedures. The EU itself is not party to the European Convention on Human Rights. As such, applications for family reunification based solely on Article 8 of the Convention do not fall within the scope of EU law. The Commission is working with the Member States and the European Parliament to implement the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 . The Pact integrates key EU policies on migration, asylum and border management. It will ensure that the EU has strong and secure external borders, fast and efficient procedures, and an effective system of solidarity and responsibility. This will sustainably reduce migration pressure to and within the EU. 1 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 12, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/86/oj. 2 more information available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migrationand-asylum_en.”
  Legal migration · Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-09 “E-001451/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The April 2024 European Council conclusions 1 highlighted the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. This aligns with the November 2023 Joint Communication 2 , advocating for a progressive, proportionate, and reversible approach. As an EU candidate country and long-standing member of the Council of Europe, Türkiye is expected to apply the highest democratic standards and practices. Full respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law will continue to be an integral part of EU-Türkiye relations. The Commission’s position on the arrest of the Mayor of Istanbul on 19 March 2025 was spelled out in the joint statement 3 of the High Representative/Vice-President and Commissioner for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, issued on the day of the mayor’s detention. The statement stressed that the events gave rise to questions regarding Türkiye's adherence to its long-established democratic tradition. The EU urged the Turkish authorities to provide full transparency and follow due process. Accession negotiations with Türkiye remain at a standstill since June 2018, following the decisions of the Council 4 . This position was re-confirmed by the Council in December 2024 5 . Consequently, the Commission has reduced financial support to Türkiye, with funding reoriented towards support for civil society organisations and EU key priorities. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 2 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-politicaleconomic-and-trade-relations-0_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_836. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf. 5 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-03-27 “E-001291/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The intelligence threats assessments of the Member States remain outside the remit of the Commission. Therefore, the Commission is not in a position to evaluate or assess them. The Commission officials, in their public statements, have been referring to open-source information in which Member States’ intelligence services assessed the probability of Russian aggressive actions against the EU as likely in a five-year perspective. Commission defence industry programmes and instruments aimed at boosting European defence are proposed in the context of growing threats to European security which are proliferating in a way that poses an acute challenge to the EU way of life. This was the case even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, the Russian full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine has forced the EU and its partners to confront the reality of high-intensity war returning on the European continent on a scale never seen since 1945. Consequently, in the Commission assessment the only way the EU can ensure peace is to gain the ability to deter those who could harm the EU. Therefore, in March 2025, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President presented jointly the White Paper for European Readiness 2030 1 and the President of the Commission previously proposed the ReArm Europe Plan that lays down sound funding foundations to support a surge in defence. This long-term endeavour will enable the Member States to build up their armed forces to face any scenario, including the most extreme military contingencies. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0120.”
  Defence spending · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-03-25 “E-001240/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to help creating the conditions for safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable returns, including through stepping up its support for Syria’s socio-economic recovery. The Commission is supporting Member States with a view to promoting an EU coordinated approach allowing beneficiaries of international protection to benefit from temporary ‘go-andsee’ visits to Syria, with the aim of facilitating sustainable returns to the country. ‘Go and see’ visits to Syria are strictly intended to provide Syrian beneficiaries of international protection with an opportunity to make informed decisions about the viability of their possible permanent return to Syria. Some Member States already have a similar practice in place. Visits to Syria outside the frameworks set up by Member States should be taken into account by the latter when assessing whether the conditions for international protection have ceased in accordance with the Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU 1 , taking into account the specific circumstances of the beneficiary and subject to the relevant procedural safeguards as set out in the Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU 2 . 1 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, p. 9-26, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/95/oj. 2 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 60-95, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/32/oj.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-03-19 “E-001164/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The European Union was founded as a peace project – and it remains one. But peace is not self-sustaining. In an era of rising threats, the Union and its Member States must be prepared to defend themselves and to deter any actor that seeks to challenge EU security or weaken EU democracies. The Union and its Member States need to be ready, even for the most extreme military contingencies such as armed aggression. This is the goal of the ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper on European Defence – Readiness 2030 1 . The Commission proposal for the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument is fully in line with the Treaty. Once adopted, it will provide loans to Member States to help them boost their defence capabilities through common procurement. This will reinforce the competitiveness and readiness of the European defence industry. While defence remains firmly within national competence, and Member States retain full sovereignty over their armed forces - from doctrine to deployment - the EU plays a complementary role. The evolving security landscape requires enhanced cooperation among Member States, including in the field of defence. The Treaty on European Union, particularly Article 42, provides a legal basis for developing a Common Security and Defence Policy, which respects the specific character of national defence policies. Recent defence related initiatives aim to support and enhance national efforts, particularly by reinforcing the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, which is a critical pillar of the EU’s overall defence readiness. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-03-14 “E-001112/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Democracy is a founding value of the EU. Elections are at the core of democracy and should be fair and free from any interference. The conduct and the organisation of elections are the competence and responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional and legislative rules, while respecting their international obligations and EU law. National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with these rules. The Commission has no comment on the decision by the Romanian Constitutional Court of 6 December 2024 to annul the first round of the Romanian presidential elections, nor on the decisions taken by the Romanian Electoral Bureau as regards the validation of candidates in national elections. These matters fall entirely under the responsibility of the Member States.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-03-12 “E-001070/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. The start date for the Entry/Exit System (EES) operations has been revised due to several reasons, including disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, technical complexities of the EES design and specific implementation difficulties at central and national levels. In October 2024, the Justice and Home Affairs Council agreed that a progressive launch of the EES would be the best way forward. Subsequently, the Commission adopted on 4 December 2024 a proposal for a Regulation on a temporary derogation from certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 and Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards a progressive start of operations of the EES 1 . Co-legislators reached a provisional agreement on the proposal on 19 May 2025. According to the revised interoperability roadmap, endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 5 March 2025, the EES entry into operation is foreseen in October 2025. 2. The EES procurement was carried out by the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (euLISA). The Commission has asked the Agency to provide the information requested by the Honourable Member. 3. As regards the costs for the development of the EES, the Commission has asked the euLISA to provide the information requested by the Honourable Member. The Commission will send the Agency’s reply to the Honourable Member as soon as possible. 1 COM(2024) 567 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-03-11 “E-001035/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission Türkiye is a candidate country and a key partner for the EU. Accession negotiations have remained at a standstill since 2018, in line with the Council Conclusions 1 . The EU’s serious concerns about the continued deterioration of democratic standards, the rule of law, and respect for fundamental rights have not been addressed. On 17-18 April 2024, the European Council reconfirmed 2 the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. Since then, the EU and Türkiye held five high level dialogues in areas of mutual interest according to the Council’s guidance 3 . Türkiye has been constructive in working towards sustainable de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, addressing trade barriers in the context of the Customs Union, and working on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia. The Turkish Foreign Minister attended an informal lunch with EU Foreign Ministers in August 2024 and May 2025. Consultations at senior officials’ level continued on foreign policy and regional issues. The implementation of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement 4 has continued to deliver tangible results in reducing irregular and dangerous crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean route to Europe. Türkiye continues to provide support to approximately 3.6 million refugees, while working to prevent irregular migration. On 16 October 2023, the Commission presented the EU Action Plan for the Eastern Mediterranean route 5 with measures addressing migration management along this route, including Türkiye. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf. 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4994.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-03-03 “E-000888/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The EU supports the transition process towards a unified, stable and peaceful Syria. As of 6 March 2025, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that over 356 200 Syrians have returned to Syria via neighbouring countries since early December 2024, and that almost 890 000 internally displaced persons have returned to their home region since November 2024. While remaining cautious due to the volatile situation in Syria and the many challenges which still lie ahead, and in line with the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024 1 , the EU is committed to help create the conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees. The EU will continue to work with neighbouring countries as well as specialised agencies 2 in this regard, in particular by supporting Syrians who decide to go home and by stepping up its support for Syria’s socioeconomic recovery, including through the gradual easing of EU restrictive measures. The EU support and suspension of sanctions is commensurate with the developments in the country. Syrian nationals who are beneficiaries of international protection have a right to reside in the territory of a Member State that granted them protection. Directive 2011/95 3 provides for the conditions to assess whether the person has ceased to be a refugee or to be eligible for subsidiary protection and whether to revoke, end or refuse to renew refugee or subsidiary protection status 4 . When a person is no longer a beneficiary of international protection and if they have no other right to stay, they fall under the scope of the Return Directive 5 . When implementing the Return Directive, Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement 6 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/19/european-council-conclusions-19december-2024/. 2 Such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organisation for Migration. 3 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast). 