Alice TEODORESCU MÅWE

Policy topics Alice TEODORESCU MÅWE is active on

What Alice TEODORESCU MÅWE has said (16)

• 2026-06-17 “(10:50:33 – 10:51:30): Thank you. Thank you very much. We've been, depending on Russian gas, and now we depend on Chinese metals. We have to put an end to this nightmare. China controls 90% of, minerals. And, of course, this has an impact, on the whole issue of cars, diesel cars, and petrol cars. So it means that we're depending on the country that emits the most greenhouse gas greenhouse gases in the world. We're becoming more and more dependent on China because we want to maintain our image when it comes to the environment. We have to be realistic. We need competitiveness and economic security, but we need a sea change in European policy, and we need to make sure that we have the right priorities. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with China
• 2026-02-18 “E-000689/2026 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Commission aims to take action against over-implementation – or ‘gold-plating’ – by making increased use of regulations instead of directives, and by enforcing the free movement rules 1 . However, in the area of environment, according to Article 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Member States may maintain or introduce more stringent protective measures than what is required by EU law, provided that such measures are in compliance with the Treaty. Based on the limited information available, the Commission does not find that the situation outlined by the Honourable Member necessarily involves disproportionate application or over-implementation of EU law. Generally, detailed licensing conditions are left to the Member States and are not laid out in EU environmental legislation. The Commission is fully committed to the objective of simplification and to ‘stress test’ EU legislation to remove unjustified burdens. The Commission aims to ensure that EU law strikes the right balance between environmental protection and other EU objectives, including competitiveness and public interest goals. For example, the environmental assessment and permitting rules include several overriding public interest exceptions 2 . 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/nl/statement_26_405. 2 In the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, the Habitats Directive, and the Water Framework Directive. See Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (codification) Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, pp. 1–21; Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, pp. 7–50; and Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, pp. 1–73.”
  EU policy on pesticides · Agriculture (green)
• 2026-02-02 “E-000405/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission On 29 January 2026, the Commission presented the first European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy 1 , setting out concrete objectives for the next five years. This strategy, together with the reform introduced by the Pact on Migration and Asylum 2 , will help reducing illegal arrivals to the EU and unauthorised secondary movements within the EU, countering the adverse effects these have on migration management and security. There are some issues in the area of migration that remain under the sole responsibility of Member States, and policies and decisions to regularise the status of illegally staying thirdcountry nationals fall into this category. It is important that Member States’ decisions do not affect the correct application of the EU migration and asylum system. A national residence permit issued by a Member State does not give authorisation to settle freely around the EU, but only to live and work in the Member State that issued it. If a person holding a national residence permit is found to be illegally staying in another Member State, or if that person applies for asylum in another Member State, that person must go back to the Member State that issued the residence permit. National authorities must act in a spirit of sincere cooperation for this to happen swiftly. In the context of the Return Handbook 3 , the Commission recommended to take into consideration specific criteria and circumstances when deciding to regularise the status of illegally staying third-country nationals under national law. 1 COM(2026) 45 final: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ce0d294e-5dd9-4e2a-bf6853d9d16fc95a_en?filename=European%20Asylum%20and%20Migration%20Strategy.pdf. 2 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. 3 C/2017/6505: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2017/2338/oj/eng.”
  Asylum & border control · Legal migration
• 2025-10-30 “E-004268/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The registration of EU trade marks is managed by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). The ‘PRÄST’ EU trade mark was partially invalidated by the EUIPO 1 . That decision is currently under appeal before the EUIPO Boards of Appeal 2 . The EUIPO is a legally autonomous agency bound to apply the provisions of the EU trade mark Regulation 3 and the decisions of its Boards of Appeal are subject to legal review by Union Courts. Under the EU trade mark Regulation, a trade mark must be able to indicate that the relevant goods come from a particular undertaking. If a trade mark describes a type of product, then it may be refused registration or invalidated. However, the names of traditional food products may be eligible for other forms of intellectual property right protection, in particular the EU-wide protection for product names linked to a specific geographic origin as well as traditional specialities, laid down in Regulation on Geographical Indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products 4 . The current system appropriately balances the principles of trade mark law and the need to protect traditional food names because the EUIPO must object to any trade mark that would misuse, imitate or evocate a geographical indication (GI) or traditional specialty guaranteed protected under the Regulation (EU) 2024/1143. The EUIPO produces comprehensive Guidelines on all aspects of its procedures, including the various reasons for objecting to or invalidating an EU trade mark. Dedicated sections concern conflicts of trade marks with protected GIs and traditional specialities 5 . The Guidelines are revised regularly, based on input from public and private stakeholders, including the European Commission. 1 EUIPO cancellation decision No C 66 395 (invalidity) of 25/09/2025. 2 EUIPO Boards of Appeal procedure R 1845/2025. 3 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ L 154, 16.6.2017, pp. 1–99). 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/1143 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on geographical indications for wine, spirit drinks and agricultural products, as well as traditional specialities guaranteed and optional quality terms for agricultural products, amending Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013, (EU) 2019/787 and (EU) 2019/1753 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 (OJ L, 2024/1143, 23.4.2024). 5 For trade mark registration procedure: https://guidelines.euipo.europa.eu/2302857/2231948/trade-markguidelines/section-4-absolute-grounds-for-refusal and invalidity procedure; https://guidelines.euipo.europa.eu/2302857/1785652/trade-mark-guidelines/3-absolute-grounds-for-invalidity.”
  Intellectual property rights (IPR)
• 2025-09-08 “E-003469/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is concerned by the growing number and intensity of antisemitic incidents and anti-Israeli actions in the EU. Antisemitism is a threat to democracy and the Commission is determined to fight it in all its forms and manifestations, in line with its EU antisemitism strategy 1 . Ensuring the security of EU citizens as well as of tourists is essential for the Commission and all Member States. Violent attacks, intimidation and security threats on individuals have no place in the EU. The 2008 Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia 2 requires Member States to criminalise public incitement to violence or hatred based on ethnic origin or religion. The Commission monitors its correct transposition. However, it is for national authorities to ensure an effective investigation and prosecution of individual hate offences, including when motivated by antisemitism. The Commission has been supporting cooperation between national authorities and experts to improve knowledge and exchange practices on fighting antisemitism 3 . The European Internal Security Strategy-ProtectEU 4 places the ‘protection of people, especially those most vulnerable to attacks … including Jewish and Muslim communities, … at the heart of the EU’s work on security’. The Internal Security Fund 5 supports the protection of Jewish places of worship. The new EU Agenda for Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism will include actions to tackle antisemitism and protect places of worship. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-antisemitism/eu-strategy-combating-antisemitism-andfostering-jewish-life-2021-2030_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_framw/2008/913/oj/eng. 3 An example is the successful collaboration preventing and countering violent extremism including antisemitism involving 14 Member States and the EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/isf/wp-call/2023-2025/call-fiche_isf2024-tf2-ag-protect_en.pdf.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism
• 2025-07-14 “E-002871/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission On 17 June 2025, the Commission adopted the Defence Readiness Omnibus 1 , proposing new measures to cut red tape and facilitate the EUR 800 billion of investment that EU countries need to ensure their defence industries can deliver at speed and scale. The measures build on the vision set out in the White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 that identified simplifying and harmonising rules as an essential way to boost Europe's defence investment and preparedness. In the Communication accompanying the Defence Readiness Omnibus 2 , in its section ‘Developing skills and ensuring employment frameworks adapted to defence readiness’, the Commission points out that the Court of Justice of the EU has confirmed that Directive 2003/88/EC may not apply in relation to certain specific activities, including active deployment or initial or operational training. 3 While preserving existing flexibilities, the Commission will engage with Member States and social partners on the application of the Directive to military personnel in the Armed Forces. 1 New simplification proposal will speed up defence investments in the EU https://commission.europa.eu/newsand-media/news/new-simplification-proposal-will-speed-defence-investments-eu-2025-06-17_en. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Defence Readiness Omnibus, COM(2025) 820 final, 17.6.2025 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0820. 3 Judgment in case C-742/19, Ministrstvo za obrambo - https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-742/19.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2025-07-02 “E-002684/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The on-going discussion about the potential classification of ethanol to which the Honourable Member refers is part of the evaluation of ethanol, in view of its possible approval as an active substance for use in biocidal products under Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 (BPR) 1 . The decision will be made by the Commission, considering the opinion of the European Chemicals Agency’s Biocidal Products Committee expected to be adopted by the end of 2025, and it will only concern uses of ethanol in biocidal products. Ethanol may still be approved for use in biocidal products, regardless of the conclusion on the hazard classification, if deemed safe for human, animal health and the environment. The authorisation of biocidal products containing ethanol will take place subsequently under the responsibility of the Member States, which may consider socio-economic impacts, such as availability of disinfectants. In this regard, the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) conducted a public consultation on alternatives to ethanol in biocidal products (25 February30 April 2025). Additionally, the Greek authorities plan to submit a dossier to update the harmonised classification under Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 2 by the end of 2026. After a thorough scientific assessment by ECHA, the Commission will decide on the appropriateness of reclassification, following consultation with the relevant expert group. The Commission will do its utmost to duly consider all relevant aspects in the decisionmaking process. 1 Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal products. 2 Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, OJ L 353 31.12.2008, p. 1-1355.”
  EU competences on health · Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU
• 2025-05-19 “E-002001/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The ITER project was explicitly set up at the end of the cold war to demonstrate the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion energy for peaceful purposes. The technology applied in ITER is magnetic confinement fusion, which is not directly applicable for weaponisation. Bilateral contacts or engagement with Russia in the context of the ITER Agreement are currently minimised. This also includes procurement restrictions of components from Russia for the European supplies to ITER managed by Fusion for Energy - the European joint undertaking for ITER and the development of fusion energy.”
  Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-05-16 “E-001978/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU provided fundings, together with other Member States, for the construction of the European Hospital of Gaza 36 years ago, in 1989, 18 years before the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza. With the financial support of the EU, the hospital was built to provide secondary healthcare services to Palestinians in Gaza. The EU has never had any management responsibility for the European Hospital. Further to Israeli Defence Force order, the European Hospital, managed by the de facto Ministry of Health in Gaza, was evacuated in July 2024 and following the evacuation, reportedly looted. On 13 May 2025, Israeli airstrikes hit the compound of the hospital and the surrounding area causing a number of civilian casualties. The EU has unreservedly denounced and condemned Hamas' use of medical facilities and recalled their protection under international humanitarian law 1 . The EU has also reiterated repeatedly the importance of ensuring the protection of all civilians at all times, as well as of civilian infrastructures. Regarding specific checks and monitoring mechanisms to ensure sound financial management in Palestine 2 , the Commission has strong safeguards and procedures in place to ensure that EU funds are managed in a transparent and sound manner. The Commission implements rigorous safeguards to ensure that no persons or entities receive EU funding if they are involved in criminal or unethical practices, including terrorist financing and terrorist offences. Due diligence and risk assessment are systematically conducted before funds are disbursed. All financing agreements include clauses prohibiting the diversion of funds to listed groups or individuals. EU restrictive measures are applicable to any of the Commission grant beneficiaries all over the world. No evidence has been found to date that money has been diverted for unintended purposes, as reaffirmed during the financial review of EU assistance in Palestine that took place in November 2023 3 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/11/12/statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-european-union-on-humanitarian-pauses-in-gaza/. 2 This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/communication-commission-review-ongoing-financial-assistancepalestine_en.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2024-11-08 “P-002484/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission strongly condemned these unacceptable acts and deems it essential that there be no impunity. In the resurgence of violent attacks against Jewish communities across the EU following the terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel on 7 October 2023, the Commission confirmed its clear stance against antisemitism and all other forms of hatred. It accelerated the implementation of the EU Antisemitism Strategy and presented the Joint Communication ‘No place for hate’ 1 in December 2023. The Commission made available EUR 7 million under the Internal Security Fund to strengthen efforts against terrorism and radicalisation: EUR 5 million for the protection of Jewish places of worship, schools and community gatherings in a December 2023 call for proposals 2 , and EUR 2 million for countering radicalisation in an open call for proposals in 2025. All initiatives funded by the EU must comply with the EU acquis and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The recent Financial Regulation recast 3 reinforces the possibilities to exclude from EU funding entities that pursue activities contrary to EU values, for programmes financed as of 1 January 2028. The Commission in direct management and Member States in shared management examine compliance of project applications with eligibility rules. If there is evidence that a beneficiary violated rules during the implementation of a project, including the applicable EU acquis and international law, they are required to use all available means to terminate the cooperation and recover the EU funds. For programmes financed as from 1 January 2028, a breach of EU values will constitute a ground for exclusion from financing for grave professional misconduct. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023JC0051 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/isf/wp-call/2023-2025/call-fiche_isf2024-tf2-ag-protect_en.pdf (including places of worship, CBRN, countering non-cooperative drones, firearms trafficking and explosives detection dogs). 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general Budget of the EU.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-10-17 “E-002157/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFSP) 1 , the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is subject to an asset freeze and a prohibition to make funds or economic resources available to it within EU jurisdiction. This means, as provided for by Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 2 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, that all funds, other financial assets and economic resources belonging to, or owned or held by the PFLP must be frozen and that no funds, other financial assets and economic resources are to be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the PFLP. Everyone under EU jurisdiction is obliged to comply with these prohibitions. Member States are responsible for the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions. The Commission ensures the uniform implementation of the sanctions and monitors their enforcement by national competent authorities. In this capacity, it may engage with Member States on the actions they take to verify compliance with the sanctions. The Commission will do its utmost to ensure the compliance of all Member States with the sanctions. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001E0931 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R2580”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-10-09 “E-002007/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Achieving climate neutrality by 2050 requires ambitious policies by all Member States across all sectors. The revised Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) regulation aims to reduce emissions and increase removals from the land sector. Collectively, the EU has set a target to increase net removals by 42 million tonnes of CO 2 equivalents (MtCO 2 eq), delivering a sink of -310 MtCO 2 eq by 2030. This increased ambition is distributed between Member States based on their share of the total area of managed land in the EU. Providing renewable raw material for a circular and sustainable bioeconomy is one important contribution of the land sector in attaining the climate objectives and enabling a green transition. Land practices that generate healthy, biodiverse and resilient forests and soils are a prerequisite to ensure long term, viable access to both these resources and ecosystem services. This is why the Commission is engaging in close dialogue with Member States that are now in the process of revising their land use policies, such as in the context of the National Energy and Climate Plans. The LULUCF regulation includes flexibilities which take into consideration specific circumstances in Member States. Part of the general flexibilities includes transferring surpluses between the Effort Sharing Regulation and the LULUCF. Other flexibilities take into account the need to support Member States experiencing natural disturbances such as forest fires or pests, or have a disproportionate share of organic soils. Building on the recently launched evaluation of the LULUCF regulation 1 , the Commission will explore potential options for integrating the land use sector into the EU’s climate policy framework to implement the forthcoming 2040 target. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14227-EU-rules-on-land-use-land-usechange-and-forestry-LULUCF-evaluation_en”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-09-26 “E-001833/2024 Answer given by Mr Schmit on behalf of the European Commission Directive 2003/88/EC 1 lays down minimum safety and health requirements for the organisation of working time, including minimum 11 consecutive hours of daily rest. The Directive offers significant flexibilities to establish derogations in sectors and situations where this is necessary, including in the defence industry. Member States may derogate from daily rest for specific activities, such as those involving the need for continuity of service or production. These derogations may be adopted by national law or collective agreements. Derogations can be introduced for any activity, if adopted by collective agreements. For all derogations the workers concerned must receive equivalent periods of compensatory rest or, exceptionally, appropriate protection. In Jaeger 2 , the Court emphasised the health and safety implications of missing minimum rest periods and held that compensatory rest for missed daily rest must follow immediately after the working time it is supposed to counteract. Only in entirely exceptional circumstances, where granting equivalent compensatory rest is impossible for objective reasons, appropriate protection can be permissible. Accordingly, the Directive opens the possibility in certain circumstances for shifts to last 24 hours continuously, provided that the conditions to derogate from daily rest are fulfilled. Member States may choose whether to implement derogations enshrined in the Directive and whether to entrust national social partners with it. The Commission currently does not intend to propose a revision of the Directive 3 . 1 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9‐19. 2 Judgement of 9 September 2003, Landeshauptstadt Kiel v Norbert Jaeger, C-151/02, ECLI:EU:C:2003:437. 3 For more details on European defence industry see the reply to E-001846/2024.”
  EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers · EU rules on hazardous working conditions
• 2024-07-16 “E-001368/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission The Commission condemns in the strongest possible terms all forms and manifestations of antisemitism and is determined to fight Jew-hatred. This goes against everything that Europe stands for and, in these difficult times, the Commission stands by the European Jewish communities. Following the terrorist attacks by Hamas of 7 October 2023, the Commission has reacted decisively and immediately accelerated the implementation of the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life 1 . The Commission will publish a first progress report on the implementation of its EU Antisemitism Strategy in autumn 2024. On 6 December 2023, the Commission also presented the Joint Communication ‘No Place for Hate: A Europe United against Hatred’ 2 to counter polarisation in society, which includes targeted measures to strengthen the security of Jewish communities, tackle online antisemitism and prevent antisemitism through education. The Commission will continue, in close cooperation with Member States and relying on databased evidence such as the 3 rd survey published by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights in July 2024 3 , to take decisive action to curb the rise of antisemitism and ensure a future for Jews in Europe and beyond. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-antisemitism/eu-strategy-combating-antisemitism-andfostering-jewish-life-2021-2030/about-eu-strategy_en 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/c60c451c-ccd2-406a-be3a-ef65123f2bb6_en 3 https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2024/experiences-and-perceptions-antisemitism-third-survey”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism
• “We had a debate yesterday on returns on this idea of save third countries and it seems that the problem isn't fully understood across Europe. Another point a lot of the problems that we are discussing today are linked to the right to asylum which was put in place after the second world war and has played an important role and there are people now because of war who are moving to third countries and we really have to try to reframe that. There's a root problem here. We can we can only externalize processes if it's done well but we really have to we can't just cover things up. We have to deal with the process properly in third countries to ensure that we're opening proper routes for people who need asylum. Only then can we ensure that we can stop human trafficking.”
  Asylum & border control
• “Thank you, Madam President. This very moment, decisive talks are taking place about a possible cease fire between Israel and Hamas. The liberation of the hostages that Hamas have held for over 600 days must constitute our highest priority. If we want to avoid another 7th of October, then Hamas, whose goal is not peace but Israel's eradication, must be conquered militarily and ideologically. The Palestinian people deserve better than a life under a brutal terrorist regime. Despite the risk to their own lives, many courageous Gazans have protested against the oppression from Hamas. And these are the voices that we should support. A lasting peace requires two states, but only if both states recognize each other's right to exist. The prerequisites for peace do not start with a ceasefire. They start with the will to coexist. Thank you.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine