Joachim STREIT

Policy topics Joachim STREIT is active on

What Joachim STREIT has said (22)

• 2026-03-17 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 3.6.2026 Written question The Commission fully respects the principles of subsidiarity and of Member States’ sole responsibility for national security pursuant to Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union. The measures announced under ProtectEU Agenda [1] aim to support Member States through enhanced cooperation, information exchange, analytical capacities, and a sharper legal toolbox, without altering this division of competences. The communication is a non-legislative Commission initiative. Like other Commission initiatives, it is transmitted to national parliaments, which may submit opinions under the political dialogue with the Commission. Any future legislative proposals stemming from the communication, including any reinforcement of the role of EU agencies or expansion of analytical and coordination capacities, would be prepared in accordance with the Treaties and with this division of competences, including appropriate involvement and consultation of national parliaments and regional authorities. Conditions and safeguards relating to data protection, fundamental rights and parliamentary scrutiny must be proportionate. The ProtectEU Agenda therefore also underlines that strengthened security action must go hand in hand with robust safeguards, including data protection, fundamental rights and effective oversight, in line with EU law. [1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the Regions ProtectEU: Agenda to prevent and counter terrorism; COM/2026/101 final.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Privacy & law enforcement · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-03-12 “E-001039/2026 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers to its replies to recommendations 2 (a), 3 (c) and 4(c) of the Special report 08/2026 of the European Court of Auditors 1 . The Multiannual Indicative Programme 2 for the European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation 3 specifies that improvements in nuclear safety will be monitored and evaluated with performance indicators, including impact, implementation and projectspecific indicators. At the design stage, the Commission checks those performance indicators for inclusion in the project’s results framework. Implementing partners report on a regular basis to the Commission on progress against indicators of the results framework during project implementation. The initial selection of cooperation proposals is informed by the assessment of criteria such as budget, duration, maturity, partnership track record, magnitude of nuclear safety risk, political priority, added value for EU policies, sustainability and urgency. Geopolitical or foreign policy interests are important and embedded in some of these criteria but are not the only ones. Each donor decides independently on the size and fairness of their contribution to multi-donor funds while all donors aim to ensure that the total of their contributions covers the full estimated project budget. However, when there is an expected shortfall in contributions from other international donors, the Commission may decide to contribute a larger share of the cost burden than originally planned due to urgency, priority, relevance for EU and to prevent additional nuclear safety risks and cost escalation linked to delayed project implementation. 1 European Court of Auditors, Special report 08/2026 ‘International nuclear safety cooperation – The Commission remains an important global player but lacks a comprehensive strategy and robust monitoring’, https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/publications?ref=SR-2026-08. 2 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7b5eaa6a-14df-4634-867718d51fc55c37_en?filename=insc-mip-2021-2027_en.pdf. 3 Annex of C(2021) 8687 final of 3 December 2021. https://internationalpartnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/climate-environment-and-energy/nuclear-safety_en.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2026-03-06 “E-000940/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has been in contact with the German authorities regarding the ‘Solar Package I’ amendments to the German Renewable Energy Law (EEG 2023). One of the criteria for authorising State aid is to limit aid to what is necessary to address an identified market failure and thus avoid overcompensating beneficiaries. This principle is reflected in the Climate, Energy and Environmental Aid Guidelines 1 , which govern the Commission’s assessment of aid. Long-term commitments to disburse aid (contract duration of up to 20 years) create considerable uncertainty about market developments and whether financial projections are being implemented in practice, and thus the possibility of undue windfall profits. For this reason, in the Commission decision of December 2022 in Case SA.102084 2 approving the EEG 2023, Germany committed to introduce a claw-back clause (or similar mechanism) to limit any windfall profits. This obligation is a condition for the authorisation of the German State aid scheme. It is the responsibility of Member States to notify aid in line with the applicable legal requirements and to ensure the timeliness and quality of the information provided. Once a Member State notifies to the Commission a proposal for an aid scheme or its amendment, the Commission assesses whether the proposed scheme or amendment is in line with the State aid Guidelines and sectoral legislation. By ensuring compliance with these rules, the Commission ensures the compatibility of the proposed scheme or amendment with the internal market and its legitimacy vis-à-vis other Member States. The Commission has two months from the receipt of a complete notification to issue a decision. Given the confidential nature of discussions between the Commission and the Member States, the Commission cannot comment on the details of any particular notification. 1 OJ C 80, 18.2.2022, pp. 1–89, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52022XC0218%2803%29. 2 OJEU C/2023/061 of 17.02.2023, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/202302/SA_102084_80CC9685-0100-C1F9-86A8933503F73C2D_58_1.pdf.”
  Energy transition (state support)
• 2025-10-08 “E-003952/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes risks in the EU related to generative artificial intelligence (AI) very seriously. The set of EU rules covering AI-related risks, including the Digital Services Act 1 (DSA) and the AI Act 2 , are the most comprehensive available in the world. The AI Act obliges providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic risk to assess and mitigate risks, including the facilitation of disinformation, and imposes transparency obligations. Under the DSA, very large online platforms (VLOPs), and very large online search engines (VLOSEs) must analyse and mitigate systemic risks on civic discourse and electoral processes stemming from their services, including their AI systems where relevant. In the DSA guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes 3 , section 3.3 is focussed on risks related to AI. The Political Advertising Regulation 4 requires providing information on the use of AI systems when using targeting or ad-delivery for political advertising. The Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Toolbox 5 , developed by the European External Action Service (EEAS), facilitates counter-FIMI action. Built for realworld operational application, including AI-relevant application, it provides for a wide range of actions such as resilience building measures, or external action, including restrictive measures such as sanctions. Finally, under the European Democracy Shield 6 , the Commission is looking at ways to reinforce the EU collective capacity to strengthen information and election integrity, looking at the role of AI. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market f for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act). 3 Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. 5 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulationinterference-fimi_en. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/european-democracy-shield-documents_en.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Transparency and oversight of AI-generated content
• 2025-10-08 “E-003953/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission In today’s geopolitical context, the EU and Canada have a strong shared interest in working more closely together, including on energy. Canada is a trusted and like-minded energy partner for the EU. Being a resource-rich country with a stable regulatory framework and a key geostrategic ally with an advanced trade agreement with the EU, Canada is a privileged partner for the EU to achieve its clean energy transition and clean manufacturing objectives. At the EU-Canada Summit held in Brussels in June 2025, parties agreed to cooperate more closely and explore options to work together on more resilient, diversified, reliable energy supply chains, including clean tech value chains, liquefied natural gas (LNG), renewables, hydrogen and other safe and sustainable low-carbon technologies. For the EU, this cooperation is particularly important in light of the EU’s REPowerEU Plan and roadmap to phase out imports of Russian energy. It will also contribute to the EU’s overall goal of diversifying energy supplies, notably by moving from fossil fuel imports to clean energy, both home grown as well as imported from trusted suppliers. Within the established framework of the EU-Canada High-Level Energy Dialogue 1 , the EU and Canada are stepping up discussions on how Canada is advancing efforts to address internal trade and permitting barriers and diversify its energy and raw materials export portfolio, and exploring how this can contribute to the EU’s energy diversification and transition goals. Overall, the EU aims to further increase the bilateral trade and fully harness the potential of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) for the benefit of both economies, while strengthening transatlantic energy security and resilience. 1 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/international-cooperation/key-partner-countries-and-regions/canada_en#eucanada-high-level-energy-dialogue.”
  Natural gas · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-09-26 “E-003762/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission In the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 1 , the Commission recalled that even though Member States’ defence spending has grown by over 31% on aggregate since 2021, it remains far below US levels. Rebuilding European defence needs sustained public and private investment. Even with the additional budgetary leeway introduced by the ReArm Europe Plan 2 , the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) must considerably increase EU support to strategic European defence investments. The Commission considers that defence-related funding under the next MFF, notably in support to research and development (R&D), shall primarily be driven by these objectives, while considering, where relevant, potential dual-use applications, such as supporting related firefighting activities. The Commission’s report ‘Safer Together’ 3 highlights firefighters' role in emergencies, including in Ukraine and their need for modern technologies for situational awareness and safe evacuations. The future European Competitiveness Fund (ECF) 4 will provide significant support to investment in defence, security and space. As such, the Commission proposed a dedicated ‘Resilience, Security, Defence and Space’ policy window, under the ECF, with a EUR 131 billion budget. This window will address civil security industry needs. Defence industrial instruments and its budget cannot replace civil protection instruments. In addition, the Commission proposal for the next MFF foresees that dual-use R&D activities may be supported under the programme Horizon Europe 2028-2034 5 . Finally, in line with the Preparedness Union Strategy 6 , the Commission aims to boost the support to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, notably for aerial-fire-fighting means. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2653/oj/eng. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b778739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0555&qid=1753802586340. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0543. 6 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b81316ab-a513-49a1-b520b6a6e0de6986/download.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-07-28 “P-003120/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The primary responsibility for disaster preparedness and response lies with the individual Member States. The European Union has a supporting competence in the area of civil protection. When a disaster overwhelms national response capacities, the country can request assistance through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 1 . The support through the UCPM can take the form of spontaneous, direct offers of national capacities by Member States or UCPM participating states, offering of national assets precommitted to the European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP) 2 or use of the extra layer of protection financed by the Commission, the rescEU reserve 3 . The relevant national German authorities did not formally request assistance through the UCPM in the context of the floods in 2021. Germany requested the activation of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service 4 on 13 July 2021 and mapping for the affected areas in Germany was provided. 1 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/european-civil-protection-pool_en. 3 Please note that the Member States have an exact overview of their national capacities. Overviews of ECPP and rescEU capacities are available through ECHO Daily Maps from that time: https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/API/ERCC/Maps/DownloadPublicMap?contentItemID=3751&fileN=MainFil e&forceDownload=False&ext=.pdf. https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/API/ERCC/Maps/DownloadPublicMap?contentItemID=3847&fileN=MainFil e&forceDownload=False&ext=.pdf. 4 https://emergency.copernicus.eu/.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-07-24 “E-003083/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission Stockpiling, including the suggestion of specific quantities, is primarily a competence of the Member States. There is no mandatory stockpiling requirement at EU level. To support Member States, the Commission regularly organises workshops, focused on specific threats and scenarios, to discuss recommended quantities, authorised products, as well as products under development. This explicitly includes medical countermeasures from small and medium-sized enterprises. All Member States are invited to these workshops, which take place several times per year, partially in a secure format. The Commission has developed a priority list of medical countermeasures in collaboration with Member States. It serves as the basis for the last resort rescEU stockpiles of medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. A substantial share of these products were developed and are manufactured by small- and medium-sized EU enterprises. Once the medical countermeasures preparedness roadmaps for specific health emergency scenarios are established in 2026, the Commission will develop a list of candidate medical countermeasures that could be suitable for advance purchase and inclusion in the EU strategic stockpiles. This list will be based on the methodology of identification outlined in the Medical Countermeasures Strategy 1 The current rescEU legislation does not cover stockpiling of investigational products or medical countermeasures that are not authorised anywhere in the EU. Discussions are ongoing among the Commission, Member States and the European Medicines Agency to explore options for including such products in EU strategic reserves if needed. 1 Annex 2: EU strategic plan for stockpiling of medical countermeasures of the Medical Countermeasures Strategy – https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/preparing-eu-next-health-crisis-medical-countermeasuresstrategy_en.”
  Innovation incentives in medicine procurement · Government stockpiling of critical medicines
• 2025-07-24 “E-003084/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 1. The proposal for the Regulation on a monitoring framework for resilient European forests 1 does not stipulate a requirement for Member States to carry out a wildfire risk assessment. Instead, the proposal stipulates that the Commission would do this as part of providing standardised forest data under Annex I of the Regulation, based on the defined methodology for wildfire risk assessment 2 . This methodology is already implemented as part of the European Forest Fire Information System 3 . An obligation might arise if a Member State decides to opt out under Article 6 of the proposal - in that case, the Member State would need to provide the risk assessment data in accordance with the defined technical specifications. 2. Member States report data on the allocations of EU cohesion policy funds 4 used for civil protection by type of risk, as well by output and results of civil protection projects to the Commission via Information Technology system SFC2021. The Commission provides the clear and comprehensive overview of funds used for civil protection measures with the specific allocations, aggregated outputs and results per Member States 5 . In 2021-2027, the planned EU cohesion policy contribution to the category of expenditure ‘prevention or management of climate related risks: fires’ is about EUR 2.2 billion, with Italy and Spain allocating around EUR 0.5 billion of EU funds each to forest fire prevention and management measures. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-regulation-forest-monitoring-framework_en. 2 No requirements exist as part of the proposal for the use of these maps on the national level, however the indicators included in the Commission’s proposal would facilitate the production of up-to-date maps on wildfire risks in forests. 3 https://forest-fire.emergency.copernicus.eu/apps/fire.risk.viewer/. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/available-budget_en. 5 21-27 Adaptation and risk management, disaster and civil protection - Cohesion Open Data https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/stories/s/21-27-Adaptation-and-risk-management-disaster-and-/j4px-zny5.”
  EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.) · Management of EU forests
• 2025-06-30 “E-002640/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has implemented several activities to enhance the awareness and understanding of EU policies among Canadian citizens. In the current context, the EU is stepping up its outreach activities in priority areas for EU-Canada relations, such as the digital partnership, security and defence, research and innovation, trade and energy. These outreach activities include participation in important Canadian events as well as organisation of workshops and webinars on EU policies. Media are actively engaged in the EU’s outreach initiatives. For instance, the Delegation of the EU to Canada organises the EU-Canada Young Journalists Fellowship 1 every year. On 23 June 2025, at the EU – Canada Summit 2 in Brussels, the leaders agreed, among other, to work together to deepen research and innovation collaboration by leveraging Canada’s association to Horizon Europe and to increase people-to-people ties, improve mobility and recognition, including in higher education and research through Erasmus+, the European Research Council and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions. Canada already participates in the international dimension of the Erasmus+ programme and benefits from several opportunities, including exchanges of students and staff, scholarships under the Erasmus Mundus Joint Masters, and Jean Monnet activities aimed at developing EU studies worldwide. The EU is further expanding its partnerships with Canadian universities and think tanks on a number of outreach initiatives. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/canada/applications-open-eu-canada-young-journalist-fellowship2025_en. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/u5fbfl5b/st10671en25-eu-canada-joint-summit-statement.pdf.”
  EU-US relations · EU foreign policy approach
• 2025-06-30 “E-002642/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Under Directive (EU) 2016/801 1 , researchers and students are entitled to stay on the territory of the Member State after the completion of research or studies for a period of at least nine months in order to seek employment or set up a business. In addition, one of the four pillars of the Union of Skills that the Commission adopted in March 2025 2 is to attract and retain international talent. One such initiative is the EU Talent Pool 3 , the first EU-wide job matching platform to facilitate international recruitment of third country nationals residing outside the EU. As part of the upcoming visa strategy, the Commission will also consider measures to support the arrival of top students, researchers and trained workers from third countries. The ‘Choose Europe for Science’ 4 announced in May 2025, a EUR 500 million package for 2025–2027 funded through Horizon Europe, will help the EU to remain competitive in the global race for talent in the research and innovation sector. It includes the Marie SkłodowskaCurie ‘Choose Europe’ pilot, which supports early-career researchers with attractive allowances and longer employment prospects as well as a seven-year 'super grant' under the European Research Council. Additionally, the 65 European universities alliances 5 funded by Erasmus+ are a key asset for Europe global talent attractiveness. International students can benefit from many joint programmes, including from Erasmus Mundus Joint Masters programmes 6 which provide for full scholarships to the best-ranked students worldwide. Finally, the European Social Fund Plus currently supports the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights and the EU’s employment, social, education and skills policies. 1 Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing (recast), OJ L 132, 21.5.2016, p. 21–57, Article 25. 2 COM(2025) 90 final. 3 COM(2023) 716 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023PC0716. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/research-and-innovation/choose-europe_en. 5 https://education.ec.europa.eu/education-levels/higher-education/european-universities-initiative. 6 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/opportunities/opportunities-for-individuals/students/erasmus-mundus-jointmasters.”
  Recruitment policies in the EU · EU policy on brain drain
• 2025-04-01 “E-001336/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Canada is one of the EU’s closest and most long-standing partners. The relationship is rooted in shared values and is also shaped by extensive historical, cultural, political and economic links. Nonetheless, Canada does not qualify as a ‘European’ state, within the meaning of the term presently set out in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. There are no plans to revise the Treaties or to assess the benefits and possible consequences of Canadian accession to the EU.”
  EU-US relations · EU enlargement
• 2025-04-01 “E-001337/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission The Commission aims to make the EU the most attractive and secure place for both EU and non-EU scientific talent, especially amid today’s uncertainties. Europe is already a safe haven for scientists, and this role must be protected by enshrining the freedom of scientific research in EU law. The Commission will put forward a new EUR 500 million package for 2025 –2027 to make Europe a magnet for researchers. This includes the Marie Skłodowska-Curie ‘Choose Europe’ pilot, 1 which will support early-career researchers with attractive allowances and longer contracts, and a seven-year 'super grant' under the European Research Council. The EU is also making it easier for researchers to relocate and integrate. The ‘Students and Researchers’ Directive 2 provides a framework 3 for researchers to enter and reside in the EU, and the upcoming visa strategy aims to build on this by further easing migration procedures. EURAXESS 4 offers information and personalised assistance, helping researchers connect with institutions and regional innovation ecosystems. The European Research Area Act, expected in 2026, will aim to introduce measures strengthening the freedom of scientific research, research careers, mobility and coordination across Member States. The Commission supports European regions through initiatives like Regional Innovation Valleys to boost local innovation, particularly in digital and healthcare sectors. This is complemented by tools such as the Artificial Intelligence factories 5 , the European Institute of Innovation and Technology 6 , Digital Innovation Hubs 7 and Startup Europe 8 . These efforts are further supported by EU Cohesion Policy, which helps regions leverage funding to support innovation and digitalisation. 1 In addition to the ‘Choose Europe’ pilot, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Action (MSCA) provide a wide range of training, mobility and career development opportunities that are open to researchers of all nationalities, including United States researchers, for them to successfully relocate to Europe. 2 Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing (recast). 3 This framework includes, amongst others, equal treatment rights with EU citizens in many areas, possibility to bring their families to the EU, intra-EU mobility rights, right to stay for up to nine months after the end of the research to look for a job, possibility to teach while conducting research, etc. 4 https://euraxess.ec.europa.eu/. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-factories. 6 https://www.eit.europa.eu/. 7 https://european-digital-innovation-hubs.ec.europa.eu/home. 8 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/startup-europe.”
  Research priorities within the EU
• 2025-03-31 “E-001322/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission deeply regrets the US decision to impose tariffs on EU exports to the US. The Commission has taken note of the US recent decision to not apply duties of 20% for 90 days, while continuing to apply duties of 10%. Accordingly, the Commission decided to immediately pause its own EU’s countermeasures on steel and aluminum, whose scope alcoholic beverages are excluded from, for 90 days. This decision was taken precisely to allow time and space for EU-US negotiations. Any future EU response will continue to be carefully crafted to minimise the negative impact by giving priority to negotiations while adopting adequate countermeasures and promoting the diversification of our exports. The EU has at its disposal several instruments that allow addressing the impacts, including exceptional measures to address situations of market disturbance. The Commission is currently assessing the precise effects of the US tariffs on EU exports. It is also monitoring the indirect effects of such situation. So, it is still premature to conclude on market measures. The EU carries out preferential trade with close to 80 countries, so the Commission will pursue all available possibilities to grow these relationships and assist the sectors concerned, including wine, with diversifying their trade. Moreover, if swiftly adopted by the co-legislators, the recently proposed wine package 1 will increase the capacity of wine growers to respond to different challenges the sector is facing through changes in the management of production potential, adapting some labelling and production rules for dealcoholised products and extending support to consolidate external markets and for climate change adaptation. 1 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013, (EU) 2021/2115 and (EU) No 251/2014 as regards certain market rules and sectoral support measures in the wine sector and for aromatised wine products (COM/2025/137 final).”
  Export of EU agri-food products · EU-US trade relations
• 2024-11-14 “– Frau Präsidentin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Die russische Schattenflotte wird auf mindestens 600 Tanker geschätzt. Und ich habe für diese Entschließung heute gestimmt. Denn bei der russischen Schattenflotte handelt es sich um alte Schiffe, die häufig ohne Versicherung fahren und häufig ihren Namen und ihre Flaggenregistrierung ändern. Damit sind diese Schiffe eine große Gefahr für die Umwelt und die Meere – ich denke insbesondere auch an Deutschland und die Nord- und Ostsee – und verstoßen auch gegen den Geist des EU-Sanktionsregimes, denn in dieser Weise unterläuft Russland die EU-Sanktionen und steuert europäische Häfen an. Wir müssen unbedingt die Europäische Staatsanwaltschaft damit beauftragen, auch gegen diese Vergehen zu ermitteln, und das Ganze auch bei der Frage des Umweltschutzes unter Sanktionen zu stellen. Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die russische Schattenflotte verletzt europäisches Recht, und dem muss man hier ein Ende setzen.”
• 2024-11-13 “E-002510/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Article 23a of the Schengen Borders Code 1 , as provided by Regulation 2024/1717 2 , provides for a procedure under which the competent authorities of a Member State may, where the conditions laid down in that article are met, transfer a third-country national who is apprehended in the internal border areas during checks involving the competent authorities of both Member States within a bilateral cooperation framework. In addition to this transfer procedure, Member States may apply pre-existing bilateral readmission agreements or arrangements between themselves, within the meaning of Article 6(3) of the Return Directive, to transfer irregularly staying third-country nationals to another Member State 3 . Without prejudice to this provision, Article 6 of the Return Directive applies towards irregularly staying third-country nationals. Applicants for international protection can be transferred to the Member State responsible for examining their application for international protection under the Dublin Regulation 4 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders. OJ L 77, p. 1-52. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders. OJ L, p.14-15. 3 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. OJ L 348, p. 98-107. 4 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 31–59.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-09-27 “E-001863/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner On behalf of the European Commission EU law does not regulate conditions to grant residence permits to foreign investors based on investor residence schemes. The Commission has taken several initiatives to address the risks of investor residence schemes for security, money-laundering, tax evasion and corruption. In its 2022 Recommendation 1 , the Commission called on Member States to take measures to prevent such risks and cease the application of investor residence schemes for nationals of Russia and Belarus. In addition, the proposed recast of the Long-Term Residents Directive 2 includes rules to prevent third-country investors from abusively acquiring EU long-term resident status, and the Anti-Money Laundering package 3 introduces strict obligations on involved actors and requires Member States running these schemes to assess and monitor risks, and to put in place mitigating measures. According to the information available to the Commission, Hungary is not operating an investor citizenship scheme, which systematically offers citizenship in exchange for pre-determined payments or investments, without a genuine link with the Member State concerned. The Commission considers such schemes to breach EU law on Union citizenship and the principle of sincere cooperation 4 . The Commission will continue monitoring the developments in Member States, including Hungary, taking action, in accordance with its role of guardian of the treaties, where appropriate. 1 C(2022) 2028 final, Commission Recommendation on immediate steps in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in relation to investor citizenship and investor residence schemes. 2 COM(2022) 650 final. 3 In particular: Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive(EU) 2019/1937, and amending and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849; Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 4 For this reason, on 21 March 2023, the Commission has referred Malta, the only Member State operating an investor citizenship scheme to the Court of Justice in relation to its investor citizenship scheme.”
  Rule of law in Hungary · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2024-09-23 “E-001791/2024 Answer given by Vice-President Jourová on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission co-funds the Media Freedom Rapid Response 1 and is aware of the data it collects. The Commission monitors media freedom, including the safety of journalists, in all Member States, taking into account the 2021 Recommendation 2 on the safety of journalists, the package against strategic lawsuits against public participation 3 and it will also take into account the European Media Freedom Act 4 (as from 2025). The Rule of Law Report 5 makes specific recommendations to Member States, asking them to take steps to address them. 2. In her political guidelines 6 , the President-elect of the Commission referred to increased support for and protection of independent media and journalists. The Commission will take stock of the progress achieved by Member States, based on key performance indicators and the findings of the Rule of Law Reports, and will decide which additional steps are required. The Commission will also ensure the effective application of the European Media Freedom Act to protect media and journalists. 3. The Commission will ensure that the future long-term budget has strong safeguards on the rule of law - including the general regime of conditionality, applying to all EU funds, including external support. Respect for freedom of expression and media freedom falls under the fundamentals for EU accession. The Commission will continue to support candidate countries’ alignment with the EU acquis in this area, including through financial assistance. 1 https://www.mfrr.eu/ 2 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/79357 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32024L1069 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401083 5 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en 6 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU support for traditional (non-digital) media
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner Members. The EU is at a crossroads. Do we want an EU that takes its responsibility, or do we want one which has long term debts? Germany's free voter party is clear. We say no to borrowing. The Covid fund was a one off exception in a one off crisis. It wasn't a carte blanche for joint borrowing. What began as an exception cannot become the standard. Every new joint debt pushes responsibility down the road to future generations and undermines Europe's stability. That is not fair to the following generations, nor is it sustainable. Sustainability means not more debt, but it means reform. That's why we want a Europe that can remain strong, sets Priorities, but can reform and has a responsible financial policy. I will not vote in favour of debt reform.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “Thank you. Chair. Colleagues. I'm very pleased to be here as the shadow rapporteur. And I'm a member of the Budget Committee as well. And the discussion over the next MFF, um, shows that we're at a very important time, but the fate of the regions in the EU does depend on this MFF. And there are some figures here. 35, 80, 60, 33% of the EU budget for cohesion policy for rural areas, 80% of EU areas are covered 80%, and of that 80%, 60% of the EU's population lives. And if you look at it that way, in in Germany, we have very many rural areas that are dependent on the regional funds to make up for the problems with living standards. But the bad news is from Brussels and from Mrs. von der Leyen is that, uh, that there are problems looming. This principle of regional promotion, I think, needs to be our guiding principle. In July, Mrs. von der Leyen presented the MFF proposal, which marked the end of cohesion policy as we know it. National and regional partnership plans mean centralization and political control by capitals. That isn't cooperation. Secondly. This led to a wave of dissatisfaction at all levels of administration and with all political groups, which we've seen here in Reggie and Mrs. von der Leyen's response a Non-paper and then the Non-paper. It showed us how seriously she considers the concerns of members here, i.e. not very seriously. We are expecting a highly amended MFF where there are clear guarantees for the regions, and to date that hasn't been forthcoming. Thirdly, what we do have is a proposal to change article ten, where at least 10% of the finance will be for rural areas.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• “Let me remind you of my of three figures, 35, 80 and 60, 60% of the population will only get 10% of the finance. Well. In terms of, um, the people, People are going to suffer in rural areas. And fourthly, the Non-paper talks about the regional check. But the way it's presented, it looks like just an exercise in red tape by the those in power. We're waiting for national authorities to check up with the regional authorities on what they need. Imagine Viktor Orban consulting the mayors from opposing parties. Next. This doesn't look very serious in work in the Regi committee. I hope that we can send a strong signal that we're not giving up in terms of the region's competences. I think regions need to have an appropriate role, a The strong amount of budgetary control. The connectivity principle, which was voted on in Afco and there has to be direct financing of local authorities. After virtually 40 years as a local politician and a mayor myself, let me just say regions are not begging for money. They're just asking for their fair share, because the regions have paid via taxes with people's hard work in the regions, in rural areas. Life isn't easy in those places, and we've paid for this. And I hope that this message gets through to the president of the European Commission so that we can work with common sense as we move forward. Thank you.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• “Thank you, Madam President. This citizens initiative offers us an opportunity to showcase the treasures of our regions. That's our cultural and geographical heritage. Just think of the wine roots in the Rhineland-Palatinate festival. To the Moselle, the Eiffel Tower and many more. These are treasures which are also sustainable tourism. Tourism destinations. We need more of these. We need more tourist destinations with the support of the EU. In the Palatinate and throughout Germany, because we have great untapped tourist potential to develop. Of course. Not everything is gold, but we have so many beautiful places that we can be proud of, and we should let these stars shine out. I think with the involvement of citizens on the ground in these localities, I look forward to developing such initiatives because I think sustainable tourism is an important goal for the 21st century.”
  EU strategy for tourism development