Per CLAUSEN

Policy topics Per CLAUSEN is active on

What Per CLAUSEN has said (75)

• 2026-03-25 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 3.6.2026 Written question The EU is closely following developments in north-east Syria, including reports of the disappearance of two journalists in Raqqa. Consular assistance to EU citizens remains an exclusive national competence. The EU consistently recalls that all parties must respect international humanitarian law and international human rights law, including the protection of journalists and the prohibition of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance. The reported disappearance of these two journalists underscores the broader issue of missing persons across Syria, and the need for efficient investigations. The EU calls on the Syrian transitional authorities to conduct prompt, transparent and impartial investigations into all such cases, in cooperation with the National Commission for Missing Persons as well as relevant international mechanisms, such as the International Commission on Missing Persons and the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The EU will continue to advocate for a safe and enabling environment for independent reporting and media in Syria, in line with international standards, and to support efforts that uphold freedom of expression.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU relations with Kurdish people
• 2026-03-03 “E-000864/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Nitrates Directive 1 requires Member States to implement action programmes ensuring that farmers adhere to good practices for the use of fertilisers in areas vulnerable to nitrate pollution with the aim of reducing and preventing further such pollution. Pollution is defined as a situation where nitrate concentrations in surface or groundwater exceed 50 mg/l or could exceed this limit if no action is taken, or where surface waters suffer from eutrophication. The EU threshold for nitrates in drinking water remains 50 mg/l 2 , but Member States are free to set stricter standards to protect public health. The Commission closely follows the implementation of the Nitrates Directive in the Member States. Based on their reports for 2020-2023, an EU summary report is currently in preparation. The Commission is finalising an evaluation of the Directive, expected later in 2026. The Commission is in contact with national authorities and has over the years initiated numerous infringement proceedings to ensure effective enforcement of the Directive. Also, the Common Agricultural Policy 3 provides Member States several tools to support farmers towards sustainable nutrients management. The Commission is not conducting scientific studies on individual cancer risk factors and their social costs but supports Member States in their efforts to improve cancer prevention, early detection and care through Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan 4 . Relevant actions addressing colorectal cancer include the European Code Against Cancer 5 , the EU-funded Joint Action EUCanScreen 6 , the development of European guidelines and a quality assurance scheme for colorectal cancer prevention, screening and treatment. 1 Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, pp. 1–8. 2 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, pp. 1–62. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013, OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, pp. 1–186. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/public-health/european-health-union/cancer-plan-europe_en. 5 https://cancer-code-europe.iarc.who.int/. 6 https://eucanscreen.eu/.”
  Groundwater Directive · Water pollution · Use of fertilisers
• 2026-02-05 “E-000470/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Following the political agreement reached by the Foreign Affairs Council on 29 January 2026, the Council adopted on 19 February 2026 Decision (CFSP) 2026/421 1 which added the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the list of groups and entities subject to Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (CP931) 2 . Following that listing, the IRGC also became subject to the restrictive measures in Articles 2 and 3 of CP931, namely the freezing of its funds and other financial assets or economic resources, as well as the prohibition for EU operators to make funds and economic resources available to that group 3 . Those restrictive measures are temporary and do not entail a confiscation of assets. The Council may maintain those sanctions in force for as long as there is an ongoing risk of the IRGC being involved in terrorist activities. The IRGC had already been subject to those restrictive measures following its listing under the Iran weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sanctions regime, on 25 October 2010 4 . The listing of the IRGC under CP931 sends a very strong political message. As regards the enforcement of those measures, it falls within the remit of each Member State. The diplomatic presence of Iran in Member States is delimited by bilateral agreements in line with the provisions of international law. 1 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/421/oj. 2 OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj. 3 On 26 February 2026, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2026/455 on restrictive measures to combat terrorism (ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/455/oj). That Decision repealed the CFSP part of CP931, but reproduces the substance of CP931, which will continue to be applied in accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. At the same time, that Decision also repealed Decision (CFSP) 2026/421, but maintained all previous listings under CP931, including that of the IRGC. 4 Council Decision 2010/644/CFSP of 25 October 2010 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ L 281, 27.10.2010, p. 81, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/644/oj).”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-01-28 “E-000353/2026 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission's Communication on High-Speed Rail (HSR) published 5 November 2025 1 focuses on railway connections between major cities in Europe and covers most regions along the European Transport Corridors. It thus contributes to the cohesion objective of the transEuropean transport network (TEN-T) Regulation 2 , by ensuring accessibility and connectivity across the EU. It also aims to linking regional rail services and public transport to high-speed rail ensuring that all regions benefit from HSR investments. As can be seen from its Annexes 3 the Communication covers the entirety of the European transport corridors, including those in Scandinavia. It envisages minimum ambition for a HSR network according to the speeds set in Annex 3 of the TEN-T Regulation and encourages Member States to aim for higher speeds where possible and economically viable. However, it remains the Member States responsibility to implement such projects. Also, other parts of the network should benefit from major infrastructure investments on the TEN-T HSR network. Night trains and rail freight should benefit from the proposed improvements to capacity coordination, track access charges, vehicle authorisation and rolling stock financing. In addition, the Commission intends to tackle infrastructural, commercial and technical barriers, including rolling stock availability and access to service facilities. 1 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/774e79c9-1ece-4514-8f16a2b98049c82e_en?filename=COM_2025_903_HSR.pdf. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj/eng. 3 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c814d78c-1867-4efc-87aad1af34ae253f_en?filename=SWD_2025_960_HSR_maps_tables.pdf.”
  EU funding for transportation · EU support of rail transport · EU transport infrastructure integration
• 2026-01-28 “E-000354/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Island inhabitants are invited to be involved in defining the strategy’s framework through a public call for evidence, which was launched on 4 March 2026. This consultation provides an opportunity to contribute views on the challenges faced by EU islands and propose concrete solutions to these challenges. The call, which runs until 1 April 2026, is open to everyone with particular encouragement for contributions from island-based stakeholders, including local and regional authorities responsible for islands, community and grassroots organisations, youth networks, business associations and other civil society actors. Inputs received will contribute to shaping the strategy. The strategy will cover the EU islands of all sizes. Existing studies, contributions received during consultation and opinions from the Consultative Committees will be taken into account to ensure that the strategy reflects the diverse situations and challenges EU islands face. The EU Strategy for Coastal Communities, which will focus on coastal communities, will be adopted together with the EU Strategy for Islands.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-11-21 “E-004652/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU welcomes the positive developments in the dissolution and disarmament process of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). A credible and inclusive peace process, based on dialogue and reconciliation, respecting fundamental rights and the rule of law, would be a constructive step to achieve a peaceful and sustainable political solution to the Kurdish question, and would contribute to stability in the region. Common Position 2001/931/CFSP 1 (CP931) provides for the application of specific measures to combat terrorism. PKK has been listed under CP931 since 2002. The listing is reviewed every 6 months, in accordance with Article 1(6) of CP931, and was last maintained on 29 July 2025 2 . Pursuant to the relevant case law 3 , the Council may maintain a person, group or entity on the list if it concludes that there is an on-going risk of them being involved in terrorist acts. Should the Council be satisfied that that risk no longer exists, it may decide, by unanimity, to remove them from the list. The EU remains committed to supporting a lasting and inclusive peace process and follows the developments on the ground through the EU Delegation to Türkiye. The EU also supports dialogue and peacebuilding activities through the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, hosting political leaders, civil society, and women’s organisations to strengthen local ownership and foster cross-party cooperation; through the Instrument for Preaccession Assistance as well as through the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, that aim to strengthen rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy, thus contributing to create a conducive environment for minority rights in Türkiye. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj/eng. 2 Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1577 of 29 July 2025, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/1577/oj/eng. 3 Judgment of 26 July 2017, Council of the European Union v Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, C 599/14 P, EU:C:2017:583, paragraph 51.”
  EU-Turkey relations · EU relations with Kurdish people
• 2025-11-04 “E-004319/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The European External Action Service has been discussing the situation in Sudan during its political dialogues with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at various levels. The EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa has been engaging extensively with regional stakeholders, including the UAE. In this context, the EU representatives raised concerns about reported UAE support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while emphasising the importance of the UAE’s constructive engagement for reaching a sustainable cease-fire in Sudan. The EU will continue to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict, in close coordination with the international community, using diplomatic tools and instruments, including restrictive measures. The EU already has a sanctions regime in place, which currently targets eleven individuals and eight entities from both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, including its second in command 1 , which has recently been extended until October 2026. The EU is also fully engaged in advocacy efforts aimed at ensuring humanitarian access to El Fasher 2 . The closest humanitarian responders to El Fasher are concentrated in the locality of Tawila in North Darfur, and a number of them are financially supported by the EU. Ensuring accountability is one of the four key asks in the Council Conclusions on Sudan from 20 October 2025 3 . The EU continues to support the work of the International Criminal Court and of the United Nations in the country, and is determined to do its utmost, including in cooperation with international accountability mechanisms, to bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice. The EU Ministers discussed the dire humanitarian situation and the geopolitical implications of the war in Sudan at the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 November 4 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/2368/oj/eng. 2 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/sudan-joint-statement-highrepresentative-kallas-and-commissioner-lahbib-seizure-el-fasher-2025-10-28_en. 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/20/sudan-council-approves-conclusions-onthe-ongoing-conflict/. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/11/20/sudan-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-20-november-2025/.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU relations with United Arab Emirates · EU policy on Sahel and Sudan
• 2025-11-04 “E-004329/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not taken so far a decision regarding the further steps on infringement case 2021/2057 addressed to Denmark 1 . To ensure equal treatment, the Commission continues to assess the Danish national measures together with the other ongoing infringement cases concerning the Enforcement Directive on the Posting of Workers 2 (Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Since sending letters of formal notice to 24 Member States in July 2021 and reasoned opinions to 17 Member States in January 2023, including Denmark, the Commission has closed 18 infringement cases. The Commission has also addressed additional letters of formal notice to other Member States in 2025 (Austria, France and Luxembourg), which include similar grievances to the infringement case concerning Denmark. In order to treat the Member States concerned equally, the Commission will continue with the next steps on all the ongoing infringement cases, including Denmark. The Commission would also like to refer to the previous replies to questions E-001880/2025 3 and P-000460/2024 4 . In these replies, the Commission already provided information on the status of the infringement cases for non-conformity of national measures with the Enforcement Directive on the Posting of Workers. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?version=v1&typeOfSearch=byCase&activeCase=true&langCode=EN&memberState=DK&page=1& size=10&order=desc&sortColumns=refId&refId=INFR(2021)2057. 2 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the internal market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’), OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, p. 11-31 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/67/oj/eng. 3 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 4 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2024-000460-ASW_EN.html.”
  EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers
• 2025-10-24 “E-004195/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The promotion and the protection of human rights constitutes a core dimension of the EU’s engagement with the Kingdom of Bahrain. The EU uses all available means at its disposal to address the human rights situation in the country. The EU has consistently raised its serious concerns regarding the situation of imprisoned EU citizens, including during the regular annual EU-Bahrain Human Rights Dialogues. Moreover, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights engages actively on individual cases of political prisoners, including the mentioned case. Such an enhanced political and human rights dialogue is a key tenet of the future bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between the EU and the Kingdom of Bahrain, reflecting the shared commitment to promote regional stability, prosperity and human rights in the country. The SPA shall aim to promote EU interests, while upholding its core values as a principled and value-based actor on the international stage. The European Parliament also plays an important role in ensuring that values-based diplomacy remains central to the EU external action, combining principled advocacy with enhanced practical cooperation to promote gradual but sustained reforms in the Kingdom of Bahrain.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU relations with Gulf countries
• 2025-10-17 “E-004105/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The promotion and the protection of human rights constitutes a core dimension of the EU’s engagement with the Kingdom of Bahrain. The EU uses all available means at its disposal to address the human rights situation in the country. The EU has consistently raised its serious concerns regarding the situation of political prisoner and prominent human rights defender, Mr Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, with the Government of Bahrain, including through annual EU-Bahrain Human Rights Dialogues and EU Delegation in Riyadh, with Bahrain’s National Human Rights Institution, and in the framework of the Human Rights Council in Geneva. EU Special Representative for Human Rights addressed a letter to the Foreign Affairs Minister of Bahrain, pleading for Mr Al-Khawaja’s immediate and unconditional release on humanitarian grounds, as did the former EU Special Representative for Human Rights in 2021. The EU has frequently liaised on the matter with the Danish authorities, who hold the main consular responsibility on Mr Al-Khawaja’s case as a Danish citizen. Taking into consideration the conclusions of the United Nations (UN) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of 2012 1 , the EU has also been insisting on numerous occasions with its Bahraini interlocutors on the need to respect the UN Guidelines on the Minimum Standards of Treatment of Prisoners (‘Mandela Rules’), underscoring the EU’s principled position on freedom of expression and association. 1 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/730786/files/A_HRC_WGAD_2012_6-EN.pdf.”
  EU competences on human rights · EU relations with Gulf countries
• 2025-10-14 “E-004027/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission EU sanctions regulations are directly applicable in all Member States and, accordingly, the freezing of assets is usually carried out by relevant EU economic operators. In accordance with the applicable legal obligations, reporting about the frozen assets is made first to the national competent authorities of Member States and, second, by those authorities to the Commission. When considering the value of frozen assets, it is important to bear in mind that for certain types of assets (e.g. securities) the value can be particularly affected by market fluctuations. In parallel, EU sanctions provide for several derogations, with the ensuing effect that where national competent authorities decide to grant an authorisation to that end, the overall value of frozen assets decreases. Overall, the variations observed in the total amounts frozen are thus not necessarily indicative of funds ‘disappearing’ but can instead reflect the outcome of market fluctuations and possible authorisations granted to release funds under the available derogations. As far as interest is concerned, as a rule, interest owed to the owner of the frozen funds continues to accrue to the owner but remains equally frozen. As part of its regular contacts with Member States on frozen assets reporting, the Commission has reached out to the Danish authorities on the matter raised.”
  Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-09-25 “E-003722/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines the right to freedom of expression and information as well as media freedom and pluralism. Both are considered essential pillars of the rule of law and crucial checks and balances in democracies. The Commission is committed to supporting and protecting independent media and journalists in the EU. It has done so through initiatives such as the European Media Freedom Act 1 , the Recommendation on the safety of journalists 2 and via a range of support actions such as Creative Europe and Multimedia Actions 3 . The Commission monitors developments across all EU Member States in the area of media freedom and pluralism in its annual Rule of Law Report 4 . At international level, the EU follows global human rights developments closely and remains committed to the promotion of freedom of expression as a fundamental right for everyone, everywhere. The EU Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline offer political and operational guidance to EU staff and EU Member States for their work in third countries and multilateral fora, as well as in contacts with civil society and other stakeholders 5 . The EU seeks to engage with partner countries around the world through dialogue and cooperation and we are committed to continue engaging with the United States and civil society in this spirit. The EU does not plan to adopt a specific policy dedicated to granting international protection to media professionals from the United States. In line with EU asylum law 6 , any application submitted will be subject to individual assessment by the relevant authorities of the concerned Member State. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/new-push-europeandemocracy/protecting-democracy/european-media-freedom-act_en. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-protection-safety-and-empowermentjournalists. 3 https://culture.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/creative-europe-media-strand. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en. 5 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/09_hr_guidelines_expression_en.pdf. 6 Common European Asylum System (CEAS) - Migration and Home Affairs.”
  EU-US relations · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-09-12 “E-003528/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen On behalf of the European Commission The Commission is deeply committed to multilingualism, which reflects the cultural and linguistic diversity of the EU, and therefore makes every effort to provide information in all 24 EU official languages. The State of the Union is a particularly important moment for the EU’s democracy during which the Commission President is ‘taking stock of the current year and looking ahead to priorities for the following years’ 1 . As in previous years, the Commission services and staff ensured timely publication of the President’s State of the Union address as well as related documentation, e.g. the letter of intent. All 24 language versions of both the State of the Union address and the letter of intent were translated and published on the dedicated webpage 2 after the President finished the speech. Said documents were sent for translation as early as possible with a view to sharing all 24 language versions with EU citizens rapidly upon publication. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:304:0047:0062:EN:PDF. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en.”
  Multilingualism in EU institutions
• 2025-09-08 “E-003470/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The organisation and delivery of health services and medical falls within the Member States’ responsibilities pursuant to Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The EU supports Member States in various ways. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recommends that Member States follow the clinical guidelines of the European AIDS Clinical Society on post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV 1 and has issued guidance on testing policies 2 . The ECDC collects and analyses data in cooperation with the World Health Organization producing annual reports and monitoring progresses against the Sustainable Development Goal 3.3. The Health Security Committee 3 periodically reviews and discusses the progress and challenges in relation to the achievement of Goal 3.3. The Commission has been a strong supporter of the Global Fund (GF) since its creation in 2002, most recently through the pledge made by the President in 2022 of EUR 715 million for the seventh replenishment cycle, which covers the grants for the period 2024-2026. The Commission is aware of the GF’s eighth replenishment cycle and associated pledging events and is assessing options which are framed by current implementation levels of the multiannual financial framework. 1 https://www.eacsociety.org/media/guidelines-12.0.pdf. 2 https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/european-standards-hiv-prevention-and-care-module-hivtesting. 3 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj.”
  Vaccination · EU competences on health
• 2025-09-01 “P-003346/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has reacted resolutely to the decision of the United States to refuse or revoke entry visas for members of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organisation ahead of their participation in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York. Through a statement delivered by the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) on behalf of the EU on 30 August 2025 1 , the EU urged that this decision be reconsidered, in light of the UN Headquarters Agreement between the UN and its host state. The UN recognises the State of Palestine as a non-member observer state, and since 1974 the Palestine Liberation Organisation has been entitled to participate in the General Assembly upon invitation. In line with established practice, their officials must be permitted access to UN Headquarters. Full participation of all delegations is essential, as set out under Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement 2 . The EU reiterated its position during the dedicated UN’s Host Country Committee session on 12 September 2025, when EU Ambassador made a statement on behalf of the EU and its Member States, supporting the position of the UN Legal Counsel, and recalling the HR/VP’s statement on behalf of the EU from 30 August 2025. The EU will continue to follow this matter closely in all relevant fora. Dialogue conducted in good faith, with full respect for international law, remains the most effective way to ensure Palestine’s voice is heard at the UN. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/30/palestine-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union/. 2 https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2011/volume-11-I-147-English.pdf.”
  EU-US relations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-07-17 “E-002987/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has been gravely alarmed by the violent incidents that have occurred in Syria over the past months and has strongly condemned the horrific crimes against civilians. Such messages were voiced in a series of statements following the violence in March 2025 in the coastal region 1 , the terrorist attack against Mar Elias Church 2 , and the violence in Southern Syria 3 . The transitional authorities, together with local authorities, bear the responsibility to protect all Syrians without discrimination on the basis of ethnic and religious background or gender. In May 4 and June 5 2025, the EU introduced new listings against human rights violators. The EU also welcomed a recent United Nations Commission of Inquiry report 6 and has called for transparent, credible and impartial investigations, and for all perpetrators of grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law to be held accountable and brought to justice, including with the support of relevant international mechanisms. The EU continues to call for an immediate end to violence across Syria and remains attentive to the actions of the transitional authorities in ensuring the protection of all Syrians. In all constant interactions with the transitional authorities, the EU calls for accountability, inclusivity and respect for human rights, and for the full, equal and meaningful participation of all Syrians in all spheres of political life and society. The EU believes that it is imperative to step up the dialogue and promote pluralism, tolerance and substantive civic participation across Syrian society, with a view to advancing a truly inclusive and peaceful, Syrian-led transition that guarantees human rights and fulfils the aspirations of all Syrians. 1 Syria: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the recent wave of violence, 11 March 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/11/syria-statement-by-thehigh-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-recent-wave-of-violence/. 2 Syria: Statement by the Spokesperson on the terrorist attack in Mar Elias church in Damascus, 23 June 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-terrorist-attack-mar-elias-church-damascus_en. 3 Syria: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the violence in Suwayda, 24 July 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/24/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-situation/. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501110. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202501255. 6 Syria: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Violations against civilians in Coastal and Western Central Syria in January – March 2025, 15 August 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/syria-statement-spokesperson-report-independent-international-commissioninquiry-violations-against_en.”
  EU-Syria relations · EU competences on human rights
• 2025-07-03 “E-002733/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. The common agricultural policy (CAP) does not prevent, but enables Member States to set up financial instruments, such as loans, guarantees and equity under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). These can be programmed under different types of interventions, including for projects under cooperation and LEADER. The targeting of the EAFRD financial instruments and the eligibility conditions are defined by the EAFRD Managing Authorities and programmed in the CAP Strategic Plans. Currently, the financial instruments are programmed in the CAP Strategic Plans of Spain and Bulgaria. Being a repayable form of support, provided by financial intermediaries (banks), financial instruments target financially viable projects, which are profitable and/or cost-saving. 2. The Commission promotes and supports Member States in creating financial instruments. The technical assistance programme fi-compass 1 offers a wide set of communication, analytical and dissemination material for the purpose of assisting stakeholders in the understanding, creation and use of financial instruments under the EAFRD and shared management policies. In this context, using financial instruments for projects under LEADER would strengthen the progressive and sustainable development of the EU rural areas. 1 https://www.fi-compass.eu/.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-07-01 “E-002650/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is concerned over restrictions to civic space, intimidation and recent detentions of human rights defenders in El Salvador. The EU expects the Salvadoran authorities to uphold the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and due process at all times, and to ensure the safety and physical integrity of those detained. The EU regrets the Foreign Agents Law adopted by the Legislative Assembly on 20 May 2025 and has made this clear publicly 1 and directly with the Salvadoran authorities, in close coordination with Member States and other international partners. This legislation runs counter to El Salvador’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which it is a state party. Respect for the rule of law and human rights remains essential to the EU-El Salvador partnership, and is a regular focus of the bilateral dialogue with the government. Civil society in El Salvador is a relevant interlocutor for dialogue and cooperation. While the EU remains committed to supporting inclusive and sustainable economic and social development in El Salvador, the new legislation on foreign agents and the shrinking space for civil society risks undermining development and could negatively impact cooperation. The EU-Central America Association Agreement 2 provides in its political, cooperation and trade parts of the agreement, useful provisions for dialogue on human rights and commitments to respect them. Suspension should be a last resort. In addition, actions should be appropriate and proportionate, and any negative consequences should be considered. The population in El Salvador or in the wider region, and particularly vulnerable groups, should not be penalised. 1 El Salvador: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Foreign Agents Law and recent developments, 7 June 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/el-salvador-statement-spokesperson-foreign-agents-law-and-recentdevelopments_en. 2 EU-Central America Association Agreement, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=legissum:4314902.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2025-06-24 “E-002535/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission In 2021, the Commission launched a horizontal investigation to follow up on its assessment of the 2 nd River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) of all Member States. Concerning Denmark, the Commission raised questions about the gaps in the classification of ecological and chemical status. Denmark confirmed the gaps and indicated that it was in the process of establishing environmental quality standards (EQS) for the remaining priority substances 1 and river basin specific pollutants 2 in the matrices in which they are monitored. However, they indicated that this work would not be completed by the end of 2021, the deadline to adopt the 3 rd RBMPs, and hence to submit updated classifications during the following RBMP cycle, hence in 2028. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the 3 rd RBMPs resulted again in a recommendation 3 to ‘step up the efforts to meet the requirements set out in the Water Framework Directive 4 as regards monitoring, assessment, data management and reporting’. The Commission is aware that Denmark is in the process of revising its 3 rd RBMPs and expects to see in these revised reports already significant progress in tackling the issue. The Commission intends to raise the issue during the upcoming structured dialogues on the Water Framework Directive and Floods Directive implementation, to take place in 2025 and 2026. 1 di(2-ethylhexyl) Phthalate, benzo(a)pyrene, fluoranthene, hexachlorocyclohexane, nickel and tributyltin. 2 aminomethylphosphonic acid, arsenic, butyl benzyl phthalate, benz(a)anthracene, chrysene, di(2-ethylhexyl) adipate, diisononilphtalate, glyphosate, copper, chrome, polychlorinated biphenyls, phenanthrene, pyrene and zinc. 3 SWD(2025) 34, 4 February, recommendation 6 on page 40. 4 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35.”
  EU policy on water management · Water pollution
• 2025-06-17 “E-002427/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU is founded on the values of respect for human rights, which also represent a core dimension of its external policy. This also applies to EU relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its member states 1 . Human rights questions are regularly addressed at all levels, including through Political and Human Rights Dialogues with each GCC country. They were also discussed at the first EUGCC Summit in Brussels (16 October 2024), where both sides committed to deepening these dialogues as a key element of cooperation 2 . The EU systematically encourages GCC countries to live up to their international human rights commitments, including by ratifying and implementing key United Nations (UN) treaties, actively supporting the work of the UN Human Rights Office and the UN Special Procedures, fully cooperating with UN human rights mechanisms, and ratifying and implementing International Labour Organisation conventions and recommendations. The EU also offers technical support, expertise and best practices as appropriate. The regular Human Rights Dialogues between the EU and the GCC countries provide a constructive avenue for frank exchanges, including on individual cases of concern. The EU Special Representative for Human Rights also engages actively with GCC countries on individual cases of political prisoners. The proposed bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreements with each of the six GCC member states aim to promote EU interests while upholding its core values as a principled and valuebased actor on the international stage. 1 The Kingdom of Bahrain, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Kuwait, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/16/first-european-union-gulf-cooperationcouncil-summit-joint-statement/.”
  EU relations with Gulf countries · EU competences on human rights · Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2025-05-12 “E-001880/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Following letters of formal notice sent to 24 Member States in July 2021 and reasoned opinions sent to 17 Member States in January 2023, including Denmark, for the nonconformity of their national measures with the Enforcement Directive on the Posting of Workers 1 , the Commission closed infringement proceedings concerning 18 Member States 2 between March 2024 and May 2025. At this stage, the ongoing infringement proceedings concern six Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Main issues identified in those infringements relate to administrative requirements and control measures (Article 9), penalties (Article 20), as well as cross-border enforcement of penalties and fines (Chapter VI) of the Directive. The Commission is currently assessing the measures at issue in the context of the ongoing infringement procedures, including the one against Denmark. In determining the appropriate next steps, the Commission is mindful of the need to ensure equal treatment among all Member States for which it has identified similar concerns, in accordance with the principles of fairness and consistency in enforcement. If the Commission deems national measures not to be in line with the Directive, it will continue to follow the stages of infringement proceedings, including possible referral to the European Court of Justice. 1 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the internal market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’), OJ L 159, 28.5.2014, p. 11-31. 2 Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.”
  EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers
• 2025-04-23 “PE773.019v01-00 EN E-001619/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The thresholds reflect the international commitments of the EU in the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) in the World Trade Organisation, which was negotiated also by the EU. The EU international commitments have been agreed in exchange of reciprocal commitments from other trading partners. Below the thresholds of the Public Procurement Directives 1 , in case of award of public contracts concerned by a cross-border interest, the Treaty principles still apply, notably with regard to open competition, non-discrimination, equal treatment and transparency 2 . The current EU thresholds range between EUR 143,000 for the majority of supply and services contracts by central contracting authorities and EUR 221,000 by subcentral contracting authorities, to EUR 5,538,000 for all works contracts and concessions, regardless of the awardee. In the context of the revision of the EU public procurement legislative framework, the Commission intends to conduct an impact assessment, which should cover also the question of administrative costs and thresholds. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02014L0024-20180101, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02014L0025-20180101, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02014L0023-20180101. 2 Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, OJEU C179/2, 01.08.2006.”
