Sandro RUOTOLO

Policy topics Sandro RUOTOLO is active on

What Sandro RUOTOLO has said (45)

• 2026-07-16 “(11:03:38 - 11:04:27): Yes. I'll be very quick because we don't have much time. I have to say that I agree with all the work you have carried out, professor, with the artificial intelligence, with this overview. There's no pluralism. There's a summary which is produced by a private sector like Google, and nobody knows which criteria are being followed to decide on the sources and to create a hierarchy. Now if citizens receive a complete answer from Google, which seems correct, without going to visit the direct sources, is it a bigger damage for the journalism, or is it a bigger risk for pluralism? And I'll stop here.”
  Search engines (liability)
• 2026-07-16 “(10:32:13 - 10:34:29): Thank you, chair. I would like to thank the speaker for this excellent contribution. You reassured me because it's been 2 years that we've been insisting on digital sovereignty, on algorithms and transparency. I was thinking of the weight that social platforms have of their influence. You may remember the German elections. Musk, with his 300,000,000 followers, had done an interview with the far right wing politician. And today, Musk, just before the French elections, is also working and endorsing miss Le Pen. So I think this shows what the platforms can do. Now we have carried out studies on the elections, which were carried out over the last years. And we've seen that the fact that a text post goes viral is not enough to explain why certain politicians get more attention and why there is radical content. The political vision depends on opaque recommendation systems that are controlled by the platforms. They decide autonomously without any democratic control. They decide which politicians should get more visibility during a campaign. So in conclusion, do you have the code of the algorithm? Do you have the access data to verify if the platforms apply the same visibility criteria to all politicians because we have the impression that they don't. We have the impression that this transparency doesn't exist. That's why we have some requests. You know that the European Commission has lodged an inquiry, and we want a parliamentary inquiry into this fact because parliament needs to know. We need digital park and issue. The same rules for all, a level playing field.”
  Recommender systems · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-07-16 “(09:48:58 - 09:50:38): Thank you, chair. Now the spread of drones has changed our concept of territorial security. It's a major change. As we've seen in the conflict areas, drones are becoming more and more autonomous because of artificial intelligence. So I'd like to ask you, delegating lethal decisions to official art of to artificial intelligence is a problem, don't you think? I mean, an algorithm cannot always distinguish 100% the difference between a civilian target and a military 1. At the same time, we have very rapid threats. And so the future counter drone systems will also have to use AI in order to have a quick reply, an automatic reply. So while you are working on new security standards, I would like to ask you how the research center will try to prevent collateral damage, especially when these systems are working in urban areas with a high population density. Do protocols already exist to guarantee that even in the case of high automation, there is still human control on destruction? Can we have a guarantee that a machine in no case can decide alone to act in a lethal manner?”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes
• 2026-07-13 “(17:04:17 - 17:06:09): Thank you, chair. This is Schubert. Thank you for your report. I would like to take up one point of concern, a very worrying fact. One hundred and thirty of the people who were arrested for terrorist acts were minors. That's very worrying. Even though, if I understand correctly, there has been a decline compared to attacks in previous years, we mustn't underestimate in any way the terrorist threat, which unlike organized crime is not just about obtaining profit. It's about spreading fear, hitting indiscriminately, dividing society, and pushing democracies towards exceptional security measures. So our response cannot be confined to repression and enforcement. We have to look at terrorist threats but also the social and digital context, which promote radicalization and recruitment, especially among the younger sector of the population. So I'd like to ask, in respect of this specific argument, a comment from your observatory. What legislative measures would be useful to oblige platforms to prevent these risks in the design of their systems? Have you noticed active cooperation on the part of the tech giants, or do they continue to push back and attempt to avoid their own responsibility because propaganda is everything for terrorism? Thank you. **Anna Sjöberg (ECTC Europol): (17:06:15 - 17:08:00): Thank you. Yes. Indeed, coming back to the problem with minors being targeted specifically by this propaganda, it's a major concern. And indeed, this is why we need to take different levels of measures. There is no silver bullet, I would say. We do need to have many measures in place to be able to tackle this problem. One of the important things is, of course, the algorithmic amplification, which is also extremely targeting minors. So they actually don't have to look for the propaganda; the propaganda actually looks for them. So this is extremely important. The use of AI, but also the use of AI to avoid detection. At the same time, it's not so easy to only point at the online service providers because we already have quite good cooperation with them. The problem is the blockchain, the decentralized platform. So it's not only technically easy to do content moderation and to make sure to prevent this kind of dissemination of propaganda. We need to use the current regulation and continue to use the current regulation. We are providing the platform for the personal platform for the collection and for attributing this kind of content online and to support the member states and the competent authorities. But at the same time, we need to have better education, more awareness in society to also build resilience against this attempt to recruit minors online.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-06-17 “Madam president, commissioner, millions of youngsters are growing in digital environments controlled by a handful of private businesses through cyberbullying, hate speech, and grooming in these environments. The prefect of Naples, my city, sounded the alarm bells because social media are influencing young people that are trying to, that are joining criminal gangs. There was this ruling in The US against Meta and Google because it was found that they were promoting addiction, among young people. And I think that if there were to be a park and it were full of bullies, predators, and so on, would we tell parents that they need to keep an eye on their children more? No. We would ask the authorities to make the park safe. Why should the online environment be any different? We need a common European response. Safe platmores from the get go, from when they're designed, and proper algorithms, the safety of children should prevail over everything else.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2026-01-13 “E-000086/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is investigating whether Meta’s mitigation of systemic risks and transparency obligations under the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 are met. In 2024, the Commission opened proceedings under the DSA against Meta, on suspicion that the recommender systems of Facebook and Instagram demote political content 2 . The Commission is monitoring Meta’s compliance with the DSA and has sent requests for information, including on recommender systems 3 . Findings related to ongoing investigations are confidential until publicly communicated. On 24 October 2025, the Commission preliminarily found Meta in breach of its obligation to grant vetted researchers adequate access to public data under Article 40 DSA 4 . This essential transparency obligation contributes to the detection, identification and understanding of systemic risks in the EU stemming from very large online platforms (VLOPs), such as Meta’s Facebook and Instagram, including any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse or electoral processes. The EU has put in place a strong co-regulatory framework to counter disinformation 5 , which encompasses the DSA, including the Commission Guidelines on electoral processes 6 , the Code of Conduct on Disinformation including its Rapid Response System 7 , and the DSA Elections Toolkit 8 . Building on this framework, the Commission adopted the European Democracy Shield 9 , which sets out a strategic framework to safeguard, strengthen and promote democratic resilience. Digital Service Coordinators designated pursuant to the DSA can organise election roundtables to facilitate information sharing and coordination between stakeholders. Upon request, the Commission can provide support in this exercise 10 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/digital-services-act.html. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373. 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses#ecl-inpage-metaplatforms. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2503. 5 Beyond the DSA, this notably includes the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R0900&qid=1771413840504) and the 2023 Commission’s Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections (https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2023/2829/oj/eng). 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024XC03014&qid=1714466886277. 7 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation. 8 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-presents-new-best-practice-election-toolkit-digitalservices-act; https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators. 9 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/democracy-digital. 10 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/dsa-election-readiness-roundtable-platforms-search-engines-anddigital-service-coordinators.”
  Recommender systems · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-01-12 “E-000065/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The High Representative/Vice-President issued a statement on 4 January 2026 on the aftermath of the US intervention in Venezuela 1 , supported by 26 Member States. The statement stresses that international law and the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty enshrined in the United Nations Charter must be upheld under all circumstances. It also recalls that members of the United Nations Security Council have a particular responsibility in that regard. In the address to the European Parliament Plenary on 20 January 2026 2 , the High Representative/Vice-President underlined that the lack of democratic legitimacy does not suspend international law. All actors must respect human rights and international humanitarian law. Respecting the will of the Venezuelan people remains the only durable solution for Venezuela. The EU continues to advocate for a Venezuelan-led, peaceful transition to democracy in Venezuela. The EU is ready to support and accompany all Venezuelans in this process. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuela-statement-high-representative-aftermath-us-interventionvenezuela_en. 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ep-plenary-opening-statement-eu-hrvp-territorial-integrity-and-sovereigntygreenland_en.”
  EU-US relations · EU-Venezuela relations
• 2025-11-20 “E-004636/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission All contracts involving EU funding must ensure full respect of applicable EU legislation, including on accountability, transparency and sound financial management, and aim at protecting the financial interests of the EU. In accordance with the Financial Regulation 1 , the Commission applies established selection procedures and carries out both ex ante and ex post checks in relation to entities receiving EU funding. During the selection process and before the grant is awarded, the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) database is consulted to verify that an entity is not in an exclusion situation – for example, due to grave professional misconduct, fraud or bankruptcy. In addition, the Commission conducts legal entity validation and operational and financial capacity checks. The Commission carries out ex post audits as part of its standard control strategy. If there is clear evidence that any entity receiving EU funds, is in violation of these provisions, the Commission may take appropriate measures, including the suspension, termination, reduction and/or recovery of EU funding. The Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed that the mere fact that a national measure has been taken for the purpose of protecting national security cannot render EU law inapplicable and exempt the Member States from their obligation to comply with that law 2 – including the European Media Freedom Act (‘EMFA’) 3 which provides strong safeguards against the use of spyware against media, journalists and their families, including for purposes of national security. The Commission is currently monitoring the full implementation of EMFA and continues to engage with Member States to ensure compliance with the related requirements. 1 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj. 2 Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18, La Quadrature du Net, Judgment of 6 October 2020 (Grand Chamber): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62018CJ0511 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083.”
  EU research funding · Conditions to access EU budget · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-11-04 “E-004316/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission While the Commission supports initiatives enhancing academic mobility, admission requirements, including language certifications, are determined at national level. This is in line with Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 , which places responsibility for the organisation of education systems with Member States. As such, universities in Member States have the autonomy to set their own admission criteria, including language proficiency standards, as long as they comply with EU law. In accordance with the above, and in line with the principle of institutional autonomy, universities in Member States may therefore require students to demonstrate their proficiency to enrol in English taught courses 2 . In addition, the recognition of academic qualifications primarily rests with national authorities. The Commission remains committed to strengthening recognition within the EU, while respecting the Member States’ competences, through non-binding instruments. Regarding exemptions for alumni of English-taught courses, while the Commission continues to work towards facilitating student mobility and improving accessibility, it primarily operates by encouraging best practices across the EU or offering other relevant support. For example, students selected to go abroad with the Erasmus+ might undergo a free online language support test, which determines their proficiency in various languages, including English. Additionally, after such assessment students have access to a personalised language learning pathway. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12016ME%2FTXT. 2 https://education.ec.europa.eu/news/prepare-to-prove-your-english-language-skills-with-some-courses-ofstudy-in-europe.”
  Governance of academic priorities within the EU
• 2025-10-29 “P-004238/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission As the Commission noted in its reply to written question E-000777/2024 1 , the Commission became aware of the existence of this account in July 2023 in particular through a letter to the President of the Commission from 16 Members of the European Parliament. At the time, the Commission contacted Frontex to establish whether there had been any association between the person in question and Frontex. The Agency performed an internal investigation and notified the Commission that the person had never been employed by Frontex. Frontex as a decentralised Agency of the European Union enjoys a substantial degree of independence, including in the contractual processes for the provision of the services it requires. The Commission is a member of Frontex’s Management Board, but it does not directly manage or award the Agency’s contracts. Procurement decisions are taken by Frontex under its applicable rules and under its responsibility. The Commission does not direct or reassess Frontex award decisions. Staff of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies who fall under the Staff Regulations and Conditions of Employment of Other Servants are bound by their rights and obligations as civil servants. For other persons, the general laws of the Member States apply. 1 Parliamentary question E-000777/2024, Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Asylum & border control
• 2025-05-06 “P-001825/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The European Council in March 2025 1 deplored the breakdown of the ceasefire in Gaza and called for an immediate return to the full implementation of the ceasefire-hostage release agreement. It stressed the need for a ceasefire leading to the release of all hostages and a permanent end to hostilities. The EU has been consistently calling for the immediate resumption of humanitarian aid at scale into Gaza. The High Representative / Vice-President (HR/VP) of the Commission, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean and the Commissioner for Equality, Preparedness and Crisis Management called for the lifting of the blockade on humanitarian aid into Gaza (statements of 12 April 2025 2 and 7 May 2025 3 ). Following the exchange at the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 May 2025, with the support of the majority of Member States, the HR/VP announced the review of Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the Association Agreement in view of the untenable humanitarian situation in Gaza. This was discussed with Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council on 23 June 2025 as well as the European Council on 26 June 2025. The Foreign Affairs Council will revisit the issue on 15 July 2025. It will be up to Member States to decide the next steps, if any. The Commission has allocated EUR 170 million of humanitarian assistance for Gaza and the West Bank in 2025 so far. This brings the total support to over EUR 500 million since 2023 (EUR 102 million in 2023 and EUR 237 million in 2024). The Commission continues its utmost efforts to ensure full compliance with IHL and advocate for unimpeded access for all its humanitarian partners. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/viyhc2m4/20250320-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 2 https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-high-representative-kallas-andcommissioners-suica-and-lahbib-humanitarian-situation-2025-04-12_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/statement_25_1155.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-04-24 “E-001648/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Protocol on migration signed between Italy and Albania in 2023 is a bilateral initiative between these two countries. Member States may apply national legislation implementing EU law, including asylum law, to situations which fall outside the scope of EU law, provided that such application does not undermine or circumvent the application of harmonised rules or obligations under EU law as a whole. The Commission takes note of the information provided by the Honourable Members. The Commission follows the initiative carried out by Italy and Albania closely and continuously assesses its compliance with EU law and fundamental rights.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-23 “E-001615/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission This transaction has not been formally notified to the Commission. It is up to the companies to notify transactions for merger control clearance, if they constitute a concentration with an EU dimension under the Merger Regulation 1 . The processing of personal data requires a legal basis under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2 . The acquisition of the shares in a company that is a controller of personal data does not provide a legal basis for the processing of personal data by the acquiring company. The transmission of personal data by X to xAI and any further processing of individuals’ personal data by xAI would therefore require a legal basis in the GDPR. Without prejudice to the competences of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, the enforcement of the GDPR in individual cases lies primarily with the competent national supervisory authorities and courts. For instance, in April 2025, the Irish Data Protection Commission announced the commencement of an investigation into the processing of personal data comprised in posts on the X social media platform for the purposes of training generative artificial intelligence models, in particular the Grok Large Language Models (LLMs), developed by xAI. In 2024, the EU adopted the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) 3 . The AI Act in Article 53 sets out specific transparency requirements regarding training data for general-purpose AI (GPAI) models. In addition, Article 55 imposes an obligation on providers of GPAI models with systemic risks to identify and mitigate those risks arising from the development and use of such models. The AI Act’s enforcement mechanism is key to ensuring that AI models placed in the EU market are not threatening consumers’ rights and the democratic values of the EU. 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1. 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence, OJ L, 12.7.2024, 2024/1689.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• 2025-03-06 “E-000979/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 1. Regulation 656/2014 1 applies in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and does not affect the division of competences between the EU and the Member States or the obligations of the national authorities under the relevant international conventions 2 . This also includes the responsibility for declaring and coordinating search and rescue (SAR) activities in cases such as the one in question. In line with international law, this competence belongs exclusively to the rescue coordination centre(s) that oversee the area in which the specific incident takes place. 2. The Commission has no competence to influence the way SAR activities are declared or performed by the responsible national authorities. Nevertheless, saving lives at sea is a moral duty, as well as a legal obligation for Member States under international law, independently from the circumstances that lead people to find themselves in distress at sea. The Commission remains committed to supporting the Member States to operate in line with this principle. The Commission repeatedly calls on all actors involved in SAR to always prioritise saving lives at sea and to comply with the relevant legal framework. 3. According to open sources, the persons stranded on the Miskar oil platform were rescued by Sea-Watch and subsequently safely disembarked in Lampedusa on 4 March 2025, upon instructions received by Sea-Watch from the Italian Coast Guard. 1 Regulation (EU) No 656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules for the surveillance of the external sea borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 93–107. 2 Such as the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-11 “E-000617/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the recent reports on the use of Paragon. Its position on the use of spyware is very clear: any attempts to illegally access data of citizens, including journalists and political opponents, is unacceptable, if confirmed. The data protection and privacy acquis offers comprehensive protection to the confidentiality of communications and users’ personal data and terminal equipment. EU data protection law is applicable to the processing of personal data by private entities, even where such processing is required for national security purposes. Under the ePrivacy Directive 1 , the interception or surveillance of communications is prohibited without the consent of the user. While restrictions are permitted for important public objectives, they are subject to strict conditions and safeguards. The Law Enforcement Directive 2 is also applicable when competent authorities process personal data for law enforcement purposes. Supervisory authorities have effective powers to examine any allegations of misuse, and data processed can be subject to judicial review. As regards the protection of journalistic sources and confidential information, the Commission recalls that Article 4(3)(c) of the European Media Freedom Act 3 (EMFA) will become applicable as of 8 August 2025. The application of this and other safeguards in EMFA will ensure free and independent media across the EU and protect them against interference. The Commission will use all tools at its disposal to ensure the effective application of EU law. 1 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37. 2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4. 3 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R1083. The provision stipulates that ‘Member States shall ensure that journalistic sources and confidential communications are effectively protected’ and that, subject to a strictly limited derogation, ‘Member States shall not deploy intrusive surveillance software on any material, digital device, machine or tool used by media service providers, their editorial staff or any persons who, because of their regular or professional relationship with a media service provider or its editorial staff, might have information related to or capable of identifying journalistic sources or confidential communications’.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Privacy & digital economy
• 2025-01-30 “E-000423/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 sets out rules for providers of intermediary services to tackle illegal content, while safeguarding freedom of expression. The DSA imposes enhanced ’due diligence’ obligations on providers of very large online platforms, including conducting risk assessments and to put in place mitigation measures tailored to the risks identified including risks related to recommender systems. On 7 January 2025, Meta publicly announced the introduction of a system in the United States based on ‘Community Notes’ as a replacement to the third-party fact-checking Meta had previously used. Based on information available to the Commission, this policy does not currently apply in the EU. In addition, Meta has informed the Commission of changes to its content policy and political content control on Facebook and Instagram. These changes apply globally, including in the EU. The Commission has received Meta’s ad hoc risk assessment reports in relation to these changes and is reviewing them. In 2024, the Commission initiated formal proceedings against Meta, including in relation to the suspicion that Meta demotes political content in the recommender systems of Facebook and Instagram. 2 The Commission is monitoring the functioning of Meta’s services to ensure compliance with the DSA. Finally, the Code of Conduct on Disinformation is a robust set of commitments to fight disinformation while respecting the freedom of expression. 3 Following the request of the signatories of the Code the Commission and the European Board for Digital Services, in February 2025, endorsed the Code as a code of conduct within the meaning of Article 45 DSA. Adherence to the Code may therefore constitute a mitigation measure within the meaning of Article 35 DSA. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022R2065 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373 3 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-01-27 “E-000339/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attaches great importance to upholding and fostering pluralistic and independent media in the EU and condemns any form of interference in the professional activities of journalists and their editorial independence. Article 3 of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) 1 is aimed at fostering citizens’ right to have access to pluralistic and editorially independent media content, by requiring Member States to put in place framework conditions for safeguarding such right. It does not apply to actions or decisions taken by media service providers related to their internal organisation. Nonetheless, the EMFA also provides for a set of safeguards - which will start applying in August 2025 – for the independent functioning of public service media, including requirements for Member States to ensure that public service media provide impartial and pluralistic information and opinions to their audiences. In this light, any action or decision taken by public service media providers should guarantee and not undermine their editorial independence and ability to fulfil their public service remit. The Commission is following closely the preparations in Member States, including Italy, to implement and apply EMFA and will engage with the relevant national authorities to ensure that the national initiatives in this respect are in line with the Act’s objectives and requirements. The Commission will also continue to monitor the situation of media freedom and pluralism in Italy and in all the other Member States, including within the forthcoming 2025 Rule of Law Report 2 . 1 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083, OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rulelaw/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2024-12-05 “E-002785/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The automotive industry is a core engine of European prosperity. The sector accounts for EUR 1 trillion in gross domestic product, a third of private research and development investment in the EU and it provides direct and indirect employment to 13 million Europeans. However, the European automotive sector is at a critical turning point, challenged by rapid technological changes and increasing competition. Against this background, the President of the Commission in January 2025 launched a Strategic Dialogue on the Future of the European Automotive Industry 1 , a collaborative and inclusive process designed to tackle the sector's most pressing challenges. On 5 March 2025, the Commission put forward an Action Plan 2 , which builds on the Strategic Dialogue. The Action Plan sets out concrete measures to help secure global competitiveness of the European automotive industry and maintain a strong European production base. It also includes measures to ensure better support for workers affected by the transition of the sector. In particular, the Commission has proposed to extend the scope of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund to also support workers threatened by imminent job displacement. Additionally, the Commission is working with social partners and Member States to increase European Social Fund Plus funding for the automotive sector, supporting workers who want to reskill and look for new job opportunities. The Commission is using the mid-term review to incentivise Member States to reprogramme more funding to these ends. Moreover, the Commission will work with social partners to prepare a Quality Jobs Roadmap to be published towards the end of 2025. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_378 2 https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/89b3143e-09b6-4ae6-a826932b90ed0816_en?filename=Communication%20-%20Action%20Plan.pdf”
  European Globalisation Adjustment Fund · EU policy on forced redundancies
• 2024-11-26 “E-002653/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 aims to contribute to a safe, predictable and trusted online environment that facilitates innovation and in which fundamental rights are protected. Under the DSA, very large search engines (VLOSEs) and very large online platforms (VLOPs) with more than 45 million users in the EU, such as X, are subject to specific due diligence obligations, as given their size, they pose particular risks for the protection of fundamental rights, the dissemination of illegal content, civic discourse and electoral processes and societal harms online. The Commission is in charge of supervising and enforcing these obligations. The actions taken under the DSA are aimed at ensuring that the systems, including algorithmic ones, of VLOSEs and VLOPs are not misused. Their providers must fulfil their responsibilities to identify and mitigate the risks related to such systems in the EU. On 18 December 2023, the Commission opened an investigation into X’s compliance with the DSA 2 . This investigation covers, among other things, X’s compliance with the DSA in relation to the dissemination of illegal content and the effectiveness of the measures taken to combat platform and information manipulation. At this stage, the Commission cannot comment on ongoing investigations. Finally, the Commission is continuously monitoring security matters related to social media platforms and has issued internal guidance regarding the use of such applications on the devices used for professional purposes. The Commission does not encourage the use of noncorporate tools for professional exchanges on such devices. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act). 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-opens-formal-proceedings-against-x-under-digitalservices-act”
  EU rules on digital competition · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-10-08 “P-001987/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU firmly condemns Russia’s ongoing intimidation, harassment and killing of European media workers who report from its war of aggression against Ukraine. This also includes the use of politically motivated arrest warrants, recently issued by Russia against international journalists reporting from war zones and frontlines. The EU consistently highlights Russia’s attempts to obstruct the work of European and other journalists addressing these issues regularly in multilateral fora like the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) where Russia is present. In particular, Russia’s ongoing intimidation and harassment of journalists in war zones and frontlines was raised in the statements by the EU at the OSCE Permanent Council on 26 September 2024 1 and 17 October 2024 2 . On 11 October 2024, the EU raised the issue in the European External Action Service Spokesperson’s statement where it condemned the death of Ukrainian journalist Victoria Roshchyna 3 . She died while being in illegal arbitrary Russian detention. The EU will remain steadfast in its commitment to protect media freedom and the safety of journalists around the world and in war zones. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/osce-permanent-council-no1489vienna-26-september-2024_en?s=66 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/osce-permanent-council-no1492vienna-17-october-2024_en?s=66 3 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ukrainerussia-statement-spokesperson-death-ukrainian-journalist-russiancaptivity_en”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2024-09-10 “E-001665/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission Detention conditions are primarily a responsibility of Member States. All Member States have, however, committed themselves to respect the standards on this matter drafted by the Council of Europe, such as the 2006 European Prison Rules 1 . Moreover, on 8 December 2022, the Commission adopted a Recommendation on the procedural rights of suspects and accused in pre-trial detention and on material detention conditions 2 . It should be noted that the minimum standards, as laid down in the Recommendation, are not legally binding on Member States. Member States had the deadline of 1 October 2024 to inform the Commission on their follow-up to this Recommendation. Based on this information, the Commission will monitor and assess the measures taken by Member States and submit a report. 1 https://rm.coe.int/european-prison-rules-978-92-871-5982-3/16806ab9ae 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7570”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2024-08-08 “P-001503/2024 Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission The Commission condemns Belarus’ hybrid attack on the EU’s external borders and stands in full solidarity with the Member States affected by these actions. Member States have a duty to protect the external borders, in line with their obligations under EU law, including the respect of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the right to asylum in the application of EU law. National security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State. The Commission is in close contact with the Polish authorities to ensure that the protection of the EU’s external borders against the instrumentalisation of migration for political purposes is done in a manner which is compliant with fundamental rights, in particular by guaranteeing effective access to the asylum procedure and respecting the principle of non-refoulement.”
  EU-Belarus relations · Asylum & border control
• “(15:31:31 – 15:33:50): I address my question to Mr. Volman. It's very good that there should be an age verification based on the digital wallet because that's the only instrument which fully guarantees good management of data. It allows us to see whether or not a user has a particular age without revealing names, surname and date of birth. But I'd like to add to that, that age verification is only the start. And so it's not useful to try to construct a fortified door If however, there can be dangers associated with that, we have to make sure that social media generally is a safe place. It's not a question of building walls. So my question is as follows. You explained to us that VPN is not really useful for getting around the checks because VPN actually is for geographical location or to protect privacy. But if a platform in any case wants to have a proof through the age verification system VPN on its own, as you said, is not useful. We accept that. But as you have said, we've got other sources such as parents. So that being the case, how can we guarantee that the adoption of this instrument doesn't give a false sense of security making the platforms disinvest in the the the actual active protection of young people. And so I'm I'm coming to my conclusion, chairman. We don't want a situation in which the responsibility falls on the parents. It's the platforms who have to provide a safe digital space in which no 1 can get around the system? Thank you.”
  Age restrictions on children's access to social media · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• “Thank you chairman. Well, very briefly, I think it's clear that this is a European issue. I mean, you from the Commission, but also citizens labs have clearly confirmed that. Now, I understood from Citizens Lab that Francesco Mantellato, the director of Front Page, was illegally spied on by Paragon. Now we have to see whether that's the case for the other journalist, Sergio Pellegrino. But my question to you is on the 8th of August, the info will come into force. Now, which kinds of sanctions can the commission levy on the Italian government if it is shown that it illegally spied on journalists, not for reasons of being involved in organised crime or terrorism, but for preventive reasons to undermine press freedom in Europe.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “President. Thank you very much. Mr. Gill, as well. Now, you said that one of the five aims of the digital compact is to promote a digital safe space that respects human rights. Against that backdrop, a I does have huge risks in terms of armed conflict. If you look at Ukraine, Gaza drones with explosives are becoming more and more autonomous. When the link to the human operator is dropped, the. The mission can carry on. So that means that software stays. This no longer humans. So how can I distinguish between a civilian or a white flag waved by a soldier? These Apparatus is being governed globally in this digital compact would be a big chance for us to guarantee proper human decision making in this. How does the UN intend to transform the compact into a legal framework that's properly binded, as with the Ottawa Convention? Uh, the, uh, against, uh, mines, given the, the context where Russia, China and the US are massively investing in more and more autonomous arm system systems. I am scared of this setup in terms of what may transpire in future.”
  Artificial Intelligence for military purposes
• “We know officially that the Italian government. Has admitted things they shouldn't have done because there's a procedure for tapping phones. Finds the authorization needs to come from the general prosecutor in Rome. So we know that Paragon, as you've confirmed. Tapped the communications of Mediterranean activists. We know that Mr. Cancellata was, uh, was communications were intercepted. Now, technically, I don't think you've confirmed whether the spyware used was Paragon, but, uh. Unless, uh, a journalist has committed an act of terrorism or killed someone, he can't preventively be spied on. And, uh, the judiciary hasn't said anything either. And the new element is. The, uh, spying on Pellegrino. That happened just recently. And I think you were just working on that now. So the government has said that, there are 14 European countries involved here. Apple has talked about 150 countries. I think this is a European issue, but I think it goes further than that. I mean, as you said in this comes into various conflicts that exist. So I have a very simple question for you. I don't think it's worth asking questions on Pellegrino yet, but you've been working on Cancelado. Mr. Cancelado for longer. So, uh, can you confirm the kind of software used there? And what have you found? And that's very important because, uh, chairman, we have the Media Freedom Act and in article four that bans, bans, espionage activities on journalists. And then you have the civil rights discourse as well because media mediterranean Mediterranean. The NGO, uh, well, really, I mean, they're helping people there. Not a danger to anyone, are they?”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “Thank you very much, Commissioner. 25% of children, you said just a moment ago have been involved or have witnessed online bullying. This is harrowing. It's an emergency, and we have to act immediately. The action plan is a necessary step. I was quite impressed by how you described this, but whether this succeeds or not will depend on the platforms reactions. It's not enough just to remove harmful content once a tragedy has occurred. And it's not even about banning the content for younger people. I'm not saying it's not good, but it's not enough. We have to look at the root causes, the architecture of digital environments and those algorithms for or in order to rake in profits, just promote conflict instead of protecting the users. If we are to have an efficient plan, how are we going to oblige the platforms for banning the A spread of harmful content before it harms teenagers. And if we report these, how are we going to have a swift reaction? There has to be taken down within minutes, not within hours or days. We can only judge the plan on the basis of specific results. So let's work together to truly protect these children.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• “Thank you very much. Thank you, Vice President Virkkunen. Digital sovereignty is at the heart of the challenge that we face. It's not just making sure that the DSA is respected, but it's about doing things properly. Market operators need to assume their responsibility in the US. There is a court case against, uh, Mark Zuckerberg because of dependence, leading mechanisms and the effect on minors. We need to make sure that we look at democracy. Yesterday there was an Anfa working group and we met meta and TikTok on article 18. We said that reducing the visibility of content through algorithms algorithms is the same as constraining dissemination, but they don't want to manipulate their systems. When are you going to check their algorithms? When are you going to do that so that we know whether what they're saying corresponds with reality? And now on, um, digital fairness, are you going to ban mechanisms that create dependencies, especially when it comes to young people? Now the Digital Services Act, are we going to take steps so that we have sovereignty and independence when it comes to critical infrastructure? Now the AV, MSD, are you going to have an age limit that will be uniform across the EU? Thank you.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online · Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• “So good evening, president. Now let's talk about Pekka. The commission has not yet proposed binding legislation against the abuse of spyware or publish the promised communication. The time has come to do it. Do it now. Meanwhile, a new case is shaking. Europe. The spyware Paragon graffiti instance. According to meta, 17 European countries are involved. 61 users were infected, seven of which were Italian. Apple is talking about 150 countries worldwide. I appeal to those who have received notifications from Apple and Meta come out into the open. Help us. We must protect journalists, opponents, activists from. We must protect them all from illegal spying spied on by U.S. funded Israeli software. Citizen lab confirms that at least two Italian and one European journalists have been spied on. The commission answered my question by saying that the illegal use of spyware is unacceptable, but concrete actions are missing and they are needed. On the 30th of May, with the SNP and green groups, we went to Rome. We spoke to the victims. This is a case that is not exclusively Italian. It is a European issue. And there is no democracy without freedom, without freedom of press, there is no democracy whatsoever. Thank you.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “Thank you very much, chair. Well, first of all, thanks to the speakers for this very significant and important contributions in Cult Committee. We're also working on this subject with an initiative report that I am the rapporteur for, that analyzes the impact of social media on young people and proposes specific measures to fight against these risks. But Eurostat data from 2024 tell us that 97% of people between 16 and 29 years old in the EU connect to the internet every day, and nine young people out of ten are active on social media. And then there are other data which are even more alarming, which we've just heard a few minutes ago that millions of young people in Europe access pornographic content every month, very often under the age of ten. That's a. Uh, an alarm bell for us. We have to act. We need to be more severe. We need to have more robust verification systems that are really can protect privacy to stop miners accessing, uh, violent or sexually explicit content. Uh, technical controls, though, are not enough. We need an educational strategy across Europe to help, uh, parents and teachers, uh, to enable children to, uh, uh, know how to navigate the digital world as digital citizens, uh, fighting against cyber bullying needs to be a plan for education, uh, in, uh, effective behavior and, uh, online respect. Uh, uh, it's a question of defending dignity and therefore the future of our digital democracy. Thank you. Chair.”
  Safety features & content control for child protection online
• “Thank you. I simply wanted to add a couple of things. Uh, words of thanks, uh, for your intervention. Last week, we had this discussion, uh, on the bleak and the during the trip to Rotterdam. And I simply wanted to under line the importance of the fight against corruption and To coordination. It's a fight which we all have to carry on right now. To fight organized crime, basically. We know that drugs are imported from South America by the Ndrangheta and by the Albanian mafia. But, um, this entire this entire organization at the local level as well, of course, that requires corruption to be able to function knowing where the container with the drug is. It's a simple example, but here we understand the importance. Indeed, everything that I've heard up until now. Well, I, I always hope that there will be that understanding on the part of the European Commission as well on this issue, because when we speak about corruption, about organised crime and fighting against it, it means that we need, of course, the support of all. We need citizens to be understand and to be involved in this entire process. Thank you.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• “Thank ou very much, chair. Miss Yorova, we listened to your project, democracy 27, with great interest, and we'd like to wish you every success in this project. Of course, everyone needs to feed in to support our European democracy. Now you recently referred to a series of visits to member states, and I'd like to ask you, as part of these visits, do you aim to also go deeper into spyware abuses? As you'll recall, during your mandate, the PEGA committee at the European Parliament formally recommended that the commission adopt a legislative act about this, but to date, nothing has been done. That notwithstanding, in the meantime, we've had other scandals, the Paragon scandal. So do you aim to put pressure on the commission to ensure that it respects the recommendations of this parliament? And finally, in light of the growing role of digital platforms in public debate? How do you assess the impact of social networks algorithms vis a vis polarization and the spread of hate speech online and the weakening of various or the siloing of various political views. Thank you very much.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “President. Commissioner. Today, president von der Leyen informed us that disinformation is dividing our societies and eroding democracy. So we can say that a democracy shield that's effective has to be based on two pillars. The first is the freedom of the press, independent information and the protection of sources. This is the only antidote to disinformation. Six journalists were spied on with spyware. Illegal spyware. If the media is not independent from politics, democracy is fragile. The second pillar is the defence of elections, from interference from abroad and from large digital platforms. We can't allow any old Elon Musks to manipulate our democratic processes. It's not. It's unbelievable that it's been two years since the investigation into X, and we still don't know anything. The freedom of the press, digital transparency. This is the backbone of democracy. Thank you.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Vice president, vice president. Commissioner. Cyber bullying is not the same thing as bullying. There was there were once clear borders, clear limits to this type of behaviour. Once you left school, once you were back home. Where you could close the door and you weren't bullied anymore. But that has all gone now because with cyber bullying, people can get to you anywhere. And this is a phenomenon that knows no breaks. And victims are very likely to have suicidal thoughts compared to children who do not suffer this phenomenon. So there are two things that must be implemented. First, we need a European set of guidelines on access to social media for young people. And I want to be very clear on this when it comes to policy, well, before it is laid out, experts must be consulted when an emergency takes place. You need experts in place to tackle it, as we did with Covid. And once the right kind of age has been decided on when people can access social media, well that needs to be implemented across the EU. That's the first thing. Second thing. The responsibility of platforms. Platforms must be turned into the right kind of atmosphere for young people. When cyberbullying takes place, any content that has been used must be taken down without waiting for burdensome red tape or endless steps to follow. For too long we've been saying to young people, turn off your phones. Now it's time to turn to the platforms and say, stop the violence. Thank you.”
  Digital platforms liability for harmful and illegal content
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. The one who controls the algorithm controls the public debate, and the one who controls the public debate can influence votes. So it's good to find X. It got a virulent reaction from across the Atlantic, and Elon Musk is virtually calling the EU a Fourth Reich. The crucial thing is to look at algorithm and appellation meta two algorithms reduce the visibility of political content. The same is true of other platforms too. So you've got a private sector actor deciding what we can see, what should be given prominence, what we don't see. The centre for Media Resilience, uh, can't keep track 24 hours a day. Every minute counts during an election. And so we're playing catch up. We're years behind. The Democratic damage is already done. We are seeing the outcome of elections already. So it's too late to rectify it.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank very much. Madam president, commissioner. When I was on mission in the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, I discovered the figure of extractors. These are children recruited by organized crime to recover cocaine from containers coming from South America. I started thinking about my city Naples, where more and more young people are becoming victims and the perpetrators of, armed war.”
  EU policy on criminal justice
• “Thank you president. Colleagues. The freedom of the press is not an algorithm, it's democracy. Seeking the truth. The fine imposed on Google is a correct and necessary sign because Google abused its power, monopolizing digital advertising and suffocating competition. When a single player controls data, news, advertising and income, then there is no freedom of information. It's a monopoly, which is the enemy of pluralism. And we need plurality of voices. Who pays the greater price? It's independent newspapers, journalists which seek the truth, a small editors. Now we need to ensure that our laws actually have life breathed into them. Because to guarantee freedom of information, we need rules to the commission. I say do not fear giants. You must continue in the same way with investigations for other platforms. Tiktok and meta X defend the citizens, not algorithms. Europe cannot be neutral. When the freedom of the press is jeopardized. It must choose which camp in the camp of democracy.”
  EU rules on digital competition
• “Thank you, Madam Chairman. We like freedom and that's why we need to protect ourselves from disinformation. Opinions are opinions. But if you say information, if you say something is information when it's not true, that's misinformation. So thank you Commissioner. You've already explained what this center is going to look like. You've given us a lot of information, but I'd like to say that we already have a pilot project in the Culture Committee, and we hope that we will be able to use that information to improve the services of the center. There'll be technicians, IT specialists, and that will be helpful for election campaigns too. There's misinformation 24 over seven. And we also need to identify what information is and what misinformation is, even if it's not clear. This center will need to look at manipulated videos, identify, uncover misinformation in real time so that the instruments can be used for the Democracy Shield.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you for your truth, your words of truth. On the 8th of August. In a month this will. Media Freedom Act will come into force in many countries. Haven't even introduced this yet. In Cyprus, for instance, the draft law makes it easier to spy on journalists in Slovakia. Well, let's not talk about Slovakia in Malta. They don't even know which ministry needs to deal with this issue. In Hungary of Orban, political will is non-existent. And in Italy, well, the board of the Righ is appointed by the government. There is no reform in the area of governance. So basically this is in the hands of the majority, because the uh, managers of Rea have clearly and openly said that they belong to Prime Minister Maloney's party and for journalists were spied upon, uh, openly through spyware, uh, with a boat by, uh, by a company or sold by a company called Paragon, uh, an Israeli company funded by American. So let us stop, uh, an alibi. Brussels needs to act herself animals. **Nicolae ȘTEFĂNUȚĂ @Chair: But I now give the floor to Mr. Animals from PFI group.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “Thank you. President. Well, today we're not just discussing a directive. We're actually defending cultural diversity, legislative sovereignty and European democracy against dental attack. The Trump administration has decided to identify the Avms as a barrier to trade, and is threatening to hit European production with a tax of 100%. It's a hostile approach, not just versus the European Union, but also versus all of those who believe in a strong audiovisual sector which is diversified and independent. Trump is striking out at Europe by saying that might is right, ignoring the principles of reciprocity, cooperation and transatlantic dialogue. But we're not going to fall into that trap. The defence of our cultural heritage is not negotiable. This directive is much more than just a law. It is a shield to defend our diversity, our pluralism, our creators, and our history. This is a battle for independence and cultural diversity in Europe, and it's a battle that we do not plan to lose.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you very much. Chairman. Thank you. Commissioner. We have a mission which is to counteract the idea that fighting misinformation is censorship. They don't do this directly. They distort the public debate. Let's take the case of X. Digital platforms are really public services. They come from that. They need to have public responsibility. A recent parliament survey shows that 42% of European young people 16 to 30 years old, mainly finds out information about politics through Instagram and Facebook. That's where the future public opinion is formed, and that's where today's democracy is under challenge. So, Commissioner, hasn't the time come to imagine and create a public digital infrastructure in Europe for the common good that can also value our incredible audiovisual, cultural and information heritage? Why don't we create a European brand or mark for digital reliability, which shows when people are meeting democratic standards? It's time to make a stand. Democracy has to be defended and built, even in the digital world.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• “Thank you very much. President. Commissioner. It's a shame that in Italy we didn't have the Commission on the Rule of Law. It's a real shame, because we would have realized about the extent of Italian democratic backsliding. The EU UDS seeks to protect us against manipulation and interference. But this manipulation is not only coming from the usual suspects, i.e. Russia and China. Today, online manipulation of algorithms is also coming from the the big tech leaders. We cannot accept that after two years of investigation into X, the Commission still needs to decide. It is the time to provide answers and to act to ensure that we have digital sovereignty at a European level. The Shield talks about the need to ensure the independence of journalists, but how can we do that if those who are informing us are threatened with a spyware and threatened with the muzzle? We need to work against the spyware. We need to ensure that no critical voices are intimidated against, and no spyware is used against journalists. This is the strength or should be the strength of our democracy. Thank you.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “Thank you very much, chairman. I was struck by your focus on the consumer. And how to interact with them. Your presentation was very exhaustive. In with the previous candidate as well. I felt like there was a good debate about the impacts on health of legal and illegal drugs. I understand that in your mandate, you've gone from monitoring to a more active role. So my question is. Most of the competencies for drugs are at a national level. These are non-binding recommendations. So how do you plan to make sure that these recommendations are really taken up by member states? What do you suggest to overcome the fragmentation between national policies that are often not coordinated at European level? We recently went on a mission to the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, and there we heard requests to consider the fight against drugs as an investment, not a cost for Europe. We saw the issue of underage people who are not consumers, but who deal these drugs, these young people die. These people are brought into gangs. So how do we, Coordinate. How do we go from just monitoring to a more active role?”
  Regulation of drug precursors in the EU
• “Thank you. President. Commissioner. Well, it should be parents, not algorithms, that bring up our children. Mrs. von der Leyen said that. But in reality, 97% of young people use internet every single day, and 1 in 4 is addicted to their smartphones. For children between 11 and 14, Many spanned more than nine hours a day online. While they're online, they say cyber bullying, pornography, hate contact, betting are all sorts of stuff. You can't blame the kids or the families. It's our responsibility because we have acted too late and these platforms are using manipulative technologies. We need to set age limits. Now sometimes we need to have the courage to say no. First of all, we need to protect young people. We cannot simply send a generation to be brought up by the lords of Big Tech. The damage will be irreversible.”
  Age restrictions on children's access to social media
• “Well thank you, chairman. Uh, chair of the Data Protection Board. Well, thank you very much for your presentation. We welcome the positive results that you have described. I mean, I think there have been important steps forward taken, but more work still needs to be done. I think protecting data isn't only technical, it's a political issue. It's to do with power. Whoever controls data controls people. And I think now that power is all too often concentrated in the hands of large digital businesses, private players who don't operate under Democratic control, or administrations that aren't transparent about what they're doing. In 2024, we've seen the increased use of biometric data, and we've also seen AI systems used more and more, and we've seen guarantees not being applied. So given this framework, the purchase of. The X platform and the AI startup that he bought us, and I'm talking about Elon Musk here obviously are of concern because this is an operation which is worth over €800 billion and a dollar. Excuse me. And he can train his AI systems on data, which has been taken from millions of users. And this is often data that is polarizing and and not proper information. So is this compatible with the GDPR? Is it acceptable to have AI systems trained on data that comes from a platform that refuses European rules on data protection? Thank you.”
  GDPR