Fernando NAVARRETE ROJAS

Policy topics Fernando NAVARRETE ROJAS is active on

What Fernando NAVARRETE ROJAS has said (80)

• 2026-07-14 “(16:37:14 - 16:40:32): Thank you, chair. Thank you, all the speakers, for clarifying on a very technical and specific, topic. And I'm very grateful that mister Wehmer has mentioned that this is not everything, but it's part of an important approach. So we have to see to see all what we are doing altogether. So it's 28th regime combined with the simplification where where simplification really matters. It's, it's, it's really the policy. I I would like to express my support, for the line of trouble that this, Omnibus is is taking. I think it's the right approach strategically. My worries here, bit of timing. I mean, sorry. As dramatic as has been put, the challenges for today, in 2037, all the decisions many decisions in many sectors that are relevant for the future are already gone. So, I understand that the given clarity for the very distant future also has value today, but it's fairly limited. I would strongly suggest, to go much, much more ambitious and, to try to bring forward these benefits, for the 2030s, but at least on the 2020s, because we want to have a future. Now on I like very much this approach that we take into account not just the complexities of of, of avoidant technique, but also the additional layers of rules that we have decided together, which is pillar 2. But if we take this logic to the fullest, it's not just only CFC. It also might apply. And I would like to ask commission why you have not thought about, getting away from this limitation to interest deductibility, for example, pill, groups on the Pillar 2. I mean, this idea of you have some subsidiary with a lot of debt because it's under tax. Sorry. The same logic that you mentioned for CFC, I think, could apply also for this. So we have to take it to the fullest that Pillar 2 will be up and running, and it will be effective. It's the agreed globally agreed solution to many of these problems. So these European specific solutions that made sense in the past maybe are no longer up to the task. So I would like also to suggest to be more, aggressive. Also be more aggressive if possible. I mean, now the proposal is on the table, but in in in the negotiations, I think we in parliament should be more aggressive, for example, in terms of limiting the options for member states because this is a directive. So, yes, full deductibility sounds very nice, not just for Intergroup, for all companies, but then you have member states where deductibility, you would still allow to be 95, only 95%. So you have a cascading effect within a group that has no connection with the cost of keeping, a participation. And this, this, clearly, it's a breaking in the smooth functioning of the single market, I think this loophole should be, removed from the, policy options for member states. So thank you. Thank you very much, sir.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-07-09 “(11:03:47 - 11:05:14): Thank you, chair, commissioner. Our 28th tax regime for startups and scale ups has the potential to help these companies have better funding options and have access to larger market to expand and innovate. This can help Europe move away from the medium technology trap that is currently keeping EU's economy behind. To keep up globally, we need far more disruption and innovation in our economy. That is how a prosperous future for all is built. That is why I want to encourage the commission, to act with ambition, to use this new single market integrating tool to the fullest, expanding its application to the largest possible scope of firms and topical areas. This is a test bed for what this new tool can deliver to culminate a common market that IMF data is showing that is far away from completion. And let me close with a new potential disruptive application of the 28th regime, namely bringing with legal certainty the full potential of DLT technology and tokenization to the very core of our financial system to reduce cost and increase scale and speed. This is an area where Europe could get a double dividend. Firstly, new financial markets that would be pan European from the start, avoiding current fragmentation. And secondly, a 1st moving advantage that could attract global liquidity. Commissioner, the name of the game is ambition. Act here, and thank you very much.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2026-07-02 “(10:14:17 - 10:15:31): Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Ms. Ruh. I would like to ask you specifically on your last comment on scale, how to get more scale. And 1 of the impediments that banking industry is claiming is lack of harmonization and interpretations of the rule. So we've done a great deal on our side just to move from directives to regulations. We've done a great deal, with level 2, but then it comes to level 3. So interpretation of the rules by supervisors and things apparently break loose. So we get different answers to the same rule book, within the banking union. And more worrisome to me is within the European Union, between the Eurozone vis a vis of national supervisors outside of The US. So I would like to ask you internally within the eurozone or the banking union, what procedures do you have internal? I think you have alluded, briefly on that to ensure that different banks in different jurisdictions get the same answer to the same problem, but also an assessment of how it is working coordination with supervisors beyond the banking union, but within the European Union, in order to also get, that the same problem gets the same answer within, the union?”
  European Banking Union
• 2026-06-23 “Thank you, chair. I would like to reiterate, to mister Doborskas, my question regarding the fiscal drag. What's been highlighted by the European fiscal board, the change of criteria by the European Commission about the treatment of fiscal drag that is now considered across the board as a revenue, a one off discretionary discretionary measure. I would like you to expand why this this change of criteria and what's the justification because it's the only reason why Spain, formally, fulfills the criteria of the accumulated deviations in the in the account. But I would like the commission to understand what's behind the changing criteria. Thank you.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2026-06-23 “Thank you, chair. Thank you, commissioners. I will address, commissioner Dombroskas, and I will speak into Spanish. Commissioner, you know me well, and I always start with the same thing. 905 days, we haven't had a budget in Spain. What is your opinion about that? What do you think that any country should do about addressing this problem? We haven't been able to submit a budget to you for 2 years and more, and we're counting the days. What are we supposed to do with a European semester analysis when we don't have a proper basis for it. It's it's just a formality. You always say, yes. You're vigilant. You watch fiscal policies, macroeconomic policies. You watch trends. You are aware of the budget implications. But it seems to me that none of this is actually addressing the fundamental underlying issues. If you you reduce your expectations, to be honest, often, it's a bit of an intellectual argument. Looking at the data is looking to the past, whereas what we need to look at now is how we can exert an impact on the budget policies that governments are adopting. And the reason that we have this European semester is precisely this. We have changed rules. We've got precise constraints for expenditure, and we manage income as well and expend and spend it in a proper way so as to have a balanced budget. We've got high tax receipts in Spain, yet we don't have proper criteria for managing the output. We have to look at the income tax. We have to look at tax on unearned income, and we need to look at the overall picture of the government receipts. In terms of a general escape clause, it is important that we focus on sustainability of the public accounts, and we need to have clear and supervised prudential rules for this. Therefore, I'd like to know from you what you intend to do to try to restore the credibility of the fiscal rules because I feel that the credibility has really deteriorated in recent years. Many thanks.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2026-06-22 “The nonlinear effect of supply shocks also make this essential. When they become larger, more persistent, we can see disproportionately greater deviations from our inflation target. The scenarios that we have been using since March to assess the current shock are a key tool of capturing these risks and guiding policy decisions at a time of high uncertainty. Third, our policy response must be tailored and graduated in line with the medium term orientation of our strategy. The appropriate response to a deviation of inflation from target is context specific, taking into account its source size and persistence. So there are three broad cases that we should consider. If the shock is small and temporary, short lived. It can in principle be looked through. I've heard that many times. Why didn't you look through? Well, if the shock gives rise to a sizable but not too persistent overshoot of her target, a measured adjustment of policy is warranted. If, however, inflation is expected to deviate significantly and persistently from target, our response must be appropriately forceful or persistent to prevent self-reinforcing dynamics arising and the risk of inflation expectations anchoring. This is the framework which guided the decision that we took in June. For now, we are. In the second case, the shock is too large to look through without jeopardizing our target, but we see no evidence yet of the anchoring of inflation expectations or second round effects that would warrant a more forceful policy response at this stage.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “So on growth, once again, we have revised slightly down 0.8, 26, 1.227 and 1.6 in sorry, 1.5 in 28. This is the revision that we have, and it's predicated on the monetary policy decisions that we have made in June. And on the inflation outlook and GDP outlook that was produced by the overall European stuff. Is that sufficient progress? Well, more would be much appreciated, I'm sure, by all our citizens because with more growth things are much easier in multiple respects. Whether you look at jobs, whether you look at investment, whether you look at the the monetary policy decision that we make. It's it's, it's, it's helpful in, in each and every respect. I think there is one area which we have not yet discussed at this stage of, of our, of my hearing. And that's in the area of what active energy policies we put in place in Europe in order to respond to the dependency and the lack of sovereignty that we have in that regard. And, you know, I don't often do that because we look at aggregate numbers. But when I look at particular member states results, and when I try to associate that with the energy policy, there is a clear link. When you look at growth in Spain, you look at growth. In Portugal, for instance, you look at the price of electricity in these two countries and the effort that they have put in place in order to change the energy mix. It's pretty obvious that there is a correlation between the two. And I would hope that not only these two, you know, from my country, France for that matter, thanks to the nuclear investment that have been made over the course of the last 50 years or so, finds itself in, in a in a decent energy price position, which does not necessarily translate in in growth of GDP numbers, at least as of as of now. But I think this is an area where policymakers outside the ECB can can play a role in order to deliver more growth. That would be helpful. As I said, on all accounts, jobs, investment, monetary policy, inflation. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2026-06-22 “And those principles have guided our reflections and our decision making. First, we must carefully assess the nature of the supply shock, its size, persistence and propagation. Monetary policy cannot lower energy prices directly. The central bank cannot reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Let's be clear. But it must assess the extent to which higher energy costs spill over into other prices, what we call the indirect effects, and risk triggering second round effects through wages and price setting. Both the size and persistence of the shock are critical. Small and short lived shocks typically have limited effects beyond the energy component. But as shocks become larger and more persistent, their impact can increase in a nonlinear way, with stronger and more widespread effects on prices and on wages. The macroeconomic environment also plays a key role in how the shock propagates. When demand is strong, remember 22, for instance, firms may find it easier to raise prices when labor markets are tight. Workers may be in a better position to bargain for higher wages. These dynamics are more likely to become relevant when inflation is already elevated compared with previous inflation episodes. However, at this stage, the current shock appears to be smaller in magnitude and occurring in a different context. During the previous episode, the economy was emerging from the pandemic, which had created significant macroeconomic imbalances, including supply chain disruptions and highly accommodative monetary and fiscal policies to support recovery.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “In contrast, at the onset of the current shock, inflation was closer to target if not at target, and monetary and fiscal policy were no longer highly accommodative. This suggests. I need to find my line because I want to make my point clear that the pass through may be more limited thus far. Thus far, the risks remain. If the shock intensifies or persists. But this does not mean that we can be complacent. After the high inflation period of 22 and 23. Price and wage formation. Maybe we don't know yet. We're not seeing it. Maybe more sensitive to new shocks. The memory muscle is better trained. Second, we do not only focus on the baseline, we also focus on the risks around it. In an uncertain environment like this, one policy cannot rely solely on the most likely path for the economy. As a result, we place strong emphasis on the risks surrounding the baseline and where appropriate, we use alternative scenarios to assess how different shocks configurations could affect the outlook, and you have a clear description of those shocks, which is the last graph on the second page where you have all three scenarios. The milder, the adverse and the severe, both in that it applies to GDP and to inflation.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much for your two questions. On the first one, I think. I'm tempted to give it a two fold interpretations. There is the AI bubble formation, which has been identified by not only the IMF, but also the Financial stability report that we published on a regular basis in which the sudden market price correction is identified as one of the three key risks that need to be watched going forward. So the, the, we have an entire business area within the ECB that is looking at those financial risks as well as you know, other matters, but the financial stability risks associated with tech bubble. I would not call it AI bubble, but tech bubble is is is one of them. I think there is another aspect to this AI danger, which has to do with the question that Mr. Fernandez was, was putting to me, which has to do with sovereignty and with autonomy, and the fact that in a sector where market capitalization is very high, where capital draining is huge, and where the prospect of improved productivity or significant transformation is to be demonstrated and might very well be demonstrated, there is an element of uncertainty about it, which is a vulnerability, especially if we don't control it and if we don't have alternative to that. On, on, on the supply shock, you know, as I said, I tried to explain how both on the account of propagation of the shock throughout the economy and the consequences, it could have the potential second round effect that we do not yet see. For the moment, I think that inflation expectations do play a role. I know that it's not universally accepted, but I think we at the ECB contend that inflation expectations actually matter when it comes to to demand going forward and formation of demand. Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much for your question. What I was a little bit confused about is your reference to the what you call the free lunch, which I thought referred to the. The escape, which I understand is capped at 0.3 in the first year and a total of 0.6 of GDP and focused on energy expenses in order to change the energy mix, or whether you were referring to the whole package under the roof, which is. So you're referring to the the what I would call the small escape clause. Is that right? Yeah. No, no, I know, but it's it's I know by all accounts it's not small, but at least it's capped and it should not exceed an overall of 1.5% of European GDP as well. If I understand correctly. I you know, I cannot opine on that because I think it's it obeys a direction that is otherwise determined by the Commission, by the Council, in order to move faster in the energy transition that was predicated, and which I think has to be accelerated in view of the dependency that we are under now. The second point I think that your question brings about is how is that? How is it spent? How is it controlled in order to satisfy the requirement of this energy mix, which will accelerate the transition towards more renewable. And this, again, is not within the remit of the of the ECB. The third point that you make, which is more relevant is, is this fiscal approach likely to reduce the the monetary policy space that we have? And the answer to that is that we will not be fiscally dominated, and we will determine our monetary policy on the basis of our mandate. And we will take the decisions that we have to take in that respect.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much. And I think you have you have described part of the rationale behind the decision that we took last year and the decision to. Increase rates in general, because the impact that we have in order to deliver price stability and fight inflation is by either dampening demand and or anchoring or re anchoring inflation expectations. And when we see the risk of possible de anchoring of inflation expectations at all levels, and however measured either by markets or by surveys or by consumers themselves, it is. Very important that we make those decisions so that we do not have to necessarily dampen demand as much as we would have to if we didn't pay attention to inflation expectations. So for the moment, as I have said in my introductory remarks, we have seen some anchoring of inflation expectations, particularly at consumers levels in the short term. So if you look at the. I'll bring you back to the charts that you have, I don't. If you look at the one on the right side of the first page, you have the inflation expectations. And you see that when you compare the October, sorry, the February and the April expectations, you see that it has moved up for the first year a little bit for the three years and virtually not for the for the five years. Those are elements that we pay close attention to. And whether it is this one is obviously an indication for the short term, but that's often the case when there is a rise of prices that the the expectations of the consumers is hiking up. What matters to us is the longer term expectations. And that one has been broadly unchanged, either by market measures or by survey measures or by consumer measures.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “And that's the third graph that you have on the on the first page of the two of the documents that we have sent you, we are confident that with appropriate monetary policy action, inflation will return to target. The June Eurosystem staff projections foresee headline inflation at 3% in 2026, 2.3% in 2027 and 2% in 2028, but the outlook remains uncertain, with upside risks to inflation and downside risk to economic growth. The peace agreement in the Middle East is welcome, but the situation remains fragile, with risks of setbacks or possibly re-escalation. The full implications of the war for medium term inflation and growth will depend on the intensity and duration of the energy price shock, as well as the scale of its indirect and second round effects. This uncertainty is reflected in the broad range of outcomes for inflation and growth in the alternative scenarios prepared by staff in the context of their projections and published on our website, and that include a milder scenario and adverse scenario and a severe scenario. So in line with our commitment. To ensuring that inflation stabilizes at our 2% target in the medium term. As you indicated, Madam President, we decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points at our last June meeting.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Well, thank you so much for your question. One, I want to turn the question over to you. Where are we on the digital euro? Hopefully by the end of the day tomorrow, we will know a lot better where we are, and I hope we are in a good place in order to start the next stage of the work, which is going to be of a more technical nature in order to run the pilot function that we need to have in place, in order to really make sure that the experience of all our compatriots in Europe is a good experience, because I don't think we have the chance to you don't get a second chance to make a good impression. It has to be a good experience for all of them, and I very much look forward to that, that phase. So I'm not putting any pressure on you. But this outcome tomorrow is, is, is really important. I'm not sure exactly what is the point of you exactly what you mean by the buy liquid money. But suffice to say that there is plenty of liquidity in the system. Okay, you want to clarify that, please.”
  Digital euro
• 2026-06-22 “There is one element of my response on the previous point that I would like to come back to, because you said, what is your favorite rate or something like that. My favorite one is the one which actually keeps the medium term inflation at 2% because that's, that's the, that's the objective we have. And that's how we define price stability. So whatever is the interest rate applicable that will actually deliver is the one that would that I would favor myself. Now, the issue of public debt is something that obviously is of concern to the commission, to the member states in how they define their debt sustainability and how they define the service of their debt. And, you know, I should not be ever either fiscal dominated or financially dominated. And I should really we should focus at the ECB on price stability as an objective.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Well, thank you very much for your question, because it really addresses a point that we are particularly attentive to. And that's the the burden of inflation and the allocation of the burden, whether it falls largely on on corporate, whether it falls on on labor. So is it the capital or is it the labor that actually bears the brunt of the of this external supply shock that our economies are suffering? And we are particularly attentive because we've been through 22, 23, 24 where in the first place you know, unit profit increased and margins were then later squeezed to the benefit of unit labor. This is not what we are seeing at the moment. We are not seeing an increase in margins. We're not seeing an increase in unit margin either. But we are very attentive to it because it's clear that. Labour are suffering as a result, and we just want to make sure that the allocation is in check and that we can alert policy makers about this if it has to be addressed by them. On, on the wages front, what we are seeing and we, we know that there is a lag between the numbers that we are seeing, no matter how sophisticated our indicators have been and the actual impact on, on the numbers. And what we are seeing at the moment is a moderation in the increase of wages. If we look at the compensation fund per employee, for instance, which is a a traditional, pretty standard and easy measure to to compare. There has been a decline, and the latest number is 2.6% increase in compensation for employer per employee. I think it's not sufficient to just look at that one. We have to look at the other trackers that we have built over the course of the last few years to anticipate where wages are going and how they respond to the to inflation. But for the moment, it's more a track and a trend of moderation that we are seeing in the numbers.”
  EU taxation policy (political compass)
• 2026-06-22 “Last met in February. Inflation had remained close to our ECB 2% target for over a year, and euro area economic activity was showing solid growth momentum. Only a few days later, war broke out in the Middle East, reminding us how quickly external shocks can reshape the economic outlook. The topic you have chosen for today's exchange. How monetary policy should be conducted in an environment of heightened geopolitical tensions and frequent supply shocks that you just alluded to, madam president, is particularly timely in my remarks today, I will review what the incoming data tell us about the euro area economy and outline our latest monetary policy decision. I will then explain in more detail how our monetary policy strategy is guiding us in responding to shocks, such as the one that we're facing today. So the euro area economy was gaining some traction when the war in the Middle East broke out. Real GDP rose by zero 3% quarter on quarter in the first quarter of 2026. You might say what? Well, yes. Once adjusted for exceptional volatility in Ireland. You must have received this two page documentation that we have always promised as part of our dialogue. And you will see for yourself how this Irish peculiarity has impacted the real GDP outcome. But the war is now weighing on activity, and incoming information points to a slowdown, especially in services. Manufacturing, in the meantime, has held up.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Having said that, we are still significantly above pre-war levels by a range of about 30%, certainly on on oil food prices. Is is is more complicated. And when you look at the food prices now, food prices have declined in the last couple of months. And it's, it's counterintuitive because we would have thought many would have. Conventional wisdom would dictate that because of the impact on the price of fertilizers, a significant amount of which goes through the Strait of Hormuz, the result would have been an increase in food prices. And you could also deduct from the impact of El Nino that we would also see increased food prices. This is not yet the case, and we believe that the impact on food prices is likely to take a bit longer, and we are likely to see that in the course of 27, more than in the course of 26. But we have to be very attentive to that. On the so food inflation decreased actually to 1.9% in May 26th. On, on investment. We are seeing a stabilization of investment. Investment had been on the rise. We are now seeing a flattening of investment, particularly from the private sector, less so from the public sector, notably because of the investment in defense and infrastructure. Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “This graduated approach requires us to remain agile and by proceeding, meeting by meeting and staying data dependent without committing to a particular rate path, we can adjust our response as the shock evolves and ensure that it remains proportionate. So to conclude. Supply shocks are becoming more frequent. The ECB is well equipped to meet this challenge. Our updated strategy provides a clear framework to assess shocks, manage risks, and calibrate our response. It allows us to respond proportionately to the shock we face and to remain anchored to our medium term objective of price stability. But monetary policy cannot fully offset the impact of such shocks. Strengthening structural resilience, especially in the energy sector, will be essential to reduce the euro area's vulnerability to external supply shocks. Finally, taking. Before taking your questions, I would like to very specifically thank all of you, but in particular the rapporteur, the shadow rapporteur, and this committee, Madam President, for the progress made on the single currency package. This is an important milestone in moving the digital euro project forward and anchoring it firmly in the Democratic debate. This is a matter that I have personally been engaged in for the last six and a half years, since seven, and I'm delighted to see that it's coming to fruition in this so important arena of democratic debate. Thank you very much.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Merci. Merci beaucoup. I think there is a link, actually, between what we do in relation to short term rate. And you are you are correct that when we take an interest rate decision, when we move the DFR by 25 basis points, it impacts the short term rate predominantly. But I would also contend that it has an impact on the long term interest rates, because if we did not make a decision of that nature, then markets would assume that we are going to be complacent. And it's very likely that if that is the case, the risk premium associated with the long term definition and and setting by markets would take it into account and would probably increase as a result. So I think that the interest rate decision that applies directly to the short term also impacts at the long end of the of the of the curve as well.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “So this you know, I just wanted to come back to that because it's a really important component in the assessment that we do of the impact of our decisions. I think I, I will again say what I mentioned, when we see inflation here, which includes all the components of the basket, including energy and food, move up in the way it has from the 1.9% that we had in February to 3.2% in May. And more importantly, when we see that core inflation taking out energy and food is also moving up, particularly propelled by services which went from 3 to 3.5% in short order. Then we have to be very attentive and we think that we have to take measures, particularly if in the meantime, we see that growth, which we have revised a little bit by 0.1, is holding. And when we see that the financial sector is solid. And that brings me to the comparison with what we have seen in 2008, in 2011, and in 2022, where we had different set of circumstances. Midst of a financial crisis, 2008 2011, when interest rates were hiked in the midst of an energy crisis, and 2022 when it was not a pure supply shock, you had a mixture of supply and demand and a fiscal and monetary situation that was vastly different. So I hope I have explained to you a little better the context in which we have taken our decision, which we believe is, as I said, robust across all scenarios, better one than baseline, but also worse one than baseline. Bearing in mind that at the moment, given the reduced uncertainty, we are probably in between base and milder follow up.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you, chair, and thank you for attending this dialogue with Econ Committee. I would like to ask you on how the ESM is preparing for the future, in particular in prevention and management of banking crisis. So there's been a lot of discussion on how to deal with the so-called liquidity in resolution problem. And the ESM has come up as a potential solution. So I would like to hear your vision on what role the ESM can perform in terms of solving the crisis in resolution problem in Europe, potentially with the backstop or providing counter guarantees in favor of the Eurosystem. My second question is, for such a complex arrangement to be set up that includes different organizations. How much of a problem is that the ESM stands outside of the EU institutional framework, and therefore the governance, as you explained, is different from the other institutions participated. Third question, how dependent on the ratification of the new treaty is necessary, whether ratification of the new treaty is necessary for all this potential new arrangement for liquidity and resolution to take place, or can we. Do we have enough flexibility within the current treaty? And final point, what is it? Is there any limitation, hard limitation by which the ESM cannot provide the counter guarantees directly in favor of the single resolution board, instead of having Member States and then having the ESM with the precautionary line? Thank you.”
  European Banking Union
• 2026-06-22 “You push that digital euro while at the same time having banknotes. The answer is a resounding yes. Yes and yes. Banknotes are here to stay for as long as our compatriots in Europe want to use them. The banknotes will be here, so one does not exclude the other? Absolutely not.”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital)
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much. Madam president, I concur with the analysis of the stablecoins markets with one exception, which is that while 99% is denominated in US dollar, not all players are US actors. And in particular, one of the two is actually headquartered outside the United States and escapes the governing law of the US, in particular the Genius Act. So without naming any of the two, it's the largest of the two is actually located outside and and registered outside the United States, which I think reinforces your point. The second comment I would make is that I like the way in which you characterized an asset against an asset, because I would contend that to assume that stablecoins is a coin and therefore a currency is slightly abusive. I think like you do that it is an asset which has deployed multiple times. And which cannot be really characterized as a currency. It does not satisfy the three criterias of what a currency is. Safe assets. Yes. And I think it's it would be very much required in the context of capital market union, which is badly needed, which has been called for by the Draghi report, which has been called for by the latter report, and which I think is only going to be amplified and made stronger and safer if there are safe assets of a European nature. Yes.”
  Use of stablecoins
• 2026-06-22 “1.4 sorry. One point I'm looking at my scenario which is the wrong way to look at things of course. But anyway we've revised slightly down on on both 27 and maintained at at 28 inflation. Same thing we had to revised upward, as I said, 3% for 262.3 and then 2% in 28. Which brings us back to the medium term target that we had. So. In view of all that you mentioned, one of the instruments that we have available in order to address issues if they were to arise. And I would just like to mention that this instrument, TPI, which we. Engineered in previous time is predicated on a number of criteria. On a certain number of conditions, and is certainly not intended to address the fundamentals of an economy and the necessary restructuring that need to happen. So we have, I think, all the tools needed in order to address any development in the euro area. But each of them applies to a particular set of circumstances, and each of them obeys a number of criterias, which will be observed by the Governing Council having the discretion to identify and diagnose the situation. And we will do so if and when it is needed.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much for your two questions. I'll start with the latter. You know, I applaud the efforts undertaken by the Commission and by anybody who cares to listen to the Draghi recommendations and the recommendations. I think they should. They go hand in hand. And while the Draghi report is of a much broader scope, the improvements of the competitiveness of the internal market and the removal of obstacles along the way of moving goods services capital within the European Union are very important as well. But if I had to pick one and and actually deliver on that one in addition or as an accelerator that I would I would favor, it would be the saving and investment unions or, you know, what I call the capital market union, because I think that. And that touches on the first question that you asked, what is badly needed to respond to the inventiveness, the creativity, the talent and the markets that we have when it comes to LM product, the like of mythos, the like of chat 5.5, the likes of whatever China will introduce on on the global market. It is capital. And we need to be able to harness not only public money, because there is a limit to how much public money can be mobilized. But we have to mobilize private capital in order to sustain and to encourage this, this capacity we have in Europe. And that would be a response to what is what has clearly been. A frustration of many in experiencing some LMS in the last few days. Thank you.”
  EU industrial funding (mechanism level: EU-pooled vs nationally-financed)
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much for your question, which I'm going to use to actually address a point which is under debate, which will come to you at some stage, I'm certain, and that is the issue of changes of improvements on the financial scene and in the financial sector, which is often presented as simplification and which, in our view, is necessary as long as it does not undermine the resilience of the financial sector. And trust me, we will be very attentive to all proposals. And there are some very interesting ones underway at the moment, but obviously they should not undermine the resilience of the system. We have lived through 2008. We have experienced the trauma that can result from a financial crisis, and this is not something that we should consider lightly. As a result of, which obviously simplification should not be equal to deregulation. And I think that it's important that this be reminded. Thank you.”
  Financial regulation
• 2026-06-22 “Well, as as we both know, it's a strong attribute of an international currency of reference to have a deep and liquid market that includes a Treasury, a la Treasury bonds like the US treasuries, for instance, and that we do not, for the moment satisfy that requirement. When you look at what is common debt issued at the European level. It's one 1 trillion as opposed to what would be the international issuance of of treasury bonds, which is much more than that, obviously. Under what conditions this could happen? What criterias, what attributes, what guarantees, what moral hazard containment and all of that is something that obviously other parties than the European Central Bank should have to decide. But it's an important step. Yeah.”
  EU industrial funding (mechanism level: EU-pooled vs nationally-financed)
• 2026-06-22 “The decision to raise rates fully considered and discussed is robust across the scenarios prepared by staff. The milder, the adverse and the severe meaning that in all scenarios a rate hike was warranted. Recent developments have remained within the range of scenarios considered. With this decision, we remain well positioned to navigate the uncertainty caused by the war, and we will, of course, closely monitor developments and follow a data dependent and meeting by meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. And we are not pre-committed to any particular rate path. Let me now explain in more detail how our monetary policy strategy guides us in an environment shaped by frequent supply shocks, and how it supported us in the decision that we took in June. The latest shock emerged suddenly and developed rapidly, but it did not find us without a compass. Our 2025 strategy assessment focused focused precisely on how monetary policy should respond in an environment characterised by higher uncertainty and more frequent supply shocks. As you indicated, president, in the last four years in particular. Our strategy is designed to ensure that we can continue to deliver price stability under such conditions, and it rests on three principles.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Well, thank you so much. That's a really interesting question, actually. And I will I'll be perfectly blunt with you. I don't know that we are doing that at all. Maybe we do. But I think it's really important for the reasons that you've mentioned, because the spending capacity, the analytical capacity of price increases in particular, is more acute from women than men in general. And obviously there are multiple exceptions. And I would not dream of categorizing women doing this, men doing that, because there is a great it's much more blurred than we think. But I'm certain that the inflation expectations in particular is assessed in a different way from by women than, than by men. Second is, you know, I'm taking you back to my old days when I was head of the IMF, where we pushed gender budgeting very strongly in order to have an active determination as to how sovereign spend money and were they direct their budgeting, taking into account the differences between women's contribution to the economy and man's contribution to the economy, especially if they have as their objective a better representation on of of both genders. But I promise to get back to you because I don't know whether we do that or not. And I think it's a really interesting proposition. Thank you..”
  Gender roles, equality and inclusion
• 2026-06-22 “On that particular item, it's it's unclear. So we do not have, you know, a final and conclusive analysis of whether that acquisition and defense of sovereign autonomy, autonomy, or, on the contrary, lack of sovereign autonomy is going to be having a disinflationary or inflationary impact on us. So we are looking at that carefully. We're trying to analyze it to understand better what the impact will be. But for the moment, it's unclear. And I think I'll leave it there. And hopefully we can clarify that the sort of the intuitive conclusion is that the lack of sovereignty and therefore, you know, sort of being in the hands of other price determinants would likely be inflationary. But I think we have to get under the hood of that in much more analytical way than I'm doing it now. But that's the intuitive response.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Well, thank you very much for your question. And you tackle clearly one. Concept which is the R star, the neutral rate the. This sort of Ideal point where monetary policy. Hence interest rates nor stimulate nor restrict the activity. And this is that sort of wonderful moment which you can never really assess because it's predicated on the absence of shocks. And we are just moving from one shock to the other. As one of you, I think, identified ever since 2014, the sort of initial invasion of of Crimea by Russia and, and, and then thereon, we've been moving from shock to shock. However, economists are very attentive and try to do the best job they can to identify the area where we assume that the interest rates is as neutral as possible. And that range has been identified by the staff of the ECB as being in between 1.75 and 2.25. That was the reference until recently where as a result of multiple factors affecting our economy, it was possibly argued that this upper range was closer to 2.5 than to 225. Does that make a difference? And should we, as a result, consider that inevitably there is a path as a result of this ECB stuff analysis? I don't think so, because we do not actually use that R star point or even range to necessarily decide the monetary policy decision that we make. We look we apply a reasoning and a stance that I have tried to describe in my introductory statement. And it's on that basis that we make decisions. But I think I have tried to address your question of the R star as well as as could be. And it's what you said about pension and about I don't know if you mentioned productivity, but it's clearly one point that would have an impact. These these elements we constantly take into consideration and staff, does this analytical work on a regular basis?”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much for your question. As, as, as I tried to explain in my introductory statement our objective, our mission, our mandate is price stability. And we have defined it in our strategy review initially in 21 and then again in 25 when we updated we've defined that price stability objective as the 2% medium term target that we, we are constantly reviewing and analyzing on the basis of, you know, inflation outlook, underlying inflation, and the dynamic of, of monetary policy transmission. So we regard that as our mission. And I don't think that we are looking at trade offs, so to speak. We are looking at whatever is going to have an impact on price stability. So if, for instance, growth was to stagnate or if sovereignty was going to be undermined. We have to analyze that in respect of what impact it has on price stability. That's how we take it into account. But for sovereignty to be affirmed and defended. Price stability is what we can deliver. Custody of the currency is what we can deliver. Making sure that the payment infrastructure, making sure that in the digital age, our currency is solid. This. This is our duty. But there are multiple other priorities and tasks that we cannot deliver because it is not our mission. It is not our mandate. And it falls within the remit of other authorities in the executive branch, in the parliamentary branch. And I very much hope that this is taken very seriously because it's going to matter a lot in the future.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Well, thank you so much. But I don't think that I agree with the premise of of your your own scenario. When you say that we will have lasting pressure on energy prices this is not what we anticipate. We flag various hypotheticals in our scenarios and in particular in the, if you look at them in the adverse and the severe scenario, we look at prices and, and we try to anticipate that this is not the baseline. Certainly this is not the mildest scenario, and as I've indicated earlier, we are seeing ourselves now between the baseline and the milder scenario. So we don't anticipate that. If you look at what the experts in terms of energy, in terms of reserves are telling us, they they expect or fear more of an abundance of, of energy in the future than, than restriction and and increase of prices as a result. But we have to be prepared for all scenarios. And that's a point where I agree with you. And under the circumstances, we also believe that the best response in the face of what we have, this energy shock, it's a persistency, it's size and its possible diffusion throughout the economy. The best response that we have is the interest rate. So we're not looking at anything else at the moment. We have plenty of tools in the toolbox. But what we're looking at is the interest rate. Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “I think this is not the only account by which you measure the solidity and the international pattern of currency. You have to also measure how much invoicing is done in a currency, how much issuance is done in a particular in a particular currency. And that gives an idea of, you know, how strong a currency is. It's also obvious to us that to strengthen the international role of our currency, we need several attributes that have nothing to do with monetary policy. I think where we can play a role is by being a strong institution, by being an independent institution, by respecting the rule of law and inscribing our action within those parameters. We also have the responsibility to provide enough liquidity so that those in need of euros, in order to avoid fire sales, for instance, that would be damaging for the proper transmission of our monetary policy, have access to plenty of liquidity. And it's in that context that we enlarged and redefined the role of our repo lines in euro, which will become effective in the new format, new framework as of July the 1st. But other elements are necessary a clear international trading network, a strong defense predictable policies by other actors. And all of that is outside the remit of the central bank. But from our perspective, we try to do the best we can in order to respond to the demand in terms of liquidity, the demand in terms of safety and security and reliance on the institution. Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much for your two questions. So on on the first one, you are right that we have always faced a differential of inflation between the member states, and that differentials has narrowed markedly to below the pre-pandemic averages for overall inflation in February and in March this year. But again, now it has reopened a bit in in the latest numbers that we've seen in April and May. So, you You know, you you know the business because you're a former central bank governor yourself. We we cannot have a monetary policy that is applicable on a per member state basis. We have to define our monetary policy with reference to the entire euro area. And we have to analyze the transmission of our monetary policy stance throughout all the member states. And we, we, we do that. We try to measure how it impacts lending, both in terms of volumes, in terms of transmission of rates. And that differential is is kept at a reasonable level so far. But but we we do see a little widening of it. The the relationship between central banks, I think, operates in a different environment than the political relationships, probably because we are all guided by the same objective of price stability and being driven by the same objective, I think helps understand the complexity of what we do, the differences of the economic background against which we operate. And I can assure you that certainly from a personal point of view, my relationship with the new chair of the fed is is very good. I've known him for a long time. And and it's it's a very good relationship. Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “No. What I said is when we have a projection for 26 coming from the whole euro system at 0.8, it is not stagnation of our economy. And I think, you know, if I don't mean to, to brag about our wisdom, but I think that we need to examine our numbers with with a lot of scrutiny, because the Irish numbers, with all due respect to Ireland and the, the the Irish economy, but for all sorts of reasons and the international activity of international companies, these numbers in a way distort a little bit the actual fundamentals of all member states, including Ireland for that matter. So we do calculate on the basis of the modified domestic index, which has been produced a few years back under the leadership of Philip Lane as governor of the Bank of Ireland, which I think reflects more accurately the activity in the euro area. Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Thank you very much for your encouragement on the monetary policy decision that we took last week. And you are right in saying that it's a signal, but it's also, in my view, the right analysis of the data that we received, the projection that we have for the inflation outlook, the risk surrounding our projections as well, and the inflation outlook, the underlying inflation as well, which is a good indication of where we're heading And in view of all that, I think and I agree with you, that that decision was warranted and as I said, is robust across all scenarios that we have produced. You've mentioned our revision of both GDP and inflation, and you're right that we revised downward in particular for well downward for GDP and upward for inflation, 0.8 for GDP, which is, you know, it's it's not trivial. I would not call it a stagnation. And I think that because it's a Eurosystem decision, we got the best brain of all the ncbs when it comes to projecting the the economic result and the expected output to have the, you know, a good proposal that canvas the entire Euro system. But we did revise downward a little bit. We were at 0.9 in March. We are at 0.8 in June, and the projection in terms of GDP are also revised.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-22 “Well, thank you for your very pointed questions. I will not address your first question because, as I have said, we will decide monetary policy on a meeting by meeting basis, being data dependent and without having any pre-set rate path. And I will stick to that because that's that's the determination that we've made and that's our stance on on fiscal policy. I think we've been very clear that any fiscal measures that are intended to respond to the shock, to the energy shock, the supply shock that we have described, that those measures have to be, as I call them, triple T, they have to be temporary. They have to be targeted and they have to be tailored. I think it's really for the commission to determine whether the measures that are being decided by member states are actually complying with the triple T's. From what I've heard from the commission, it's not always the case. And while the the volume of support has been limited so far, we are at 0.125, if I recall, roughly of additional special support, but it's not a triple T compliant on on all accounts. And you know, if I can use this forum to remind member states that it should be, it should be temporary, it should be targeted, it should be tailored. So when there is a shock in reverse, then these measures can be reversed as well. And the fiscal position of member states can be can be in a better shape. Thank you.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2026-06-22 “This partly reflects inventory building in response to supply chain pressures, but also stronger defense spending. Looking ahead, the June 26th Eurosystem staff projections see real GDP growth at 0.8% in 26, 1.2% in 27 and 1.5% in 28. Staff now expect domestic demand to be weaker than they projected in March, as the war has dented confidence and higher energy costs are weighing on real incomes. At the same time, household balance sheets remain solid overall and consumption should continue to be the main driver of growth. Investment should also be supported by firms spending on new digital technologies and government spending more on defence and infrastructure. The war is likewise pushing up inflation, which rose to 3.2% in May from 3% in April. The main driver of inflation since February has been rising energy inflation, which was above 10% in both April and May. In May, inflation, excluding energy and food, also increased to 2.6%, partly reflecting the initial indirect effects of higher energy prices. And you have that pretty well established in the inflation documentation that you have in your two pages. If you have had a look at it reflecting this energy spike, inflation expectations over shorter horizons have risen well above the levels seen before the outbreak of the war in the Middle East. But the public does not currently expect high inflation to be lasting. Most measures of longer term inflation expectations stand at around 2%, supporting the stabilization of inflation around target in the medium term.”
  Defence spending
• 2026-06-22 “Well, thank you so much, and thank you for taking a clear interest in the international role of the Euro. For those who don't know, we have an event later today at the House of the Euro, at which we will debate with you notably, but with also Valdez Dombrovskis, Commissioner Dombrovskis, the role, the international role of the euro and how it is characterised. What are the components? What are the missing components? Where do we need to do more work? So. I think in each and every area, we have to do what is necessary. And we as central bank for the euro area, we look at what is within our remit and what we can do. We do so with in the background of our mind the attributes of a sovereign currency, which plays an international role. The facts first, the euro represents a little over 20% of the currency reserves held by national central banks around the world. It has been more or less stable since 2019. We did not take a hit at the time of the crisis, or if we did, we're recovered, but we are now pretty much where we are in 2019. The other major currencies are number one, the US dollar still, of course, although slightly declining, and other currencies, including in particular the renminbi, which has slightly increased in both reserves but also by other measurements. And one component has increased as well. Most recently is the volume and the value of gold as a reserve in the reserves of the national central banks.”
