Fabio DE MASI

Policy topics Fabio DE MASI is active on

What Fabio DE MASI has said (80)

• 2026-06-17 “(09:50:37 – 09:51:47): President, look at Russia's war of aggression, flouting international law. We came up with sanctions. We bought more fracking gas from Donald Trump. But what about the Israel and US attack and their war? What are we doing turning a blind eye? What about our relationship with China? For years, Germany has had a high trade surplus, and we defended that trade surplus saying that it was down to the engineering genius of Germany. Now I'm sure that there is excess capacity in sectors such as steel, but China has pursued smart policies and critical raw materials, semiconductors. We need to learn from China. We need to recognize that withdrawing the public sphere from the economy does not work. We need to recognize that we have to invest in strategic sectors of the future rather Thank you.”
  EU-China relations
• 2026-03-18 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 22.5.2026 Written question The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [1] responds to security needs for the protection of European critical infrastructure and public spaces, covering drones as well as hybrid threats from other unmanned threat vectors such as balloons. In 2025, suspensions of flight operations due to drones, near-miss with an aircraft, violation of airspace by military drones, and the entry of unmanned balloons into national airspace were all observed in Europe. Such incidents attest to the pressing need to take measures to ensure the safe operation of drones in airspace, and to protect against threats arising from drones and other unmanned threat vectors. While incidents like these pose a security threat, attribution of responsibility for individual incidents is not within the Commission’s competence. [1] COM(2026)81 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2026-03-16 “Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission 27.5.2026 Written question Secure use of drones and the security of drones placed in the internal market are a priority of the Commission. The action plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security [1] (‘Action Plan’) envisages measures including a Drone Security Package to adapt the regulatory framework to new threats. In this context, the Commission will work also on establishing an EU Trusted Drone Label to further enhance trust in civil drones. The label would rely on independent third-party verification and define additional product-level trust and resilience criteria without duplicating existing EU cybersecurity legislation. The Commission has not been involved in discussion on an import ban against specific drone manufacturers, including DJI. All drones placed in the internal market must comply with the applicable regulatory framework, including Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 [2] and relevant delegated and implementing acts, such as Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 [3] and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 [4] . Based on the Cyber Resilience Act [5] , a large majority of drones placed on the EU market will also be subject to mandatory cybersecurity requirements. Moreover, the proposal for revision of the Cybersecurity Act [6] sets out an objective and risk-based framework to address non-technical cybersecurity risks in information and communications technologies (ICT) supply chains in the EU, which may also occur in relation to drones and counter-drone systems. As part of the action plan, the Commission proposed to initiate work with Member States on a coordinated risk assessment on drones and counter drone capacities. This could be followed by a Drone and Counter-Drone Security Toolbox proposing proportionate security mitigation measures. [1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security. COM(2026)81 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026DC0081. [2] Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1139/oj/eng. [3] Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/945/oj/eng. [4] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/947/oj/eng. [5] Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013 and (EU) 2019/1020 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 (Cyber Resilience Act). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj/eng . [6] Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), the European cybersecurity certification framework, and ICT supply chain security and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/881. COM(2026)11 final.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US trade relations · Trade relations with China
• 2026-03-10 “Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission 16.6.2026 Written question 1. Direct taxation, such as taxation of windfall or excess profits falls essentially within the competence of Member States. Every Member State remains currently fully competent to address excess profits generated by energy companies in national tax law provided it respects the fundamental freedoms laid down in the Treaties. The Italian excess profit tax but also the EU-level temporary solidarity contribution laid down in Chapter III of Council Regulation (EU) No 2022/1854, which targeted surplus profits of EU companies or permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors, was an extraordinary emergency measure applied during the energy crisis of 2022-2023 and justified by a specific set of circumstances at that time. 2. It is the position of the Commission that the EU should stay the course on its long-term strategy of diversification, decarbonisation and Russian fossil fuels phase out. Abandoning it would make the EU more dependent, more vulnerable and weaker. In line with this, the Commission is committed to facilitating the implementation of the REPowerEU Gas Regulation. On 18 March 2026, in light of the conflict in the Middle East and its impact on global energy markets, the Commission published updated guidance [1] on the implementation of the regulation, with a view to reducing any unnecessary barriers to non-Russian gas imports into the EU. [1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-publishes-updated-guidance-repowereu-gas-regulation-2026-03-18_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Fossil fuels · EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2026-03-10 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 18.5.2026 Written question The President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP), have been in continuous contact with partners in the Middle East and other relevant interlocutors to coordinate the EU’s response. These engagements were also used to express solidarity with the countries affected by Iran’s attacks, urge de-escalation, call for all parties to comply with international humanitarian law, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, and call on Iran to end destabilising activities in the region and ensure freedom of navigation and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz [1] . This diplomatic outreach included a high number of phone calls with a broad range of interlocutors. [1] At leadership level, that included — but is not limited to: • The videoconference co-hosted by the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission with leaders from across the Middle East and neighbours (Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf states, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Türkiye and Armenia) on 9 March 2026; • President of the European Council visit to United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar on 14 and 15 April 2026. Ministerial and other engagements included — but are not limited to: • EU and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Ministers of Foreign Affairs convened together for a videoconference on 5 March 2026 that resulted in a joint statement: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/05/joint-statement-by-gcc-eu-ministers-meeting-on-recent-developments-in-the-middle-east-iran-s-attacks-against-gcc-states/; The HR/VP travelled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on 8 and 9 April 2026; the EU Special Representative for the Gulf visited all six GCC countries in March 2026. The Commission applies strict transparency rules concerning interest representation and publishes information on meetings held with interest representatives on the dedicated transparency webpages of the Members of the College [2] . Information on such contacts may also be made available through other channels, including press releases and social media. However, as set out in Article 4(2) of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 [3] and Article 3(b) of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 [4] , these rules do not cover meetings held with representatives of public authorities of the Member States or representatives of public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, or intergovernmental organisations. There is therefore no obligation to publish meetings held with such representatives. As regards exchanges within the Commission, it should be recalled that, pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, discussions in the meetings of the Commission are confidential [5] . [2] https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/president/transparency_en and https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/kaja-kallas_en#transparency. [3] Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register, OJ L 207, 11.6.2021: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2021/611/oj. [4] Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 of 4 December 2024 on transparency measures concerning meetings held between Members of the Commission and interest representatives, and repealing Decision 2014/839/EU, Euratom, C/2024/11500, OJ L, 2024/3081, 5.12.2024: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3081/oj. [5] Article 14 of Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080 of 4 December 2024 establishing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission and amending Decision C(2000) 3614, C/2024/10000, OJ L, 2024/3080, 5.12.2024: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj.”
  EU-Iran relations
• 2026-03-10 “E-000988/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Further to complaints received on the two cases mentioned by the Honourable Member, the Commission has requested information from the German authorities and is currently assessing their replies. From a more general point of view, the Commission would like to recall that, as a rule, national authorities and notably national review bodies are the best placed to make the appropriate in-depth analysis of the legal and factual circumstances of each individual case and to take the appropriate relevant measures. Interested economic operators are therefore invited to submit their individual appeals to those national authorities.”
  EU restrictions on unfair commercial practices · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2026-03-06 “Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission 5.6.2026 Written question The Commission is aware of this statement. According to the Treaties, investigations into the Nord Stream pipelines incident fall solely under the responsibility of the Member State concerned. At the same time, the Commission supports the protection of critical infrastructure in the EU, including submarine cables and energy pipelines, as set out in the ProtectEU Internal Security Strategy [1] . The EU has reinforced its legislative framework with the directive on the resilience of critical entities [2] and the directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union [3] . As a follow-up to the Council Recommendation on strengthening critical infrastructure resilience [4] , Member States adopted in 2024 the EU critical infrastructure blueprint [5] to enhance cooperation at EU level in responding to disruptions with significant cross-border impact. The Commission also adopted in 2025 an EU Action Plan on Cable Security [6] to mitigate future threats to critical maritime infrastructure, which includes measures to strengthen the repair capacities and promote technologies to detect and deter hybrid threats and enhance surveillance and protection of maritime infrastructure. The EU maritime security strategy [7] includes further actions to improve surveillance, protection and resilience of infrastructure, including energy pipelines from conventional, hybrid and cyberattacks. Finally, in December 2025, the Commission launched a EUR 15 million call for proposals [8] to support the implementation of the directive on the resilience of critical entities as well as two calls of EUR 20 million for increasing the repair capacity of cables in the Baltic Sea and EUR 20 million for the deployment of smart sensing cables. [1] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy; COM(2025) 148 final. [2] Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC: ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj. [3] Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive): ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj. [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023H0120%2801%29. [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202404371. [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0009. [7] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0008. [8] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-provide-eur-15-million-support-critical-entities-resilience-2025-12-10_en.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2026-03-02 “P-000854/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU follows developments in Iran and the Middle East with utmost concern. Since the beginning of hostilities, EU pledged firmly to support regional stability and the protection of civilians. As the hostilities have serious consequences across but also beyond the Middle East, the EU is working with its partners towards de-escalation. At the European Council on 19 March 2026, Member States called for de-escalation and maximum restraint, the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure and full respect of international law by all parties as well as a moratorium on strikes against energy and water facilities 1 . It is up to the Iranian people to decide their own future. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/03/19/european-council-conclusions-on-middleeast/.”
  EU-US relations · EU foreign policy approach · EU-Iran relations
• 2026-02-27 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 11.5.2026 Written question The Commission takes the allegations regarding the former Commissioner for Trade very seriously and has referred the matter to the European Anti-Fraud Office (‘OLAF’) for appropriate follow-up, within its independent investigative function. OLAF has confirmed it has opened a case but is not in a position to share details on individual cases or probes beyond the information and data already made public. This is in order to protect the confidentiality of investigations and of possible ensuing judicial proceedings, as well as to ensure respect for personal data and procedural rights. OLAF fully respects the presumption of innocence and the rights of defence of the persons/entities concerned. The investigation of other criminal offences remains the competence of national authorities.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2026-02-02 “Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission 21.5.2026 Written question The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to the information on missions expenses and third parties, which was provided in the answer to Written Question E-000189/25 [1] . Information on missions by the Members of the Commission for the year 2025 and subsequent years is or will be made publicly available on dedicated webpages which ensure transparency of missions for the public [2] for both the President and the Members of the Commission. This information also details the cost breakdown of mission elements — such as travel, accommodation, daily allowances, and miscellaneous expenses. The reason and cost of each mission is systematically published once the billing process is concluded. [1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. [2] See the dedicated transparency section of the websites of the Members of the Commission via the following link: https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners_en.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Budget for EU politicians
• 2026-01-27 “P-000300/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Active conflicts and prevailing instability in Ukraine, Gaza, Venezuela and Iran; the erosion of multilateralism; and the weaponisation of trade and resources are redefining international relations. In his speech in Davos, the Canadian Prime Minister acknowledged that, albeit imperfect and sometimes selective, the rules-based international order offered a frame of predictability to those pursuing values-based diplomacy and those seeking accountability under international law, benefiting small and middle powers. He issued a call to resilience to ’powerfirst, norms-second’ politics and a call to action to build a more just, balanced and inclusive world order. The EU is now facing several challenges: in the first instance, a geo-political challenge by Russia’s imperial ambitions that directly threaten Europe’s security; but also a geo-economic challenge by China with the weaponisation of economic dependencies and its continued support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, the United States demands more European self-reliance in its defence and has put into doubt some of the defining characteristics of the transatlantic partnership. The EU is responding through three parallel work tracks: the urgent strengthening of Europe’s defence readiness by 2030; securing its neighbourhood through enlargement, investments and partnerships to the East and the South; and building global partnerships through deepened cooperation in trade, security and defence in the Americas, Africa and the Indo-Pacific. The EU’s approach is driven by principled pragmatism and safeguarding the EU interests without compromising its values.”
  EU-US relations · EU-China relations · EU foreign policy approach
• 2026-01-20 “Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission 7.4.2026 Written question The reasons for every listing are public and contained in the annex to the legal acts [1] . Those reasons are underpinned by ample open source evidence which, following the data protection regulations, is at the disposal of the listed persons or their legal representatives upon request. These restrictive measures were adopted by the Council acting in unanimity. Every person designated by the Council can bring forward a legal challenge and contest their listing in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is independent, and ensures that any listing is lawful. Where the Court decides that a listing does not comply with the EU law, it has the power to annul the listing. The European External Action Service maintains regular contact with the Swiss authorities. Following the adoption of Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2572, Switzerland was provided with additional clarifications. [1] Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2572 of 15 December 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202502572 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/966 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/966/oj/eng.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Foreign interference in Europe · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2026-01-19 “E-000193/2026 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is aware of these developments, which were communicated directly to the Agency and the Commission in 2025. As explained in the Commission’s replies to questions E-002375/2023, E-000314/2024, E001567/2025 and E-002267/2025, Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAPs) can be reported, as any other aviation safety occurrences, via a harmonised reporting system at EU level, called ECCAIRS2 1 , already implemented and managed in accordance with Regulation (EU) 376/2014 2 . The users of ECCAIRS2 are Member States, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and EASA. These occurrences are classified and stored in the European Central Repository of aviation safety occurrences for further analysis. EASA has confirmed that, at present, the risk situation remains unchanged and that no further action is warranted in this area. 1 https://aviationreporting.eu/. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/376/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-11-07 “E-004415/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission As indicated in the answer to written parliamentary question E-001110/2025, the Commission publishes in the transparency register, information on all meetings, including minutes, held by the Head of Cabinet, The Digital Adviser and the Diplomatic Advisor of the Commission President with interest representatives, among others, arms industry representatives. In addition, Members from the Commission President’s Cabinet exchanged emails and other correspondence with representatives of the arms industry to respond to invitations, congratulatory messages, or requests for meetings with the President which were shared with the Honourable Member in access to documents request EASE/2025/5658. In addition to the documents disclosed already to the Honourable Member, the Commission identified one more letter (ARES 2024/6937003) which in the spirit of good cooperation it shared with the Honourable Member via the EASE 1 platform on 9 February 2026 with reference 2026/0474. 1 Electronic Access to European Commission Documents (EASE).”
  Arms export from the EU
• 2025-11-03 “E-004295/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not have any information suggesting that the closure of the bank accounts of the person mentioned in the subject of the question would be linked to the court proceedings mentioned in the question. Credit institutions, like other economic operators, have in principle the freedom to decide with whom they want to enter into a contract or maintain a business relationship. Yet, the Payment Services Directive (PSD) 1 provides certain rules for the termination of payment accounts for example that payment service providers are only able to terminate payment accounts if this possibility is provided in the contract with the client and are obliged to give at least a 2month notice to the client. To ensure citizens have access to basic banking services, the Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) 2 provides all EU consumers the right to a payment account with basic features (PABF) and sets out only a limited number of reasons which can justify the refusal for opening a PABF, such as that the opening of the account would lead to an infringement of anti-money laundering rules. In addition, unilateral closure of a PABF by the bank is also only allowed for limited reasons such as that the consumer is no longer legally resident in the EU or has deliberately used the account for illegal purposes. 1 Article 55 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ L 337, 23.12.2015. 2 Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, pp. 214–246.”
  Transparency requirements for interest groups · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-11-03 “E-004293/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The European Cloud Sovereignty Framework 1 in its published form summarises the criteria by which cloud solutions will be evaluated in the ongoing competition for Sovereign Cloud under the ‘Cloud III’ Dynamic Purchasing System. Access to the detailed specifications is limited to the participants of that competition pursuant to applicable procurement rules. Sovereignty Objective 2 ‘Legal & Jurisdictional Sovereignty’ received a weighting that is balanced and comparable to the weighting of the other seven objectives. As stated on page 6 of the document, the weighting of Sovereignty Objective SOV-2 considers relevant safeguards otherwise ensured in the procurement procedure, including minimum requirements, mandatory contractual clauses and technical measures. The Commission further underlines that while each Sovereignty Objective counts towards a global ‘Sovereignty Score’, a cloud solution must also achieve a certain minimum threshold in each objective. This design ensures a holistic and comprehensive implementation of the sovereign objectives, because insufficient performance in one objective cannot simply be compensated by higher scores in others. In consequence, the Commission considers all criteria to be appropriately represented in the scoring. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/09579818-64a6-4dd5-9577-446ab6219113_en.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU digital & tech sovereignty
• 2025-10-31 “E-004278/2025 Reply The Council has not discussed this question, as it does not fall within its sphere of competence.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · Transparency requirements for interest groups
• 2025-10-31 “E-004288/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Recent drone-related incidents affecting the EU’s internal security – from attacks and disruptions targeting critical infrastructure to other malicious uses – underline the urgency of strengthening the EU collective preparedness and response. Regarding the Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI) geo-fencing service, Member States have suspended its use due to inconsistencies identified between the manufacturer’s mapping data and the officially established unmanned aircraft system (UAS) geographical zones within the EU, which may entail both safety and security risks. When operating in the open category, all unmanned aircraft bearing a class identification label are required, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2019/945 1 , to be equipped with a geo-awareness function that provides timely warnings to the remote pilot when the aircraft is approaching a UAS geographical zone. The challenges posed by drones cut across multiple domains: the protection of European critical infrastructure and public spaces; aviation security; the fight against hybrid threats; the surveillance and safeguarding of EU’s external borders; the prevention and investigation of terrorism and organised crime; as well as the preservation of Europe’s technological sovereignty and defence capabilities. All this requires a unified and strategic response at EU level. The Commission is therefore working on an action plan which will cover the multidimensional aspects of drone security. Its objective will be to enhance EU’s preparedness to prevent impactful incidents, detect better malicious activities and deploy the right capacities to effectively tackle the threats, leveraging technology to protect EU’s border, critical infrastructures and public spaces. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0945.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2025-10-23 “E-004187/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Dutch government’s decision to impose certain restrictions in relation to the governance of Nexperia was taken to address concrete security risks stemming from serious and wellsubstantiated concerns over the mismanagement of this company. The Dutch authorities have clearly stated that the ministerial order is a national measure taken under the Goods Availability Act and is based on the Netherlands’ own findings and assessment. The Commission took note of this initial decision to intervene and has been following closely all further developments, including the response taken by the Chinese side. In parallel, the competent Dutch Court continues assessing alleged misconduct. The Commission has been acting primarily as a facilitator in the ongoing bilateral negotiations, seeking to re-establish these critical supply chains and finding a long-term solution. As a result of these efforts, China has eased the restrictive export measures, allowing Nexperia products to be shipped. The situation remains however critical. The Commission continues to closely monitor the situation and act in accordance with the situational need and applicable rules.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure · EU-US trade relations
• 2025-10-20 “E-004120/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on the specifics of its security measures and installations. Its security policies and procedures are designed to ensure the highest level of protection for the Commission’s staff, visitors, and assets, and they are regularly reviewed and updated to reflect the evolving security landscape and to address identified risks.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies
• 2025-10-12 “E-003997/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission Direct taxation, such as taxation of windfall profits of energy companies, including electricity companies, falls essentially within the competence of Member States. The EU-level temporary solidarity contribution 1 , which targeted surplus profits of Union companies or permanent establishments with activities in the crude petroleum, natural gas, coal and refinery sectors 2 , was an extraordinary measure applied during the energy crisis of 2022-2023. Currently, the Commission does not plan to introduce any similar measure targeting profits of energy companies. However, the Commission supports other tools for a fair and affordable electricity market, such as Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and two-way Contracts for Difference (CfDs). As proposed by Mr. Draghi, such tools provide affordable electricity to consumers and thereby increasingly decouple the price of electricity for consumers from volatile fossil fuel generation costs. The Commission recently adopted a guidance helping Member States establishing CfD schemes and assessing barriers to the signing of PPAs. Furthermore, the Electricity Market Design reform introduced the concept of an electricity price crisis, during which Member States can implement temporary public interventions to set electricity supply prices. 1 Introduced by Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices. 2 The relevant activities correspond to following NACE codes rev 2 in accordance with Regulation (EC) 1893/2006: 05.1 Mining of hard coal; 06.1 extraction of crude petroleum; 06.2 extraction of natural gas; 19.1 manufacture of coke oven products; 19.2 manufacture of refined petroleum products.”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2025-10-12 “E-003996/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission As already indicated in the reply to written parliamentary questions E-001695/2024 and E-002766/2024, which also related to the Nord Stream pipeline, the European arrest warrant (EAW) is an entirely judicial procedure between the judicial authorities in the Member States based on the particular circumstances of each individual case where surrender is requested. Neither the Commission nor the Member States’ governments can interfere or influence decisions taken by judicial authorities. Where the authority, which issued the EAW has doubts concerning the correct application of the framework decision on EAW by the executing State, it can refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the European Union under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning obligations of the executing judicial authority. Moreover, the authority which issued the EAW can request the assistance of Eurojust. Eurojust is tasked to facilitate the execution of requests for, and decisions on, judicial cooperation in cross-border cases, including requests and decisions based on the EAW.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-10-12 “E-003995/2025 Reply In the European Union, the arrest and surrender of requested persons is handled through the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which is an entirely judicial procedure. The Council does not comment on individual surrender proceedings between national judicial authorities.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-10-06 “P-003904/2025 Reply The Council regularly discusses threats to EU critical infrastructure, including threats posed by drones and hybrid campaigns. However, it is not for the Council to produce findings concerning incidents. The Council also supports close cooperation among Member States to strengthen the protection and resilience of EU critical infrastructure. To this end, a Council recommendation on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure and a Council recommendation on a blueprint to coordinate a response at Union level to disruptions of critical infrastructure with significant cross-border relevance were adopted in December 2022 and June 2024, respectively. These acts complement the Directive on the resilience of critical entities (CER) and the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2), both adopted in December 2022.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2025-10-01 “E-003821/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission As part of State aid procedures, the Commission contacts the authorities of the Member State concerned by the procedure. Any information exchanged between the Commission and the Member State in the context of State aid procedures is primarily channelled through the Permanent Representation of the respective Member State.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-09-05 “E-003458/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU honours and commemorates all victims and sacrifices made to end the Second World War, a profoundly tragic chapter in the history of Europe and the world. Regrettably, the Second World War brought painful divisions in Europe and for many Europeans the end of the war brought not freedom, but further subjugation. On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia, the EU paid tribute also to the courage of the people of China, who endured immense suffering in defending their homeland and contributing to the end of the war. Russia continues to deliberately manipulate historical narratives surrounding the Second World War and its aftermath to distract and divert attention from the uncomfortable truth. It remains essential to uphold historical accuracy and reject any attempts to rewrite history for political gains, ensuring that the sacrifices and lessons of the past give guidance toward a peaceful and just future. Today, unfortunately, Europe is confronted with another painful reality: Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine violates international law, including the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law. The EU stands with Ukraine in its efforts to restore its full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Remembrance of communism/Soviet Union
• 2025-09-05 “E-003438/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to the information on missions involving the use of private charter flights by the Members of the Commission for 2024, which was provided in the answer to question E-000189/25. Information on the use of private charter flights by the Members of the Commission for the year 2025 is or will be made publicly available 1 for both the President and the Members of the Commission. The reason and cost of each mission is published once the billing process is concluded. Additionally, the choice of the airline and any particular flight for a mission is subject to a number of criteria including timetable, agenda constraints and cost-efficiency. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyinitiative/meetings/mission.do?host=a2c7c963-a9ad-4c47-aa734bb46b06dd5d&missionsperiod=2025_4.”
  Budget for EU politicians
• 2025-09-02 “E-003368/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission Regarding the Honourable Member’s question about State aid, the Commission has adopted a decision in case SA.104638 on 12 September 2025. In its decision, the Commission has reached the conclusion that the payments made by the German Federal Government to FIEGE Logistik Stiftung & Co. KG do not constitute aid under EU State aid rules. The decision will be published as soon as a non-confidential version is available. Regarding the alleged contradiction mentioned in the question, the Commission would like to point out that the assessment under EU State aid law is a separate matter from contacts in relation to national audits, which were the contacts referred to in the written reply by Commissioner Hadja Lahbib to question P-002657/2025.”
  Financial regulation
• 2025-09-02 “P-003367/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) interference, including jamming and spoofing, occurs daily in the EU's Eastern territories, notably in areas close to conflict zones, affecting both Global Positioning System (GPS) and Galileo 1 or EGNOS 2 . This threat is not new, and the European Union Safety Agency (EASA) has issued guidance to aviation stakeholders to ensure safety during GNSS service disruptions. EASA is closely monitoring the situation and stands ready to implement safety measures whenever needed. The pilot flying the plane carrying the Commission President to Plovdiv, Bulgaria, reported a GPS issue to air traffic control and used an ILS (Instrument Landing System) during a safe landing. The Commission is committed to tackling this issue and works alongside its Member States to bolster the resilience of the EU Galileo system. Already world-class, Galileo declared in July 2025, the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) to provide assurance that the received Galileo navigation message is coming from the system itself and has not been modified. In the near future, key measures will include deploying more satellites in low earth orbit to improve resilience, developing interference monitoring services, and supporting complementary position, navigation and timing services. The Commission will also increase cooperation with Ukraine on relevant anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technologies to mitigate a wide spectrum of signal interference. These steps will prevent future navigation disturbances and ensure the safety and security of thousands of flights in civil aviation, while also protecting the EU's citizens and economy from the increasing threat of GNSS interference. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/galileo-satellite-navigation_en. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/egnos-satellite-navigation_en.”
  EU competences on space policy
• 2025-08-13 “E-003232/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The case-law of the Court of Justice confirms the principle of freedom to set rates in the nonlife insurance sector 1 . The Commission has been in contact with the Romanian authorities regarding this specific measure, which was introduced as temporary measure. It is the Commission’s understanding that the cap on motor third party liability insurance premiums has not been renewed following its expiry on 30 June 2025. 1 See, to that effect, the judgment of the Court of Justice of 7 March 2013, C-577/11, paragraphs 21 and 22.”
  Regulation of vehicles insurance
• 2025-08-13 “E-003233/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission Although German authorities should have tendered out the contracts for building the three specific stations mentioned by the Honourable Member, there was not enough evidence to conclude a systematic breach of EU public procurement rules. Hence, this led to the closure of the EU-Pilot/pre-infringement dialogue mentioned by the Honourable Member. This is irrespective of whether the German authorities share the same legal assessment of the conditions under which the procurement of all the respective stations falls under public procurement law. In case of alleged breach of EU rules on public procurement in specific procedures, interested parties can approach review bodies and national courts. In these cases, it is up to the national courts to apply and enforce citizens' rights under EU law.”
  EU Competition policy · EU support of rail transport
• 2025-08-13 “E-003234/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission As laid out in Article 10(1) of the Code of Conduct 1 , members of the College of Commissioners may ‘participate in European politics as members of European political parties or organisations of the social partners at European level provided that this does not compromise their availability for service in the Commission and the priority to be given to their Commission duties over party commitment’. The post was published during the 2022 European People’s Party (EPP) Congress in Rotterdam. The President attended the meeting in her capacity as President of the Commission and congratulated a fellow European leader. The Guidelines on ethical standards for the participation of the Members of the Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament 2 were adopted in January 2024 and implemented for the European Parliament elections in June 2024. 1 Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission of 31 January 2018, 2018/C 65/06, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D0221(02). 2 Guidelines on ethical standards for the participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament, 24.1.2024, https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2024-01/participationof-ec-members-in-ep-election-campaign-guidelines_en_1.pdf.”
  Budget for EU politicians
• 2025-07-19 “E-003014/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission On 17 June 2025, the Commission adopted a proposal for the REPowerEU Regulation 1 . The accompanying assessment of impacts 2 explains that the proposed Regulation will have limited impact on prices and security of supply and analyses its impact on existing long-term contracts, for both pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas. The proposed Regulation will impose an unconditional legal prohibition of gas imports as a EU trade and energy policy measure. As such, it constitutes a sovereign act of the EU beyond the control of gas importers that makes Russian gas imports unlawful, without any discretion for Member States concerning its application. This should enable EU importers to invoke force majeure (i.e., an unforeseeable event preventing a party to fulfil its contractual obligations) in order to terminate their contracts. As regards recent unlawful practices from the Russian Federation, affected companies and Member States cannot be held liable for any judgments, arbitral awards, including investorState arbitral awards 3 , or other judicial decisions adopted under procedures which are illegal under international customary law or under a bilateral investment treaty, and against which the person or Member State concerned does not have effective access to the remedies under the relevant jurisdiction. 1 Proposal of the European parliament and of the Council for a Regulation on phasing out Russian natural gas imports, improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:ef933a1c-4c3b-11f0-a9d001aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025SC0830. 3 With respect to financial responsibilities concerning possible investor-to-state dispute settlement resolution cases, reference is made to Regulation (EU) 912/2014, where applicable.”
  Natural gas · EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• 2025-07-17 “E-002993/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission For the justification of closing a case without final decision in light of Judgment C‑40/23 P, the honourable Member is invited to refer to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 1 . Based on the information the Commission received from a concerned citizen on the HHLA-MSC case, it concluded that the person does not meet the conditions of an interested party under Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589, which is a prerequisite for submitting an admissible formal complaint under Article 24(2) of the same Regulation. In line with usual practice, the citizen was informed accordingly. Consequently, the case file was closed without a formal decision. 1 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, pp. 9, available at: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/1589/oj/eng.”
  Financial regulation
• 2025-07-17 “E-002992/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has closed the case regarding allegations on the sale price of shares in Hamburger Hafen und Logistik Aktiengesellschaft (HHLA) to the shipping company MSC without a formal decision pursuant to Article 24(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 1 , as no interested party within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 submitted an admissible formal complaint. The Commission could reopen the case if it were to receive an admissible formal complaint that fully complies with Article 24(2) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 containing factual elements substantiating the existence of unlawful aid to MSC. 1 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, pp. 9, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/1589/oj/eng.”
  State Aid · EU Competition policy
• 2025-07-16 “E-002921/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on statements made by national Governments. EU Directive 2022/2523 of 14 December 2022 on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for multinational enterprise groups and large-scale domestic groups in the EU is EU law and is implemented as laid down in the legislation.”
  EU competences on taxation · Tax Havens
• 2025-07-14 “E-002858/2025 Reply The G7 statement on global minimum taxes is a political statement of the G7 member countries, intended to provide a way forward on global minimum taxes within the OECD Inclusive Framework. The G7 statement represents the G7 shared understanding that an agreement on a ‘side-by-side’ system to the OECD’s Pillar Two global minimum tax regime would facilitate further progress to stabilise the international tax system, including a constructive dialogue on the taxation of the digital economy and on preserving the tax sovereignty of all countries. At this stage, it remains to be ascertained how a ‘side-by-side’ system would be structured, whether it would require revisiting OECD’s Pillar Two design and implementation, and whether it would lead to amendments to the EU Pillar Two Directive.”
  Tax Havens · EU competences on taxation
• 2025-07-01 “E-002659/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has no competence to intervene in individual criminal investigations or proceedings. It has not exchanged any information on the case in question with Europol, Interpol, EU Member States or the United Arab Emirates.”
  Privacy & law enforcement · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-07-01 “E-002657/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission would like to recall that the procurement, auditing, and follow-up of national purchases of medical countermeasures are primarily the responsibility of the Member States concerned. In this context, the German authorities conducted their own audit concerning the procurement of masks and related logistic support, including the contracts with the firm Fiege. The Commission is not aware of any contacts with German authorities, ministries, or other public bodies in relation to this national audit. Accordingly, the Commission has not had such contacts as part of that process.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-07-01 “E-002658/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Extradition arrangements between EU Member States and third countries, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are governed by multilateral or bilateral treaties. Moreover, decisions on extradition are taken by national courts or by Ministries of Justice or of Foreign Affairs. The Commission does not, as a matter of principle, intervene in individual national criminal investigations or proceedings.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-06-30 “E-002616/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU expressed its regret over the dangerous escalation in the Middle East following Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran’s response, warning of potential destabilisation and further escalation. While reaffirming its strong commitment to peace, security and stability in the Middle East, the EU continues to urge all parties to abide by international law, show restraint, and refrain from taking action, which could lead to a new escalation, as most recently stated in the European Council conclusions of 26 June 2025 1 . The EU remains clear that Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons. However, the EU firmly believes that lasting security must be sought through diplomacy. The EU continues to engage all stakeholders to encourage a return to negotiations, actively pursuing diplomatic channels and reaffirming that a negotiated solution is the only path forward to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and ensure regional stability. The EU supports the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uphold safeguards and backs the Non-proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of global non-proliferation. It rejects any attempt to undermine the Treaty and calls on Iran to resume cooperation with the Agency as per its legal obligations. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/26/european-council-conclusions-on-themiddle-east/.”
  EU-Iran relations · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons · EU-US relations
• 2025-06-05 “E-002267/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not intend to do so: Member States gather knowledge or documentation about unidentified anomalous phenomena according to the national security needs. The Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy remain dedicated to the safety and security of the space environment. In particular, the Commission is committed to enhancing the EU space situational awareness capabilities, within the remit of the EU Space Regulation 1 and in line with its recent proposals for the European Competitiveness Fund, without prejudice to national competences. Additionally, the EU Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and national civil aviation authorities may receive safety reports on unidentified airborne objects that may endanger civil aviation safety. The collected safety occurrence reports are stored in a central repository and analysed for safety purposes only. Reporting, storing and analysis of civil aviation occurrences are governed by Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0696. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/376/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on space policy · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-06-05 “E-002266/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The area of unidentified aerial phenomenon (UAP) is considered a competence of the Member States, allowing them to address these phenomena according to the national security needs. For example, France has established the Group for study and information on unidentified aerospace phenomena (GEIPAN). This notwithstanding, the Commission is committed to enhancing the EU space situational awareness capabilities within the remit of the EU Space Regulation 1 and without prejudice to national competences. This work will be crucial to elevating the EU situational awareness, improving the EU ability to detect, assess and respond to various risks in space. The Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy remain dedicated to collaborating with stakeholders to ensure the safety and security of the EU space environment. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/696, OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 69–148; ELI: https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj?eliuri=eli%3Areg%3A2021%3A696%3Aoj&locale=en.”
  EU competences on defence · EU competences on space policy
• 2025-06-05 “P-002273/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission In the access to documents case, the General Court found that the Commission should have provided a more detailed explanation in its decision that it does not hold the requested documents. The Commission is closely studying the General Court’s decision and will decide on next steps. To this effect, the Commission will adopt a new decision in full compliance with the judgement.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-05-07 “E-001836/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The official social media accounts of the President of the Commission were not used to promote the campaign as the lead candidate for the European People’s Party (EPP). In the role as lead candidate for the EPP, separate social media accounts were used that were managed by the party and no Commission human or material resources were used for the 2024 campaign. This was in conformity with the applicable rules 1 and the requirement that members of the College of Commissioners ‘ensure that a distinction can be made between their public statements and interventions as participants in the campaign and those made in an institutional capacity’. Before the 2024 campaign and since the re-election, party events are attended in the capacity of President of the Commission. As laid out in Article 10(1) of the Code of Conduct 2 , members of the College of Commissioners may ‘participate in European politics as members of European political parties or organisations of the social partners at European level provided that this does not compromise their availability for service in the Commission and the priority to be given to their Commission duties over party commitment’. 1 Guidelines on ethical standards for the participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament, 24 January 2024, P(2024)2, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/777395ce-2b48-4286-ad57-dfd1e2245940_en. 2 Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission of 31 January 2018, 2018/C 65/06, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D0221(02).”
  Budget for EU politicians
• 2025-04-17 “E-001572/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission Unidentified anomalous phenomena are not part of the scope of the ongoing work on the EU Space Act. This notwithstanding, the Commission is committed to enhancing the EU space situational awareness capabilities. Efforts are continuously being made to strengthen the EU space surveillance and tracking capacities. This is crucial to elevating the EU situational awareness, improving the EU ability to detect, assess, and respond to various risks and threats in space. The Commission remains dedicated to collaborating with stakeholders to ensure the safety and security of the EU space environment.”
  EU competences on space policy
• 2025-04-17 “E-001583/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The EU-Southern African Development Community (SADC) Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has been provisionally applied since 2016. A comprehensive external expost evaluation of the EPA was published in September 2024 1 . It shows that the EPA has delivered on its main aim to increase trade in goods between both sides, with an overall increase since 2016 of 24% (31% for SADC exports and 18% for EU exports). It has also helped to diversify SADC exports as particularly visible in the South African automotive sector. The Commission will publish a staff working document this year to follow-up on the ex-post evaluation study. The ex-post evaluation study is also used as input for the EPA review that is provided for in Article 116 of the EPA 2 . In the course of the review, both sides are assessing to what extent the implementation of the EPA can be further complemented or improved. Based on the current state of play, the Commission does not expect any reopening of the agreement or any addition of new trade areas. The Commission aims at concluding the review by the next EUSADC Joint Council (at political level) that will be prepared beforehand by the EU-SADC Trade and Development Committee (at senior official level; both meetings are envisaged to take place in 2026 at a date still to be determined). 1 https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/analysis-and-assessment/ex-post-evaluations_en. 2 Art. 116: (1) The Parties agree to review this Agreement in its entirety no later than five (5) years after its entry into force. Such review is without prejudice to instances of adjustments, reviews or revisions otherwise provided for in this Agreement, such as those contemplated under Articles 12(2), 16(8), 17(5), 18(5), 26(10), 33(3), 35(6) and 65(e). (2) As regards the implementation of this Agreement, either Party may make suggestions oriented towards adjusting trade-related cooperation, taking into account the experience acquired during the implementation thereof. (3) The Parties agree that this Agreement may need to be reviewed in light of further developments in international economic relations and in the light of the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22016A0916(01).”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2025-04-17 “E-001568/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission The conclusion that there is a risk from the introduction of Phyllosticta citricarpa into the EU territory and the contribution of citrus fruits in the spread of the pest is based on the opinion of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) of 2014 1 . Subsequent scientific publications 2 complement EFSA’s scientific opinion. Those subsequent scientific publications did not provide evidence that would lead to a modification of EFSA’s conclusions as regards the contribution of the citrus fruits to the spread of the pest through trade. EFSA’s scientific opinions are normally submitted to the World Trade Organization by the interested parties as part of litigation proceedings and also referenced, when necessary, in the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures. 1 https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.2903/j.efsa.2014.3557 (EFSA Journal 2014;12(2):3557, 243 pp. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2014.3557). 2 https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/supporting/pub/en-555 (EFSA supporting publication 2014:EN-555. 195 pp.). https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/4513 (EFSA Journal 2016;14(6):4513, 53 pp. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2016.4513). https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/5114 (EFSA Journal 2018;16(1):5114, 48 pp. doi: https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5114); https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598022-22775-z. Geographic distribution, prevalence, and incidence of citrus black spot caused by Phyllosticta citricarpa in Tunisia: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/379427720_Geographic_distribution_prevalence_and_incidence_of_ci trus_black_spot_caused_by_Phyllosticta_citricarpa_in_Tunisia; https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1878614624000497.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU · Pesticides & trade
• 2025-04-17 “E-001567/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission confirms that there is an ECCAIRS category for these types of occurrences under event type ‘Near Airborne Collision with Other Airborne Object’. Therefore, flight crews can fulfill the mandatory reporting obligations on any interference with the aircraft by any airborne object that could endanger the operation of the aircraft, as set out in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1018 1 . The reporting of any other Unidentified Aerial Phenomena, which does not constitute a risk in terms of a potential airborne collision, can be reported under the provisions of the voluntary reporting systems established pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 2 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation. 1 Articles 5(1) and (8) of Annex I, and Articles 1(1) and 3(3) of Annex III to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1018 of 29 June 2015 laying down a list classifying occurrences in civil aviation to be mandatorily reported according to Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 163, 30.6.2015, p. 1–17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2015/1018/oj. 2 Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, amending Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1321/2007 and (EC) No 1330/2007, OJ L 122, 24.4.2014, p. 18; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/376/2018-09-11.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• 2025-04-17 “E-001569/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Commission supports the G20 Common Framework (CF) for Debt Treatments, which is a mechanism to provide poorer countries with orderly and coordinated debt restructurings. The Commission supports making the CF timelier and more predictable for debtor countries and extending it to middle-income countries that need it. The CF has started to deliver and restructuring timelines are now shorter. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable Playbook on sovereign debt restructuring, which includes indicative guidance on timelines, is an important step in the right direction. The Commission is an observer at the IMF and is not a prescribed holder of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), therefore it does not hold SDRs. The EU at the IMF Board supported the USD 650 billion SDR allocation and the Commission supports EU Member States’ SDRs rechannelling efforts towards vulnerable countries. EU Member States so far pledged around USD 37 billion of SDRs (or equivalent contributions) to the IMF trust funds and lead the way in transferring the resources to these funds with around USD 35 billion delivered. Decisions to allocate SDRs are based on long-term global liquidity needs and require approval by an 85% majority of the total voting power. The Commission supports the proposals to channel SDRs through multilateral development banks for countries in a position to do so, whilst respecting national legal frameworks and their reserve asset status. For EU Member States it is not legally possible to channel SDRs to multilateral development banks because of Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”
  Debt relief for developing countries
• 2025-04-15 “E-001536/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Ribera on behalf of the European Commission As a matter of policy, the Commission does not comment on bilateral exchanges between the Commission and Member States or complainants at the stage of the preliminary investigation. Should the Commission decide to open a formal investigation procedure, communication on the proceedings will follow at that time.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-03-20 “E-001207/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The G20 Rio de Janeiro Leaders’ Declaration 1 emphasises the need to promote fairer and more progressive tax systems and to engage cooperatively to ensure the effective taxation of ultra-high-net-worth individuals in full respect of tax sovereignty as a response to the ‘blueprint for a coordinated minimum effective taxation standard for ultra-high-net-worth individuals’ commissioned by the G20 Brazilian Presidency. This blueprint presents a proposal for a global coordinated approach on the taxation of ultra-high-net-worth individuals. The Commission notes the proposal from the EU Tax Observatory on a wealth tax for ultra-high-net-worth individuals resulting therefrom. The Commission’s own analysis of tax systems finds that there are highly diverse approaches in the EU on the taxation of capital income and on the imposition of wealth-related taxes. The Commission also understands that an effective common action in this area in the EU and internationally requires certain prerequisites. In particular, progress needs to be made to ensure an effective exchange of information on beneficial owners and on real estate and asset registration. In addition, the Commission considers that to address the issue of effective taxation of highnet-worth individuals, a better understanding of the topic is needed. To this effect, in December 2024, the Commission launched a study on wealth-related taxes. This study should be concluded before the end of 2025. It should provide further information on the overall context and on the effectiveness of wealth-related taxes targeting high-net-worth-individuals in both EU and non-EU countries. Moreover, the Commission also continues to monitor the distributional impact of tax-benefit systems via the EUROMOD 2 microsimulation tool, i.e. the EU tax-benefit microsimulation model that calculates the effects of taxes and benefits on household incomes and work incentives for the population of each country and for the EU as a whole. 1 G20 Rio de Janeiro Leaders’ Declaration, https://g20.gov.br/en/documents/g20-rio-de-janeiro-leadersdeclaration 2 https://euromod-web.jrc.ec.europa.eu/”
  EU competences on taxation · Wealth taxation
• 2025-03-14 “E-001109/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission enforces strict rules to prevent conflicts of interest, requiring staff to report any conflict of interest that may impair their independence, including those related to private financial transactions. Additionally, EU and national law prohibiting insider trading apply to EU staff. The Commission believes the existing rules are sufficient but invests in awareness and training for staff, ensuring they understand and comply with their obligations. The Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the Commission is competent to investigate any breach of the rules applicable to the Commission staff. Investigations may also be carried out by the European Anti-Fraud Office in case of serious misconduct by staff and by the national instances.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-03-14 “E-001110/2025 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission With respect to the Commission President von der Leyen’s contacts with defence contractors since the European Parliament elections in June 2024, she hosted the first-ever Strategic Dialogue with the European defence industry 1 on 12 May 2025. Fifteen defence companies were represented at the meeting 2 . On 5 June 2025, the President hosted a working dinner with industry on tech and innovation, participants included Airbus, Frankenburg Technologies OÜ (FT), Isar Aerospace SE (ISAR), and NATO Innovation Fund (NIF). President von der Leyen did receive invitations via email or correspondence to attend conferences on defence matters, which she had to decline due to prior commitments on her agenda. Additionally, she received congratulatory messages from some defence contractors on her re-election following the European Parliament elections in June 2024. The Commission publishes information on meetings, including – since 1 January 2025 – minutes, held by President von der Leyen with, among others, defence industry representatives on the President’s online public calendar 3 , the transparency register 4 and through other channels of communication, including press releases and social media. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/read_25_1181. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1187. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/transparencyinitiative/meetings/meeting.do?host=a2c7c963-a9ad-4c47-aa734bb46b06dd5d&page=1. 4 https://transparency-register.europa.eu/search-register-or-update/search-register_en.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-02-11 “E-000623/2025 Reply This matter concerns issues of implementing EU law, which does not fall in principle within the competence of the Council. The Council does not have access to the Schengen Information System (SIS), which is a highly secure and protected database exclusively accessible to authorised users within competent authorities, such as the police and the border guard. These authorities are the sole responsible for data processing in the SIS, including entering and consulting alerts on persons.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-02-10 “E-000603/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The legislative proposal for a Regulation establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union 1 , adopted by the Commission on 11 March 2025, introduces the possibility to return illegally staying third-country nationals to a ‘return hub’ (article 17 of the proposal). Legislative negotiations on this proposal are ongoing. The Commission has not held discussions with third countries on return hubs. 1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM/2025/101 final.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-01-28 “E-000363/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its Decision C(2025) 9000 of 15 January 2025, and more particularly its recital (9), available on the following website: Former European Commissioners' authorised occupations 1 . 1 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-goodadministration/commissioners-and-ethics/former-european-commissioners-authorised-occupations_en”
  Budget for EU politicians
• 2025-01-20 “E-000207/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission Several former Members of the Von der Leyen I Commission have indeed notified envisaged post term of office activities, taking into account the end of their Commission office. he Commission does not provide information on ongoing assessment procedures regarding the compatibility with article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of their envisaged post term of office activities. The decisions adopted by the Commission, together with the corresponding opinions from the Independent Ethical Committee, when those opinions are requested pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission 1 , are available on the dedicated website 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2018.065.01.0007.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2018%3A065%3ATOC 2 https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-goodadministration/commissioners-and-ethics/former-european-commissioners-authorised-occupations_en”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-01-07 “P-000027/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The President of the Commission regrets that it was not possible to convene a dedicated meeting with outgoing European Ombudsman. The Commission would like to recall that during the long mandate of the European Ombudsman there have been numerous written exchanges between the President and the European Ombudsman, and that the cooperation between the Ombudsman’s and the Commission’s services have been extensive, daily, and very good. The Commission will continue to build on this positive and mutually beneficial relations with the incoming European Ombudsman.”
  Activities of EU Ombudsman · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2025-01-07 “E-000028/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The Commission, in coordination with its partners, followed closely the military build-up by Russia ahead of the full-scale invasion. Foreign Affairs Council discussed the issue regularly throughout 2021 1 . In December 2021, the European Council stressed the urgent need for Russia to de-escalate tensions caused by the military build-up along its border with Ukraine and aggressive rhetoric. It reiterated its full support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, warning that any further military aggression against Ukraine will have massive consequences and severe cost in response, including restrictive measures coordinated with partners 2 . Ever since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has firmly and unequivocally condemned this blatant violation of international law. 1 See for example on 19 April 2021: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/informal-video-conference-eu-foreignaffairs-ministers-remarks-high-representativevice-president_en 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/53575/20211216-euco-conclusions-en.pdf”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022) · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term)
• 2025-01-07 “E-000026/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission Free and fair elections are at the core of democracy. The conduct and the organisation of elections is a competence of the Member States, in accordance with their national constitutional rules and legislation, as well as their international obligations and EU law. National authorities and courts are primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the applicable rules. The Commission supports Member States on electoral matters, mainly through the European cooperation network on elections 1 . This brings together authorities with competence in elections to exchange information and best practices. In 2023, the Commission also issued a Recommendation on inclusive and resilient elections 2 . The Digital Services Act (DSA) 3 sets rules for online intermediaries and platforms. In 2024, the Commission issued Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines to mitigate systemic risks linked to electoral processes 4 . In the context of the Romanian presidential elections, on 5 December 2024, the Commission issued a retention order to TikTok 5 and, on 17 December 2024, opened formal proceedings 6 against the provider of TikTok for suspected DSA breach. The proceedings focus on management of risks to elections or civic discourse linked to TikTok's recommender systems and policies on political advertisements and paid-for political content. The Regulation on political advertising 7 , entering into full application in October 2025, will strengthen the transparency and accountability in the use of political advertising. The Commission’s forthcoming Democracy Shield will aim to strengthen free and fair elections and the integrity of electoral processes in the EU. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eucitizenship-anti-corruption/democracy-and-electoral-rights/european-cooperation-network-elections_en 2 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2829 on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament, OJ L, 2023/2829, 20.12.2023. 3 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102. 4 Communication from the Commission – Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3014/oj/eng 5 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6243 6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6487 7 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024.”
  Foreign interference in Europe · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-01-07 “E-000025/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission A just transition is a key principle of the implementation of the European Green Deal. The new emissions trading system (ETS) for fuel combustion in buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) 1 has been designed with important safeguards to start in an orderly, smooth and efficient manner. ETS2 will complement policies and measures at national and EU level. Action at national level, which is set out in the National Energy and Climate Plans, will also be crucial in delivering the required emission reductions. A part of the revenues raised by ETS2 will finance the Social Climate Fund 2 , which is established to ensure a socially fair transition by addressing impacts on vulnerable groups, especially lower and lower-middle income households and those in energy or transport poverty. Member States are to define the vulnerable groups in their Social Climate Plans. Together with a minimum 25% national contribution, the Fund will mobilise at least EUR 86.7 billion over 2026-2032. It will fund structural measures and investments in energy efficiency, renewable energy, decarbonisation of heating and cooling and sustainable mobility and transport, including social leasing, public transport, shared mobility and on-demand offers. Pending the impact of these investments on reducing emissions and energy bills, there will be the option to provide temporary direct income support. This will come alongside existing funding instruments supporting vulnerable groups, such as Recovery and Resilience Facility and Cohesion Policy Funds. Member States must spend all remaining national auction revenues on select climate and energy purposes, prioritising social aspects. They could also further top up their contributions to their Social Climate Plans. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/87 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/955”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2025-01-07 “E-000029/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission On 28 June 2017, the transmission system operators (TSOs) of Continental Europe signed with their respective counterparts Ukrenergo and Moldelectrica the agreements to interconnect the power systems under the auspices of ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity). Following the start of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression and responding to an urgent request by Ukrenergo and Moldelectrica, on 11 March 2022 Continental Europe TSOs concluded that the conditions for an emergency synchronisation were met. Subsequently, the trial synchronisation was completed on 16 March 2022 1 . The TSOs acted in the context of political support expressed at the extraordinary Energy Council meeting of 28 February 2022. The European Council meeting of 24 March 2022 endorsed the emergency synchronisation as ‘a remarkable achievement’. Ukrenergo has since completed the permanent synchronisation project as confirmed by the Continental Europe TSOs on 28 November 2023. 1 https://www.entsoe.eu/news/2022/03/16/continental-europe-successful-synchronisation-with-ukraine-andmoldova-power-systems/”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-18 “E-003033/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not comment on individual cases of potential take-overs on which it might be required to decide, based on its competences. The banking sector in the EU has robust capital positions and ample liquidity. It has shown high profitability in recent years, in part due to the reforms carried out since the 2007 financial crisis, including the establishment of the Banking Union 1 . In this context, take-overs, mergers and other forms of consolidation can make banks more resilient to shocks, for example where they lead to greater asset or geographic diversification. Bank consolidations may also allow European banks to increase the efficiency of their business models, to pursue growth strategies and to increase their investments in digitalisation. At the same time, EU merger control ensures that banking consolidations with a EU dimension do not stifle competition and thereby harm consumers. The Commission is in constant contact with Member States’ administrations and competition authorities and cover a wide range of subjects. 1 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/banking/banking-union/what-banking-union_en?prefLang=fr”
  European Banking Union · Financial regulation
• 2024-12-18 “E-003030/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission European Union anti-money laundering rules do not contain any outright exemptions for gambling services, including national lotteries. The current Anti-Money Laundering Directive 1 , which was agreed by the co-legislators in 2015 and amended in 2018, allows Member States to exempt providers of certain gambling services from all or part of the requirements of the Directive only if they conduct a risk assessment which demonstrates that those services pose a low risk of money laundering. That decision must be notified to the Commission together with a justification. The former Commissioner for Justice was not a member of the college of the Commission when the current rules on gambling were proposed by the Commission and agreed by the co legislators. The newly adopted Anti-Money Laundering Regulation 2 further limits the type of gambling services that may be exempted, and the Commission is empowered to reject or approve any proposed exemptions. This Regulation will apply as of 10 July 2027. There is therefore no a priori exemption for gambling services, including national lotteries, and it is in all cases the responsibility of the Member State to demonstrate the low money laundering risk associated with the service. 1 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73–117. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-12-18 “E-003005/2024 Answer given by Commissioner Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission The Commission was informed of the allegations against former Commissioner Reynders and of the investigations carried out by the Belgian authorities on 4 December 2024 by the media.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-12-16 “E-002973/2024 Reply The Council has not discussed the issue of Unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP). The Council has discussed and worked on the development of rules and tools for the strengthening of the resilience of critical infrastructure within the EU, including through the adoption of the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive and the Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2) in December 2022, the Council Recommendation on a Union-wide coordinated approach to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure in December 2022, and the Council Recommendation on a blueprint to coordinate a response at Union level to disruptions of critical infrastructure with significant cross-border relevance in June 2024. It also regularly discusses hybrid threats and hybrid campaigns, including against critical infrastructure, and the EU’s response in this context, for instance in the context of the Hybrid Toolbox. It has also imposed sanctions, such as those established in October 2024 in view of Russia’s destabilising activities against the EU and its Member States, including cyber-attacks and sabotage against critical infrastructure.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2024-12-16 “E-002972/2024 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The EU Space Programme 1 implements space activities in fields such as earth observation, satellite navigation and space situational awareness. It is implemented in close cooperation with the Member States, the EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), the European Space Agency and many other stakeholders. Regulation (EU) 2021/696 2 , which sets up the EU Space Programme for 2021-2027 and establishes EUSPA, lays down the components and objectives of that programme. Gathering knowledge or documentation about unidentified anomalous phenomena is however not one of these objectives. The Commission does not hold any information that would correspond to the topic of unidentified anomalous phenomena. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/eu-space-programme_en 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0696”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2024-12-04 “E-002766/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission As already indicated in the reply to parliamentary question E-001695/2024, which also related to the Nord Stream pipeline, the European arrest warrant is an entirely judicial procedure between the judicial authorities in the Member States based on the particular circumstances of each individual case where surrender is requested. Neither the Commission nor the Member States’ governments can interfere or influence decisions taken by judicial authorities.”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-12-04 “E-002764/2024 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission As already indicated in the reply to parliamentary question E-001695/2024, which was also related to the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline, the European arrest warrant is a judicial procedure between judicial authorities in the Member States based on the particular circumstances of each individual case where surrender is requested. Neither the Commission nor the Member States’ governments can interfere or influence decisions taken by judicial authorities. The European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation is tasked to facilitate the execution of requests for, and decisions on, judicial cooperation, including requests and decisions based on the European arrest warrant.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs · EU-Ukraine relations
• 2024-12-04 “P-002765/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has no access to the data in the Schengen Information System and therefore cannot check if a person is subject of an alert. The Commission also cannot enter, correct or delete data contained in the Schengen Information System. Pursuant to Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 1 , alerts on persons wanted for arrest for surrender purposes on the basis of a European arrest warrant (EAW) shall be entered at the request of the judicial authority of the Member State that issued the EAW. Pursuant to Article 9(2) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA 2 the decision to issue or not to issue an alert for the requested person in the Schengen Information System lays with the issuing judicial authority. 1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 November 2018 on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, amending and repealing Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU, OJ L 312, 7.12.2018, p. 56. 2 2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States - Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision, OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1.”
  Privacy & law enforcement · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-12-04 “E-002767/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Investigations into the explosions that occurred on the Nord Stream I and II pipelines in September 2022 fall under the responsibilities of the Member States concerned and are still ongoing in Germany. The Commission does not interfere with ongoing investigations or prejudge its outcome.”
  EU-Ukraine relations · EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2024-11-18 “E-002570/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto On behalf of the European Commission Cohesion policy legislation does not include reporting requirements for Member States as far as dual use projects is concerned. Information on the amounts planned by the Member States for such projects is therefore not available to the Commission. A study on the contribution of the defence sector to regional development, and vice versa, through the European Structural and Investment Funds in the 2014-2020 programming period was carried out by the Commission showing that around EUR 1 billion was invested in dual use projects in all Member States 1 . Furthermore, at the General Affairs Council (Cohesion) meeting 2 of 28 November 2024, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania issued and presented a joint declaration calling for facilitation of a dual use approach to investments and for additional and adequate incentives to be foreseen in the financial envelope of cohesion policy in the post-2027 programming period to address the challenges of economic and social convergence, resilience and security. 1 Study on the Contribution of the defence sector to Regional Development through the European Structural and Investment Funds : https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/study-contribution-defence-sector-regionaldevelopment-through-european-structural-and-investment_en 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2024/11/28/”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2024-10-30 “E-002350/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Council Directive 2011/96/EU Parent Subsidiary Directive 1 , exempts dividend payments and other profit distributions by subsidiaries to their parent companies from withholding taxes, it also provides for the elimination of double taxation of such income at the level of the parent company. Share buy-backs, which are not considered as distribution of profits, do not involve transactions under the scope defined in the Parent Subsidiary Directive. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32011L0096”
  Priorities of taxation policy in the EU · EU competences on taxation
• 2024-10-24 “E-002257/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes the security and, in particular, the confidentiality of the communications systems it uses very seriously and has issued recommendations to its staff regarding security in the use of video-conferencing tools, including Webex. In addition, the Commission relies on a variety of video-conferencing tools and has provided clear instructions on which systems may be used for meetings involving sensitive information. The Commission is attentive to the development of viable, complementary sovereign solutions and closely monitors open-source adoption by EU public services. For nearly two decades, the publicly accessible Open-Source Observatory 1 has been tracking news, reports and case studies, demonstrating the growing adoption of open-source across the EU. This includes recent national governments’ efforts to develop and implement open-source alternatives to proprietary office collaboration suites. The Interoperable Europe Portal 2 , which hosts the Observatory, encourages the sharing and re-use of common solutions, including open-source by federation of software catalogues. Internally, the Commission is also an adopter of open-source software. For example, most of the Commission websites 3 are built on Drupal, and Linux is the main platform in the data centres. 1 https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/collection/open-source-observatory-osor 2 https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/interoperable-europe 3 https://commission.europa.eu/index_en”
  EU digital & tech sovereignty · Promotion of open-source softwares
• 2024-10-11 “E-002026/2024 Answer given by Ms McGuinness on behalf of the European Commission Under the EU Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) 1 , improving access to finance for the defence industry is a priority. As the Commission replied in written question E-003638/2023 2 , ‘the EU sustainable finance framework does not impose any limitations on financing the defence sector’. Nor does it classify defence activities as sustainable under the EU Taxonomy 3 or the Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation 4 . The sustainable finance framework aims to incentivise investments in activities which contribute to the EU environmental objectives. While defence activities are not covered in the Taxonomy, defence undertakings can for example report investments into greening their buildings or transport solutions under the Taxonomy, like any other sector. In addition, to contribute to the green transition and strengthen its resilience and cost-efficiency, the Commission supports the efforts of the European defence sector to improve sustainability, reduce carbon emissions and increase circularity in resource use, e.g. via the European Defence Fund which includes a dedicated category ‘energy resilience and environmental transition’. 1 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrialstrategy_en 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html 3 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomy-sustainable-activities_en 4 Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector, OJ L 317, 9.12.2019, p. 1–16.”
  Military emissions reporting · Arms export from the EU
• 2024-10-01 “E-001899/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission The Commission has received submissions on the sale of shares in the Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA) to the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC). The Commission is assessing whether those submissions can be treated as complaints within the meaning of Article 12 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 1 which, according to Article 24(2) of that regulation, can only be submitted by interested parties. At this stage, the Commission is not in a position to communicate on possible further steps relating to the above-mentioned submissions. In general, it is for Member States to assess if a specific measure involves State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and, if that is the case, to notify to the Commission for its assessment before granting such measure (except for specific cases covered by block exemptions). 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R1589”
  EU Competition policy · State Aid
• 2024-10-01 “E-001900/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission The Directorate General for Content, Networks and Technology supervises the compliance of very large online platforms and very large online search engines under the Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 . To this effect, the co-legislator entrusted the Commission with investigative and enforcement powers. These powers and related procedures are laid out in the DSA and include the possibility of accepting commitments, i.e. remedial actions offered by platforms to remedy the Commission’s issues raised in certain proceedings. To assist companies in deciding whether to offer commitments, in line with the principles of good administration, the Commission may explain its concerns to the online platform provider 2 . The Commission’s actions, including in relation to the open investigations 3 , are undertaken within the limits of its powers. No demand, proposal or offer of ‘quiet censorship’ has been made in this process. The acts and decisions adopted by the Commission on the basis of the DSA are subject to judicial review by the EU courts. 1 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1–102. 2 The Commission adopted the first DSA commitment decision on 5 August 2024, making binding TikTok's commitments to permanently withdraw TikTok Lite Rewards programme from the EU, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_24_4161 3 Updated information on the supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines can be found here: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU rules on digital competition
• 2024-10-01 “P-001898/2024 Answer given by Vice-President Jourová on behalf of the European Commission On 27 September 2024, the Commission has lodged appeals against the two judgments of the General Court of 17 July 2024, seeking to partially annul the confirmatory decisions in cases T-689/21 Auken and others v Commission 1 and T-761/21 Courtois and others v Commission 2 , concerning public access to the unredacted versions of the contracts for the purchase of COVID-19 vaccines. The latter case concerned, in addition, access to the declarations of absence of conflict of interests signed by the representatives in the EU-Member States Joint Negotiation Team. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62021TJ0689 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62021TA0761”
  Covid-19 vaccines procurement · Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thank you very much. Madam president, you said something earlier which worried me a little bit, I may admit. You said that the overriding tool to fight inflation should be the interest rate. Now to the very blunt instrument of the instrument, of the interest rate, to the hammer of the interest rate, every problem looks like a nail. And we have certainly had a very interesting discussion in the in the last years of how the recent inflationary episodes have been mainly driven by supply side shocks, um, bottlenecks and so on. We had it 2022 with the energy price shock. Now we have new looming risks. For example, the illegal invasion, the illegal attack on Iran has triggered the risk of closing the the the Strait of Hormuz. This would be par excellence again, uh, triggering probably cost side shocks not being driven by by demand. So could I read your statement as suggesting that the best the ECB could do if we end up again in such a world of energy, price shocks and so on, you would again react by raising interest rates and push the costs of adjustment, mainly to the working people of Europe and to to businesses, as rising interest rates do not only kill the the, the source of the problem, but also other unrelated sectors in the economy.”
  ECB monetary policy