Kostas PAPADAKIS

Policy topics Kostas PAPADAKIS is active on

What Kostas PAPADAKIS has said (73)

• 2026-03-24 “Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 26.5.2026 Written question The EU legal framework, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/429 [1] and Commission Delegated Regulations (EU) 2020/687 [2] and 2020/689 [3] , establishes harmonised measures across the Union for eradicating Category A diseases, such as foot and mouth disease (FMD). These include culling infected herds, restricting animal and product movements from affected zones, and, where appropriate, vaccination [4] . Following confirmation of the FMD on Levos, restrictions were immediately imposed [5] under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/687, which permits derogations, allowing certain low-risk animal products to leave the restricted zones, provided risk-mitigation measures are applied. The EU co-finances emergency veterinary measures via the Single Market Programme [6] , covering costs for culling, compensating farmers, cleaning and disinfecting the affected premises, and vaccination [7] . The Commission stands ready to deploy vaccines from the EU FMD antigen bank upon Greece’s request. Additionally, under the Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plans Regulation [8] , Member States may support investments in restoring agricultural potential and introduce crisis payments for farmers affected by catastrophic events. The Commission may also adopt exceptional support measures for market losses linked to restrictions imposed to curb disease spread. [1] ‘Animal Health Law’ OJ L 84, 31.3.2016, pp. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj. [2] OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, pp. 64–, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/687/oj. [3] OJ L 174, 3.6.2020, pp. 211-340, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/689/oj. [4] https://food.ec.europa.eu/animals/animal-diseases/diseases-and-control-measures/foot-and-mouth-disease_en [5] OJ L, 2026/732, 24.3.2026, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2026/732/oj. [6] Single Market Programme: OJ L 153, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/690/oj. [7] https://food.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c1ed1748-1b55-4e7b-add0-b7eb41c65a3e_en?filename=cff_animal_emergency-measures_ah-ms-guidelines.pdf. [8] OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, pp. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
• 2026-03-20 “Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission 12.5.2026 Written question The Water Framework Directive [1] is neutral regarding public or private ownership of water services and leaves full discretion to Member States as regards national governance structures. The directive also allows Member States broad flexibility in setting water pricing and related cost-recovery mechanisms, taking into account socioeconomic, environmental, geographic, and climatic conditions, provided the environmental objectives are met. Member States are hence entirely responsible for water management, including allocation decisions, prioritisation during scarcity, infrastructure investment, and compliance with the Water Framework Directive and the Drinking Water Directive [2] . The latter requires ensuring access to safe drinking water, to identify and manage supply risks, and taking timely preventive and corrective action where risks are known. Particular attention must also be paid to vulnerable groups during supply disruptions. To ensure access and affordability, Member States may use tools such as subsidies, social or progressive tariffs, and cost redistribution from households to polluters and intensive users, in line with the polluter-pays principle and the ‘adequate contribution’ clause. The Water Resilience Strategy [3] recognises access to clean, affordable water as a human right and includes a flagship action to support leakage reduction and infrastructure modernisation. Under the modernised cohesion policy [4] , EUR 1.3 billion (EU contribution) [5] has been allocated to Greece for 2021-2027 to strengthen water management and resilience, including drinking water systems. [1] Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1-73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32-35. [2] Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1-62. [3] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/environment/water-resilience-strategy_en. [4] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/2021-2027_en. [5] Out of which EUR 73.4 million have been allocated under the regional Programme ‘Attiki’.”
  Water pollution · EU policy on water management
• 2026-03-02 “Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 28.5.2026 Written question The Commission has no data that confirms a negative impact on safety of the rail market opening to competition. On the contrary safety indicators and safety performance data collected by the European Union Agency for Railways imply a positive trend of improved safety levels in the Single European Railway Area since 2010. Despite deplorable large accidents in recent years, the number of significant accidents has dropped from 2230 in 2010 to 1565 in 2023. A similar downward trend can be observed for the number of victims of accidents (fatalities and seriously injured). Moreover, most of the reported accidents refer to accidents caused by third parties: road users at level crossings or unauthorised persons trespassing railway tracks. These two categories of accidents account also for 97,4% of all fatalities [1] . Finally, in respect of military mobility, the Commission promotes the concept of ‘dual-use infrastructure’ to ensure that military mobility projects will positively contribute to the development of the EU rail system and thus society as a whole. The cost reductions advocated by the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) European Coordinator’s report [2] are supposed to lower the cost of ERTMS deployment on trains and therefore allow for a wider roll-out of this important safety system. [1] Safety Overview 2025, EU Agency for Railways, March 2025, see figures 2, 8 and 10. Document available at: https://www.era.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025-03/safety-overview-2025.pdf. [2] W ork plan of the European coordinator Matthias Ruete, Publications Office of the European Union, 2026, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2832/9894936.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU policy on aviation safety
• 2026-02-19 “E-000711/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges the difficulties experienced by those affected from the devastating earthquakes. In 2022, Greece has benefitted from EUR 1 351 886 of financial assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund for essential recovery and repair operations in Crete following the earthquake. The funds were used to clean up the disaster-stricken areas, to provide temporary accommodation and to restore essential road, education and wastewater infrastructure. In addition, with the support of Cohesion Policy for 2021-2027 1 , Greece has allocated resources for risk prevention and management of risks related to natural hazards not associated with climate, for example, earthquakes. Under the shared management and subsidiarity principle governing the Cohesion Policy funds, selection and implementation of projects is the responsibility of the national authorities. However, it should be noted that compensations for damages to private properties are not eligible. In line with the Article 73(2)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation 2021/1060 2 , the Commission considers that a cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool to determine the best relationship between the amount of support, the activities undertaken and the achievement of objectives. It helps thus the competent national authorities define the most appropriate scope of projects, their level of EU funding and the added value for the society. 1 https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/cohesion_overview/21-27. 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj/eng.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Cohesion and rural funding
• 2026-02-06 “E-000492/2026 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Rendering assistance to persons in distress at sea is a moral duty and a legal obligation under international law. Migrant deaths at sea are a tragic reminder of the need for a comprehensive approach to migration management and renewed efforts to combat migrant smuggling. The Commission is committed to preventing dangerous journeys by tackling the root causes of illegal migration and strengthening measures against organised crime along migratory routes while promoting safe and legal pathways. As regards search and rescue (SAR) 1 , the Commission has promoted reinforced information sharing, coordination and cooperation among all relevant stakeholders, including partner countries. Upon requests by the Member States, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) provides technical and operational support to facilitate the safe and effective management of the external borders of the EU. The Agency must act in full compliance with its EU and international law obligations in all its activities and engagements. SAR is a responsibility of national authorities, Frontex, through the provision of services such as aerial surveillance, can support SAR operations and help saving lives at sea, by enabling the Member States to identify situations of potential distress earlier and respond more quickly and effectively. In 2025 alone, 24 877 people were rescued at sea with Frontex support 2 . The Commission is working on the revision of the Frontex mandate, in line with the Commission’s political guidelines 3 , including with the aim of increasing its surveillance capabilities, which are key also to prevent loss of lives at sea. 1 https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/migration-management/search-and-rescue_en. 2 Frontex, 2025 In Brief: https://www.frontex.europa.eu/2025-in-brief/. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2026-01-31 “E-000403/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The minimum requirements set by the Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions 1 , Work-life Balance 2 , and the Working Time 3 Directives give specific form to fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundaments Rights 4 . The Framework Directive 89/391/EEC 5 and the related EU Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Directives set minimum requirements for the health and safety protection of workers. They require, in particular, that the employer evaluates all occupational risks and puts in place preventive and protective measures. The primary responsibility for properly enforcing national legislation transposing EU Directives lies with national authorities 6 . Pursuant to Article 4 of the Framework Directive, Member States must ensure, in particular, adequate controls and supervision of the application of the national transposing provisions. In this regard, Member States are competent to decide on the organisation of enforcement authorities/labour inspectorates and on the nature, frequency, procedure and other characteristics of such controls. Directive 2012/18 7 , covers establishments where dangerous substances may be present in quantities exceeding certain thresholds. Pursuant to its Article 5, Member States have to ensure that operators of such establishments take all necessary measures to prevent major accidents and to limit their consequences for human health and the environment. Operators must prove, at any time, that they have taken these measures, in particular for the purpose of inspections, which Member States are required to perform pursuant to its Article 20. However, pursuant to information available to the Commission, such requirements do not apply to the concerned factory. 1 Directive (EU) 2019/1152 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union, OJ L 186, p. 105 (https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1152/oj/eng). 2 Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU, OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79 (https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/1158/oj/eng). 3 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9 (https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/88/oj/eng). 4 They aim, respectively, to improve working conditions by promoting more transparent and predictable work for workers in all sectors of activity, address women’s underrepresentation in the labour market by designing worklife balance arrangements, such as leaves and flexible working arrangements, and to regulate working time and rest time in all sectors of activity. 5 Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, p. 1 (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A31989L0391). 6 Relevant labour inspectorates or equivalent bodies. 7 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of majoraccident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 1 (Seveso-III-Directive, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/18/oj/eng).”
  EU competences on social policies · EU rules on hazardous working conditions
• 2026-01-23 “E-000265/2026 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission Despite tragedies such as Adamuz, available data (among other statistics compiled by the European Union Agency for Railways or Eurostat) show that there is an overall reduction of major accidents (from an average of 5 per year at the end of 1990s to 1 per year since 2020) in the single European railway area as well as a reduction of the number of victims in parallel to the adoption of the 4 th railway package and the improved safety framework. This legal framework and in particular the Rail Safety Directive 2016/798 1 defines clearly the responsibilities and obligations of the rail transport ecosystem: rail undertakings, infrastructure managers, national safety authorities and the European Railway Agency. Certification and validation that the different applicable regulations are fulfilled is a shared effort and review mechanisms are foreseen in case of non-compliance by any of the certified entities. In this regard, there are no indications that the 4 th railway package and the liberalisation of the train services had any negative impact on safety. The Executive Director of Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking’s declaration draws attention to the reality and specificity of the rail sector, where rolling stock typically has a lifespan of around 40 years, while infrastructure equipment can last even longer. Provided maintenance is performed as required, this is not a safety challenge per se. The work of Europe Rail Joint Undertaking is focused on innovations and investments, including those that improve rail safety. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/798/oj/eng.”
  EU support of rail transport · EU policy on aviation safety
• 2026-01-07 “E-000031/2026 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission International law and the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter must be upheld under all circumstances. Members of the United Nations Security Council have a particular responsibility to uphold these principles. The new circumstances provide an opportunity for Venezuela to transition to a more democratic future, a future that must be determined by all Venezuelans. A dialogue open to all positions and actors, within the framework of the constitution, will lay the foundations for national reconciliation and coexistence. Respecting the will of the Venezuelan people remains the only durable solution for Venezuela. The EU is ready to support and accompany all Venezuelans in this process.”
  EU-Venezuela relations · EU-US relations
• 2025-11-06 “E-004397/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes the safety of citizens and the prevention of accidents very seriously. Responsibility for authorising, supervising and enforcing safety requirements at defenceindustrial sites lies primarily with the competent national authorities, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. When it comes to legislation like the Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU) 1 , EU law harmonises objectives, not operational supervision. The Military Mobility Package 2 puts forward proposals for a comprehensive set of measures to ensure the swift, coordinated and secure movement of military personnel and equipment across the EU. The proposal for a Military Mobility Regulation does not include any financing for industrial activities as such. Safety measures, including for industrial sites, are outside the scope of the Military Mobility proposal. However, safety measures foreseen at the EU level for different modes of transport will continue to apply. In fact, initiatives like the proposed European Competitiveness Fund 3 (Article 47) feature the ‘enhancement of the protection and resilience of infrastructures that are strategic for military mobility’ 4 . The Commission stands ready to engage with all national Greek authorities should substantiated concerns regarding the application of this specific piece of EU legislation be brought to its attention. 1 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/industrial-emissions-and-safety/industrial-accidents_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0846. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0555. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025PC0555R(01).”
  EU competences on defence · Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons
• 2025-11-03 “E-004297/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Séjourné on behalf of the European Commission The Postal Services Directive 1 (the Directive) requires Member States to ensure that users enjoy a postal universal service at all points of the territory. However, the Directive does not specify the exact number or location of points of contact. The Greek national postal regulatory authority has informed the Commission that the Hellenic Post has postponed closures in all non-urban areas and that discussions are underway with Hellenic Post. The Directive allows Member States to implement the postal universal service according to the needs of users and the national specific circumstances. The Commission has announced that it will propose a revision of the Postal legal framework at the end of 2026 2 , notably to ensure that citizens and businesses can receive deliveries throughout the EU at affordable prices and increase consumer protection. The Commission has no legal powers to intervene in discussions between management and worker's representatives. The EU legal framework provides for minimum requirements on workers’ involvement when management is contemplating collective redundancies, in line with Directive 98/59/EC 3 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01997L0067-20080227. 2 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/publications/single-market-our-european-home-market-uncertainworld_en. 3 Directive 98/59/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 225, 12.8.1998, pp. 16–21, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1998/59/eng. It should be noted that this Directive does not apply to workers employed by public administrative bodies or by establishments governed by public law.”
  EU policy on forced redundancies · EU competences on social policies
• 2025-10-15 “E-004060/2025 Answer given by Mr Micallef on behalf of the European Commission The Commission considers cultural heritage a cornerstone of European identity and social cohesion, a driver of the creative economy and sustainable development, and a catalyst for societal resilience. It promotes its safeguarding, accessibility and mainstreaming across multilevel EU policies and programmes. Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 stipulates that EU’s role is limited to encouraging cooperation between Member States and supporting and supplementing their actions, with a view to conserving and safeguarding cultural heritage of European significance. The management of archaeological sites remains the sole responsibility of the Member States. Over the years, the Commission has increased the budget of the Creative Europe programme from EUR 1.47 billion (2014-2020) to EUR 2.44 billion (2021-2027). One third of the current programme (EUR 0.8 billion) is dedicated to the Culture Strand. In the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission proposes to double the budget in the Creative Europe – Culture strand of the new Agora EU programme, from EUR 0.8 billion to EUR 1.8 billion. 1 OJ C 202 7.6.2016, p. 121-122.”
  EU and national cultural identities
• 2025-10-06 “E-003908/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities in line with the human rights approach of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is being implemented in matters falling under the EU's competence. It is envisaging new actions to enhance the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 1 , as announced in its 2026 Work Programme. The Strategy provides a framework for further progress towards improving the lives of persons with disabilities. One of the flagship initiatives under the Strategy is the European Disability Card, established by the Directive (EU) 2024/2481 2 , which is being transposed by Member States into national legislation and will be applicable as of 2028. The card aims to facilitate the free movement of persons with disabilities across the EU. It will provide them with legal certainty that their disability status will be recognised when travelling to or visiting other Member States for short stays and accessing special conditions or preferential treatment offered to residents with disabilities in respect of a wide variety of services, activities, or facilities, including parking rights. The Directive does not apply to the area of social security. The organisation of social protection systems and of disability assessment remains a national competence. As a flagship action of the Strategy, the Commission has also issued guidance on independent living and inclusion in the community of persons with disabilities in the context of EU funding 3 . It provides practical recommendations to Member States on the use of EU funding to accelerate the transition to community-based services and independent living for persons with disabilities. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=23707&langId=en. 2 Directive (EU) 2024/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 establishing the European Disability Card and the European Parking Card for persons with disabilities, https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/2841/oj/eng. 3 Commission Notice Guidance on independent living and inclusion in the community of persons with disabilities in the context of EU funding. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7188/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on disability inclusion & accessibility · EU expenditure on social policy
• 2025-10-03 “E-003899/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Member States are responsible for water management and for meeting the objectives set out in the Water Framework Directive 1 . The Greek authorities are therefore responsible for the identification of most appropriate options to ensure supply of water for irrigation and related financing options for these investments, including through the EU financial support. As outlined in the Water Resilience Strategy 2 , in the light of increased water scarcity and more frequent and prolonged droughts, it is nevertheless important when planning any additional water supply options to do so as part of an integrated strategy that balances demand and supply while considering long-term climate impacts. Furthermore, the environmental impacts of any new project needs to be assessed carefully to ensure compliance with applicable environmental law, including by ensuring that the status of the affected water bodies will not deteriorate, as stipulated by the Water Framework Directive. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 3 ensures income stability through decoupled income support and risk management tools, such as insurance and disaster recovery assistance. It also funds sustainable irrigation systems. Moreover, as part of the CAP simplification package 4 , the Commission proposed a new type of crisis payments for farmers allowing the use of existing funds to offset severe production losses from natural or catastrophic events. Finally, the modernised cohesion policy 5 promotes investments that strengthen water access and resilience. 1 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p.1. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘European Water Resilience Strategy’, COM(2025) 280, 4 June 2025. The quotes are from page 1 and pages 6-7 respectively. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy_en. 4 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/b595fc96-2988-44fb-86a54383cb070119/download. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/2021-2027_en.”
  Agricultural funding · EU policy on water management
• 2025-10-01 “E-003835/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission agrees on the importance of the infrastructure and services responsible for child protection and has proposed measures to strengthen prevention in both its proposal for a Directive on criminal law 1 and for a Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse 2 . Both proposals rely on a thorough and publicly available impact assessment 3 , including on fundamental rights, and strive to achieve a fair balance in the protection of all fundamental rights impacted, including the right to privacy and the rights of the child enshrined in Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 4 . Neither proposal permits the collection, aggregation, processing and recording of the content of users’ conversations, nor does either proposal allow the detection of materials not linked to child sexual abuse. Communications companies are the main actors that are capable of detecting explicit videos or videos that are child sexual abuse material. Currently, companies are encouraged to do this voluntarily – a practice that has existed for over a decade and proved essential for child protection. Data shows that voluntary detection of child sexual abuse by companies in private communication services led to the rescue of a significant number of victims and to the arrest of perpetrators 5 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52024PC0060. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022PC0209. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0209; https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024SC0033. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj/eng. 5 For sample cases, see the Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022SC0209, Annex 7, p. 267.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse · Safety features & content control for child protection online
• 2025-08-19 “E-003254/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 1 strengthens the rules on the protection of individuals’ personal data, which apply directly to organisations that process personal data in the EU. Data flows to third countries are subject to specific requirements which ensure that the level of protection of personal data is maintained. 2 Under the GDPR, consent is one of the six grounds for lawful processing. Beyond consent, the controller may rely on legitimate interest for the training of artificial intelligence (AI) models and systems with users’ personal data, where such processing is necessary for the pursuit of that interest and the interest is not overridden by the interests or rights of the data subjects. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) held that, subject to certain conditions, legitimate interest could be relied upon for the development of AI models 3 . Where legitimate interest is relied upon, individuals have a right to object 4 . Members States’ competent national supervisory authorities and courts have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the GDPR and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission continues monitoring the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. The Irish Data Protection Commission (DPC), as the competent lead authority in this case, in cooperation with all concerned national data protection authorities, has engaged with Meta and required them to take additional measures and improvements 5 . Individuals may lodge a complaint either directly with the DPC or their national data protection authority, which will forward the complaint to the lead authority, the DPC. 1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 2 Chapter V GDPR. 3 European Data Protection Board (EDPB) https://www.edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/opinionboard-art-64/opinion-282024-certain-data-protection-aspects_en. 4 Article 21 GDPR. 5 21 May 2025 DPC statement on Meta AI: https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/latest-news/dpcstatement-meta-ai.”
  Privacy & digital economy · GDPR
• 2025-08-19 “P-003255/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 1 can only be activated by Greece which has 12 weeks as from when the first damage occurred, to demonstrate that the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002. The EUSF may cover a part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities 2 . Case-bycase derogation is not possible. 2. The Commission’s proposal for the 2028 – 2034 Multiannual Financial Framework on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and Union support for health emergency and preparedness and response 3 has significantly increased the indicative financial envelope compared to the proposal for the 2021 – 2027 period. The Preparedness Union Strategy highlights the need to prepare for large-scale, cross-sectoral incidents and crises, and improve the interaction between civilian and military actors, in full cooperation with Member States. This enhanced cooperation does not change the rules of the respective funding instruments governing each sector. Already now, civilian authorities need military support 4 and both benefit from the improved interaction. The mid-term review package 5 also seeks to allow Member States to optimize the use of the funds allocated to each of them under the cohesion policy programmes to enhance industrial capacities to foster defence capabilities, and resilient infrastructure, prioritising those of a dual-use nature and civil preparedness depending on their specific needs. Meanwhile, financing for other basic infrastructure and civil preparedness unrelated to defence continues 6 . 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012. 2 This means, for example, the recovery of essential infrastructure, provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations, and protection of the cultural heritage. 3 Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2028 to 2034. COM/2025/548 final. 4 For example, in case of health emergencies, extreme weather events, hybrid and cyberattacks. 5 Regulation (EU) 2025/1914 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1058 and (EU) 2021/1056 as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges in the context of the mid-term review. 6 If eligible under relevant programmes and according to identified national / regional needs.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-08-01 “E-003167/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission shares the concerns over water scarcity in regions that are most acutely affected. Water management is entrusted to the Member States as they are best placed for managing national resources, including the prioritisation of uses in times of scarcity and infrastructure investment and are free to decide on their own property ownership systems 1 . In addition, the EU has gradually built up a common framework regarding water management at the EU level. First, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 2 allows the Member States to consider the socio-economic impacts of the arrangements to recover the costs of water services, including water pricing, as well as the geographic and climatic conditions. Member States can apply different mechanisms to promote access to affordable water services, including social tariffs or progressive block tariffs. Furthermore, the Common Agricultural Policy 3 provides important support for the farmers. The support could be mobilised for soil improvements, efficient irrigation, water reuse and climate resilient crops 4 . Cohesion Policy, in turn, supports Member States to improve their public water infrastructures to enhance sustainable water management for human consumption 5 . Recently, the European Water Resilience Strategy 6 reiterates that access to clean, affordable water is a human right, while recognising the need to curb demand and over-abstractions, as well as improve water efficiency and reuse to avoid supply disruptions. 1 This neutrality is based on the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, Article 345). 2 Article 9 of the directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1-73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32-35. 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy_en. 4 Greece’s Strategic Plan for the Common Agricultural Policy (2023-2027) – 36.5% of the utilised agricultural area will receive support (under eco-schemes and agri-environment climate interventions) for practices beneficial for soil and water management. 5 Cohesion Policy supports does not finance irrigation, but only investments for the provision of water for human consumption. 6 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘European Water Resilience Strategy,’ COM(2025) 280, 4 June 2025. The quotes are from page 1 and pages 6-7 respectively.”
  EU policy on water management
• 2025-08-01 “E-003168/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The organisation and regulation of national politics and political parties are the exclusive competence of the Member States. Subject to the respect of certain basic principles, such as those laid down in Articles 2 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union and of their international commitments, it is the responsibility of Member States to lay down the specific rules regarding these areas, and of the competent national administrative and judicial authorities to ensure compliance with applicable law.”
  Rule of law and democracy in the EU (political compass)
• 2025-07-15 “E-002882/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission closely monitors the situation of the arrivals of third country nationals departing from Libya towards Crete. Under the Pact on Migration and Asylum 1 , Member States are obliged to develop contingency plans, setting out measures to ensure the adequate reception of applicants in cases where the country is confronted with a disproportionate number of arrivals. The Commission is aware of the Greek law of 11 July 2025 which imposes a three-month suspension on international protection applications for individuals arriving from North Africa and orders their immediate deportation. This is an exceptional situation, as highlighted by the European Council 2 , which addressed the worrying situation in Libya. The Commission is currently evaluating this legislation and monitoring its implementation, which must be in full compliance with EU and international law. The objective of the Dublin III Regulation 3 is to ensure quick access to the asylum procedures and the examination of an application by a single, clearly determined Member State. This Regulation will be replaced by the Asylum Migration Management Regulation 4 in the summer of 2026. The new responsibility rules should ensure a fair and effective system of attributing responsibility, supported by a permanent solidarity mechanism. In line with the Qualification Directive 5 which is based on the application of the Geneva Convention 6 , beneficiaries of international protection must be issued with a residence permit by the Member State which granted such status. 1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, COM(2020) 609 final. 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf. 3 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast). 4 Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Conuncil of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013. 5 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), OJ L 337, 20.12.2011, p. 9–26. 6 Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees, as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-07-08 “E-002774/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission supports in principle the user pays principle which implies that users bear the cost of building and maintaining the infrastructure they are using, rather than the infrastructure being financed with public money. It remains that the Eurovignette Directive 1 does not oblige Member States to put tolls in place. The decision about the precise location of the road infrastructure lies with Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. 2. The decision about private or public ownership of roads lies with Member States. 1 Directive 1999/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 1999 on the charging of vehicles for the use of road infrastructures, OJ L 187 20.7.1999, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1999/62/oj.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-06-26 “E-002580/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Plans or projects likely to have a significant effect on Natura 2000 sites, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects, must be subject to an appropriate assessment of their implications for the sites in accordance with the Habitats Directive (HD) 1 . They can only be authorised if the integrity of the sites is safeguarded. When adverse effects cannot be excluded, the plan or project can exceptionally be authorised under Article 6(4) of the HD only under certain conditions 2 . Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, it is primarily the responsibility of the Greek authorities to ensure compliance with EU environmental law. In June 2025, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice under Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU to Greece 3 for failing to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU of 17 December 2020 4 as Greece has yet to establish the necessary conservation measures for 239 Natura 2000 sites. The Renewable Energy Directive (RED) 5 as amended 6 introduces measures to accelerate permitting for renewable energy projects with appropriate safeguards. In general, the installation of renewable energy projects is subject to an environmental assessment under the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 7 or an appropriate assessment under the HD. These assessments ensure that the environmental impacts of projects are duly addressed and mitigated or compensated. The RED includes an obligation for Member States to identify specific areas 8 where a lighter permitting regime applies. These should be areas where the renewable energy plants would not have a significant environmental impact, so Natura 2000 sites and other protected areas are to be excluded. 1 Article 6(3), Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 2 Commission’s guidance document: Directorate-General for Environment, Managing Natura 2000 sites – The provisions of Article 6 of the ‘Habitats’ Directive 92/43/EEC, Publications Office, 2019, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2779/02245. 3 INFR(2014)2260: https://ec.europa.eu/implementing-eu-law/search-infringementdecisions/?langCode=EN&version=v1&typeOfSearch=byDecision&refId=INFR(2014)2260&page=1&size=10 &order=desc&sortColumns=decisionDate. 4 C 849/19. 5 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, OJ L 328, 21.12.2018, pp. 82–209. 6 Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652, OJ L, 2023/2413, 31.10.2023. 7 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1–21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1–18. 8 By February 2026.”
  EU policy on permitting for renewable energy projects · Nature protection and restoration in the EU
• 2025-06-26 “E-002579/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The exceptional situation stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its consequences on the security environment, justifies that the EU takes urgent measures to establish a temporary instrument aimed at providing financial assistance to Member States. The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) purpose is to support Member States that want to invest in defence industrial production to increase their defence readiness. The Commission does not oppose or choose between security and welfare; and social policies remain high on its agenda. The Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument 1 provides substantial financial means, e.g. via the Recovery and Resilience Facility 2 , rescEU 3 and EU4Health 4 . At any rate, decision prioritising their policy agendas remain ultimately the responsibility of the Member States. Participation of third countries to procurement supported by SAFE as buyers allows to increase the level of aggregation of the demand necessary to scale up the EU industrial capacity and at the same time, ensures that Member States participating to the procurement obtain better prices. Conditions for Ukraine and Türkiye industrial participation in SAFE are different. Ukrainian industry gets a standing that is as similar as possible to that of the EU industry. By contrast, the Turkish industry can only be made eligible though a bilateral agreement needs to be signed between Türkiye and the EU. The adoption of such an agreement rests with the Council, in accordance with the applicable legal basis and the decision with a vote to take place in line with the applicable legal basis and decision-making process. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32020R2094. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02021R0241-20240301. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EL/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022D0288#:~:text=Decision%20No%201313%2F2013%2FEU%20set s%20out%20the%20legal%20framework,an%20effective%20response%20to%20natural%20and%20manmade%20disasters. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/522/oj/eng.”
  EU competences on defence · Defence spending
• 2025-06-11 “E-002352/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission Article 13 of the Waste Framework Directive 1 (WFD) requires Member States to ensure that waste is managed in an environmentally sound way without endangering human health or harming the environment. Waste policy should focus on prevention, preparing for re-use and recycling as set out by the Green Deal 2 , the circular economy action plan 3 and the waste hierarchy in Article 4 of the WFD. The inclusion of incineration plants in the Greek plan does not contravene the above instruments. Incineration with energy recovery is higher placed in the waste hierarchy than other disposal operations such as incineration without energy recovery and landfilling. However, the competent authorities should only grant permits to waste facilities if the intended method of treatment is acceptable from the point of view of environmental protection and if it is in line with the relevant waste management plans required in the WFD 4 . In particular, in order to protect human health or harm to the environment, they must respect the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) 5 , which lays down emission limits and techniques to stay below certain emission thresholds 6 . Cohesion Policy does not support investments in waste incineration, in line with EU’s commitment to prioritise waste prevention, reuse and recycling 7 . Without prejudice to the Commission’s role as guardian of the Treaties, Member States are primarily responsible to ensure compliance with EU legislation and appropriate citizen consultation process in the development of waste management strategies and specific waste treatment plants in accordance with the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 8 , the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive 9 and the IED. 1 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives, OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3‐30, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/851 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 109‐140. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/environment/strategy/circular-economy-action-plan_en. 4 Article 28. 5 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control), OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17‐119. 6 through the best available techniques conclusions (Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/2010 of 12 November 2019 establishing the best available techniques (BAT) conclusions, under Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, for waste incineration, OJ L 312, 3.12.2019, p. 55–91) for waste incineration, which are the reference for setting the permit conditions. 7 Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02021R1058-20241224). 8 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1‐21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1‐18. 9 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, OJ L 197, 21.7.2001, p. 30‐37.”
  Industrial emissions directive (IED) · Circular economy · Air quality policy
• 2025-05-28 “E-002155/2025 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The Water Framework Directive (WFD) 1 provides that Member States set cost recovery arrangements, including water pricing, considering social, environmental and economic impacts as well as the geographic and climatic conditions, as long as environmental objectives are met. Member States apply different mechanisms to promote access to and ensure affordability of water services, including subsidies, social tariffs or progressive block tariffs. Applying the Polluter-Pays Principle 2 and the ‘adequate contribution’ clause can shift costs from households to polluters and intensive users, potentially lowering tariffs. Member States are responsible for water management, including decisions on water allocation and prioritisation of uses in times of scarcity and on infrastructure investment, and ensuring compliance with the WFD. Additional water supply options could be considered by Greece as part of an integrated strategy, better balancing water demand and supply, considering longterm climate scenarios. The European Water Resilience Strategy 3 recognises access to clean, affordable water as a human right and that in regions with acute overexploitation, water scarcity threatens development. and that it is essential to continue securing water supply, meeting the demands from different users in a fair way. Improving water efficiency, particularly among intensive users, is key to avoid supply disruptions. The modernised cohesion policy 4 encourages investments to secure water access and resilience. For 2021-2027, EUR 1.2 billion 5 were allocated to Greece to enhance overall water management and resilience aligning with broader EU goals, including drinking water and wastewater management. 1 Article 9 of the Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35. 2 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/economy-and-finance/ensuring-polluters-pay_en. 3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘European Water Resilience Strategy,’ COM(2025) 280, 4 June 2025. The quotes are from page 1 and pages 6-7 respectively. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/communication/mid-term-review-2025/communication-mid-termreview-2025_en.pdf. 5 Public expenditure.”
  Climate efforts · Air quality policy
• 2025-05-27 “E-002115/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) 1 enables the EU to show solidarity towards displaced workers. The EGF offers one-off re-active assistance in case of major restructuring events by co-financing personalised active labour market policy measures with the aim of bringing dismissed workers back into sustainable employment as quickly as possible. The Commission proposed on 1 April 2025 to amend the EGF Regulation 2 to support workers at risk of imminent job loss, allowing earlier intervention by swiftly mobilising support before collective dismissals and job losses occur. The EGF support does not replace measures which are the responsibility of the enterprises by virtue of national law or collective agreement. Tailor-made training to cater for labour market required skills is a cornerstone of the EGF support along with individual job-search services, occupational guidance, outplacement, entrepreneurship promotion and financial contribution to business start-up for those aiming to become self-employed. Job-search allowance, employer recruitment incentives or contribution to cost of carers complement the above referred measures and cannot exceed 35% of the cost of the package of measures. The Member States are entirely responsible for deciding the mix of measures funded by the EGF. Member States are required under the EGF Regulation to prevent, detect and deal effectively with any irregularities, including fraud, committed by beneficiaries. The European Anti-Fraud Office has the power to carry out administrative investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the EU. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/691 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/691/oj/eng. 2 COM(2025) 140 final, 1 April 2025 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0140.”
  Funding for vocational training · European Globalisation Adjustment Fund
• 2025-05-16 “E-001973/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Protecting migrant workers from labour exploitation and ensuring their adequate working and living conditions is a priority for the Commission 1 . The EU legal migration Directives 2 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights provide that migrant workers should live decently and have a right to fair working conditions. The Seasonal Workers Directive 3 provides for a right to accommodation with an adequate standard of living. The Employers Sanctions Directive 4 grants migrants who reside and work illegally rights to ensure they are informed about their entitlements from illegal employment and can lodge complaints. The Commission monitors the implementation of these directives by Member States. Migrants’ access to adequate housing is also a priority of the Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-27 5 . The EU Solidarity Fund can be activated at the request of Greece within 12 weeks after the damage occurred, demonstrating that the total damage exceeds the required thresholds 6 . It may cover part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities. Private damage is not eligible. The European Regional Development Fund supports Greece with some EUR 141 million for social infrastructure for vulnerable groups. The European Social Fund Plus can support housing-related interventions for vulnerable groups but does not fund housing provision directly. In Greece, EUR 224.3 million are programmed for measures to enhance access to quality services. Regional programmes fund shelters for homeless people and housing assistance. The Helios+ programme 7 supports migrant integration, including accommodation support. 1 Political Guidelines 2024-2029: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf. 2 Notably the Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU) and the Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU). 3 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/36/oj. 4 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 168, 30.6.2009, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/52/oj/eng. 5 COM(2020) 758 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52020DC0758. 6 As specified in Article 2, Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund, OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2002/2012/oj/eng. 7 https://greece.iom.int/helios.”
  EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers · EU policy on labour exploitation in global supply chains · EU housing policy
• 2025-05-12 “E-001869/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission On 16 April 2025, the Commission proposed 1 to establish an EU list of safe countries of origin. It also proposed to frontload two elements of the Asylum Procedure Regulation 2024/1348 2 , notably the new ground for applying accelerated and border procedures based on an EU-wide 20% recognition rate and the possibility to designate safe third countries and safe countries of origin with exceptions. Under the proposal, applications for international protection of people coming from countries designated as safe countries of origin at EU level would be examined in an accelerated or border procedure. This examination may lead to a decision to grant international or subsidiary protection, depending on the individual circumstances of each case. The proposal is based on a thorough analysis of the relevant criteria pertaining to the political and legal situation in each country. In the event of significant changes in that situation, the designation may be suspended and eventually removed. The proposal respects fundamental rights and observes the principles enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, including the right to asylum and protection against refoulement. The proposal to revise the conditions for the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept 3 and the possibility to establish ‘return hubs’ according to the proposal for a Return Regulation 4 are different from the proposal referred above. The ‘safe third country’ concept implies transferring the applicant to a third country where the application for protection would be examined in substance under the law of that country. The notion of ‘return hubs’ refers to the return of persons whose application for protection has already been examined in substance and rejected in the EU. 1 COM(2025) 186 final. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU; OJ L, 2024/1348, 22.5.2024. 3 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept, COM/2025/259 final, adopted on 20 May 2025. 4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union, and repealing Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and the Council, Council Directive 2001/40/EC and Council Decision 2004/191/EC, COM/2025/101 final, adopted on 11 March 2025.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-30 “E-001763/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission takes note of the German Federal Administrative Court’s judgment 1 whereby the transfer of two beneficiaries of international protection in Greece was deemed permissible on the basis that they would not be at risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 2 , upon their return to Greece. In its Communication of 4 April 2025 on the status of migration management in mainland Greece 3 , the Commission concluded that, while improvements may continue to be necessary in certain aspects of migration management, there are no systemic deficiencies in the Greek mainland asylum and reception system resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Dublin III Regulation 4 does not apply to beneficiaries of international protection. In its judgement in case-673/19 5 , the Court of Justice ruled that in instances where a third-country national is present in a Member State without fulfilling the conditions for entry, stay or residence while holding a valid residence permit in another Member State, including because the third-country national was granted refugee status, the Return Directive 6 is applicable, which allows for the use of existing bilateral agreements between Member States. This is a bilateral agreement between Greece and Germany to allow for the voluntary transfer of beneficiaries of international protection who moved on from Greece to Germany where they applied for asylum again. 1 https://www.bverwg.de/de/pm/2025/30. 2 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 391–407. 3 Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the status of migration management in mainland Greece, COM(2025)170 final. 4 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 31–59. 5 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 24 February 2021, M and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid and T, C-673/19, EU:C:2021:127, paragraph 30. 6 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98–107.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-04-30 “E-001761/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Non-Performing Loans (NPL) Directive 1 applies as of 30 December 2023. According to Article 2 of the Directive, its scope is limited to creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement, or of the non-performing credit agreement itself, issued by a credit institution established in the EU. From this perspective, the transfer of social insurance debt or due contributions are not in scope of this Directive. This domain is therefore competence of national law, without prejudice to the application of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) 2 . The supervision and enforcement of the GDPR falls within the competence of the national supervisory authorities and courts, without prejudice to the competences of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties. 1 Directive (EU) 2021/2167 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2021 on credit servicers and credit purchasers and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17/EU, OJ L 438, 8.12.2021, p.1. 2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (GDPR), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. and (EU) 2018/1725.”
  Non-performing mortgages · EU competences on social policies
• 2025-04-28 “E-001686/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission Directive 2008/68/EC 1 on the inland transport of dangerous goods carries over into the EU acquis the safety standards derived from the international legislation applicable to rail (RID), road (ADR) and inland waterways (ADN). These rules and standards have existed for a long time; they are refined and revised every other year in order to ensure that the latest technical and scientific developments are taken into account. Compliance with these standards is thus designed to ensure the safe transport of dangerous goods, whether by rail or by other transport modes. However, to be effective, these rules must be properly enforced; checks and verifications need to be performed both regularly and preventatively. As regards the carriage of military freight, this is generally subject to the same rules as commercial freight in relation to the transport of dangerous goods. The Commission would also emphasise that a shift from the use of rail for the transport of dangerous goods to road would not improve safety for EU citizens: not only is road the least safe of all transport modes but this would also prejudice EU climate objectives. At the same time, it should be noted that an increase in rail traffic does not prevent the fulfilment of all relevant safety standards, especially in light of on-going work to roll out modern signalling systems and to reinforce safety responsibilities amongst different rail stakeholders. Overall, rail safety has in fact been improved over the last years: according to the European Railway Agency the number of fatalities and accidents in the rail sector has decreased significantly since 2010 and the number of fatalities in the EU in 2023 was 841. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/68/oj/eng.”
  EU policy on aviation safety · EU support of rail transport
• 2025-04-28 “E-001688/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The Eurostat definition of unemployed is based on guidelines and global standards provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO). In line with Article 148 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (the ‘Employment Guidelines’) are to guide policy implementation in the Member States and in the EU, including in matters related to unemployment benefits 1 . Member States retain their autonomy to determine the details of their social security systems (Article 153(4) TFEU), including which benefits are provided, their eligibility conditions and their calculation methods. Consequently, Greece retains its competence to determine the amounts of unemployment benefits to be provided. The reform of the unemployment benefit system, tested on a pilot basis under the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility, is part of the Greek government’s effort to streamline unemployment benefits, to improve public spending efficiency and facilitate transitions to employment. The ongoing pilot considers prior work experience and applies an indexation of the benefit to the latest daily net wage level, which is decreasing over time to motivate return to work thereby having a positive impact on the coverage of the unemployment insurance system. The pilot is based on a study funded by the Commission and complements the employment incentive introduced by Law 4921/2022 2 , whereby unemployed persons who find a job during the duration of the unemployment benefit are entitled to 50% of the remaining benefit as an incentive in addition to their salary. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202403134. 2 https://www.kodiko.gr/nomologia/download_fek?f=fek/2022/a/fek_a_75_2022.pdf&t=098149c7b54fc11d14f3 b0da58d67f17.”
  Minimum income harmonisation at EU level · EU competences on social policies
• 2025-04-22 “E-001604/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The EU can meet its climate and zero pollution goals successfully only if all sectors of the economy, including shipping, make significant emission reductions. For instance, to mitigate potential cost increases, the maritime related Fit for 55 regulations require only gradual emission cuts over time, support is given to the industry through EU funding programmes, and Member States can provide certain temporary exemptions e.g. for connections to small islands. The liberalisation of maritime cabotage under Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 1 allows EU operators to provide services freely, while enabling Member States to impose public service obligations to ensure connectivity, especially to islands. These may include requirements on fares, frequency, or vessel standards, and may be compensated under EU State aid rules, provided the aid is proportionate and transparent. The Commission does not regulate domestic fares, ticket categories, or the deployment of specific vessels. These matters fall entirely under national competence. It is for each Member State to decide whether to impose public service obligations or introduce social pricing schemes for groups such as students, pensioners, or persons with disabilities. Concerns about pricing, service levels or fleet conditions should therefore be addressed to the national authorities responsible. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1992/3577/oj/eng.”
  EU Competition policy · Decarbonisation of maritime transport
• 2025-04-17 “E-001566/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The EU has strengthened the legislative framework regarding the protection of critical infrastructure, notably with the entry into application in October 2024 of the Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities 1 , that enhances the resilience of critical entities that provide essential services for vital societal functions or economic activities. ProtectEU 2 stresses the importance of timely transposition and correct implementation of this Directive. The EU Preparedness Union Strategy 3 provides a comprehensive approach to preparedness, cutting across all policy areas, governance levels and stakeholders, grounded on an all-hazards whole-of-government, and whole-of-society approach. The focus of preparedness should be on solutions that address complex crises with cascading effects, while maximising risk reduction and optimising resources. The EU investment in dual-use infrastructure on the Trans European Network (TEN-T) aims at boosting connectivity across all modes of transport, offering significant benefits for civilians in peacetime while also serving as deterrent against potential military crises. By building or upgrading existing transport infrastructure, dual-use projects have ensured that infrastructure is capable of upholding higher traffic volumes, including transportation of military capabilities as well as civilian traffic. The EU has provided around EUR 1.7 billion in support since 2021, funding 95 dual-use projects in 21 Member States. ProtectEU embeds in its core the respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Strategy promotes a whole-of society approach, as well as security mainstreaming for security considerations to be integrated in all EU legislation, policies and programmes. 1 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy; COM/2025/148 final. 3 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Preparedness Union Strategy, JOIN/2025/130 final.”
  Defence spending · Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure · EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2025-04-12 “E-001513/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque On behalf of the European Commission The strategy for the Savings and Investments Union (SIU) 1 aims to offer citizens more and safer opportunities to invest in capital markets and increase their wealth while, at the same time, boosting EU economic growth and competitiveness. The SIU is committed to ensuring that citizens have easy, simple and low-cost access to a wide variety of investment opportunities offering good returns on their household savings. It will also improve the availability of stronger and more effective supplementary pension systems that deliver better performance to help citizens save for retirement. This includes also promoting auto-enrolment in supplementary pension schemes, an instrument that has proven effective in increasing participation of savers in pension schemes resulting in better returns on investment and higher pensions. In addition, to boost transparency and encourage participation, planned measures will also include recommending the implementation of pension tracking systems to help workers keep track of their pension entitlements in different schemes and make informed decisions about their retirement savings. The SIU will not result in forced contributions, diversion of funds or sequestrations. On the contrary, citizens will enjoy full freedom to invest based on their personal choices. They will have control of where they want to keep and allocate their money. The SIU aims to increase their choice by allowing them to get better access to productive investment opportunities. The Commission has no competence to deal with the second question, which is a matter solely for the national authorities concerned. 1 COM(2025) 124 final: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/commission-unveils-savings-and-investmentsunion-strategy-enhance-financial-opportunities-eu_en.”
  Financial regulation · European Banking Union
• 2025-04-10 “E-001484/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Member States have a primary responsibility to monitor the application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary steps for enforcement. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission monitors the situation and may decide to take appropriate action. Directive 2014/17/EU 1 on mortgage credit agreements introduced specific rules to protect consumers where the credit is denominated in a foreign currency (e.g. explanations on the implications for consumers, right to convert the credit agreement into an alternative currency or other arrangements in place to limit the exchange rate risk). The directive only applies to mortgage credit contracts concluded as from 21 March 2016. Directive 93/13/EEC 2 on unfair contract terms requires Member States to ensure that terms in all consumer contracts are fair and intelligible, and that consumers are not bound by unfair contract terms. The Commission does not intervene in contractual agreements between lenders and borrowers. In case of legal disputes, it is for Greek authorities and courts to assess, based on the circumstances of each case, whether Greek banks complied with their obligations regarding the fairness and transparency of contract terms, such as exposing the borrower to a foreign exchange risk 3 . Regarding enforcement actions, the Commission does not have powers to intervene in individual consumer disputes or to review decisions of national authorities and courts. 1 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 60, 28.2.2014, p. 34-85. 2 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29‐34. 3 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-186/16 Andriciuc.”
  Non-performing mortgages · Financial regulation
• 2025-04-09 “E-001461/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Cohesion Policy supports Greece with investments in road infrastructure through the sectoral programme ‘Transport’ and the regional programmes, provided they align with the programme’s priorities and the applicable regulatory framework. However, under the shared management and subsidiarity principles governing the Cohesion Policy Funds, project selection and implementation fall under the responsibility of the relevant national and regional managing authorities. According to the latest information provided by them, there is no provision for funding the project in question. In line with Article 73(2)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) 2021/1060 1 , the Commission considers that a cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool to determine the best relationship between the amount of support, the activities undertaken and the achievement of objectives, and thus to prioritise investments for structural mobility and safety improvements. Especially for larger investments, cost-benefit analysis helps the competent national authorities to define the most appropriate scope of projects, their level of EU funding and the added value for the society. This added value can include economic impact and road safety. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy.”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2025-04-04 “E-001386/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission According to Article 153(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the ‘Treaty’), the right to strike does not fall under the EU’s legislative competence. Regarding the education systems in the Member States, Article 6 of the Treaty limits the role of the EU in the area of education to supporting, coordinating or supplementing Member States’ actions. The Member States remain solely responsible for the content of teaching and organisation of their education systems. Nevertheless, under the European Education Area cooperation framework, the Commission monitors and analyses Member States’ education policies in the Education and Training Monitor. The teachers’ evaluation mechanism in Greece contains elements for teachers’ career development which are important for the quality of education.”
  EU competences on social policies
• 2025-03-10 “E-001030/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission is fully aware of the challenges faced by many farmers, including in Greece. To address these challenges, the Vision for Agriculture and Food presented on 19 February 2025 1 contains an ambitious roadmap towards an agri-food system that is attractive, competitive, future-oriented, sustainable and fair for current and future generations, including trade and simplification. In particular, the work on the livestock and the simplification package, will look at improving the competitiveness and resilience of the livestock sector. 2. The current Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) supports interventions that help farmers implement actions to prevent crisis situations and build on medium and long-term resilience. The CAP Strategic Plan 2023-2027 (CSP) 2 for Greece includes tools to support farmers to mitigate short-term impacts, such as direct payments, sectoral and rural development interventions aiming to stabilise farmers’ incomes. In addition, the CSP envisages also support for investments to restore agricultural potential following natural disasters, adverse climatic or catastrophic events. Regarding the requests for input subsidies and State guaranteed prices, the Commission is and remains in favour of market orientation. In this context, the Vision states that farmers must get a better revenue from the market and that for this they need to benefit from a fair and equitable food chain. To this end, the Commission already on 10 December 2024 3 adopted a proposal to rebalance the positions in the chain and it will consider further initiatives. Other suggestions in relation to taxes, or pensions are largely in the remit of the national authorities or control bodies. 1 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/vision-agriculturefood_en#:~:text=Shaping%20the%20future%20of%20farming%20and%20the%20agrifood,entire%20value%20chain%20within%20the%20EU%20and%20globally 2 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/ 3 COM(2024) 576 and 577 final.”
  Direct payments to farmers (pillar 1) · EU policy on farmer–buyer relations in the agri-food supply chain · Agricultural funding
• 2025-03-10 “E-001028/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea is a legal obligation under international law. Actors involved in search and rescue operations must act in a lawful, swift and coordinated way to make sure that those in distress at sea are brought to safety as rapidly as possible independently from the circumstances. The Commission is in regular contact with Greece, continues to call for the national investigations and judicial proceedings to be conducted in a prompt and comprehensive manner and expects the authorities to prosecute any wrongdoing, as is their responsibility. In its Decision of 26 February 2024 1 , the European Ombudsman noted that in the case of Pylos, Frontex has not breached any relevant rules concerning its emergency response obligations, although the report identified areas for improvement to help prevent tragedies in future. Repeated migrant deaths at sea are a tragic reminder of the need for a comprehensive approach to migration management and renewed efforts to combat migrant smuggling. The EU supports Member States in migration management (e.g. through financial and operational support), with the objective of creating fair, efficient, and sustainable migration and asylum systems. At the same time, it will continue its work on preventing dangerous journeys from taking place. This is done by addressing the root causes of irregular migration and by reinforcing the existing framework to combat organised criminal networks along migratory routes to the EU. 1 https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/182665.”
  Asylum & border control
• 2025-02-19 “E-000764/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. Most Member States own the designated Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs). This is also the case in Greece, where the Hellenic Aviation Service Provider (HASP) is part of the Ministry for Infrastructure, Transport and Networks. Since ANSPs are monopolistic service providers, they are subject to economic regulation. The regulation requires the setting of binding targets for the key performance areas of safety, capacity, environment and costefficiency. ANSPs shall put in place the necessary measures to reach these targets, including via hiring of staff and via investments. With regard to profits, as referred to by the Honourable Member, the legislation in force 1 allows for ‘a reasonable return on assets’. 2. The Single European Sky regulatory framework aims at putting in place rules that contribute to a safe, sustainable and efficient air traffic management system in the EU. Very importantly, the application of this framework is without prejudice to Member States’ sovereignty over their airspace. This sovereignty also applies to the way in which Member States coordinate operations between civil and military users, who are sharing the same airspace. In the case of larger cross-border military exercises, the Eurocontrol Network Manager – appointed by the Commission - typically offers to assist ANSPs in planning such events. 1 Article 29.3 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2803: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2803/oj/eng”
  EU competences on space policy
• 2025-02-05 “E-000535/2025 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission 1. Among the main objectives of Directive 1999/62/EC 1 , as lastly amended by Directive (EU) 2022/362 2 , are the elimination of distortions of competition in the Single Market and the establishment of a fair mechanism for charging infrastructure costs to hauliers. Accordingly, the Directive sets out a methodology in its annexes to define toll tariffs for heavy-duty vehicles based on the recovery of construction costs principle and of the user pay principle. Those rules continued to apply only to heavy-duty vehicles following the 2022 revision that extends the scope of the Directive to include light-duty vehicles. Therefore, the definition of toll tariffs imposed on light-duty vehicles falls entirely under the remit of Member States. The requirement of proportionality of user charges, mentioned in the question, refers only to user charges (also known as time-based charges or vignettes) and not to tolls (distance-based charges). 2. The decision between exclusive state ownership or private ownership of roads lies with Member States. The Commission supports the user pays principle which implies that users bear the cost of building and maintaining the infrastructure they are using, rather than the infrastructure being financed with public money. Directive 1999/62/EC gives Governments the possibility to impose tolls to recover these costs and sets out the rules to follow if they choose to do so. 1 Directive 1999/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 1999 on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, OJ L 187, 20.7.1999, p. 42, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1999/62/oj. 2 Directive (EU) 2022/362 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 February 2022 amending Directives 1999/62/EC, 1999/37/EC and (EU) 2019/520, as regards the charging of vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures, OJ L 69, 4.3.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/362/oj.”
  EU transport infrastructure integration · EU funding for transportation
• 2025-01-03 “P-000006/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The fall of Assad’s criminal regime marks a historic moment for the Syrian people. The European Council of 19 December 2024 1 stressed the historic opportunity to reunite and rebuild the country and underlined the importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people, in line with the core principles of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2254. In this respect, the EU supports the work of the UN Special Envoy for Syria. Syria’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within secure borders should be fully respected, in accordance with international law. This was also the agreement reached in Aqaba 2 on 14 December 2024 on common principles 3 for the international community’s engagement in support of the Syrian people in this unprecedented transition. The EU has a strategic interest in a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Türkiye. In this context, the EU continues to expect Türkiye to respect the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of all Member States, in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 4 and to unequivocally commit to and promote good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having recourse, if necessary, to the International Court of Justice. The European Council conclusions of 12 December 2019 5 clearly stated that the Türkiye-Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea 6 infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/press-statement-eu-high-representative-foreign-affairs-and-security-policyfollowing-international_en 3 https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/syria/news/2024/article/joint-statement-on-syria-14-dec-2024 4 https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/41768/12-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf 6 https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/Turkey_11122019_(HC) _MoU_Libya-Delimitation-areas-Mediterranean.pdf”
  EU-Syria relations · EU-Turkey relations
• 2024-12-11 “E-002873/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission 1. and 3. EU law sets out minimum requirements in the social field. The Working Time Directive 1 protects workers’ safety and health by laying down minimum requirements on working time. The Directive notably guarantees workers 11 consecutive hours of daily rest and a weekly rest period of 24 hours plus the 11 hours of daily rest; any derogations must comply with strict conditions. It also limits weekly working time, including overtime, to an average of 48 hours for each 7-day period. Member States may adopt and maintain provisions or permit the application of collective agreements more favourable to the protection of the safety and health of workers than Directive 2003/88/EC or other EU directives setting minimum requirements in the social field. The Commission does not have any evidence that the Greek legislation referred to by the Honourable Member breaches the provisions of Directive 2003/88/EC. 2. The Seveso III Directive 2 sets obligations both to competent authorities and operators to prevent and control major-accident hazards 3 . Member States must ensure that operators are obliged to take all necessary measures to prevent major accidents and to limit their consequences for human health and the environment, and to demonstrate to the competent authorities, at any time, that this has been done, notably in case of inspections. The Directive makes competent authorities responsible for ensuring compliance with it, and for the operator to act to prevent and control major accidents. In particular, the operator must draw up an internal emergency plan and provide necessary information for the competent authority to be able to draw up an external emergency plan 4 . It must also draw up a major-accident prevention policy 5 and produce a safety report 6 . 1 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9‐19 - https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/88/oj 2 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of majoraccident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC, OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 1–37 - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/18/oj 3 Article 5 of Directive 2012/18/EU. 4 Article 12 of Directive 2012/18/EU. 5 Article 8 of Directive 2012/18/EU. 6 Article 10 of Directive 2012/18/EU.”
  EU policy on labour exploitation in global supply chains · EU rules on hazardous working conditions
• 2024-12-04 “E-002751/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission Acknowledging the important role of firefighters and civil protection services, the Commission respectfully notes that EU law does not require making all seasonal firefighters permanent. In particular, the requirement to prevent abuse of fixed-term contracts under the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work 1 applies only to ‘successive’ contracts. A contract initiated after a significant lapse of time is not considered successive 2 . Consequently, the employment relationships of seasonal firefighters do not count as abusive. The report on Strengthening Europe´s civilian and military preparedness by former Finnish President Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the Commission, tackles the topic of comprehensive preparedness, building on a whole-of-government, whole-of-society and allhazards approach, including also climate-related disasters such as wildfires. Noting that prevention and preparedness help mitigating the effects of natural disasters, the report emphasises the key role of firefighters and civil protection services. The EU has a supporting competence in civil protection, complementing national prevention and preparedness efforts where a joint approach is more effective than separate actions, and encouraging cooperation under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism 3 to improve the effectiveness of prevention, preparedness, and response efforts against disasters. The functioning and deployment of firefighting services remain the competence of Member States. Concerning the clashes between seasonal firefighters and police, the Commission deplores violence but cannot comment on the specific incident. It recalls the importance of freedom of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed under the Greek Constitution. 1 Annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ L 175, 10.7.1999, p. 43), https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1999/70/oj/eng 2 Case C-362/13, Fiamingo, par. 71. 3 https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en”
  Climate efforts
• 2024-11-06 “P-002451/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU has consistently been a leading supporter of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has been providing lifesaving services in Gaza and across the region in line with the mandate adopted by the UN General Assembly. The European Council reaffirmed repeatedly that these services were essential 1 . Furthermore, the European Council has condemned any attempt to abrogate the 1967 agreement between Israel and UNRWA or to otherwise attempt to obstruct its capacity to operate its mandate 2 . Following the very serious allegations against several UNRWA staff regarding their possible involvement in the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks, the Commission reviewed its funding decision for UNRWA. The Commission engaged with UNRWA’s Commissioner General and welcomed his commitment to tackle the serious issues at stake, including through the adoption of an action plan to implement the recommendations of the UN Independent Review Group 3 (IRG), and the swift follow up on the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service report on the allegations against UNRWA’s staff 4 . Upon fulfilment by UNRWA of the conditions agreed for the 2024 EU funding, the Commission disbursed in three tranches a total of EUR 82 million, the last of which in October 2024. Additionally, the Commission disbursed a topup of EUR 10 million on 20 December 2024 5 , in view of progress on the implementation of the recommendations of the IRG and of the EU audit. The EU remains committed to supporting the Agency, providing both financial and political backing to enable UNRWA to fulfil its mandate, in particular in light of the recent ceasefire, which the EU has warmly welcomed. In this regard, the EU will continue calling for full and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid to the Gaza strip and that aid can be effectively distributed to those in need, including by UN agencies and notably UNRWA 6 . 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/70880/euco-conclusions-2122032024.pdf; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf 3 https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/colonna-report-and-action-plan 4 https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-investigation-statement-05aug24/ 5 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-disburses-additional-eu10-millionpayment-unrwa-2024-12-20_en 6 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/01/18/israelpalestine-statement-by-the-highrepresentative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-welcoming-the-ceasefire-and-hostage-deal-in-gaza/”
  Support for international humanitarian organisations · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-10-24 “E-002247/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Mînzatu on behalf of the European Commission The reference to ‘adequate’ minimum wages in Directive (EU) 2022/2041 1 has to be understood in the context of the aim of its provisions, which seek to promote the adequacy of minimum wages with the aim of achieving decent living and working conditions. However, the Directive also fully respects the competence of Member States to set the level of minimum wages within their territory, in line with Article 153(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2 (TFEU). The Directive establishes a procedural framework for setting and updating statutory minimum wages that requires Member States to define clear criteria (notably taking into account the purchasing power of statutory minimum wages 3 ), to use indicative reference values to guide their assessment of adequacy and to effectively involve social partners in the whole process. In addition, Member States may also use an automatic indexation mechanism provided that the application of such mechanism does not lead to a decrease in statutory minimum wages. The Directive does not impose statutory minimum wages to the detriment of collective bargaining. It leaves Member States the choice to set statutory minimum wages, to promote access to minimum wage protection provided for in collective agreements, or both. In any event, and as mentioned in Recital (22) of the Directive, well-functioning collective bargaining is an essential factor for achieving adequate minimum wage protection and therefore the Directive requires all Member States to promote it. 1 Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union (OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 33–47) - https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022L2041 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008E153 3 When setting and updating statutory minimum wages, the criteria defined by Member States have to include the following elements: The purchasing power of statutory minimum wages, taking into account the cost of living; the general level of wages and their distribution; the growth rate of wages, and long-term national productivity levels and developments.”
  Minimum wages harmonisation at EU level · EU competences on social policies
• 2024-10-15 “E-002085/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU’s policy on critical raw materials, as determined by the Critical Raw Materials Act 1 , aims to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and does not weaken EU environmental rules. The environmental effects 2 of plans and programmes and of individual projects covering mining activities have to be duly assessed in accordance with the EU requirements on strategic environmental assessment 3 and on environmental impact assessment 4 . In addition, plans or projects likely to have a significant effect on Natura 2000 sites, either individually or in combination with other plans or projects, must be subject to an assessment of their implications for the sites in accordance with Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive 5 . They can only be authorised if the integrity of the sites is safeguarded. When adverse effects on the integrity of a site cannot be excluded, the plan or project can exceptionally be authorised under Article 6(4) of the Directive only under certain conditions 6 . The Commission has issued guidance on non-energy mineral extraction and Natura 2000 7 . New projects also have to be assessed as regards their impact on water bodies and can only be allowed subject to compliance with the criteria set out in Article 4(7) of the Water Framework Directive 8 . 2. It is primarily the responsibility of the Member States to ensure the proper application of the relevant legal provisions and to take the necessary enforcement actions. In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will monitor the situation and may decide to take action as appropriate. 1 https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-rawmaterials/critical-raw-materials-act_en 2 incl. inter alia on land and water resources (including groundwater). 3 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, O.J. L 197, 21.07.2001 p. 30 – 37. 4 Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1–18. 5 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7–50. 6 Commission’s guidance document European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, Managing Natura 2000 sites – The provisions of Article 6 of the ‘Habitats’ Directive 92/43/EEC, Publications Office, 2019, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2779/02245 7 European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, Guidance document on non-energy mineral extraction and Natura 2000: a summary, Publications Office, 2019, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2779/985239 8 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1.”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-03 “E-001945/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation ASPIDES is an autonomous and purely defensive operation and is not linked to any actions, such as strikes on Yemeni soil, taken by national forces or other operations in the area. The objective of the operation is to protect merchant shipping and lives of the seafarers and uphold the freedom of the navigation granted by international treaties. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES is not linked to the ongoing escalation in Gaza and Lebanon but aims at contributing to maritime security in the Red Sea, as well as to preventing further escalation through its strictly defensive posture. In this context, EU does not view calls to terminate EUNAVFOR ASPIDES or withdraw assets from it as conducive to achieving regional de-escalation. The EU has been consistently calling for a ceasefire in Gaza 1 , and does so now with respect to Lebanon as well 2 . The EU remains firmly committed to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace based on the twostate solution, as reiterated by the European Council in its conclusions of 17 October 2024 3 . The EU actively supports and engages with international partners on concrete irreversible steps towards the two-state solution reviving a political process to this end, including through the holding of an international peace conference as soon as possible. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/gaza-statement-high-representative-adoption-un-security-councilresolution_en; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-councilconclusions-27-june-2024/ 2 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/lebanonisrael-statement-high-representative-escalation-hostilities_en; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/lebanon-statement-high-representative-latest-developments_en; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/paris-oecd-and-un/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-lebanon-220thexecutive-board-unesco_und_en 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17-october2024/”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine · EU humanitarian missions
• 2024-09-26 “E-001844/2024 Answer given by Ms Ivanova on behalf of the European Commission Article 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 1 limits the role of the EU in the area of education to supporting, coordinating or supplementing Member States’ actions. Article 165(1) TFEU stipulates that Member States remain solely responsible for the content of teaching and organisation of their education systems. Based on this, the EU supports Member States with funding through the Erasmus+ programme 2 , the European Social Fund Plus 3 , the Recovery and Resilience Facility 4 and the European Regional Development Fund 5 . The Commission presents an annual analysis of how education and training systems evolve across the EU in the Education and Training Monitor 6 . The publication brings together the latest available data and updates on national policy measures for all levels of education. Another annual publication, Investing in Education 7 , analyses the financing of education across the EU. The 2024 edition 8 shows that investment in education fell during the pandemic and has not returned to pre Covid levels. The Council recommendation of 22 May 2018 9 on promoting common values, inclusive education, and the European dimension of teaching includes a specific reference to learners with disabilities in terms of ensuring effective equal access to quality inclusive education. The Commission is not in a position to comment on the appropriateness of the education infrastructure in Member States. Nevertheless, the Commission agrees that adequate education infrastructure is a basic condition to ensure high quality education. On this, the Commission published in 2022 a study on investments in education infrastructure with the aim to identify good practices 10 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT 2 https://erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu/ 3 https://european-social-fund-plus.ec.europa.eu/en 4 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en 5 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/erdf_en 6 https://education.ec.europa.eu/about-eea/education-and-training-monitor 7 https://op.europa.eu/en/publicationeditions?p_p_id=eu_europa_publications_portlet_search_executor_SearchExecutorPortlet_INSTANCE_iNulj08 zem1W&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&facet.pub.edition=b172797d-3752-11ef-b441-01aa75ed71a1 8 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b172797d-3752-11ef-b441-01aa75ed71a1/language-en 9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018H0607%2801%29 10 https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/01ea6b48-d266-11ec-a95f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en”
  Focus of EU policy on education (shaping workers vs citizens)
• 2024-09-18 “E-001760/2024 Answer given by Mr Wojciechowski on behalf of the European Commission Member States may provide support for restoration of agricultural potential damaged by natural disasters and for preventive actions in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 1 . It is up to Member States to plan those interventions in their CAP Strategic Plan (CSP) and eventually support investments to restore agricultural production potential of mastic crops. Eligible investments may be funded entirely (up to 100%) by EU resources, under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). The CSP may also offer financial support in form of loans, guarantees or working capital to help farmers restore agricultural potential after such events. Member States may benefit from exceptional market measures including support packages to address economic difficulties of farmers financed from the agricultural reserve according to the Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 2 . In the case of adverse climatic events which can be assimilated to a natural disaster, national authorities may also grant support to farmers from their national budget in line with EU State aid rules 3 . According to the Floods Directive 4 , the objectives for risk reduction are determined at national level by the Member States based on local and regional circumstances 5 . The same applies to the selection and prioritisation of measures aiming to reduce the risk from flooding. For the period 2021-2027, Cohesion Policy supports Greece with some EUR 379 million (public expenditure), to invest on risk prevention and management of floods through targeted measures under the sectoral programmes ‘Environment and climate change’ and ‘Civil Protection’. Under the regional programme ‘Voreio Aigaio’, EUR 13 million (public expenditure) are granted to flood protection actions. 1 Article 73 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013, OJ L 435/1, 6.12.2021. 2 Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007, OJ L 347/671, 20.12.2013. 3 Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas 2022/C 485/01, OJ C 485, 21.12.2022, p. 1; Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/2472 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 1; Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013 p. 9. 4 Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks, OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27–34. 5 https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/water-framework-directive/implementation-reports_en#ref-6thimplementation-report-2021”
  Agricultural funding · EU policy on water management
• 2024-09-06 “E-001645/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU will continue to support Ukraine in the face of Russia’s war of aggression; any solution, which ignores Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, would entail rewarding the aggressor and legitimising attempts to redraw borders by force, not just in Europe. Ukraine is exercising its inherent right of self-defence under the United Nations (UN) Charter 1 and against a nuclear power. Russia is further escalating its aggression, ramping up its systematic bombardment against civilians and civilian infrastructure in violation of international humanitarian law, leading the International Criminal Court to issue arrest warrants for potential war crimes and crimes against humanity. Russia also started using Democratic People’s Republic of Korea missiles and possibly soon Iranian ones. In 2024 Russia has also launched new military offensives, attacking Northern Kharkiv in May, and intensified offensives across the whole front. September saw the highest number of drone attacks, while the air attack on 26 August was the worst of the entire war, with hundreds of missiles and drones. It is President of Russia, who is escalating its war of imperialistic conquest of Ukraine, leading now, per UN reports, to the highest civilian casualties since October 2022. In the occupied areas the detention and deportation of Ukrainian civilians, including children, continues. UN reports warn of systematic violations of human rights, including widespread torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war. EU’s support makes a difference, for instance, on air defence. The overall EU assistance to Ukraine and its people by the EU and Member States amounts so far to more than EUR 118 billion. This includes around EUR 43.5 billion of military support, of which EUR 6.1 billion via the European Peace Facility 2 . 1 https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/european-peace-facility-2021-2027.html”
  EU-Ukraine relations · Russia-Ukraine conflict (10th term) · Defence spending
• 2024-08-29 “E-001570/2024 Answer given by Mr Reynders on behalf of the European Commission The Commission strongly condemns any illegal access to interpersonal communications. Under the ePrivacy Directive 1 , the interception or surveillance of communications and traffic data by public or private bodies other than the user is prohibited without the consent of the user. Member States may restrict these rights to safeguard national security, defence, public security and investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses under certain conditions and adequate safeguards. When intrusive surveillance software is used by public authorities to process personal data for law enforcement purposes, the Law Enforcement Directive 2 applies. EU data protection law is also applicable to the processing of personal data by private entities, even where such processing is required for national security purposes. National supervisory authorities and courts are competent to ensure effective compliance with this legislative framework. They must be independent and have sufficient powers and the necessary means to exercise them. It is essential that these authorities make full use of their powers and investigate thoroughly any allegations of rights violations in this area. Regulation (EU) 821/2021 3 is not applicable in this context, as it covers the export of cybersurveillance items from the EU to third countries. The 2024 Rule of Law Report 4 follows up on developments concerning the national checks and balances in response to allegations of alleged illegal use of spyware. The chapter on Greece refers to the investigations carried out by independent authorities and the judicial investigations which started in 2022. It also reports on criticism voiced by journalists and stakeholders as well as on other developments, including the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Resolution 5 and the Government’s reply on the investigations and modifications of the applicable legal framework. 1 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37. 2 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89–131. 3 Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (recast), OJ L 206, 11.6.2021, p. 1–461. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en 5 https://pace.coe.int/en/files/33116/html”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · Privacy & digital economy
• 2024-08-19 “E-001519/2024 Answer given by Ms Ferreira on behalf of the European Commission 1. The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 1 can only be activated at the request of Greece which has a deadline of 12 weeks as from when the first damage occurred, demonstrating that the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002. It may cover the costs of emergency and recovery operations by the public authorities. Private damage is not eligible. So far, Greece has not requested EUSF assistance for this disaster. 2. Overall, more than EUR 2 billion are planned under Cohesion Policy to support the prevention and management of fire risk. These investments target the reduction of the vulnerability of more than 130 million people to wildfire risk, particularly in regions with higher risk of wildfire exposure. The 2021-2027 Cohesion Policy programmes for Greece include allocations for addressing fire risk prevention and management actions, with a total public funding of EUR 421 million. Under shared management, Greece decides how to deploy these funds, in line with the applicable regulatory framework, and the objectives and priorities set up in the abovementioned programmes. 3. Regarding the organisation and functioning of firefighting services, the Commission refers to the reply to written question 000020/2024 of 28 February 2024 2 . 1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html”
  Agricultural funding · EU policy on infrastructure for preventing climate-related disasters (floods, droughts, extreme weather etc.)
• 2024-08-05 “E-001475/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission The EU considers that the United States (US) embargo and connected measures such as the inclusion of Cuba in the US list of countries sponsoring terrorism (SST) have a negative impact on the Cuban population and are an important factor – even if not the only one – in the serious economic crisis the country is undergoing. The EU and Member States have consistently supported the United Nations (UN) Declaration against the US embargo on Cuba, which is voted yearly (last time in November 2023) 1 . The US removal of Cuba from its list of countries not fully cooperating on counterterrorism efforts (in May 2024) is a positive step and it is hoped that the US will also be able to complete the process by removing Cuba from the SST list. On every pertinent occasion, the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) and/or his services pass clear messages to its US interlocutors in line with the UN Declaration, reiterating the need to end the embargo and the importance of removing Cuba from the SST list. The HR/VP and/or his services also take these opportunities to recall that external trade and foreign investment can play a crucial role in setting the island on a path towards modernisation and reform. 1 https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/11/1143112”
  EU-Cuba relations · EU-US relations
• 2024-08-05 “E-001474/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. Neither the Water Framework Directive 1 , the Drinking Water Directive 2 nor the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive 3 establishes whether the management and supply of water should be done by the public administration or by private entities. Moreover, Article 12 of Directive 2014/23 4 explicitly excludes the water sector from its scope, leaving the organisation and governance of water services a matter of national competence. 2. Greece is a major beneficiary of EU funding including for water infrastructures. Cohesion Policy 5 supports Greece with more than EUR 1 billion to modernise infrastructures including water transportation and wastewater treatment plants. For instance, in November 2022 Greece received EUR 21.1 million from the Cohesion Policy Funds 6 for upgrading its water infrastructures. Moreover, the European Regional Development Fund 7 and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 8 also co-fund measures in Greece to improve regional water infrastructures. Importantly, the selection of projects under all these funds remains ultimately the responsibility of each Member State. Within Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) 9 , a water regulatory authority has been established with the aim to strengthen the institutional framework, supervise the water sector and ensure the sustainability of water services, while Greece benefits from RRP funding for water supply and water saving infrastructures. Greece also participates in several research and innovation projects of Horizon Europe 10 for water resilience like ‘Water Security for the Planet’ 11 , ‘PRIMA’ 12 and ‘A Soil Deal for Europe’ 13 . 1 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35. 2 Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption (recast), OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1–62. 3 Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment, OJ L 135, 30.5.1991, p. 40–52. 4 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 1–64. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/what/investment-policy_en 6 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/cohesion-fund_en 7 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funding/erdf_en 8 Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013, OJ L 435/1, 6.12.2021. 9 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en 10 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe_en 11 https://www.water4all-partnership.eu/ 12 https://prima-med.org/ 13 https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-opencalls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/soil-deal-europe_en”
  EU policy on water management
• 2024-08-01 “E-001387/2024 E-001464/2024 Answer given by Ms Kyriakides on behalf of the European Commission In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 2021/690 1 and Commission Implementing Decision C(2023) 8926 2 , in particular Annex 3 thereof 3 , certain measures implemented by Greece against the Peste des petits ruminants (culling of animals, compensation to owners for the value of the animals culled, disinfections of holdings, etc.) may be eligible for EU co-funding, up to a maximum rate of 30%. Moreover, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 4 , depending on the identified needs and intervention strategy, through their Common Agricultural Policy Strategic Plans, Member States may provide support for investments in preventive actions and for restoration of agricultural potential following natural disasters, adverse climatic or catastrophic events 5 . This would also allow to support investments to restore agricultural production potentially damaged by animal diseases or by measures taken to eradicate or contain the disease. The design and implementation of those measures depends on Member States. Staffing of veterinary services and related laboratories in Member States, including Greece, is under the responsibility of each Member State, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/429 6 , in particular Article 13 thereof. 1 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/690/oj 2 C(2023) 8926 final, Commission Implementing Decision of 21.12.2023 on the financing of the Programme for the internal market, competitiveness of enterprises, including small and medium-sized enterprises, the area of plants, animals, food and feed, and European Statistics and the adoption of the work programme for 2024-2027, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6150e32-3fa5-4276-923ba36faf4fec1e_en?filename=C_2023_8926_F1_COMMISSION_IMPLEMENTING_DECISION_EN_V3_P1_31 19489.PDF 3 Annex 3 to C(2023) 8926 final, Commission Implementing Decision of 21.12.2023, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/c69d5f53-6966-420f-86287ff84bf91646_en?filename=C_2023_8926_F1_ANNEX_EN_V2_P1_3132789.PDF 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj 5 Article 73 of Regulation (EU) 2021/2115. 6 http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/429/oj”
  Animal diseases prevention and management in the EU
• 2024-07-31 “E-001459/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission attaches great importance to public transport as it is key to achieving more sustainable mobility and reduce congestion in urban areas. It seeks to promote urban transport, which is efficient, safe, sustainable and inclusive, regardless of whether it is provided by public or private operators. The procurement of clean road transport vehicles under Directive 2009/33/EC 1 is part of the Commission’s goal to promote sustainable transport solutions and stimulate the market for clean and energy-efficient vehicles, including zero-emission buses. European funds support greener public urban transport in Attica and are made available, inter alia, for the purchase of clean public transport buses in Athens, the renew of rail rolling stock on Metro Line 1, construction of new Metro Line 4, and development of the suburban rail, under the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. National authorities should accelerate the pace of implementation of these projects to ensure the greening of transport, sustainable and improved level of public service for all citizens. It is for national authorities to monitor transport operations safety and ensure that operators implement periodic maintenance and also comply with applicable labour law provisions as well as relevant technical/safety requirements including the training of staff. The Commission would also note that public authorities may financially support public passenger transport services, in accordance with the conditions set out in Regulation (EC) 1370/2007 2 .The Commission would like to point out that EU law does not prescribe privatisation in the field of public transport. 1 Directive 2009/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 5–12. 2 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1–13.”
  Road transport environmental policy
• 2024-07-24 “E-001408/2024 Answer given by Mr Lenarčič on behalf of the European Commission The European Council has repeatedly called for an immediate end to the hostilities, the protection of civilians, the respect for international law and international humanitarian law, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance 1 2 3 . The High Representative/Vice President has consistently urged Israel to grant and facilitate unimpeded humanitarian access to and within Gaza. Throughout 2023 and 2024, the High Representative/Vice President, alongside the Commissioner for Crisis Management, has consistently underscored the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza 4 5 and repeatedly called for unimpeded humanitarian access 6 7 . The EU has been clear that a deal on a sustained ceasefire and the release of hostages is a critical step in alleviating the humanitarian crisis and protecting the lives of the wounded and vulnerable populations affected by the conflict. The EU, through its humanitarian partners, has allocated more than EUR 290 million of humanitarian aid to Palestine 8 in 2023 and 2024, including significant amounts to support health services. The EU humanitarian partners have been delivering critical medical supplies in difficult circumstances. The EU has also supported the deployment of Emergency Medical Teams as well as medical evacuations and transported over 3 300 tonnes of humanitarian supplies. The EU has been consistently clear in conveying its concerns through political engagement and frank and open dialogue, including to Israeli partners. The Association Agreement 9 is the legal basis of the ongoing dialogue and cooperation with Israel and provides a useful mechanism to discuss issues of mutual concern and advance the EU’s point of view. 1 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/22/european-council-conclusions-21-and-22march-2024/ 2 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/04/18/european-council-conclusions-17-and-18april-2024/ 3 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-council-conclusions-27-june2024/ 4 Statement by the High Representative/Vice President and the Commissioner for Crisis Management on famine in Gaza, 18 March 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_1541 5 Joint Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President and the Commissioner for Crisis Management on the humanitarian situation in Gaza and West Bank, 17 April 2024, https://civil-protection-humanitarianaid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-andcommissioner-janez-lenarcic-2024-04-17_en 6 Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President and the Commissioner for Crisis Management on the humanitarian situation and access constraints, 23 June 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/gaza-statementhigh-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-and-commissioner-crisis-management_en 7 Joint statement by the High Representative/Vice-President and the Commissioner on Crisis Management on military action in Khan Younis, Gaza, 5 July 2024, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/newsstories/news/joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-and-commissioner-crisismanagement-2024-07-05_en 8 This designation shall not be construed as a recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 9 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A22000A0621%2801%29”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-07-24 “E-001409/2024 Answer given by Mr Wojciechowski on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Greek Rural Development Programme 2014-2022 1 and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Strategic Plan 2023-2027 (CSP) 2 provide support for investments to restore agricultural and forestry potential following natural disasters, adverse climatic or catastrophic events. It is up to the Managing Authorities to allocate funding for such needs. Support for damages may also be provided by the Hellenic Agricultural Insurance Organisation (ELGA) 3 . The Greek CSP includes possibilities for support for insurance of certain risks not covered by the ELGA insurance. At the end of 2023, the Commission provided an additional exceptional funding of EUR 43 million through the agricultural crisis reserve 4 . These funds were paid to farmers around lake Karla by the end of May 2024. Through the 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy funding, some EUR 150 million (public expenditure) have been allocated for relief measures for households and small and mediumsized enterprises affected by the flood in the area, and some EUR 13 million (public expenditure) for aid to maintain workers’ employment and to adapt workers and enterprises to change. 2. It is important that the scarce water sources are not over exploited to ensure long term access of farmers to water. The Water Framework Directive 5 requires Member States to ensure that water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives to use water efficiently and an adequate contribution of the different water uses, (at least industry, households and agriculture), to the recovery of the water services’ costs while taking account of the polluter pays principle. In so doing Member States can take into account the social, environmental and economic effects of the recovery and the geographic and climatic conditions of the regions affected. 3. CSP support is offered to help farmers improve their competitiveness, resilience and sustainability. This may involve land use changes. Apart from basic income support, Greece also provides coupled income support for some sectors that face difficulties and are important for socio-economic and/or environmental reasons 6 . 1 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/metra-paa-pages/ependytika-epicheirimatika/ 2 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/category/sskap-2023-2027/sskap-egkrisi-tropopoiiseis/ 3 https://elga.gr/ 4 OJ L, 2023/2820, 18.12.2023. 5 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73, as amended by Commission Directive 2014/101/EU of 30 October 2014, OJ L 311, 31.10.2014, p. 32–35. 6 https://www.agrotikianaptixi.gr/parembaseis-sskap-pa/ameses-enischyseis/syndedemeni-eisodimatiki-stirixi32/”
  Agricultural funding · EU policy on water management
• 2024-07-22 “E-001395/2024 Answer given by Ms Kyriakides on behalf of the European Commission According to Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 , the definition of national health policy and the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care including in the field of mental health, is a national competence. The Commission supports Member States in strengthening their health workforce via the EU4Health, Erasmus+ and the Third Health Programme. Examples are a joint action on forecasting and planning of health workforce 2 ; projects on workforce retention, task shifting and medical deserts 3 ; actions on skills development under the BeWell project 4 , projects on training programmes and digital skills 5 and an action on shortages of nurses 6 . The Cohesion Policy Funds 7 , 8 and the Recovery and Resilience Facility 9 may provide additional support. The Commission supports Member States via the EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025 10 and its Action Plan 11 , which identify the priorities, including on health-related aspects of drug use and drug-related harm. Strengthening access to treatment and care services including evidence-based targeted prevention interventions for people who use drugs is a priority area 12 . The EU Drugs Agency promotes evidence-based interventions to raise awareness on the adverse effects of drugs 13 . The Commission is evaluating the implementation of the Strategy and its Action Plan. The Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 14 calls on Member States to implement good practices of deinstitutionalisation. EU labour law 15 sets a broad range of minimum requirements to be transposed in national law. The Commission promotes support to the unemployed and adequate unemployment benefits, as per the principles of the European 1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=en 2 Funded by EU4Health Programme; HEROES: https://healthworkforce.eu/ 3 Third Health Programme Projects : AHEAD: https://ahead.health/; OASES : https://oasesproject.eu/; ROUTE: https://route-hwf.eu/; TASHI: https://tashiproject.eu/; METEOR: https://meteorproject.eu/ 4 Funded by Erasmus+ programme: https://bewell-project.eu/ 5 EU4Health programme: https://health.ec.europa.eu/publications/2022-eu4health-work-programme_en: https://www.amreducare.eu/; https://eh4future.eu/; https://gesea.eu/; https://digicantrain.turkuamk.fi; https://ddsmap.easpd.eu/; https://ehma.org/projects/transition/; https://hpass.healthworkforce.eu/ 6 HS-CA-24-46 Nurses at the heart of more resilient health systems and safe healthcare, published in the 2024 EU4Health Work Programme report, p. 179. https://health.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c60cda6b-ad324909-9118-8a1f69c3cd32_en?filename=funding_c_2023_8524_annex1_en.pdf 7 All relevant investments should demonstrate alignment with relevant national and EU policy and legal frameworks, namely the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), respecting the principles of equality, freedom of choice, right to independent living, protection and prohibition of any form of segregation. 8 Cohesion Open Data Platform: https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/funds/21-27 9 The Greek Recovery and Resilience Plan includes a reform to ensure access to quality mental health services for specific populations suffering from mental illness and addiction. 10 EU Drugs Strategy 2021-2025, OJ C 102I , 24.3.2021. 11 EU Drugs Action Plan 2021-2025, OJ C 272, 8.7.2021 12 Priority area 6 of the EU Drugs Strategy, Actions 32-42 of the EU Drugs Action Plan. 13 Regulation (EU) 2023/1322 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2023 on the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1920/2006, OJ L 166, 30.6.2023, Article16. 14 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52021DC0101 15 https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157&langId=en”
  EU policy on mental health · Public and private sectors role in healthcare services
• 2024-07-17 “E-001373/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Vestager on behalf of the European Commission 1. In 2014, the Commission adopted a decision ordering Greece to recover unlawful and incompatible aid (EUR 135 million plus interest) granted to LARCO in the form of State guarantees and capital injections in the period 2008-2010 1 . Greece is required to take all necessary steps available in the national legal system to implement that decision and ensure recovery from LARCO. Greek Law No 4664/2020 provides for LARCO’s special administration and the sale of its assets. After such sale, it will be for the new owner(s) of LARCO’s assets to decide to employ new and/or former LARCO employees. 2. The Commission notes the importance of raw materials such as nickel and cobalt for the EU, and as it explained in its answers to written questions E-000639/2022 and E001471/2022, after the sale of LARCO’s assets, it will remain possible to mine laterite and produce ferronickel in relation to these assets and to make use of these metal resources. As part of its Green Deal Industrial Plan, the Commission proposed a Critical Raw Materials Act 2 , which recently entered into force and aims to reduce supply risks and support domestic production capacities for minerals, such as nickel and cobalt. The Commission has launched an open call for the recognition of Strategic Projects to benefit from more efficient permitting and receive support in accessing investment. 3. As the Commission explained in its answers to written questions E-000639/2022 and E001471/2022, on 20 January 2022, the Court of Justice ordered Greece to pay penalties until the full implementation of recovery 3 . Such penalties are a standard outcome where a Member State does not comply with a Court judgment. Such penalties are borne by Greece, not LARCO. 1 Commission Decision 2014/539/EU of 27 March 2014 on the State aid SA.34572 (13/C) (ex 13/NN) implemented by Greece for Larco General Mining & Metallurgical Company S.A, OJ L 254, 28.8.2014, p. 24– 38, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/539/oj 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU), No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020, OJ L, 2024/1252, 3.5.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1252/oj 3 Judgment of 20 January 2022, Commission v Greece, C-51/20, ECLI:EU:C:2022:36.”
  Sourcing of critical raw materials · State Aid · Ownership of strategic assets
• 2024-07-17 “E-001370/2024 Answer given by Mr Schmit on behalf of the European Commission Far from being an anti-labour instrument, the Working Time Directive 1 sets out minimum requirements for the protection of the health and safety of workers in all sectors of activity. The provisions of the Directive give specific form to the fundamental right of every worker to a limitation of maximum working hours and to daily and weekly rest periods, which is expressly enshrined in Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Directive does not differentiate between ‘active and ‘inactive’ periods of working time, as the concepts of working time and rest time are mutually exclusive 2 . The Court of Justice has given extensive interpretation of these concepts for the purpose of implementing the Working Time Directive 3 . The Directive does not prevent Member States from applying national provisions or permitting the application of collective agreements more favourable to the protection of the safety and health of workers than the minimum standards it sets 4 . The Commission encourages social dialogue and the negotiation and conclusion of collective agreements regulating the employment and working conditions of workers. The Commission supported the High Level Group of experts on social dialogue set up in Greece in 2018 and is monitoring the implementation of its conclusions. However, the functioning of national social dialogue, including that of the collective bargaining framework, is the responsibility of each Member State. In June 2023, on a proposal from the Commission, the Council of the EU adopted the Recommendation on strengthening social dialogue in the EU 5 . The Commission will monitor, in consultation with Member States and the social partners, the implementation of the Recommendation at national level. 1 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9. 2 Article 2 of Directive 2003/88/EC. 3 See in particular part IV of the Communication from the Commission, Corrigendum to Interpretative Communication on Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, 2023/C 143/06, OJ C 143, 26.04.2023, p. 11–77, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023XC0324(01)R(01) 4 Article 15 of Directive 2003/88/EC. 5 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10542-2023-INIT/en/pdf”
  EU policy on permanent and fixed-term employment · EU regulation of cross-border and posted workers
• “Uh, you told us Mr. Travaini that there are 5000 wagons that could go to scrap. So are we having 5000 railing coffins right now on our networks? And do they not have fire safety mechanisms? The president of Unifor presently said that rail equipment has a very long cycle of life, and consortia cannot take out very expensive equipment before their cycle of life runs out. So this is technology. We will have this technology in the future as well. You're not going to freeze them out. So procedures are costly to approve of new technologies and very time consuming. So you know, you talk about high costs of rail transport safety. And the operators who are looking for profits decide they have no interest in changing their technology. Whatever the effects might be on the safety of passengers and people working, only 61% of the Gsm-r is installed in Europe. We have the future railway communication system, which is radio communication between drivers and station masters, and we also have the automated systems are yet they're not being implemented. So these business consortiums say okay, no development if it's too costly and it doesn't bring a profit. So. You know, is your innovation going to be implemented or does it always have to be profitable for it to be implemented to the cost of human life.”
  EU support of rail transport
• “With the new explosive increase in prices, up to 50% on imported fertilizers within a couple of months because of the imperialist war in the Middle East, it. The Commission with with its government, with its governments are now selling us really something beautiful, as if something is beautiful. But actually it's just a bunch of garbage. All of this the the policies of the European Union has set tariffs and unbearable tariffs and duties on fertilizers from third countries, including from Russia as well. And then there's that American LNG as well that has taken over. So you can understand why these prices have all exploded. The situation is unbearable for farmers, and consumers cannot afford what's on supermarket shelves. No sacrifice ought to be made for these imperialist wars, which have simply led to this explosion in prices. We have to get rid of the VAT as well. We have to provide to farmers and we have to provide subsidies for energy. Thank you.”
  Use of fertilisers
• “So we are. If we debate public transport in Greece, we have to debate Tenby as well. Strange that two and a half years on, it's the first time that we're debating that here as well. But there's been a cover up from the New Democracy government. Officially, the commission thinks it's a disaster, disastrous accident. But it was a crime, basically. Um, there has been a lack of implementation in safety in the name of competition. We heard about that from the commissioner. And so, um, they we've seen that, uh, that's led to Temby and uh, obviously the European Union, um, people at home are travelling around, but there are carriages which need to be updated or should go to scrap, as we've heard. We need some answers on that. It's only through a massive, organised fight from the people together throughout the European Union. That and that there are penalties applied to all of the governments who have gone along with all of this. Only with that will we actually achieve our aims.”
  EU policy on aviation safety
• “In Greece and the EU, there has been an explosive situation when it comes to housing in Greece. 40% of people's income goes to housing. We see thousands of houses being auctioned off, even of people with disabilities. There have been some programs to, um, buy a house to subsidize, um, rents, etc. but this has led to a further skyrocketing of prices, and it has helped the funds who keep acting as vultures. Only people can save people's houses. They need to find a fight against bank lobbies, funds and developers in order to, um, eliminate capitalist profit. This is why people want to have a housing policy that will provide cheap housing and subsidized by the government, without developers and other companies in the middle, and no more auctioning off of houses and stop this policy.”
  EU housing policy
• “20:29 – 16:21:29): Thank you I will speak in Greek. Hi Representative Callas. We are seeing this legitimate aggression by the United States against Iran and we are continuing to fail to face allies with their responsibilities to beef up their military presence in Hormuz. We have the problem of the Israeli attacks on Lebanon and you're talking about expanding Aspida's so we are talking therefore about a widening of the conflict. Therefore I believe that it is also incumbent on the Greek government here given that there are international forces seeking to defend British bases on Cyprus whereas we know that we also have problems given that there are US bases in Crete as elsewhere. Thank you very much.”
  EU-US relations
• “Council decisions, dangerous decisions by NATO are just continuing the business of war. Competition to build bridges and conclusions regarding Gaza just masking the genocide that is taking place as we sit here and the massacres of civilians in Gaza, Israel, the US all together against Iran, NATO and the EU involvement in Libya has led to this dreadful agreement between Turkey and Libya. And we're seeing people arriving in boats of refugees arriving on the coast of Crete, and a dreadful conditions. You are talking about lowering wages, robbing the Palestinians of their coffers, of public funds. We have to show solidarity with Palestine. We should not get involved in any of these massacres and these wars.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “Thank you chair I will speak in Greek. He asked the safety of rails is acceptable for all users. This is what the report says. At a time when rail disasters in Europe have increased by 23% between 21 and 23, and that includes the 57 people dying after a collision of two trains. Because of the policies of the Europeans of the government of New Democracy and the ones before them. This deregulation of rail, which is looking for bigger capacity, higher um, speeds for profit for the transport consortiums and 85% of rails does not have Ertms in Europe, which means there is a danger to life for those, uh, for passengers and people working there and in this very risky network. According to publications, we also have no black consignments carried within the, uh, European Defence Mobility package with no certificates, and it might even have to be related to the explosion in TMB, which brought up a mushroom of smoke which caused a lot of death, has still not been investigated fully because there's a governmental cover up. And while the ERA was giving in old wagons like the ones in um, TMB, these certificates, that they were safe from fire and, uh, you are a candidate for that position that you will be holding. So you need to take a position on this.”
  EU support of rail transport
• “I believe we have the threat of all out war with the US Israeli attack against Iran and Lebanon. They are talking about the protection of women. These are just excuses. When they have close allies like Saudi Arabia, the Taliban and the Syrian jihadists, the real reason is the US-China competition. And the bourgeoisie in Greece also wants a piece of the action. And the government of new democracy was quick in protecting the British bases in Cyprus and even Bulgaria. Of course, it's not compassion for the Cypriot people after 52 years of occupation. The US, British, NATO military bases were supposed to safeguard the Cypriot people, but they themselves now have to be supported even by the so-called pacifist Spain, because they are used for the war and are a target. So Greece should get out of this war. We should shut down these bases. The people should not pay and we need to put a limit on prices.”
  Relations with NATO
• “The imperialist U.S. Israel war and the participation of the EU and member states in this war constitutes a real danger for the people of Europe. We could be a target of counterattacks, but there are also sacrifices that people must make. This law imposes policies that go against worker's life becomes more expensive. And this savings and investment union really is one way of digging deep into the pockets of workers and accessing their savings. We want to make a gift of European liquidity to grant to big groups and monopolies. We do not want to see the people affected. We don't want salaries and pensions to be touched.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “The recent energy agreements between the US and Greece, the vertical corridor, mean that this will cement the presence of American LNG in Greece. The strategy of the EU and our government is to abandon the much cheaper Russian natural gas. In this competition with capitalist Russia, the Greek people pay a very high price for American LNG, but also for the liberalised energy market in Greece. And so energy has become a traded commodity, and there are guaranteed profits for renewables conglomerates through European grants and taxes. At the same time, the people are paying a high price for the green transition and for this international competition to control trade routes and hubs and ports. But no matter which energy, route, pipeline or contract with American conglomerates, the people need to take ownership of their wealth.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thank you. Chair. I will speak in Greek. The report is asking for a military Schengen. Even more measures and a new package Ads for military mobility. You think that we are not giving enough money? So you are proposing to give €800 billion and for the army, you 250 for safe and all of those infrastructures, bridges and WS, uh, infrastructure. We are even proposing about, uh, uh, revitalizing marshes so as to try to stop enemy tanks. So you see that, uh, even when the EU is talking about, uh, protection of their environment, they are being hypocritical. So for years, we say that there is no money for the people. And, uh, at the same time, we see underinvestment in, uh, public transport infrastructure, and people are playing with their lives every day by getting on mass transit. So all of these things have nothing to do with defense. The US already. Is getting ready to rename their Department of Defense to a Department of War. So what we have here is an antagonism of cartels. Uh, in order to slaughter peoples like we are doing in Ukraine or in Palestine, where people are being driven off their land by your ally, Israel. So we should make no sacrifice for the war economy. We should increase wages and fund infrastructure that is needed by the people.”
  Defence spending