  ECB monetary policy
• 2026-06-15 “(17:51:06 – 17:52:56): Thank you, president, vice president. Economic independence is an economic and security related obligation. Everyone's wondering how to do that, but I think people basically are looking at how they can select the right industries, provide some subsidies, and create European champions. And all of that is very smart and forward looking, but, unfortunately, these ideas that go against the basic ideas of the free market, which are fundamental European ideas, and they have never worked in the European Union or in China or in The United States. What would work, and I've I'm pleased to have heard that here, is to complete the single market. We really need to ensure that our single market is completed so that we can be innovative. Europe shouldn't try to do everything and anything. What Europe should be trying to do is ensuring that European businesses can act freely and can produce certain goods and services that are essential for everyone across the world. Interdependency is interdependence is not vulnerability if we are diversified. We need a wide network of social partners and leverage for negotiation. When 2 elephants fight, it's the grass that suffers. The leopard flees. Europe isn't an elephant in global terms, and we don't want to be the grass either. We should learn to be the leopard with an agile, competitive, and open economy.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-10-09 “E-003981/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Article 6 of Regulation 473/2013 requires all euro area Member States to submit by 15 October to the Commission and to the Eurogroup a draft budgetary plan for the forthcoming year. This deadline allows the Commission to issue an Opinion on the submitted draft budgetary plan as soon as possible and in any event by 30 November. This timeline allows EU's policy guidance to be appropriately integrated in the national budgets before those are finalised 1 . The above provision is consistent with the budgetary timeline envisaged by the same Regulation (Article 4) that requires that ‘…The draft budget for the forthcoming year for the central government and the main parameters of the draft budgets for all the other subsectors of the general government shall be made public annually not later than 15 October…’. The submission of a draft budgetary plan to the Commission is meaningful only when it corresponds to a draft budget at the national level. On 2 October 2025, the Commission proposed to amend Regulation 473/2013 2 . The amending regulation proposed by the Commission specifies that the submission of a draft budgetary plan at unchanged policies is not needed in case a government is not in a position to prepare a draft budget law for adoption by the national parliament. The Commission expects that the Spanish government will submit its draft budgetary plan for 2026 as soon as a draft budget law is prepared for adoption by the national parliament. The Commission keeps monitoring fiscal developments in Spain, and has considered all relevant policy measures when preparing its Autumn 2025 forecasts. 1 Pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 in case of particularly serious non-compliance of the draft budgetary plan with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact the Commission opinion shall be issued within two weeks of the submission of the draft budgetary plan. 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1173/2011 and (EU) No 473/2013 (COM(2025) 591 final).”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-04-16 “E-001555/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission preliminary assessment of the fourth payment request 1 considered the fiscal sustainability requirements of the pension reform as satisfactorily fulfilled 2 , noting that ‘the closure clause legislated as part of Milestone 409 ensures that corrective measures enter into force as soon as necessary so that the long-term fiscal sustainability of the pension reforms […] is preserved even under less favourable developments than assumed.’ The Commission has taken note of the decision by the Council of Ministers to amend Royal Decree 100/2025, which is relevant to the application of the closure clause, since it provides further specification to guide its calculation by the independent fiscal council Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF). The Commission is currently assessing the impact of the proposed amendments to Royal Decree 100/2025. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e8b93743-5a80-4c10-9caa4dabedc95728_en?filename=C_2024_4171_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_nlw_part1_v2_1.pdf. 2 These requirements are set out in the Council Implementing Decision: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10150-2021-ADD-1-REV-2/en/pdf.”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• 2025-04-16 “E-001553/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Under the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) framework, social contribution projections, including those paid into the pension system, are ordinarily assumed to remain constant as a ratio to gross domestic product (GDP) during the ten years that follow the end of the adjustment period, i.e. from 2032 to 2041, unless different assumptions are duly justified. In the case of Spain, its medium-term fiscal structural plan (MTFSP) internalises the impact of compensatory revenue measures legislated in 2023 (along with the pension reform) that will materialise after 2031. The cumulative increase in social contributions over the following ten years is estimated at 1.8 percentage points of GDP, which improves the debt dynamics. This assumption relies on the legislated measures described in Spain’s Country Fiche accompanying the 2024 Ageing Report. These measures lower the adjustment required to put debt on a plausibly downward path and enable a higher average net expenditure growth over the adjustment period. The revenue increases over the years 2027-2031 resulting from the potential activation of the closure clause were not included in the assumption of the Spanish MTFSP. Under the commonly agreed methodology, the activation of the closure clause would have been considered a discretionary revenue measure and would be taken into account only ex post in the assessments of compliance with the net expenditure rule. Therefore, the updated estimates of the independent fiscal authority (AIReF) do not imply that the Spanish plan deviates from the debt reduction requirement.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-04-16 “E-001554/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Royal Decree 100/2025 inter alia further specifies the closure clause of the 2023 pension law (Royal Decree Law 2/2023), which was positively assessed by the Commission in the context of the fourth payment request by Spain 1 . Royal Decree 561/2025 adopted on 1 July 2025 introduces amendments to Royal Decree 100/2025. The independence of national fiscal authorities is safeguarded by the national fiscal frameworks Directive, as amended in April 2024 2 , which is based on and expands the independence safeguards as included in Regulation 473/2013. Member States have until the end of 2025 to transpose the new or amended provisions of the Directive. A full legal transposition check will be undertaken in 2026. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e8b93743-5a80-4c10-9caa4dabedc95728_en?filename=C_2024_4171_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_nlw_part1_v2_1.pdf. 2 Council Directive (EU) 2024/1265 of 29 April 2024 amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States.”
  Rule of law in Spain · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-04-10 “E-001493/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission publishes unemployment statistics based on the EU Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) 1 . The EU-LFS serves as the primary source of labour market information in the EU. However, it does not provide specific data on permanent seasonal workers (PSW), as a distinct category. During their active work season, PSW are classified as employed, but in the off-season they are categorised as unemployed if actively seeking work, or as outside the labour force otherwise. 1. PSW figures at the national level would offer country-specific insights for this specific group. For detailed information on PSW, dedicated national data could be the most suitable source. For country-specific analyses, the Commission often relies on figures published by national providers to complement the findings. 2. In European official statistics released by Eurostat, the employment status of individuals is determined according to internationally recognised methodologies and in compliance with EU regulations. The EU-LFS is conducted consistently across countries and over time, guided by Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/2240 on the organisation of a sample survey in the labour force domain 2 , and adheres to the International Labour Organisation definitions. Eurostat validates the quality of survey data and metadata to ensure they comply with EU regulations and provide harmonised information. 3. The Commission considers that out-of-work PSW who are not actively seeking employment cannot be classified as unemployed under existing statistical definitions. No revision of the data collection methodology is planned. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/2240/oj/eng. 2 Idem.”
  EU policy on permanent and fixed-term employment · EU competences on social policies
• 2024-10-18 “E-002162/2024 E-002163/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Spain submitted its medium-term fiscal-structural plan on 15 October 2024. The Commission’s assessment of the plan finds that it does fulfil the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 1 and it recommended that the Council endorse the plan on 26 November 2024. In its assessment and prior guidance to Spain submitted on 21 June 2024 2 , the Commission took into account already implemented reforms and in particular their impact on fiscal sustainability through future government revenue, expenditure and potential growth, in line with the Regulation and following the commonly agreed methodology. This includes already legislated revenue increases that occur in the future, like is the case for the Spanish pension reform. While the pension reform is a part of the measures in the Spanish plan, it is not part of the reforms and investments underpinning an extension under Article 14 of the Regulation and as shown in Annex II of the Commission assessment. The Commission services have provided constant guidance to all Member States on how to ensure that their plans comply with the requirements of the Regulation. The Commission has assessed all the Member States’ plans’ compliance with the provisions of the Regulation, on the basis of common, transparent methodologies. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj/eng 2 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1d44833a-6435-4f02-94f9543777d4036b_en?filename=Commission_prior_guidance-spain_en.pdf”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2024-10-18 “E-002161/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The submission of the Member States’ draft budgetary plans and their assessment by the Commission (as established by Regulation (EU) 473/2013) is an important element in the fiscal surveillance. Member States submit their draft budgetary plan for the forthcoming year by 15 October 1 and the Commission provides an opinion by end-November 2 . Member States are invited to take into account, in the process of adopting their budget law, the Commission opinion on their draft budgetary plan 3 . It may however happen that a government is unable to table a draft budget in national parliament by the usual deadlines. In these cases, the submission should as a rule take place at least one month before the draft budget law is planned to be adopted by the national parliament, except where to do so would prove not feasible due to the country-specific parliamentary approval calendar. In the latter case, the submission should still take place in time to allow the Commission to adopt an informed opinion on the plan and the Eurogroup to hold a proper discussion well before the budget law is planned to be adopted by the national parliament 4 . The Commission continuously monitors fiscal developments in Member States. It takes into account all fiscal developments and fiscal measures when it prepares and publishes its macroeconomic forecasts, including fiscal accounts. The Commission confirms that, while it has already received the Spanish medium-term fiscal structural plan 5 , it has not yet received a draft budgetary plan for 2025. The Commission raises the attention of the Honourable Member that the said recital 39 of Regulation 2024/1263 indicates that the Commission should, when providing its opinion on the draft budgetary plan, assess whether the draft budgetary plan is consistent with the expenditure path set by the Council Recommendation that endorses the medium-term fiscal structural plan. 1 Art 6(1) of Regulation (EU) 473/2013. 2 Art 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 473/2013. 3 Recital 21 of Regulation (EU) 473/2013. 4 Moreover, Regulation 473/2013 (Cf Art 4(3)) establishes that, while the budget for central government should be adopted by end-year, the Member States should have in place reversionary budget procedures to be applied if the budged is not adopted or fixed upon by 31 December. 5 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/45e0463e-1216-459a-820ac7eb9381f27d_es?filename=national_medium-term_fiscal-structural_plan_spain_es.pdf&prefLang=en”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. And to our chair, I would like to note that on the 8th of July, our plenary voted with a majority for strengthening governance and supervision of the European Investment Bank. Nevertheless, so far you have ignored this political mandate that's worth taking note of. And besides the governance problem, the other big issue is the lack of respect for internal controls. Statistical bodies have improved GDP growth estimates. But that is largely the doing of the president of the institution. It seems that there are no instructions from governments or institutions who help them to take this step. Now it's the European Investment Bank. But. How do you feel? Mrs. Calvino? Have trust in European institutions and in European cooperation. When the highest representatives permanently disrespect control mechanisms.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. I would like to speak in Spanish in this case. So, Mrs. Kovesi, I'd like to really congratulate you for being so clear and so brave. Uh, I, uh, you really conveyed the message of urgency and how serious the difficulty is. And I think the situation is even worse than what you tried to convey after your presentation. I couldn't avoid thinking of a case which pension holders in Spain are experiencing, Uh, because there are certain, uh, criminal, uh, chain like Eva meadows. And what's happening is that the criminal organizations have actually seeped into the Spanish institutions and earning money from these frauds. There are a lot of investigations, but some of these criminals have become part of the hard nucleus of our government. And there have been millions of frauds with respect to fuels and VAT. And the license to make these frauds, uh, were operable. They actually, the Ministry of Ecology gave these licenses, and Mrs. Teresa Rivera introduced the case. It's a case of pollution. There's corruption, and it's in one of the governments of the EU. We're talking not just about carousel frogs, but this is actually an official license for Frauding. We're talking about 200 million and you've got a lack of competence. There are a lot of corruptors. A lot of people were corrupt and some people who are fair. And the rule would be for our justice system. What we have to do is find out what failed, why did the alarms not go off, and why should we have to avoid it and not make it easier? And this has even come up to the College of Commissioner. And what I'm worried about in the future is that it is serious that the high political representatives don't. They're actually putting up barriers for people like you who are seeking the truth. So I have to be very, very blunt. What degree of cooperation are you getting from the judicial and police Spanish authorities to try to reach this political and economic political ring? The cost of which is not only money we mentioned, but the deterioration of the reputation of institutions which we need to preserve. Thank you very much.”