4 This is subject to the procedural safeguards laid out in Directive 2013/32, including an individualised assessment and the right to an effective remedy against a decision withdrawing international protection status. 5 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. 6 Articles 4 and 19(2) of the Charter.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood · Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-28 “E-000882/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its repercussions for European and global security constitute an existential challenge for the EU. 1. While the EU remains committed to supporting Ukraine in achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, it is ultimately Ukraine’s inherent right to choose its own destiny. In light of this, the EU has taken note of the outcome of the United States (US)-Ukraine and US-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia, including the proposals for ensuring safe navigation in the Black Sea, as well as the end of attacks on energy facilities in Ukraine and Russia. The EU is ready to support the upcoming steps, together with Ukraine, the US and other partners. 2. The EU reaffirms its continued and unwavering support - for as long as it takes - for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The EU maintains its ‘peace through strength’ approach, which supports Ukraine in building its own robust military and defence capabilities as an essential component. The EU remains committed, with like-minded partners and allies, to provide further comprehensive support to Ukraine, as it exercises its inherent right to self-defence against Russia’s war of aggression. 3. A comprehensive peace agreement, which respects Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, needs to be accompanied by robust and credible security guarantees for Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression. As referred to during the European Council meeting on 6 and 20 March 2025, the EU and Member States are ready to contribute to security guarantees, in particular by supporting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself effectively, based on their respective competences and capabilities, and in line with international law 1 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/0mpg5ctf/20250306-ukraine-euco10-25-en.pdf and https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11-2025-INIT/en/pdf”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-US relations · EU competences on defence
• 2025-02-27 “E-000874/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission As the security architecture Europe has relied on can no longer be taken for granted, we must urgently ramp up our collective expenditure in defence, strengthen our capabilities and take a proactive approach to security. The Honourable Member is referred to the package of documents on defence adopted on 19 March 2025 which outlines the Commission proposals in this respect. First, the Commission White Paper provides a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, laying out the case of for a once-in-a-generation surge in European defence investments 1 . Second, the Commission proposes to unlock flexibility for higher defence expenditure through a coordinated activation of the national escape clause 23 . The use of this flexibility is to be monitored by the Commission and Council, while the EU fiscal framework continues to operate. Third, the package includes a proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the European defence industry Instrument 4 . Once adopted by the Council, the instrument would provide financial assistance to Member States allowing them to carry out urgent and major public investments in support of the European defence industry. To finance support under the SAFE instrument in the form of up to EUR 150 billion in loans, the Commission would be empowered, on behalf of the EU, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions. As the Honourable Member is aware, following up on its conclusions of 6 March 2025 and in the light of the White Paper, the European Council called for an acceleration of work on all strands to decisively ramp up Europe’s defence readiness within the next five years. 1 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025)120 final, 19.3.2025. 2 C(2025)2000 final, 19.3.2025. 3 The national escape clause (see Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263) can be activated (i) in case of exceptional circumstances outside the control of the Member States, (ii) that have a major impact on the public finances of the Member State concerned and (iii) provided that the deviation does not endanger fiscal sustainability over the medium term. 4 COM(2025)122 final, 19.3.2025.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-02-26 “E-000866/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The exclusion of Modul University Vienna from EU funding granted through direct or indirect management is due to Council Implementing Decision 2022/2056 (CID) 1 , which aims at protecting the EU budget against rule of law breaches in Hungary. In accordance with Article 2(2) of the CID, legal commitments cannot be entered into with any public interest trust or entities maintained by such trusts, if they are established under the provisions of the Hungarian Act IX of 2021. The evaluation of Modul University Vienna’s ownership structure, carried out by the Erasmus+ National Agency in Austria, concluded that since 12 May 2023 Modul University Vienna is to be considered as an entity maintained by the Mathias Corvinus Collegium, a public interest trust listed under the aforementioned Hungarian Act IX of 2021. The European Health and Digital Executive Agency (‘HADEA’) reached the same conclusion in August 2024 regarding another project. Modul University Vienna challenged it before the General Court of the European Union. The case is pending (Case T-570/24). The Commission respects the relevant legal framework, including the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the EU budget, Regulation (EU) 2021/817 2 on Erasmus+, and Regulation (EU) 2021/695 3 on Horizon Europe. The legal framework ensures that the awarding of funds is guided by transparent and objective criteria, in full compliance with the principle of equal treatment, and includes mechanisms for recourse. The Commission is fully committed to support a diverse and pluralistic scientific and research community across Europe and applies the same objective criteria irrespective of political or ideological affiliations, ensuring that no unjust discrimination occurs against any entity. 1 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, OJ L 325/94, 20.12.2022. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing Erasmus+: the Union Programme for education and training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013, OJ L 189/1, 28.5.2021. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013, OJ L 170/1, 12.5.2021.”
  Rule of law in Hungary
• 2025-02-24 “E-000827/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission According to available data 1 , between 1 October 2024 and 28 February 2025, 11 575 Afghan women applied for international protection in the EU; the trend is stable compared to the same period last year (from 1 October 2023 to 28 February 2024, 11 190 Afghan women had applied for international protection in the EU). The Commission cannot predict the number of applications for the coming years. According to available data 2 , on 31 December 2023 (latest yearly data available), there were 62 836 residence permits delivered for family reasons on the basis of the Family Reunification Directive 3 to people with Afghan citizenship. The Commission cannot predict the number of residence permits issued for family reasons for the coming years. Decisions regarding applications for international protection and the granting of such protection fall under the competence of Member States. Applications need to be examined individually, objectively and impartially, and the decisions taken by the competent authorities in line with the EU rules on asylum, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union. In its judgment of 4 October 2024 4 , the Court ruled that an accumulation of discriminatory measures in respect of women 5 comes within the concept of ‘act of persecution’, since those measures, by their cumulative effect, undermine human dignity as guaranteed by Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 6 . 1 Eurostat, Asylum applicants by type, citizenship, age and sex – monthly data, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asyappctzm__custom_17394164/default/table?lang=en. 2 Eurostat, All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_resvalid__custom_16729112/default/table?lang=en. 3 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 12. 4 Judgment of 4 October 2024, AH and FN v Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl, C-608/22 and C-609/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:828. 5 Deprivation of any legal protection against gender-based and domestic violence and forced marriage, requirement to cover the entire body and face, restriction to access to healthcare and freedom of movement, prohibition from engaging in gainful employment or limitation to the extent to which they can do so, prohibition of access to education and taking part in sports, exclusion from political life and others. 6 Ibid., paragraph 46.”
  Asylum & border control · Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2025-02-06 “P-000555/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission On 10 February 2025 the United States (US) announced the imposition a 25% tariff on all US imports of steel and aluminium as of 12 March 2025 and subsequently published a list of downstream products to which the tariffs will also apply 123 . On 13 February 2025, the US announced plans to impose so-called ‘reciprocal tariffs 4 . The President of the Commission and the Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security publicly stated that while the EU is ready to discuss mutually beneficial solutions, any unjustified tariffs will trigger firm and proportionate EU countermeasures. The President spoke to the Vice-President of the United States on 11 February 2025. Moreover, the Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security also discussed this with his counterparts, including during a meeting in Washington on 19 February 2025. The Commission will spare no effort to avert unnecessary tensions but is ready to act to safeguard its economic interests. The EU has at its disposal instruments that allow addressing unjustified measures, including with tariffs. To promote European competitiveness, the Commission adopted its Competitiveness Compass 5 , the strategic framework for the Commission’s work in this mandate, and other industrial policy initiatives 6 . The Competitiveness Compass sets out an approach and a selection of flagship measures on three transformational imperatives to boost competitiveness: closing the innovation gap, a joint roadmap for decarbonisation and competitiveness, and reducing excessive dependencies and increasing security. The 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report 7 provide an analytical basis for the EU’s industrial strategy. 1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/adjusting-imports-of-steel-into-the-united-states/ 2 https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restores-section-232tariffs/ 3 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-18/pdf/2025-02832.pdf and https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-18/pdf/2025-02833.pdf 4 https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/02/reciprocal-trade-and-tariffs/ 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0030 6 For example, the Clean Industrial Deal proposes six business drivers for a competitive yet decarbonising economy: (1) affordable energy, (2) lead markets, (3) financing, (4) circularity and access to materials, (5) global markets and international partnerships and (6) skills. 7 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/2025-annual-single-market-and-competitivenessreport_en”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2025-02-05 “E-000545/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission 1. Sauli Niinistö was nominated unpaid Special Adviser to the Commission President on 20 March 2024. The High-Representative and Vice-President of the Commission at the time received his salary and there was no additional payment linked to the drafting of the Report. 2. Special Advisers are selected based on their expertise and qualifications. The choice of Mr Niinistö to work on preparedness was based on his expertise on this matter, as former President of Finland. Based on a whole of society and whole of government approach, Finland has a comprehensive preparedness and civil defence strategy in place, which prepares for all emergencies including military, hybrid threats and natural disasters. 3. Each Special Adviser must provide a declaration of activities and sign a document declaring that there is no conflict of interest between their duties as adviser to the Commission and their other activities. On the basis of the declaration by Mr Niinistö, the Commission established that there was no conflict of interest regarding his activities and his duties as Special Adviser.”
  EU competences on defence · Relations with NATO
• 2025-02-05 “E-000544/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission appointed Mr Draghi as unpaid Special Adviser to President of the Commission from 3 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 to draft a report on the future of European competitiveness. 2. M. Draghi was not awarded a contract but appointed to the position of unpaid Special Adviser. This is therefore not a process that involves competitive bidding. The President of the Commission appointed him to draft the report based on his very deep and wide-ranging experience. 3. The Commission, at this stage, cannot provide with further information on possible future contracts for reports or analyses to experts that will be commissioned during this mandate.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Von der Leyen
• 2024-07-16 “E-001367/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission Free speech is a pillar of democracy and at the core of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 and the European Convention on Human Rights 2 , which are legally binding on all EU institutions and Member States. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 3 does not regulate content 4 . Its objective is to ensure that everyone in the EU can enjoy online platform services safely, in full respect of fundamental rights. It does so by defining the platforms’ responsibilities, so that algorithmic systems do not amplify illegal content and very large online platforms and search engines (VLOPSEs) 5 take reasonable, proportionate and effective mitigation measures against the risks they pose to society (e.g. addictive design). It also protects EU users against over-removal of lawful content. The Commission supervises DSA compliance by the VLOPSEs. To this effect, the co-legislator entrusted the Commission with investigative and enforcement powers, similar to those under EU competition rules. These powers and related procedures are laid out in the DSA 6 and include the possibility of accepting commitments, i.e. remedial actions offered by platforms to solve the Commission’s concerns without being subject to fines for non-compliance. To assist companies in deciding whether to offer commitments, in line with the principles of good administration, the Commission stands ready to explain its concerns to them 7 . All Commission’s actions, including in the DSA case concerning X and all other enforcement actions, are undertaken within the limits of its powers as outlined above. No demand, proposal or offer of ‘quiet censorship’ was made. The acts and decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of the DSA are subject to judicial review. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A12012P%2FTXT 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/european-convention-on-human-rights-echr.html 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 4 As in the offline world, that is a matter for specific laws and the courts to determine. 5 VLOPSEs are designated online platforms and search engines with more than 45 million users in the EU (10% of the EU population). 6 DSA, section 4. The college of Commissioners has empowered the Member of the Commission with responsibility for communications networks, content and technology for the enforcement of the DSA on its behalf. Final acts (such as designations, final findings of non-compliance, decisions making commitments binding) have to be adopted by the college upon proposal of the empowered Commissioner. Actions related to running of the investigations are entrusted to the empowered Commissioner and its services in the Directorate‑General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (such as requesting information, ordering inspections, initiate infringement proceedings). 7 The Commission adopted the first DSA commitment decision on 5 August 2024, making binding TikTok’s commitments to permanently withdraw TikTok Lite Rewards programme from the EU; see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_24_4161”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• “Europe is destroying itself. For years now we've seen our competitiveness destroyed. Our economy is destroyed by high energy prices, phasing out new nuclear energy, renewable energy. There's one sanction package after another. And in order to abandon Russian oil and gas. This is a complete political madness. You want to foster green energy, but we are in an energy crisis as being caused by your own policies. We've seen more expensive energy. People's prosperity is going down. Now we're seeing the deindustrialization of Europe. We want to be optimistic, but we are seeing a complete decline. And then the main source of energy for one member state is currently being blocked. And it is destroying Europe's security. And what does the EU do? Absolutely nothing. It remains silent and is even on the side of Ukraine and looks away when Zelensky threatens a head of state of the European Union with with murder. This is a complete scandal. There is no competitive market without proper energy supply in Europe.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Double standards and hypocrisy. That's what the European Union represents. We're punishing Google for what we ourselves enjoy doing manipulating opinions online. But you're right to criticize Google for abusing their monopoly. And you're right to criticize that Google is distorting free competition online. But my question is when do you apply these standards to yourselves? The EU is the greatest threat for the freedom of expression and the media, and thus also for democracy. In Europe. The Digital Services Act censors social media. They want to impose on us what we are supposed to be reading. You call a free press, you refer to a free press giving the rights to the mainstream media. That's you friendly. You're giving important position to your friends. You're abusing your power. This has nothing to do with our idea of freedom. It's quite simply a top down democracy.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “The European security policy. Armament, armament, armament, even more weapons, even more billions into the defense industry need more power for the European Union. And that is what the European security policy looks like. You're spreading anxiety and worry. You want to pump billions into the defense armament industry in order to achieve your great aim of creating a defense and debt, um, Uh, policy. You want to have more powers in Brussels, do away with the member states, and you want to have this European security policy. And of course, we still have to support Ukraine. It's totally absurd because it would appear that basically you're just on a power rush. So the security strategy, basically you want to arm, arm, arm without any kind of, uh, reality. And all of this is a burden for the European citizens. What the European citizens want the people in the street. You don't seem to be bothered about that at all. So what about the European peace policy? I think Europe is going to, uh, is a far more uncertain about its own policies, and you're just escalating rather than thinking about peace. The idea is to de-escalate, protect the borders, and strengthen the member states. And that's how you get peace. Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you. The EU wants a complete ban on Russian imports. And we know that these are just hypocrites, because the citizens in Europe are the people that they don't care about at all. You're going to push Europe into the next crisis. This is going to be an energy crisis. And you are focusing on specific individual member states. You're pushing them towards economic ruin. You. Are ignoring the fact that it's not that easy for every country to switch to renewables. You're not. You're just talking about this need for this sophistication. Is it not enough just to see that there is inflation? Aren't do you really want to push more people into poverty? This isn't possible unless we have cost efficient energy supplies. We're going to increase poverty in Europe. And the worst thing here is that you are saying that these countries, countries, their veto, you're going to get your own back by looking at the funding that they would get through the recovery funding. We need to have the respect for national sovereignty because that is the the standard here. Ladies and gentlemen, if we don't have affordable energy supplies, then there is no competitive market that will be able to function. And you're just going to throw us against the wall.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Thank you very much, colleagues. Now, this EU strategy for civil society is not about protecting democracy, as the Commission is trying to tell us. Rather, what it is, is the next step towards the Brussels ideologically patronising us. It's at the expense of the Member States and our citizens. Now NGOs are supposed to be the core of democracy here, but they don't mean. Uh, people taking part in a voluntary fire brigade or doing volunteering work socially. What they mean is these ideologically Motivated NGOs, which are really the long arm of the commission. And these NGOs are supposed to defend EU values. But this is no longer any kind of, uh, balanced consensus on values, but rather it's, uh, climate, gender and migration that are being focused on. This is what's being promoted. Anything else is being pushed to the side. This is not a diverse civil society. This is ideological selection with taxpayers money. €9 billion are going to flow through the Agora EU program, €9 billion when we've got inflation, cutbacks, poverty. This is really a slap in the face for Europe's taxpayers. This is without any clear definitions, without true transparency and without effective, uh, democratic scrutiny. And although the Court of Auditors, the Court of Auditors has Constantly called attention to these kinds of issues. 17 billion went to various shady players. That's what they decided. But no consequences have been drawn to date. And we've got this platform for civil society. It seems to be the commission on its own who decides who gets to speak and who doesn't. That's not a political dialogue. And then you've got the European Democracy Shield that threatens a system of surveillance and, uh, ideological, uh, steering. So how can you justify this huge amount of budgetary resources at a time of economic decline? And how can you be ensured that this one sided promotion of certain NGOs is going to end.”
  EU engagement with civil society
• “Ladies and gentlemen, it's absolutely astonishing the way. Uh, Europe is, uh, heading for the wall. Europe's economy has been going downhill for a long time. And it's not America's fault. It's Europe's own fault. You have been strangling businesses in the Green Deal or the green disaster energy policy, supply change policy, emissions trading certificates, all this bureaucracy and overregulation. This is the biggest deindustrialisation of Europe ever. And the European Commission strategy is, well, nothing. You've imposed tariffs on China. Why are you complaining about America's tariffs on Europe? The hypocrisy is extraordinary. Austria has the biggest recession of all EU countries and it's your fault. We, uh, we are regulating while the US and China are developing.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU