Jorge MARTÍN FRÍAS

Policy topics Jorge MARTÍN FRÍAS is active on

What Jorge MARTÍN FRÍAS has said (46)

• 2026-02-16 “E-000661/2026 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission invites the Honourable Member to consult the Financial Transparency System (FTS) 1 . The portal makes available to the public information on recipients of funds financed from the EU budget and implemented directly by the Commission (at Headquarters or in EU delegations to non-EU countries) and other EU bodies such as executive agencies ('direct management') or implemented indirectly by other international organisations or nonEU countries ('indirect management'), and beneficiaries of the European Development Fund 2 . A search for ‘Code Pink’ in the name of the beneficiary filter on the FTS produces no result. Please note that data for the year 2025 is not included, as it is expected to be published in June 2026. Code Pink is not registered in the Transparency register 3 . Therefore, there is no publicly available information about its participation in meetings, membership in expert groups or public consultations to which it may have contributed. The Commission requires registration of interest representatives in the Transparency register for their appointment to Commission expert groups or for meeting Members of the Commission, their members or Cabinet and/or Commission staff holding management functions. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html. The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1–222), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, data on recipients is not disclosed for very low value contracts below EUR 15 000 and where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the persons or entities. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-development-fund-edf.html. 3 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en.”
  EU-US relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2026-02-04 “E-000458/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The allegations of the U.S. House Judiciary Committee are unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 brings unprecedented transparency in relation to and accountability of online platforms. The DSA does not prescribe which content is illegal; this is determined by national law or other EU laws. It protects freedom of expression and entitles users to explanations and redress if their content is removed. From July to December 2025, of 3.4+ billion content removals, most breached terms of service, while others involved unsafe products, scams, illegal hate speech, violence, or Internet Protocol violations 2 . The Commission's guidelines and codes of conduct support providers of online platforms with DSA compliance; these are entirely voluntary. Platforms choose mitigation measures; codes are one option among many, designed by platforms themselves. Engaging with platforms on how their systems operate across different jurisdictions is a normal and necessary part of regulatory oversight. Trusted flaggers operate exclusively in specific areas of expertise (e.g., protection of minors’ violations or intellectual property infringements) where they can submit notices related to illegal content. These notices are not legally binding; just like any notice of any other user, they serve solely as alerts to platforms, which must conduct their own independent assessment of the content’s legality before acting. The trusted flagger status is awarded by the independent Digital Services Coordinators of Member States following strict criteria set by the DSA and subject to various safeguards, such as objectivity, quality and transparency requirements, and the revocation of the trusted flagger status in case of misuse. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://transparency.dsa.ec.europa.eu/dashboard.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-01-23 “E-000266/2026 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission implements rigorous safeguards to ensure that no persons or entities receive EU funding if these are subject to EU sanctions or are involved in any criminal or unethical practices, including terrorist financing and offences. These safeguards include ex ante and ex post risk assessment, monitoring and strong controls and audits. These include verification of eligibility of the request for payment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), screening of beneficiaries against international and ad hoc sanctions lists ahead of disbursement and auditing 100% of the payments executed by the PA. The European Court of Auditors certified the control and safeguard system of the PalestinianEuropean Socio-Economic Management and Assistance Mechanism (PEGASE) as ‘robust’. No evidence has been found to date that money has been diverted for unintended purposes, as reaffirmed during the financial review of EU assistance in Palestine that took place in November 2023. Following Hamas’ terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023, the EU carried out a thorough review of EU financial assistance 1 for Palestine 2 , including programmes implemented by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). The review showed that the Commission’s controls and existing safeguards in place work well, and no evidence has been found to date that money has been misused or diverted for unintended purposes. UNRWA is a pillar-assessed UN Agency and has been subject to a complementary pillar assessment in 2022. In the last years, the Commission has also been working closely with UNRWA to enhance the neutrality processes and controls systems in the Agency, among others by financing, in 2024, a project to reinforce the Department of Internal Oversight Services and Ethics Department. Furthermore, the Commission is also a member of the Working Group on Neutrality and Integrity Issues which aims, among others, at advising and supporting UNRWA in the implementation of the Colonna Report Recommendations 3 . 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/communication-commission-review-ongoing-financial-assistancepalestine_en. 2 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of EU Member States on this issue. 3 https://www.un.org/unispal/document/colonna-report-and-unrwas-high-level-action-plan-for-implementationof-the-recommendations/.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question As the Commission pointed in its reply to Written Question E-001287/2025, ‘over the last decade, the EU has supported the justice sector, transparency mechanisms and the fight against corruption, electoral reforms, deployed four Election Observation Missions, and supported strengthening the national human rights protection system in Honduras (e.g. Proderechos programme [1] )’. The criteria for the distribution of financial resources under the Multiannual Indicative Programme [2] (MIP) are based on a thorough assessment of local needs, alignment with national development priorities, contributions from other cooperation partners, evaluations of previous actions, and the strategic interests of the EU and its Member States. While 20.7% of the total funding is directly allocated to strengthening the rule of law, this priority is integrated across other sectors, including public finance management, social dialogue for employment and forest governance. These areas contribute to the broader objective of promoting good governance and addressing systemic issues such as corruption, impunity, and institutional weaknesses. The EU also recognises the interconnectedness of challenges in Honduras, including the impact of climate change on fundamental rights. As such, 45% of the MIP funding is dedicated to climate policies, which are essential for safeguarding livelihoods, dignity and security, and addressing the root causes of vulnerability in the region. This holistic approach ensures that the EU’s support is both targeted and responsive to the complex realities on the ground, while maintaining a strong focus on the rule of law as a cross-cutting priority. [1] Programme Proderechos Honduras, https://www.proderechos.hn/. [2] can be found at https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/honduras_en under ‘related documents’.”
  Global priorities for international development · EU climate aid for global South
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission 26.3.2026 Written question Colombia's Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) for 2021-2027 [1] funds diverse projects aligned with the two identified priorities for the country: peace and environment. Three annual action plans (AAPs) for years 2022, 2023 and 2024 have been defined under this programme and are publicly available on the Commission website. Details about the objectives, scope and beneficiaries of these plans can be found on the enclosed links [2] . No AAP was adopted to date under the 2025-2027 MIP allocation. The Commission ensures proper use of funds through audits, monitoring, reporting, and control systems, ensuring transparency and accountability. Fraud prevention measures, such as hotlines and investigative units, further safeguard funds. When the Commission becomes aware of any suspected cases of fraud, corruption, or other illegal activities affecting the EU budget, it informs the European Anti-Fraud Office and, where applicable, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. At the moment there are no suspicions of illicit use of funds in Colombia’s initiatives. [1] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/247ac3ef-31b6-4b41-8278-4a112c456039_en?filename=mip-2021-c2021-8995-colombia-annex_en.pdf. [2] AAP2022 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a5854a1d-d602-4df5-a1bd-3f2aab182bd7_en?filename=aap-2022-c2022-9751-colombia_en.zip. AAP2023 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a941e2ea-42d2-4d9a-9e75-3acf209270a5_en?filename=aap-2023-c2023-3233-colombia_en.zip. AAP2024 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2f2db8eb-492e-4e6a-a623-8b415b827127_en?filename=aap-2024-c2024-5643-colombia_en.zip.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission 30.4.2026 Written question The 2025-2027 allocation to Nicaragua, including the streamlined focus on the ‘sustainable economic growth’ priority, reflects the outcome of the Mid-Term Review process [1] . The review established 2025-2027 allocations based on several elements, including evolving global EU priorities, the absorption capacity and the operating environment of the countries, and the broader context of international partnerships with the EU. From January 2021 to January 2026, EUR 22.9 million have been disbursed. [1] https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2e2834f5-5ab9-4f07-a5f7-e7b32d6b6480_en?filename=ad-mip-2024-c2024-7502-americas-caribbean-annex_en.pdf.”
  Global priorities for international development · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question EU humanitarian funding aims to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable Venezuelans inside the country and in host countries across the region. It also supports disaster preparedness. EU-funded projects provide protection, health, nutrition and education in emergencies. The most vulnerable Venezuelans hosted in the region receive emergency medical services, food assistance, legal information, protection, education in emergencies and shelter. Targeting is based on identified needs. All EU-funded humanitarian actions are subject to a strict legal, financial, operational and audit framework to ensure that the assistance reaches those most in need in line with the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. None of these funds are channelled, directly or indirectly, through governments. EU humanitarian assistance is delivered through UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement and accredited international non-governmental organisations vetted by the EU, operating under UN coordination within the UN Humanitarian Response Plan and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-managed Venezuela Humanitarian Fund. The EU exercises rigorous oversight and requires full accountability from implementing partners, including adherence to strict ethical and professional standards. To this end, the EU performs systematic ex ante due diligence and risk assessments, regular monitoring and audits of management and control systems. Where misuse of EU funds is identified, the funds are either not paid or recovered, and the partner may be rendered ineligible for future EU financing.”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · EU-Venezuela relations
• 2025-10-13 “E-004005/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The definition of gold bullion of Article 4(1)(60a) of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) 1 makes clear that not all kinds and forms of gold can receive the 0% preferential riskweight and be used as collateral for prudential purposes. Only physical gold with uniform purity and mass such as gold bars, ingots, and coins to be treated as a commodity meets the CRR definition, because its standardisation and, consequently, fungibility makes it easily and speedily valued and traded on the market (also in bulk and without physical delivery through gold certificates), thereby reducing its risk profile. As gold jewellery is not subject to uniform purity and mass standards across the globe that would make it valued and accepted as a commodity, it is not generally traded in the bullion market and, accordingly, it does not meet the definition of Article 4(1)(60a) of the CRR. The fact that the gold contained in jewellery can be extracted and transformed in e.g. gold bars is not sufficient because it would still need to go through refining during the melting process to meet the standard purity and mass necessary to be considered as a commodity and thus be traded on the bullion market. Such a prudential treatment does not hinder the ability of the borrowers to pledge gold jewellery according to the applicable property law. However, such a pledge will not allow the lending bank to reduce its prudential capital requirements according to Articles 134(4), 197(1)(g), 207(1-4) of the CRR. 1 OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, pp. 1–337.”
  Financial regulation
• 2025-10-01 “E-003809/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of allegations of forced labour in Cuba. The EU Forced Labour Regulation 1 prohibits the placing on the EU market of all products made with forced labour irrespective of their origin. From its entry into application in December 2027, the Commission and the Member States’ competent authorities will be able to investigate the presence of forced labour in the manufacturing of products sold on the EU market and ban the products concerned when sufficient evidence is found. Member States’ authorities will enforce the prohibition to ensure that banned products do not enter and are withdrawn from the EU market and disposed of. The Commission will support the implementation of the Regulation through dedicated guidelines for economic operators and competent authorities, and a public database of forced labour risks in specific geographic areas or with respect to specific products. The Commission also advances the implementation of international standards on forced labour through other measures and policies outlined in the Commission’s Communication on Decent Work Worldwide 2 , including through mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence of large companies under the Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence 3 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 (OJ L, 2024/3015, 12.12.2024), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3015/oj/eng. 2 Communication on decent work worldwide for a global just transition and a sustainable recovery, COM(2022) 66 final; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022DC0066. 3 Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1760/oj/eng.”
  EU-Cuba relations
• 2025-09-03 “E-003398/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU will continue to support Colombia in the common fight against drugs trafficking and organised crime. Colombia’s active participation in EU-funded programmes and its close cooperation with agencies like the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL) and the European Drugs Agency are of enormous value for the safety of Europe. Inter alia, this collaboration enhances the capacities of security forces of both sides and facilitates police and judicial cooperation in the pursuit of criminals and terrorists. Examples of successes include the shutdown of Kidflix, one of world’s largest paedophile platforms, and the seizure of 1 400 tons of drugs by operation Orion. Given the threat posed by organised crime, the EU will intensify its police and judicial cooperation with Colombia. The EU and Colombia aim to further improve the exchange of information between EUROPOL and Colombia, intensify cooperation in areas such as seizures at sea, trafficking of weapons, and the execution of mutual legal assistance and extradition requests. The EU and Colombia are also negotiating a new agreement on judicial cooperation with European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation. The EU will also continue to support Colombian peace efforts, in recognition of the inextricable link between the pursuit of peace and the fight against crime in Colombia. Regular monitoring, such as reports, evaluations and data collection efforts, ensure accountability of EU funds.”
  EU-Venezuela relations · EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2025-09-01 “E-003349/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission EU funds are not transmitted to the Cuban authorities. Over the past five years (2021-2025), 29 contracts have been signed for a total amount of EUR 94 897 243, through contribution agreements and grant contracts. Under the Directorate-General for International Partnerships, 18 contracts were signed with the following partners: (i) contribution agreements with Pan American Health Organization (EUR 1 875 000), United Nations Development Programme (EUR 34 827 700), Agence Française de Développement (EUR 18 389 300), Fundación para la Internacionalización de las Administraciones Públicas and e-Governance Academy (EUR 8 500 000), Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (EUR 12 400 000), Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (EUR 1 050 000), United Nations and Member State agencies (EUR 2 570 000) for Euroclima projects; (ii) Grant contracts (EUR 4 656 336) with European civil society organisations, selected through competitive calls for proposals. Under the EU humanitarian aid instrument, 11 contracts were signed and are implemented by United Nations agencies and European civil society organisations (EUR 10 628 907). As with all EU cooperation programmes worldwide, a system of reporting, monitoring, controls and audits is in place to ensure that funds are spent in accordance with Financial Rules and Regulations 1 . If that is not the case, a procedure is put in place to recover ineligible expenditures. As of today, the Commission has not received any audit report indicating fraud, corruption or other illegal activity related to the abovementioned projects. 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj/eng.”
  EU-Cuba relations
• 2025-08-25 “E-003288/2025 Reply The listing of a person, group or entity under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP has to satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 1(2) to (4) thereof, which provides a definition of persons, groups and entities ‘involved in terrorist acts’ as well as of ‘terrorist acts’ for this purpose, and which specifies the requirements related to the adoption of a decision by a national competent authority in respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned. Currently, there are 13 individuals and 22 groups and entities on the so-called ‘EU terrorist list’, which are both active within and outside the EU. The Council reviews the list at regular intervals and at least every 12 months. The Council has not discussed the inclusion of drug cartels on the list of persons, groups and entities covered by the measures in Articles 2 and 3 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, nor the issue raised by the Honourable Member in question two. The EU drugs policy priorities are set out in the EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025 1 . It takes an evidence-based, integrated, balanced and multidisciplinary approach to the drugs phenomenon at national, EU and international level. The Strategy covers three policy areas: drug supply reduction including enhancing security; drug demand reduction including prevention, treatment and care services; and addressing drug-related harm. It also incorporates a gender equality and health equity perspective, and complements national policies. The new EU strategic framework on drugs, which will replace the current EU Drugs Strategy, is currently under preparation in close cooperation between the Council and the Commission. 1 EU Drugs Strategy (2021-2025) (OJ C 102I of 24.3.2021, p. 1)”
  EU-US relations · EU-Cuba relations · EU-Venezuela relations
• 2025-07-03 “E-002724/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission 1.The definition of ‘raw material’ used in the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) does not include materials mainly used as combustion fuels. Nuclear materials (i.e. ores, source materials and special fissile materials) 1 , come under the nuclear common supply policy 2 , which is an exclusive competence of the European Atomic Energy Community. This competence is executed by the Euratom Supply Agency, under the supervision of the Commission, for nuclear materials for all civilian uses and all EU users. Therefore, nuclear materials have not been included in the scope of the CRMA. 2. While the Commission may, according to the Euratom Treaty 3 , issue recommendations with a view to the development of prospecting for and exploitation of mineral deposits, the Euratom Treaty and the related secondary legislation do not establish obligations for Member States to engage in the mining of or exploration for radioactive minerals 4 . At the same time, Member States have the right according to Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to determine the conditions for exploiting their energy resources, their choice between different energy sources and the general structure of their energy supply. In this context, it is up to Spain to decide whether to prohibit the exploration and mining of radioactive minerals under its national legislation. 3. Ensuring access to critical raw materials is essential for the EU’s energy transition and strategic autonomy. The Commission therefore supports close coordination and informationsharing between Member States to help build a shared understanding of future supply needs and opportunities. 1 Article 197 of the Euratom Treaty and Euratom Regulation No 9 of 2 February 1960. 2 Title II, Chapter 6 of the Euratom Treaty. 3 Article 70, paragraph 2. 4 According to Article 70, paragraph 3 of the Euratom Treaty, Member States shall submit annually to the Commission a report on the development of prospecting and production, on probable reserves and on investment in mining which has been made or is planned in their territories.”
  Nuclear energy · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-06-23 “E-002499/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission In the last 20 years, six projects implemented by Mexican civil society organisations have received European financial support through global and local calls for proposals to implement environmental protection projects in Mexico for a total amount of about EUR 3 million. The organisations are: Oxfam México (two), Foro para el Desarrollo Sustentable, Espacios Naturales y Desarrollo Sustentable, Socios-México/Centro de Colaboración Cívica and Amigos de Sian Ka’An. The objectives and eligibility criteria for actions are established in the guidelines for grant applicants for each call for proposals according to the EU Financial Regulation 1 and based on EU policy initiatives which also cover green aspects such as the European Green Deal or the Global Gateway strategy. In 2022, for example, a call for proposals aimed at strengthening the capacity of civil society to participate in the fulfilment of Mexico's nationally determined contributions. Detailed information on the calls and funded actions is available on the Commission’s website 2 . Security and justice are a key element of the EU-Mexico partnership. Through regional programme such as EL PACCTO 2.0 3 , the EU closely works with Mexican law enforcement and judiciary authorities in the fight against organised crime and to prevent violence. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202402509. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/programmes/relex (Ref. EuropeAid/174721/DD/ACT/MX). 3 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/programmes/el-paccto-20_en.”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality) · EU climate aid for global South
• 2025-06-23 “E-002500/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU, through its Delegation in Mexico, closely followed the recent judicial elections and maintained regular contact with Mexican authorities and other stakeholders throughout the process. Both domestic stakeholders and international observers raised some concerns about the low voter turnout and the complexity of the process. However, despite operating with a limited budget and under time constraints, the Mexican National Electoral Institute (INE) conducted the elections in an orderly manner. According to official data 1 , electoral authorities have so far received approximately 300 complaints, with decisions still pending as the deadline for submitting claims is 28 August 2025. The EU fully respects Mexico's sovereign right to determine its judicial system. In its dialogue with Mexican counterparts, the EU has emphasised that an efficient, impartial, and independent judiciary is a cornerstone of the rule of law in any democracy. It also plays an important role in fostering a favourable environment for business, investment, and in guaranteeing legal certainty. Democracy and the rule of law are shared fundamental values underpinning the EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership 2 and the EU-Mexico Global Cooperation Agreement 3 in force since 2000. These principles are also central to the Modernised Global Agreement, whose signature and conclusion remain a priority for the EU. The new agreement aims to deepen cooperation, better address common challenges, and broaden both political and economic ties. The EU remains committed to working with and supporting Mexico in promoting democracy, strengthening the rule of law, and tackling security issues, including the fight against organised crime. 1 https://www.te.gob.mx/eleccion_2025/. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0447. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r14011.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2025-06-10 “E-002323/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the EU engages in digital cooperation through the EU-LAC Digital Alliance 1 , which includes Mexico, and which facilitates investments fostering the digital transition in the framework of the Global Gateway Investment Agenda. The Digital Alliance represents a bi-regional political framework that brings together signatories that share values and a common human-centric vision of the digital economy and society in which the design, development, governance, and use of technology are guided by universal human rights and fundamental freedoms. This vision encompasses the rule of law and democratic principles, transparency and accountability, high levels of cybersecurity and the protection of privacy and personal data, as well as solidarity, inclusion, security and environmental sustainability. The recently adopted EU’s International Digital Strategy 2 focuses on shaping global digital governance and standards through a values-based approach to foster a global digital transformation that is human-centric, trustworthy, and respects human rights and fundamental freedoms. The human-rights-based approach is also enshrined under Article 8 of the Regulation establishing the EU’s Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe 3 . The EU’s support to digital transformation therefore comes with strong safeguards to protect human rights, including freedom of expression and access to information. The Commission’s funding decisions under instruments such as NDICI – Global Europe, include a clause to suspend assistance if funds risk supporting censorship or rights violations 4 . The EU will keep seeking cooperation with countries sharing common goals and principles. 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/eu-latin-america-and-caribbean-digitalalliance_en. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/international-digital-strategy. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0947#enc_1. 4 Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, p.7, (40): https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj/eng.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-06-03 “E-002210/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The contribution of EUR 900 million in a Team Europe approach (EU, Member States, European Investment Bank) for Global Gateway projects was announced by the President of the Commission in December 2023 1 . The funding will support four Global Gateway initiatives on green deal, connectivity, health and education 2 . This support won’t be directly or indirectly linked to the mining sector. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Rwanda on 19 February 2024 3 , formalises the shared intention to support sustainable and responsible sourcing, production and processing of raw materials. The goal is to increase traceability and transparency and reinforce the fight against illegal trafficking of minerals, in line with the EU Great Lakes Strategy 4 . Notably, the MoU supports Rwanda’s engagement with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 5 . There is no evidence that the MoU has in any way contributed to financing or legitimising the March 23 Movement (M23) armed group or aggravating human right violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The EU has transposed United Nations (UN) restrictive measures against M23 and has adopted a series of autonomous measures targeting several of its senior leaders, including recently 6 .The EU has been supportive of the UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission established to investigate the serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law committed in North Kivu and South Kivu since January 2022. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6724. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/rwanda/global-gateway-rwanda_en?s=115. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/58035. 4 Council Conclusions of 20 February 2023, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6631-2023INIT/en/pdf. 5 https://eiti.org/. 6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/17/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-eulists-further-nine-individuals-and-one-entity/.”
  EU engagement with Christian communities inside and outside the EU · EU-Congo (DRC) relations · EU-Rwanda relations
• 2025-05-20 “E-002010/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The internal organisation and practices of the Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria (AEAT) are matters that fall within the scope of national competence. The Commission can neither replace the Member States when it comes to drawing up their national tax inspection plans nor determine the internal organisation and practices of the national tax authorities. Notwithstanding the above, in the last years, the Commission has been active in facilitating and ensuring the implementation of EU tax law by the national tax administrations through TADEUS, the Tax Administration European Union Summit. TADEUS is a forum that brings together heads and deputy heads of EU countries’ tax administrations and the Commission, to improve administrative cooperation within the EU and to meet common challenges 1 . As regards the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter), the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter are applicable only in situations falling within the scope of EU law 2 . Since the general organisation and functioning of the AEAT are questions of national competence, the Charter is not applicable. In the present case, it is thus for the concerned Member State to ensure that fundamental rights are effectively respected and protected in accordance with its national law and international obligations. 1 https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation/tax-transparency-cooperation_en. 2 See, Article 51(1) of the Charter and, for instance, judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, paragraph 21.”
  Rule of law in Spain
• 2025-04-23 “E-001637/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU may decide to call for the application of the democratic clause under Article 85 of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement 1 when this move will be deemed pertinent. At this stage, as reiterated on many occasions, including in the framework of several debates at the European Parliament, the EU considers that a critical engagement under the Agreement provides higher chances to address divergences with Cuba, as well as to promote EU values, to defend EU interests, and to encourage and accompany the necessary reforms in the island. 2. EU funds are not transmitted to the Cuban authorities. Funds related to EU-funded projects in Cuba are sent to and implemented by United Nations’ agencies, Member States’ agencies and EU non-governmental organisations (implementing partners). As with all EU cooperation projects worldwide, a variety of tools are used to ensure the proper execution of EU-funded projects in Cuba. Each project budget is thoroughly analysed before the signature of the corresponding contract, and regular reports are provided by the implementing partners. Regular meetings, monitoring missions and external evaluations are carried out to verify the progress and achievement of objectives. In addition, a system of controls and audits is in place to ensure that funds are spent in accordance with the activities and conditions set out in the contract. When the Commission becomes aware of any suspected cases of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the EU budget, it informs the European Anti-Fraud Office. 1 Council Decision 2016/2232, OJ L337 I, 13 December 2016.”
  EU-Cuba relations
• 2025-03-27 “E-001287/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has supported the justice sector, transparency mechanisms, the fight against corruption, electoral reforms, strengthening the national human rights protection system (e.g. ProDerechos 1 ) and deployed consecutive election observation missions (EOMs). EU humanitarian assistance, focusing on people displaced, disaster preparedness and food insecurity, is channelled through international non-governmental organisations and United Nations agencies implementing projects. The EU remains ready to support a positive national reform agenda prioritising inclusive and sustainable development. Strengthening governance, rule of law, fighting corruption and protecting human rights are paramount. The Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027 2 (EUR 163 million) focuses on three priorities (sustainable management of natural resources and climate change; employment, decent work and sustainable growth; rule of law, democratic governance) and allows to maintain applicable oversight mechanisms to ensure funds are directed towards abovementioned objectives. Following the primary elections in March 2025, the EU clearly expressed support for the National Electoral Council, a key institution for the organisation of the general elections on 30 November 2025, and called on all state institutions to support its work as stipulated by the Honduran Constitution 3 . In response to the invitation by Honduras to observe the upcoming elections, the EU will deploy an election exploratory mission six to four months before the elections. This mission will evaluate whether deployment of an EU EOM is advisable, useful and feasible. On that basis, the High Representative/Vice-President will decide on the deployment of an EOM. 1 Programme ProDerechos Honduras, https://www.proderechos.hn/. 2 Multi-annual Indiciative Programme Programme for Honduras 2021-2027, https://internationalpartnerships.ec.europa.eu/countries/honduras_en. 3 Declaración Local de la Unión Europea en Honduras, 24 March 2025, https://x.com/EUambHN/status/1904281667289641435/photo/1.”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2025-02-11 “E-000632/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission Boosting EU cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in the fight against organised crime is a priority of the Commission 1 . It is also a priority of the EU cooperation with Mexico. The EU closely monitors Mexico’s security strategy and remains committed to supporting Mexico in security and drug trafficking efforts through programmes like the Europe Latin America Programme of Assistance against Transnational Organised Crime 2 and the Cooperation Program between Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU on drug policy 3 . The Commission ensures effective fund management through strict monitoring, evaluation, and financial controls, involving the Court of Auditors and the European Anti-Fraud Office. The EU applies a constructive engagement policy while safeguarding financial interests, using the early detection and exclusion system as per Article 138 of the Financial Regulation 4 . EU support in Mexico funds civil society organisations focused on democratic, social, and economic development. Assistance also extends to inclusive and green reforms via Member States and United Nations agencies, emphasising capacity building, best practice exchanges, and policy support. Key intervention areas include decent work, green transport, migration, health, public finance reform, in the framework of the Global Gateway strategy 5 . Civil society plays a crucial role in Mexico’s development, achieving successes in migration, human rights, transparency, and public accountability. This participatory approach strengthens reforms and the rule of law. The EU also actively cooperated with the United States and other partners in the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. 1 Action 15 of the Communication on the EU roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organised crime, COM(2023) 641 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0641 2 https://elpaccto.eu/en/ 3 https://copolad.eu/en/ 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202402509 5 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/globalgateway_en”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America · EU-US relations
• 2025-02-11 “E-000631/2025 Reply The Council has not discussed the possible inclusion of Mexican cartels on the list of persons, groups and entities covered by the measures in Article 2 and 3 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (‘CP 931’). The Council can, at any time, adopt a decision to add additional persons, groups, or entities to the abovementioned list, or to remove persons, groups or entities from that list. The listing of a person, group or entity under CP 931 must satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 1(2) to 1(4) of that Common Position, which, inter alia, provides a definition of ‘terrorist act’ and ‘persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts’ for this purpose. As regards the question on coordination with the United States on drug-related matters, EU-US cooperation on combatting transnational organised crime and drug trafficking is a central focus of the longstanding EU-US Dialogue on Justice and Home Affairs held at ministerial and senior official level twice a year. The EU and the United States also regularly hold an EU-US Dialogue on Drugs in order to exchange information, strengthen bilateral cooperation and enhance coordination of actions undertaken globally to address drug-related issues. The discussions in these meetings focus on reducing drug supply by enhancing security, reducing drug demand through prevention, treatment and care services, and addressing drug-related harm, in line with the EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025.”
  EU-US relations · EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2025-01-30 “E-000421/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission communicated transparently throughout the COVID-19 pandemic 1234 . Despite the unprecedented challenges posed by the pandemic, the joint response of the EU and Member States successfully led the EU out of the emergency. The EU set up NextGenerationEU 5 as a groundbreaking temporary recovery instrument to support Europe’s economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic and build a greener, more digital and more resilient future. Critical to the pandemic period was the achievement to make safe and effective vaccines available. The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that the vaccines saved at least 1.4 million lives in WHO European region 6 . The EU Digital COVID Certificate facilitated travel for millions of EU citizens and thirdcountry nationals. The Commission adopted three reports on its implementation, including an assessment of the impact on free movement within the EU, fundamental rights and nondiscrimination 7 . The setting up of green lanes for goods to continue cross borders allowed companies to continue business and supplies to reach consumers. Member States are responsible for the definition of their national health policy and the organisation of their health services and medical care. National governments therefore decided on specific measures based on each country’s epidemiological and social situation. The response measures taken by the EU and by the Member States to protect people from the virus had a major impact on preventing its spread. The measures taken to mitigate the impact could not prevent all costs in terms of human life and well-being. An impact on mental health was one of the consequences. Mental health fluctuated with the intensity of the pandemic and containment measures, with young people being particularly affected 8 . The comprehensive approach to mental health adopted in 2023 9 set out a variety of measures to address the issue. 1 Drawing the early lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic (COM/2021/380). 2 COVID-19 - Sustaining EU Preparedness and Response: Looking ahead (COM/2022/190). 3 EU response to COVID-19: preparing for autumn and winter 2023 (COM/2022/452). 4 See also the timeline here: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/coronavirus-response/timeline-euaction_en 5 Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 of 14 December 2020 establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis. 6 https://www.who.int/europe/news/item/16-01-2024-covid-19-vaccinations-have-saved-more-than-1.4-millionlives-in-the-who-european-region--a-new-study-finds 7 COM(2021) 649, COM(2022) 123, COM(2022) 753. 8 https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3f9d55be-9e36-43d9-99adb96ac63a5b9b_en?filename=2022_healthatglance_rep_en_0.pdf 9 COM(2023) 298 final.”
  Vaccination · Transparency of EU medicines governance process · Covid-19 vaccines procurement
• 2025-01-22 “E-000274/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the rulings issued by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2021 and 2022. The Court sovereignly interpreted a pre-existing legal reserve in the Spanish law giving the architects and technical architects the exclusive right to issue the building assessment reports. The main public interest reasons used by way of explanation by the Spanish Court were related to public safety, environmental protection and building preservation. EU Member States have the possibility to reserve certain activities to specific professions, provided that those reservations comply with the EU legislation. Following a complaint, the Commission carried out an assessment of the situation described in that complaint. That assessment did not permit to identify a violation of EU rules. The Commission is continuously monitoring the compliance of the Member States’ legislation with EU law using different tools. The reform recommendations for regulation in professional services published by the Commission in 2017 1 and 2021 2 covered the reserved activities of architects and engineers in Spain. More recently, in the context of the EU semester 2023 spring package, the benefit of reducing barriers for civil engineers was stressed in the Country report 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0820 2 SWD(2021) 185 - Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication on taking stock of and updating the reform recommendations for regulation in professional services of 2017. 3 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c2a417af-a656-4526-bec174977469dcad_en?filename=SWD_2023_609_1_EN_autre_document_travail_service_part1_v4.pdf”
  EU Single Market harmonisation
• 2025-01-10 “P-000082/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Since 2021, the beginning of the current Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission has provided support to five organisations (Agence France Presse; Agencia EFE SAU, S.M.E.; Asociación Maldita contra la Desinformación, Periodismo, Educación, Investigación y Datos en Nuevos Formatos; Associació Verificat; Newtral) that are relevant to the request of the Honourable Member, domiciled or headquartered in Spain and that meet the criteria to be considered fact-checking organisations according to the European Digital Media Observatory 1 . The information regarding EU funding is public 23 . As stated in the recent Commission Opinion on the assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation 4 , independent, impartial fact-checking can significantly contribute to identifying and addressing risks linked with the dissemination of disinformation, negative effects on civic discourse and electoral integrity while fully respecting freedom of expression, in line with the Digital Services Act’s 5 objective of creating a safer online space respectful of fundamental rights. The Commission does not interfere with the independence of fact-checking organisations; candidates are in fact required to demonstrate their independence when applying for funding. 1 https://edmo.eu/resources/repositories/fact-checking-organisations-in-the-eu/ 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home 3 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/ 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation 5 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-actpackage”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-11-27 “E-002686/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The fight against organised crime is a shared challenge and priority for the EU and Mexico. The EU closely follows the Mexican government’s new security strategy, As indicated in the reply to your question E-002382/2024 from 31 October 2024, the EU remains committed to cooperating with and supporting Mexico to address security and drug trafficking, notably through the programme of the EU with Latin America and the Caribbean against Transnational Organised Crime EL PACCTO 1 and the Cooperation Program between Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU on drug policy COPOLAD 2 . The EU makes use of the appropriate tools to ensure a sound management of EU funds at all stages of the project management cycle, notably through monitoring and evaluation. Reinforcing EU-Mexico cooperation in the fight against firearms trafficking is also a shared priority. The EU seeks to improve international cooperation of law enforcement services. The EU has been encouraging Mexico to increase its involvement in the operational actions of the European Multiplatform against criminal threats (EMPACT) firearms and of the network of Police Specialized in Arms Trafficking (red ARCO), which is part of the EU programme El PACCTO. Regarding allegations that a percentage of firearms seized in Mexico is originating from EU Member States, the Commission underlines that it has no access to the operations of exportation, as it is a national competence. EU law governing the export of firearms for civilian use 3 has safeguards to ensure legal transactions. The EU recently adopted a recast Regulation that introduces, inter alia, more safeguards such as the issue of a user statement regarding the final use, the need for a proof of receipt and the possibility to carry out post-shipment checks. 1 https://elpaccto.eu/en/ 2 https://copolad.eu/en/ 3 Regulation (EU) N° 258/2012.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2024-11-26 “E-002667/2024 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission As expressed in the Political Guidelines for the 2024-2029 mandate, the Commission has a clear focus on making business easier and faster in Europe. In this context each Commissioner, working with the Commissioner for implementation and simplification, will stress test the acquis and table proposals to contribute to reducing reporting obligations by at least 25% – and for small and medium enterprises at least 35%. In working towards the goals set for the reduction of reporting obligations, the Commission has taken a pragmatic approach, focusing first on delivering measures with a significant burden reduction potential in areas that stakeholders signal as most problematic. This work will now take an even stronger prominence. The statistical office of the EU is helping provide an approximation of the baseline from which the 25% and 35% goals will be calculated, using available data and the experience from the EU and other Member States. The Commission will be communicating on the baseline shortly. The Commission will continue monitoring these measures and reflect them in its annual reporting cycle. The objective of the exercise is to reduce administrative and reporting burden (including in the corporate sustainability legislation), have simpler implementation and better enforcement, while maintaining the EU’s high standards. As the Political Guidelines stress, the Commission will stay the course on the goals set out in the European Green Deal. The Commission must however make sure that these goals are achieved in the simplest, and most practical way. Working with all stakeholders, including through the new implementation dialogues and reality checks, the Commission will therefore identify potential simplification measures to reduce red tape and facilitate the achievement of the EU ambitions.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-31 “E-002382/2024 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The fight against organised crime is a shared priority for the EU and Mexico. The EU closely follows the Mexican government’s new security strategy and opportunities for further EUMexico cooperation in this field. The Commission remains committed to cooperating with and supporting Mexico to address security and drug trafficking, as it has been the case in the past years notably through the Europe Latin America Programme of Assistance against Transnational Organised Crime 1 and the Cooperation Program between Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU on drug policy 2 . In this framework, the EU supports police and judicial cooperation, the investigation of assets and strengthens the capacities of Ombudspersons. The Commission is also leveraging on the advanced capabilities of EU’s front-line Agencies (Europol and the EU Drugs Agency) and EU’s operational cooperation platforms (the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats 3 and the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics 4 ). Besides, the EU supports the work of the national commission on mental health and addictions of Mexico. The Commission makes use of all the tools at its disposal to ensure a sound management of EU funds at all stages of the project management cycle, notably through monitoring and evaluation. The Commission applies the EU policy of constructive engagement, while protecting the financial interests of the EU, notably through the use of the early detection and exclusion system. The Commission refers the Honourable Member to Article 138 of the Financial Regulation 5 , which sets out the exclusion grounds based on which an entity may be excluded from receiving EU funding for a limited period of time. 1 https://elpaccto.eu/en/ 2 https://copolad.eu/en/ 3 https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-statistics/empact 4 https://maoc.eu/ 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018R1046”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2024-10-29 “P-002294/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission Given the essential role of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which provides crucial support to the civilian population in Gaza and the wider region, as confirmed by the European Council in December 2024 1 , the EU expressed grave concern about the serious allegations made on 24 January 2024 on the possible involvement of some UNRWA staff in the unprecedented 7 October 2023 attacks, which the EU condemned in the strongest possible terms. The Commission has been in constant contact with UNRWA at the highest levels. As a result, UNRWA committed, notably in the context of the signature of the EU-UNRWA contribution agreement to implement the actions requested in the 29 January 2024 Commission statement 2 : (i) to allow an audit to be conducted by EU-appointed independent external experts; (ii) to strengthen its Department of Internal Investigations; and (iii) to carry out a review of all UNRWA staff to confirm that they did not participate in the attacks. Following the fulfilment by UNRWA of all the conditions agreed for the 2024 EU funding, the Commission disbursed in three tranches a total of EUR 82 million, and an additional topup of EUR 10 million in December 2024 3 . This came in addition to the EUR 48.5 million of EU humanitarian funding in 2024. The Commission is committed to continuing its support for the Agency, and closely monitors the implementation of the Action Plan developed by UNRWA in response to the recommendations of the Independent Review Group 4 and further decisive action by the UN to ensure neutrality, accountability and to strengthen control and oversight over the operations of the Agency. The Commission will also continue monitoring the implementation of the recommendations resulting from the EU audit. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 2 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-statement-unrwa-2024-01-29_en 3 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-disburses-additional-eu10-millionpayment-unrwa-2024-12-20_en 4 https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/colonna-report-and-unrwa%E2%80%99s-high-level-action-planimplementation-recommendations”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2024-10-09 “E-001996/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the importance of this issue. CE marking is requested for a number of products, and it indicates that the manufacturer or importer affirms the goods’ compliance with European health, safety, and environmental protection standards, and as such, it does not guarantee the quality of a product. The unrelated CE (China Export) logo does indeed look almost the same as the CE marking with the only difference that the two letters are closer together on the Chinese CE. EU legislation 1 prohibits the affixing to a product of markings, signs or inscriptions which are likely to mislead third parties regarding the meaning or form of the CE marking. This legislation obliges Member States to ensure the correct implementation of the regime governing the CE marking and take appropriate action in the event of improper use of the CE marking. Member States are also obliged to provide for penalties for infringements, which may include criminal sanctions for serious infringements. Those penalties have to be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and constitute an effective deterrent against improper use. These legal tools enable the competent national authorities to lead their necessary fight against any fraudulent use of the unrelated CE (China Export) logo. 1 Article 30(5) and (6) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30-47.”
  "Buy European" provisions
• 2024-09-23 “E-001790/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission Mexico is an important political and economic partner for the EU at bilateral, regional, and multilateral level. Democracy and the rule of law are shared fundamental values in the EU-Mexico Strategic Partnership 1 and are at the core of the EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement (Global Agreement) 2 in place since 2000. These values remain central in the effort to finalise the modernisation of the Global Agreement. The EU respects Mexico's sovereign right to choose its judicial system. An efficient, effective, impartial and independent judiciary is an essential pillar of the rule of law in any democracy, as well as, from an economic point of view, an essential element to ensure a favourable business environment, guarantee legal certainty, as well as to keep and attract investment. Policy developments related to the rule of law, human rights and good governance, both in the EU and Mexico, are matters that are discussed notably within the EU-Mexico High Level Dialogue on Human Rights. The discussion with Mexico on these important topics will continue in the forums established by the EU-Mexico Global Agreement. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/eu-mexico-strategic-partnership/productdetails/20170624DPU08702 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r14011”
  EU relations with left-wing Latin America
• 2024-08-06 “E-001481/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission EU sanctions are designed to promote peaceful democratic change and are a means to encourage a meaningful dialogue process towards a peaceful and democratic Venezuelan-led solution to the crisis. They are regularly reviewed based on the evolution of the situation on the ground and any modification of sanctions is the result of a unanimous decision by Members States in the Council. To encourage Venezuelan efforts towards inclusive and competitive elections and facilitate an EU Election Observation Mission, the Council decided exceptionally on 13 May 2024 to suspend temporarily the travel ban on four individuals 1 . The Council also decided to maintain the whole sanctions regime, including all 54 individuals listed. The National Electoral Council of Venezuela, however, afterwards took the unilateral decision to withdraw its invitation to the EU Election Observation Mission. The EU remains of the view that Venezuelans should be able to choose their representatives in credible, transparent, and competitive elections, supported by international observation, including the EU, which has a long and distinguished record of independent and impartial observation. The EU remains extremely concerned about the situation in Venezuela following the 28 July 2024 presidential elections. In the absence of independently verifiable voting records, the EU will not recognise the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro as the country’s democratically elected president. The EU will continue to support the Venezuelan people in their democratic aspirations. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/03/statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-with-council-decision-cfsp-20241339-concerningrestrictive-measures-in-view-of-the-situation-in-venezuela/”
  EU-Venezuela relations
• “We have to ensure free access to basic services for citizens who may not have all of the technical options available. That's the case today with cash. No one should be obliged to use the digital euro. It should be a choice, a possibility that we make available, but it should not be an obligation. If the digital euro is supposed to be the digital equivalent of cash, which seems to be the philosophy, it has to be accepted everywhere as legal tender. I can't fully understand the logic or follow the logic in the draft report, which I think excessively increases the number of cases when this digital euro could be refused. My approach is similar to that of the commission. I think it's legitimate to ask which kind of scenarios would a citizen have an opportunity to pay by a digital euro? In the report, it seems only to be offline and in big chains of shops. There are other points of agreement, I think, which are less philosophical, so to speak. I'm not going to go through them all. He's aware, and we'll discuss those in more detail. And once again, this is a package. This should all be treated together. And neither the commission or any of the co-legislators want to make cash disappear. I think we all need a bit more time to properly analyze this proposal, and I'm happy that we'll soon be able to get into discussions with the team. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “I think there is room here for a compromise that picks up and reflects all the different concerns of different groups. However, it is concerning to say, and I wanted to say this in the committee, it's concerning to see Renew socialists, Greens and the left tabling amendments that aim to. Tabling amendments that aim to erase our entire report and in line with what their advisers have said in shadows meetings, they are drafting a parallel text on the fringes of this committee. This is completely opaque and is not involving all political sources. Political forces. This is an unusual way of working. It's anti-democratic. It ignores the third biggest political force in the parliament and millions of citizens, we think. This sadly shows that some groups are denying political rights and are blocking people who have different viewpoints from participating. Ladies and gentlemen, I want to conclude on a positive note. Patriots for Europe has delivered on this report. This is a report that offers real solutions for our companies and for our citizens. It's a report that opens the gates to prosperity. It's a report that has been that has benefited from amendments from other groups. And I'd once again like to thank them for their collaboration. Thank you.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Colleagues. First and foremost, I would like to thank the Secretariat staff for the work and support they have given us. I would also like to thank the interpretation services for the work they have done and their patience in allowing us to understand one another as well as I must. I thank the shadow rapporteurs and their teams for being available and working well on this file. Thank you very much everyone. Now moving on to the report itself. The report is based on an assessment which is by no means just a Patriots diagnosis. It is borne out in different reports like the Draghi report letter report and also in the scale up strategy of the commission. The problem is not the lack of start ups in Europe, because we do have a dynamic ecosystem, but rather it's the the drain of scale ups. And the key question is why are scale ups leaving the EU? From our point of view, the main reason is about an excessive bureaucracy and overregulation. There are several issues that stem from this, including the extremely damaging consequences of the Green Deal. All of this has increased business costs, costs and diverted resources away from Competitivity and it is harming the growth of companies because only those companies with more than 20 or 50 people in their legal departments can survive.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Gracias. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Europe needs more freedom, more competitiveness and more prosperity. But this is not where we are heading. Because if we apply a pillar two is is something which ties the hands of Member States. Moreover, if we take into account the China and the US, don't apply a second pillar. Well, that's almost all of the GDP of the world. So Europe is deciding to hinder itself. Why? Whilst our competitors are just a freedom to do whatever they want. And secondly, uh, taxation is a member state, uh, um, competence. It's a key competence for them. But when we talk about addressing tax fragmentation, what we're doing is opening other doors to tax harmonisation, which would be, uh, be imposing a tax nightmares on all European member states.”
  EU competences on taxation
• “Thank you very much, Madame Chair and Mr. Giorni. The competitiveness compass is, is is put in place for development. The omnibus package is the best proof of of the measures in the Green Deal. We've seen the damage that that's caused. But what's Disconcerting is that the Commission might not recognize the damage that's being caused by this. Why do you continue insisting on committing the same errors again? Would it not be easier for the good of Europeans and our economy to look at what has been what has been proposed in the past, which has led to a path which has made us less competitiveness? Why do you choose these paths which are not in the interests of Member States, and why do you not focus on freedom to make us more prosperous and competitive? Thank you.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• “Ladies and gentlemen, the commission has wasted precious time in reaching a agreement that Europe needs. But not just that, it's also actively torpedoed the negotiations. Firstly, months were wasted on unnecessary dramatization by the commission itself, prejudices and anti-Trump policies rather than the general interests. We were looking at tariffs would have been negative for everyone. At the same time maintaining intact the real tariffs which will impoverish European continent, the Green Deal, the 2030 agenda and other such policies. Secondly, it is not smart to insult people that you're trying to agree with, and therefore it's right to recall the words of a vice president of this parliament from the Spanish Partido Popular, who referred to Trump as a alpha male. And then you have another committee president who insulted the president of a democratic country. I don't think this is a way to build a solid relationship with our main strategic partner. Nor does it help that the Parliament, because of this coalition between the centrist parties, has failed to condemn an attempted attack on a presidential candidate who has been elected with a majority that many people had rejected. So what should we do? We should negotiate and keep talking. And we should, once and for all, leave behind the anti-Trump ism that has contaminated our foreign policy. Because nobody wants these tariffs. But if ultimately they arrive, you will be the people who need to answer to the people of Europe.”
  EU-US relations
• “Thank you. Chair. Well, I do understand the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. To all of you, because of attacks against freedom of expression in the US. Now, what happens is that the censorship is still carrying on that set up, and the commission needs to get rid of, but not before responding to the conclusions in the justice report from the US Congress. And according to that, the US exerted pressure on digital platforms for years to change their moderating rules. The Commission also censored true information and cancel political debates that didn't agree with the ideas behind the ideas of the commission. And finally, it says that the commission interfered in at least eight elections in six countries in Europe. And that is something that Mr. Breton got involved with in Germany and Romania. So the the Commission needs to take all actions necessary to reverse this situation. The security situation. And you can't hide behind civil society because civil society isn't cancelling other people.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you very much. I would like to ask three questions. First of all. The plan is going to be based on a clean technology and energy intensive industry. How is this going to. How is the green industrial deal going to, uh, guarantee that it doesn't slow down these industries? Uh, I've mentioned two sectors, but this could also affect other types of companies, especially SMEs. Uh, and uh, due to the rise in energy prices, they may not be able to access financing. And secondly, the law that the Commission wants to publish. Focuses on certain criteria and and certain and has an impact study done been done on this to ensure that this law doesn't create a new burden. Because one of the priorities is reducing bureaucracy and permitting innovation. And based on the one in, one out principle, what law would we get rid of in order to allow this? And how does this fit in with the strategy to streamline bureaucracy? And thirdly, in an interview last year. With it was stated that, uh, with uh, the aim of creating a good argument for the green transition. Around 500 companies, uh, of around 500 companies asked, around a third Warned. That they thought that they would be less competitive due to the green transition. So what's being done to reverse this trend? In line with the Commission's goal to reduce CO2 emissions by 90% by 2040. Because this is not in line with the solutions that are proposed as part of the plan. Thank you very much for renews.”
  Energy (green transition)
• “A few facts and figures to illustrate this. European companies spend more than €150 billion per year on regulatory compliance. More than 60% of companies identify reporting obligations, most of which are linked to the Green Deal as an obstacle to investment. And more than 55% of SMEs consider administrative burden to be the biggest challenge they face, which is particularly difficult for start ups and micro SMEs. These facts and figures only show the tip of the iceberg, and we want to go above and beyond simplification packages. We want to substitute the one in, one out approach for a real simplification strategy. This needs to be based on Proportionality, SM exemptions, predictability and legislative stability. We want to open the gates to prosperity. The second section of the report talks about the need to mobilise European savings and private investment. We are looking at improving information and protection of small investors. We want to boost financial literacy and use public funding as a tool to attract private capital, not as a subsidy. We are also suggesting tax incentives and to make rules on securitisation more flexible, so that banks will free up resources for business funding. The third section is focused on closing the funding gap when it comes to the scale up phase vis a vis third countries.”
  Conditions to access EU budget
• “Thank you. Thank you for your time. As you know, on the 12th of November, the Commission submitted the European Shield for democracy. Now, however, they want to have a unified Europe with looking at the combined data for financial effects. Now, the members of the press will soon. We want to know when are you going to submit the list of those that were elected? What type of election are you placing? How do you think we're going to consider the actors involved in this? Now? We are concerned with connecting this network with the digital network. There is a risk that the so-called reliable one has become, um, whistleblowers become official. Now here, what the context is legal could become illegal. They might communicate the same entity, the power of verifying and at the same time denouncing certain platforms. Now, this de facto would have an ideological component. Finally, the Commission cannot ignore the fact that that platforms like meta use this in order to, cause problems to those who were combating their dogmas. So I'd like to know what measures are going to be taken so that this new network does not strengthen this practice. And finally, will you be publishing the real figures on how many accounts have been opened following these arbitrary criteria? Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you. Chair. Well, I do understand the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration. To all of you, because of attacks against freedom of expression in the US. Now, what happens is that the censorship is still carrying on that set up, and the commission needs to get rid of, but not before responding to the conclusions in the justice report from the US Congress. And according to that, the US exerted pressure on digital platforms for years to change their moderating rules. The commission also censored true information and canceled political debates that didn't agree with the ideas behind the ideas of the commission. And finally, it says that the commission interfered in at least eight elections in six countries in Europe. And that is something that Mr. Breton got involved with in Germany and Romania. So the the Commission needs to take all actions necessary to reverse this situation, the security situation. And you can't hide behind civil society because civil society isn't cancelling other people.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Thank you very much. Executive Vice president. You are a strong defender of the European Green Deal in the current European Commission. This contributed to increasing administrative costs for European businesses, representing about 1.3% of the EU GDP. In other words, around €150 million. This has limited competition, competitiveness and increased costs for businesses and had a negative effect on their competitiveness on the worldwide markets. I'm sure you know That in the last five years, while the EU, the US promoted many laws, we have many, many, many more rules in the EU. What do you think of the clocks proposal at the last plenary? Do you support it? And if so, I would like to ask you what's changed? And if it's not right for now. As is recognised through this blockage. You are recognising that this paralysing, this paralysis is negative for Europeans.”
  Climate efforts
• “I'd like to thank the rapporteur for the work on this report. But having said that, there are a couple of points I would like him to answer for me. First of all, the rapporteur sets out the establishment of a tokenized currency for online payments. But And it sets this out as a alternative to European payments, but at the same time recognizes in the report that there is for a market such as the European one that this would not be suitable also for all of the projects that have been carried out on a retail basis have so far been a failure. So in the private sector, if there's no pan-European payment sector, what does the rapporteur think can do to ensure success, to ensure that it would not fail as a previous projects have done? Secondly the main reason for an online digital Europe is for strategic payments as a competition to visa and Mastercard. Is this good use of taxpayer money because this cost at the end of the day would fall upon taxpayers and citizens. We've seen failed models. And so you're just going to intensify this negative dynamic that is leading to insolvency within a number of member states. So my question is, secondly, do you believe that if there were to be this online retail digital euro, would it be capable of competing with the bigger players to respond more rapidly to market conditions? And if you do think that would be possible, could you tell me why you think that? And if not, could you explain why your report leaves the door open to this currency being created to compete against visa and Mastercard? And then finally. In the report you have focused on creating this currency. But will it will allow Traceability. So the question is, do you think that. This digital online euro would, as proposed by the report, will guarantee the same level of privacy for citizens. Thank you.”
  Digital euro
• “Thank you. President. Ladies and gentlemen, the digital world has transformed our lives, our work, our social relations. But like all progress, it comes with threats and risks. And the most exposed to those risks are our children. Uh, to bullying, emotional manipulation, even suicide. We have to protect our minors. It's a moral duty. And to do that, parents are on the front line for caring for their children. They need to be given all the tools that they need to ensure safety of their children online. We can't accept, However, proposals which use the pretext of protecting children but will then open the door to violating privacy or mass disproportionate data gathering. This is not a competency of the European Commission, it's just another attempt to gather more competences and take, uh, responsibilities from states and from families.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse