Mariusz KAMIŃSKI

Policy topics Mariusz KAMIŃSKI is active on

What Mariusz KAMIŃSKI has said (53)

• 2026-06-15 “Andre, it's a great joy, great happiness. You are with us. You are free. I am very happy. We are all very happy, from all political parties. You have been persecuted because you were a free journalist who was writing and telling the truth, but you were also a very active activist of the Polish minority. Thanks to you, the Polish identity was being cherished, was being maintained in Belarus. And there is one thing, political prisoners, this is a very important issue, a very important problem. Each and every person released from prisons, whether they are Belarusian, Polish, who live who are for whether foreigners, every released person, this is a great event. But here, I would like to tell you about something that really pains me, and this is something which is less known to the public, to the international public. You were taking care of the tombs of the Polish partisans, Polish soldiers who were fighting against the German and Soviet totalitarianisms in the forties. Tell us what happened tell us what happened to these cemeteries, to the tombs of all these soldiers. Can Polish children go and visit the tombs of the Polish partisans and to lay wreaths, lay flowers, and cherish their memory because they were they lost the lives because they were fighting against the regimes, against Nazism, against against the the Soviet Union. Where are their cemeteries? Where are their tombs, Anci?”
  EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-02-24 “E-000770/2026 Answer given by Mr Kadis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the concerns raised. However, Russian vessels are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone of West African countries based on bilateral fisheries agreements, as illustrated by the article mentioned by the Honourable Member. If such activities are authorised by the respective coastal States, they cannot be considered illegal. The EU, through its policy of zero-tolerance towards illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, its sustainable fisheries partnership agreements and its strong presence in regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs), works with several of these coastal States to help them increase their capabilities in fighting IUU fishing and boost their monitoring and surveillance activities in their own waters. As an example, thanks to the EU’s insistence, the 2023 and 2024 compliance reports highlighting several infringements involving Russian fishing vessels were endorsed in November 2025 by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). Regarding Russia’s unsustainable fishing, the EU proposed control measures in certain RFMOs such as NEAFC and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation that were adopted to help prevent unsustainable practices on depleted stocks, such as pelagic redfish. The Commission will continue to work with Member States on similar measures for other stocks like mackerel. Constraining revenues funding Russia’s illegal war of aggression is a key goal of the EU’s sanctions imposed since February 2022. The selection of products subject to trade sanctions, such as import bans, depends on a case-by-case assessment, addressing notably their actual economic contribution to Russia’s budget and the impact on the EU supply. The adoption of EU sanctions ultimately lies with the Council of the EU.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Fisheries access for developing countries
• 2026-02-24 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 12.6.2026 Written question The questions raised by the Honourable Member fall under the remit of the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA). The Commission will send the reply by eu-LISA to the Honourable Member as soon as possible.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Asylum & border control
• 2026-02-24 “E-000769/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the information referenced by the Honourable Member. The Commission continuously monitors developments that may contribute to Russia’s ability to sustain its war of aggression against Ukraine. Where credible information emerges regarding activities that may circumvent or undermine existing EU restrictive measures (sanctions), the Commission engages on the matter carefully together with Member States as well as with relevant third countries. The EU has adopted an extensive set of individual and sectoral sanctions – across 19 packages – in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including measures targeting Russia’s military industrial complex and entities involved in supporting it 1 . The EU also maintains sanctions against Belarus for its role in facilitating Russia’s aggression. The EU continues to engage with China at all levels, calling on China to stop any support which directly or indirectly strengthens Russia’s military capabilities. To this date, the EU has taken different restrictive measures against more than 100 Chinese companies and individuals supporting Russia’s war effort. The Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President will continue to monitor the situation closely and propose additional measures where necessary to safeguard the effectiveness of EU sanctions and to address any activities that contribute to Russia’s ability to wage its war against Ukraine. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/.”
  EU-China relations · EU-Belarus relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-02-17 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question EU engagement with Cuba is guided by its values and interests. Since 2017, the EU/Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement [1] (PDCA), agreed by the European Parliament and Member States, has been the basic framework for EU/Cuba relations. The Agreement is not a way to ignore differences, but a way to address them including sensitive topics such as human rights on the island and Cuba’s position in relation to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The Agreement, through an increased critical but constructive engagement, is expected to deliver further and more concrete results. The best possible option to achieve this goal is to make its implementation and working methods more effective, rather than to abandon it. It is currently analysing ways towards this end, in order that the PDCA can better respond to expectations in promoting reforms, encouraging human rights, and supporting Cuba’s economic and social modernisation, while protecting European interests, including EU’s security. In relation to EU cooperation, including humanitarian relief, it aims at enhancing the well-being of Cuban citizens. EU funds are not transmitted to the Cuban authorities. EU-funded projects in Cuba are implemented by United Nations’ agencies, Member States’ agencies and EU non-governmental organisations. As with all EU cooperation projects worldwide, a variety of tools are used to ensure the proper execution, monitoring and auditing of EU projects in Cuba. Cuba was not a topic of the January 2026 Foreign Affairs Council. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2016056.”
  EU-Cuba relations · EU-Belarus relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2026-02-12 “E-000622/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In 2025, there were around 11 000 illegal border crossings (IBCs) at the EU’s eastern border 1 , according to consolidated Frontex data (–36% compared to 2024). At the EU’s external border with Belarus, the authorities of Poland, Latvia and Lithuania reported that, in 2025, there was again a high number of attempts to illegally cross the border. This demonstrates that the weaponisation of migration continues at the EU’s external borders with Belarus. The difference between the data reported by Frontex and by the Member States is that Frontex uses a single definition of attempted IBCs applicable across the EU, while individual Member States collect data based on their own national definition of attempted IBCs. There is currently no commonly agreed EU-wide definition for attempts to cross the border illegally. However, as part of the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, Frontex is working together with the Commission and Member States to establish an EU-wide common data collection on verifiable attempts to cross the border illegally. The Commission therefore does not consider the Frontex data misleading. 1 At the EU external borders with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-02-12 “E-000623/2026 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission First and foremost, the Commission recalls that former Commissioner for Justice, as any other citizen, benefits from principle of the presumption of innocence until a possible conviction by the competent judicial authorities. At this stage, and as far as the Commission is aware, the allegations regarding former Commissioner for Justice do not concern the exercise of his duties as Member of the College. The Commission has not conducted any internal investigations following the allegations published in the media regarding former Commissioner for Justice and will not interfere in any investigations which might be carried out by the Belgian competent authorities, yet remaining ready to cooperate with these authorities, where relevant. The Commission is not aware of any allegation of breach of EU rules by former Commissioner for Justice.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2026-02-12 “E-000621/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission On 19 May 2025, Lithuania filed an application instituting proceedings against Belarus before the International Court of Justice (the ‘ICJ’) for alleged breaches by Belarus of its obligations under the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (the ‘Protocol’) 1 and (the ‘Convention’) 2 , for the large-scale smuggling of irregular migrants from Belarus into Lithuania (case Alleged Smuggling of Migrants (Lithuania v. Belarus) 3 . On 17 July 2025, the Registrar of the ICJ notified the EU pursuant to Article 43, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court 4 , that the construction of the Protocol and of the Convention – to which the EU is a party – is in question in this case before the ICJ, and invited the EU to indicate as soon as possible whether it intends to submit observations on this case pursuant to Article 43, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court. As the EU is a Contracting Party to the Protocol and to the Convention 5 , the interpretation of the provisions in question is also likely to directly affect the EU. On this basis, the Commission decided to submit observations, on behalf of the EU, on this case pursuant to Article 43, paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court. These observations will be filed in due course in accordance with relevant internal procedures of the EU. 1 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 28 January 2004), 2241 UNTS 507. 2 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003), 2225 UNTS 209. 3 https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/200/200-20250519-pre-01-00-en.pdf. 4 International Court of Justice, Rules of Court (as amended), 1978, https://icj-cij.org/rules. 5 Council Decision 2004/579/EC of 29 April 2004 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime; Council Decision 2006/617/EC of 24 July 2006 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime concerning the provisions of the Protocol, in so far as the provisions of the Protocol fall within the scope of Part III, Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Belarus relations
• 2026-02-12 “E-000619/2026 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission In May 2023, the Commission adopted an anti-corruption package, including a Joint Communication 1 , a proposal for a Directive on combating corruption 2 and a proposal for a new sanctions’ regime targeting serious acts of corruption worldwide 3 . The Directive, on which provisional interinstitutional agreement was found on 2 December 2025, will replace the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on combating corruption in the private sector 4 for those Member States to whom it applies, including provisions on jurisdiction as the Commission considered it necessary to ensure one legal, modernised act 5 . An overview of the transposition of the 2003 Council Framework Decision can be found on EUR-Lex 6 . The Commission has comprehensively assessed its transposition in a dedicated report 7 . At the time of publication of the report, 16 Member States 8 had decided not to apply certain rules on jurisdiction (when the offence has been committed by one of its nationals or committed for the benefit of a legal person with its head office in the territory of the Member State). In some Member States 9 a dual criminality requirement is foreseen, and may be subject to further conditions, such as a report submitted by the victim or the proceeding initiated by the prosecutor. The Commission has not identified additional notifications from Member States invoking the exemptions listed under Article 7(4) of the Decision. Once the Directive will have entered into force, Member States will have two years to transpose it into national law (for most provisions); and the Commission will closely monitor and follow-up to ensure a correct transposition. Regarding the proposal for a sanctions’ regime targeting serious acts of corruption worldwide, the Council has thus far not reached a consensus on it 10 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0012. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0234. 3 JOIN(2023) 13 final. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2003/568/oj/eng. 5 The European Parliament formally endorsed the provisional agreement in a plenary vote on 26 March 2026. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CELEX:32003F0568. 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52019DC0355. 8 Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Finland, Sweden. 9 Denmark, France, Finland. 10 However, several country-specific sanctions regimes (with regards to Lebanon, Guatemala, Moldova and Haiti) already allow targeting corruption and the Council has already adopted sanctions based on the relevant listing criteria.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2026-02-06 “P-000489/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The censorship allegations of the Committee on the Judiciary of the US House of Representatives report are unsubstantiated and unfounded. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 brings unprecedented transparency and accountability for users of platforms 2 in the EU. It protects their freedom of expression by entitling them to explanations, and redress if their content is removed or restricted. The DSA does not prescribe what content is illegal; this is determined by national or other EU laws. The Commission cannot order platforms to remove specific content; such decisions are taken by the providers themselves. The DSA does not regulate electoral processes or political debate. Conducting and organising elections is solely the competence and responsibility of Member States. Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs), independent national authorities that implement the DSA at Member State level, can organise election roundtables 3 to facilitate information sharing and coordination between relevant stakeholders. Upon an explicit request from the national DSC, the Commission can provide support for the organisation of such roundtables. Such activities have been hosted with the support of the Commission in Slovakia and the Netherlands in 2023; Ireland, France and Romania in 2024; and Romania, Netherlands, Ireland in 2025. No such activities were organised for Polish elections in 2023, 2024 and 2025. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a single market for digital services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• 2026-02-04 “Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission 10.6.2026 Written question The question raised by the Honourable Member, received by the Commission on 24 February 2026, partly overlaps with his Written Question P-004435/2025, whose reply was given by the Commission on 5 February 2026. The Commission refers to its reply to the above-mentioned question concerning the charges brought against the former Commissioner for Justice . At this stage, and as far as the Commission is aware, the allegations regarding the former Commissioner for Justice do not concern the exercise of his duties as Member of the College and notably his performance as Member of the Commission in charge of Justice. The Commission has not conducted any internal investigations following the allegations published in the media and will not interfere in any investigations which might be carried out by the Belgian competent authorities, yet it remains ready to cooperate with the Belgian authorities where relevant . The Commission recalls that the former Commissioner for Justice, as any other citizen, benefits from the principle of the presumption of innocence until a possible conviction by the competent judicial authorities. The anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) package is a comprehensive legislative reform that was adopted in June 2024 [1] . The preparation of this package involved extensive and complex consultations of the various Directorates-General of the Commission, including the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers and culminated with a collegiate decision procedure at the level of the Commission, which naturally involved all the members of the College and their cabinets. It is therefore not possible to comment on the individual role of any specific Commissioner. [1] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-eu-level_en.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2026-01-27 “P-000314/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 29 January 2026 1 reached a political agreement to list the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organisation, sending a strong political message that there can be no impunity for the brutality with which peaceful demonstrations have been suppressed. The EU had already listed the IRGC in its entirety under the Iran weapons of mass destruction sanctions regime in 2010. It means that an asset freeze and a prohibition on making funds and economic resources available to the group already applies. In addition, individuals and entities linked to the IRGC are also listed under various EU sanctions regimes, regarding the human rights violations in Iran, their responsibilities in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes as well as support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The January 2026 FAC also imposed new restrictive measures on several individuals and entities directly involved in the repression and the internet censoring, among them the Minister of the Interior and several members of the IRGC. With those listings, more than 290 individuals and entities directly involved in human rights violations in Iran are now listed under the dedicated Iran human rights regime. In addition, during the FAC, the Commission raised the point on continuing support to civil society organisations and the importance of coordinated Member State action. Civil society remains key to supporting Iranians in their bid to live a life of dignity under good governance. In addition, the Council imposed restrictive measures on four persons and six entities under the EU sanctions regime related to Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression, with a specific focus on the Iranian state-sponsored programme for the development and production of unmanned aerial vehicles. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2026/01/29/.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-01-15 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 1.4.2026 Written question The EU’s position towards Belarus remains guided by the Council conclusions of October 2020 [1] and February 2024 [2] . The EU continues to call on Belarus to release and rehabilitate all political prisoners and to end repression against the people of Belarus. The regime must repeal repressive laws and stop politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary arrests. The European External Action Service is aware of the case of Belsat journalist Katsiaryna Andreyeva [3] and remains in regular contact with human rights organisations and accountability platforms, including Viasna and the International Accountability Platform for Belarus (IAPB), closely following their reporting. In addition, the EU Delegation in Minsk monitors politically motivated trials where possible and maintains contact with political prisoners and their families. The EU regularly raises the situation of Belarusian political prisoners, in relevant international human rights fora and ensures that Belarus remains high on the EU’s agenda. The issue was also addressed in the high-level conference ‘Building Foundations for Democratic Change’ held in the European Parliament in December 2025. Regarding restrictive measures, Natallia Buhuk [4] is listed under EU sanctions for involvement in politically motivated rulings against opponents of the Belarusian authorities, and responsibility in serious human rights violations and the undermining of the rule of law. [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46076/council-conclusions-on-belarus.pdf . [2] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6737-2024-INIT/en/pdf . [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belarus-statement-spokesperson-escalating-repression-journalists_en . [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32023R0419 .”
  EU-Belarus relations · EU competences on human rights
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission 23.3.2026 Written question The Commission is aware of Framatome’s joint venture project [1] . The Commission remains committed to moving away from Russian supplies in the nuclear sector. The Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports [2] is setting out a coordinated and gradual approach. Euratom is supporting development of alternative water-water energetic reactor (VVER) fuels financially, having invested EUR 20 million into research on non-Russian nuclear fuel design alternatives [3] through research projects led by Westinghouse and Framatome [4] . The investment in Lingen is subject to licensing by independent national nuclear safety regulatory authorities in Germany, with nuclear safety and security concerns due to be taken into account in this process. The Commission continues engaging with all stakeholders. The Commission and the Euratom Supply Agency, in line with the objectives of the European Energy Security Strategy [5] and the Energy Union Strategy [6] to enhance security of supply and diversify energy sources, have long been highlighting the risk of such a dependence and called for, publicly and in contacts with stakeholders, a reduction of dependence on any single supplier in the nuclear value chain. [1] Cooperation between Framatome and Rosatom/TVEL started in 2017, and plans for the joint venture predates the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0440. [3] It is expected that these fuels will be fully licenced within the next three to nine years. [4] On 21 June 2024, Framatome received an EUR 10 million contribution from the EU under the Euratom Research and Training Programme to support the development of a European fuel design for VVER reactors. [5] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Energy Security Strategy, COM(2014) 330 final. [6] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank — A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM/2015/080 final.”
  Nuclear energy · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2026-01-13 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 13.4.2026 Written question 1. The case was handled in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures, with due respect of the right to be heard of the person concerned. On 29 January 2026, the College of Commissioners concluded the disciplinary procedure with a penalty commensurate to the established facts. 2. The Commission did not gather additional evidence in the course of the disciplinary proceedings.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-11-11 “E-004454/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Delegated Regulation 2025/1393 1 introduced an obligation for the Commission to conclude by the end of 2025 the assessment of third countries not listed by the Financial Action Task Force but suspended from that organisation. Russia falls under the scope of this review. The Commission has taken into account relevant information from various sources, which indicate circumstances raising serious concerns regarding the state of Russian’s system for combatting money laundering and terrorist financing and pointing to strategic deficiencies in the same. Consequently, the Commission proposed to list Russia as a high-risk country for money laundering and terrorist financing. This proposal was transmitted to the co-legislators for scrutiny on 3 December 2025. Neither of the co-legislators objected to the proposal. Consequently, the delegated Regulation was published in the Official Journal on 9 January 2026 2 . It will enter into force twenty days after publication. 1 OJ L, 2025/1393, 21.8.2025. 2 OJ L, C/2025/8435, 9.1.2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2026/46/oj.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-11-10 “P-004435/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission reminds that, as any other citizen, the former Commissioner for Justice mentioned in the question benefits from the presumption of innocence until proven guilty according to law. This is a fundamental principle enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 48) and led down in EU secondary legislation 1 . 1. The Commission has not been involved in any investigations regarding the charges brought against the former Commissioner for Justice and is not aware of any link between him and any Russian oligarch. 2. The Commission has no information on the arts foundation referred to by the Honourable Members. 3. At this stage and based on the currently available information, the Commission has no reason to perform any audit linked to the exercise by the former Commissioner for Justice of his duties as Member of the Commission. 1 Directive (EU) 2016/343 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (Article 3).”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-10-30 “E-004264/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors developments on migration and security in Latin America. Analysis confirms that certain criminal networks operating in the region have a transnational reach and can have an impact on the EU’s internal security 1 . The Commission assesses organised crime and illegal migration challenges from that region in its regular risk assessments and addresses them in its cooperation with partner countries, as for example in the context of the EU-Latin American Committee on Internal Security (CLASI). On 17 June 2025, the European Parliament and the Council reached the provisional political agreement on the revision of the visa suspension mechanism 2 , proposed by the Commission in October 2023. The revised visa suspension mechanism gives the EU a faster and more flexible tool to react and widens the grounds for suspension. Every year the Commission adopts the visa suspension mechanism report, in which are assessed issues and risks in relation to visa-free countries. The next report will be adopted in December 2025. Activation of the mechanism depends on a thorough, evidence-based assessment in line with the Regulation 3 and notifications by Member States. 1 ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy, COM(2025) 148 final, 1 April 2025; https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0148. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250613IPR28917/agreement-on-suspending-short-stayvisa-free-travel. 3 Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 - consolidated version as of 03 February 2025; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02018R1806-20250203.”
  Asylum & border control · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-10-23 “E-004178/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Mercosur agreement represents a strategic opportunity to enhance trade and cooperation with Latin America. It supports the EU’s geopolitical objectives, including diversification, and promotes sustainable agricultural practices globally. The agreement includes commitments to environmental standards, sustainable practices and ceasing deforestation by 2030. All imports must comply with EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards and regulations. The Vision for Agriculture 1 includes several accompanying initiatives, including pursuing a stronger alignment of production standards for imported products and more stringent controls on imports. The agreement has the potential of benefiting Member States, including for agri-food exports. Finally, through carefully calibrated tariff quotas and phased market openings, it protects European farmers, providing benefits for all Member States. The Commission’s Economic analysis of the negotiated outcome 2 projects an increase in the EU gross domestic product of EUR 77.6 billion by 2040, indicating widespread economic benefits, with Mercosur gradually eliminating tariffs on 91% of EU imports. The Commission will monitor implementation to ensure that the agreement does not generate disturbances on the EU market and has mechanisms to address adverse impacts, including bilateral safeguards in case of need. The Commission is also introducing the new Unity Safety Net for crisis measures, with a total budget of EUR 6.3 billion — effectively doubling the current agricultural reserve. This reinforced support will help safeguard EU farmers in times of market disturbances amid growing geopolitical uncertainties. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0075. 2 Economic analysis of the negotiated outcome of the EU-Mercosur partnership agreement (EMPA), Publications Office of the EU; https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/6f1a741f-677e-11f0-bf4e01aa75ed71a1.”
  Pesticides & trade · Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2025-10-15 “E-004050/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the draft Regulation amending the rules on the assignment of cases to judges and is currently assessing it. It was not discussed by the Commissioner responsible for democracy, justice, the rule of law and consumer protection and the Polish Minister of Justice at their meeting of 29 September 2025. On the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Commission reported on plans to transfer it to the police and reinforce it, in its 2025 Rule of Law Report country chapter for Poland. The Commission also reported on issues pertaining to the effectiveness of the justice system in Poland and on efforts made to advance on the implementation of the Action Plan on the Rule of Law. Recommendations were made to Poland in this respect. The Commission will continue to monitor the Polish government actions aimed at restoring the rule of law.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-08-01 “P-003169/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Respect for the rule of law and the fight against corruption are clear Commission priorities, as recalled also in the 2024-2029 Political Guidelines 1 . As stated in the 2025 Rule of Law Report 2 , the Commission deems that fighting corruption effectively relies on a comprehensive approach combining preventive and repressive measures in a robust legal and institutional framework, with effective investigations and prosecutions. In its annual Rule of Law Report, the Commission therefore examines developments in all Member States and the four enlargement countries, including on their anti-corruption frameworks and specialised anticorruption bodies. The Commission has regularly reported on Poland’s Central AntiCorruption Bureau, including on issues pertaining to its independence 3 . In its 2025 Rule of Law Report, the Commission reported on the proposed dissolution of the Central AntiCorruption Bureau and its replacement by a new office 4 . It also reported on Poland’s efforts to strengthen the legislative framework against corruption. The Commission will continue to monitor and assess these institutional and legislative developments. Since 2024, the annual Rule of Law report includes country chapters on four enlargement countries (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) to support their reform efforts on democracy and the rule of law ahead of accession and to guarantee that high standards will continue afterwards. The Commission takes a similar approach to all enlargement countries, including Ukraine, in the context of the annual enlargement reports. Whilst the Commission underlines the need for independent bodies specialised in the prevention and repression of corruption, the Commission recalls that the proposal for a Directive on combatting corruption 5 does not prescribe the way in which Member States are to organise and set up such institutions. The Commission is hopeful that the co-legislators will soon come to an ambitious agreement on the proposal, thereby strengthening the fight against corruption in all Member States. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en. 3 See for instance 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, SWD(2023) 821, p. 17. 4 2025 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, SWD(2025) 921, p. 9-10. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52023PC0234.”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass) · EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-07-16 “P-002909/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission A swift and effective implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum 1 is a priority for the Commission. Almost all Member States have submitted their National Implementation Plans to the Commission. Poland submitted to the Commission its position on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum. The Commission is in regular contact with all Member States, including those that did not submit a National Implementation Plan, and is supporting them in making sure that they will be ready to fully implement the Pact as from June 2026. The Commission kindly refers the Honourable Member to the exchanges taking place at the Working Group on Asylum of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, where additional information is regularly provided on the state of implementation of the Pact by Member States. Half-way through the transition period on implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, important progress has been made both at EU and national level. The Commission will report again on progress on the implementation of the Pact in October 2025. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-11 “E-002846/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of public reports about the sale of three Airbus A330-200 aircraft to Belavia. EU sanctions on Belarus 1 prohibit EU operators from providing services, like maintenance, and from making any other economic resources available to listed persons or entities, including Belavia. Sale or supply of aircraft to or for use in Belarus is also prohibited. These sanctions apply to EU operators and persons doing business within the EU. Based on reports available to the Commission, it seems that the sale was conducted outside of EU jurisdiction. Member States are responsible for implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, including conducting investigations into potential non-compliance cases, including for sanctions circumvention, should information available to them point in that direction. In general, tackling the circumvention of EU sanctions through third countries is a top priority for the EU. The Commission continuously monitors trade flows of sanctioned goods to third countries and works closely with the Member States to identify suspicious transactions. Together with the EU Sanctions Envoy, it actively engages with third countries to ensure their jurisdictions are not used as platforms for circumvention. Where appropriate, the Commission, together with High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, can propose new sanctions. This includes the imposition of sanctions on new targets, such as persons responsible for circumvention. Adoption of sanctions requires the unanimous approval of all 27 Member States. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.”
  EU relations with United Arab Emirates · EU-Belarus relations
• 2025-06-27 “E-002608/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission Members of the Commission have participated in the annual Bilderberg conferences over the years. While the Bilderberg Group indicates on its website 1 that participants take part as individuals rather than in any official capacity, participation of Members of the Commission in these conferences can nonetheless be part of Commissioners’ duties, where it gives them the possibility to present policies falling within the Commission’s mandate and of general European interest, as was the case at the conference of 2025. The four Commissioners have published information on their participation in the annual Bilderberg conference on their online calendars 2 . Bilderberg Group publishes the list of participants and the topics for the dialogue on its website 3 . This information is available to the general public. 1 https://www.bilderbergmeetings.org/meetings/meeting-2025/press-release-2025. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/calendar-items-president-andcommissioners_en?f%5B0%5D=ewcms_calendar_item_title%3Abilderberg. 3 https://bilderbergmeetings.org/meetings/meeting-2025/participants-2025.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-06-24 “E-002542/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission proposal for a Directive laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union 1 , includes, in Article 3(2), the offence of public instigation. This targets activities of migrant smugglers that intentionally instigate migrants including through the internet, to enter, transit across or stay irregularly in the EU which could also apply in cases of instrumentalisation. Moreover, instrumentalisation is proposed as an aggravating circumstance in Article 9(d). In addition to the offence of public instigation, the Commission proposal also includes the offence of facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit or stay in the EU, for financial or other material benefit or in cases when there is a high likelihood to cause serious harm in Article 3(1). The Commission is aware of the amendments proposed by the European Parliament and looks forward to the adoption of its final report as soon as possible, to enable a swift and successful negotiation of this instrument. 1 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA, COM(2023) 755 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-06-13 “E-002388/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has not mandated non-governmental organisations (NGOs), consultancy firms, or lobbying outfits to influence the decisions and policies of democratic governments and independent institutions. Operating grants are awarded following competitive calls for proposals. Applicants submit proposals that include the description of their work-programmes of activities in areas indicated in the Regulation for the Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE) 1 , which are then annexed to the grant agreement. The work programme may mention, among other applicant’s activities, advocacy activities. The Commission does not prescribe the specific activities to be carried out by the NGOs in their work programmes, nor instructs them to support specific positions. The Commission refers to its previous answers 2 and its replies to the European Court of Auditor’s (ECA) Special Report 11/2025 3 relating to NGOs’ financing in internal policies. The Commission adheres strictly to its transparency obligations. Information about EU fund recipients, including NGOs, is published on the Financial Transparency System 4 . The Commission proactively shares the objectives and outcomes of funded projects on the Funding & Tenders Portal 5 . Furthermore, non-commercial interest representatives, including NGOs, are required to report their lobbying activities and disclose their main funding sources, including any contributions exceeding EUR 10 000 and representing more than 10% of their total budget, in their registrations in the Transparency Register 6 . The Commission will also explore the feasibility of incrementally increasing the frequency of publishing annual data updates in the Financial Transparency System, thus increasing the frequency of updates as per ECA’s recommendation 7 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000280-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.html; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qe/2025/000351/P10_RE(2025)000351_EN.pdf; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/291733/Replies%20to%20questionnaire%20addressed%20to%20Cssr %20responsible%20for%20Budget%20and%20Administration_final.pdf. 3 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECAReplies/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11_EN.pdf. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html (The annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation whereby data on recipients is not disclosed for very low value contracts below EUR 15 000 and where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the persons or entities). 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/home. 6 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/index_en. 7 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECAReplies/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11/COM-Replies-SR-2025-11_EN.pdf.”
  Regulation of NGOs in Europe · Transparency requirements for interest groups · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-05-14 “E-001940/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. At this stage, as far as the Commission is aware, the allegations regarding the Former Commissioner for Justice do not concern the exercise of his duties as Member of the College. The Commission has not conducted any internal investigations following the allegations published in the media. 2. The Commission has not had contacts with the Belgian authorities on the allegations against the Former Commissioner for Justice. The Commission generally stands ready to cooperate with the Belgian authorities where relevant.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-05-14 “E-001941/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has met and is in direct and constant contact with all Member States that have faced the instrumentalisation of migrants. As recalled in the Commission Communication adopted in December 2024 1 , addressing the situation at the EU eastern external border, Member States may take exceptional measures to counter the threat of weaponisation of migration. These measures must be temporary, limited to what is necessary, proportionate and apply only to welldefined cases, while respecting non-derogable rights and principles. The Commission withdrew the proposal for Regulation 2021/0427 2 following the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 (the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation) 3 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 (the Schengen Borders Code) 4 . The Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation provides for procedural derogations in relation to the asylum common rules that Member States may be authorised to apply in situations of crisis, including instrumentalisation. The revised Schengen Borders Code allows Member States to temporarily close border crossing points in case of instrumentalisation, while guaranteeing access to international protection procedures. The Commission proposal for a Directive laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union 5 also introduces the offence of public instigation to tackle the activities of smugglers that intentionally instigate migrants, to enter, transit across or stay irregularly in the EU. Instrumentalisation is proposed as an aggravating circumstance. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders, COM(2024) 570 final. 2 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum, COM(2021) 890 final. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147, OJ L, 2024/1359, 22.5.2024. 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/1717 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJ L, 2024/1717, 20.6.2024. 5 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA, COM(2023) 755 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-23 “E-001622/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Public service media play a key role in upholding freedom of expression and information and contribute to an informed public debate by providing a plurality of information and opinions. The Commission has no competence to intervene in the organisation and conduct of national elections. It supports the Member States in the promotion of democracy, of which free and fair elections are at the core, and the application of relevant rules, including the new EU rules on political advertising 1 . The European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) puts in place a new set of rules and standards to uphold media pluralism and independence in the EU 2 , while EU has also introduced new rules for the safety and protection of journalists and measures to address strategic litigation against public participation 3 . The Commission, in its annual Rule of Law Reports, examines rule of law developments in all MS on an equal basis, focusing on four pillars, including on media freedom and pluralism, and makes recommendations. For Poland, the Commission took a notice in its 2024 Report of a dismissal of public service media’s management. The 2024 Report also noted that authorities are working on a draft law that would provide a new regulatory framework for public service media aimed at ensuring full alignment with EMFA provisions. The Commission made a recommendation to Poland to pursue efforts to ensure an effective legislative framework for the independent governance and editorial independence of public service media, taking into account European standards. The Commission will report on developments in the forthcoming 2025 Rule of Law Report, and it monitors the implementation of EMFA in all Member States. 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/900. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083. 3 Directive (EU) 2024/1069.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-04-15 “E-001534/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission replied to written questions E-001534/2024 and E-003062/2024, reiterating its strong condemnation of Russia’s espionage, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns. As stated in those replies, the country chapter for Poland of the 2023 Rule of Law Report 1 factually reported on the arrest by the Polish Security Services and the charge of illegal espionage on behalf of Russia of Pablo González not only on the basis of an alert published on the Council of Europe’s platform but also on the basis of information brought to the Commission’s attention by different organisations. The Commission did not take a position or make an assessment about this case. The Commission will continue monitoring developments in the Member States and remains committed to strengthening the Rule of Law Report. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b576c76e-0755-4690-92667895c4294433_en?filename=48_1_52627_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-04-11 “E-001504/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is not directly involved in specific criminal investigations. The Commission cooperates with Eurojust and Europol 1 in enabling and supporting the EU's judicial and law enforcement cooperation. The Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 established the European Board for Digital Services (‘the Board’), an independent advisory group composed of the Member States’ Digital Services Coordinators (DSC) and chaired by the Commission. 3 The Board Working Group 7 - Orders and criminal issues - provides for exchanges and discussions on the cooperation with law enforcement authorities to tackle illegal content online and to support the Commission’s assessment of systemic and emerging issues across the EU under the DSA. This relates to the orders referred to in Articles 9 and 10 and to the notifications under Article 18 of the DSA 4 . In accordance with Article 33 of the DSA, the Commission designates as very large online platforms (VLOP) or very large online search engines (VLOSEs), respectively those services with a number of average monthly active recipients in the EU (AMAR) equal to or exceeding 45 million. The information published on the online interface of Telegram, indicates that its overall service had fewer than 45 million AMAR as of February 2025 5 . The Commission services have discussed the number of AMAR with the legal representative of Telegram and will continue to actively monitor the updated AMAR related information due by August 2025 as well as all other information available to it 6 . The Commission services are in close contact with the relevant authorities, particularly the Belgian DSC 7 which is competent for supervising Telegram’s compliance with the DSA 8 . 1 See, for example, Eight countries launch Operational Taskforce to tackle violence-as-a-service https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/eight-countries-launch-operational-taskforce-totackle-violenceservice#:~:text=Europol%20is%20at%20the%20heart,developed%20under%20OTF%20GRIMM%20progress. 2 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1-102. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-board. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/working-group-7-european-board-digital-services-orders-andcriminal-issues. 5 https://telegram.org/tos/eu-dsa. 6 Pursuant to Article 33(4) DSA, the Commission may designate a service, on the basis of self-reported data or information requested pursuant to Article 24(3) DSA or any other information available to the Commission. 7 More information on the role of Digital Services Coordinators can be found on: https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-dscs . 8 Pursuant to Article 3(n) DSA, the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment encompasses the Digital Services Coordinator of the Member State where the legal representative of the provider of an intermediary service is established.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-04-11 “E-001505/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU promotes human rights, democratic governance, the rule of law and the fight against corruption policies as a priority in its external action. Serious acts of corruption threaten peace and international security, enabling terrorism, organised crime and other crimes. It is for the Council to decide by unanimity whether to adopt the High Representative/Vice-President’s proposal to establish a new Common Foreign and Security Policy sanctions regime targeting serious acts of corruption worldwide. Meanwhile, the EU has introduced and made use of the possibility to impose restrictive measures (sanctions) to target serious financial misconduct concerning public funds in country-specific contexts 1 . The EU supports the universalisation and effective implementation of the fight against corruption, including via its trade tools, such as the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) 2 framework and Everything but Arms (EBA) 3 scheme (GSP+ and EBA beneficiary countries need to ratify and implement the United Nations Convention against corruption). Human rights dialogues with more than 60 countries are opportunities to discuss issues related to corruption and its negative impact on human rights. The promotion and protection of civil society’s actors fighting against corruption is at the core of EU’s anti-corruption efforts. The EU strives to protect whistle-blowers and provide support to national human rights institutions, human rights defenders and journalists at risk. 1 Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 of 28 April 2023 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova; Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/254 of 12 January 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Guatemala. 2 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/generalised-scheme-preferences-plus-gsp. 3 https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/everything-arms-eba.”
  EU policy on social & environmental impact of foreign investments · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-03-27 “E-001292/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission has dealt with the information it received from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) in full compliance with the applicable procedures. Further to its investigation, OLAF transmitted the case to the Commission, with the recommendation to open the disciplinary procedure. A disciplinary penalty can only be imposed after the entire disciplinary procedure has been completed. Therefore, an instant removal of an official from the post is not legally possible. During the procedure, the persons concerned enjoy, in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the presumption of innocence. 2. OLAF has not found evidence of criminal conduct. It did gather elements indicating a breach of professional obligations. The Commission is not aware of any evidence other than the one reported by OLAF. 3. The EU-Qatar air transport agreement was negotiated at the request of Member States and EU stakeholders. The negotiations were conducted in a fully transparent manner with the close involvement of Member States representatives and EU stakeholders. The outcome of the negotiations was endorsed unanimously by all Member States that considered it fully responded to the negotiating directives adopted by the Council. The agreement was then signed by all Member States and the EU. The Commission considers that potential breaches of professional obligations by the then Director-General should not result in a suspension of the application of the agreement.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-03-19 “E-001172/2025 Answer given by Mr Síkela on behalf of the European Commission The eligibility rules applicable to procurement contractors under Global Gateway are laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/947 1 . Accordingly, when the Commission implements EU funds directly or through partner countries in indirect management, entities established in China are not eligible, unless China participates in the concerned EU-funded action as a donor or as a beneficiary of the action. When EU funds are implemented in indirect management with pillar-assessed entities 2 , such entities apply their own eligibility rules on access to procurement. Therefore, depending on the rules of the pillar-assessed entities, companies established in China may be eligible. Where the procurement procedure is carried out by the Commission or by a partner country, the provisions on abnormally low tenders and foreign subsidies of the Financial Regulation 3 also apply. Under the same legal framework, entities that are subject to a final judgment or final administrative decision finding them guilty of fraud, corruption, or any other crime or misconduct 4 shall be excluded from participating or implementing EU funds and they shall be rejected from a procurement award. Other related entities such as beneficial owners, affiliated entities, persons exercising powers of representation, decision or control, persons assuming liability for the excluded entity, etc. may also be excluded. In case of funds entrusted in indirect management to pillar-assessed entities and before signing contribution or guarantee agreements, the rules of the partners must have been positively assessed by the Commission, in accordance with the Financial Regulation 5 , ensuring that implementing partners have, among others, equivalent rules for procurement and exclusion from access to funding. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009, OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1-78, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj. 2 Such as the World Bank or other international finance institutions. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. 4 Article 138 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. 5 Article 157(4) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.”
  Trade relations with China
• 2025-02-26 “E-000860/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Following the suspension of the visa facilitation agreement between the EU and Russia in September 2022 1 , the Commission presented updated guidelines to Member States on visa procedures as well as on border controls for Russian citizens at the EU's external borders 2 . The guidelines call for reinforced security scrutiny when issuing visas to Russian citizens and thorough checks at the EU external borders. At the end of 2024, the Commission conducted an evaluation of the application of the guidelines which has shown that most Member States have implemented the guidelines regarding visa issuance in Russia. There was a sharp decrease in the overall number of visas issued to Russian citizens (from 4 million in 2019 to 0.5 million in 2023). Member States indicated that they apply additional security checks on Russian visa applicants, in particular those not having an essential reason to travel to the EU. They also confirmed that they verify in the Schengen Information System whether the applicant is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purpose of refusing entry. The list of supporting documents to be submitted by applicants in the Russian Federation for short-stay visa was updated in September 2024 3 . While the revised list does not explicitly feature military identity cards, it increased documentary requirements to take account of the heightened security risks posed by Russian applicants and recalls that consulates may request additional documents during the examination of a visa application, in accordance with Article 21(8) of the Visa Code 4 . 1 Council Decision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9 September 2022 on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation; OJ L 234I, 9.9.2022, p. 1–3. 2 Communication from the Commission 1. Updating guidelines on general visa issuance in relation to Russian applicants following Council Decision (EU) 2022/1500 of 9 September 2022 on the suspension in whole of the application of the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation; and 2. Providing guidelines on controls of Russian citizens at the external borders; Brussels, 30.9.2022, C(2022) 7111 final. 3 COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION of 11.9.2024 amending Implementing Decision C(2016) 3347 as regards the list of supporting documents to be submitted by applicants in the Russian Federation for short-stay visas; Brussels, 11.9.2024, C(2024) 6136 final. 4 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code), OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1–58.”
  Asylum & border control · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-02-26 “E-000861/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Russian malign influence, interference and attempts to manipulate take many forms, including accusations against specific Member States, such as in the case of Poland, which has been the target of Moscow’s campaigns for many years, including with attempts to undermine political leaders, Polish policy and material support to Ukraine, as well as Poland’s role in the EU. The EU has been at the forefront of developing policies and tools to contribute to the Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference 1 (FIMI). Within the mandate of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Russian FIMI campaigns are monitored, analysed and exposed and findings are made public, including on the EUvsDisinfo 2 platform. The Commission reiterates its position of strong condemnation of Russia’s espionage, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns. The Commission will further prepare a European Democracy Shield, which will include initiatives to help to counter foreign information manipulation and interference online. It should be noted, however, that reviews or similar kinds of investigations of lobbying activities alleged of falling under the scope of FIMI are within the competence of the Member States. The Commission nor EEAS does not comment on national criminal investigations and the administration of justice in the Member States. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulationinterference-fimi_en 2 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/”
  Foreign interference in Europe · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-01-14 “E-000113/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) is economically and geo-strategically important. It will strengthen strategic cooperation between like-minded partners that share similar values. The EMPA offers export opportunities for several EU agri-food products that will benefit from reduced tariffs in Mercosur countries (e.g. wines, spirits, confectionary, dairy and olive oil), as well as the protection of EU Geographical Indications in a market of 280 million consumers. For EU sensitive agricultural sectors, trade preferences granted under the EMPA are limited through tariff quotas. Bilateral safeguards can be triggered to protect a specific agricultural sector, including where market access has been limited by tariff quotas. This would protect farmers in case increased imports from Mercosur cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the relevant EU sectors. The Commission will monitor agricultural market developments closely. For the unlikely event that – despite all precautions – the agricultural market situation in Europe were to be negatively impacted due to the agreement, the Commission announced to set-up a reserve worth at least EUR 1 billion to address possible disturbances in agricultural sectors. After its translation and legal revision, the Commission will present a proposal for signature and conclusion of the EMPA. In that context, the Commission will present its proposal for the legal basis and architecture of the deal. Any proposed legal architecture will safeguard competences of the EU co-legislators and Member States and their national parliaments, in accordance with the Treaties.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur · Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2025-01-09 “E-000055/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Schengen Borders Code 1 allows Member States to temporarily reintroduce internal border control to address serious threats to public policy or internal security as a measure of last resort. The Commission is engaged in an ongoing dialogue with all Member States concerned by the reintroduction of internal border to ensure that these controls remain necessary and proportionate, that Member States exchange information, and that they adopt mitigating measures to limit the effect of control on the movement across internal borders and the functioning of cross-border regions. The Commission also supports the use of alternative measures to internal border controls, as listed in the Commission's Recommendation of November 2023 2 . On 10 July 2024, the amended Schengen Borders Code entered into force. It provides a revised framework for the reintroduction of internal border control, with clearer deadlines and stricter reporting and monitoring obligations for both the Member States and the Commission. In line with Article 27a(3) of the amended Schengen Borders Code, the Commission will issue an opinion after receipt of a notification that prolongs internal border control to a period of 12 months in total. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a EU Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code); OJ L 77, p. 1-52. 2 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/268 of 23 November 2023 on cooperation between the Member States with regard to serious threats to internal security and public policy in the area without internal border controls, OJ L, 2024/268, 17.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/268/oj”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-01-07 “E-000024/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission As mentioned in the reply to E-001534/2024, the Commission’s position on Russia’s espionage, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns is one of strong condemnation. As also stated before, the country chapter for Poland of the 2023 Rule of Law Report 1 contains a factual reference to the case and indicates the sources of the relevant information, which include the Council of Europe platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists. The Commission usually refers to such alerts in the Rule of Law Report under the pillar of media freedom in relation to all Member States. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b576c76e-0755-4690-92667895c4294433_en?filename=48_1_52627_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2024-12-19 “E-003062/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission replied to written question E-001534/2024 on 6 January 2025 reiterating its position of strong condemnation of Russia’s espionage, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns. As also stated in that reply, the country chapter for Poland of the 2023 Rule of Law Report 1 , factually reported on the arrest by the Polish Security Services and the charge of illegal espionage on behalf of Russia of Pablo González. It did so on the basis of information brought at the time to the attention of the Commission by different organisations as well as an alert published on the Council of Europe’s platform.The Commission did not make an assessment about this case and usually refers to such alerts in its Rule of Law Report in relation to all Member States. The Commission has always been clear in its statements that it does not comment on national criminal investigations and the administration of justice in Member States and pays careful attention to any references to individual cases in the Rule of Law Reports. The Commission remains committed to strengthening the Rule of Law Report, as expressed in the Political Guidelines 2 . 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b576c76e-0755-4690-92667895c4294433_en?filename=48_1_52627_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-12-03 “P-002726/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia, imposing severe consequences and costs and seriously curbing its war economy. The EU has sought to balance effective sanctions against Russia with the specific economic needs of its Member States and partners and ensure, in the interests of global food security, that EU sanctions do not target in any way the trade in agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers, between third countries and Russia. The Commission is closely monitoring the situation regarding the import of fertilisers into the EU from Russia and Belarus. The Commission is concerned by the EU’s continued reliance on certain types of Russian fertilisers and is considering ways to reduce it. While reflecting on new measures, upholding food security remains our primary consideration. The EU has designated a number of persons having interests in the fertiliser sector. Those listings are based either on their leading role in the Russian economy, or their involvement in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian government. The EU remains committed to ensuring that sanctions are robustly enforced and that they target those supporting or benefiting from activities that undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• 2024-10-17 “E-002148/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission works closely with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and Europol 1 to monitor the situation of synthetic drugs across the EU, including captagon and fentanyl. With its new mandate 2 , EUDA has strengthened its threat assessment capabilities and is developing a European drug alert system to facilitate the exchange of information on developments requiring rapid actions to safeguard health, social aspects, safety and security. The fight against drug trafficking is one of the priorities of the EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025 3 and action plan 4 . Penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking are governed by Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA 5 . The Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime 6 foresees penalties for offences relating to participation in a criminal organisation. The Commission also adopted a dedicated EU roadmap 7 envisioning exchanges with China. The EU Drugs Dialogue was notably used to systematically raise the issue of drug precursors and synthetic drugs and ask China to take effective measures. There are also specific exchanges via the EU-China joint follow-up group meetings on drug precursors and on customs cooperation to help prevent the entry of designer precursors 8 in the EU territory. In April 2023, the EU decided to list 11 individuals and 3 entities in the framework of EU restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria 9 targeting those responsible for the production and trafficking of narcotics, notably captagon. The trade in amphetamine has become a regime-led business model, providing its inner circle with revenue that contributes to its ability to maintain its policies of repression against the civilian population 10 . The Commission is conducting an assessment together with EUDA of captagon trafficking in the region. 1 The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1322/oj 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021XG0324(01) 4 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/fd218c19-c5d6-11ec-b6f4-01aa75ed71a1/languageen/format-RDF 5 Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2004/757/2022-08-18 6 Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42–45 7 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023DC0641 8 Substances with no known legitimate uses. 9 COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2023/844 of 24 April 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2023:109I:FULL 10 Any decision on sanctions, including the addition of restrictive measures on individuals and entities, is taken by the Council acting unanimously.”
  Regulation of drug precursors in the EU
• 2024-08-21 “E-001534/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has strongly condemned Russia’s espionage, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns. There can be no doubt of the Commission’s position in this regard. The country chapter for Poland of the 2023 Rule of Law Report 1 , to which the Honourable Member refers, briefly mentions the case of Pablo González under the pillar of media freedom. It factually reports on his arrest by the Polish Security Services and the charge of illegal espionage on behalf of Russia without taking a position. The case of Pablo González, who at the time was believed to be a freelance journalist, had been brought to the attention of the Commission by different organisations expressing concern over his arrest and the length of his pre-trial detention. There was also an alert published on the Council of Europe’s platform and the Commission usually refers to such alerts in its Rule of Law Report in relation to all Member States. The Commission is aware of the outcome of the case and considers it important and pays careful attention to any references to individual cases in the Rule of Law Reports. On media ownership, to which the Honourable Member also refers, the country chapter for Poland of the 2024 Rule of Law Report 2 notes that the 2024 Media Pluralism Monitor has reported some progress as regards media ownership transparency. The Commission is committed to further strengthening the Rule of Law Report, as expressed in the Political Guidelines. The Commission is also committed to implement the European Media Freedom Act 3 . 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/b576c76e-0755-4690-92667895c4294433_en?filename=48_1_52627_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/9c081f05-688d-4960-b3bcea4fc3b2bafb_en?filename=48_1_58078_coun_chap_poland_en.pdf 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL_202401083”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-08-21 “E-001535/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU policy on Belarus is outlined in the Council conclusions of 19 February 2024 1 and 12 October 2020 2 . The EU has limited its engagement with the authorities to the bare minimum and has intensified cooperation with civil society and democratic forces. EU financial assistance has been recalibrated away from state authorities and towards non-state actors, with almost EUR 140 million committed since 2020 to support the people of Belarus. The EU has also focused on responding to the human rights situation and mobilising the international community, including as regards justice and accountability. Since August 2020, the EU has adopted several rounds of restrictive measures against Belarus 3 in response to the repression of civil society and democratic opposition, misconduct of the electoral process, the incitement and organisation of illegal border crossings, human rights violations, the diverting of a passenger flight, and the regime’s involvement in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The Commission, including the President herself, has been and remains very vocal in support of the democratic aspirations of the Belarusian people, and in condemning the illegal actions of the regime. The EU will remain steadfast in its support for a democratic Belarus. 1 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6737-2024-INIT/en/pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/46076/council-conclusions-on-belarus.pdf 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02012D0642-20240228”
  EU-Belarus relations · Asylum & border control
• 2024-07-29 “E-001451/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission In response to the increasing role of State actors in facilitating irregular migration and using migrants to create pressure at the EU’s external borders, the EU has acted jointly to respond to these threats. This unified approach aims to effectively protect the EU against the instrumentalisation of migration for political purposes as outlined in the renewed EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2021-2025) 1 . Since the beginning of the crisis at the EU’s external borders with Belarus, the Commission took firm action. It reached out to partner countries to limit the arrivals to Belarus, proposed a Regulation to take measures against transport operators that facilitate or engage with migrant smuggling or human trafficking, and provided a toolbox addressing the use of commercial means of transport to facilitate irregular migration to the EU 2 . Furthermore, dismantling migrant smuggling networks and undermining their business models is a key priority for the Commission working together with EU agencies as outlined in the Call to Action of the Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling 3 . In addition, the Commission has proposed to strengthen the EU legal framework 4 and the role of Europol 5 to ensure the EU has the necessary tools to respond to this evolving crime. As regard situations of instrumentalisation of migrants, the Crisis and force majeure Regulation, adopted on 14 May 2024 6 , provides for a crisis framework at EU level. As the other instruments under the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Crisis regulation will become applicable on 1 July 2026. It provides for temporary derogations from the standard asylum procedures that Member States could be authorised to take, in full respect of fundamental rights. 1 COM(2021)591 final. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/toolbox-addressing-use-commercial-means-transport-facilitate-irregularmigration-eu_en 3 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/60f6cc08-c7ee-46db-bee5689562d34436_en?filename=Call-to-action-global-alliance-to-counter-migrant-smuggling_en_1.pdf 4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA; COM(2023) 755 final . 5 Proposal for a Regulation on enhancing police cooperation in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and on enhancing Europol’s support to preventing and combating such crimes and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794; COM(2023) 754 final . 6 Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters · Asylum & border control
• “Commissioner. President. Ladies and gentlemen, Russian gas is a cheap gas. But with it comes a corruption and influence from other intelligence services. It also leads to political blackmail. So how can how hypocritical can Brussels and Berlin be now that there are wars in Georgia? There's Donbas, there's other areas as well. And. This is a shame. For what the European, um. What the what the European Union has done. And if you look at the former Chancellor Schroeder as well, we must never have another Schroeder in, in Europe. Now, this is this ban of Russian energy is better late than never. And also, it would be good that we put an end to this war. And Nord Stream should just be left where it is forever.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• “Commissioner. I'm happy we're able to meet to talk about fighting disinformation, foreign intervention in election processes in the EU for us in Poland. This subject is relevant given the presidential election in Poland. We have seen a problem with with illegal financing of electoral campaign from abroad. This was discovered by journalists of an independent internet source. In recent weeks, Polish social media, in particularly Polish Facebook, was flooded by political commercials promoting the candidate of the current government, Mr. Sulkowski, and attacking his main opponents, which are related with the opposition. The money used to finance the advertising was not included in official electoral funds. Those behind this campaign are connected to the ruling Civic Platform, and they admitted themselves publicly that they acted on a request of a foreign entity, and apparently it was a Hungarian Austrian company. Stratus, the owners of which failed to explain where the money came from. Commissioner in the Polish presidential election. As we speak today, there has been foreign intervention and illegal financing of the electoral campaign of Mr. Kossakowski. We need urgent reaction from the European Union. Thank you. We have the second election in two weeks. We don't know what else can happen. Please be active on this. Thank you very much.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• “Thank you. I will speak Polish. Ladies and gentlemen, I think it's, um, very justified that you mentioned that we have a problem with, uh, external interference in Armenia, but it is not only Russia. We have another big player in the region that is hostile to what is happening now in Armenia. And I'm talking about Iran. Have you noticed any interference, any false news being propagated by Iran because you've focused on Russia only? You've also mentioned that Russia is attacking everything related to the European Union. And I'm thinking, uh, my question is, is the attack also aimed at the US? Because the US is also playing a huge part in stabilizing the situation in the region. Is the disinformation campaign also directed against the US? And is Iran also a player in spreading false news? Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “I would like to join in on the thanks to the rapporteur on the excellent work she's been doing, and I would like to stress that all political groups agree that we need high standards for fighting corruption. But this is the expectation of the public from Expectation from our voters, European citizens, especially where we had a number of loud scandals. And I agree with the previous speakers who stressed already that to an insufficient extent, those regulations relate to EU institutions. This is the weakest spot of this directive. It is addressed at member states, but the standards and the fighting of corruption should also refer to institutions of the EU itself. The European Parliament proposed a more ambitious tax than the original proposal of the Commission, but unfortunately this is now being thought by the Council. Some of those discrepancies are going too far and they're weakening The insufficient directive even further. The Council must take into consideration what the opinion of the Parliament is, and I hope that we as Parliament will remain united and we will not step back from the. Conservative and ineffective proposals of the Council.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you. I will speak Polish. Ladies and gentlemen, I think it's, um, very justified that you mentioned that we have a problem with, uh, external interference in Armenia, but it is not only Russia. We have another big player in the region that is hostile to what is happening now in Armenia. And I'm talking about Iran. Have you noticed any interference, any false news being propagated by Iran because you've focused on Russia only? You've also mentioned that Russia is attacking everything related to the European Union. And I'm thinking, uh, my question is, is the attack also aimed at the US? Because the US is also playing a huge part in stabilizing the situation in the region. Is the disinformation campaign also directed against the US? And is Iran also a player in spreading false news? Thank you.”
  Foreign interference in Europe
• “Dear colleagues, for a few months now, we have been told that foreigners are fighting for Russia in Ukraine. Many of those people are from African states. They have been lured into Russia. They have been promised a well-paid work. Later they are incorporated into the army and against their own will they are sent to the front line. What Russia is doing is a war crime. It is human trafficking. There is also another group of foreigners fighting for Russia. Those are classic mercenaries, people willing to kill for money, notably people from Cuba, Communist Cuba. I cannot imagine that the Cuban regime is unaware of it. The EU cannot turn a blind eye. We need to suspend the agreement on dialogue and cooperation between Cuba and the EU. It has to happen now. On the Russian side, in Ukraine, there are no international brigades of volunteers. Those are hooligans, henchmen and victims of human trafficking.”
  EU-Cuba relations
• “Thank you very much. Well, my questions are twofold. The first question is for a couple of months now, Russian secret service are engaged in terrorist activity in the EU, including Poland, Lithuania, Czechia or Bulgaria. The aim of those attacks are critical objects of infrastructure, of critical importance, and I am sure that Russia and Belarus should be listed as high risk countries when it comes to money laundering and financing of terrorism. Do you do anything in that direction as an institution? And the second question is related to an unbelievable scandal that we have had lately. And this is the former Commissioner for justice, Didier Reynders. Mr. Reynders is accused of money laundering. Looking at the charges against him, it is clear that he was engaged in that activity before he held office and during he held the office. Does your authority monitor that case? And do you think that candidates for a very important post in the EU should be vetted before they, um, well before they can exercise their, their functions. Should they be vetted as far as their property is concerned?”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• “The. Most fundamental rights, the free choice of the government is one of the most fundamental rights of its citizens. Any external foreign interference in the conduct of elections is highly problematic. And here we're talking about a democracy shield. The European Commission is wanting to set up a new European centre, and it's very unclear. It's supposed to be tackling interference in elections, and it is supposed to be just about a European network of controllers who are going to be making decisions about truth or falsehood. We're looking at billions of sums set aside for NGOs. Who is going to get this money and how? It's not clear. And all of it looks like a plan which really just serves the left wing establishment. And all of this with the pretext of tackling Russian disinformation. In Poland, we're not afraid of that. What we are afraid of is interference in Polish elections. We are concerned about Brussels bureaucrats.”
  Foreign interference in Europe