  Rule of law in Spain
• “Thank you chair. Thank you, Mr. Camilleri, for coming to to this House. I would like to concentrate on the first part of your presentation to basically on recurrent topics, in particular related to the statutory independence of National Statistical Institute. It's and I'm quoting your own report, you mentioned that one of the unresolved risks is statutory independence that remains insufficiently guaranteed, and you ask for a change in regulation, in particular in regulation 2 to 3. You've just mentioned and I think and this is just my personal assessment, this call for action is urgent for me. The last straw was here two weeks ago. I think, uh, former vice president of the Spanish government and now president of EIB, proudly, uh, was very proud of what she did commingling with the statistical methods of the National Statistical Institute in Spain that prompted the resignation of its chair. So my question is, do you consistently urging a changing of this regulation? My question is, why do you think there is a need for change in regulation and not just for the enforcement of it? In particular, article five A that already prohibits. So why do you think it's regulation and not enforcement? And in case it's it's change of regulation. What are you specifically recommending to change to make these interferences not just unthinkable but impossible. And thank you very much.”
  Rule of law in Spain
• “Thank you very much. Chairman. Thank you very much. President. I'm going to speak Spanish. Of course. First of all, my thanks to you for these recommendations. And I sincerely hope that they will be the basis of an effective revision of the regulatory framework, which is very important based on the Commission and Parliament input and the bank's publication. I have four points to make. First of all, regarding the process, I would like to know how much you factored in contributions from the EB A or the Ecrb or other institutions. And if you haven't, is there a reason for doing that at a later stage? How do you intend to listen to all relevant stakeholders from the banking sector? Secondly, I'd like to ask about recommendation one and the complexity of the regulation and how you intend to deal with that, you have an idea to try to realign things to simpler, more streamlined standards in order to reduce the costs, which on banks which have been accumulating over decades. Then thirdly, I'd like to know about the scope and application you're arguing the case for a additionally simplified structure for small banks and enterprises as NCIS. The counterpart is that they would need to hold extra capital. How much would this additional capital amount to, and how would you intend to deal with the ancillary costs that could be incurred? So these are all, to me, outstanding matters. I would like you to address them. If possible, I'd like to know if you've thought about SSM governance Consultation and ownership issues pertaining to the supervisory authorities to thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “(15:49:06 – 15:50:15): Thank you, chair. Thank you, mister Cipollone. I would like to ask you a couple of questions regarding standards and interoperability. 1 in the digital euro domain. And you so you've spoken about you've been more explicit about the open standards you announced the last time you were here. But there was also comments from this house selling the other way around. How is the ECB planning to reuse preexisting European standards in order to reduce cost for the development of the whole digital euro project. So I want to ask you the other way around. So, my 2nd comment is also on interoperability better than the wholesale space. We had, this week, the announcement by the Bank for International Settlements on the Agora project. And I'm going to ask you that basically shows that it's possible to have a cross border, multicurrency, settlement in central bank money, and I think it's a big development. And I would like to ask you what is the ECB doing that their its own projects, Agora and Pontes, are going to fulfill criteria to be interoperable with other central banks might be designing in their own jurisdiction. Thank you very much.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you, thank you very much. Two questions to both Missus Leroy and Mister Mazza Ferro. The first one is what can be done from a regulatory or a legislative standpoint to accelerate financial asset tokenization to reap all the cost reduction and all the efficiencies but going beyond pilot projects basically to reach it at real scale that is commensurate to the size of European financial markets. So what's your assessment of the current Commission proposals in this regard? The second one is precisely on the issue that has been prompted about tokenized deposits but in a wholesale environment. I'm not talking about the retail part. So it seems to me that it's obvious that in markets we need two to tango. So we need the securities leg and we need the cash leg both to be native in DLT technology. It's apparent that the securities leg is going faster and on the cash leg clearly private solutions are going much faster than wholesale CBDCs. So first what is this? And second, within this private layer, why is it that ad hoc lightly regulated stablecoins are superior to wholesale tokenized deposits or tokenized money market funds participation? I fail to see why is this a superior once both are in DLT native, why having this lighter instrument of cash is superior. We have seen it can go even in benign macro financial scenarios to be thirty five percent below par.”
  Use of stablecoins
• “Thank you. Thank you chair. Thank you, Mrs. Buch. As you well know both well, the Draghi letter and also the news reports all acknowledge the key contributions of financial stability and a global level playing field to address the EU competitiveness challenge. However, it is also true that they all point out to the prudential regulatory framework and its supervisory implementation, as you have mentioned, as a potential obstacle for EU competitiveness. Similar claims have been made as to its impact on house affordability due to tighter funding conditions to home developers limiting home supply. In this regard, I would like to know your opinion about some specific proposals contained in said Instead reports first, the idea of having all significant institutions under a so-called fully harmonized 28th regime, encompassing not only supervision activities, but also crisis management and deposit insurance as a way to increase market integration. Second, the idea of establishing a pan European securitization platform that will help to transfer banks long term mortgage risks, thus creating more room for new mortgage and corporate lending origination. Additionally, I would like to know what role do you see for cross-border consolidation as a means to increase banks competitiveness and shock absorption capacity? And finally, if I may, how much would you would, in your opinion, the completion of the banking union contribute to a reduction of the compliance and regulatory burden for banks, especially those competing globally? Thank you.”
  European Banking Union
• “I think it was very clear that VAT is at least a marginal help, but it's not the major driver. If we're talking fiscal policy and you want to really increase R&D the least, I would think about this VAT. There are many other things. So we have R&D incentives basically tax credits. And that brings me a bell. So that's why I want numbers just to realize how much it's really R&D at risk, whether it's the the crux of the matter. Because if it's that, then the question is are it's structurally the EU impeded because of the application of the pillar two, because we know pillar two on the OECD for large firms, and these defense companies tend to be large, might be in scope. We know it has a problem, a pillar two in terms of the effectiveness of of tax credits compared to the US, that has a slightly distinct way of, of of doing this through Gilti that we know is much more efficient in terms of not negating the effects of tax credits to R&D. So I would like an assessment from, uh, the tax experts. Uh, how much is this impediment going to be a problem for uh, for European industry? Thank you.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “Uh, yes. I would like to leverage on on the previous question for my colleagues, uh, because we've received criticism of previous safeguards about stablecoins. So why does the commission, in particular Commissioner Dombrovskis, so confident that he's claiming his initial remark that this will never jeopardize financial stability, that these safeguards for the digital, you are so much better than previous safeguards and other pieces of legislation that we saw. Financial stability will never be at at risk. And another comment is what's the value added of having a centralized ledger on the ECB balance sheet versus a leaner alternative, which will be a pure offline tokenized cash that is untraceable, has little risk for financial stability, and it's much, much simpler. So I still fail to see the merits for the pure online. Apart from just having a pan-European payment scheme that can be provided by private. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you. President. What do energy digital technologies hold for us? Technology simply allows us to do things and we then, as politicians, are responsible for deciding how it's going to be used to make sure that it's used for the general interest. To equate technology with goodness is just as ridiculous as the opposite. If we do that, we run the risk of being blinded by the opportunities of new technologies and forgetting the core of what it is we want to achieve. Specifically, for the digital euro or digital currencies, we run the risk of being blinded by the arguments. Now we see that citizens want to be able to pave freely, safely throughout Europe. Right now, this is conditioned by excessive dependency on non-European suppliers. This is a vulnerability that both economic and geopolitical, that we need to correct. However, we need to be careful. The solution cannot be to enclose European innovation in a single product, which contains certain economic risks, and gives rise to concerns about privacy when there are other options, thanks to technological advances and infrastructures that already exist today, we have the opportunity to create a pan-European payment system which is competitive, autonomous and innovative. The path is not guaranteed, but nor is its failure. We can use this opportunity not to just choose one option blinded by the opportunity. Rather, we should be looking at all of the different possibilities that different payment systems and see what they offer our citizens.”
  Digital euro
• “Until when is the European Commission going to tolerate a country failing to send in its plan to the Commission within the agreed timeframe? Secondly, until when is the commission going to tolerate a government's refusal to subject itself to fiscal supervision and. To only give you projections, not a political plan, thus a pretext for inaction. Thirdly, what is the commission going to do with the next generation funding and the pensions, which would then guarantee the funding of public programmes? And what does the Commission think the implications are likely to be for citizens across Europe, particularly a government in Spain, which doesn't have a budget, doesn't have any kind of budgetary plans nor any capacity to legislate. So we are suffering from this in Spain. But this is a problem which will spread across Europe, because we will see a reversion to extreme rigorous austerity in the future once the government changes. And this is not sustainable. And that is the point of the European semester. It is there to try to ensure economic prosperity and not to prop up failing governments.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “Thank you. President. The global tech race that started years ago and Europe is on the sidelines of the generations that made a leader in the first quarter of the century. Is it a lead that we cannot catch up on? No, it's not an impossible task. We have to focus on our strengths the education of the population, the These are technical and scientific infrastructures. We have a European talent triumphs abroad and the qualifications are very high. I think our weakness is the lack of incentives, because the European companies get a lower return on their investment, and the reason for this is because anybody who takes the risk and innovates well, obviously they should be able to enjoy the fruits of their investment, but instead they get higher taxes and higher red tape, and the result is obvious, less innovation. Secondly, there is the lack of a true real internal market without barriers, so that all of this can reach the necessary critical mass. And there's a kind of vicious circle when it comes to financing as well that stunts growth. Ultimately, we don't know what the most recent solution will be, but we have our European young people. We have to make sure that they stay trained and work in the European Union, not leave, especially when it comes to innovation and products so that they can see the light of day.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. And to our chair, I would like to note that on the 8th of July, our plenary voted with a majority for strengthening governance and supervision of the European Investment Bank. Nevertheless, so far you have ignored this political mandate that's worth taking note of. And besides the governance problem, the other big issue is the lack of respect for internal controls. Statistical bodies have improved GDP growth estimates. But that is largely the doing of the president of the institution. It seems that there are no instructions from governments or institutions who help them to take this step. Now it's the European Investment Bank. But. How do you feel? Mrs. Calvino? Have trust in European institutions and in European cooperation. When the highest representatives permanently disrespect control mechanisms.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. And to our chair, I would like to note that on the 8th of July, our plenary voted with a majority for strengthening governance and supervision of the European Investment Bank. Nevertheless, so far you have ignored this political mandate that's worth taking note of. And besides the governance problem, the other big issue is the lack of respect for internal controls. Statistical bodies have improved GDP growth estimates. But that is largely the doing of the president of the institution. It seems that there are no instructions from governments or institutions who help them to take this step. Now it's the European Investment Bank. But. How do you feel? Mrs. Calvino? Have trust in European institutions and in European cooperation. When the highest representatives permanently disrespect control mechanisms.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “(14:47:11 – 14:48:29): Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Vice Chair. Welcome again for the last time at this committee. And today, I'd like to express gratitude. Gratitude for the interaction all of these years. Thank you very much for your accountability. And speaking as an individual here, thank you. Allow me to thank you for the work that you've done on the governing body all of these years. Because as you've talked about, the European economy is facing major challenges at the moment, and the final result has been that there has been a process of inflation, but it has been managed in the best possible way with large major economic challenges and then also return to price stability. And we haven't fallen into complacency, I'm pleased to say. We've learned lessons from all of these episodes with the revision of the monetary policy as you've mentioned. So I wanted to ask you about this. What are these lessons that you've learned from previous episodes of inflation, which are particularly useful now and will allow us to improve our responses in the future to deal with inflation developments on the markets at the moment? Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. The competitiveness compass, as I see it, helps us to see what's ailing in the European economy. We lack competitiveness compared to the major world economies. And therefore, first and foremost, we are failing to generate and disseminate innovative ideas to produce goods and services. Secondly, energy costs are relatively high compared to other economic areas. And we don't have major native energy resources such as they have in China and India. We have an internal market which has not been fully integrated. At least we know where we're at. But that doesn't go far enough. We need to be heading towards prosperity for all citizens. How to go about this? Well, we ought to have cross-cutting measures in place to encourage competitiveness throughout the economy. For example, we need cheap energy, low energy, low carbon energy. We need real incentives for innovation. If you we ought to be able to enjoy the products of innovation on an internationally competitive market. Internal barriers to trade need to be removed because we have 45% tariffs on services and 110% for goods, or rather, the opposite. We aren't setting the bar high enough in the internal market, and that's the worst, worse than any protectionist measure from the USA. We've got a lot on our plate, so let's get going.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• “Just focusing too narrowly on just taxation issue might just be missing the large part of, or at least a significant portion of the problem. So this is the idea of bundling that you mention. Or I don't know if we could talk about a single stop shops for these type of workers that encompass all these problems altogether. I think it's it might be more productive because some of the partial solutions you point out in your report really go to the core of international taxation. I mean, it's really 180 degree shift in how. And it's a very complex equilibrium. So are we really risking to change a very complex equilibrium that affects almost global taxation just for a, for a 1% of workers. But even it might be worth but if it's not really solving the problem for this 1% because the bulk of the problem lies elsewhere. It's a bit of an overkill, so I just want to have some numbers. Whether we are really targeting the solutions to the real problems these people are, these companies at the same time are facing. Thank you very much.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you for, for for the speakers. A fairly general comment. First, I don't know how we ended up talking or discussing about again and again on tax avoidance and profit shifting. Sorry, this was not the subject, at least I think in my view. As for today debt equity bias, in my mind it has more to do with incentives to innovate, to create, to grow. I mean, that's the topic as of today, more than although there might be an angle of of profit shifting eventually, but it's just a minor thing that's not the subject. So let me go back to what I consider to be the core of the subject. So I've heard Professor Devereaux mentioning an impact of 5 to 10 percentage points in terms of the balancing from the optimal decision between equity and debt. But my question is, given the experience, even within Europe, I think we have in the European Union, we have five countries that have established some sort of adjustments in there. They are different each way. If the if, if the counterbalancing effects of these tax measures is enough to counterbalance fully this this the original imbalance of 5 to 10 percentage points. So first of all, if measures work okay in the in the in the scale, they are they are designed. The second one is on, on the cap of the equity allowance on these 30% of EBITDA. And the idea that you have you cannot have a negative fiscal effect. So you have to carry forward any, any allowance. Don't you think that it will increase substantially the impact of any measure if this can be a refundable tax credit? And the third one is in terms of complexity that you mentioned. Is it feasible to do this corrections in an efficient way that we are not creating extra complexity? So because we are trying to do some simplification at the same time. So these are my three points. Thank you very much.”
  Tax Havens
• “I'll speak in Spanish. Um. Thank you very much. Cheers, Commissioner. I'd like to start. By thanking you. Thank you for your hard work. And thank you, too, for having enabled us to avoid something which happened in Spain, which involved efforts to try to to set aside independence when it came to the pensions reform. And that's something which is now to be rectified by the Spanish government. So many thanks for your hard work. And please transmit that to the other vice president. It's important that we remain vigilant over and beyond questions of reform. The underlying issue pertains the European taxpayers money has been used to validate a pension, pension reform, which is rather than improving sustainable durability as has damaged it. So the authorities have predicted a growth in pension for 3.3% of GDP between now and 1950 20, 53% more than the estimates from just two years ago. The fact is, in Spain, when it comes to sustainability of the pension system, it's like talking about the sustainability of public accounts and finances. We're talking about a further increase of public debt, more than 27% of GDP by 2050. That's that costs more than the pandemic cost us. So, ladies and gentlemen, this is more than just a national question. This under undermines the credibility of the fund's next generation EU. Uh, could have been a success, but the fact is, in Spain, those funds actually undermine the sustainability of public accounts and finances. In the face of this ongoing issue, we'll have to accept the fact that we won't have indicators or models which will enable us to show that there has been a success. The fact is, European money should be used to reform our economies, but not to block reforms. So what we would like to know is what measures the Commission intends to act both as part of the recovery plan and the European Semester.”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• “(15:43:51 – 15:46:17): Thank you, madam chair, again. And on behalf of my colleague Marco Falcone, I want to read the following statement. The draft opinion by our colleague, Kubin, provided a good starting point for reaching a balanced and pragmatic final text in line with the objectives of the European People's Party group. The amendments tabled have added valuable input and are helping us in the negotiation phase to build a solid convergence. We hope this can be as broad as possible so we can vote already in June on a proposal based on a well balanced and sensible compromise. We are taking into account everyone's proposal. It might sound methodical, but it is not, including those who currently have the greatest reservation about the compromise. Let me start with the first point, definitions. Important work is being done to streamline product definitions, taking into account new market realities such as smoke free products, while also aligning existing categories. Second, the increase in taxation and excise duties. The rapporteur's proposal already introduced an initial reduction and restored a degree of flexibility for Member States. We are improving it further along the principle of lower risk, lower taxes, ensuring that innovative products that help people quit smoking as well as niche products such as cigars are not penalized. We are following this approach because in the current context, any EU initiative should support competitiveness and strengthen the productive fabric. We cannot risk introducing excessively high taxes that could fuel inflation and ultimately undermine the objective of protecting public health. In addition, there are 2 risks we must avoid. On the 1 hand, pushing consumers toward the illicit market or towards products from third countries. On the other, negatively affecting the competitiveness of the agricultural and industrial value chains linked to tobacco. On this common sense points, our call to all colleagues is to set aside preconceptions and focus on the best solutions in the interest of European citizens. Thank you very much, madam chair.”
