Andi CRISTEA

Policy topics Andi CRISTEA is active on

What Andi CRISTEA has said (18)

• 2026-03-17 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 19.5.2026 Written question The Commission is committed to supporting Member States in central and eastern Europe through cohesion policy investments. The 2014-2020 ex post evaluation of cohesion policy funds [1] showed that, while existing support in these areas has not yet been sufficiently scaled to address business growth and internationalisation, investments have laid vital foundations for growth and innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises. Smart Specialisation Strategies (S3) offer a clear path forward in the next programming period. Regions adopting S3 already demonstrate better business performance, particularly when combined with instruments such as the Innovation Investment Instrument (I3), alongside deeper synergies with Horizon Europe (HE) and InvestEU [2] , for example by leveraging transfer mechanisms [3] or providing alternative funding for projects awarded the Seal of Excellence. Emerging European economies are among those which benefitted most [4] from InvestEU-supported finance for investments and are specifically targeted by the European Innovation Council (EIC) Pre-Accelerator call [5] . To better target European financial support for these economies, the Commission announced the setup of the EastInvest facility, a dedicated financing platform for eastern border regions [6] . In the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, renewed support is proposed to continue with investments in innovation and industrial transition via the National and Regional Partnership Plans, which will continue allowing transfer possibilities, also to the European Competitiveness Fund. [1] Commission Staff Working Document Ex post evaluation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund for the programming period 2014-2020: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2025)328&lang=en. [2] The EU’s flagship research and innovation programme: https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en. [3] The transfer mechanism gives the Member State possibility to transfer up to 5% of their resources under shared management to any other EU directly or indirectly managed instrument. The transferred funding can be used only for the benefit of the Member State concerned. For instance, a transfer can enable excellent HE proposals from the concerned Member State/region to participate in HE when budgetary constraints would otherwise prevent them from being selected for HE support. Additionally, the InvestEU Fund currently allows the possibility for Member States to transfer resources from their shared management funds to a Member State Compartment and hence increase financing (from equity to venture debt and risk sharing loans) in their country to support high-growth companies or other investments. [4] On a gross domestic product/per capita weighted basis. [5] The Commission is supporting companies in the EU region also by the EIC Pre-Accelerator call targeting specifically small and medium-sized enterprises and startups in widening countries. The goal of this initiative is to increase the business, investor and technology readiness of high potential deep-tech startups from the widening countries preparing them to successfully apply for the EIC Accelerator and secure other forms of investment. The first edition of this call was organised in 2025 with more than 1000 applications, 70 companies have been funded and 320 awarded with Seal of Excellence to help them access alternative or complementary EU and national funding sources. The next EIC Pre-Accelerator call is planned in 2027. [6] Communication on the EU's eastern regions bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/themes/eastern-border-regions_en.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2026-03-03 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question The proposal for the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) [1] indeed aims to reinforce the EU’s global leadership by strengthening the resilience, competitiveness and decarbonisation of its industrial base, while making the Single Market a stronger platform for secure and sustainable industrial cooperation. This also supports deeper cooperation with partners with which the EU has concluded trade agreements in full respect of the EU’s international commitments. The Commission recognises that businesses operating across the EU and the UK are part of integrated trade, investment value chains across Europe, supporting growth, competitiveness and economic security. The measures in the IAA reaffirm the EU’s openness to trade as a source of economic strength and resilience, while ensuring fair access to the Single Market and strengthening Europe’s industrial base. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0100.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2025-11-12 “E-004503/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Given the upcoming expiry of the steel safeguard on 30 June 2026, conducting a full impact assessment would have seriously risked leaving a gap of protection of the steel sector between the safeguard and the new steel measure. In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines 1 , a derogation was granted. Instead, the Commission conducted a public consultation and a call for evidence. In addition, it prepared a detailed analytical document in the form of a Staff Working Document 2 (SWD), including an economic assessment presenting the evidence behind the proposal and cost estimates. The analysis focuses on the steel sector, including downstream users. The SWD finds limited impacts: the most restrictive scenario shows steel prices rising by 3.25%, downstream output effects remain modest and the increase in household consumption prices is estimated at 0.42%. The EU will engage with the relevant trade partners as part of Article 28 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 3 process. The SWD’s modelling already captures integrated value chains under existing Free Trade Agreements and shows no significant disruption for sectors relying on steel inputs Article 4(1)(c) (in the main document) of the proposal 4 and, where necessary, also adopt safeguard measures complying with the requirements of the applicable agreement as per Article 4bis of the proposal. On compensatory concessions, the SWD assesses cross-sector effects of tariff adjustments. The economy-wide impacts are small, with export changes of 0.1 to 0.3 percent point relative to baseline, indicating limited market-access risks for EU industries. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation/better-regulation-guidelines-andtoolbox_en. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=SWD(2025)780&lang=en. 3 https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.htm#art28_bis. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)726&lang=en.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• 2025-10-21 “E-004130/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is fully engaged in maintaining and fostering the EU's autonomous, reliable and cost-effective access to space, as indicated in the EU Space Programme Regulation 1 and in the Mission Letter of the Commissioner for Defence and Space 2 . Access to space is a key enabler and indispensable element in the overall space value chain: without autonomous access to space, there is no credible and strategically autonomous EU space policy. The EU has regained its autonomous access to space thanks to the entry into service of the Ariane 6 and Vega C launchers which have already brought into orbit EU satellites for both Copernicus and Galileo EU systems. Additional launches of EU satellites with European launchers are planned throughout 2026. The EU ambition is to facilitate the aggregation of demand for European launchers, to foster research and innovation in technology, and to support European critical and strategic test and launch infrastructure, without prejudice to the European Space Agency (ESA)’s activities. The Commission is regularly engaging with ESA to ensure alignment of ESA’s activities with the strategic goals of the EU Space Programme. The EU and ESA are separate entities with different governance systems and decision-making procedures: ESA selects the launch service providers for the launch of ESA satellites while the EU selects the launch service providers for the launch of its own EU satellites. For the support of United States operators launching from EU territory, the Commission is not involved in any decision. The Commission is committed to ensuring an autonomous, secure and cost-efficient capability to access space, considering the essential security interests of the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj/eng. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/630c289c-7ff1-4fdd-944f0f596e7e7914_en?filename=mission-letter-kubilius.pdf.”
  EU-US relations · "Buy European" provisions · EU competences on space policy
• 2025-09-17 “E-003604/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission WiFi calling is a possibility implemented in the most recent smartphones that the end-user can decide to activate. Whether the option of calling over WiFi (including on roaming) is supported and actually available is a choice left to providers of mobile electronic communications services, in accordance with the requirements of national legislation and in conformity with EU legislation. To this end, the European Electronic Communications Code 1 (EECC) affirms ‘the principle that […] a national regulatory or other competent authority should neither impose nor discriminate in favour of the use of a particular type of technology’ 2 . From the end-user’s perspective, numerous Over-the-Top applications allow making calls using an internet connection through Wi-Fi or mobile data without activating Wi-Fi calling, allowing end-users to make calls without using traditional calling services. Hence, it is not necessary for national authorities to require providers to support and to make available WiFi calling, in accordance with the principle referred to above. As to emergency communications, the EECC requires Member States to ensure that caller location information is made available after an emergency communication is set up. Challenges may arise for providers of mobile communications services depending on how this obligation is implemented at national level. Any limitation to provide access to the single European emergency number 112 in terms of location of the caller when using WiFi calling, might prompt the operator to use another technology, such as traditional calling services, that allow making caller location information available as required 3 . The Commission is in contact with providers of mobile communications services and national regulatory authorities to follow-up on possible future developments. 1 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, pp. 36–214. 2 See Recital 25. 3 See Art. 109(6) EECC.”
  Geo-blocking · 5G
• 2025-09-02 “E-003361/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The support to space new entrants, startup and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is a key objective of the EU Space Programme 1 . To this end, the Commission created the CASSINI initiative 2 , with an investment capacity of up to EUR 1 billion for 2021-2027 complemented by an equivalent amount by private venture capital funds. Since 2021, the CASSINI initiative has channeled investment capital guarantees to 16 venture capital funds and made four co-investments directly into space companies. These funds have made more than 60 investments into space companies until the second quarter of 2024. The European Innovation Council has provided over EUR 300 million in support for space technologies. Within Horizon Europe, SMEs benefit from EUR 15.3 billion in Cluster 4 ‘Digital, Industry and Space’ with a lump-sum cost model, where there is no need to declare non-recurring costs separately. The European Investment Bank also provides venture debt to SMEs and mid-caps developing highly innovative technologies, solutions or platforms 3 . These financing solutions have proven to be successful in helping space SMEs accessing finance and thus also in funding their non-recurring costs. Looking ahead, the Commission, in close coordination with the European Space Agency, the EU Agency for the Space Programme and Member States, will: (i) set-up a CASSINI Growth Investment Facility and a Debt / non-dilutive Financing Facility, also addressing the scaleup phase; (ii) set up a Manufacturing Accelerator, offering advisory services for optimising manufacturing processes, logistics and sourcing strategies; and (iii) facilitate the expansion and modernisation of manufacturing and test facilities across the EU, in line with state aid rules. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj/eng. 2 with the European Investment Fund as implementing partner; https://www.cassini.eu/cassini-initiative. 3 https://www.eib.org/en/products/equity/venture-debt/index.”
  EU competences on space policy · EU industrial funding
• 2025-07-18 “P-003002/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (Network and Information Security [NIS2] Directive) 1 and Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (Critical Entities Resilience [CER] Directive) 2 aim to increase the cybersecurity and physical resilience of critical infrastructure across various sectors, among which drinking and waste water. While under the CER Directive Member States are required to identify the critical entities operating critical infrastructure in these sectors and carry out risk assessments, under the NIS2 Directive, Member States have to ensure that, as a rule, medium-sized or larger entities from the concerned sectors have to take cybersecurity riskmanagement measures to protect their network and information systems and to report significant incidents. Under the CER Directive, entities identified as critical will have to take resilience-enhancing measures. Member States had an obligation to transpose both directives into their national laws by 17 October 2024. The Commission has launched infringement proceedings against the Member States that have not notified full transposition. The recently adopted water resilience strategy 3 sets out flagship actions concerning finance, investments and infrastructure to achieve a stable supply. Moreover, the EU supports the implementation of EU cybersecurity legislation, including the NIS2 Directive, through the Digital Europe Programme and its Cybersecurity Work Programme 2025-27 4 . Calls for proposals under that topic will open in 2026 and 2027. 1 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80). 2 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p.164). 3 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS European Water Resilience Strategy (COM/2025/280 final). 4 https://cybersecurity-centre.europa.eu/document/download/8af166e1-69c5-4ccd-b38f5a3ffe43ad73_en?filename=DEP%20WP2025-2027_March2025.pdf.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-04-30 “P-001727/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the importance of ensuring a safe, predictable and trusted online environment. Pursuant to Article 91(1), second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 1 (Digital Services Act, DSA) by 17 November 2025, the Commission must evaluate and report to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on (a) the application of Article 33 of the DSA 2 , including the scope of providers of intermediary services covered by the obligations applicable to very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs), and (b) the way that the DSA interacts with other legal acts, in particular those listed in Article 2(3) and (4) of the DSA. To this purpose, the Commission is preparing the report, prior to the launch for adoption and the formal transmission of the report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee. As the report due by 17 November 2025 is targeted to the specific scope established in Article 91(1) of the DSA, the potential requirement of mandatory identity verification for social media accounts is not in scope and will not be covered. This is without prejudice to other evaluation reports due by 17 November 2027 and five years thereafter pursuant to Article 91, paragraph 2 to 6, of the DSA. 1 OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj. 2 Article 33 sets out the threshold and process for the designation of very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large online search engines (VLOSEs).”
  Electronic identity · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-03-05 “E-000950/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom 1 lays down provisions at EU level for the protection of the public, workers and patients against the dangers of exposure to ionising radiation. It requires to give information to patients who have undergone nuclear medicine procedures on the risks of ionising radiation and appropriate instructions aiming to restrict doses to persons in contact with them. However, this Directive does not include provisions on a European passport for medical radioisotopes. In 2011, the Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities (HERCA) network 2 prepared a ‘patient release card’ 3 , to be used on a voluntary basis, as a standard document in case of transboundary movement of nuclear medicine patients across Member States. Electronic Health Records (EHRs) may include information on procedures involving radioisotopes in line with their practices and legal requirements. Article 14 of the European Health Data Space (EHDS) Regulation 4 defines the priority categories of personal electronic health data in the scope of the European Electronic Health Record Exchange Format (EEHRxF), the rights of natural persons and the certification of EHR systems. Information on radioisotopes procedures could be exchanged as part of these priority categories, if relevant for healthcare provision, as they are not meant for non-medical uses. The EEHRxF technical specifications will be defined under Article 15 of the EHDS Regulation and be based on input from experts and stakeholders. A European medical radioisotope passport is not in the scope of the EHDS, but, under its Article 24, the Commission may support supplementary cross-border digital health services if Member States provide them through MyHealth@EU. 1 Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 2013 laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation, and repealing Directives 89/618/Euratom, 90/641/Euratom, 96/29/Euratom, 97/43/Euratom and 2003/122/Euratom, OJ L 13, 17.1.2014, p. 1. 2 HERCA is a voluntary association of 56 radiation protection authorities from 32 European countries including the 27 EU Member States.. More information at https://www.herca.org. 3 https://www.herca.org/download/4681/?tmstv=1743758182. 4 Regulation (EU) 2025/327 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2025 on the European Health Data Space and amending Directive 2011/24/EU and Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 OJ L, 2025/327 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/327/oj.”
  Processing of health data · Medical devices
• 2025-01-21 “P-000253/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen On behalf of the European Commission On 17 December 2024, the Commission opened formal proceedings against TikTok 1 , following the suspicion that the provider of this very large online platform may have breached the Digital Services Act (DSA) 2 in relation to its obligation to properly assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to election integrity, notably in the context of the Romanian presidential elections of 24 November 2024. After the formal opening of proceedings, the Commission continues to investigate the provider of TikTok’s compliance with the DSA, for example, by sending additional requests for information, conducting interviews and inspections, or taking additional monitoring actions, such as requesting access to algorithms. By means of a request for information, the Commission may require the provider of TikTok to provide data and documents it has been obliged to retain on the basis of the retention order issued by the Commission on 5 December 2024 3 . The opening of formal proceedings empowers the Commission to take further enforcement steps, such as interim measures and non-compliance decisions. The Commission may also make any commitment offered by the provider of TikTok to ensure compliance with the DSA binding on such provider. For example, on 5 August 2024, the Commission had made TikTok’s commitments to permanently withdraw TikTok Lite Rewards programme from the EU binding 4 . The DSA does not set any legal deadline for bringing formal proceedings to an end. The duration of an in-depth investigation depends on several factors, including the complexity of the case and the exercise of the rights of defence. Moreover, the opening of formal proceedings does not prejudge any other proceedings that the Commission may decide to initiate under the DSA. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6487 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6243 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4161”
  Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-01-21 “E-000248/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission Providers of intermediary services offering ride-hailing or home delivery services fall under scope of the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 . As such, their obligations under the DSA include providing a single point of contact to enable users to communicate directly and rapidly with them, pursuant to Article 12 of the DSA. Moreover, this point of contact must be reachable by electronic means and in a user-friendly manner, including by allowing recipients of the service to choose the means of communication, which shall not solely rely on automated tools. Moreover, the DSA provides for additional measures against misuse, including a notice and action mechanism (Article 16 of the DSA), and other tools to limit the use of the intermediary service by malicious recipients (such as drivers or deliverers) who act incompatible with the terms and conditions concerned or provide manifestly illegal content (Articles 14 and 23 of the DSA). Furthermore, recipients of services in the EU have the right to lodge a complaint against providers of intermediary services where they suspect that an infringement of the DSA has taken place, pursuant to Article 53 of the DSA 2 . The DSA also obliges providers of online platforms to provide an effective internal complaint-handling mechanism (Article 20 of the DSA). In addition, sellers of goods and providers of services who conclude distance contracts with consumers, including via online platforms, must provide their contact details, including their telephone number, under Article 6 of the Consumer Rights Directive (CRD) 3 . Under Articles 18 and 20 of the CRD, the seller is liable for timely delivery of the goods and bears the risk of loss or damage to the goods attributable to a carrier that the seller has offered to the consumer. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1 – 102. 2 According to Article 53 of the DSA, recipients of the service have the right to lodge a complaint before the Digital Services Coordinator of the Member State where the recipient is located or established. A list of all national Digital Services Coordinators is available on the Commission´s website (see https://digitalstrategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-dscs). 3 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 64–88. The competent national authorities and courts are responsible for the enforcement of EU consumer legislation regarding specific traders and infringements.”
  Platform workers · EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers
• “Thank you very much, chair. Commissioner. The real world relies on heavy infrastructure, on massive transportation networks, and not on applications run in one cloud or another. We might have all the new laptops and phones that we want every year, but at the end of the day, the electric cars brought in by are brought in by ships that burn fossil fuels just like they did 50 years ago. If we want to be absolutely honest, if we want to reduce pollution, it's not enough to tax emissions. It is our duty to create here in Europe, plants that would produce clean fuel, fuel for planes and ships. That means modern facilities for the production of synthetic fuels and biofuels. Ports prepared for green fuels, clear rules and support for investment so that companies would have the courage to invest. Thank you.”
  Decarbonisation of maritime transport
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. So the draft regulation, I would say, is a positive step towards stronger monitoring and implementation of the union's strategic priorities. And in the same time, it should also help reduce administrative burden and improve transparency across the European Union. Um, I take note positively of the introduction of the Unified System for tracking budget expenditure and applying horizontal principles consistently across all member states. At the same time, in my from my perspective and from the perspective of my political family, three points deserve further attention. First, the regulation should state more clearly that its purpose is not to define the eligibility of activities, but to track expenditure and the performance of financed actions. Second, stronger safeguards are needed in our perspective, to ensure that earmarked spending for climate, social objectives and gender equality is actually spent and not only planned and and reported. And finally, third, I personally support the performance based approach. And it's focused on results for for citizens. But I would favor a more granular system than the current three tier model. Thank you.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• “Thank you. Chair. Honourable members. Dear colleagues, the re-attribution of scientific and technical tasks to the European Chemicals Agency is not just a matter of administrative efficiency. It is a strategic step towards strengthening the EU's ability to act decisively on chemicals policy. This move enhances our union's capacity to protect citizens' health and the environment, while also supporting innovation and regulatory regulatory clarity for the European industry. I urge this House to support the Re-attribution and continue building a chemical policy that is effective, future proof and rooted in scientific excellence. Thank you.”
  Chemicals regulation
• “Commissioner. There's a dangerous road ahead, potentially with our American friends. We have a structural asymmetry in terms of principles, values and interests. We're no longer aligned and the prospects are not good. These tariffs are an expression of a deep social crisis in the United States, a social crisis as a result of the. Unequal distribution of wealth in the United States. The greatest inequality of wealth distribution since the French Revolution. What is being protected in America is not the interests of the workers, but the interests of investors. That is what needs to change.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Madam president, Commissioner. Since Brexit, access to British waters and shared stocks has become a permanent source of tension for our fishers. It is time to give some stability to coastal populations in France, Ireland, Netherlands and elsewhere. We've seen reductions in quotas, which was a bitter blow. We're now seeing that they're avoiding both the spirit and the letter of the fisheries agreement. We need a clear balance between access to European markets and access to fisheries resources. And if that agreement is not respected, that means that the fish stocks themselves are at threat, such as North Sea mackerel. So we need to work together to put a stable, fair system in place to respect ecosystems, protect our marine resources and coastal populations of the EU and the UK. Otherwise, what is the point of having an agreement until 2038?”
  Environmental regulation of fisheries
• “You so much, chair, and thank you to the commission for the presentation. Dear colleagues, we have to we have three balls in our hands, its principles, values and interests. And we need to carefully deal with all of them. And I, I have to say that we strive to find a balance between simplification and the values and principles we stand for. So my group is looking forward to working together with the other political groups on this file. And we are, however, concerned about some of the so-called simplification proposals, proposals, particularly on on due diligence. Our fear is that these proposals might undermine our efforts in combating human rights abuses and environmental harm. And and also our climate ambitions. But they also undermine legal certainty for businesses and might jeopardise the competitive edge of the EU's increasingly sustainability driven industry. So not only NGOs and trade unions, but also a significant number of companies and corporate groups have recently urged the EU to uphold the integrity of these laws, emphasising the importance of predictability. And I can mention, um, limiting the due diligence to only the first tier of the supply chains, which ignores, uh, where the most serious abuses often occur. I could mention weakening climate requirements, which ignores the urgency of the climate crisis, but also sends the wrong market signals, in our view, and harms long term competitiveness. Also removing harmonized civil liability and access to justice provisions risk leaving victims of abuse with with no reparation. So taking this um, concerns into into account, I'm ready to work closely with the rapporteur and my distinguished shadow rapporteurs to help deliver a well-balanced opinion. This is key. A well balanced opinion, one that simplifies the rules were needed with actually undermined without actually undermining competitiveness or weakening the level of ambition required to address today's social and environmental challenges. So we have three balls in our hands. We don't want to put nothing on the ground. And we would like to, uh, to, to to be very balanced and constructive in our approach.”
  Due diligence in supply chains (environmental and human rights)
• “Thank you, Madam Chair. I will be speaking in Romanian. Colleagues, today we're not talking about, uh, pipelines or gas molecules. No, this debate is about something more important. We're talking about, um, sickly dependence that ties certain state member states to, um, very sick regime that exports terror and fear by the cubic meter. And like all dependencies, it started out very comfortably and ends in a leash. To be pragmatic doesn't mean to buy cheap, but rather not to buy vulnerability. Colleagues, strategic autonomy means that we should choose our own interdependencies or dependencies, rather than have them imposed on us by geopolitical or historic contexts. Today we choose to turn off the tap and stop the Russian gas and we will not suffocate. On the contrary, we will breathe more easily. Thank you.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)