Paulius SAUDARGAS

Policy topics Paulius SAUDARGAS is active on

What Paulius SAUDARGAS has said (21)

• 2026-06-17 “Thank you, president, commissioner, dear colleagues. When hostile actors target a national register, they are not merely stealing data. They are targeting trust in our state institutions. This is why the recent breach of Lithuania's center of registers is so alarming. More than 600,000 records were unlawfully accessed, including personal identification data, addresses, and property information. Among those affected may be public officials or members of the security services whose data could be exploited by hostile intelligence services. Investigation could lead to foreign state involvement. This would not be a technical incident. It would be another hybrid attack. Cyber threats do not stop at national borders and neither should our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to them. We need coordinated European cyber defense architecture. The EU has already taken important steps to strengthen our collective cybersecurity. Through NSS 2, we are raising security standards for critical sectors and public administration across Europe. Through the Cyber Solidarity Act, we are improving our ability to detect threats early, share intelligence, and support member states. Agencies such as ANESA, together with national cybersecurity authorities, are helping to build a stronger and more coordinated European response. So, dear colleagues, more single market for cybersecurity as well.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2026-06-17 “Madam president. Commissioner. Dear colleagues, when hostile actors target a national register, they are not merely stealing data, they are targeting trust in our state institutions. This is why the recent breach of Lithuania's central registers is so alarming. More than 600 000 records were unlawfully accessed, including personal identification, data addresses and property information. Among those affected may be a public, officials or members of the security services whose data could be exploited by hostile intelligence services. Investigation could lead to foreign state involvement. This would not be a technical incident. It would be another hybrid attack. Cyber threats do not stop at national borders, and neither should our ability to prevent, detect and respond to them. We need a coordinated European cyber defense architecture. The EU has already taken important steps to strengthen our collective cyber security. Through NSS two, we are raising security standards for critical sectors and public administrations across Europe. Through Cyber Solidarity Act, we are improving our ability to detect threats early share intelligence and support Member states. Agencies such as Enisa, together with national cyber security authorities, are helping to build a stronger and more coordinated European response. So, dear colleagues, more single market for cyber security as well. Thank you.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2025-04-24 “E-001655/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Since the Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. For this purpose, the Commission adopted the REPowerEU Plan 1 in May 2022, aiming to fast forward the clean energy transition, diversify energy supplies, and enhance EU energy independence. Despite a significant progress that was collectively achieved in the EU, energy imports from Russia still remain in the EU system. Dependency on Russian energy imports possess a threat to the EU’s economic security due to weaponisation of energy supplies by Russia. With the REPowerEU Roadmap, adopted on 6 May 2025 2 , the Commission is fully committed to stop relying on Russian energy. The Roadmap will enable the phase out of Russian energy imports, in a coordinated, stepwise and secure manner as we advance on the EU’s energy transition. As outlined in the Roadmap, concrete measures will be presented in legislative proposals by the Commission mid- June. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/key-documents-repowereu_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/news/roadmap-fully-end-eu-dependency-russian-energy-2025-05-06_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2024-12-16 “E-002968/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has and will continue to proactively engage with all stakeholders concerned by the implementation and effective functioning of Council Directive (EU) 2021/514 (DAC7) 1 . The Commission remains committed to supporting the transition to a circular economy through its policies implementing the 2020 Circular Economy Action Plan 2 and to applying the initiatives of the new Circular Economy Act. Certain stakeholders have raised concerns regarding the disclosure of sensitive tax information on sellers that carry out activities involving the sale of goods and who may not necessarily have a liability to tax on these sales. In response to these concerns, the Commission in collaboration with the Member States has published a dedicated webpage 3 that (i) details the rationale for the introduction of DAC7, (ii) clarifies that DAC7 does not impose any new tax or in any way regulate the taxation of income earned by sellers on digital platforms, and (iii) provides additional information on the relevant national taxation rules in this area and the application of DAC7 within each Member State. The Commission is currently evaluating the implementation and functioning of Council Directive 2011/16/EU 4 . As a follow up to that evaluation, the Commission may, if appropriate, propose legislative amendments to this Directive. 1 OJ L 104, 25.3.2021. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1583933814386&uri=COM:2020:98:FIN 3 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation/tax-transparency-cooperation/administrative-co-operation-andmutual-assistance/dac7_en 4 OJ L 64, 11.3.2011.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU · EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you. Chair. The ministers. I'm very glad to see that defence is a top priority of the Danish presidency. As someone from the eastern flank, I can assure you that for our states, defence is not an abstract policy field. We are literally at the front line of the EU and NATO, and we are doing our homework. Initiatives like the Baltic Defense line is shield, and other measures we already taken are concrete examples of our commitment, but we need support while defending our common border. There are indications that the upcoming MFF. I hope it will be presented today will be generous towards the eastern flank countries in this regard, which is encouraging. Could you perhaps elaborate on how the Danish Presidency intends to ensure that this focus on defence translates into concrete support for the states most exposed to external threats? Thank you.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you, Madam President. Commissioner. Dear colleagues, The end of life vehicle regulation supports circular vehicle design and sustainable waste management. There are two main objectives of this legislation. To reduce the negative impact to the environment and to solve the problem of critical raw materials in Europe. The demand for rare earth elements and other materials is increasing, and Europe lacks these resources. That means that circular economy and efficient recycling is a must do for European Union. So, dear colleagues, I think we have achieved the necessary balance in the proposed compromise. Advocating for realistic targets and a fair level playing field for all the stakeholders in a broad automotive sector and beyond. Some specific points I want to address. Only the base vehicles remains in the scope to protect SMEs from excessive burdens. The explicit exemptions are introduced for trailers, motor caravans, military and special purpose vehicles. Also vehicles of historical and cultural interest. The compromise lowers the mandatory recycled plastic target to 20%, to be reached in six years after the regulation enters into force, and 25% in ten years. Of this, 15% must come from recycled plastic from end of life vehicles themselves. The so-called closed loop target, up to 50% of the target can come from pre-consumer waste. The compromise ensures that components must only be designed for removal when technically feasible, ensuring recyclability and reuse without unrealistic burdens.”
  Ecodesign & durability
• “Ah, okay. Uh. Concerning export. European Parliament wanted to ban only the export of end of life vehicles. Commission and Council proposed to restrict this to all non roadworthy vehicles. The agreement reached is later date of application of the non roadworthy export ban. So plus two additional years. Important concession from Parliament side on plastic targets. I will not go into details. While it was despite it was quite hot topic, but it's on the envy responsibility. So the agreement reached uses the council targets, but only with two steps approach. The pre-consumer plastic is excluded from the scope, the timeline 15% in 72 months and 25% in 120 months. The ambition is higher compared to the parliament proposal, but still balanced. We also agreed with a mirror clause for the third country plastic with clear auditing system about closed loop target. We succeeded to limit closed loop target to 20%. Target something in between both positions of Parliament and Council are the material targets. An agreement has been found also on other materials which, with a clear timeline for the Commission to propose targets after an impact assessment for steel, aluminium and other critical raw materials in line with Parliament mandate. About circularity strategy, we agreed with less burdensome option as requested by Parliament, simplifying the requirement that has to be submitted at manufacturers level and with reduced numbers of points to report. Legal basis we agreed to a limited application of dual legal base with article 192. Date of application was prolonged to the 24 months as requested by the Council. To sum up, outcome is balanced with more realistic targets. Reduced bureaucracy Predictability for the manufacturing sector are innovation oriented approach. The very burdensome requirement for individual owners transfers was more balanced as well due to time constraints. Several points were left for the technical finalization with the upcoming presidency. That's from my side. I hope Parliament will support this position. Thank you.”
  Own resources (plastics)
• “Mr. President commissioner, colleagues. Our market is flooded with millions of parcels sold online, often from third country sellers entering the EU within minimal checks. Too many of these products are unsafe, non-compliant and impossible to trace. When something goes wrong, consumer rights are meaningless. If enforcement stops at the border. Online marketplaces play a central role in this. Their business model is built on scale, speed, and aggressive marketing, including dark patterns, constant promotions, and influencer influencer driven sales. They cannot continue to profit from exposure while claiming no responsibility for what is sold on their platforms. But we must also talk about who is most exposed children. Minors are increasingly targeted by online advertising for cheap, unsafe and inappropriate products. The European Parliament has rightly called for stronger protection of minors online, including age appropriate design and restrictions on harmful practices, as well as clear age limits for social media. These priorities must be addressed not only in content regulation but also in commercial practices. Thank you very much.”
  Liability for online marketplaces
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. Dear colleagues. This file is utmost important as well as urgent. My sincere thanks to rapporteurs, Miss and Mr. Niinisto and the whole team. They were very strong and committed. However, I'm sorry, but I slightly lack the adequate ambition from the Council and the Commission to fight back the most brutal regime of the century. You must be united. You must be courageous. The compromise bans imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG. Six weeks after the regulation enters into force, with a transition period allowing existing contracts to run until short term LNG and pipeline gas contracts are phased out by April and June next year, respectively. However, the compromise was achieved largely because Parliament agreed to make concessions, especially dropping the ambition to ban oil as well. The commission promised to present a legislative proposal at the beginning of next year. So the responsibility now lies with the Commission to keep the commitment to finally rescue Europe from Russian fossil fuels. We will be waiting. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “(10:36:05 – 10:37:13): Thank you, chair. Dear colleagues, let us be clear. Political, economic, and energy integration go hand in hand. If we are serious about your enlargement, and I hope we are, then integrating the energy systems of candidate countries is essential. Energy is geopolitics. It's about security, influence, and resilience. If we leave neighboring countries outside our energy market, we leave them vulnerable, we leave them exposed to influences from outside. We have already seen what happens when even member states remain dependent on fossil fuels and isolated networks. These energy islands influence and weaken all of us. Accelerating integration of the Energy Community is not just technical work. As our colleague from Moldova rightly said, it's a strategic step for Europe's security and stability. A larger single market makes us a stronger player in the geopolitical arena. A connected energy system makes Europe strong. Thank you.”
  EU energy infrastructure integration
• “Thank you. Chair. Dear colleagues, dear representatives from the neighboring friendly countries, thank you for your valuable insights. I would like to start with an example from our national Lithuanian experience. We faced a particularly challenging period as our electricity market liberalisation began, precisely when the Kremlin launched its campaign of energy blackmail against Europe. With gas prices artificially inflated, electricity costs surged, forcing our government to step in and subsidize energy bills to protect our citizens. Despite these pressures, we remain committed to our course liberalizing the market, accelerating the development of renewable energy, and phasing out fossil fuels. This steadfast approach enabled us to become the first country in Europe to fully disconnect from Russian energy resources. The challenge is that Europe faces today from the ongoing full scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia's hybrid war against Europe and the looming uncertainty in today's geopolitical environment further highlights how important it is for us to take necessary action to ensure a secure, stable and interruption free supply of energy. It's not only a social imperative, but also a strategic necessity for the political and economic stability. However, for our neighbors, electricity affordability remains a central challenge. That is why implementation of the electricity integration package is crucial. Seeking a more competitive, secure and sustainable energy system across the region. Fostering cross-border electricity trade. Enhancing market transparency and liquidity. Diversification of generation. Renewable energy promotion. Hence delivering affordable electricity consumers. Thus laying the groundwork for a fully interconnected and resilient pan-European electricity market. We must act as both architects and guardians of an energy future, ensuring smooth transformation toward a more connected and resilient energy system. Thank you.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• “Thank you, Madam President. Commissioner Andrius Kubilius. Dear colleagues, countries bordering Russia have been facing hybrid warfare, including GPS disruptions for years. A major incident, such as the spoofing of the plane carrying Madam President Ursula von der Leyen and dear Commissioner, was unfortunately only a matter of time. Russia is developing developing technologies not only to target specific regions of the European Union, but to threaten Europe as a whole. The number of spoofing and jamming sources continues to rise. For example, in 2025, the number of spoofing spoofing sources in the Kaliningrad region alone bordering Lithuania increased from 5 to 29. This phenomenon increasingly extends beyond the aviation sector. The maritime sector is affected, with ships forced to bypass seaports because their signals are jammed. Farmers near the borders struggle to cultivate their land due to interference that disrupts connected tools such as drainage systems. Even private devices and civilian applications are being impacted. Most importantly, Russia remains largely unaccountable before the international community. Actors who disregard international rules and pose a direct threat to the safety of international transport must be sanctioned. Our response must be firm and coordinated. Strong sanctions and investment in resilient technologies. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Proposals shifted the obligation to company wide circularity strategies not per model cutting red tape for all, especially SMEs. Once again, there are no mandatory contracts between producers and treatment operators to protect SMEs and in the application of extended producer responsibility in article 37, the documentation requirements apply only to exports, not to sales within the European Union. Roadworthy vehicles can be sold without any additional documentation. This is very important. While we do have millions of contracts in EU and this would be the undue administrative burden and I am not sure if it would help to fight missing vehicle problem while missing vehicles are missing because they are illegally dismantled. And we should rather enforce the fight with illegal dismantling and harmonise the registration and deregistration process. The compromise based the distinction between used vehicles and end of life vehicles on technical criteria, while safeguarding owners right to repair treatment facility rules refined so that a mandatory component removal applies only when technically feasible. Once again balancing environmental ambition with industrial practicality. Dear colleagues, I would like to thank you all for your amendments, valuable discussions and constructive negotiations. Finally reaching the compromise. Many thanks to all the advisers who made the tremendous job and also to my co-rapporteur from Envi committee. I ask you to support the well balanced proposal. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. Here I am. Thank you, Mr. Ehler. Dear Commissioner, recent statements of the new US administration indicate the rising tensions between the EU and the US. I think you've noticed that the imposition of tariffs on critical components like chips and other goods signals increasing protectionism and potential unreliability in transatlantic trade relations. Geopolitical reality calls for scaling up Europe's defence efforts, addressing capability gaps and preparing for a full spectrum of contingencies. Our reliance on external suppliers for critical raw materials, components and technologies make us even more vulnerable. How do you see the role of EU funded research, innovation and start ups in reducing the union's reliance on external suppliers for critical technologies and components? What specific initiatives are you pursuing to ensure that breakthroughs in dual use technologies contribute to European strategic autonomy and defence resilience? Thank you.”
  EU-US relations
• “Dear Commissioner, thank you for your presentation. Dear colleagues in the digital era and AI involvement in most aspects of existence, cybersecurity is of utmost importance considering the single market of European Union. We should accept that there will be not separate individual cybersecurity systems in different member states, different areas or companies. More and more, we are interlinked in our digital economy. Hence, cybersecurity incidents in one place can result in an overall security issue altogether. As European Union, we must stop the threats coming from third countries. Every week we face systematic and mostly state sponsored cyber attacks targeting our resilience, our economy, our democracy. For countries on the eastern flank. This pressure is even stronger. Cyber and hybrid attacks are not occasional incidents. They are persistent and state linked in most cases, more obviously or not. We have Russia or China on the opposite side. Cyber risks have grown faster than our rules, while fragmentation and uncertainty still weaken the single market. That is why the revision of Cybersecurity Act is both timely and necessary. This also means recognizing the growing role of enisa. The revised act must ensure that Enisa has a clear mandate, the right tools and adequate resources so far. Our main expectations appear to be reflected in the Commission's approach. If we certify toys and foods for safety, we must also certify the digital system that runs our hospitals, our energy networks and our public administrations. Thank you.”
  Scope of EU cybersecurity obligations
• “Dear colleagues, I share much of the vision outlined by the Commission. I strongly support actions to mitigate hybrid threats, strengthening cyber security measures, enhancing resilience and preparedness. Digital networks must be treated as critical infrastructure. I equally share the European Union's ambition to become a more competitive global player through harmonisation, the creation of a genuine single market, and the use of economies of scale. However, this is also where I have some concerns. While the act is in theory intended to support all market participants, there are growing fears among smaller telecommunication operators regarding competition. The DNI seeks to centralise operations to deploy pan-European services. Smaller local providers fears this will create an even playing field, compared to large providers capable of operating across all 27 member states under a single passport. Although mechanisms are introduced to lower entry barriers and facilitate expansion for smaller firms, the overall direction appears to favor large scale infrastructure investment. In conclusion, the regulation that leads to increased market concentration risks undermining smaller and more innovative telecom operators. This could ultimately result in higher costs for end users and reduce innovation and outcome we must avoid. Thank you.”
• “Thank you very much. Chair. Dear colleagues, dear chairpersons, uh, let's go back to the simplification question. We talked a little bit about it, but I think reducing bureaucracy is essential for improving our competitiveness as a continent. Recently, the improved regulation on so-called better data sharing in financial services and investment support entered into force, aiming to streamline supervisory reporting and enhance data sharing among EU financial authorities. One of its provisions concerns the creation of a single integrated reporting system. Building on the ongoing sectoral work, the European Supervisory authorities are expected to prepare a report presenting options for improving supervisory data collection, assessing the feasibility and setting out a roadmap for implementing a cross-sectoral integrated reporting system with the ultimate goal of establishing a single integrated reporting framework. In your view, what has been done so far in this regard? Could you update us on the progress already achieved? If so, thank you. If someone could answer that. Thank you.”
  EU regulation on financial data access
• “Thank you chair. Dear ministers, as we look ahead to the Danish presidency. Energy independence and security remain at the heart of Europe's strategic resilience. Yet this goal is being tested, most recently by Slovakia's demands of legal exemption to continue purchasing Russian gas until 2034, in exchange for lifting its veto on the package of European sanctions against Russia. This directly undermines our collective efforts. By contrast, Lithuania has shown that cutting energy ties with the aggressor is actually possible and effective. Achieving full independence from Russian gas, oil and electricity, while strengthening national security and accelerating the green transition. How will the Danish presidency ensure that such success stories become the norm, not the exception, and that no member state can hold the EU's strategic interests hostage? How will you work to uphold and advance the EU's commitment to phasing out Russian energy while managing internal divisions? Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. Madam chair, it's a great value to talk to you. Thank you very much. But in one very important debate in EU on whether and how to use a frozen Russian assets, I hear counterargument that if we touch the frozen assets, it would impact the financial stability of eurozone. But if we will not use them, if we will not give sufficient support for Ukrainians, if Russia will defeat Ukraine and later attack the eurozone country, Let's say one of the Baltic states, for example. Would this not be a much greater impact to the financial stability of eurozone? I would like to ask, how does the Esrb assess the systemic risks linked to the EU's decision, potential decision to use frozen assets in a model of reparation loan and following the recent proposal of the commission? I mean, using article 122 of the treaty to allow sanctions related to these assets to be prolonged by qualified majority. And how do these risks compare with the potential consequence of a major geopolitical shock? As I mentioned, a conventional military aggression against an EU, NATO and eurozone country. Thank you.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• “I hope it's okay. Yeah. Please. President. Dear Commissioner. Dear colleagues, the development of digital markets. The introduction of the digital euro and trust. Digital identities are the building blocks of a digitally resilient European Union. These initiatives strengthen the single market and empower our businesses to innovate and give our citizens greater control and security in the digital age. About 63% of euro area card based transactions are processed by non-European countries. 13 out of 20 eurozone countries are dependent entirely on international card schemes or mobile solutions. Foreign platforms dominate e-payment solutions and mobile apps. Reliance on intermediary banks cost eurozone firms 20 billion annually in fees. With the digital euro, we ensure that monetary sovereignty remains in European hands while enhancing our resilience in the face of international policy uncertainty. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you, Mr. President. Dear colleagues. China is playing hard. For example, Lithuania continues to be brutally blackmailed. Politically motivated, sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions on Lithuanian exports remain in place, as do sanctions against two Lithuanian banks. Yes, the EU has managed to defuse recent escalations on rare earth, but you never know. We must use more strictly the instruments already at our disposal, including investment, screening and enforcement. Also, asymmetrical response like tariffs on small packages which are flooding our market with a pace of 12 million per day. Our response must be proactive diversifying supply chains including recycling and circularity, activating domestic mining and cooperation with like minded partners still including the United States. Dear colleagues, if tomorrow you will wake up in the world where all your daily equipment, mobile computer, vehicle, you name it are made in China, do not expect that your daily decisions will not be made in China. Thank you.”
  EU-China relations