  Heated tobacco products
• “Mr.. President. Commissioner. Protecting citizens rights to pay in cash is not just a question of inclusion. First and foremost it's a question of principle. I believe in an open society where it's people and not the lawmakers who freely decide what means of legal tender they wish to use. Today, many citizens are wishing to use cash because it's universal and it respects privacy. And if citizens want to pay cash, it's our duty to guarantee that they can continue to do so without the throughout the Union, without any stigma or barriers or discrimination. Cash is a natural payment instrument for Europeans. It's in its traditional physical form, which is to be made mandatory and in its digital form through the digital euro that I propose in my report, a digital version of cash. Which works from one digital device to another without any need for any intermediary, a central infrastructure of the ECB, or therefore protecting privacy just as well as cash does, and allowing payments even without an internet connection. And it can be used in e-commerce as well. So let's be clear. Protecting cash, whether it be physical or digital, should not become a tool to force citizens to go for one particular payment option, nor should it be used to control through the central bank. This should be left up to competition and freedom of choice. Protecting cash and allowing its digital form. We give people autonomy and freedom of choice. Thank you.”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital)
• “Lagarde. Commissioner. Dear colleagues, bringing inflation back to target after pandemic has been a challenge, but it's been no worse than in any other major economy. So in this regard, let me reiterate what I said on a similar occasion one year ago. Well done. But deep down, things are getting much tougher. The challenge to central bank independence is not a US oddity. It is a concerted attack from many fronts at a time of very high public debt. To fend off this attack, invoking the treaty provisions of denouncing the attacks elsewhere is necessary, but not sufficient. People's trust on the ECB is anchored on its compromising primary objective. Price stability for the good of EU citizens. A clear and narrow mandate strengthens accountability, anchors expectations and ultimately makes independence easier to defend in a democratic society. When central banks expand into areas that are perceived as going beyond this core mission. Even with very good intentions, it exposes itself to growing political pressure. Safeguarding central bank independence today demands from US politicians to respect institutional lines, and for central banks to avoid mission creep. Monetary policy should never be subordinated to fiscal considerations, or to other objectives that belong to the realm of elected policymakers, like climate action or strategic autonomy. President Lagarde. It is not easy to self restrict ECB's capability when so many legitimate but conflicting objectives objectives are requested from you. But in so doing, you will be cementing ECB's independence, which is Europe's most valuable asset. Thank you very much.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Thank you chair. And thank you, Mr. Bailey, for for coming to to this committee. I had originally three questions. Let me try in one minute. First one is a highly political. So how is international cooperation really working in the domain of financial stability? Are we still better off than in the trade domain? And please, if you can distinguish what happens at the surveillance level that what I've seen from your report, it's still working okay globally. But what about political action and implementation of measures? First one, second one. It's on on what you mentioned about that. To large extent, the growth of NFI was by design. Okay. The interconnectedness. So don't you think with maybe we've gone too far in that because, uh, I mean, now we've seen the stress test is real. It's not just a theoretical thinking with the with the private credit. Uh, don't you think that not allowing banks to fund longer term has been a problem that has fueled too much private credit with the cost of reduction of, uh, um, lending standards, which I think is the key for financial stability or at least one of the keys. And the third one is, uh, stablecoins again. And what is money specifically? I'm talking about settling financial transactions. So not for making transfers peer to peer, but settlement asset for financial transactions. Don't you think that the core element for such an instrument to be a settlement asset is to have access to central bank liquidity, because it's either issued by the central bank or indirectly has access to central bank liquidity. For me, it's hard to to find a money that functions as money without that characteristic. Thank you. Tell me.”
  Use of stablecoins
• “Thank you. Thank you chair. And thank you professors for such an in-depth analysis of of mobile workers or whatever all encompassing term we might find out for these different, uh, uh, situations. Uh, I just want to to know from that extra cost. You calculate if you can disentangle how much is really for one of the causes you mentioned, which is effectively higher taxation, double taxation, or this split year plus plus full year. I mean, just pure revenue. I mean more taxation with compliance, pure compliance, costs for failing for taxes. And disentangle these two also from other compliance costs associated with. You mentioned payroll management, but I can imagine many others in relation with Social Security insurance. I can I mean, from my personal life as my current I you can imagine a full plethora of of elements of additional costs, but you have to single them out because I'm not convinced. But I don't have numbers. It's just a it's just a I guess that maybe just the pure tax part is not the bulk of it. It might be the other and therefore just trying to solve the problem of these high mobility workers.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “(15:23:30 – 15:24:23): you very much, madam vice president. Welcome. Now the state aid framework. We have seen a systematic approach to this since the pandemic. Now there's a shock. We need more flexibility, but it's never good to backtrack. It wouldn't be good to go back to a binding framework for state aid. Because if we continue just injecting flexibility or rather, if we continue injecting flexibility and don't go back to what we had, then this could jeopardize a single market. We need this If we have this state aid, it could weaken the system that we have. I was wondering what your opinion”
  State Aid
• “(15:31:58 – 15:33:59): Thank you, Madame Chair. And on behalf of, the reporter, my colleague, Khachi Pandela, let me read you the following. Dear colleagues, let me begin by underlining that for this draft report in total 85 amendments have been introduced. All broadly moving in the same direction, strengthening the commission's proposal while ensuring full respect for data protection principles. The amendments place particular emphasis on strengthening safeguards in line with the recommendations of the European data protection supervisors. They clarify and strictly limit the categories of VAT data accessible to EPPO and OLAF, ensuring that access is granted only when it's necessary, linked to a specific investigations and carried out by authorized users. A broad majority of political groups also underscore the need for adequate financial resources to equip both parties with the technical infrastructure required for secure and effective data access. Overall, these amendments aim to ensure that we reinforce the fight against cross border VAT fraud, while guaranteeing that access to sensitive data remains targeted, proportionate and fully compliant with EU data protection standards. Finally, let me briefly outline the next steps. Today, the first technical meeting was held and on Wednesday, May 6, the first shadowed meeting will be held. We aim to adopt the report in committee on the June 3 with the plenary debate and vote foreseen for July 2026. I believe that our discussions will result in a good compromise text with wide support from the political groups. Thank you. And this is all from mister Hachi Bandela. Thank you. On behalf of Ms. Carla, Tavares, Ronald Fernandez for the SMD.”
  Privacy & law enforcement
• “Thank you chair. Thank you Commissioner. It's always a pleasure to have you here in this committee. I would like to raise today. Today just two issues. On the first one, as you well know, a Prussian general, Helmuth von Moltke is famously known for once said, saying no plan survives first contact with the enemy. And I fear, unfortunately, and this is a topic you might be expecting, unfortunately, we as the European Union, we find ourselves precisely in this situation following Trump's return to the To the presidency. As for global tax issues, as you as you mentioned. So the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the OECD pillar two agreement has shattered what was already a fragile international balance. In my view, it is evident that Europe must rethink the direction of global discussions on taxation. Imposing a restrictive set of unilateral rules in isolation on our capacity to attract investments to foster innovation, thus eroding EU competitiveness, does not seem to make much sense. So how does the Commission intend to respond to the US withdrawal? Specifically, what is your contingency plan to avoid European companies to be kept in a crossfire between EU implementation of the pillar two by member states and, on the other side, retaliatory measures announced by the US administration for anyone trying to externally constrain their fiscal policy.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you. Thank you chair. And thank you, professors for for for your for your report. And your presentation was very enlightening. Um, let me try to broaden a little bit, uh, the scope of the discussion, if I may, uh, because I think it was very interesting, the interaction between, uh, incentives in the form of tax credits and pillar two. But I think the subject can be expanded a little, a little bit more. So suppose we want to incentivize from a public perspective R&D activities or investment more in general. I think the first question is, uh, which one is in theory and in practice, more effective? It's either subsidies or tax, uh, or operating through the tax system. Here we have just concentrated on that. That was a given. But let me go one step back and let's ask in terms of time to market, uh, minimizing deadweight of the measures, which one is in general, uh, more, more, more appropriate then you have discussed at the very beginning this idea of, of tax coordination. If this is done at the national level, there is a need of tax coordination. Um. And my question here is, wouldn't that be just a particular case of controlling state aid? Uh, I mean, even if you do it through subsidies or any other form, you have exactly the same problem. If you have more, uh, more fiscal space, you can always undercut, uh, your, your neighbor. So I think this is just a particular case of state aid rules. So my question is why we need, uh, an additional policy tool of tax coordination and not just apply the standard state aid rules, in this case applicable to tax incentives.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. Thank you. Thank you president, for these comments. I would like to ask you because I'm a bit puzzled. How can it be that we in Europe, but at the same time in the position to we are risking some risks of currency substitution by dollar denominated stablecoins and at the same time to be in a position to become the global reserve currency. Being at both places at the same time seems a bit of a of of a contradiction. Second one is on the claim of the digital euro, as are at the best counter for this risk, if it exists, is, uh, how can it be that an instrument that is designed as a means of exchange is a good counter for, uh, for a stablecoin that's mostly, as you've mentioned, is, uh, is, uh, a store of value, uh, development in the market. Uh, third question, uh, why European citizens getting their income in euros will risk getting in foreign exchange risk in their daily lives in order to reap the benefits for. For dollar denominated stablecoins, that seems a bit odd to me. And on the fundamental issue of becoming the global reserve currency. How do you see the transition for the European economy from running large current account surpluses to the consequence of being the reserve currency of large and growing current account deficits, as the US has done in the last half century? Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you. Thank you again. Uh, chair. Just just, uh, you mentioned time. Time was of the essence. Just you mentioned as rebalancing European economy to serve this as a global provider of of of safe assets. But how much time? And by the way, just we're not talking about rebalancing its imbalances in the other direction. It's I mean, so how much time if we do everything right. And by the way, I think the, the travel you envisage in your op ed in the financial time, I think it's good in itself, even if it does not lead to the final destination of getting or getting this global dominance. And the second point is I really want to understand, uh, digital in relation to, to, to uh, stablecoins because you see, it provides the business case, okay, what the people are looking for. And we had a discussion, uh, the European citizen has to engage in foreign exchange risk. And the counter is okay, but it provides its interest bearing. Are you now proposing that the digital euro should be interest bearing, just to be a real counter for this? Because that would be extremely shocking. I think it would be a more efficient counter for this to have efficient, fast, cheaper means of payment and interest bearing. And that's something we already have. That's called deposits. It makes the function across borders. I would say that's a good proposition for safeguard in Europe, but I would like to know your opinion on this. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. Madam Commissioner, reforms, fiscal sustainability and investments are the way to make sure that the European population doesn't get left behind. When we threaten fiscal sustainability, we undermine the confidence of Europeans in the welfare state and we undermine the confidence of investors. We need to reform the sustainability of pensions and not deteriorate them in countries like Germany and France. Authorities are aware of the sustainability challenges of the welfare state and they're trying to take measures. In Spain, the problems are piling up. The independent authority on fiscal issues says that the pension system is not sustainable. And given that, what can we do? We can't allow fiscal polarity to undermine investors and people's confidence. I would like to invite the Commission to make the sustainability of the welfare state to become a goal for compatibility, competitiveness. So not to, uh, approve any measures that would undermine it. I would like to ask member states to make structural reforms that will contribute to the long term sustainability of pensions, and we need extra plans and individual company plans to channel more investment towards competitiveness, as well as strengthening the safety and security of citizens in their retirement. It's not an easy road, I know, but we have to work on it every day and be responsible. Thank you.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets