Kai TEGETHOFF

Policy topics Kai TEGETHOFF is active on

What Kai TEGETHOFF has said (50)

• 2026-07-15 “(15:14:15 - 15:16:24): Thank you, dear ministers. Thanks for being with us here today. I was very pleased to see, in the Irish presidency program that the also hear today from you, that the files of the passenger package are listed as 1 of your transport priorities. As parliament's on the rail ticketing regulation, I truly believe that this is a file where we can deliver something very concrete for citizens. For passengers, this is not an abstract market file. It's about making it easier to find, compare, and to book rail journeys across borders. And it is about avoiding the situation where people need several apps, several tickets, and still don't know what happens if they, in the end, miss a connection. I think we can all agree, that this package responds to something citizens have been expecting for years already, which is simpler booking, clearer information, and stronger, protection when they travel. Parliament will take this work very seriously, and I also hope that council will also move with the necessary ambition there. My 1st question is therefore on the timeline of this. How do you intend to organize work on the rail ticketing regulation and also in the wider context on the whole passenger package in council? And does the presidency already have a position, on the rail ticketing regulation or on the package as a whole? And my 2nd question is on the multimodal passenger rights. Does the presidency now that after 9 or 10 months, we already, started the trialogue and just concluded the air passenger rights and the, enforcement of passenger rights files, Does the presidency now intend to resume the work on this file and, or do you see, for example, in any way, a connection to, for example, the passenger rights, passenger package? Thank you.”
  EU support of rail transport
• 2026-07-08 “(11:52:05 - 11:53:08): Thank you, chair commissioner colleagues. The data is clear. The next climate refugees will be us. It will be families in Spain, Portugal, or Italy forced to leave towns their grandparents built because the climate is just too hot. In Andalusia right now, experts are using crop planting methods once reserved for the Sahara because that's what Europe's soil is turning into. Yet some still prefer just distracting citizens. Today, we again listen to some of your climate lies that, in the end, only serve and protect the wealthy. Those who are building climatized luxury bunkers because they know what's coming as do you. You're just fooling your own voters. We need a European plan to work with nature, to update our infrastructure before our own citizens are forced to flee it. Let's stop pretending the danger is somewhere out at the gates. The danger is right here in our own ranks.”
  EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
• 2026-06-22 “(17:15:34 – 17:17:27): Dear chair, dear colleagues, thank you. On behalf of Per Holmgren as co sponsor, I'm reading, these notes. As Europe faces yet another summer of record breaking heat, we are reminded that the climate crisis is not a distant threat, but a reality already affecting people across our continent. COP 31 will therefore be a crucial moment to move from commitments to implementation and to ensure that the EU continues to show leadership in climate ambition. The parliament must remain firm in its commitment to climate action. The adoption of the EU's 20 40 climate target was an important milestone, but the EU must ensure that member states' national energy and climate plans include sufficient measures to achieve the EU's 20 30 targets. At the same time, the EU must call on all parties globally, especially major emitters, to step up their efforts if we are to keep the Paris Agreement within reach. The parliament must also remain strong in supporting the transition away from fossil fuels. We welcome the growing momentum towards transitioning away from fossil fuels, including the conference, held in Colombia earlier this year. The conference must now deliver concrete progress on the transition away from fossil fuels for all parties. COP 31 must deliver concrete progress on the implementation of, the just transition mechanism. You must also continue to lead by example and ensure predictable and adequate financial support for climate action, for adaptation and resilience, and particular in the most vulnerable countries, and continue also to push in negotiations for the global climate finance gap to be addressed. We look forward to working with the negotiating teams to achieve a strong, ambitious, and forward looking resolution for COP 31. Thank you.”
  Climate policy
• 2026-02-10 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question 1. It corresponds to Member States to formulate and execute their social aid programmes [1] . Portugal (and its autonomous regions of Azores/Madeira) can legislate on transport subsidies, passenger benefits, and territorial schemes, provided they respect EU law. In particular, Article 51 of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) [2] specifies the conditions for compatibility of national aid measures for air transport benefiting residents of remote regions. This regulation exempts this type of social aid from the obligation of prior notification to the Commission, provided that the conditions laid down in the GBER are fulfilled . Therefore, the Commission has not assessed the Portuguese Social Mobility Subsidy ( SSM) scheme. 2. Member States are responsible for designing, implementing and evaluating efficiency of their social aid programmes and may determine the method by which aid is delivered. EU law does not prescribe a specific disbursement mechanism: both direct price reductions applied at the point of sale and post-purchase reimbursement systems may be used. The choice between these approaches is therefore a matter of national policy. 3. EU law permits Member States to impose a public service obligation (PSO) for scheduled air services between an airport in the Union and an airport serving a peripheral or development region [3] . Member States may use either PSOs or social aid granted under Article 51 GBER or both mechanisms to address the connectivity needs of residents of remote and outermost regions, depending on their specific circumstances. [1] Art. 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) specifies that the EU role in this area is only that of supporting and complementing the activities of the Member States in this field , https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12016ME%2FTXT. [2] Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:02014R0651-20230701. [3] Art. 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1008/oj/eng.”
  Funding for OCTs and outermost regions
• “We are offering free allowances until 2030. Covering basically 95% of the cost difference between the sustainable aviation fuels and the conventional fuels. Effectively, this is a contract for difference. Shouldn't airlines actually be a lot more assertive in demanding the sustainable aviation through fuels from the suppliers? Um, because to actually have this compelling business model, we also need a strong and predictable demand, um, not only for the producers, but also to, to incentivise the necessary investments, because we know that for for scaling up the, the production, um, it requires a huge amount of investment and also for this for this needed risk reduction, we would need a strong demand there. And then also in this context, what would your opinion be on the potential role of public or government backed market intermediaries to bridge this gap so those intermediaries could, for example, align long investment cycles of around ten years with those shorter, fewer contracts of 3 to 5 years, and by this then also boosting the investor confidence in the whole supply chain. So basically, how do we make this a sustainable aviation through an actual business case? Thank you.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• “Yes. Thank you. From Tran's side, we see the draft report as a solid base for further negotiations as it brings back more structure and predictability. Our first priority is the cross border dimension as also, already mentioned, before and the annex. The annex was meant to illustrate the cross border dimension referred to in the regulation, nothing more, nothing less. Keeping the annex can create the impression, that a project would or should get priority for funding simply because it is included in the list. The commission and council have both made very clear that this is not the case. Starting from this, we believe it is cleaner to define the cross border dimension directly in the text and just delete the annex. Second, we support the cohabitors in the, on the separation between transport and military mobility envelopes. We recognize the importance of the military mobility, but civilian transport priorities should not be put in competition with it, and we do not want to take the risk of crowding out the civilian envelope. Third, we support a clearer separation between objectives and eligible actions. Article 3 should define the objectives of the program, while a separate article should define the eligible actions. This is important for legal clarity, but also to know exactly what can and should be funded. Fourth, on work programs, we support delegated acts. We also think European coordinators should be consulted when the work programs are prepared because they know their corridors, bottlenecks, implementation gaps, and are regular contact with the local and regional authorities. Fifth, we also believe award criteria should be included in the Basis Act. Flexibility is useful, but the regulation should still set the main criteria guiding, project selection. This would make project selection more transparent and predictable. Finally, I want to say few words on the performance regulation. We have very strong concerns about the approach taken in the draft report. A single harmonized system can reduce fragmentation, make reporting more comparable, and give parliament a clearer picture of what EU spending actually delivers. But if we now start adding exemptions or shortcuts on do no significant harm and climate tracking, we are not simplifying. We are doing the opposite and risk fragmenting the new framework before it has even started. For us, CEF should remain aligned with the horizontal performance regulation, not create program specific rules that weaken its coherence. Thank you.”
  EU cohesion/structural-fund architecture: consolidation vs ring-fenced separate funds · EU transport infrastructure integration
• “Dear colleagues on the conservative and far right benches, you want to talk competitiveness. So let's do that. Look at the news. Just days after the strikes in the Middle East, gas prices were already skyrocketing. That's the real tax on European business. Our crippling dependence on imported fossil fuels. Yet you use competitiveness as a trump card to unpick the ETS. Our most powerful market driven tool for green innovation, the ETS is not a burden. It's the very tool that incentivizes technical innovation that lets us build energy independence and domestic clean technology, and that ultimately drives our competitiveness. True competitiveness won't come from protecting the system that let us fall behind in the first place. Come back to future colleagues by holding us back. You're not protecting our economy. You're simply misunderstanding it and destroying our chance to catch up with the rest of the world and to adapt our economy, economic growth to planetary boundaries.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “Yes. Thank you. Um, I just want to address a question to Mr. Regan. Um, given our use objective to shift more freight to rail. Um, and you mentioned very many examples of bureaucratic, um, burden. Um, in your sector. But how much of the bureaucratic burden, um, actually comes from the lack of harmonisation across member states? Um, something like differences in signal signalling systems, languages or national rules. So and then from your perspective, also, what role should the EU play in accelerating the removal of, um, these cross-border barriers and especially what role can we in the Parliament and here in this committee, um, play to support you there? Um, and then second, we have the EU agency for Railways, the ERA. It was created to simplify cross-border operations and reduce administrative administrative complexity through a single European approach to safety and certification. You already mentioned that the ERA clearly has not enough resources. Um, just want to underline this. But from your perspective, where are there still bottlenecks in how authorizations and certifications are handled across member states? And should the ERA maybe even get a little.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• “Yes. First of all, thank you for the presentation. Let me start by recognizing the quality and the outcome of the study. It highlights a number of important and very concrete findings. For example, combined transport reduces external costs compared with road only freight when it comes to emissions congestions, accidents and noise. It also uses the strength of each mode road for the first and last mile and rail, inland waterways or short sea for the longer distance where they are more energy and cost efficient. And also, it confirms that combined transport remains one of the most effective tools to achieve modal shift when the right conditions are in place, for example, reliable services, sufficient capacity and targeted support. These are valuable evidence based conclusions. But we have this exchange now in a very peculiar moment. The study shows that combined transport brings tangible benefits and has real potential to support EU climate and transport objectives. And yet, the Commission has announced its intention to withdraw the proposal. So we understand the argument that there has been no movement in Parliament or council, but the proposal was tabled in November 2023, at a time when Parliament was entering an election and transition cycle not exactly the ideal moment to advance a complex file. May I also remind that the proposal was published several months after the publication of the text from the Greening Fright Package. So the key questions are why not give the institutions the time they realistically need to start their work? And why is the Commission not actively encouraging progress now that new evidence clearly shows the relevance of combined transport at a moment when we need every tool to support rail freight, reduce emissions and build resilient logistics, withdrawing a useful instrument seems counterintuitive.”
  EU support of rail transport
• “Yes.Thank you. Um, I would like to ask you two questions. Uh, complimenting your presentation. Uh, thank you for this. Of course. First of all, um, and first, the other report emphasizes that the non CO2 emissions from aviation are as harmful as the CO2 emissions, if not even more so. Um, and with the uptake of sustainable aviation fuel, of course this would help. But as we know, the availability in the coming decades will be still limited. And so we also need to work on uh, reducing the non CO2 emissions in conventional jet fuel. So um, in this context, especially the aromatic content plays a crucial role, and there has been already a pilot project in 2023 from our committee here working on optimizing the jet fuel composition to especially also focusing on the reduction of the aromatic content. Um, what is your view on this? What is are the the necessary next steps to be taken at European level, especially also regarding the reduction of aromatic content of the conventional jet fuel fuel, and how does also the Clean Aviation joint undertaking contribute especially to this aspect? And second, for the sustainable aviation fuel ramp up? Um, so we know that already, especially for the goals after 2030 or 2035, we will need a real domestic, um, business model for sustainable aviation fuels right now under the ETS Aviation Directive.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• “Trump wants one thing. It divided Europe because a divided Europe is easier to break. And the saddest part is some people in this house are playing along. But a united Europe is a stronger Europe. Joint climate disaster fund, cross-border rescue teams, early warning systems built together. That is Europe at its best. United in crisis, stronger than any single nation could ever be alone. Trumpists see this strength and they fear it. They are pulling the oldest puppet trick in the box. Praise authoritarians and whisper to conservatives that courage is optional. And to many of you are falling for it. Worse, some of you don't even fall. You follow. If you agree with them, just say it clearly. If you don't prove it, we need a United States of Europe now. It's not naive. It's courage. Cultivated.”
  EU political integration
• “The IT and digital sovereignty in budget line 2101 which also has the computing and telecommunications. We see an increase of almost 10%. Is this growth directly tied to the procurement of European solutions to bolster our digital sovereignty? Um, if so, if this is the case, it is explainable. If not, has the administration conducted a formal risk assessment regarding our continued reliance on non European providers? Because also unless um I or we have missed it so far. This time, the preliminary draft estimates lack a dedicated IT chapter to explain these figures. So there are some clarification is definitely welcome. And on the cybersecurity plan we do need a clearer roadmap. Um for example, what are the projected long term budgetary impacts of this plan beyond the current financial year? And the third part is the staff travel and missions. So the fourth largest item increase in this budget is linked to the staff missions and travel in this era of hybrid work and advanced digital collaboration tools. And knowing also, of course, that let's say the Strasbourg travel is not exactly a PR success for us, how are we to justify this upward trend? And should we not rather focus on decreasing our overall mission related expenditure there? Thank you.”
  EP seat in Strasbourg · EU digital & tech sovereignty · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• “Yes. Thank you. Exactly. So since Reinier van Lanschot cannot be here today, I will also talk a little bit on on the behalf of the other side. Um, first of all, thanks a lot to the Co-rapporteurs and the teams, the secretariats, for all the work on the draft report that you have been presenting here today. Um, we do share the view that the speed is very important. Um, to, to get the Moldova facility, um, implemented ahead of Moldova's parliamentary elections. Um, of course, at the same time, we also want to carry out our parliamentary duty, duty to carefully scrutinise and also to exercise our co-legislator role. So in this way, we look forward to to try to come as quick as possible to the best possible result and do our share in that regard. Um, concerning the content, we also fully agree with the co-rapporteurs suggestions to increase the Pre-financing to 20%, and to also find ways to increase the effective volume of grants to also increase, um, the support for capacity building, and also that addition of a dedicated dialogue to ensure a proper parliamentary scrutiny. So all of these are very good suggestions. We very much appreciate that. And secondly, also, we do see it as a very positive sign that the Moldova facility follows the logic of the Western Balkans facility and the good results of the Western Balkans facility is very much a result of the good work in the Parliament that has been done back then.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• “Heat wave hits a village already omnipresent last summer, this summer and probably every future summer from now on. But still, we are not taking adequate action to fight the root cause of the problem. Climate change. Heat wave after heat wave. Commission president von der Leyen yesterday talked here about heat waves and I here in support what you say, Commissioner, but at the same time, the commission is missing action showcases in a hurtful way that there actually is no commitment to act, no strategy to address health problems of our citizens in overheated cities. No credible action on droughts, no credible attempts to save our forests, water bodies, or to restore nature. No political will to change our ways of life accordingly. Standing ovations for the difficult and dangerous work of firefighters are nice, but they don't even address the core of the problem. We need to act, step up our efforts on mitigation, and finally start to actually adapt to the ongoing climate change.”
  Climate efforts · EU climate adaptation and disaster preparedness
• “Yes thank you chair. Thank you. Commissioner. Um, talking about the corporate fleets proposal, it sets targets for both cars and vans covering both battery electric and plug in hybrids. Um, yet looking into the impact assessment, um, you clearly see and it clearly states that setting targets for vehicles other than zero emission would be, and I quote, inconsistent with existing legislation would be would fail to contribute to the objective of making zero emission vehicles more attractive and would not give sufficient certainty to vehicle manufacturers. In fact, also we see right now in member states trends to phase out support schemes for plug in hybrids because they are too expensive and they just don't deliver on the emission reductions they pretend to do. This is not only in Belgium the case, but also, for example, in Eastern European member states. The rest of the impact assessment does not take into account those options with plug in hybrids, and only takes zero emission vehicles into account. So, Commissioner, how come how come that despite this impact assessment, you come up with a completely different proposal, and with a proposal that has less of an impact on greenhouse gas emissions, brings less affordable EVs. On the second hand market, and is even more expensive for large companies. I would really be interested in your reasoning for this or in your words. This is a real conundrum for me.”
  Road transport environmental policy · Corporate fleet electrification: binding zero-emission quotas vs. voluntary approach · 2035 ICE phase-out: strict zero-emission target vs. flexibility for carmakers
• “And one point that we do see some room for improvement is in clarifying the wording on the specific objectives, for example, with regard to supporting the youth, promoting cross-border community projects, or also supporting the community communication to strengthen the favoured vision of enlargement, for example, or security aspects such as defence against hybrid warfare, and also in respect for the do no significant harm principle. Um, we know that we want to um, also, if it is in the in the context of the Malta Moldova facility may be complicated still and hold up the green conditionalities in that facility. Um, finally, I would also come back to the role of Parliament, and here we think it we still need to keep in mind the issue of delegated acts. I think it is very important that we as a European Parliament, in the end, have a say about the financing of, uh, of of this facility in the end. And so therefore I would recommend to have a focus on this, amend it in this regard, or at least keep in the further process a close eye on that to make sure that we still have have it in our hands. Thanks again for all the work, and I'm very much looking forward to a very constructive negotiations and negotiations in the next weeks and months on that. Thank you.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Thank you. Chair. Dear Commissioner. Last week's heatwave was yet another wake up call. We need to drastically scale up the protection of our water resources and safeguard our citizens from extreme heat. I am glad to see that the Commission plans to prioritise nature based solutions under the Water Resilience Strategy. Nevertheless, the strategy is notably light on legislation. Can you share further details on whether we can expect a legislative proposal to enhance our water resilience, for example, in the form of a climate adaptation plan next year? And second, in the years since I became an MEP, I have become aware of what feels like countless scientific studies documenting the increasing presence of toxic, forever chemicals in our tap water, our waterways, and even our wine, not to mention the hugely damaging effects they have on human health. The latest I am aware of was just published last Thursday and concluded and dear chair, you will not like to hear that. It concluded that every single person in the Netherlands has PFAS in their blood. It's unlikely that it's a lot different in other countries. Commissioner, could you please provide an explanation as to why, despite its bold rhetoric, the water resilience strategy contains almost nothing on preventing PFAS pollution at source. And why is the Commission unprepared to hold to account those responsible for poisoning our waterways in the first place?”
  PFAs
• “Yes. Thank you to the rapporteur. First of all, for for this report, I want to highlight some points. Um, first on water saving and water efficiency. So I think we really need to understand that we need those binding saving targets and efficiency goals. Without those, it just doesn't work. Um, and at the same time, we also see a push that call for a right for economic use of water, as we have seen in the Blue Deal declaration of the EEC. Um, so this is the wrong direction. We cannot just, um, say we have need to have the right for economic use. We first have to protect the water resources. And this, uh, needs those targets from heavy industry to agriculture. The second point on water pollution. We are talking about the forever chemicals PFAS so often. But we also need to follow up on this with action. And we have to make sure, first of all, those PFAS are not being released into into surface and ground water anymore. And we also need the measures to really understand and monitor those PFAS levels in all water bodies and also in a in a group approach for all those different substances called PFAS. And so far and without this binding legislation, this does not happen.”
  Water pollution
• “And Switzerland is part of the European system through the Land Transport Agreement. This means it is bound by our EU rules and yet now we have a situation where a key corridor is subject to unilateral national measures. So I would like to ask you three questions a little bit more in detail. You of course mentioned your concerns about that situation. But how do you. Maybe a little bit more formally speaking, assess the compatibility of those Swiss measures with the EU Switzerland land transport agreement. Second then maybe also give us a little bit more of your insights if there was already that European process underway. How did we actually end up that? We have those unilateral measures and Switzerland decided to go this this path by themselves. And third, what can you. And you mentioned you, you want to try to solve the situation, but what can you actually do now to bring this back to a coordinated European approach? And maybe also to avoid similar situations in the future, because we still don't fully know what actually went wrong in this process. Thank you.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• “Yes. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Edenhofer. Um, that's a very interesting, um, report that you're presenting there. And I've tried to listen very carefully to the to the different aspects that you're bringing up. Um, I want to first start with your, uh, report on the 2040 climate targets. Um, from June 2023. Because there you stated very clearly that the EU has already exhausted its fair share of the global emissions budget, and the only way forward, if Europe still wants to contribute fairly to the Paris Agreement, is to pursue the more ambitious end of the 2040 target range, meaning basically, uh, -95% by 2040. Um, and that's what it says ambitious domestic emissions reductions that can only be complemented by measures outside the EU. The first recommendation now and what we also have seen um, in the in the discussion so far, um, is might be going into a different direction. So I would also, uh, stress the concerns that already have been, Yeah. Voiced by Vulcan that we should not use. Uh, like the, um, the reductions in other countries to make up for for our not complying with with the targets. Um, and then also now the report, you say, um, the first recommendation is to set separate legally binding targets for gross emission reductions, permanent removals and temporary removals. Um, could you maybe also in that whole context, um, kind of elaborate a little bit more, why those separate targets are important for the post 2030, um, EU climate policy framework and maybe also, um, on your, uh, view on the international, uh, reduction approach. And second, um, for your recommendation to you are, um, going into the importance of robust monitoring, reporting and verification systems and mentioning the EU's carbon removal certification framework. Um, right now, the Commission's Carbon Removal Expert group is developing the certification methodologies for the issuance of the CRC units. What advice would you give, um, for this development? Um, and what aspects would you think are very important to ensure, ensure the high credibility of the CRC issued units? Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “(17:10:32 – 17:12:58): Yes. Thanks a lot. So the message that you deliver is quite clear. People are already living with this crisis. And the 1 report title also says it all, overheated, underprepared. Citizens are anxious about the future, feel powerless. Too few know what adaptation measures actually exist. That is a failure of governance, and it must be a public responsibility. The scientific advisory board is right to call our current approach fragmented and incoherent. We have 27 patchworks of national plans of an underfunded, rarely binding, and disconnected from the climate neutrality agenda. And we know risks do not respect borders. A drought in the Rhine Basin or a wildfire in the Mediterranean or a flooding in the Oda region, these are shared European risks that demand shared European action. So thank you for your 2 presentations, but we have this exchange also in the light of the upcoming European climate resilience framework. So let me be very clear about what we expect from the upcoming proposal. This would be, 1st, binding adaptation targets, not only voluntary ambitions. 2nd, a dedicated and ring fenced financing so that adaptation is no longer the poor cousin of mitigation. And 3rd, nature based solutions at the heart of the framework. Restored wetlands that absorb floodwater or urban green spaces that cool our cities and protect the most vulnerable or healthy forests and rivers that build resilience while delivering for biodiversity, these are not luxuries. These are the most cost effective insurances we have. So I have only 1 question, and this is more to commission. The scientific advisory board has called our current approach fragmented and incoherent, and this is the good assessment of the current situation. And we have the clear explicit recommendation of binding adaptation targets. So what can we actually expect from your upcoming proposal? Will it contain binding targets? Will it contain ring fenced financing for adaptation, or how will you address those demands and current needs? Thank you.”
  EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
• “Thank you, chair. We are strongly committed to a good and stable relationship with the US. That won't change. But as world. We cannot support this deal. It's enough. Sometimes when your partner crosses a line, you have to tell them. And the US. Or rather, Trump and his cabinet have been crossing lines with Europe for a while now. On a daily basis, we have to stand up. A good trade deal should work for both sides, and this one simply doesn't. And it's rather a product of coercion and not of negotiation. Europe should not concede under pressure, but negotiate from strength and protect our own interests. Let's get back on the negotiation table and make a deal that works for both.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Yes. Thank you. Chair. I will speak on behalf of our shadow rapporteur, Vincent Maza, who can't be here today in the afternoon. First of all, I would like to start by thanking the rapporteur for leading the process and for the strong fight on the file. Parliament has said enough after an unprecedented case in which the council forced a second reading driven by the interests of airlines rather than the rights of passengers. Forcing the interinstitutional machinery in this way is unacceptable. In the third trilogue, it became evident that the council had no intention of negotiating, arriving without a mandate and without real proposals, driving the process into a deadlock. From there, the final stage of the legislative process, conciliation, will begin with the same negotiating approach concrete progress and not a single step backwards on rights. Parliament has consistently worked to strengthen passenger rights, resisting attempts by some member states influenced by the aviation industry to weaken them. It has defended equal rights for passengers with reduced mobility, including the right to travel with an accompanying person at no unjustified cost. Parliament also demands automatic, transparent and easily accessible compensation for delays and cancellations. Additionally, it has acted as a safeguard against abusive airline practices such as excessive charges for hand luggage or airport check in taking a firm stand to protect European consumers. Thank you.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• “Especially considering the fact that your sector might be seen as a very good example where we need strong EU regulation to actually reduce the administrative burden. Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “(14:52:13 – 14:54:34): Yes. Thank you. I would like to start, by thanking the reporter for this very, yeah, for her draft opinion as a very solid basis, for the negotiations. I think there's several elements we strongly welcome. First, the draft gives transport and, transport infrastructure a clearer place in the, NRPPs, which is important because transport is not just another investment area. It's essential for, cohesion, territorial accessibility, and, the functioning of the internal market. We also welcome the link with the completion of the TNT network, including the 2030, 2040, 2050 deadlines. These deadlines will only be credible if they are reflected in, yeah, national and regional investment planning. Finally, we also welcome the recognition that the NRPPs and the CEF must work together. So and that brings me to my first priority. That is the complementarity with the connecting Europe facility. The CEF must remain the main instrument for cross border transport infrastructure with high European added value, but it cannot finance everything. So the NRPPs should therefore support the national and regional parts that make European corridors work in practice, access routes, urban nodes, multimodal hubs, freight terminals, last mile connections, and domestic bottlenecks. So these 2 instruments in the end must work hand in hand if we are serious about completing the 10 t. Second priority is to make sure transport is clearly visible in the plans and, also adequately funded. In such a broad instrument, there's a real risk that, transport becomes diluted among many competing objectives. We therefore need clear references to rail, regional and urban, public transport, multimodal connectivity, interoperability, safety, resilience, and accessibility. And our third priority is governance. Transport priorities must be identified early together with those who have the expertise on the ground. So regions, cities, transport authorities, and relevant stakeholders. And their involvement should not be a box ticking exercise, but part of the preparation, monitoring, and evaluation of the plans. So we are ready to work constructively on this draft with the objective of making the NRPPs a real tool for completing the 10 t and supporting sustainable mobility across Europe. Thank you.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• “Yes. Thank you, dear ministers, for your presentation of the program here today with us. Um, the president, this program underlines that cross-border passenger rights are an important element in ensuring European mobility. The presidency will work towards transparent and clear passenger rights for all modes of transport. That's what it says in the programme. And also, um, you refer specifically to the enforcement file and the passenger rights file, as also already presented here today and mentioned by several colleagues. Um, I won't spend too much time on the air passenger rights, but, um, I do want to mention the the chosen procedure in council and also the council's position. Um, because we do not believe that this, uh, respects the principle of sincere cooperation. And this puts us all under unnecessary time pressure. Um, from the parliamentary point of view. We will not accept that, um, procedural tricks are being used to undermine passenger rights of our citizens. So we want the case law on both compensation and free hand luggage to be respected. And I think this is an important point. Um, and then last but not least, um, I want to echo what, um, colleague Jessica already mentioned that in this, um, package. Um, there's one file that that you are not mentioning that is the multimodal passenger rights, um, file. So I would love to hear from you. Um, your, your position of whether you intend to work on this. And we'll start trialogues on this as this is also, uh, yeah, quite important one in that context. Thank you.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• “(17:14:39 – 17:17:04): Yes. Thank you, first of all, for that study. Very interesting and also useful useful for our work in, in Trane. If anything, I would just have, wished to receive it earlier so that, we, we could have, let our amendments be guided by it more. So there are several elements that I strongly welcome. First, the study confirms, self transport as the EU level backbone for strategic transport investment, especially for cross border, corridor on core 10 t projects. And it also rightly warns against the dilution of transport priorities into inside those broader envelopes. Second, I welcome the logic on complementarity between SEF and the NRPPs. CEF for the European cross border projects and the NRPPs for the national regional last mile investments that make the network then work in practice. And third, the emphasis on ERTMS and rail digitalization is very important as 1 of the areas where EU level intervention is clearly needed and justified. And finally, well, I also strongly welcome the warning on flexibility. Flexibility is necessary, but it must not become open ended fungibility. So I think that's that's clear. I have 3 questions for you. First, on the performance regulation. Could you maybe explain a little bit more in detail why the horizontal framework is necessary and why transport specific indicators should complement it rather than replace it? Then second, on technical assistance, how do we design it so that it helps weaker administrations prepare major 10 t and rail projects instead of simply rewarding those with already strong capacities. And third, the, study sees a useful role for the ECF in supporting the industrial capacity behind transport technologies, including ERTMS and, FRMCS? How can we make sure the ECF actively contributes to these transport prior priorities in complementarity to the CEF? Thank you.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU transport infrastructure integration
• “German car manufacturing. Or in von der Leyen's words, the pride of Europe is fighting for its life. We are watching others win a race we should be leading. Why? Because we have an establishment that is terrified of losing voters to the right. Those who called this debate today are in the business of fear tactics. And as we saw in the introduction already also of plain lies, they are far more obsessed with protecting corporate interests than the workers they claim to speak for. Meanwhile, the world is going electric with or without us. Colleagues, every moment you delay, you are actively destroying our industrial base and handing market share to Beijing. Stop the foot dragging, not electrification. Your hesitation is costing jobs. Let's put all of Europe's talent and expertise into our car industry's electric future. Commit to the 2035 target, and let's prove and ensure that Made in Europe still means number one.”
  2035 ICE phase-out: strict zero-emission target vs. flexibility for carmakers · Powertrain choice: EV-only pathway vs. equal support for hybrids, e-fuels, H2 · Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. Thank you to all the panelists also for for your presentations. I would like to ask you about the CO2 emission targets. So, Miss Matera. Um, you you presented, um, like, everything that that concerns your sector. And I guess your the charging sector has been definitely, um, profiting from the CO2 targets. Um, obviously, um, and in this sense, something that might be perceived as administrative burden, um, has been advantaged to to your sector. Um, maybe everything that reduces also the gap in cost between, um, electric vehicles and combustion engine powered cars. Um, to Also. Yeah. For the benefit of your sector. Um, it would be interesting to see your views in this regard. And what other aspects you see that that might help in this transition there. And then to Mr. Schultz. Um, I really would love to hear your view on the CO2 emission targets because, um, you, um, expressed the goal that the EU should enable you to innovate, basically. Um, so the you use CO2 emission targets, um, from my perspective, have driven EU car makers to accelerate electric vehicle development and are on the way to to helping you to compete with China's manufacturers. Um, if the EU would not have set such targets, then China might even have rather focus on competing with combustion engines. And actually, we see this already. Um, right now, um, uh, as, uh. Yeah, the sales for combustion engines have grown on the back of EU tariffs. So, um, would you see the EU two EU CO2 emission targets, um, somewhere in one of your three categories that you, uh, proposed in your, in your presentation, or would you rather see this as a complete, um, separate thing that, that we don't need to worry about for now?”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “1 in 25 people at the Cop 30 was a fossil fuel lobbyist, the same lobbyists who were getting conservatives and the far right in this house to do their dirty work for them. It is you, more than half of this Parliament that spent months weakening Europe's climate targets, so that we would show up at Cop 30 with as little leverage as possible. As a result, we looked unsure and smaller than we are at a time where the US has left a gap for climate leadership that Europe should fill. It is citizens that are victims of your sabotage colleagues, instead of chasing short sighted political wins. Let us focus on what the world expects from the EU. As citizens increasingly suffer under the intensifying climate crisis, will you keep wasting their money for tactical lies or join the fight for a livable planet? **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Co-Chair: Martin Günther.”
  Climate efforts
• “Yes. Thank you, Commissioner, for the presentation. My first question goes in a very similar direction. The 2030 requirement for multimodal passenger hubs is a major opportunity to improve seamless travel in our cities. How will the Commission help urban nodes ensure that these hubs are not only delivered on time, but also actually designed to generally improve integration between local, regional and long distance services? I will keep it that short. I think it's connecting very well to the question from Christoph. And second, on the bright side, the 2040 deadline for multimodal terminals involves infrastructure with long planning and permitting timelines. How do you envisage accompanying member states and cities in the early phases, from land use planning to financing strategies, so that work on those freight terminals begins early enough to then later on meet the long term objectives laid down in the regulation. Thank you.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• “100 days. That's all it has taken. President von der Leyen to give in to the dinosaurs of industry, and to the pressure of her own party by butchering important corporate sustainability laws before they were even implemented, by advancing a migration policy that gives in to the far right and paves the way for detention centers in third countries, and by weakening essential rules for reducing CO2 emissions of cars. We are at risk of heading in the wrong direction. My suggestion for the next 100 days. Stop giving into the panic. Come forward with a bold plan to reform our European Union. Empower innovators instead of dinosaurs. Attract the best talent from all around the world. Increase female participation. Get the maximum value for citizens from the EU budget. Pave the ground for a European Army now and prepare the EU for ambitious enlargement. We want the United States of Europe. This is getting more urgent than ever before, day by day.”
  EU political integration
• “Imagine. Imagine the electric vehicle market as a football match EU against the rest of the world. In the first half we slept. We fell behind by one goal. Our team, our industry was not competitive. Now we are in the second half. We need to catch up and the team can out of the dressing room motivated and full of drive. The sales numbers in 2025 for electric vehicles are reaching record highs and despite a clear strategy. Suddenly the coach is waving the team in the opposite direction, letting go the own strategy and goals and creating huge uncertainty for the sector, emitting another tens of megatons of CO2 emissions. Having to import another billions of euros worth of fossil fuels, slowing down the momentum to finally get small, cheap European electric vehicles on the market that we desperately need to score a goal, this proposal leaves us even further behind. Soon, China will control the entire battery charging supply chain. The new score is 0 to 2 and the coach is standing at the sideline dancing and cheering loudly. What a disgrace.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “I hear every day that the automotive industry is struggling to meet its targets, cannot afford to pay its fines, will have to lay off its workers. Yes, the sector faces struggles, but these are of its own doing. Some fail to recognize global headwinds and stuck their heads in the sand instead of adapting. Here's a fact the CO2 targets work. We parliamentarians love to gather here in this hemicycle and talk about European competitiveness, but do we genuinely think that rolling back our targets, damaging investment, certainty, rewarding laggards, and penalizing first movers will do anything for Europe's car industry. Other than leave it further behind China's. There's blood in the water and the sharks have smelt it. If you think the car industry has any intention to comply with the targets in 2027, you are sadly mistaken. Instead, their next goal will be to tear down the 2035 goal in total. Yes, the automotive plan contains some nice ideas. Give us a legislative proposal for the electrification of corporate fleets as soon as possible. But opening the targets is a huge mistake and the commission needs to take it off the table.”
  2035 ICE phase-out: strict zero-emission target vs. flexibility for carmakers · Corporate fleet electrification: binding zero-emission quotas vs. voluntary approach · Road transport environmental policy
• “Yes, thank you also to you for your presentations. Meeting the review targets after 2030 would require a major increase in CSF production, especially for the synthetic fuels, meaning that production capacity needs to start developing actually already now, ideally also through more decentralized networks that then can be scaled up over time. Um, in this regard, are we planning ahead enough for the requirements of the next decade, particularly also in terms of e kerosene production and maybe what could be done more in terms of incentives for investment in their mass production in the different member states. And additionally could synergies or for example, joint ventures with airports be established in order to optimize logistics and lower related transportation costs? And do you maybe already have any existing examples in this regard? Thank you.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• “A trans European transport network, sustainable, interconnected and secure. That is what we want. In reality, it in parts often still looks rather fragmented, underfunded and vulnerable. That does not necessarily apply for road, but for rail most certainly. And rail infrastructure would be so important. Rail infrastructure means connectivity to have a fully functioning single market for business and citizens. Rail infrastructure means cohesion, means linking regions and leaving no country behind, and rail infrastructure means security, especially in times of crisis, to move goods and troops wherever we need them. So, Commissioner, I agree with you fully. We need to invest in a modern cross-border rail infrastructure for for citizens, for economy and for our security. So we need to complete the Ten-t network as soon as possible. And we really need to strengthen the Connecting Europe facility. So a strong Europe moves on strong rail connections. Let's build them.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• “Yes, thank you, chair, and thank you, Mr. Von, for the presentation. Let me begin by acknowledging that AFI is delivering results. Since 2021, we have seen the number of battery electric cars and vans has increased from around 2.2 million to more than 7.6 million. Over the same period. Public recharging points have grown from roughly 300,000 to over 1 million, and the total power output also is well above the minimum required under the fleet based target. So it shows that when the EU sets clear and binding targets, investment follows and regulatory uncertainty works. So we now have the foundations of a European charging backbone. The next step is to ensure that the demand keeps pace with the supply. And thank you, Mr. Van, for hinting at just this aspect in your presentation. If vehicle uptake slows while infrastructure continues to expand, including in corporate fleets, which account for around two thirds of new vehicle registrations, as we know, we risk underused assets and weaker market confidence. And well, we follow that. Supply and demand must evolve together. Related to this, I have two questions. First does the Commission consider the current pace of vehicle uptake sufficient to ensure sustainable utilisation of the infrastructure being deployed? Or does it see a stronger electrification, also of corporate fleets, as a needed part of the solution? And second, and this is a little bit in. Yeah. Also addressing the pricing aspect. Yeah. We know the upcoming half year review will focus on user aspects and fair pricing. Yet many drivers still face very high public charging, charging prices, and also insufficient pre-charge information. There are also concerns about competition between mobility service providers and vertically integrated chargepoint operators. How will the commission address these issues, and is it prepared to consider stronger provisions to ensure transparent and non-discriminatory pricing? Thank you.”
  Corporate fleet electrification: binding zero-emission quotas vs. voluntary approach · EV charging infrastructure
• “Yes. Thank you. So also within the executive within the executive executive committee decision discussions. Of course, we should be attentive of the aspect of aviation security, including cyber security for civil aviation and the relevant policy developments and initiatives. Also within the executive side, the three environmental protection items are, of course, of course of crucial importance. If we are serious about tackling the remarkable impact of aviation emissions, we need to make sure that we advance in the global convergence towards EU standards. We first need to exercise proper scrutiny regarding the Council reports on the present and future impact and trends in aircraft noise, local air quality, emissions and CO2 emissions. Second, we need the long term global aspirational goal for international aviation not to become an exercise of greenwashing and of actually dodging concrete regulatory steps aimed at ensuring a proper mitigation of the climate of aviation. We are very interested in the outcomes arising from work with the ICAO related sustainable aviation fuels when it comes to the goal of enhancing scientific understanding of aviation's climate impacts, the union needs to be at the forefront in fostering research on the non CO2 impacts of aviation. Third, regarding Corsia, we need to at least get a clear perspective of the 2027 scope and enforcement, including guarantees on the accuracy accuracy of the offsetting certificates. We cannot forget that the scope of the ETS Aviation Directive was limited through the extension of the stop the clock decision until 2026. In the faith that there would be a global uptake of caution if we do not get these guarantees at the eco assembly, we should quickly reconsider this. And finally, it would be extremely important to discuss properly the working conditions and labour standards within the civil aviation sector and the direct indirect impact on safety. And last comment on the presentation. I'm very happy to see the facilitation of inclusiveness in persons of reduced mobilities being addressed as just also presented. Thank you.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• “As long as we depend on fossil fuels, we will be vulnerable to those who control fossil fuels. Can we control who rises to power? No, but we can control how dependent we are on them. Yet Europe keeps repeating the same mistake. After Putin invaded Ukraine, we reduced our dependency on Russia. But instead of actually breaking the cycle, we simply shifted it this time to the US. The cost of this vulnerability is enormous. Between 2021 and 2024, Europe paid €930 billion extra for fossil fuel imports just because of price shocks and geopolitical crises. These costs are predictable and they are avoidable. Energy independence is not only climate policy, it's security policy. Dear Commissioner Jorgensen, the Hamburg declaration is not optional. This is our roadmap to European independence and it's on you to implement it.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Yes. Thank you. First of all, thanks also for coming up with the high speed rail plan today. Um, and it's nice to see that we can discuss about the implementation of this now and in this context. I think it's also good that we are able to talk about the details of the Connecting Europe facility. Now, um, in the current CF, we have the eligibility and awarding criteria clearly defined directly in the regulation itself. In the new proposal, those are like those disappear and are replaced by rather general references. And we understand that this will be adopted ultimately then by implementing acts. So the justification that we see is that for greater flexibility. Um, but of course like we understand that. But of course this should not come at the expense of stability and predictability. Um, of course, seeing investments in transport infrastructure, especially rail, being long term by nature. So we need clear and stable criteria and should not only rely on blind trust in commission. And Xenia. Um, so my question is how will you guarantee transparency and predictability for investors? Um, if those eligibility and awarding criteria are not anymore represented in the regulation itself?”
  EU cohesion/structural-fund architecture: consolidation vs ring-fenced separate funds
• “Yes. Thank you, chair, and thanks to the co-rapporteurs for their draft report. I will represent my group, both for Envi and Tran today, so I try to keep it as short as possible. I'll start with a level of ambition. The commission's approach in setting national targets should, in theory, incentivize electrification. The reality is that the proposed targets are in several large markets barely distinguishable from business as usual. In other words, we risk legislating a trajectory that the market would broadly deliver anyway. If this regulation is to mean anything, it must bend the curve and not just trace it. So there's also overwhelming evidence that stronger signals do work. Nine out of 27 member states already have company car tax systems that clearly incentivize going electric. Where governments do act, the effect is dramatic. Belgium went from under 9% corporate EV registrations in 2021 to 54% in 2025. France hit 41%, nearly double Germany's level. Policy design works. The problem is that it is the exception and not the rule. We plan to table a package of amendments that do the following. First, we make a competitive and affordable secondhand market for zero emission vehicles an explicit objective because this transition must also be a social one. Second, we tighten the definition of financial support so that member states can no longer quietly keep subsidizing combustion vehicles through tolls, depreciation, or fuel tax breaks. Third, we improve legislative coherence by introducing binding consistency between the draft national plans and the NECPs, commission assessment and recommendation cycle and full public transparency of the data. And finally, we sharpen the focus on genuine zero emission vehicles rather than letting low emission categories dilute the signal over time. Citizens are already today paying the price of our oil dependence. Let us give them a framework worthy of this urgency. Thank you.”
  Corporate fleet electrification: binding zero-emission quotas vs. voluntary approach
• “Yes. Thank you, all of you, for the presentation. Um, booking claim is sometimes Presented as a key tool to help aviation comply with refuel EU aviation requirements. But if the system is too global in scope, it may raise concerns around fuel quality, traceability and also fraud risks. How can we ensure robust guarantees on certificates of origin and traceability and fuel quality, especially also given past allegations of palm oil being used or being disguised as used cooking oil? How does also geopolitical instability affect the reliability, availability and the price of biofuels produced in third countries, including through higher transport costs? And would it make sense to limit booking claim to a European geographical scope to reduce fraud risks, improve traceability and limit the climate footprint linked to transporting fuels to specific hubs and on synthetic aviation fuels. Refuel EU aviation only introduce synthetic aviation fuel subtarget from 2030. While the ETS directive already provides free allowances to cover up to 95% of the price gap with conventional kerosene. However, these free allowances currently expire in 2030. So should this 95% support be used more actively now to help build synthetic fuel production capacity in Europe before 2030? Also, given oil price volatility and recent concerns over kerosene shortages, is this not an additional reason to accelerate synthetic fuel production? Thank you.”
  Decarbonisation of aviation sector
• “Um, first of all, for for the presentation, I think it was quite impressive. Um, to to see with your summary and the numbers, um, that the in the end is a very, uh, like, has proven to be a very effective tool for funding cross-border infrastructure, especially also in the rail sector. Um, and also your, your, uh, your, your numbers and, uh, what you describe also shows very clearly that we need to preserve this, uh, instrument in its structure and strengthen the funding in, in the, in the context of the next MFF, also, considering all the different aspects that we call for, uh, for a higher funding, as we can also hear here in the in the exchange now. Um, I want to highlight one aspect. And this relates to uh, that so far, um, almost a third of the CEF transport funding um, has is going to to those major rail projects, like, for example, Rail Baltica, the Brenner Base Tunnel, or also the Lyon-turin link, as you also described on your slides. Um, of course, those are, um, super important projects and, uh, they need the European funding. That is super clear. Um, at the same time, I think it is worth asking ourselves whether we could achieve, um, some more impact or be more efficient. Um, if we put a larger focus also on those small scale projects. Um, things like missing links or small cross-border connections can make a real difference for regional mobility, or can make a difference for people living near borders, and also can make a difference for the overall cohesion and usability of the of the network. Um, a better balance between those huge flagship projects and those rather smaller targeted interventions might help us deliver results more quickly on the ground and make sure that no region is left behind, and that all the regions are really connected to to the overarching, um, network in a better way. So I would like to get your, um, impression about this aspect and see whether we might be able to focus a little bit on that stronger in the future. Thank you.”
  EU funding for transportation
• “Yes. Thank you. First of all, thanks a lot for your presentation. Also very interesting to hear your priorities. There are also some topics that I really appreciate you bringing up, especially Minister Klimczak. Um, you mentioned the completion of the Ten-t network, um, as one of the priorities. Of course. That is great to hear. Um, maybe you can go a little bit more into detail. How can we actually ensure that Ten-t is deployed in a timely manner, especially also considering that the core network is to be completed within the next five years? And, um, having this as your priority, could you maybe elaborate which specific actions your presidency can take in this regard. And second, like the. As a priority you also have the increasement of investment in transport and rail. Um. Mr. Danielson also already mentioned, um the upcoming MFF and how, uh, yeah, how you might want to approach defending the Connecting Europe facility. I think in general, we can also ask the question, how can we ensure that Member States have this as an interest to increase the investment in, in transport and rail? And how can we also make sure that Member States give priority to investment, for example, in cross-border rail infrastructure? If you have some more details on what specific actions you can take within your mandate, that would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration
• “Thank you Commissioner, in the early answer, earlier answers, you referenced recital 17 on the climate objectives. Recital 17 of the proposed delegated Act states that the proposal is consistent with the climate neutrality objective set out in article two of the climate Law. Article six of the climate law requires the Commission to assess the consistency of any draught measure, draught measure or legislative proposal with our union climate objectives, including that assessment in any impact assessment accompanying these measures are proposals and make the result of that assessment publicly available at the time of adoption. I may have missed it, but I have not been able to locate any climate consistency assessment for this proposal. Could you please explain how, in the absence of the results of this assessment, we lawmakers can be confident that this proposal, which reduces reporting requirements, for example, for biomass and fossil gas related activities, is consistent with our EU climate objectives. To. In my opinion, it is very hard to believe that that seeing the the 10% materiality threshold and which kind of companies would not be longer required to report.”
  Green Taxonomy
• “Yes. Thank you commissioners. The next MFF is Europe's most critical and crucial investment blueprint. While we of course welcome the climate ambition, the proposed structural changes raise serious questions about enforceability and quality. Commissioner Hoogstra the commitment to apply do no significant harm horizontally across the EU budget is vital, but its implementation in the current MFF and also in the RF has varied. So how will the Commission ensure the new horizontal application of Do no significant harm is truly binding and uniform across all instruments, so also cohesion, Cap and the New Competitiveness Fund and following your commitment at your hearing to phase out fossil fuel subsidies in the EU budget. What specific, enforceable exclusion criteria will definitely rule out the use of EU funds for new fossil fuel infrastructure? And to Commissioner Russell. The combined green mainstreaming target of 35% appears to have come at the expense of a clear, dedicated biodiversity target. What is the logic behind this? If I understand correctly, the 35% target combines all six environmental criteria into one basket compared to just climate and biodiversity under the current framework. Yet the overall pot of money available for these priorities hardly increases at all. Will this not result in less funding for some or even for all of these criteria? And then following up on the question already asked in this context, how does commission specifically plan to reform the climate and environmental performance tracking methodology, which currently allows overestimation by double counting to ensure transparent and measurable progress is delivered for climate mitigation, adaptation and biodiversity protection.”
  EU policy on sustainability criteria in public funding
• “(17:25:23 – 17:28:25): Yes. Thank you. The performance regulation is the first attempt to put climate tracking do no significant harm performance indicators, reporting, and elevations, into 1 horizontal regulation. That is a major change up up until now. These rules were scattered across sector specific programs. For transport, this means that, the investments financed through CEF, the ECF, or the NRPPs will now be counted and assessed under the same common framework instead of only, through separate program specific lenses. That was, in in the past, a point of criticism, and so we support the logic of the proposal. A single harmonized system can reduce fragmentation, make reporting more comparable, and give parliament a clearer picture of what EU spending actually delivers. And precisely because this is the first attempt, we should, not pretend that everything is perfect. Some parts need to be corrected. Our draft opinion is not about reopening the whole regulation. It is focused on a few points to improve it and reduce the risk of unclarity. First, on the indicators. If the same indicators are supposed to be used across the whole EU budget, the commission must explain clearly how they should be applied and come up with a technical guidance. Otherwise, we simplify on paper, but actually create confusion, in practice. Second, the annex is necessary because without it, there is no common tracking, system across the entire MFF, but it must also be credible. So where a coefficient or indicator does not reflect the real purpose of an investment, we propose targeted corrections. Third, on the do no significant harm, we support having 1 single guidance instead of different interpretations in every program and fund. But this guidance must come early, be simple, and avoid creating extra uncertainty for project promoters. I understand that some colleagues are considering deleting the do no significant harm article or the NX 1 in total. Of course, we will wait to see the amendments and assess them carefully, but, I would already say that, deleting NX 1 from the trend opinion would not necessarily delete it from the regulation by the lead committees. It could simply mean that Tran does not provide the sectoral expertise on a highly technical annex that is very relevant, for transport. So this expertise has especially also been asked for by the batch and. So I think for us, that just would be a missed opportunity. So having this said, I'm, interested in the interventions by the colleagues. Thank you.”
  EU cohesion/structural-fund architecture: consolidation vs ring-fenced separate funds
• “Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. Um, also from from my from our side. Fully support for our line. Thank you for your draft report. And also thank you for the statement very strongly. Just stating this point. I just want to reinforce this. The CEF debt instrument was established to support, uh, investment in high performing and sustainable infrastructure. And with the reallocation to the Investeu fund, we need to make sure it will serve just those purposes, and that all those reallocated funds will just be under the sustainable infrastructure window. And that's also what we try to reinforce a little bit with the amendments that uh, that we table. So, um, fully on on that line. And thank you. Um, would like to support that. Thank you.”
  EU cohesion/structural-fund architecture: consolidation vs ring-fenced separate funds
• “Yes. Thank you. Chair. Dear Commissioner, you mentioned the German coalition agreement, and that's why I want to focus on the international credits again. Um, I will leave aside the already mentioned problems and also the well-documented issues of overestimation and lack of reliability of those credits. And I want to only talk about the economic implications of those credits. We already saw in 2020 for a slowdown in the slowdown in the volume of cleantech investments. Um, and on top, we are facing huge geopolitical challenges. We are having structurally higher energy costs than our economic competitors and our formerly strongest ally across the Atlantic is threatening us with a trade war. So this should be the point in time when we should be sending a clear signal to the industries of the future that Europe is the right place to invest. International credits rather seem to have the just opposite effect, as those would be like mean that the EU would be paying foreign actors to do our work for us. We would be channelling billions of euros in investments in technologies that reduce emissions elsewhere. So if the plan is to open our carbon market to international credits, this would inevitably drive down the EU carbon price and also mean that member states will lose billions in ETS auctioning auctioning revenues And if, on the other hand, the the plan is to allow member states to buy those offsets, this would cost billions in taxpayers money. So please explain to me how outsourcing our emission reductions would align with our objective of creating a competitive, um, compelling business case for a competitive decarbonization, as you have just been describing. Thank you.”
  Extension of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
• “Rail is the backbone of public transport in Europe, or at least it should be. But as long as buying train tickets feels like navigating through a maze, rail will struggle to compete. And as long as passengers do not enjoy full passenger rights protection, people will not trust rail. Not because it's slow, but because it's hard to access. The upcoming initiatives on rail ticketing must finally deliver. One journey, one ticket. No excuses. We need open data, fair and clear rules and a level playing field for all operators and platforms. Public and private passengers should not need five apps and a PhD to book a train. Let's get away from rail being the most frustrating mode of transport. Let's make rail the easiest way to travel.”
  EU support of rail transport