  "Buy European" provisions
• 2025-04-23 “E-001618/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission In the light of the current geopolitical situation, the Commission is giving high priority to reducing the EU’s dependencies on external digital providers. Strengthening Europe’s capacity to develop, deploy, and maintain its own secure digital solutions is essential for longterm resilience. Open Source 1 technologies play a key role in this effort by offering transparent, interoperable, and sovereign alternatives to proprietary software. The Commission supports this transition through strategic initiatives. The Next Generation Internet 2 (NGI) programme mobilised EUR140 million to fund over 1 400 open-source projects across decentralised platforms, trust technologies, and privacy-enhancing tools. Its successor, the Open Internet Stack, will deliver validated, EU-compliant digital building blocks for public bodies and small and medium-sized enterprises. Additional efforts include SIMPL 3 for data sharing in trusted Data Spaces 4 , and GenAI4EU 5 /OpenEuroLLM 6 , which promote European open-source artificial intelligence infrastructure. While precise EU-wide savings are difficult to quantify due to varied national procurement practices, studies 7 suggest that open-source adoption could significantly lower licensing and vendor lock-in costs. More importantly, it enhances Europe’s strategic autonomy and digital competitiveness. As of 2024, about 45% of software publishers used by the Commission are US-based. All are procured via EU-registered entities in full compliance with EU procurement, data protection, and cybersecurity legislation. 1 The European Commission adopts its new Open Source Software Strategy 2020-2023, available at https://shorturl.at/t88O5. 2 https://ngi.eu/. 3 https://simpl-programme.ec.europa.eu/. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/data-spaces. 5 https://eic.ec.europa.eu/eic-funding-opportunities/eic-accelerator/eic-accelerator-challenges-2025/genai4eucreating-european-champions-generative-ai_en. 6 https://openeurollm.eu/. 7 Practical Guide for EU Governments: Evaluating Open Source Alternatives vs. Commercial Software, available at https://shorturl.at/1jhs2.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · Promotion of open-source softwares
• 2025-03-25 “E-001243/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Directive (EU) 2024/2831 1 on improving working conditions in platform work entered into force on 2 December 2024 and each Member State has until 2 December 2026 to transpose the Directive into national law and to notify the Commission of its transposing measures. The Commission will assess if Member States have completely and correctly transposed the Directive after this date. In order to facilitate Member States’ transposition of the Directive, the Commission has set up a dedicated Commission expert group. The group is composed of Member States’ representatives (as members) and representatives of the European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) States, the EFTA Secretariat and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, as well as of EU social partners (as observers) 2 . The Commission is strongly committed to support Member States’ full and correct transposition of the Directive. However, the Commission is currently not considering any further EU-level initiatives that are specifically aimed at improving working conditions in platform work. 1 Directive (EU) 2024/2831 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on improving working conditions in platform work, OJ L, 2024/2831, 11.11.2024 - https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2831/oj/eng 2 For further information and documents, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expertgroups/consult?lang=en&groupID=3974”
  Platform workers · EU competences on social policies
• 2025-03-24 “E-001229/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission The arrest of the mayor of Istanbul on 19 March 2025 has given rise to questions regarding Türkiye's adherence to its long-established democratic tradition 1 . The EU has been continuously expressing serious concerns over the situation in the area of rule of law in Türkiye. In 2018, the Council took an extraordinary measure to put the accession negotiations at a standstill due to Türkiye moving away from the EU. At the same time, Türkiye is a candidate country and a key partner for the EU. The European Council of April 2024 reconfirmed 2 the EU’s strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. The re-engagement efforts with Türkiye are recalibrated considering the developments in the country. Nevertheless, there are sectors where interests converge, and cooperation can be mutually beneficial, including the Customs Union, migration management, the green and digital transitions, agriculture and rural development, investment and connectivity, and crucial regional issues such as Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Leaving avenues for engagement open provides a broader platform for promoting stability and addressing shared challenges in a complex geopolitical landscape. The Commission doesn’t maintain a list of the like-minded countries. In a more general context, like-minded partners of the EU share the same or similar values, standards, vision and/or commitment for engagement in specific policy areas. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-kallas-andcommissioner-kos-recent-events-2025-03-19_en. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf.”
  EU-Turkey relations
• 2025-03-19 “E-001152/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The purpose of the Regulation on the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH) 1 is to ensure high level of protection of human health and the environment, as well as the free movement of substances, competitiveness and innovation. The efficient functioning of the internal market for substances can be achieved only if applicable requirements do not differ significantly between Member States. However, as confirmed by the European Free Trade Association Court in case E-9/16 2 , in cases where the manufacture, placing on the market or use of a substance is not yet harmonised (i.e. no restriction) Member States may maintain or adopt national rules 3 provided the REACH restriction process is also initiated. To address the concerns raised by per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contamination, some Member States have initiated national measures to restrict some uses of PFAS. While the Commission shares these concerns, it considers that such measures are more efficient if taken at EU level by the established restriction procedure supported by a solid assessment by the scientific committees of the European Chemicals Agency. This process would avoid disruption of the internal market and guarantee all EU citizens an equally high level of protection. A broad PFAS restriction dossier has been prepared by five national authorities. The European Chemicals Agency’s committees must finalise their opinions on this dossier before the Commission can prepare its proposal to restrict PFAS in the EU. As also confirmed in the abovementioned Court case, after adoption of an EU restriction, Member States need to align with the harmonised legislation. The Commission is carefully following all measures at national level to assess their relevance for future policy development. 1 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, OJ L 396, 30.12.2006. 2 https://eftacourt.int/download/9-16-judgment/?wpdmdl=1804; https://eftacourt.int/download/9-16judgment/?wpdmdl=1804 3 Cf REACH article 128(2).”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-02-13 “E-000676/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Freedom of religion or belief remains high on the EU’s international human rights agenda, in line with EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief 1 . The Commission is aware of the situation of Bahá'í community in Egypt and is in contact with the Baha’i community in Brussels and in Cairo. Freedom of religion or belief was an important subject in EU Special Representative for Human Rights Skoog’s visit to Egypt on 4-5 November 2024, where he raised with government officials the situation and the administrative challenges faced by the Bahá'í 2 . The Commission will continue supporting Egypt’s national institutions and civil society through cooperation programmes to implement Egypt’s Human Rights Strategy and Universal Periodic Review recommendations. Overall, human rights remain a priority in the EU’s relationship with Egypt. The Association Agreement and the Partnership Priorities mutually agreed in June 2022 3 define the political framework for the EU’s bilateral relations with Egypt, where both parties commit to ‘further promote democracy, fundamental freedoms, and human rights, gender equality and equal opportunities’. This is also referenced in the Joint declaration of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership 4 . In the context of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt, macro-financial assistance requires that ‘Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights’. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11491-2013-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu-special-representative-human-rights-mission-egypt_en?s=95 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-2803-2022-ADD-1/en/pdf 4 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-declaration-strategic-and-comprehensive-partnership-betweenarab-republic-egypt-and-european-2024-03-17_en”
  EU competences on human rights · EU-Egypt relations
• 2025-02-04 “E-000492/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission remains firmly committed to fight antisemitism in all its forms and manifestations. With the Joint Communication ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ of 6 December 2023, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President responded to the increase of antisemitism and all other forms of hatred 1 . On 14 October 2024, the Commission adopted the first progress report of the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) 2 . The Commission responded to questions related to Mr Musk’s gesture at the midday press briefing of 21 January 2025: ‘We absolutely stand by our policy on antisemitism. We will not comment on any gestures, which are indeed being interpreted, by some and not by others, as having a particular meaning or intention’. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/c60c451c-ccd2-406a-be3a-ef65123f2bb6_en. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-antisemitism/eu-strategy-combating-antisemitism-andfostering-jewish-life-2021-2030/first-progress-report-eu-strategy-combating_en.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism
• 2025-01-16 “P-000178/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU and the United States (US) are each other’s largest trading and investment partners and share a robust and deeply interwoven economic relationship. The EU remains committed to fostering stable, balanced, and predictable trade relations with the US and to expand cooperation in key areas such as critical supply chains and emerging technologies. The EU regrets unjustified barriers to free and fair trade, which harm European businesses, workers, and consumers. The EU will react firmly and proportionally to defend its trade and economic interests and has tools at its disposal to do so. At the same time, the EU continues to be ready to engage in a constructive dialogue with the US, in order to seek a solution that avoids unnecessary harm to both economies. Denmark and the US have been strong allies for decades and the EU is confident this will continue. The Transatlantic relationship is founded on a shared history and strong bonds. For decades, this partnership has been a cornerstone of peace, security, and economic growth. The EU is ready to deepen and strengthen this relationship, discuss shared interests and address global challenges together.”
  EU-US trade relations · EU-US relations
• 2025-01-16 “E-000180/2025 Answer given by Ms Zaharieva on behalf of the European Commission Any research and innovation activities in projects carried out under Horizon Europe 1 must have an exclusive focus on civil applications. During the execution of the Horizon Europe projects, all beneficiaries must ensure that the activities under the action comply with that rule. In addition, Horizon Europe beneficiaries must also comply with ethical principles and applicable EU and international law, and all Horizon Europe proposals go through an ethics screening during the evaluation process. The projects, in which Israel Aerospace Industries participates, are of a purely civil nature as per Article 7 (1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695 2 . These include among other things projects to develop hybrid electric regional aircrafts, to revolutionise liquid hydrogen aircraft refuelling at airport scale, and to advance material science applications to reduce the generation of waste and enhance the safety of workers 3 . Furthermore, also within the scope of the implementation of Horizon Europe, the Commission applies specific measures with regard to the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 in line with the Commission Guidelines No 2013/C 205/05 4 . All projects funded by Horizon Europe are being closely monitored by the Commission to verify compliance with the applicable legal framework 5 . Any non-compliance by a beneficiary may trigger contractual measures as provided for in the Horizon Europe model grant agreement 6 . 1 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj/eng 3 For information on the projects please consult the CORDIS website https://cordis.europa.eu/search?q=frameworkProgramme%3D%27HORIZON%27%20AND%20(%27israel%20 aerospace%20industries%27)&p=1&num=10&srt=Relevance:decreasing or the HE Dashboard https://dashboard.tech.ec.europa.eu/qs_digit_dashboard_mt/public/sense/app/dc5f6f40-c9de-4c40-8648015d6ff21342/sheet/3bcd6df0-d32a-4593-b4fa0f9529c8ffb0/state/analysis/select/Organisation%20PIC/999969315 4 OJ C 205, 19/07/2013. 5 Including with the ethical principles and the relevant EU, national and international law. See Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, OJ L170, 12/05/2021. 6 E.g. the recovery of EU funding or even termination of the participation.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-12-11 “E-002863/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) confirms the EU’s commitment to a Syrianled, Syrian-owned peaceful and inclusive transition with the participation of all Syrian citizens, including the Syrian Kurdish population. The EU urges all Syrian and regional actors to exercise maximum restraint and avoid any further violence, to ensure the protection of civilians, and to uphold international law, including international humanitarian law. Türkiye has a legitimate right and responsibility to fight against terrorism, ensuring that this is done in accordance with the rule of law, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in full respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbouring states. The HR/VP evokes the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024 1 , calling for full respect for Syria’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within secure borders, in accordance with international law. The HR/VP already expressed this position in her statement of 9 December 2024 2 , and clearly reiterated it in multiple international meetings, including in Aqaba on 14 December 2024 3 , where the international community agreed on common principles for engaging in support of a Syrian-led, Syrian owned transition. The HR/VP also took the opportunity to underline the EU’s position in her bilateral meetings with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and will continue to do so. The EU stands ready to support the new phase in Syria in coordination with regional partners and others. For this, the HR/VP is in close contact with her counterparts in the region. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/09/syria-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-fall-of-the-assad-regime/ 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/press-statement-eu-high-representative-foreign-affairs-and-security-policyfollowing-international_en”
  EU relations with Kurdish people · EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-11-21 “E-002615/2024 Reply The EU has strongly condemned the escalation in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, following increased settler violence and the expansion of illegal settlements 1 . In response to the situation, the EU has listed 14 persons or entities under the EU restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses 2 . As per the conclusions of the European Council of 17 October 2024, the Council is also taking work forward on further restrictive measures against extremist settlers and against entities and organisations which support them. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/qa3lblga/euco-conclusions-27062024-en.pdf, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024D1175&qid=1733942619824, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024D1967&qid=1733942619824”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-11-18 “E-002569/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The implementation of the arms embargo is the responsibility of Member States. The export (outside of the EU) of military technology and equipment is subject to the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 1 , revised in 2019, which is binding for all Member States. The competent authorities of Member States take the final decision on a case-by-case basis whether to authorise or deny an individual export or transit license of military equipment in accordance with the criteria of the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. These criteria cover inter alia the risk of violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the risk of diversion (notably via unauthorised re-export), and the behaviour of the recipient country with regard to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and the respect of international law. Where licences are granted, conditions are generally attached to them, for instance on end-use, storage and on re-exportation. The conditions can be adjusted to the level of risk of the recipient countries. The EU has maintained an arms embargo on the whole of Sudan since 1994, prohibiting the sale, supply, transfer, or export of arms and related materiel to the entire country 2 . Thus, the EU has already implemented the recommendation of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission 3 to expand the United Nations arms embargo (currently applying only to Darfur) to the entire country and will continue encouraging others to follow suit. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/compos/2008/944/oj/eng 2 See current EU legislation in Council Decision 2014/450/CFSP (OJ L 203 11.7.2014, p. 106). 3 See the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan (A/HRC/57/CRP.6), https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57CRP-6-en.pdf”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU policy on Sahel and Sudan
• 2024-11-08 “E-002476/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The protection of human life and the respect for human rights and human dignity are fundamental principles of migration management, in line with obligations under EU and international law. In EU funded programmes, the Commission adopts a human rights-based approach, with human rights being considered in each phase of the project cycle. The Commission monitors EU funded programmes through several means, including regular reports from implementing partners, on the spot verifications, results oriented monitoring exercises and external evaluations. Furthermore, all contractual obligations include clauses, which entitle the Commission to suspend or terminate any contract if it has evidence that, or needs to verify whether, the beneficiary has breached any of its obligations. Respect of human rights is also reflected in the Commission’s dialogue with partner countries. The Commission, in close cooperation with the European External Action Service and EU Delegations, is currently reflecting on ways to further reinforce internal tools to strengthen the implementation of the human rights-based approach in all its interventions. In line with the President of the Commission political guidelines 1 , the Commission will further reflect on new ways to counter irregular migration, while respecting international law and ensuring sustainable and fair solutions for the migrants themselves. Particular attention will be paid to the respect of fundamental rights, including the respect of the principle of nonrefoulement. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU-Turkey relations · EU-Tunisia relations
• 2024-10-16 “E-002087/2024 Reply The promotion and protection of human rights are at the core of the EU’s engagement with third states and among the key objectives of its external action. In order to put human rights at the core of its action, the EU has developed a broad range of legal and policy instruments, including the Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues 1 adopted in 2021, which serve as guiding reference. Human Rights Dialogues are one of the main means of implementation of the EU external human rights policy as outlined in the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024” 2 , which has been extended to 2027 3 . In line with the Lisbon Treaty and the role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Art. 27(2) TEU 4 ), the EEAS leads these dialogues. Human rights dialogues are embedded in the overall political relationship with third states. As set out in the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council “A Strategic Partnership with the Gulf” 5 and the relevant Council conclusions 6 , the promotion and protection of human rights remains at the core of EU's engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its Member States. The EU conducts regular Human Rights Dialogues with the Members States of the GCC and discusses human rights issues as part of the political engagement with them. The priorities set out in the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy guide those discussions. When relevant, individual cases are raised during the dialogues. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6279-2021-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7029-2020-INIT/en/pdf 3 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9508-2024-INIT/en/pdf 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2016/art_27/oj/eng 5 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-%E2%80%9Cstrategic-partnershipgulf%E2%80%9D_en 6 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10038-2022-INIT/en/pdf”
  EU relations with Gulf countries · EU competences on human rights
• 2024-09-10 “E-001664/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The specific case mentioned in the Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 2023 Annual Report 1 refers to staff who worked in an EU delegation. The European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission monitor their staff compliance as regards statutory obligations and those deriving from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 2 . Any infringement of those obligations brought to the attention of these institutions are addressed and referred to the Investigative and Disciplinary Office of the Commission (IDOC), or to OLAF accordingly. The EEAS and the Commission services have followed up on the recommendations given by OLAF but cannot comment on individual cases. Staff are provided with training on rights, obligations, and privileges before departing for a posting to an EU delegation, as well as appropriate inductions and refresher trainings on the ethics rules in place and on the reporting mechanisms for allegations of misconduct. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/olaf-report/2023/index_en.html 2 Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iii-3&chapter=3&clang=_en”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-09-09 “E-001655/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Water Framework Directive (WFD) 1 obliges Member States to achieve good water status by 22 December 2015, with a possibility to apply time related exemptions until 22 December 2027. After that date, the potential for applying exemptions will be very limited, and would require evidence that all measures are in place to reach the best possible status and that further measures to achieve good status are not feasible or they are disproportionately costly, or that natural constraints imped the achievement of the objectives in the given timelines. Where justifications are lacking or not appropriate or detailed enough, Member States may be considered in breach of the WFD. The Commission will report its assessment on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive before the end of 2024, in accordance with Article 18 WFD. Denmark has indicated it will report new measures in the course of 2024 following from the recent Green Denmark agreement. Considering the current cycle is the last cycle during which time related exemptions can still be invoked, the Commission will pay particular attention to the extent to which all measures that are required to achieve good status are put in place during the period 2022-2027. However, it already seems clear that Denmark has not yet established the state of many water bodies which are reported to be in ‘unknown status’. This seriously hampers the possibility to devise appropriate measures for reaching good status hence also to justify exemptions in accordance with the strict criteria set out in the WFD. Further to its assessment, the Commission will engage with the Danish authorities and, in case of breach of the WFD, take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with EU law. 1 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-07-26 “E-001432/2024 Answer given by Mr Breton on behalf of the European Commission The Commission recognises the dangers of asbestos. The revised Asbestos at work Directive 1 lays down limit values for workers’ exposure to asbestos, as well as sets obligations for employers to identify and address asbestos risks in buildings 2 . In addition, the Waste Framework Directive 3 requires Member States to ensure that waste management is carried out without endangering human health or the environment. The Commission has been engaging with EU citizens, national authorities and stakeholders to prepare the proposal on the screening and registration of asbestos in buildings. This included an event of the High-Level Construction Forum in 2022 4 and an Open Public Consultation in 2023 5 . Since then, an impact assessment has been prepared to identify the optimal combination of measures. The Commission is already advanced in its internal preparatory processes, and it will be up to the new Commission to decide on the most appropriate way forward. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02009L0148-20231220 2 Before beginning demolition, maintenance or renovation work on premises built before the entry into force of the Member State’s asbestos ban, Article 11 provides for the employers’ obligation to identify presumed materials containing asbestos, in particular by obtaining information from the owners of premises, from other employers and from other sources, including relevant registers. If such information is not available, the employer shall ensure an examination by a qualified operator. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02008L0098-20240218 4 https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/53026 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13543-Asbestos-screening-registeringand-monitoring/public-consultation_en”
  Air quality policy
• 2024-07-26 “E-001433/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission As the question regarding ‘Frontex’s use of firearms and ammunition’ falls entirely under the responsibility of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the Commission has asked the Agency to provide the details requested by the Honourable Member. The Agency’s reply will be sent by the Commission to the Honourable Member as soon as possible.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-07-24 “E-001418/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU took good note of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in respect of the ‘Legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem’ 1 . Its conclusions largely confirm existing EU positions, which are fully aligned with United Nations (UN) resolutions 2 regarding the status of the occupied Palestinian territory. The EU has a long-standing position of non-recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 and considers Israel’s settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory as illegal. The EU position is thus in conformity with the conclusion of the opinion that international organisations have a duty not to recognise as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory. In addition, as regards its own obligations (as well as those of the Member States) as set out in the EU-Israel Association Agreement 3 , the EU already complies with the obligation to distinguish in its relations with Israel between the territory of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. In particular, products originating in the West Bank cannot benefit from the preferential tariff arrangements granted for products originating in Israel. EU law also requires that any foodstuff originating in the Israeli settlements cannot be labelled and/or imported to the EU as originating in Israel. The EU is still assessing the Advisory Opinion and its implications for EU actions and policies, including common foreign and security policy. With regards to the possible future restrictive measures targeting individuals or entities, it should be stressed that it would be for the Council to adopt such measures by unanimity. 1 Summary of the Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204176 2 Among others, UN Security Council Resolution 1515, 1544, 1860, 2735. 3 EU-Israel Association Agreement, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/israel/documents/eu_israel/asso_agree_en.pdf”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-07-24 “P-001413/2024 Answer given by Mr Schmit on behalf of the European Commission The right to strike does not fall under EU competence (TFEU, Article 153(5)). However, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union recognises the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements and take strike action. The Recommendation on strengthening social dialogue in the EU 1 recommends Member States to ensure that workers and trade unions are protected when exercising their right to collective bargaining. It is the responsibility of Member States to ensure the proper functioning of national social dialogue as well as correct application of national provisions and fundamental rights. With the introduction of the ‘Monti clause’ in Directive 2018/957 2 the co-legislators confirmed the equality of fundamental rights and the freedoms of establishment and provision of services. However, for this clause to have effect at national level, Member States have to transpose it into their law. A recent report on the application and implementation of the Posting of Workers Directive and accompanying Staff Working Document 3 analyses this transposition. In the same report, the Commission notes the challenges related to subcontracting. It intends to work with the European Labour Authority to map subcontracting liability in Member States. 1 Council Recommendation of 12 June 2023 on strengthening social dialogue in the European Union (C/2023/1389) - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202301389 2 Article 1(1)b, second subparagraph of Directive (EU) 2018/957 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 June 2018 amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 173, 9.7.2018, p. 16–24. 3 Staff Working Document accompanying the report on the application and implementation of Directive (EU) 2018/957: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023SC0357 Report on the application and implementation of Directive (EU) 2018/957 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A320%3AFIN).”
  EU policy on employment subcontracting · EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers
• “Next. When you listen to the debate today and think about who the EPP want to create a majority with in this room in the future, I don't think it's strange that there's not a lot to applaud when you see the role the EU has played at the Cop 30. It is true that the EU supported the phasing out of fossil fuels, but they were one of the last to do so. And why were we so defensive about financing? I think one thing remains clear when it comes to Cop 30 and climate. The EU is not leading as they should have been. There are many reasons for this, one of them being that the European Commission was so tardy with our climate goals that in fact, they breached our own climate act. Could the result of Cop 30 have been worse? Yes, no doubt, but it could also have been a lot better. If the EU had taken its responsibility seriously, we could very well have achieved more, much more than we did. The EU has a role to play and we don't do that and it's our own fault. Thank you. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Co-Chair: Raoul.”
  Climate efforts
• “They did it also in 2015. Then it was mentioning of human rights breaches and corruption that annoyed the ruling family. In spite of the fact that respect of fundamental rights were part of agreements between the EU and Azerbaijan then, as they are now. So we have an agreement and then, of course, we will react. Some of the wording might be so vague that you could discuss how they are supposed to be understood. But that's an important debate to take. Back then. It took about a year before relationships were reestablished, so perhaps we can hope that things will change. But I think, as I said, that it is regrettable and it is rarely a good idea to cut off dialogue or limit parliamentary cooperation, especially when you're in a partnership. I think it's important to say that what this shows is, it just underlines how much we need to make ourselves independent from imported oil and gas from Russia or Azerbaijan or other countries. Because there are regimes we don't want to be dependent on, so we need to get out. And even though there are outbursts of anger, there will be criticism when it's justified. The only way to avoid criticism for breaches of human rights is to not breach the human rights. And I hope Azerbaijan would choose to do that, because if they did, we wouldn't criticize them. And then we could perhaps have a dialogue and then we could face the things together. Thank you.”
  EU-Azerbaijan relations
• “We need to be better at analyzing, classifying and phasing out hazardous chemicals. The suggestion that we are discussing today does not resolve the many problems that we have with harmful chemicals harmful to the people and the environment, but they are a step in the right direction and that is why I support these measures. One thing we need is to better be able to assess how many EU citizens are exposed to hazardous chemicals. That's something that requires systematic data from many sources. And that's what we're getting at all for here. The EU's various agencies will also get the possibility for using the same data. And finally, there will be increased focus on the phasing out of animal testing, something we've long needed. It's not often I say this, especially when it comes to an EU proposal, but I'd like to say that this is an EU proposal that I'm looking forward to voting for.”
  Chemicals regulation · Use of animal testing
• “Any time an EU state buys Russian gas or oil, we are financing the unjust war of Putin. So we've actually provided more support to Russia's war chest than to Ukraine's, which is ridiculous. So it's all the more important that we put a stop to that no longer buy Russian gas. I think, nevertheless, that there are three important questions that we need to raise. First of all, why is this only happening now more than three years too late? And secondly, how long are we going to still buy Russian oil and uranium? And thirdly, why are we still so slow in developing renewable energies to achieve a genuine independence of European energy? Maybe we wouldn't be dependent on Russia anymore, but dependent on other countries. And when push comes to shove, we know that they're also prepared to blackmail Europe and constitute a threat to Europe. We haven't achieved our goal yet, but we're making a step in the right direction.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you very much, chairman. And thank you, Commissioner. Thank you for being here with us today. Now, we heard a good point made earlier about electrification. I mean, that's one a part of the solution to our problems. But there is something that I'm concerned about. The commission talks not about renewable energies, but so-called clean energies. And that's then And reflected in the Clean Industry Act. And that means a nuclear power stations and fusion, nuclear fusion as alternatives to renewables. And that's problematic. I mean, nuclear energy and biofuels are not sustainable. One damages the climate and the other one goes against some of our rules. So this brings me to my question to you, Commissioner. How can we ensure that we have the appropriate focus on renewables because they're better in technical terms, but also for the environment? People here are accusing the Green Deal of increasing energy prices, but the problem is that we're going too slowly.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you. I can see that it's clear. It's clear that the presidency attaches great importance to the fact that competitivity of European industry needs to be increased by reducing red tape, and that's all very well, but. A lot of the issues are about protecting our populations or protecting our environment. This is very important for our employees. And I think that Citizens in Europe won't necessarily understand if their working conditions are affected. Even if we want to increase competitivity, it cannot be that we protect the environment and working conditions less than we protect our workers if we don't take action in terms of chemical production. This is going to cost us a great deal of money if we're going to have to clean it all up afterwards. Look at how much it cost to clear up pollution from leaks. I think that we need to ensure that cutting red tape is all very well, but we need to also protect the environment, also protect working conditions for employees also. And I have two questions that I want to ask you. I'd like to know what you're going to To do as the presidency in terms of deregulation. There should not be negative consequences for people living in Europe, for the environment, for nature. And we shouldn't lose sight of these elements when we talk about stepping up. Competitivity. Public funds used for this purpose need to also take account of the green economy. Job creation, but creating good jobs also.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “First of all, the European Union doesn't have a low level of competitiveness compared to the US. On the contrary, it's the US that wants to slap tariffs on our products and we shouldn't try and emulate the United States. The competitiveness compass of the European Commission will take us down the wrong track because it promotes deregulation, all encompassing deregulation, which reduces the protection of humans, nature, climate. We have to listen to green associations and European NGOs that are That are protesting. We need to listen to those companies that say that the best way of improving competitiveness isn't deregulation, because when there is rule backsliding, it means less certainty for companies, less capacity to plan and less investment in sustainable development and so on. And that will harm competitiveness. And in the meantime, all we have is a race to the bottom, and that in turn will damage competitiveness.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you very much. I think it's very important to remember that here in Europe, we are in the midst of a triple crisis, a climate crisis, a biodiversity crisis. And we also have significant challenges through chemical pollution and other forms of pollution. The green transformation of our industry has therefore never been more important than it is now. Now, the European Commission's clean industrial deal can be the answer to this. We want to have better competition and we also want to protect the planet, but we do not want to improve competitiveness at the expense of health and the environment, therefore. Social justice is extremely important, and workers and local communities must be at the heart of the transformation. We need ambitious targets for fair and green industry. I have one specific question to ask you and it's about chemicals. What can be done to ensure an effective phase out of PFAS and promote the development of sustainable alternatives?”
  Chemicals regulation
• “Thank you. And I'm speaking Danish and. I have to say that I'm shocked to hear about the conditions under which Amazon workers have to work. Not just really poor conditions of employment and excessive monitoring and people being fired if they try to organize. It's ridiculous that billionaires from American can come to Europe and earn even more money, while ridiculous while ignoring the normal work place conditions we have and ignoring the European Parliament. But what's even more is that we can see that public companies are giving awarding tenders to Amazon. And given that Amazon is not paying taxes, we're using the taxpayers money to buy services from Amazon. I think that's grotesque. I think it's Disastrous. And I'd like to ask Mr. Ross from Uni Europe what consequences he thinks it would have for Amazon if we just said that the public tendering rules that we have in Europe are such that they exclude companies which are not prepared to conclude collective bargaining agreements or not prepared to allow their employers to organize, and so on and so forth. What would be impact if we said that such companies could not have public tenders?”
  EU policy on social criteria in public funding
• “Well, if there is something that is really clear in European politics today, deregulation, simplification of the answer to everything. Now if you ask about the subjects, people tell you, well read the Draghi report as if it were a Bible. And the Draghi report when you talk about that report. Basically I have the feeling that you've only read a few paragraphs because you only seem to quote some of those chapters, because it also talks about green investment, talks about good working conditions of a strong social contract. Those are the bases for a European Union which is to be competitive. Can't we just try and solve these problems once and for all?”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “I too think that it is regrettable and sad that the Azerbaijani Parliament has decided to suspend connections with the European Parliament, but I think we need to look for an explanation and look at that explanation. Apparently they do not like being criticised for breaching fundamental rights. When you disregard rule of law and press freedom. You have to accept that you will be criticized when you treat your prisoners of war against international law. You have to accept criticism. When you will not recognize that the people of Nagorno-Karabakh have a right to their own language and culture. Well, then you will be criticized. And when we're talking about human rights and international law, I think it's good that the European Parliament clearly states what they stand for. Somebody said that we have double standards. I could wish that the European Parliament would always state its case clearly when we're talking about human rights, but we can't go from no double standards to no standards. Perhaps we will never know exactly why the Parliament decided to pull out of our cooperation or from Euronest. They chose to leave, so they will of course be welcome to return. I think that would be a wise decision because this will probably hit both Azerbaijan and its people more than it hurts us. When you say no to dialogue is it's usually not a good choice. And what we probably need to remember is that this isn't really something new. It's not the first time that there's a bajani regime decided to do the same.”
  EU-Azerbaijan relations
• “Thank you very much. When it comes to energy intensive energy industries. Sorry, I have to say that I'm disappointed. I'm disappointed following the debates today. Um. Um. It was supposed to be good, and then it was actually bad. We've chosen to look ahead and prioritise real, fair green transition over a cheap, populist, right wing talking point. But no. Today, instead, we see that. Most jobs are part of the green transition. The green transition is supposed to create jobs. But rather we are continuing to favour a questionable, obsolete technology. But it's the workers who are in the front line in the green transition. What we see on the table today is that we're continuing to focus on the technology of the past without any ambition or nuclear CO2 storage gas. Rather than looking at electrification or new sustainable technologies that are very well known. In the long term, that's going to be detrimental to our security, to our workers. And Trump's measures are not going to do anything to improve any of this. We know that we need a democratization, but here we see two short term vision and the speaker has been cut off.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you very much. And I will speak in Danish. For its for. About a year ago, we discussed how the Horizon Europe program was financing the Israeli military sector. And then you answered that they did not. Well, since then, we've had a number of revelations in different media saying that we do see Israeli military projects receiving funds from the horizon program. Even the Ministry of Defence has received it. And we're not talking about peanuts here. It should be several million euros we're talking about transferred to Israeli defense companies, and that only after October 7th, this is happening. Despite the fact that Horizon Europe cannot finance military activity, and despite the fact that the EU External Action Service in June confirmed that Israel has committed indiscriminate attacks on hunger and torture and apartheid against Palestinians, there are clear indications that Israel is breaching its human rights obligations under the Association Agreement. So I have to ask this question. Does the Commissioner find it responsible for the EU to continue financing military activities in a country being accused of genocide? And wouldn't it make more sense to suspend the agreement, the association agreement with Israel? Will you promise to investigate these human rights consequences of former and future research funding destined for Israel and their military programmes? Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you. And I will speak in Danish. Firstly, I'm glad that the Commission recognises the serious crisis that our water environment is in. Use environmental rules only work if the countries abide by them, and a lot of the member countries have not lived up to their obligations, not because they did know better, but as a political choice. An example is my own country, Denmark. The minister has admitted to Denmark for 14 years, not reporting on values for chemicals in our water waste, which means that we have not been able to document the extent of the pollution of our water and not been able to evaluate the situation in our seas. So I would like to ask Commissioner Oswald, what is the Commission going to do in order to make sure that member countries like Denmark actually abide by the rules from the EU? Will the Commission have procedures against countries that year after year? Do not abide by the water regulation? And then about the first we know the serious consequences that PFAS has, and we know how expensive it's going to be to clean up the situation as it is. So it seems incredible that the commission does not have a clear plan as to an out facing of PFAS that could start as soon as possible. Thank you.”
  Water pollution
• “Thank you very much. I'm pleased to see you both here. Just some questions. First of all, on simplification. If I have understood it correctly, I think the approach of the Danish government is to follow. Simplification without reducing environmental standards or labour standards, which I think are very important for us to strengthen. I see proposals that would see a reduction in these standards, for example, the legislation on public procurement. Is it a Danish priority that when it comes to procurement, we avoid, uh, companies that have bad labour practices that don't have collective bargaining agreements, for example, then on energy and climate? The 90% target by 2040 is a minimum that needs to be achieved if we want to maintain our targets, Mr. Aagaard. How can we ensure that we get this 90% reduction by 2040? What is going to happen with climate credits inside the EU and externally? How can we avoid what's often happened in the past where climate policy is misused to invest into projects? That actually just end up pushing the burden on to third countries with less strict emissions targets. If we want to achieve the 2040 targets, we really need to move quickly. In Denmark, we often see this model of doing a lot at the beginning and then tapering off. But that's not possible. Companies need to have clear targets and we need to send a clear signal. Thank you.”
  Climate efforts
• “All of us were born in the EU, so now you talked about the defence of European citizens. We also have to talk about defending or protecting our citizens against dangerous chemicals that are now found in nature. So my question is, if you are in favour of simplification and harmonisation, what about the rules which are which Denmark has Are introduced to prevent the use of PFAS in certain products. Should this not be the case for all EU products? Is it? Is it? Is that not the biggest simplification of all that is banning dangerous chemicals? It set out in reach. Or. Do you think we should just let industry continue to pollute nature and harm citizens? I think a number of our citizens would be interested in your reply.”
  PFAs
• “Yes. Thank you. I will speak in Danish. Since I think that this hearing that we're attending today, it illustrates that high risk workers are facing a number of very serious challenges. The positive thing is that there is this possibility to solve some of these problems. It's important to underscore also that prevention needs to be our starting point. Problems that have been mentioned often result from having too low staffing and a lack of support and attention. We can see the impact of carcinogenic materials, and working in these kind of environments means that we need sector specific legislation. It's also been said that insecure work, work, seasonal workers, migrants these are the people that are most exposed and the worst protected. And if Vision Zero is going to be anything other than a slogan, then we need to integrate prevention and training safe substances and protection for all workers in the workplace. My question, therefore, would be what are binding provisions would provide for equal protection across these different sectors? And how can we be quite sure that vulnerable workers, the ones that I mentioned earlier, including migrant seasonal workers and people who have insecure positions, how can we ensure that they don't end up being the last people that get the benefits of Vision Zero? Because it's very important that Vision Zero also includes the most exposed workers. Thank you.”
  EU rules on hazardous working conditions
• “Thank you. Thank you so much. Well, if we look at the environmental regulation, we need to look at the businesses that have invested in electric vehicles. And if we continue to undermine the green policies, what's the point of investing in green policies. The worst situation is that, again, we're trying to go too quickly. We don't seem to have a proper debate. The whole thing is a disaster. I mean, this has been approved by the European Parliament and the member states in 2023, this entire policy. So I do understand that at the moment, there is a race to try and swallow our own promises in the area of green transition. But this is not a race that we should be taking part in. So please, colleagues, say no to this legislation, this climate legislation, and no to urgency.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• “I'd. Today. We are talking a great deal about Europe beholden to its principles. If we look around the world, that appears to be a bit of a joke, though, because we preach one thing and do the opposite based on the conclusions of the last council meeting where we talked a great deal about how to support a peaceful transition in Syria. What we're seeing in Syria now, though, is anything but peaceful and including we're seeing young Kurdish women being thrown from high buildings, we're seeing violent abuses, and we're seeing is fighters. The EU's reaction has been limited to a few statements while they continue to finance the Syrian regime. Who are behind what's happening? Why are we so afraid to put our foot down and demand that this ceases? That is what we should be doing if we believe in our principles.”
  EU-Syria relations
• “Well, here we are again with an action plan from the commission, which was published just a few minutes before it was presented. That Could lead one to suspect that the Parliament here shouldn't be allowed to read this, because otherwise we could have looked at this more closely. It indicates that that is the Commission's preferred strategy. But that all smells worse than the manure that we're talking about here. The action plan stinks because here we're not dealing with our long term dependency on imports or. Or addressing environmental concerns and environmental protection. It would. It's as if you think you can cure an alcoholic by giving him cheaper alcohol so that he won't then have to do without it. There are alternatives. The Commission knows that. Why are they not really looking at that, at those alternatives rather than going along with business as usual, we need an action plan. But it all needs to be completely overhauled.”
  Agriculture (green)
• “(17:44:21 – 17:45:28): Yeah. We got some good news that the European Parliament is gonna switch its default search engine from Google to the European browser, Quant, which is designed to avoid tracking users, and that's an important step. And this has an effect on data security, but it also sends out important signal about how we can make sure that we are independent of the American tech giants. That's very important, and I think it needs to be underscored. And we see how The US has managed to bring to bear, sanctions against members of the ICC, and this means people have problems using access, to payment cards and shopping online, this sort of thing. So we need to strengthen our technical technological sovereignty to changing our operating systems in this way or browsers. It's a very good way to support the European technology technology sector, And that means, we can move to making money on those. And that's really my question to the commissioner.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty
• “Thank you. I'm from Denmark, and we've seen many examples of these endless subcontracting chains. Social dumping, exploitation. This costs human lives. We know that this increases economic crime. That's the reality. And therefore, I'm surprised that a Danish MEP in this parliament is saying that we don't need to do anything about it. We don't have any problems. Now, if he doesn't, if he doesn't want us to do anything about this situation. This situation, which is unfair for workers. And and he doesn't want to combat economic crime. What about Europol? Europol says that European crime networks, the most dangerous ones, are actually hidden behind legitimate companies. We need to do something about that. It's on our doorstep. This is an issue we need to tackle, and I would like to see a constructive response. How are we going to respond to this challenge?”
  EU policy on labour exploitation in global supply chains
• “Thank you. I will speak in Danish. I just want to make quite sure that I've understood this correctly. Your view is that you don't want to conclude collective bargaining agreements, because you feel that that is an internal matter in that way, you've clearly said that you don't respect the model we have for the labor market in Europe. Do you then feel that it's reasonable for you to get contracts from public authorities so that you use taxpayers money to undermine the labor market model? And that's so that's one question. Second question. Is it common for you to do what you've done in Italy, that is spy on trade union meetings and then report to the management? What has been said and done? Is that part of your normal relationship with trade unions?”
  EU regulation on worker representation in company decisions
• “When it comes to chemicals policy, I'm not sure if the emotion which is predominating is anger or indignation. Everybody is clear about the fact that the respect of human life, health and protection of nature is becoming increasingly unimportant. The only mantra which counts now is we have to make life easier for businesses. For years now, we've been waiting for reforms in this sector. The idea from the outset was to better protect humans and nature. But in reality, what we see is that we're just down to support chemicals countries. We still haven't faced up to the fact that we need to do something about phases. We are doing the opposite of respecting our duty to protect. This is completely irresponsible. Once again, future generations will have to pay the price for our action, or lack of inaction, and the price they'll have to pay will be extremely high.”
  Chemicals regulation
• “And I will speak in Danish. To start, I'd like to say to Commissioner Jorgensen, I do remember our time together with great joy. And you were also. We were ministers together. And we're talking about expanding and extending the grids. That's extremely important for the energy policy. And climate policy are also part of transport policy. How can we can improve the transport systems if we take account of the climate here? Railway transport is so key. It is an excellent alternative. But there is a real crisis. It's expensive and it's difficult to move over to trains. We need more capacity on the railways, particularly on the borders and at the busy intersections. We need to ensure that the networks function better, and this is not something that's easy to deal with. So do we want to ensure that the establishment of night trains in Europe is something we support, so that we can, with a good conscience, move over to the railways? Thank you.”
  EU support of rail transport
• “Thank you. I will speak in Danish. It's really a pleasure to be here. I'd like to thank the Commission for this excellent work. Uh, on behalf of the citizen and the environment, I'd also like to thank the president, the chair. It's very important to take account of animal welfare. We need to work towards an end to animal experimentation, particularly with cosmetics. There are much more effective ways of testing safety of products on humans than animal testing, and that really shouldn't be a problem for anybody, not industry either. We need to take account of safety at work as well, and we've seen that the resources made available were not sufficient to protect workers from dangerous chemicals. This text goes in the right direction, but I'd like to put forward some proposals in order to reinforce the protection of workers. Unions have an important role to play here, and we need to look at the protection of a range of different industries nurses, construction workers and so forth. No one should die because of their work. I'd like to highlight also. The importance of insisting on certain aspects, certain chemicals which can have a huge impact both on human health and environmental health. We must do away with dangerous substances. I really look forward to working with you on this file, and I can see that what we have here at the very outset is a very good result so far.”
  Chemicals regulation · Use of animal testing
• “Thank you. And I will speak in Danish. TIt's true that this proposal contains some elements which you would call simplification. However, it's also true to say that it contains a number of significant reductions in protection of of citizens. We're watering down both environmental and health protection. This has been confirmed in a statement from the Danish government to the Parliament in saying how what our attitude should be, this proposals and the UN Special Report has actually criticized this proposal and it says it's contrary to basic human rights, the right to live safely and not be exposed to toxic substances. There are clear worsenings of the standards here. And then the Commission's proposal water things down further in terms of protecting people against dangerous substances, particularly the transition period in the rapporteur's report, which says that carcinogens can be in a product for six years after it's been determined that it's a carcinogen. And then you come and tell me that you're not reducing the protection of citizens health. And this watering down is wrapped up in economic arguments. But from a. Human point of view, there's no economic argument, because if these people are exposed to these substances, become ill and die, then there's no economic gain for the society at large. I hope we can change course giving these long exemptions From for the industry is not acceptable. Carcinogens should be withdrawn from the market when it's been determined that they're not acceptable. I would also suggest that we ban PFAS in cosmetics. The people of Europe want a protection against PFAS and dangerous chemicals. We have to make sure that these substances are not in the product. So there's no danger when a father puts suncream on his child, or the teenager puts on makeup before a party. This is a human rights, and it is our duty to protect our citizens. I hope you'll stand with me in doing this work. Thank you.”
  Chemicals regulation
• “There is the commission's green industry deal report. When I read this proposal on a clean industrial deal, I was pleased, but also somewhat concerned. Um, I was, uh, pleased because of the 2040 target, but concerned about outdated forms of energy such as nuclear and gas and electricity, and also concerned because I think the deregulation agenda places barriers to green policies. I feel anger and I feel frustration. It's not as bad as it could have been, but is it really enough for us to be pleased? We need more than what the commission is proposing. We need climate action. We need more green, climate friendly policies. I think this proposal needs to be revised. Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Once again, prices for electricity, heating and fuel are increasing. Of course, because of the war the US and Israel are waging against Iran and Iran's attacks on neighbors, their threats in the Strait of Hormuz, and it pushes prices up. But we could have avoided this if we had acted earlier, if we had transitioned to renewable energy, energy, because we know how dependent we are on fossil fuels. But instead, many of the members here, especially on the right wing, decided not to do that. They held on to fossil fuels. They insisted on gas instead of wind and sun And what I hear today is that you're still fighting the green transition. That's the most important, which means that we Europeans will just have to pay on prices, environment and really expensive energy. I have to ask the right wing, when will you live up to your responsibility? When will you grow up? Thank you.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Yes. It's true that energy prices are too high in European countries. And there's no doubt about the fact that we have to tackle this problem. But that doesn't mean that we have to continue depending on coal, oil and gas. We need this green transition and move towards low cost renewable energy. That's my first point. Secondly, the fact that energy costs are higher in Europe isn't going to change. It's the US that are going to have competitiveness problems vis a vis Europe. And that is why Trump decided to impose tariffs on European products.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “Thank you very much. This reminds me of a story from Denmark, when the then government changed the definition on what poverty is. So 3000 children, then all of a sudden we're no longer poor. And this didn't cost the state anything at all. They didn't cost the state anything at all. That was a very smart move. But those children, they weren't out of poverty. It was just a change in the way in which the statistics were developed. And this is not a way to solve a problem if you can't just change it, if you the problem if if you can't see it, it doesn't mean that the problem isn't there. If we see we see a forest fires, we see climate change. We see a drop in biodiversity and the forests are under constant threat. This is similar to the poor children. The problem isn't disappearing just because we push it under the rug. And so the Commission's proposal is very welcome in the left group. It's important that we exchange data so that we can create an overall view. To be able to find the necessary political solutions, we need to be able to understand the problem in its totality so that we can find the necessary solutions. And so that's why I find that the Commission's proposal is a good starting point, so that we can work on it to have better and stronger Indicators that will also cover socio economic indicators. We also need to make sure that member states have to create long term plans. And we think that in the current form, this is this. This should continue to exist. We certainly feel that we should uphold the current situation so that we can make sure that our forest can continue to be surveyed in the way in which it needs to be.”
  Management of EU forests
• “Thank you. I think one thing that we can all agree about is that EU must become less dependent on the USA when it comes to defence. We could ask why in Denmark, we decided to buy another 35 fighter jets from the United States. We are under pressure from the USA. There aren't enough European alternative. We are extremely vulnerable in this way. We we take part in the MF 50 program, and this means that we are participating in the war in Gaza. Many people are criticizing that. And that brings me to my question. How likely is it that the Danish presidency will announce that that more would like more states would like to buy fighters from the USA? And and will there be any states against that? Why can't we buy more fighters from Europe? And why can't we become less dependent on Donald Trump and invest in European industry? Given all of the unrest that's been created by Donald Trump's policies. And how can we focus on human rights? If that is military contribution to the genocide in Gaza? What this is against the EU charter? What, as member states, can we do to stop exports and imports from into and into Israel? And there's there needs to be a ministerial meeting in Greenland to see what this means for Greenland. We cannot we cannot force Greenland to act.”
  EU-US relations
• “Thank you. I was speaking Danish. Thank you. So we have a unique opportunity to build on good examples and show the world that we can create safe industry, serving the people and health, the environment, and being a driving force to support the environmental transition. For that reason, it is necessary that we should focus on the workers and their role because they are the driving force for the future of industry. We must ensure that a prominent role is given to workers in manufacturing. This also includes retraining and further education because industry continues to develop. That means that we need good working conditions, proper wages and a right to democratic codetermination. Thank you.”
  EU regulation on worker representation in company decisions
• “(17:47:03 – 17:47:31): thank you for that answer. Maybe I could just say that is I think what we're lacking is a clear plan as to how we are to ensure that we can replace American or other technologies in this particular area and replace it with European technologies. And we have a clear action plan on how to achieve that. I think that'd be a good idea if that could be part of the commission's plan too.”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty