Fernando NAVARRETE ROJAS

Policy topics Fernando NAVARRETE ROJAS is active on

What Fernando NAVARRETE ROJAS has said (46)

• 2026-06-15 “(17:51:06 – 17:52:56): Thank you, president, vice president. Economic independence is an economic and security related obligation. Everyone's wondering how to do that, but I think people basically are looking at how they can select the right industries, provide some subsidies, and create European champions. And all of that is very smart and forward looking, but, unfortunately, these ideas that go against the basic ideas of the free market, which are fundamental European ideas, and they have never worked in the European Union or in China or in The United States. What would work, and I've I'm pleased to have heard that here, is to complete the single market. We really need to ensure that our single market is completed so that we can be innovative. Europe shouldn't try to do everything and anything. What Europe should be trying to do is ensuring that European businesses can act freely and can produce certain goods and services that are essential for everyone across the world. Interdependency is interdependence is not vulnerability if we are diversified. We need a wide network of social partners and leverage for negotiation. When 2 elephants fight, it's the grass that suffers. The leopard flees. Europe isn't an elephant in global terms, and we don't want to be the grass either. We should learn to be the leopard with an agile, competitive, and open economy.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-10-09 “E-003981/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Article 6 of Regulation 473/2013 requires all euro area Member States to submit by 15 October to the Commission and to the Eurogroup a draft budgetary plan for the forthcoming year. This deadline allows the Commission to issue an Opinion on the submitted draft budgetary plan as soon as possible and in any event by 30 November. This timeline allows EU's policy guidance to be appropriately integrated in the national budgets before those are finalised 1 . The above provision is consistent with the budgetary timeline envisaged by the same Regulation (Article 4) that requires that ‘…The draft budget for the forthcoming year for the central government and the main parameters of the draft budgets for all the other subsectors of the general government shall be made public annually not later than 15 October…’. The submission of a draft budgetary plan to the Commission is meaningful only when it corresponds to a draft budget at the national level. On 2 October 2025, the Commission proposed to amend Regulation 473/2013 2 . The amending regulation proposed by the Commission specifies that the submission of a draft budgetary plan at unchanged policies is not needed in case a government is not in a position to prepare a draft budget law for adoption by the national parliament. The Commission expects that the Spanish government will submit its draft budgetary plan for 2026 as soon as a draft budget law is prepared for adoption by the national parliament. The Commission keeps monitoring fiscal developments in Spain, and has considered all relevant policy measures when preparing its Autumn 2025 forecasts. 1 Pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 in case of particularly serious non-compliance of the draft budgetary plan with the budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact the Commission opinion shall be issued within two weeks of the submission of the draft budgetary plan. 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1173/2011 and (EU) No 473/2013 (COM(2025) 591 final).”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-04-16 “E-001555/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission preliminary assessment of the fourth payment request 1 considered the fiscal sustainability requirements of the pension reform as satisfactorily fulfilled 2 , noting that ‘the closure clause legislated as part of Milestone 409 ensures that corrective measures enter into force as soon as necessary so that the long-term fiscal sustainability of the pension reforms […] is preserved even under less favourable developments than assumed.’ The Commission has taken note of the decision by the Council of Ministers to amend Royal Decree 100/2025, which is relevant to the application of the closure clause, since it provides further specification to guide its calculation by the independent fiscal council Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (AIReF). The Commission is currently assessing the impact of the proposed amendments to Royal Decree 100/2025. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e8b93743-5a80-4c10-9caa4dabedc95728_en?filename=C_2024_4171_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_nlw_part1_v2_1.pdf. 2 These requirements are set out in the Council Implementing Decision: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10150-2021-ADD-1-REV-2/en/pdf.”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• 2025-04-16 “E-001553/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Under the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) framework, social contribution projections, including those paid into the pension system, are ordinarily assumed to remain constant as a ratio to gross domestic product (GDP) during the ten years that follow the end of the adjustment period, i.e. from 2032 to 2041, unless different assumptions are duly justified. In the case of Spain, its medium-term fiscal structural plan (MTFSP) internalises the impact of compensatory revenue measures legislated in 2023 (along with the pension reform) that will materialise after 2031. The cumulative increase in social contributions over the following ten years is estimated at 1.8 percentage points of GDP, which improves the debt dynamics. This assumption relies on the legislated measures described in Spain’s Country Fiche accompanying the 2024 Ageing Report. These measures lower the adjustment required to put debt on a plausibly downward path and enable a higher average net expenditure growth over the adjustment period. The revenue increases over the years 2027-2031 resulting from the potential activation of the closure clause were not included in the assumption of the Spanish MTFSP. Under the commonly agreed methodology, the activation of the closure clause would have been considered a discretionary revenue measure and would be taken into account only ex post in the assessments of compliance with the net expenditure rule. Therefore, the updated estimates of the independent fiscal authority (AIReF) do not imply that the Spanish plan deviates from the debt reduction requirement.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-04-16 “E-001554/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Royal Decree 100/2025 inter alia further specifies the closure clause of the 2023 pension law (Royal Decree Law 2/2023), which was positively assessed by the Commission in the context of the fourth payment request by Spain 1 . Royal Decree 561/2025 adopted on 1 July 2025 introduces amendments to Royal Decree 100/2025. The independence of national fiscal authorities is safeguarded by the national fiscal frameworks Directive, as amended in April 2024 2 , which is based on and expands the independence safeguards as included in Regulation 473/2013. Member States have until the end of 2025 to transpose the new or amended provisions of the Directive. A full legal transposition check will be undertaken in 2026. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e8b93743-5a80-4c10-9caa4dabedc95728_en?filename=C_2024_4171_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_nlw_part1_v2_1.pdf. 2 Council Directive (EU) 2024/1265 of 29 April 2024 amending Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States.”
  Rule of law in Spain · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-04-10 “E-001493/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission publishes unemployment statistics based on the EU Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) 1 . The EU-LFS serves as the primary source of labour market information in the EU. However, it does not provide specific data on permanent seasonal workers (PSW), as a distinct category. During their active work season, PSW are classified as employed, but in the off-season they are categorised as unemployed if actively seeking work, or as outside the labour force otherwise. 1. PSW figures at the national level would offer country-specific insights for this specific group. For detailed information on PSW, dedicated national data could be the most suitable source. For country-specific analyses, the Commission often relies on figures published by national providers to complement the findings. 2. In European official statistics released by Eurostat, the employment status of individuals is determined according to internationally recognised methodologies and in compliance with EU regulations. The EU-LFS is conducted consistently across countries and over time, guided by Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/2240 on the organisation of a sample survey in the labour force domain 2 , and adheres to the International Labour Organisation definitions. Eurostat validates the quality of survey data and metadata to ensure they comply with EU regulations and provide harmonised information. 3. The Commission considers that out-of-work PSW who are not actively seeking employment cannot be classified as unemployed under existing statistical definitions. No revision of the data collection methodology is planned. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/2240/oj/eng. 2 Idem.”
  EU policy on permanent and fixed-term employment · EU competences on social policies
• 2024-10-18 “E-002162/2024 E-002163/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Spain submitted its medium-term fiscal-structural plan on 15 October 2024. The Commission’s assessment of the plan finds that it does fulfil the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 1 and it recommended that the Council endorse the plan on 26 November 2024. In its assessment and prior guidance to Spain submitted on 21 June 2024 2 , the Commission took into account already implemented reforms and in particular their impact on fiscal sustainability through future government revenue, expenditure and potential growth, in line with the Regulation and following the commonly agreed methodology. This includes already legislated revenue increases that occur in the future, like is the case for the Spanish pension reform. While the pension reform is a part of the measures in the Spanish plan, it is not part of the reforms and investments underpinning an extension under Article 14 of the Regulation and as shown in Annex II of the Commission assessment. The Commission services have provided constant guidance to all Member States on how to ensure that their plans comply with the requirements of the Regulation. The Commission has assessed all the Member States’ plans’ compliance with the provisions of the Regulation, on the basis of common, transparent methodologies. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj/eng 2 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1d44833a-6435-4f02-94f9543777d4036b_en?filename=Commission_prior_guidance-spain_en.pdf”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2024-10-18 “E-002161/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The submission of the Member States’ draft budgetary plans and their assessment by the Commission (as established by Regulation (EU) 473/2013) is an important element in the fiscal surveillance. Member States submit their draft budgetary plan for the forthcoming year by 15 October 1 and the Commission provides an opinion by end-November 2 . Member States are invited to take into account, in the process of adopting their budget law, the Commission opinion on their draft budgetary plan 3 . It may however happen that a government is unable to table a draft budget in national parliament by the usual deadlines. In these cases, the submission should as a rule take place at least one month before the draft budget law is planned to be adopted by the national parliament, except where to do so would prove not feasible due to the country-specific parliamentary approval calendar. In the latter case, the submission should still take place in time to allow the Commission to adopt an informed opinion on the plan and the Eurogroup to hold a proper discussion well before the budget law is planned to be adopted by the national parliament 4 . The Commission continuously monitors fiscal developments in Member States. It takes into account all fiscal developments and fiscal measures when it prepares and publishes its macroeconomic forecasts, including fiscal accounts. The Commission confirms that, while it has already received the Spanish medium-term fiscal structural plan 5 , it has not yet received a draft budgetary plan for 2025. The Commission raises the attention of the Honourable Member that the said recital 39 of Regulation 2024/1263 indicates that the Commission should, when providing its opinion on the draft budgetary plan, assess whether the draft budgetary plan is consistent with the expenditure path set by the Council Recommendation that endorses the medium-term fiscal structural plan. 1 Art 6(1) of Regulation (EU) 473/2013. 2 Art 7(1) of Regulation (EU) 473/2013. 3 Recital 21 of Regulation (EU) 473/2013. 4 Moreover, Regulation 473/2013 (Cf Art 4(3)) establishes that, while the budget for central government should be adopted by end-year, the Member States should have in place reversionary budget procedures to be applied if the budged is not adopted or fixed upon by 31 December. 5 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/45e0463e-1216-459a-820ac7eb9381f27d_es?filename=national_medium-term_fiscal-structural_plan_spain_es.pdf&prefLang=en”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. And to our chair, I would like to note that on the 8th of July, our plenary voted with a majority for strengthening governance and supervision of the European Investment Bank. Nevertheless, so far you have ignored this political mandate that's worth taking note of. And besides the governance problem, the other big issue is the lack of respect for internal controls. Statistical bodies have improved GDP growth estimates. But that is largely the doing of the president of the institution. It seems that there are no instructions from governments or institutions who help them to take this step. Now it's the European Investment Bank. But. How do you feel? Mrs. Calvino? Have trust in European institutions and in European cooperation. When the highest representatives permanently disrespect control mechanisms.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. I would like to speak in Spanish in this case. So, Mrs. Kovesi, I'd like to really congratulate you for being so clear and so brave. Uh, I, uh, you really conveyed the message of urgency and how serious the difficulty is. And I think the situation is even worse than what you tried to convey after your presentation. I couldn't avoid thinking of a case which pension holders in Spain are experiencing, Uh, because there are certain, uh, criminal, uh, chain like Eva meadows. And what's happening is that the criminal organizations have actually seeped into the Spanish institutions and earning money from these frauds. There are a lot of investigations, but some of these criminals have become part of the hard nucleus of our government. And there have been millions of frauds with respect to fuels and VAT. And the license to make these frauds, uh, were operable. They actually, the Ministry of Ecology gave these licenses, and Mrs. Teresa Rivera introduced the case. It's a case of pollution. There's corruption, and it's in one of the governments of the EU. We're talking not just about carousel frogs, but this is actually an official license for Frauding. We're talking about 200 million and you've got a lack of competence. There are a lot of corruptors. A lot of people were corrupt and some people who are fair. And the rule would be for our justice system. What we have to do is find out what failed, why did the alarms not go off, and why should we have to avoid it and not make it easier? And this has even come up to the College of Commissioner. And what I'm worried about in the future is that it is serious that the high political representatives don't. They're actually putting up barriers for people like you who are seeking the truth. So I have to be very, very blunt. What degree of cooperation are you getting from the judicial and police Spanish authorities to try to reach this political and economic political ring? The cost of which is not only money we mentioned, but the deterioration of the reputation of institutions which we need to preserve. Thank you very much.”
  Rule of law in Spain
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you for, for for the speakers. A fairly general comment. First, I don't know how we ended up talking or discussing about again and again on tax avoidance and profit shifting. Sorry, this was not the subject, at least I think in my view. As for today debt equity bias, in my mind it has more to do with incentives to innovate, to create, to grow. I mean, that's the topic as of today, more than although there might be an angle of of profit shifting eventually, but it's just a minor thing that's not the subject. So let me go back to what I consider to be the core of the subject. So I've heard Professor Devereaux mentioning an impact of 5 to 10 percentage points in terms of the balancing from the optimal decision between equity and debt. But my question is, given the experience, even within Europe, I think we have in the European Union, we have five countries that have established some sort of adjustments in there. They are different each way. If the if, if the counterbalancing effects of these tax measures is enough to counterbalance fully this this the original imbalance of 5 to 10 percentage points. So first of all, if measures work okay in the in the in the scale, they are they are designed. The second one is on, on the cap of the equity allowance on these 30% of EBITDA. And the idea that you have you cannot have a negative fiscal effect. So you have to carry forward any, any allowance. Don't you think that it will increase substantially the impact of any measure if this can be a refundable tax credit? And the third one is in terms of complexity that you mentioned. Is it feasible to do this corrections in an efficient way that we are not creating extra complexity? So because we are trying to do some simplification at the same time. So these are my three points. Thank you very much.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. And to our chair, I would like to note that on the 8th of July, our plenary voted with a majority for strengthening governance and supervision of the European Investment Bank. Nevertheless, so far you have ignored this political mandate that's worth taking note of. And besides the governance problem, the other big issue is the lack of respect for internal controls. Statistical bodies have improved GDP growth estimates. But that is largely the doing of the president of the institution. It seems that there are no instructions from governments or institutions who help them to take this step. Now it's the European Investment Bank. But. How do you feel? Mrs. Calvino? Have trust in European institutions and in European cooperation. When the highest representatives permanently disrespect control mechanisms.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. And to our chair, I would like to note that on the 8th of July, our plenary voted with a majority for strengthening governance and supervision of the European Investment Bank. Nevertheless, so far you have ignored this political mandate that's worth taking note of. And besides the governance problem, the other big issue is the lack of respect for internal controls. Statistical bodies have improved GDP growth estimates. But that is largely the doing of the president of the institution. It seems that there are no instructions from governments or institutions who help them to take this step. Now it's the European Investment Bank. But. How do you feel? Mrs. Calvino? Have trust in European institutions and in European cooperation. When the highest representatives permanently disrespect control mechanisms.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “(15:43:51 – 15:46:17): Thank you, madam chair, again. And on behalf of my colleague Marco Falcone, I want to read the following statement. The draft opinion by our colleague, Kubin, provided a good starting point for reaching a balanced and pragmatic final text in line with the objectives of the European People's Party group. The amendments tabled have added valuable input and are helping us in the negotiation phase to build a solid convergence. We hope this can be as broad as possible so we can vote already in June on a proposal based on a well balanced and sensible compromise. We are taking into account everyone's proposal. It might sound methodical, but it is not, including those who currently have the greatest reservation about the compromise. Let me start with the first point, definitions. Important work is being done to streamline product definitions, taking into account new market realities such as smoke free products, while also aligning existing categories. Second, the increase in taxation and excise duties. The rapporteur's proposal already introduced an initial reduction and restored a degree of flexibility for Member States. We are improving it further along the principle of lower risk, lower taxes, ensuring that innovative products that help people quit smoking as well as niche products such as cigars are not penalized. We are following this approach because in the current context, any EU initiative should support competitiveness and strengthen the productive fabric. We cannot risk introducing excessively high taxes that could fuel inflation and ultimately undermine the objective of protecting public health. In addition, there are 2 risks we must avoid. On the 1 hand, pushing consumers toward the illicit market or towards products from third countries. On the other, negatively affecting the competitiveness of the agricultural and industrial value chains linked to tobacco. On this common sense points, our call to all colleagues is to set aside preconceptions and focus on the best solutions in the interest of European citizens. Thank you very much, madam chair.”
  Heated tobacco products
• “Thank you. Thank you chair. And thank you, professors for for for your for your report. And your presentation was very enlightening. Um, let me try to broaden a little bit, uh, the scope of the discussion, if I may, uh, because I think it was very interesting, the interaction between, uh, incentives in the form of tax credits and pillar two. But I think the subject can be expanded a little, a little bit more. So suppose we want to incentivize from a public perspective R&D activities or investment more in general. I think the first question is, uh, which one is in theory and in practice, more effective? It's either subsidies or tax, uh, or operating through the tax system. Here we have just concentrated on that. That was a given. But let me go one step back and let's ask in terms of time to market, uh, minimizing deadweight of the measures, which one is in general, uh, more, more, more appropriate then you have discussed at the very beginning this idea of, of tax coordination. If this is done at the national level, there is a need of tax coordination. Um. And my question here is, wouldn't that be just a particular case of controlling state aid? Uh, I mean, even if you do it through subsidies or any other form, you have exactly the same problem. If you have more, uh, more fiscal space, you can always undercut, uh, your, your neighbor. So I think this is just a particular case of state aid rules. So my question is why we need, uh, an additional policy tool of tax coordination and not just apply the standard state aid rules, in this case applicable to tax incentives.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you. Thank you. Chair. Thank you. Thank you president, for these comments. I would like to ask you because I'm a bit puzzled. How can it be that we in Europe, but at the same time in the position to we are risking some risks of currency substitution by dollar denominated stablecoins and at the same time to be in a position to become the global reserve currency. Being at both places at the same time seems a bit of a of of a contradiction. Second one is on the claim of the digital euro, as are at the best counter for this risk, if it exists, is, uh, how can it be that an instrument that is designed as a means of exchange is a good counter for, uh, for a stablecoin that's mostly, as you've mentioned, is, uh, is, uh, a store of value, uh, development in the market. Uh, third question, uh, why European citizens getting their income in euros will risk getting in foreign exchange risk in their daily lives in order to reap the benefits for. For dollar denominated stablecoins, that seems a bit odd to me. And on the fundamental issue of becoming the global reserve currency. How do you see the transition for the European economy from running large current account surpluses to the consequence of being the reserve currency of large and growing current account deficits, as the US has done in the last half century? Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you. Let me be very clear on the point. On own funds and European taxes. I think what Europe. Europe's competitiveness needs is no more taxes especially not on firms. So some of the proposals that have been put forward for some own resources, I think they need to to be revisited, uh, because, uh, having more taxes on, on companies, especially on medium sized companies, I think it's not the way forward in particular those that are trying to go into the single market. So there are some aspects of what we've been put forward I think need careful revisiting. Thank you.”
  Own EU resources
• “I think it was very clear that VAT is at least a marginal help, but it's not the major driver. If we're talking fiscal policy and you want to really increase R&D the least, I would think about this VAT. There are many other things. So we have R&D incentives basically tax credits. And that brings me a bell. So that's why I want numbers just to realize how much it's really R&D at risk, whether it's the the crux of the matter. Because if it's that, then the question is are it's structurally the EU impeded because of the application of the pillar two, because we know pillar two on the OECD for large firms, and these defense companies tend to be large, might be in scope. We know it has a problem, a pillar two in terms of the effectiveness of of tax credits compared to the US, that has a slightly distinct way of, of of doing this through Gilti that we know is much more efficient in terms of not negating the effects of tax credits to R&D. So I would like an assessment from, uh, the tax experts. Uh, how much is this impediment going to be a problem for uh, for European industry? Thank you.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “Uh, yes. I would like to leverage on on the previous question for my colleagues, uh, because we've received criticism of previous safeguards about stablecoins. So why does the commission, in particular Commissioner Dombrovskis, so confident that he's claiming his initial remark that this will never jeopardize financial stability, that these safeguards for the digital, you are so much better than previous safeguards and other pieces of legislation that we saw. Financial stability will never be at at risk. And another comment is what's the value added of having a centralized ledger on the ECB balance sheet versus a leaner alternative, which will be a pure offline tokenized cash that is untraceable, has little risk for financial stability, and it's much, much simpler. So I still fail to see the merits for the pure online. Apart from just having a pan-European payment scheme that can be provided by private. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you, thank you. Chair. I will be reading the words given to me by Mr. Mandela. So, dear colleagues. Firstly, we would like to thank our colleague Malaga for the dedicated work and constructive efforts in preparing this opinion. Overall, EPP amendments have focused on strengthening the budget 2026, ensuring a resilient and forward looking instrument capable of addressing today's geopolitical challenges and supporting long term economic stability. We emphasize that the Union Budget is an essential tool for preserving competitiveness, and underline the importance of increasing its leverage to better mobilise private investment. Especially important from an econ perspective, is to underline the need for adequate funding and resources for the European supervisory authorities, enabling them to fully and effectively carry out the tasks assigned by the European Parliament and the Council. Similarly, we wanted to stress the need for adequate funding and resources for the fiscal space programme to ensure the necessary support for the national tax authorities, especially in view of ongoing digitalisation and simplification efforts. Finally, we wish to reiterate the importance of maintaining a clear focus on econ competence insurance, ensuring that we contribute with a strong opinion that will help deliver a robust and future proof budget 2026 that can meet both current and emerging challenges. Thank you very much.”
  Size of EU budget
• “Thank you. President. What do energy digital technologies hold for us? Technology simply allows us to do things and we then, as politicians, are responsible for deciding how it's going to be used to make sure that it's used for the general interest. To equate technology with goodness is just as ridiculous as the opposite. If we do that, we run the risk of being blinded by the opportunities of new technologies and forgetting the core of what it is we want to achieve. Specifically, for the digital euro or digital currencies, we run the risk of being blinded by the arguments. Now we see that citizens want to be able to pave freely, safely throughout Europe. Right now, this is conditioned by excessive dependency on non-European suppliers. This is a vulnerability that both economic and geopolitical, that we need to correct. However, we need to be careful. The solution cannot be to enclose European innovation in a single product, which contains certain economic risks, and gives rise to concerns about privacy when there are other options, thanks to technological advances and infrastructures that already exist today, we have the opportunity to create a pan-European payment system which is competitive, autonomous and innovative. The path is not guaranteed, but nor is its failure. We can use this opportunity not to just choose one option blinded by the opportunity. Rather, we should be looking at all of the different possibilities that different payment systems and see what they offer our citizens.”
  Digital euro
• “My second point is on competitiveness as you started. I believe the competitiveness compass is directionally right in many aspects. I cannot hide that my expectation was of greater ambition regarding how tax can strengthen the single market. However, having said that, one particular tax related issue in the document has really caught my attention and it's because I think it has theoretical transformative potential, which is this idea of having a 28th regime for tax laws. However, it remains unclear, at least to me, how this would be implemented, whether it would apply only to innovative companies, or it can be extended to any company trying to scale up in the single market. Specifically, I would be very glad if you could elaborate on this proposal and explain how it would interact with Member States sovereignty on tax issues for the determination of the tax breaks, tax bases or tax deductions. Thank you very much.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you very much. Chairman. Thank you very much. President. I'm going to speak Spanish. Of course. First of all, my thanks to you for these recommendations. And I sincerely hope that they will be the basis of an effective revision of the regulatory framework, which is very important based on the Commission and Parliament input and the bank's publication. I have four points to make. First of all, regarding the process, I would like to know how much you factored in contributions from the EB A or the Ecrb or other institutions. And if you haven't, is there a reason for doing that at a later stage? How do you intend to listen to all relevant stakeholders from the banking sector? Secondly, I'd like to ask about recommendation one and the complexity of the regulation and how you intend to deal with that, you have an idea to try to realign things to simpler, more streamlined standards in order to reduce the costs, which on banks which have been accumulating over decades. Then thirdly, I'd like to know about the scope and application you're arguing the case for a additionally simplified structure for small banks and enterprises as NCIS. The counterpart is that they would need to hold extra capital. How much would this additional capital amount to, and how would you intend to deal with the ancillary costs that could be incurred? So these are all, to me, outstanding matters. I would like you to address them. If possible, I'd like to know if you've thought about SSM governance Consultation and ownership issues pertaining to the supervisory authorities to thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Thank you. President. The global tech race that started years ago and Europe is on the sidelines of the generations that made a leader in the first quarter of the century. Is it a lead that we cannot catch up on? No, it's not an impossible task. We have to focus on our strengths the education of the population, the These are technical and scientific infrastructures. We have a European talent triumphs abroad and the qualifications are very high. I think our weakness is the lack of incentives, because the European companies get a lower return on their investment, and the reason for this is because anybody who takes the risk and innovates well, obviously they should be able to enjoy the fruits of their investment, but instead they get higher taxes and higher red tape, and the result is obvious, less innovation. Secondly, there is the lack of a true real internal market without barriers, so that all of this can reach the necessary critical mass. And there's a kind of vicious circle when it comes to financing as well that stunts growth. Ultimately, we don't know what the most recent solution will be, but we have our European young people. We have to make sure that they stay trained and work in the European Union, not leave, especially when it comes to innovation and products so that they can see the light of day.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• “Until when is the European Commission going to tolerate a country failing to send in its plan to the Commission within the agreed timeframe? Secondly, until when is the commission going to tolerate a government's refusal to subject itself to fiscal supervision and. To only give you projections, not a political plan, thus a pretext for inaction. Thirdly, what is the commission going to do with the next generation funding and the pensions, which would then guarantee the funding of public programmes? And what does the Commission think the implications are likely to be for citizens across Europe, particularly a government in Spain, which doesn't have a budget, doesn't have any kind of budgetary plans nor any capacity to legislate. So we are suffering from this in Spain. But this is a problem which will spread across Europe, because we will see a reversion to extreme rigorous austerity in the future once the government changes. And this is not sustainable. And that is the point of the European semester. It is there to try to ensure economic prosperity and not to prop up failing governments.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “(15:49:06 – 15:50:15): Thank you, chair. Thank you, mister Cipollone. I would like to ask you a couple of questions regarding standards and interoperability. 1 in the digital euro domain. And you so you've spoken about you've been more explicit about the open standards you announced the last time you were here. But there was also comments from this house selling the other way around. How is the ECB planning to reuse preexisting European standards in order to reduce cost for the development of the whole digital euro project. So I want to ask you the other way around. So, my 2nd comment is also on interoperability better than the wholesale space. We had, this week, the announcement by the Bank for International Settlements on the Agora project. And I'm going to ask you that basically shows that it's possible to have a cross border, multicurrency, settlement in central bank money, and I think it's a big development. And I would like to ask you what is the ECB doing that their its own projects, Agora and Pontes, are going to fulfill criteria to be interoperable with other central banks might be designing in their own jurisdiction. Thank you very much.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. The competitiveness compass, as I see it, helps us to see what's ailing in the European economy. We lack competitiveness compared to the major world economies. And therefore, first and foremost, we are failing to generate and disseminate innovative ideas to produce goods and services. Secondly, energy costs are relatively high compared to other economic areas. And we don't have major native energy resources such as they have in China and India. We have an internal market which has not been fully integrated. At least we know where we're at. But that doesn't go far enough. We need to be heading towards prosperity for all citizens. How to go about this? Well, we ought to have cross-cutting measures in place to encourage competitiveness throughout the economy. For example, we need cheap energy, low energy, low carbon energy. We need real incentives for innovation. If you we ought to be able to enjoy the products of innovation on an internationally competitive market. Internal barriers to trade need to be removed because we have 45% tariffs on services and 110% for goods, or rather, the opposite. We aren't setting the bar high enough in the internal market, and that's the worst, worse than any protectionist measure from the USA. We've got a lot on our plate, so let's get going.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• “Mr.. President. Commissioner. Protecting citizens rights to pay in cash is not just a question of inclusion. First and foremost it's a question of principle. I believe in an open society where it's people and not the lawmakers who freely decide what means of legal tender they wish to use. Today, many citizens are wishing to use cash because it's universal and it respects privacy. And if citizens want to pay cash, it's our duty to guarantee that they can continue to do so without the throughout the Union, without any stigma or barriers or discrimination. Cash is a natural payment instrument for Europeans. It's in its traditional physical form, which is to be made mandatory and in its digital form through the digital euro that I propose in my report, a digital version of cash. Which works from one digital device to another without any need for any intermediary, a central infrastructure of the ECB, or therefore protecting privacy just as well as cash does, and allowing payments even without an internet connection. And it can be used in e-commerce as well. So let's be clear. Protecting cash, whether it be physical or digital, should not become a tool to force citizens to go for one particular payment option, nor should it be used to control through the central bank. This should be left up to competition and freedom of choice. Protecting cash and allowing its digital form. We give people autonomy and freedom of choice. Thank you.”
  Means of payment (cash vs digital)
• “Just focusing too narrowly on just taxation issue might just be missing the large part of, or at least a significant portion of the problem. So this is the idea of bundling that you mention. Or I don't know if we could talk about a single stop shops for these type of workers that encompass all these problems altogether. I think it's it might be more productive because some of the partial solutions you point out in your report really go to the core of international taxation. I mean, it's really 180 degree shift in how. And it's a very complex equilibrium. So are we really risking to change a very complex equilibrium that affects almost global taxation just for a, for a 1% of workers. But even it might be worth but if it's not really solving the problem for this 1% because the bulk of the problem lies elsewhere. It's a bit of an overkill, so I just want to have some numbers. Whether we are really targeting the solutions to the real problems these people are, these companies at the same time are facing. Thank you very much.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “(15:31:58 – 15:33:59): Thank you, Madame Chair. And on behalf of, the reporter, my colleague, Khachi Pandela, let me read you the following. Dear colleagues, let me begin by underlining that for this draft report in total 85 amendments have been introduced. All broadly moving in the same direction, strengthening the commission's proposal while ensuring full respect for data protection principles. The amendments place particular emphasis on strengthening safeguards in line with the recommendations of the European data protection supervisors. They clarify and strictly limit the categories of VAT data accessible to EPPO and OLAF, ensuring that access is granted only when it's necessary, linked to a specific investigations and carried out by authorized users. A broad majority of political groups also underscore the need for adequate financial resources to equip both parties with the technical infrastructure required for secure and effective data access. Overall, these amendments aim to ensure that we reinforce the fight against cross border VAT fraud, while guaranteeing that access to sensitive data remains targeted, proportionate and fully compliant with EU data protection standards. Finally, let me briefly outline the next steps. Today, the first technical meeting was held and on Wednesday, May 6, the first shadowed meeting will be held. We aim to adopt the report in committee on the June 3 with the plenary debate and vote foreseen for July 2026. I believe that our discussions will result in a good compromise text with wide support from the political groups. Thank you. And this is all from mister Hachi Bandela. Thank you. On behalf of Ms. Carla, Tavares, Ronald Fernandez for the SMD.”
  Privacy & law enforcement
• “(15:23:30 – 15:24:23): you very much, madam vice president. Welcome. Now the state aid framework. We have seen a systematic approach to this since the pandemic. Now there's a shock. We need more flexibility, but it's never good to backtrack. It wouldn't be good to go back to a binding framework for state aid. Because if we continue just injecting flexibility or rather, if we continue injecting flexibility and don't go back to what we had, then this could jeopardize a single market. We need this If we have this state aid, it could weaken the system that we have. I was wondering what your opinion”
  State Aid
• “Thank you. Thank you again. Uh, chair. Just just, uh, you mentioned time. Time was of the essence. Just you mentioned as rebalancing European economy to serve this as a global provider of of of safe assets. But how much time? And by the way, just we're not talking about rebalancing its imbalances in the other direction. It's I mean, so how much time if we do everything right. And by the way, I think the, the travel you envisage in your op ed in the financial time, I think it's good in itself, even if it does not lead to the final destination of getting or getting this global dominance. And the second point is I really want to understand, uh, digital in relation to, to, to uh, stablecoins because you see, it provides the business case, okay, what the people are looking for. And we had a discussion, uh, the European citizen has to engage in foreign exchange risk. And the counter is okay, but it provides its interest bearing. Are you now proposing that the digital euro should be interest bearing, just to be a real counter for this? Because that would be extremely shocking. I think it would be a more efficient counter for this to have efficient, fast, cheaper means of payment and interest bearing. And that's something we already have. That's called deposits. It makes the function across borders. I would say that's a good proposition for safeguard in Europe, but I would like to know your opinion on this. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you. Thank you chair. And thank you professors for such an in-depth analysis of of mobile workers or whatever all encompassing term we might find out for these different, uh, uh, situations. Uh, I just want to to know from that extra cost. You calculate if you can disentangle how much is really for one of the causes you mentioned, which is effectively higher taxation, double taxation, or this split year plus plus full year. I mean, just pure revenue. I mean more taxation with compliance, pure compliance, costs for failing for taxes. And disentangle these two also from other compliance costs associated with. You mentioned payroll management, but I can imagine many others in relation with Social Security insurance. I can I mean, from my personal life as my current I you can imagine a full plethora of of elements of additional costs, but you have to single them out because I'm not convinced. But I don't have numbers. It's just a it's just a I guess that maybe just the pure tax part is not the bulk of it. It might be the other and therefore just trying to solve the problem of these high mobility workers.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “Thank you chair. Thank you Commissioner. It's always a pleasure to have you here in this committee. I would like to raise today. Today just two issues. On the first one, as you well know, a Prussian general, Helmuth von Moltke is famously known for once said, saying no plan survives first contact with the enemy. And I fear, unfortunately, and this is a topic you might be expecting, unfortunately, we as the European Union, we find ourselves precisely in this situation following Trump's return to the To the presidency. As for global tax issues, as you as you mentioned. So the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the OECD pillar two agreement has shattered what was already a fragile international balance. In my view, it is evident that Europe must rethink the direction of global discussions on taxation. Imposing a restrictive set of unilateral rules in isolation on our capacity to attract investments to foster innovation, thus eroding EU competitiveness, does not seem to make much sense. So how does the Commission intend to respond to the US withdrawal? Specifically, what is your contingency plan to avoid European companies to be kept in a crossfire between EU implementation of the pillar two by member states and, on the other side, retaliatory measures announced by the US administration for anyone trying to externally constrain their fiscal policy.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you very much, Madam President. Madam Commissioner, reforms, fiscal sustainability and investments are the way to make sure that the European population doesn't get left behind. When we threaten fiscal sustainability, we undermine the confidence of Europeans in the welfare state and we undermine the confidence of investors. We need to reform the sustainability of pensions and not deteriorate them in countries like Germany and France. Authorities are aware of the sustainability challenges of the welfare state and they're trying to take measures. In Spain, the problems are piling up. The independent authority on fiscal issues says that the pension system is not sustainable. And given that, what can we do? We can't allow fiscal polarity to undermine investors and people's confidence. I would like to invite the Commission to make the sustainability of the welfare state to become a goal for compatibility, competitiveness. So not to, uh, approve any measures that would undermine it. I would like to ask member states to make structural reforms that will contribute to the long term sustainability of pensions, and we need extra plans and individual company plans to channel more investment towards competitiveness, as well as strengthening the safety and security of citizens in their retirement. It's not an easy road, I know, but we have to work on it every day and be responsible. Thank you.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• “President. President von der Leyen said this very morning. Our imperative is for Europe to step up where others have stepped away. Well, this imperative applies particularly to international taxation. Resisting the temptation of unilateral action is not a sign of weakness. It is responsibility and leadership. But what should we do if others do act unilaterally? Some may argue that give us free rein to retaliate. I disagree. Unilateral actions, either by them or by us, is always an invitation to conflict. If Europe truly wants to be a global standard setter in the new world order, we need to rethink our strategy. Sovereignty is not about the power to do everything we can do. It is about the responsibility to do what we should do. The world is watching and Europe must lead by example. Europe must remain open to the world and abide to globally agreed rules to be credible partners. We must first do our homework. Simplify, innovate and create the conditions for businesses to grow here in Europe. And a unilateral EU digital service tax will not get us there. Digital service companies are currently taxed according to the same principles to any other sector, based on profits and on the location where the services are provided. Some may consider this is flawed as well, but that only calls for a stronger global engagement for an alternative, not for unilateral shortcuts. Therefore, I'm really glad the European Commission has decided to put aside such digital service tax as own resources. It is an important step in showing real leadership in a contested world. Thank you very much.”
  Own EU resources
• “Lagarde. Commissioner. Dear colleagues, bringing inflation back to target after pandemic has been a challenge, but it's been no worse than in any other major economy. So in this regard, let me reiterate what I said on a similar occasion one year ago. Well done. But deep down, things are getting much tougher. The challenge to central bank independence is not a US oddity. It is a concerted attack from many fronts at a time of very high public debt. To fend off this attack, invoking the treaty provisions of denouncing the attacks elsewhere is necessary, but not sufficient. People's trust on the ECB is anchored on its compromising primary objective. Price stability for the good of EU citizens. A clear and narrow mandate strengthens accountability, anchors expectations and ultimately makes independence easier to defend in a democratic society. When central banks expand into areas that are perceived as going beyond this core mission. Even with very good intentions, it exposes itself to growing political pressure. Safeguarding central bank independence today demands from US politicians to respect institutional lines, and for central banks to avoid mission creep. Monetary policy should never be subordinated to fiscal considerations, or to other objectives that belong to the realm of elected policymakers, like climate action or strategic autonomy. President Lagarde. It is not easy to self restrict ECB's capability when so many legitimate but conflicting objectives objectives are requested from you. But in so doing, you will be cementing ECB's independence, which is Europe's most valuable asset. Thank you very much.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Thank you. Thank you chair. Thank you, Mrs. Buch. As you well know both well, the Draghi letter and also the news reports all acknowledge the key contributions of financial stability and a global level playing field to address the EU competitiveness challenge. However, it is also true that they all point out to the prudential regulatory framework and its supervisory implementation, as you have mentioned, as a potential obstacle for EU competitiveness. Similar claims have been made as to its impact on house affordability due to tighter funding conditions to home developers limiting home supply. In this regard, I would like to know your opinion about some specific proposals contained in said Instead reports first, the idea of having all significant institutions under a so-called fully harmonized 28th regime, encompassing not only supervision activities, but also crisis management and deposit insurance as a way to increase market integration. Second, the idea of establishing a pan European securitization platform that will help to transfer banks long term mortgage risks, thus creating more room for new mortgage and corporate lending origination. Additionally, I would like to know what role do you see for cross-border consolidation as a means to increase banks competitiveness and shock absorption capacity? And finally, if I may, how much would you would, in your opinion, the completion of the banking union contribute to a reduction of the compliance and regulatory burden for banks, especially those competing globally? Thank you.”
  European Banking Union
• “Thank you, thank you very much. Two questions to both Missus Leroy and Mister Mazza Ferro. The first one is what can be done from a regulatory or a legislative standpoint to accelerate financial asset tokenization to reap all the cost reduction and all the efficiencies but going beyond pilot projects basically to reach it at real scale that is commensurate to the size of European financial markets. So what's your assessment of the current Commission proposals in this regard? The second one is precisely on the issue that has been prompted about tokenized deposits but in a wholesale environment. I'm not talking about the retail part. So it seems to me that it's obvious that in markets we need two to tango. So we need the securities leg and we need the cash leg both to be native in DLT technology. It's apparent that the securities leg is going faster and on the cash leg clearly private solutions are going much faster than wholesale CBDCs. So first what is this? And second, within this private layer, why is it that ad hoc lightly regulated stablecoins are superior to wholesale tokenized deposits or tokenized money market funds participation? I fail to see why is this a superior once both are in DLT native, why having this lighter instrument of cash is superior. We have seen it can go even in benign macro financial scenarios to be thirty five percent below par.”
  Use of stablecoins
• “The third question is more specifically on the topic you've presented with. Is it the interaction with pillar two? First of all, just to know whether this is intended or unintended. So I take from your presentation. Yes. This is one of the consequences of the pillar. Two is to reduce the effectiveness of incentives to innovation and investment in general. Okay, fine. So not very desirable feature. Is this intended or unintended. Because then you have a presentation on optimality of different design and and some of the explanations why some features are more optimal than others is conditional. As long as we have pillar two Then this is optimal. But my question goes again one step back. Okay, let's imagine we don't have pillar two. That's the conclusion. Still the same or not. Because if we are just selecting one instrument versus another, just because we have pillar two, then maybe we are getting other to additional suboptimality results from our societal perspective. And the final question is more practical. It's okay. One of the. Objectives of the next generation EU funds is to have more investment in certain areas of the economy associated with some of the transitions we are facing in Europe. Um, and we have national recovery and resilience plans. Do you have an assessment on on the different national plans, how they've been reliant in tax incentives versus subsidies? So it relates to the first question which one is more effective. And whether in those that have decided to make extensive use of. Of tax incentives, whether the design was appropriate or or not. Thank you.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU
• “Thank you, Chair. I have a couple of questions, the first one primarily to Mister Bradley and is referring to what is missing from the Commission proposal and apparently it's now being discussed at some informal level at the Council level, which is the potential for increasing the market size coming from securitization platforms. So in some form of standardization that may bring size through standardization to this market, especially into the mortgage realm. This is something most jurisdictions in the world do except Europe. So I would like to know what's the potential you see from that. The second question goes mostly to Mister Mazzaferro, which is on this macro potential holistic view and it has been touted before by Mister Hubert on this growth of private debt. I think it's not unrelated securitization being uneconomical, difficult because there are investors that want to have an exposure to certain type of risk, and instead of having the natural system that banks originate and these investors invest, we are now in a much worse situation with these investors originate and are funded by banks. Honestly, from a holistic perspective, I think from your perspective I would like to hear what is your assessment of this, let's say, counterintuitive state of affairs, and I think releasing, making securitization easier may bring the world to a much fairer state of affairs. Thank you.”
  Financial regulation
• “Thank you chair. Thank you, Mr. Camilleri, for coming to to this House. I would like to concentrate on the first part of your presentation to basically on recurrent topics, in particular related to the statutory independence of National Statistical Institute. It's and I'm quoting your own report, you mentioned that one of the unresolved risks is statutory independence that remains insufficiently guaranteed, and you ask for a change in regulation, in particular in regulation 2 to 3. You've just mentioned and I think and this is just my personal assessment, this call for action is urgent for me. The last straw was here two weeks ago. I think, uh, former vice president of the Spanish government and now president of EIB, proudly, uh, was very proud of what she did commingling with the statistical methods of the National Statistical Institute in Spain that prompted the resignation of its chair. So my question is, do you consistently urging a changing of this regulation? My question is, why do you think there is a need for change in regulation and not just for the enforcement of it? In particular, article five A that already prohibits. So why do you think it's regulation and not enforcement? And in case it's it's change of regulation. What are you specifically recommending to change to make these interferences not just unthinkable but impossible. And thank you very much.”
  Rule of law in Spain
• “(14:47:11 – 14:48:29): Thank you very much, Madam Chair, Vice Chair. Welcome again for the last time at this committee. And today, I'd like to express gratitude. Gratitude for the interaction all of these years. Thank you very much for your accountability. And speaking as an individual here, thank you. Allow me to thank you for the work that you've done on the governing body all of these years. Because as you've talked about, the European economy is facing major challenges at the moment, and the final result has been that there has been a process of inflation, but it has been managed in the best possible way with large major economic challenges and then also return to price stability. And we haven't fallen into complacency, I'm pleased to say. We've learned lessons from all of these episodes with the revision of the monetary policy as you've mentioned. So I wanted to ask you about this. What are these lessons that you've learned from previous episodes of inflation, which are particularly useful now and will allow us to improve our responses in the future to deal with inflation developments on the markets at the moment? Thank you.”
  ECB monetary policy
• “Thank you chair. And thank you, Mr. Bailey, for for coming to to this committee. I had originally three questions. Let me try in one minute. First one is a highly political. So how is international cooperation really working in the domain of financial stability? Are we still better off than in the trade domain? And please, if you can distinguish what happens at the surveillance level that what I've seen from your report, it's still working okay globally. But what about political action and implementation of measures? First one, second one. It's on on what you mentioned about that. To large extent, the growth of NFI was by design. Okay. The interconnectedness. So don't you think with maybe we've gone too far in that because, uh, I mean, now we've seen the stress test is real. It's not just a theoretical thinking with the with the private credit. Uh, don't you think that not allowing banks to fund longer term has been a problem that has fueled too much private credit with the cost of reduction of, uh, um, lending standards, which I think is the key for financial stability or at least one of the keys. And the third one is, uh, stablecoins again. And what is money specifically? I'm talking about settling financial transactions. So not for making transfers peer to peer, but settlement asset for financial transactions. Don't you think that the core element for such an instrument to be a settlement asset is to have access to central bank liquidity, because it's either issued by the central bank or indirectly has access to central bank liquidity. For me, it's hard to to find a money that functions as money without that characteristic. Thank you. Tell me.”
  Use of stablecoins
• “I'll speak in Spanish. Um. Thank you very much. Cheers, Commissioner. I'd like to start. By thanking you. Thank you for your hard work. And thank you, too, for having enabled us to avoid something which happened in Spain, which involved efforts to try to to set aside independence when it came to the pensions reform. And that's something which is now to be rectified by the Spanish government. So many thanks for your hard work. And please transmit that to the other vice president. It's important that we remain vigilant over and beyond questions of reform. The underlying issue pertains the European taxpayers money has been used to validate a pension, pension reform, which is rather than improving sustainable durability as has damaged it. So the authorities have predicted a growth in pension for 3.3% of GDP between now and 1950 20, 53% more than the estimates from just two years ago. The fact is, in Spain, when it comes to sustainability of the pension system, it's like talking about the sustainability of public accounts and finances. We're talking about a further increase of public debt, more than 27% of GDP by 2050. That's that costs more than the pandemic cost us. So, ladies and gentlemen, this is more than just a national question. This under undermines the credibility of the fund's next generation EU. Uh, could have been a success, but the fact is, in Spain, those funds actually undermine the sustainability of public accounts and finances. In the face of this ongoing issue, we'll have to accept the fact that we won't have indicators or models which will enable us to show that there has been a success. The fact is, European money should be used to reform our economies, but not to block reforms. So what we would like to know is what measures the Commission intends to act both as part of the recovery plan and the European Semester.”
  EU policy on aging workforce and pensions
• “Thank you, chair, and thank you for, for for the speakers. A fairly general comment. First, I don't know how we ended up talking or discussing about again and again on tax avoidance and profit shifting. Sorry, this was not the subject, at least I think in my view. As for today debt equity bias, in my mind it has more to do with incentives to innovate, to create, to grow. I mean, that's the topic as of today, more than although there might be an angle of of profit shifting eventually, but it's just a minor thing that's not the subject. So let me go back to what I consider to be the core of the subject. So I've heard Professor Devereaux mentioning an impact of 5 to 10 percentage points in terms of the balancing from the optimal decision between equity and debt. But my question is, given the experience, even within Europe, I think we have in the European Union, we have five countries that have established some sort of adjustments in there. They are different each way. If the if, if the counterbalancing effects of these tax measures is enough to counterbalance fully this this the original imbalance of 5 to 10 percentage points. So first of all, if measures work okay in the in the in the scale, they are they are designed. The second one is on, on the cap of the equity allowance on these 30% of EBITDA. And the idea that you have you cannot have a negative fiscal effect. So you have to carry forward any, any allowance. Don't you think that it will increase substantially the impact of any measure if this can be a refundable tax credit? And the third one is in terms of complexity that you mentioned. Is it feasible to do this corrections in an efficient way that we are not creating extra complexity? So because we are trying to do some simplification at the same time. So these are my three points. Thank you very much.”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU