Bernd LANGE

Policy topics Bernd LANGE is active on

What Bernd LANGE has said (80)

• 2026-07-14 “(14:46:09 - 14:47:27): Thanks a lot. So this concludes the debate. And, as I mentioned at the beginning, I would propose to have a simplified procedure. This means there will be no report, starting with amendments or not amendments, so have it really, in a quite swift mode. Any objections to have it in a simplified procedure? No. So we would need 5 members to oppose. So the simplified procedure is approved, and this means that we will have deadline for amendments until the Thursday, July 30, high noon, 12:00. And, then we, will, vote, in our next session about the amendments. It's really in September, and then I guess we can have a really, swift and and quick, approval of the whole exercise. Thanks a lot. Then we switch to the monitoring, groups. We have had 1 on Japan, and Miriam will tell us what happened with Japan.”
  EU political integration
• 2026-07-14 “(16:02:42 - 16:06:02): Economic security and industrial policy. So we have the foreign direct investment, and the foreign subsidies regulation. And then in the AI IAA, we have some limitation of investment. So and we have, the exclusion of some countries in the public procurement. On the other hand, we have trade agreement with public procurement. We have the car package, which is also linked to the industrial policy and has implication for trade policy. So for example, South Africa, a trade partner where we just concluded the clean energy, partnership agreement is producing cars. About about 1 3rd of their production is coming to Europe. And, of course, now they are a little under danger with this whole package if they are able to, deliver these cars in the future as well. And 50,000 people, in South Africa have now fears about their jobs. So how you will bring this different element, and I could mention even more, together so that we have a really coherent approach in trade and industrial policy, which is, of course, in line with w 2 rules. And minister the 2nd is relating the, related to the, relation with United States. You mentioned that we adopted our legislation on the reduction of US tariffs, And, therefore, we have now a basis for dialogue, and it was you you were quite quite polite on that. But even after we adopted this legislation, they started a new investigation based on 3 0 1 against pharmaceutical price in Germany. They want not to lower the price. They want to increase the price of pharmaceuticals in Germany. So this is a clear coercive measure. They want to influence legislation inside the European Union. So there will be an investigation. In September, there will be an, hearing. So and then perhaps in October, November, there will be a conclusion. So everything under your presidency. So how you think the European Union, the council, we will be ready to react on on this, yeah, coercive measures? And, my fear is that regarding some other legislation, also, are some interests, on the side of The United States in changing or influence, the legislation inside the European Union. Minister, some small questions.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2026-07-14 “(10:13:58 - 10:14:26): Thanks a lot, Denis. But let me come back to 1 question of, Juergen. Yes. So you know we have this new framework agreement between the commission and the European Parliament where even even, not, these traditional trade agreements should be in a Yeah. Closed dialogue with the European Parliament. So how is the parliament involved in the TC no. TIC?”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-07-14 “So we switched immediately to point 10, and I'm happy that Denis is staying here because now we are looking to the expert control of dual use items. And, we have the regulation from 2021, where we adopted it. And this control of export, is, I guess, in this geopolitical situation, really crucial. And now we have a report about the implementation, and Denis is presenting this to us 10 minutes maximum.”
  Arms export from the EU
• 2026-07-14 “(14:53:13 - 14:54:03): Yeah. Thanks a lot, Julio. And, of course, a different political system, but, nevertheless, a reliable partner, and, we are working quite close together to push them also to stay to their commitments. And thanks a lot for this good, really, cooperation. It's really pleasure to work together with you. Then we have, Masvec. Celine is not here. So there was a monitoring group on the June 25 specifically regarding the relation to please. Oh, excuse me. Yes. I didn't yeah. So you have to send me the latest version of the of the then then I will be better prepared. Jian.”
  EU relations with the Southern Neighbourhood
• 2026-07-14 “(14:30:08 - 14:31:57): Good, dear colleagues. Point 13 of our agenda. The temporary trade liberalization measures to Armenian products. The ATM to Armenia was adopted by the commission last week on the July 2 to liberalize around 80% of the exports to the European Union. It's a temporary measure, and this will, really an important support for the economic development in Armenia. And to explain a little bit about the measures adopted, I'm happy that miss Eva Krausa is here with us to explain the situation. She is deputy head of unit for Europe and Eastern neighborhood. And it's totally clear that we will handle this proposal in a swift manner, I guess, in a simplified procedure so that this can come into force even quick. And to welcome, also the ambassador of Armenia and to, welcome to us and to listen to, the discussion. Thanks a lot. And, so I give now Eva, the floor for 10 minutes.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-07-14 “(11:38:14 - 11:42:43): Thanks a lot. This concludes this item 11. And, of course, we will stay in contact, Pauline, on that. So I'm sure that specifically regarding the first review and then the second one, one year later, we will have a look on that. Thanks a lot to everybody. ***State of play of EU-US trade relations”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2026-07-14 “(16:25:18 - 16:26:02): Okay. Perfect. Thanks a lot. Minister, you will come in. Yeah. Briefly, in in terms of the apologies. I missed them. In terms of the the digital trade agreement with Canada, this is something that the council supports in the negotiations, and and we'll be working with our our colleagues to help this come to a conclusion in the coming months. The digital trade agenda more generally, I think it's, it's it's there to further deepen and modernize agreements, with our with our FTA partners. The agreement won't, won't change the approach to to the digital enforcement of rules, but it's, it's an important element of it. Apologies. Indeed.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-07-14 “(15:07:55 - 15:08:56): Yeah. Thanks a lot. Anfel, this is not undermining the Mercosur agreement, then, of course, you can discuss everything now. That's for sure. Thanks a lot. And then we have the Managing Group on Ukraine chaired by Karin Karlsberg. And, there, we discussed, last time on on the July 2, the trade relation with Ukraine and, specifically, also the negotiations on Ukraine's future market access on steel, and we discussed it today as well. And, therefore, there is still ongoing process regarding the new tier q system. That's it on Ukraine. This was the last monitoring group.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• 2026-07-14 “(10:16:39 - 10:17:25): Yeah. Indeed. So we will stay in contact and try to guarantee that the information are there, and we will have a meeting after the summer break in September with you again. ***Annual report on export controls of dual-use items”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-07-14 “(11:26:02 - 11:33:03): Okay. Thanks a lot. Pauline? **Pauline Weinzierl (European Commission – DG TRADE): Yes. Thank you very much, and thank you all for your very, useful remarks and pertinent questions. I think there was clearly a very overwhelming echo and focus and questions, I think, on the way forward and the question of how we will handle reviews going forward. And, indeed, I think the parliament strengthened those provisions in the final final regulation. And I would like to recall that as regards to product scope, we have a 2 step approach. We already are working on the 1st product review for 4 product categories that is due to be presented by the end of the year. So that is also the timeline mandated in the regulation. And we've already opened a public consultation running a public consultation on this and have actually already started the work on the larger review of downstream products, which can cover a large amount, of course, of potential products and a lot of different industries that we need to analyze much better. And, therefore, you know, we will come with our findings before the end of the year and recommendations on how to proceed. I think it's important to recall to to companies that, in the meantime, they have recourse to traditional safeguard investigations and TDI measures. And it is really important to use those as much as possible because they can be also triggered in a very timely manner, especially on on safeguard investigations, before we can come also with a further big product review. Also to underline that, we have a requirement to evaluate full effectiveness of the regulation by, June 2029 and then every 3 years. This is also when we will assess, for example, how this has fully impacted various aspects. And some of you mentioned the fact that we need to look big look at the broader picture, of course, and the bigger angle, including the decarbonization path of the industry, price and capacity levels, the impact on upstream and downstream, and, of course, also on the final consumers in the union, and we will do that. But we will not, of course, wait for 3 years to look at some of these things. We are monitoring really already now and then on a on a weekly, if not monthly basis, how the quota usage is actually working out, what the impact on our industry is. Now we are on day 14, so it's a bit too early to give you clear indications because some of the quotas are not even yet opened. Some of them are only opening as of tomorrow, actually, some of the more competitive pots. But we are, working on that very closely with DG Taksut, our trading partners, and our industry. I recall also that the commission has been empowered under Article 6 of the regulation to take action if there are disturbances in the market, if there are supply shortages, if there is crowding out in product categories, and if necessary, to also adjust quota volumes, including on a punctual, or urgency basis for certain product categories. This is a very important security mechanism for our own downstream industries in particular. And we will be extremely vigilant about this because, of course, we need to make sure that in its functioning, in its application, this regulation delivers for our whole industry, for our whole economy, both the steel producing and the steel using part of our economy. So we need to be very very lucid now on how we look at the functioning, and we will, of course, happily report on this in future exchanges. I think, finally, I I think I would also like to like to, point or thank you also for mentioning the fact that we've chosen, of course, the article 28, path here to ensure legality of the measure and engage with our trading partners on this on this quota, on this new regime. As I said, it's an ongoing process to conclude them and actually still negotiate, with some of them, including, of course, our our pure MFN, WTO partners like China and and Taiwan. As you know, the challenge in the steel sector is not based on a single country because we have had a big push out effect of capacities also through investments abroad and production that happens in many different countries, and this is why it's a country neutral regulation. And at the same time, we are extremely vigilant about nonmarket policies and practices that can distort, the level playing field. And, we are working and continue to work on this also with our partners in the global forum on excess steel capacity, where we focus in particular on the question of how to further tackle non market policies and practices. Also to recall, as some of you mentioned, the melt and pour requirement will be instrumental in really creating transparency on the steel supplies, and it will enable us to also see where is the steel produced and how and are there any any, circumventions happening? And this is very important, of course. And finally, on Ukraine, we have, as I explained, really taking into account and given very special consideration to Ukraine. We will continue to monitor, of course, how this, how this then works in practice. We have agreed, in principle with Ukraine under article 28 on this quota allocation, which is also a positive sign. And, we will then, I think, have to take stock also when we we adopt or when we adopt a final quota allocation to see if any any adjustments there warranted. But in principle, we have agreed this also, of course, with with Ukraine. And as I mentioned, there are some technical adjustments that we will make, that would also work in in their favor.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• 2026-07-14 “(15:08:58 - 15:27:20): Because And, the next item will be, the presentation by the Irish minister for foreign affairs trade and for defense representing, the Irish presidency. I would propose now that we perhaps, make a break until 20 past 3. Okay? Thanks a lot. Yep. So, we will ask the presidency perhaps coming a little bit earlier so that we can start 20 past 3. Thanks. So as agreed, dear colleagues, we started a little bit earlier, and, this gives more room for the exchange with, Helen McEnty, the minister for foreign affairs trade and minister for defense of Ireland, representing the president in office of the council, the Irish presidency. I'm happy that you are here and, that we can discuss a little bit the, issues, which are relevant for the trade policy at the moment. Before starting with, the whole exercise, I have to announce that for this item of our agenda, item 15, we have interpretation, of course, from Irish into other language or to our Irish colleagues. No. Nobody there. But, they can, of course, listen if the minister will speak in Irish, their, original language. So, this is also well organized. Thanks a lot for that. And, minister, yes, we have, of course, a lot of items on the agenda which were really relevant for trade policy. We discussed, just a few minutes ago, the situation with United States. And I guess this will be also a key element in your presidency, The actual trade, legal basis act, 01/2022 is expiring on the July 24, and, nobody knows exactly what will happen after it. And, we have also seen that there are some additional investigations coming, up. And beside the discussion with United States, of course, there is now this, trade and investment council with China so that we will have also some additional development with China in, the next months, perhaps until the end of October. And beside that, of course, we are hopeful that we can really conclude, and ratified, and I hope that we can cooperate on that as well, the agreement with Indonesia so that we have a wonderful Christmas gift to everybody and could really close it. And we were in negotiation with The Philippines and Thailand. And, I hope also the negotiation could be concluded, and therefore, also the cooperation is quite important. And, regarding the existing trade agreements minister, we have, SITA still there, which is ratified by 17 out of 27 member states. So if you can really motivate, your colleagues to take take some steps, this would be also quite important. And then in the international field, of course, the question of the future of the WTO and the reform process in WTO is also an important part for our economic development. So some elements, but I guess you have on your list some additional 1. And I give now the floor to you in about 15 minutes, please.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-07-14 “(16:26:03 - 16:26:23): So we are really supporting the trade the digital agreement with Korea and and Singapore. And, of course, perhaps it would be possible, with the digital agreement with Canada to ratify the CETA agreement in in in 1 approach. So”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-07-14 “(16:02:22 - 16:02:41): Thanks a lot, minister. From my side, 2 areas where I'm thinking about. And 1 is you mentioned the economic security and the industrial policy. How you will manage to have a coherent approach on that?”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2026-07-14 “(12:08:48 - 12:10:43): Thanks a lot. And, Matthias, from my side, on this joint statement. So there is the possibility that there are clear clues regarding steel and aluminum and copper. Are there any news on that? Secondly, what is about the derivatives? Martin asked this as well. So, when will they come back to 15%? And you mentioned that there is a request regarding the other items of the joint statement from the United States. Can you give a little bit more hint what they're asking exactly on these other points? And then back to the pharmaceuticals. So in this joint statement, there are clear commitments. So generic care should be based on MFN tariffs and pharmaceuticals generally covered by the 15% inclusive rate. Would you agree that this newly launched 301 investigation against the pharmaceutical price building in Germany is really contrary to this commitment in the Turnberry deal? And what will be the reaction if there will be some tariffs or other trade measures against Germany because of this investigation by the Commission? So, how will the Commission react on that? Matthias. **Matthias Jorgensen (European Commission – DG TRADE.D): (12:10:48 - 12:12:25): Thank you very much. That's a broad list of questions, touching upon a whole number of issues. So maybe I'll try to be as concrete as possible in my replies. First question is how will the US government reimburse tariffs? Well, the US government has set up a system for reimbursing tariffs. Those tariffs are, of course, paid by individual importers. And the reimbursement between these importers and the US government is something in which we do not have insight. Those are US-based or private transactions involving private actors. However, what we have seen is that we've seen reports that there have been reimbursements. The latest I saw this morning was that $81,000,000,000 had already been reimbursed. That is evidently something that we have to check up on. But, again, this is a question between the US Customs and Border Service control and individual governments. Now you expressed interest in knowing which sectors are we pressing for when it comes”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2026-07-14 “(10:54:37 - 10:56:19): Yeah. Exactly. Thanks a lot. Thank you. This, leads to the next item, which is item 11, the update on the new legislation addressing global overcapacity on steel in the European market. And I'm happy that from the DG, trade, Pauline Waldseer is there. And, we will get an report about the situation, when now the legislation is in force since the July 1 and also, the protests for the trade partners are adopted, I guess, only 2 days before, so that we have now a picture where we see how the different trading partners in different countries worldwide were recognized and, which possibilities they have to export steel to the European Union and what are the conditions for that. And, Pauline will now present the results, of this exercise, also the negotiations regarding Article 28, GATT, with the trading partners in Geneva and how the new, issue will be implemented by an act so that we have an overview about the situation. Please. **Pauline Weinzierl (European Commission – DG TRADE): (10:56:21 - 11:00:07): Thank you very much, mister chair, and, good morning, to all of you. Good to see you. So let me provide an update on on where we stand, with this important steel regulation. And 1st of all, I wanted to also thank, all the members here, for the constructive work that we have done over the past, year on this file, and for ensuring the continuous protection of Europe's steel industry, which, I recall is the 3rd world largest steel industry providing 300,000 direct jobs in the EU. And, this is also, of course, the protection of of the sector, the main aim of the new regulation addressing the negative effects of global overcapacity. And this has now fully applicable and enforced since the July 1. Today, in particular, I want to focus, of course, on, also the implementing act that, simultaneously entered into force on the July 1 and was adopted just in time, on the June 30. That sets out also the country specific allocation of the 18,300,000 tons of steel that can enter the EU as of now without tariffs. This is, as you may recall, around a 47% reduction compared to the previous safeguard. In addition, of course, the regulation then sets a 50% out of quota duty, up from 25% as opposed to the previous regime. The quota allocation that is now in force of the 18,300,000, year, tons is, basically based also on what the regulation set out under article 5 in terms of criteria. But it is also the result, of course, of our negotiations and engagements, with our trading partners under article 28 of the GATT in the World Trade Organization with over 20, trading partners that hold negotiating or consultation rights in that process. And that is also important because that is how we ensure the legality in the WTO of our change of tariff from 25 to, 50. Well, it's actually from 0 to 50% of our bound MFN tariff. I just briefly also recall that, we, have, adopted this now in a very urgent situation. So, basically, we're using as as mandated in the in the regulation, the urgency procedure, which also means that this implementing act setting out country allocations is enforced now only for 6 months, and we will then have to readopt this with an ordinary procedure, before the end of the year. The commission, also for the negotiations on how to set out this, country allocation was, of course, guided by this criteria set out in article 5 of the regulation itself, of which currently, the following, are applicable and form the basis. 1st and foremost, it's the historic trade data, the shares of each country in the period of 2022 to 2024. This is also the legal period that is necessary and mandated under article 28 of the WTO and been the basis, for all calculations, of all quotas. Secondly, though, the, regulation clearly spells out that FCA partners, existing and future, should be, taking into account, on a preferential basis and, thirdly, the existence or the conclusion of article 28 agreements. Additional to that, there is, of course, the requirement to ensure supply diversification to, take into account trade distortive 3rd country measures that have an impact on our steel market and notably to take special consideration the situation of a candidate country in immediate, security situation, and that is, of course, a reference to Ukraine. Now, as a baseline, and also following the negotiations with our trading partners, was decided to basically split the 18,300,000 tonnes into 2, halves. So 1 half, roughly, 9,150,000 tonnes that has been distributed, in a nondiscriminatory manner in the WTO and MFN basis to all trading partners using the historic trade shares. And the other half, 9 point, 2,000,000 tons, that is only available for countries that are FDA partners and is then further distinguished by the existence of the other criteria, so notably in article 28, agreement, concluded in principle at this stage. Another important element that we maintain from the current safeguard regime is, that to decide on whether or not a country gets, country specifically allocated quotas, We, took a 5%, cutoff point, for the reference period, in terms of market share. And those countries above, get, country specific allocations, again, with the exception of Ukraine, which received some additional, country specific allocations. Now let me elaborate a little bit on on the article 28 outcome and our agreements in principle with, key FDA partners. I recall also that FDA partners are, accountable for around 80% of EU steel imports. This was also why the measure applies AGA ONLIS to all FDA partners, but the only exception being, the EA countries. But, however, as I already said, the quota distribution and also the aim in the negotiations was to minimize the impact of this deal measure on our preferential trading partners, and in particular, then also those that agreed, under article 28, to, the quota allocation. This meant also that we have lowered significantly the the kind reduction of quota, which is on average 47% for those countries. Countries that are not FDA partners have received access to the MFN quotas. Also important to underline that, some countries are in line with the regulation treated as FDA partners, where those, are concluded or provisionally applied, notably India, Indonesia, and the Mercosur countries, whereas purely ongoing negotiating part countries are not yet treated as FDA partners. I already mentioned also, of course, the special, treatment of Ukraine just to say also that, this, resulted in allocations of additional volumes for Ukraine to have the best possible treatment, by granting additional country specific allocations and higher volumes beyond purely proportionate, shares based on historic trade, which also allowed us to, safeguard more than 70% of Ukraine's historic trade under under the quotas here. And we will analyze very carefully, this in the future, and we also will do some statistical corrections that, had an impact on some of Ukraine's quota. In terms of, the negotiations already called, we had about over 20 partners, and they made with those 11, firm agreements in principle with, the key partners really on steel trade, including our largest suppliers, Turkey, India, South Korea, Indonesia, but also close partners like UK, and Switzerland. Important countries, in the vicinity like North Macedonia, and, of course, Ukraine, Egypt, but also South Africa and Singapore. We have also made preliminary agreements in principle with Argentina and Brazil with a few more open issues to resolve, but already, deemed to be sufficient for, agreements in principle. These countries have all agreed to the quota allocation and have also agreed to thus not challenge, this measure either in the WTO or under FTAs. It has been, based on a very fair and objective process. And the aim now going forward will be to, conclude firmly, informally these legal agreements, which are then international agreements, in the coming months, and to continue negotiations with those partners. We did not manage to finalize yet, notably, Japan or Vietnam and, of course, China and Taiwan. And then, as I already said, before the end of the year, adopt final implementing act of quota allocations that could also take into account any new agreements reached. Finally, also to mention, of course, that a key focus now shifts to the implementation and how it actually works out also for our industry, for our trading partners. And there, I would like to recall that we're also going to be, implementing now the melt and pour principle by October based on implementing act we're adopting at the end of the summer. We're launching, the product scope review for the 1st 4 products, to be reported on by the end of the year. We will shortly launch also public consultation on the wider product review. And, of course, we will very closely monitor any disturbances in the EU's market also for downstream industries. And as I already said, as a matter of priority, continue the really constructive negotiations with all of our trading partners. Thank you very much.”
  Chinese clean tech competition: trade barriers and investment caps vs. open market
• 2026-07-14 “(11:33:04 - 11:33:31): Thanks a lot, Pauline. 1 additional question from my side. So the the customer authorities of the member states have to execute the whole exercise. Are you sure that they are able to operate in a proper way so that the different tariff quotas and the tariff free import, is really, well, let's say, controlled? **Pauline Weinzierl (European Commission – DG TRADE): (11:33:34 - 11:34:27): Thank you very much. So the implementing act is is very similar to the current safeguard regime. So it sets out quotas for for per country and then some quantities that are AGA OMNIS quotas usable by all. And each of those comes with an order number. So the exporters will have to choose the order numbers, and these are then clearly assigned to specific countries. It's a system that the customs authorities are very well used to, so are the companies. We will then see, I think, within the next months after the 1st quarter also of how some of the more competitive parts are functioning, whether there's crowding out somewhere. But I think for customs, we work very closely with DG Taksut on this. The system is is very similar to what was already in place for the last 8 years.”
  Import of agri-food products in the EU
• 2026-07-14 “(11:07:15 - 11:07:33): Thanks a lot. And, normally, I would give the floor to our, warpeteur, but, unfortunately, she is not available today. So we start with the shadow rapporteur for 2 minutes each, and Lydia is the 1st for the EPP.”
  EU political integration
• 2026-07-14 “Point 12 and the last point for this morning is the state of play with the EU-US trade relations. And I thought it was quite relevant to have this point on the agenda because some elements happened since we discussed this last time. Of course, it's now more or less one year after the Turnberry deal was concluded. We had our legislation now into force. There was a NATO summit in Ankara where we celebrated the 250 years of American independence. Belgium made a great performance against the United States at the World Cup after this red card issue. And so a lot of fireworks going on, and they are still on fire. We see that there is still some discussion about what's going on after July 24 when the actual legal basis, Trade Act 122, is expiring. We saw that there is this investigation based on Trade Act section 301 on the forced labor issue where we also, yeah, be guilty not to do enough against forced labor products coming into the European Union. Even though we have forced labor legislation, but nevertheless, so there was a hearing yesterday in the United States on that, and this will lead, I guess, then to some legislation or some executive orders. And there's still another investigation on excess capacity, which might be also coming soon. So one of the key questions is, of course, what will happen after the 24th of July? And then, there are two other investigations which are still going on. One is on the 232 on pharmaceuticals in general. And so this is, I guess, more directed to bring more production into the United States. And then, we have, now from the, I guess, on June 18, quite new, a new investigation. I guess it's also under 301 against Germany's persistent underpayment of innovative pharmaceutical products. So, this is an attack a little bit against domestic legislation here in the European Union. So these two investigations are also quite interesting in relation to our deal from Turnberry. So, of course, I'm happy that Matthias Jorgensen, our US expert, is again here with us and can give us answers to this question I mentioned and give us a little bit hint where we are in the relation between EU and US. Matthias, you have the floor for about 10 minutes. **Matthias Jorgensen (European Commission – DG TRADE.D): (11:42:46 - 11:56:15): Thank you very much, chairman, and thank you. We thank you for inviting me today to update you where we are on EU-US trade relations. I think it's a good moment. Roughly a year ago, the EU and the US agreed on the Turnberry deal. So I think it's a good moment to inform you on where we both are on the implementation of this deal, the developments which we have seen recently, further work on the joint statement and also other areas of cooperation, like critical minerals or digital issues. But maybe we should just remind ourselves a little bit of the situation a year ago. There was a lot of uncertainty. There was a lot of instability. It's the view of the Commission that it was important to act to keep our trade and economic relations as stable as possible and reduce and ideally avoid unnecessary trade tensions. And that was the key objective we pursued last year and where we believe that we were successful. With the Turnberry deal, we managed to go from a situation of high instability to a stabilization of relations to a large degree. And it provides us with a basis for work on tariffs, on non-tariff issues, and on a wider range of cooperation around which we can structure relations with the current US administration. Now with the fact that you also referred to that we have passed our tariff legislation, we have very much lived up to our commitments on the tariff side. I don't think we need to dwell too much on it. You're fully aware of the content of the regulation. We had tough but a successful trilogue in which the various priorities of the EP were reflected. And having done what we have committed to gives us now a good basis for moving forward with the key tariff related issues on the US side of the deal. That for us includes involving pending issues. So we will continue to insist for the US to respect the 15% tariff ceiling. And that, for example, will include that we will continue to push for our approaches on steel and aluminum derivatives, but also on the US lowering tariffs on truck and truck parts. We will push for the US to restore the exemptions as agreed in the Turnberry deal and as reflected in the joint statement of August 21, e.g., on cork, on precious stones, certain pharmaceuticals, etcetera. And we will want to engage with the US to seek further decreases to US tariffs by expanding the list of EU products only subject to USMFN tariff. And our commissioner has recently been very clear in his communication of these priorities to the US of our priorities in that area. So overall, we therefore have a good basis to engage with the US on the tariff issues. And also beyond, we also prolonged the last civil aircraft extension of the truce that you're also aware of. And we have constructive EU-US engagement on critical minerals and on Paxilica, and that is creating a positive momentum, we believe. At the same time, and we need to remain very clear-headed on this, the Transatlantic relationship will continue to remain volatile or at high risk of volatility. We have seen recent actions of the US towards individual member states on member states' digital services taxes as well as the launch of a section 301 investigation on pharmaceutical pricing. Now you referred to that, chairman. And while this investigation currently concerns only Germany, investigations involving other member states cannot be ruled out. And as you said, ongoing a new US section 232 investigations could result in new US tariffs, not necessarily, but it could result in new US tariffs or in new US trade measures. So it will therefore require continuous management both at the political level and at the technical level. We believe that from the side of the EU, we need to remain calm, constant, united, and coordinated, and to be sure that we do our very best and that we focus on pursuing the EU's trade interest in the context of important challenges and a wider political setting. So that will, while we are cooperating, also mean that we need to be ready to make our views known, send clear signals, and take action where warranted. Let me, therefore, now focus on some key areas of ongoing work and very topical issues. And the first one is section, US, so the US section 301 investigations that you referred to, to establish a durable US tariff regime. Then we'll look a little bit on where we are on the work on the non-tariff parts of the joint statement. I'll briefly also touch upon critical minerals and digital issues. Now, Chairman, you mentioned that the US is working on a section 232 investigations on forced labor and excess capacity. And the reason is, as you say, as we all know, that the temporary US regime based on section 122 will be replaced, or will have to be replaced because it will expire on the 24th of July. So the US is working to replace this legal basis, and they're trying to create a legal basis which will be legally solid and withstand internal legal challenges successfully. The US have confirmed the intention to move forward with measures both on labor and on excess capacity, but the exact timing of these measures is not clear. The investigation on forced labor appears advanced, but we are still waiting for the final results on this. And the one on overcapacity looks as if it will take longer. And the data finalization of the report, the findings and possible recommended measures in relation to excess capacity remains to be seen. So in that situation, because we need certainty and we need to know how to move forward, we have sought, we have looked for, and we have received clear and strong guarantees at the political level that the US will ensure that it will respect the Turnberry commitments. That is the premise upon which we believe it is in our interest to work while remaining vigilant and prepared for all eventualities. So, we have continued to engage, what we have seen as a constructive engagement in what is in turn an essential and internal US procedure to get its house in order on tariffs. At the same time, we have made very clear that we are absolutely not in agreement neither with the basic premises nor the detailed findings of these investigations. The EU is at the forefront of the fight against forced labor. You know the many ways we are. And the EU is not in any way a source of excess capacity. Now let me turn now to the work on further implementing the joint statement. And that's important because there's a tariff part and then there's a whole non-tariff related part of the joint statement. And with the tariff part of the joint statement now largely behind us, the work for the US focuses on how to further implement the rest of the joint statement. You know it covers a number of issues, NGBs, investment, economic security, purchase commitments, etcetera. And we've had several opportunities to exchange views with the US on this. And I think we feel now that each side has a better understanding of what it is that the other side is able to do or ready to do, what it wants to do, the opportunities, but we also think the limits. The US has shared certain ideas in terms of scope, structure, and oversight of this part of the cooperation that they would like to pursue on the basis of a joint statement. And it picks up on parts of the areas set out in the joint statement and includes a number of ideas on touching upon standards, regulatory cooperation, conformity assessment, SPS, economic security or other issues. I think we are now looking at getting more clarification, and we are reflecting on how we respond. And I think our preliminary assessment, and that's an important, I think, is that there's scope for constructive talks in some areas, while in other areas, there are clear gaps between our positions as could be expected. And I think in that regard, I want to make something quite clear, and that is that we've been very clear from the beginning. The changes to EU rules, implementation of our, implementation of rules or changes on our regulatory autonomy are not up for negotiations. But that doesn't mean that we cannot have constructive work with the US. That doesn't mean that we cannot move forward in various areas. There's dialogue for scope of dialogue, cooperation, and increased transparency to address some US concerns, for example, with respect to the implementation of certain EU rules. And what we want here and what we think that we need is a mutually beneficial and balanced outcome, and that's what we will pursue. And we will keep on continuing to inform you on how this work progresses. Now very rapidly, I would say, we've also had discussions with the US. We've been engaging with the US on CRMs, Critical Minerals. You've seen our joint statement, with an action plan. Our joint action plan, we've concluded a bilateral MoU. The US is still working on this internally. It's a complicated issue. And we're also continuing work inside the EU on this between DG Grow and DG Trade notably, but also with other DGs. We'll be presenting and continuing discussions with member states, and we'll come back to this also in the fall. And, again, we'll keep you informed of progress on this, but I think we're still very much at the beginning of this work. Finally, on Paxilica, the digital dialogue. Well, you know, on June 23, the EU signed the Paxilica declaration. It's useful. It will allow us to have more resilient and secure AI relevant supply chains. We also had a discussion with the US on July 21, first dedicated discussion on digital matters. That's an important area. Digital matters are important for EU growth and EU jobs. And I think we had a first positive meeting. I think it will reduce the risk of unnecessary tensions. It will increase the understanding of our legislation, and we look forward to continue what we hope will be a constructive process in the autumn. So to sum up very shortly, I think one year ago, we were faced with a lot of uncertainty with serious consequences for EU firms, workers and citizens. A year later, we have a much more stable situation. Both sides have delivered on their commitments or are on the way to doing so or close to doing so. There are further confidence building measures that we have taken, for example, the prolongation of the truce on large civil aircraft countermeasures. Work will continue on the implementation of the joint statement, both the tariff and the non-tariff part. And further than that, these will not be easy talks. They will continue to reflect both sides' interests. And there is a continued risk of volatility. That is the situation we're in. But we will continue work, and I believe we have a good basis to do so in the form of the joint statement. And we look forward to continuing this work and to keep you informed. Thank you very much.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2026-07-14 “(16:53:55 - 16:57:47): Thanks. And, from my side, also some question. 1st, there are only 2 ex official investigation in 3 years. So that is my question. Are there problems, let's say, undetected, or are the expectation too high regarding unfair investment in Europe? 2 in 3 years is quite low. Secondly, the, in the report, the the number of, is mentioned that the number of notification is really exceeded the expectation. So is the commission still able to have a proper assessment of these notification? And then the question, and this was raised also by Katharina, of the, let's say, modernization of this regulation. In the I was a little bit involved in this process of making this legislation ready. In in article, 52 of the regulation, it is clear said that there should be an implementation report accompanied with some, if necessary relevant legislative proposal. And we discussed this quite intensively that if there would should be a change of the legislation, this should be in the normal legislative process. And we had in 2023 an experience where there was an implemented act published, which were a little bit at the border to the change of the legislation. And, at that time, the inter chair and the inter rapporteur mentioned it quite clearly to the commission that this is not a proper behavior regarding, the regulation. And now you want to make some targeted adjustment. I have no clue what this means exactly and how you will introduce this. Also, with an implemented act, I have no clue how you can implement target adjustment. And this, of course, in my understanding, need also a deep involvement of the parliament. How we will involve the parliament in this adjustment? And then you wanted to change the, threshold. And, of course, this has to be done by a delegated act. That's for sure. But also here, the the threshold, if I'm remembering right, was the most controversial discussion during the, trial log. So this is the core of the legislation. And now you want to present a change in the core of the legislation with a delegated act where the parliament can only say yes or no. So how you want to, bring the interest of the parliament into this process. Okay? He's here.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2026-07-14 “(09:04:09 - 09:06:29): So good morning, dear colleagues. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We continue with our last interim meeting before the summer break, and we start this 0.9 of our agenda, state of play of the EU China trade and investment relation. I'm happy that Denis Redonnier is here with us, deputy director general of DG Trade and, of course, important chief trade enforcement officer. Welcome, Denis. China is really in, in the middle and the heart of the political discussion of the last weeks and months. You remember, the commission made an orientation debate on that, and the council discussed a bit the relation. And then the Chinese, trade minister, Huang, was in town. And there was interesting agreement, on having a new format of exchange of views, the so called, I guess, TIC or something like that, to have a discussion about the trade imbalances, the IPR, the WTO. And there should be some, really important point agreed, taking into account our concerns about the situation at the end of October. And this is quite interesting because in October, we will go to China as well. So we will have a delegation to Beijing and to Shanghai and to the surroundings, so that we have direct and and, contact to the Chinese authorities discussing perhaps also this question, how we can have a more corporate approach and not such an approach based on unfair trading measures. But it's not my duty to make a speech here. It's your duty, Denis, and I give immediately floor, to you for, round about, 10 to 15 minutes.”
  EU-China relations
• 2026-07-14 “(10:41:14 - 10:42:39): Thanks a lot. And from my side, 3 elements also on regarding China. 25% of the whole value is going to China. Can you give me a hint? Is this big companies, small companies, big projects, small com projects? And what what is the content of this huge value which was allowed to go to China? Secondly, on the report, so the the member states reporting. I looked and looked, and I didn't found the report for even '23 in in, your communication. So is this report from the figures in '23 public available? And and what is your assessment regarding, the work of the member states? And then, there is a lot of, yeah, decrease in in, declining, the, requests. So around about half of the amount of, declining, than the year before. So what is the reason behind? Is this a geopolitical situation, or are there less problematic, requests, put, on the table? Why you you can explain that this decline amount is so low compared to the years before.”
  Trade relations with China
• 2026-07-14 “(15:42:00 - 15:42:25): Minister, thanks a lot for this comprehensive overview about your, Irish presidency in the field of trade policy. And indeed, I hope this will be also a joyful cooperation in the next months. So, I will give 1st the floor to, the coordinator of the political groups for around about 3 minutes. And Jurgen Wabham from the EPP is the 1st.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-07-14 “(10:54:18 - 10:54:36): Perfect. Thanks a lot, Denis, for staying, for 2 important items here with us. And I hope that, your health will be, will recover so, that you can do your job specifically also regarding, the negotiation with China. So thanks a lot.”
  EU-China relations
• 2026-07-14 “(14:59:40 - 15:00:00): Thanks a lot, Julio. And indeed, yesterday, the coordinator supported the internal report, and we will work quite hard so that we can keep the timeline for finishing the ratification in this year. Thanks a lot. South Asia, Saskia is there, please.”
  EU political integration
• 2026-07-14 “(11:36:06 - 11:38:13): Thank you. Pauline? **Pauline Weinzierl (European Commission – DG TRADE): Yes. Thank you very much. So first, I think on the impact, I mean, we will do a full evaluation of the effectiveness, as I said, by June 2029. We will look at this in advance, of course, but we can only really assess the full impact once it has been also enforced. We've discussed that, I think, quite extensively also during the legislative process. And for that, we have our methods exactly as we have also done in our staff working document economic analysis by looking at the impact on pricing, on availability of supplies. So I think we will be doing that, of course, a bit further down the line. In the meantime, we are already consulting, of course, also on other products. So I think that will also enable us already to provide some assessments, as we go along. On Northern Ireland, let me briefly underline that in line also with the regulation, the quota allocation fully respects and maintains the solutions that were agreed and found in the Windsor agreement. And so what has actually been done is to create here additional tier queues, distinctly separate that fully, maintain the historic trade quota of Northern Ireland for the flows that concern the flows of Great Britain to Northern Ireland. And that was the solution, of course, for seven product categories that was enshrined in the Windsor agreement. And that maintains the current system that was in place already, fully. And we are very closely engaging, of course, with the UK also going forward to ensure that we can have the system in place and also look as to its proper functioning as this is extremely important, of course, for us as well.”
  Free trade agreements (FTAs)
• 2026-07-13 “(16:26:38 - 16:26:51): Thanks a lot. So, Mister Soido, the shadow rapporteur, excuse me, standing rapporteur on economic security and author of our report arrived a little bit late, but I give him the floor now.”
  EU political integration
• 2026-07-13 “(16:17:29 - 16:17:32): Okay. Thanks a lot, and I give the floor back to the commission. **Alexandra Koutoglidou (European Commission – DG TRADE.F.2): (16:17:40 - 16:21:46): Yes. Sorry. I'm noting down the questions. I don't wanna forget anything. And and thank you. Thanks to to everyone for all the questions. I mean, I'm I'm sorry it has been disappointing that we haven't come back with more information. But for what it's worth until, at least to us, your questions are viable, and we are going to take everything that you said into consideration while we are reviewing the member states' reports and we are assessing the results. In in that respect, we have also seen, of course, VP resolution, and we very much welcome how balanced the the proposal was in that regard. We noted that, there is a an explicit call for the commission to propose legislative action in terms of outbound investment. We also note that, any such proposal, the parliament would want to see it being targeted, risk and evidence based and proportionate to any, specific risks to be to be addressed. And at this stage, all that I can say in that respect is that we're considering all that, but there is no decision having been taken in terms of, tabling a legislative proposal. It is a it is a little bit premature, And in a in a sense, we are aware that many people are also concerned that we may come with a legislative proposal. Therefore, we really, want to make an objective assessment of, the risks that are out there to see whether existing tools already address those risks, and then, engage in a conversation both with the member states and, of course, with the European parliament. The the 1st question was about an anthropic where indeed there was a measure of export controls that that we have noted. And, of course, the European Union also has a regime on on export controls that concern dual use products. That is a different regime, and to a certain extent, it it may address some of the risks that tech leakage may be presenting. So it's something that we are looking in parallel to to our assessment with regards to the risks on outbound investment to see if there are any gaps there. Definitely, anything that may come as a reflection or as a proposal by the commission, it legally binding or nonlegally binding, would never have as an objective to close down business in the European Union or to close down the market. That's really not the objective here. The objective is to continue having an open market for foreign investment while we are finding a way to balance this against monitoring and addressing the risks that may come with certain of those of those investments. But, certainly, the general principles on which the European Union itself has been founded about the freedom of capital, the freedom to do business, these are nonnegotiable here. And if, if there were any measures or any, recommendations, any discussion to be to be had around that matter, it would be more about acknowledging potentially that the world has changed and then discuss jointly how we can address the risks and and that changed world, of course, without closing down our market because that's that's definitely not what we want. Is industrial policy coherent with any outbound regime? I think that an extreme view would be to say **Alexandra Koutoglidou (European Commission – DG TRADE.F.2): (16:21:46 - 16:26:37): Yes, in the sense that if we want to continue producing in the European Union, then we can also prevent technological leakage and protect the technology that is being produced within the European Union from leaving the European Union. We're not there yet in taking such a position. And in any event, the risk that member states have been monitoring is really a very narrowly defined risk that concerns technological leakage for military applications. This is really quite narrow. The technologies that are being looked into are also strictly defined. Therefore, I would think that for the time being, we are indeed trying to maintain the balance that all economic security instruments of the union are trying to maintain. On the one hand, the openness of the European economy that has brought prosperity to the European Union, and on the other hand, protection of our security and well-being. What would be the consequence of the review? There's really no decision at this stage, but whether it will be something targeted, this, I think, is something the commission has already announced both in the communication and the economic security strategy that indeed any reflection, any action to be taken would be targeted and strictly defined. Is outbound investment linked to FDI screening? There may be views and there's a school of thought that considers that a lot of the risks that we are addressing through FDI screening are also risks that may be posed through outbound investment. And that concerns, for instance, unwarranted transfer of know-how, viable technologies, unique technologies, intellectual property rights, or know-how technological processes in the sense that this IP or technology can be lost if the company's bought out and then transferred to foreign operators. It can also be lost if the company relocates or if EU investors finance competitors of those unique technologies in a third country. For the time being, there's no direct link made between the two, but what we are trying to see is whether the risks of outbound investment can also be covered through FDI screening or whether there is something that is maybe not covered through FDI screening and would require being mindful also when looking into outbound investment. Then whether we will foresee any exceptions for more small businesses, for the time being, we're not considering any rules. So also, like, no exceptions because we're not considering legislating. If we come out with anything, of course, we are mindful of the fact that it shouldn't impose burden neither on the businesses nor on the member states' administrative authorities. Will the parliament be given a possibility to see the results of the report? We need to see how we handle the results. We cannot share full access to the reports because they contain sensitive company data. And to a certain extent, some of those data are not transferred also by the member states to the commission for reasons of confidentiality. What we will probably do is that we will draw the patterns, as you said, and the conclusions, and we will come back to present those so that you get a picture of the result of the monitoring even if you don't get the specific details with company names and so on. And I think that this was all, I believe.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2026-07-13 “And now we switch to item 6, which is the outbound investment. And outbound investment, dear colleagues, was part of the economic, European economic security strategy. And, in this strategy adopted in 2025, the cold so called, Sefkovich doctrine, there was a recommendation to the member states that they should review the outbound investments made since the 01/01/2021 in 3 critical technology areas, semiconductor, AI, and quantum technology. And the deadline for this comprehensive overview is set for the 06/30/2026. And, of course, this, date is gone, and now we are here, in a good moment to take stock about the preliminary results of this, exercise. And, without further, introduction remark, I will give give the floor to Alexandra Coutu Gliedou, the head of unit f 4 economic security instruments, from DG Trade, Please for round about 10 minutes. **Alexandra Koutoglidou (European Commission – DG TRADE.F.2): (16:01:26 - 16:06:54): Hello. Thank you. Thank you, mister chair. Honorable members, thank you for inviting us and for your interest, to this matter that indeed occupies a lot of our time these days. Let me also, start by making, a little bit of an introduction and sharing the context under which we are working in this area of, outbound investment as part of investment security or investment security work in, in the unit. As you are aware, the EU is amongst the biggest sources of, outbound investment, And we are all aware that outbound investment comes with a lot of benefits. It brings innovation. It drives economic growth, and it can lead to partnerships with 3rd country entities that can make our our own companies, the EU based companies, more competitive and, hence, drive also the competitiveness of the of the EU market to a better point. That said, already in 2023 in the economic security strategy communication, the commission identified certain, risks for the EU economies, resilience of supply risks to resilience of supply chains, physical security or cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, risks to technical security, to technological security, or technological leakage, and the possible weaponization of economic, dependencies or risks of economic coercion. In that same communication, it was acknowledged that some of those risks may also be posed by outbound investments, and it was therefore, considered warranted to look closely into such transactions with a focus on with a focus on a specific risk that concerned technology leakage in a narrow set of technologies, artificial intelligence, quantum, semiconductors, where that technology leakage could lead to the enhancement of military or intelligence capabilities of 3rd country actors. Already in 2020, '3, the communication, announced the establishment of an expert group, on outbound investment that has been since a viable platform for the commission and for member states to to exchange on the matter and to share, good practices. Then on 01/15/2025, the commission adopted a recommendation on reviewing outbound investment in technology areas that are critical for economic security. These are the 3 technology areas that I mentioned before, so AI, semiconductors, and quantum technologies. And the commission essentially recommended to member states to undertake an exercise of monitoring and of reviewing transactions in those sectors in a country neutral way. So without pointing to a specific destination is riskier than other, but also acknowledging that different member states may make a known risk assessment in that regard or prioritize looking into specific countries for resources reasons also. And recommendation took a broad take as to the type of transactions that could be linked to. Because as you know, investment is a is a broad concept. It can come with movement of capital financing of transactions, but also simply technological transfer, transfer of assets, know how, and so on. The recommendation outlined the type of information to be gathered by the member states. And during the entire monitoring period, there were different meetings organized in the context of the outbound expert group in order for member states to share from their experiences, to exchange on on good practices and how they could ensure that the outcome of their reports would be would be useful and would lead to the evidence that is required for all of us to make an informed decision on on the way forward. And in that context, also, the, the commission did we we did the best that we could in order to support member states in identifying transactions and assessing, the relevant risks. The deadline for the member states reports, as you mentioned, is indeed the 30 of, June 30, to be delivered. And at this stage, we are still analyzing. I'm sorry. Probably, you expected something more interesting than than an analysis. But as a matter of fact, we are still reviewing the reports that we have received from from member states. What we can say is that all member states have taken the exercise quite seriously, and they have devoted resources to to this exercise, trying to gather evidence, to look closely into specific transactions, and to appreciate risks that that may relate to them. We will spend the summer period making this assessment, and we expect that we will be able to provide a more comprehensive overview of findings, reflections, and possibly suggestions for the way forward to to be put forward for discussion to put on the table for discussion in early autumn. So I will close here and happy to reply to any questions you may have.”
  EU industrial funding (mechanism level: EU-pooled vs nationally-financed)
• 2026-07-13 “And perhaps in addition, regarding Egypt. So we have a system where European companies are discriminated in public procurement in other elements as well, where the military is dominating more or less all elements of the the economic reality and where corruption is the day by day business. So in this environment, of course, you are saying that Egypt is a strategic partner for the region. Might be. But what is really the concrete effect of our relation with this leverage because of this huge amount of money? Where can you give me some positive examples where the situation on the ground has changed? **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): So thanks again for for this question. So I think, um, as I said, I mean, the, the, the picture will will remain mixed, uh, on, on Egypt. Uh, but I think what we could suggest is that we will have, at the occasion of the next disbursement, again, a very thorough assessment of the political preconditions. So, I mean, if there are certain aspects on which you want to discuss more in details, I think, I mean, we are obviously always, always willing to discuss these elements. Um, but, uh, but as you, as you also write this stress, I mean, the question is really in terms of progress. I mean, of course you name some CSOs, which, uh, stress some, some elements, but I mean, we, we could also, uh, you know, name elements, for example, several releases of criminal and political detainees for which authorities announced recently that this, this, um, release will take place. Uh, there are a number of commitments and progress, which we see, for example, with the recommendations that were issued in the context of the 2025 Universal Periodic Review. On the legislative front. Also, we've we've seen some positive developments. So this is I mean, there will be concrete examples that we we describe in our next information note. **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): So maybe that will be a basis for for further discussions on this. I think it's a you know, it's a difficult it's a difficult balance. But our assessment remains that overall, considering all elements, we see this this positive trend for the country. And again, in terms of, of, of concrete elements, I think it's it's not in the EU interest to have such a large country in our neighbourhood, uh, find itself in, in very difficult situations and having even more instability. So I see this as a as a positive, as a positive outcome that we have contributed with our support to ensure that there was yet another country and core of more stability in a region that on which we have just seen a multiplication of conflicts, uh, over the past years, not only since the time we, we proposed this operation, but even more so as we are implementing are implementing it. So, um, so we see this as a, as a, you know, tangible, tangible elements, uh, and clearly in the interest of the EU to, to have such support. So thank you.”
  EU-Egypt relations
• 2026-07-13 “(15:07:20 - 15:13:42): So hello, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome off to our last inter meeting before the summer break. The July meeting. There is a proposal for the agenda. Any objections to the agenda? Not the case. Are you left here? They reach Sydney next to me. Yeah. Yeah. So, this, meeting chair's announcement is, of course, web streamed as normal. So welcome from Luneburg to Ljubljana, from Tallinn to Thessaloniki, and perhaps even across the Atlantic, nobody knows. So we have also interpretations. Please speak in a model way so that interpretation could go in a proper way. So and then I have really a set set announcement. So we have we will lose 3 members of our staff, in next time. It's, Tobias, it's Safed, and Monika. They will all leave the intersecretary this month. Tobias will become the new DG Expolition Officer in The United States. So, therefore, I guess, we will have a good connection to The United States, and we will exchange our private mobile number, I guess. Safed will, leave unluckily me not. He will go to the CCC Coordination and Legislative Programming Unit. And Monika will work in the Eastern Partnership and Russia unit or Nest. Thanks a lot for all the work. I enjoyed very much to work with you, and, all the best, for the new, jobs. And regarding all the, items I just, mentioned, I guess we will stay in contact and we will count on you. So thanks a lot. All the best. And, yeah, at the same time, of course, it's a pleasure for me to welcome, to the intersecretariat 2 new members. It's Rudi Meyer and, yeah, and Kierke Kink, who start on the July 15. So welcome to Inter, and have fun. And enjoy the work here in the most important committee of the European Parliament. And I'm really happy that you are here, so all the best for you. Thanks a lot for coming. So 0.3, we have, had our coordinators meeting on the June 22. And if there are no objections until the end of this meeting, it will be, integrated in the minutes of this meeting. And, of course, we had minutes of the meeting of the June 2, and we have the same here under there are no objection under the end of the meeting. These minutes will be approved. And then we come to the presentation of a study on EU trade in textiles and export flows. And, of course, textile is of a lot of, countries important. Previous times also European Union was a big text ile exporter and producer. Now it's a little bit changed, but it has a lot of implication for European consumer. And for for business in in Europe is well. So for a lot of trading partners, it's a really important part of the GDP, Pakistan, for example. And sometimes it's also a little bit problematic. So this fast fashion trend is really going on. And regarding Xuyen, we see it really was a low price product really coming up. And this leads, of course, also to a large volume of unused textile or secondhand textiles, which sometimes then be exported to the 3rd countries again. And then this led also to a problem to the textile producer outside the European Union. So, 1 example, in 2022, nearly 30,000 tons of used textiles, 30,000 tons went only to Ghana. So it's a quite huge amount of products. So, it has, really an impact on the, value chain and and the production and the structure of economy in Ghana. So, having this a little bit in my mind, and, of course, we discussed this also a little bit, we invited, doctor Tony Scharmer to present the findings of his study. And he will give us an overview about the findings and the consequences for around about 10 minutes, and I give him the floor. Please.”
  Recruitment policies in the EU
• 2026-07-13 “This is the implementation of the macro financial assistance to third countries last year. The presentation by the commission will be given by Mister Stephanie Pammes, the head of unit for neighborhood countries and macro financial assistance. Remember, dear colleagues, we have MFA to Ukraine, Egypt, Jordan, and North Macedonia. So, there are a lot of elements which could and should be interesting for us, and I give now the floor to Miss Pammes. **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): (16:33:22 - 16:43:57): So good afternoon. I hope you hear me well. I speak closer to the microphone. So thank you very much for this invitation. Indeed, I will present today the main findings of the MFA annual report that was published by the commission on June 23. This is a regular report that we publish every year on macro financial assistance, which is a type of financial assistance to third countries. Today, I will give you an insight about the main findings of this report. To note also is that it is available on our website together with a staff working document that provides more details into the different operations that took place last year. Just as a reminder, as in past editions, the annual report covers operations that took place last year, so this time in 2025. It also provides a description of XPOS evaluations that were carried out because this is something that we systematically perform on each operation. It also contains information on general developments related to the MFA instruments, if relevant, and an overview, a short overview of potential future developments. I will first start with the core of the report, which is about the four operations that took place in 2025. Last year, we had a very important MFA operation to Ukraine. As you know, despite the remarkable resilience of the economy of Ukraine and the substantial support that is being provided by the EU through the Ukraine facility, Russia's continuing aggression kept creating additional financing needs in 2025 and beyond. In this context, the EU provided additional support through the so-called ERA MFA, standing for extraordinary revenue acceleration MFA. This operation was worth €18,100,000,000, provided under very concessional terms. To recall, it was part of the more global G7 ERA initiative in 2024 to provide €45,000,000,000 to Ukraine, in particular by leveraging extraordinary revenue generated from the Russian immobilized sovereign assets. The regulation that provided the legal foundation for this operation entered into force in October 2024. The MFA was released through a single, or what we call a sole installment, conditional on the fulfillment of a number of policy conditions. Later on, the disbursement took place throughout 2025, and it took place in several, what we call, tranches. There were actually 10 tranches, each time subject to the fulfillment of the political precondition. The report contains, and in particular, the staff working document contains more details on these elements. Now turning to the South neighborhoods, there were two MFA operations, one to Egypt and one to Jordan. In the case of Egypt, to recall the context, it's a country that's been affected by both the Russian war against Ukraine, but also more directly by the escalating conflicts in the Middle East, with a number of tensions and conflicts still ongoing, that has affected the country via multiple channels and that has had full consequence to widen the external financing needs of Egypt. In this context, to recall again, the commission proposed in March 2024 an MFA package of up to €5,000,000,000 in concessional loans, divided into two operations: a short-term MFA operation of €1,000,000,000 that was put into place to address urgent financing needs of the country and a second operation worth €4,000,000,000, what we call a regular MFA operation, which was approved by the European Parliament and the Council in June 2025. The first installment of this second operation was done in January 2026 following a positive assessment of the implementation of a number of policy measures, 13 in total, that were linked to this particular installment in different areas. Also, progress on the implementation by Egypt of the concrete and credible steps required under the political precondition and the IMF program remained on track. Now if I turn to Jordan, for which we also have ongoing MFA operations. Again, difficult context of the region, the Middle East region, that has increased pressure on the country's security and has tested its economic resilience. In this context, in April 2025, the European Parliament and the Council approved a first MFA operation to the country worth €500 million. The first disbursement of €250,000,000 took place in September 2025 after the relevant requirements were assessed as positively fulfilled. This concerned notably the political precondition and a satisfactory track record of implementation of the IMF program. Additionally, in August 2025, the commission proposed an additional MFA operation worth also €500,000,000 in concessional loans, which was approved by the European Parliament and the Council in January 2026, again to address the increasing financing needs of the country. The MOU and the loan facility agreements are currently being prepared, and the disbursements are expected to take place this year and next year, in parallel with the operation that was already fully signed and has started to disburse. Last point about our ongoing operations or 2025 elements is that we have an MFA operation to North Macedonia that was agreed and approved by the co-legislators already in 2023, so it's worth €100,000,000. That was also there to address the increasingly fragile situation of the country. The first disbursement took place in April 2024 for half of the total level of the operation of €50,000,000. But to date, the authorities have not made a request to the commission for the provision of the second tranche of the second installment. The availability period of this MFA runs until August of this year, meaning next month. We assess that it is not very likely that these funds will be requested at this stage. Also to note that the country has currently no active program with the IMF. Now if I move more briefly to an overview of the XPOS evaluation, there were a number of them that were either completed in or initiated last year. First of all, in January 2025, the commission published the joint XPOS evaluation of the operations to the eastern neighborhood countries of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. We also had the post-evaluation XPOS evaluation of the COVID-19 MFA operations to 10 partner countries, which was published in December of last year. Then, in 2025, the commission launched an XPOS evaluation of four MFA operations provided to Ukraine from 2022 to 2023, including the emergency MFA, the exceptional MFA 1 and 2, and the MFA plus, where the publication is expected by the end of this year.”
  EU-Ukraine relations
• 2026-07-13 “(16:32:29 - 16:33:19): Thanks a lot. So this concludes 0.6, and we switch immediately to 0.7. ***Presentation by the Commission of the report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2025”
  EU development aid (migration conditionality)
• 2026-07-13 “(15:59:20 - 16:01:23): Yeah. So we will proceed in this way. Thanks a lot for the offer, and we will send you the questions. Thanks a lot, professor. All the best for you. And this ends, the, item, I guess, 5, was it? ***State of play on the implementation of Commission Recommendation (EU) 2025/63 on reviewing outbound investments in technology areas critical for the economic security of the Union”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-07-13 “(16:29:31 - 16:32:28): Back to the commission. **Alexandra Koutoglidou (European Commission – DG TRADE.F.2): Yes. Thank you very much for those questions. Indeed, there are several foreign countries that do maintain outbound investment regimes. You mentioned the US and China. It's also Korea and Japan and Taiwan, if I'm not mistaken, that have their own regimes of monitoring outbound investments. And we are, of course, studying those systems in order to see what is the experience also from the implementation of those regimes. It is something that we will take into account as we are also analyzing the reports of member states because also the mechanisms of those foreign countries, they are taking into account risks that are posed by international investments. So we are interested to see the different risks that different countries may take, may focus on. Precisely because different partners may be focusing on different types of risks, not all of those regimes are the same. There is a different approach that's being followed. The US is focusing mostly on monitoring the financing of outbound investment, for example, while Japan is focusing more on technological controls when it comes to outbound investment. China's approach is the one that we have all recently seen in the legal act that was recently adopted, which essentially formalizes a little bit the regime that existed before between prohibited and encouraged investments. If I'm not mistaken, that regime entered into force on July 1, so it is a little bit early to have information about the impact of its implementation. As far as we are aware, we have not heard of any investment having been blocked on that basis. We understand that a main objective of China's act is to ensure a closer monitoring of the investments that are taking place in third countries, including after their establishment. So it's something that we will continue monitoring to see how it evolves, but we don't have yet concrete experience from implementation.”
  EU policy on screening foreign investment in strategic sectors and critical infrastructure
• 2026-07-13 “(16:09:45 - 16:12:06): Thanks a lot. And for the S and D, the shadow is, Brando Benifi. He is not here, and I will ask in on his behalf 2 major question. So a little bit also going in the direction of of, Juergen. So we have a lot of elements where we are trying to promote the industry. So we have now the Ships x 2 and, the AI and AI Development Act and, the the, Industrial Acceleration Act. How fits this together with, the, outbound investment, proposals, and what does it mean for the economic development? So for me, it seems to be at the moment not really coherent, to be honest. And secondly so, of course, we expected that you would presented us a little bit more, from the review from, the member states. So it is completed now. And, you mentioned this will be done now during the summer break, so no summer break for you. And, of course, my question is then what what is the consequence of that? Will be there some benchmarks, on on that? And is is this a ground for for deciding then if further legislative action are needed? And the, yeah, the the possible question is, of course, then if there is some legal action, will this also give, a targeted, proportionate, and legal certainty to to the European business? So this was Brando. And then we have, Jessica.”
  Overall simplification of regulation in the EU
• 2026-07-13 “(16:52:12 - 16:53:34): Thanks a lot from my side also regarding Egypt and Jordan. So we are giving a lot of money to them. And if I'm talking to a normal citizen outside the Brussels bubble, what could give me an argument? What is the main achievement of the MFA in Jordan and Egypt, and where are the main risk for the implementation specifically? Of course, in Egypt, where we discuss so intensive here in the Parliament and regarding the geopolitical situation there in the Middle East, of course. Do you expect that there is some additional MFA? Coming to our table quite soon. And this, of course, leads to the final question regarding the future MFA and and the MFA in English and the the question how we have a perspective to guarantee MFA a situation, at least on a similar level, is the Commission working on some strategies on that? So the commission. **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): Okay. So first of all, thank you very much for for all these questions. So I think I will try to group them. They will question on Ukraine and Moldova, also Egypt and Jordan, and also on the future of MFA as a, as an instrument. Um, so when it, when it comes to, uh, to Ukraine, um, I mean, we have to remember what is the objective of, of macro financial assistance. Uh, it's, it's a crisis instrument that is there really to, to support a country addressing its financing needs. So country having difficulties to, to finance itself and to strengthen the macro stability of the country. So this is, this is the essential objective of MFA as a crisis instrument by difference to longer term support, uh, that is achieved via other type of instruments. You mentioned the Ukraine facility. That is a key, uh, obviously a key instrument to support, to encourage a number of structural reforms with the medium term perspective to accompany and to support the accession path of the country to the EU. So we see these instruments, uh, you know, MFA, Ukraine facility or MFA and facilities in general. Also in in other countries such as Moldova, as really complementary tools. And so pursuing, uh, you know, complementary objectives. Um, so, so I think we, you know, we don't see contradictions. I mean, there are different, different policies that are ongoing with Ukraine, obviously, but this is a country at war who for which it is very important that we give the ability to fight the war, but also the ability for the states to to continue to function. **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): And I think this is very much in the interest of Ukraine, obviously, but also in the interests of of the EU. So in terms of, um, of MFA also, uh, with respect to, to different countries. Um, so just to recall that, uh, there are two important requisites for a country to, to benefit from MFA. Um, one is a very important one is the political precondition. And I will come back to this also in the context of Egypt in a minute. Um, and another one which is more in terms of financial condition, in terms of having, uh, an IMF program that is on track, very important in terms of having reassurances on the debt sustainability of the country, and also have a strong, uh, fiscal framework anchor, um, for, for the MFA. But to go even further back, I mean, we have to remember what is the primary objective of MFA. So since the introduction of this instrument, it has been about supporting countries mainly in the neighborhood of the EU. And why do we we do that? Because we believe that we have a strategic interest in having macro stability in these countries, because if we consider either candidate countries or countries part of the neighbourhood policy we have as EU a key interest that is country remain macroeconomically stable, not least to avoid a number of negative spillover effects on our own on our own countries. **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): So I think this is how we see this as as very important. And for other objectives, let's say there are other tools. So but the MFA has has this specific focus. Um, so to, to carry on maybe on, on Ukraine. Um, so we see, of course, you, you know, very much, you know, very well as part of the global Europe regulation, uh, that there is a specific dedicated, uh, budget that is foreseen for, for Ukraine. Um, and this is very much to ensure precisely and to answer to the, to the question also with potential crowding out on other countries such as Moldova. Precisely. The fact that there is a kind of a dedicated envelope allows that other countries can still benefit from from our assistance. Um, so I mean, MFA will remain part of the toolkit. Uh, as I said, it's a crisis instrument. So it fulfills other objectives that this longer term instrument, it will very much remain, you know, as part of the, of the global toolkit that we can offer and whether it's Ukraine or other countries, uh, I think we have, um, it is clear that this, uh, this will remain, um, so maybe not to go back on, uh, on Egypt and Jordan. **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): So first, what concrete, uh, elements to, to justify. Uh, well, I mean, concrete elements is again, thanks to this, uh, key MFA operation that are indeed substantial. We allow these countries to really weather the current shocks. I mean, the intensity and the turbulence of the global economy and the particular situation of the Middle East has not got any calmer since this MFA operations were offered. So I think I think this is what we can report on that really, it's a key element to foster macro stability in these countries, but also, and very importantly, to foster reforms, because we believe strongly that there are a number of structural reforms that this country would not have so swiftly carried out if it wasn't for for the support of MFA, because also to recall, MFA is a performance based indicator. So we provide budget support to countries to address their financing needs, but against the fulfillment of a number of policy conditions. So this is, uh, this is what we offer with MFA or what we want to achieve with MFA. And I think it's very important, again, to recall that Egypt and Jordan are two countries with which the EU assigns strategic and comprehensive partnerships. So it was truly recognized that they are very important countries for the EU as anchor of of stability in the region. And I think, again, the recent developments has really supported this approach, that we need elements of stability in the region. **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): So in terms of political preconditions to recall, the legal basis indeed of the Egypt MFA is a bit different from other countries because it's more in terms of progress trends, concrete and credible steps. So, I mean, as you said in the report, in the annual report, we we didn't shy away from, you know, a number of difficulties. We don't pretend or, you know, the situation is, uh, is, uh, you know, perfect. But, just to reassure you that, I mean, the EU really closely monitor human rights developments in Egypt also in terms of progress towards democratic standards. And we do this at all possible levels. We, of course, with the government, national authorities, but also with CSO interlocutors. And this is elements that are, you know, discussed and reminded in different fora. We were able also to conduct wide consultations during the negotiation of the MFA to recall and for the assessment of the MFA package. We also have regular institutional consultations under the association agreements and international fora, including the UN's Human Rights Council. I think this is something you you reminded us. So the MFA is precisely another platform, another instrument to foster progress in in these different areas because we look broadly at democratic standards, rule of law, human rights situation. We take into account, obviously, the, you know, the universal periodic review that are carried out. **Stéphanie Pamies (European Commission – DG ECFIN): And so the, the, the report highlights a number of elements on which we found a basis to, to find a progress overall and to recall that we reassess the situation for each and single disbursement. So it's not just at the at the inception of the operation, but also ahead of each disbursement. Um, currently we are preparing for the second disbursement. Uh, and as customary, we are preparing an in-depth assessment of, of the political precondition and obviously also of the Policy conditions, together with our colleagues from the External Action Service, and this will be reported duly to you via this information. Notes that we circulate ahead of each disbursement, on which you will see more details about what is at the core of an analysis. Again, stressing the positive developments but not shying away. Also for stressing the areas in which we would like to see faster progress. Um, so lastly, uh, I think there was a question on, um, well, I think I've addressed it already, maybe of the MFA as a, as an instrument for the future. So as I said again, uh, we believe it will, it will remain relevant. But again, with this focus on, on crisis support, uh, by, by complementarity with with other tools that already exist and will continue to exist in the future, we hope. I'll stop here. Thanks, and I hope I'll address all the questions.”
  EU-Egypt relations · EU-Jordan relations
• 2026-07-13 “(15:44:42 - 15:45:50): And from my side, really in addition to the 2nd question of Udo. So at the moment, Udo and Jung, we are buying new closes and even more than, in 2019. So in average, 2019, it was round about 17 kilo, and now it's 20 kilo. And 12 kilo per year, you have waste waste of closes. And how to deal with this? We have we changed, the waste framework directive last year end of last year so that closes are now obliged to be collected separately. Is this sufficient, or is there another measure necessary to guarantee that quality for the export for the reuse is guaranteed. And now I give the floor to Michael Galenic, senior expert for textile from DG Growth.”
  Sustainable fashion
• 2026-07-07 “(13:35:47 - 13:36:19): Stagnated. And with the agreement, we're expecting the Mexican economy to recover up to 35%, and I think that's exactly what it needs at the moment. Solidarity in our economic relations and in terms of our investment policy so that people on the ground can have prospects of a good life. And that's why I think it's important that we progress with this agreement. It's a sign of solidarity from us”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2026-07-07 “Madam Chair, Commissioner, colleagues. Globally, we're living through economically turbulent times. Stormy waters and Mexico's feeling this as well. Mr. Trump last year came out with eight times. He came out with The tariffs that had a negative impact on Mexico's economy on water distribution as well. There were other means of pressurizing the Mexican economy, and it stagnated. And with the agreement, we're expecting the Mexican economy to recover up to 35%. And I think that's exactly what it needs at the moment. Solidarity in our economic relations and in terms of our investment policy, so that people on the ground can have prospects of a good life. And that's why I think it's important that we progress with this agreement. It's a sign of solidarity from us to Mexico. Let's build bridges over troubled water. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2026-07-07 “Madam chair, commissioner, colleagues, globally, we're living through economically turbulent times, stormy waters, and Mexico's feeling this as well. Mister Trump last year came out with 8 times he's came out with tariffs that had a negative impact on Mex Mexico's economy, on water distribution as well. There were other means of pressurizing the Mexican economy, and it stagnated. And with the agreement, we're expecting the Mexican economy to recover up to 35%, and I think that's exactly what it needs at the moment. Solidarity in our economic relations and in terms of our investment policy so that people on the ground can have prospects of a good life. And that's why I think it's important that we progress with this agreement. It's a sign of solidarity from us to Mexico. Let's build bridges over troubled water. Thank you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• 2026-06-22 “That's of course one item which is also in the discussion. But it's clear that with also cooperation between European Union, European companies and South Africa, also this transition towards energy production coming from mainly coal to other sources is possible. And this will also lead to a more relaxed handling of cbam and steel. We visited also the South African biotechnology company African. This was also quite unique experience Four years ago there was no possibility of production of any vaccine in the. On. On the whole African country, continent, and therefore during the Corona pandemic. It was also an important part to really support vaccine production in Africa. And we looked specifically, who is able to do. And South Africa was identified. And in four years, the research and the production capacity was established. And we could really see how the work together with the team Europe, with global gateway money and this production in the interest of the global South, were developed and we were present as. This was certified is a good manufacturing practice. So in total, as I mentioned at the beginning, it was really fruitful and successful. This delegation and I hope that there will be also continuous productive dialogue between South Africa and US to stable global trade in a world based order, and also bringing investment to the people so that the living conditions are really improving. Thanks a lot to everybody, to the Secretariat, but also to the EU delegation for the preparation of this really, really good delegation. I now invite the other members of the delegation to add if they want. And Hannah is the first.”
  EU climate aid for global South · EU Development & Humanitarian Aid
• 2026-06-22 “Thanks a lot. And myself, I will now replace the S&D shadow rapporteur who is at the moment in South Africa with the in the parliamentarian delegation. I have only questions to the commission. So this is one of this new so-called mini deals. And we will discuss it a little bit later here as well. And this is a little bit the question how the structure is really working And now with South Africa, we have the EPA. We have the memorandum of understanding on raw materials. We have the discussion about Cbam and the steel issue. So is this setup let's say the the umbrella for for everything because you mentioned that now everything is coordinated in the Ministry of of Industry and Trade. And if this is the case, then of course, my question would be how the European Parliament and the Parliament of South Africa are involved in this discussion process, because the formerly, of course, this setup is not a normal trade agreement. And linked to that, of course, in our normal trade agreements, we have the domestic advisory groups where civil society, trade unions and business are involved in the implementation process. Similar institutions, similar bodies. We have not. Here we have the business to government dialogue. But this is a totally different format and different let's say obligation for this is there because of this setup in the umbrella function. Let's say this idea coming from also the European Parliament about this domestic advisory groups gone. And thirdly perhaps this is a new exercise. Do you have in mind that we will go ahead with similar setup was with other countries, specifically in Africa, where perhaps it is a little bit more complicated to have a traditional trade agreements. And Terry is also not here, but Chris is here. Christopher, you want come take over. Yeah.”
  EU competences on trade policy
• 2026-06-15 “Madam chair, dear commissioner, now we are concluding the debate, and I thought which rock song could be the best for concluding this debate. 1st, I thought from the doors, this is the end, my beautiful friend. But I think that's not the right 1. The right 1 is from Amazon Lake and Palmer from the beginning because we are starting now with a legal text where the European Parliament is guarantee to the citizens, I guess, at least 5 points. 1st, we will be not blackmailed. That's for sure. That's in this tax guaranteed. We will stick to a rule based order and guarantee that the power is not determining our democratic decision. Thirdly, the EP is a democratic force, and it will guarantee that we will influence the policy of the European Commission. And if The US will not stick to this commitment, it's clear that with this legal text, we can and we will react. And it's totally clear that the European Parliament has really clearly strengthened and improved the proposal by the commission. And there was a big, big pressure from outside the European Parliament, from the other side of the Atlantic, sometimes even from inside the European bodies, but we resist. And I'm really proud, dear colleagues, that we really reached this agreement, this legislation so that we can really have these 5 guarantees to our citizens. So let's vote in favor tomorrow to this legislation. Thanks a lot.”
  EU-US trade relations
• 2026-06-15 “Thank you very much, president, commissioner, colleagues. Here we are the day before the vote on the EU's input into the implementation of the Scotland deal. Now there are many implications to this. And amongst other things, it's quite clear that a handshake or a joint statement are certainly not going to be enough to keep the ship afloat. We need clear guidelines. We need clear legislation underpinning it. And therefore, colleagues, I'm extremely proud that we in the European Parliament have come together with the council and have crafted some legislation democratically to forge a path ahead. Others have obviously forgotten the democratic traditions that we have in this European Union, democratic traditions which are forged by those who are elected by the people to this parliament. And there are very important consequences which flow from this. These decisions, of course, are legally watertight, and that is extremely important. That is a critical factor at the moment when we recognize that what we are doing has got to be legally watertight, effective, and cogent. And this is why we lay such great store by the rule of law and watertight legislation. There are those who have said, oh, yes. Well, but you've been far too dilatory and delayed. Well, the reality is that in October, the commission sent to us a proposal on which we actually voted as soon as January. Then, of course, yes, there have been delays in the interim, but these are not delays which can be attributed to us or for which we can be held responsible. They are precisely to be attributed to The US because of the Greenland saga with which we're all familiar when they threatened to to annex Greenland and threatened ridiculous tariffs and were engaged in completely coercive behavior. But then also, of course, fortunately, the court has actually declared that that declaration of tariffs was actually not legally watertight. It was null and void. And therefore, these are factors which have actually delayed the proceedings. I would now like to thank all the rapporteurs and shadows and everybody who's been involved in sticking fast to our course of action in standing up for our citizens, our industry, and our workers because we are on the brink of delivering a very good result. This is going to be legislation which is based on the 5 s's, which is are so critical. And they're going to constitute valuable safeguards, which will enable us to be sure that this legislation is watertight. There can there is a sunset clause. It is legally compliant, and we are sure that this is legislation which can be reviewed, which can be updated. There are suspension clauses which can be invoked if necessary. And if there is divergence from the principles and if unilateral tariffs are introduced. Therefore, we've got some crystal clear principles set down here. We have also looked at, for example, things such as steel derivates. I don't know why washing machine is actually a steel derivate, but leaving that aside, we had to deal with that too. And this is all something which the parliament has worked hard on, and the parliament will remain extremely committed to and vigilant regarding all the developments flowing from this legislation. So, colleagues, I would ask you please tomorrow to vote for this legislation, which has been hard fought for. Thank you.”
  EU-UK relations
• “Thanks a lot. And specific to manage these challenges with this three countries, it's not an easy task. I remember quite well the development on that. So now finally on Kenya. So I was so keen for Kenya because it's so new. And Elena will give us a hint on that.”
  EU policy on African region
• “It's dishonest to point the finger and say that you can save the world, but we need to strike deals with other partners, eye to eye on a level footing. That includes working with Uruguay. Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina. Working with them to protect biodiversity, climate and employers. We can only do these things together. Not by pointing our finger. Europe. Pointing the finger. No. And defensive interest. Well, what did Lenny Kravitz say? It ain't over till it's over. As it's not over yet, we can still change things. If we want to change things, if we want to amend, if we want to add, we can still change things. We've done that with other trade deals in the past. We are a power and we can ensure that this is a good deal. We need stable agreements in this global world, this global world that is characterized by conflict where there isn't necessarily stability. But let's not forget, 40% of our GDP depends on international trade. Without that, we cannot survive. We would be squandering our welfare states. And we don't want to do anything that will benefit the autocrats of this world. Let's discuss. Let's improve this text, but let's be part of it.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “25:01 – 16:28:04): So dear colleagues, take your seat and then we will continue with the item fourteen. And the item fourteen is quite sensitive. It is about the unilateral import bans on Ukrainian products because, as you know, we had a long discussion about lifting TIR quotas in the context of the TCA with Ukraine regarding the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We lifted all limitation and this led to some really heavy import from Ukraine. Remember sugar, we had a quota free for twenty thousand tons sugar and exported four hundred thousand tons of sugar. That led to some, let's say, discussions in some member states and therefore we switched to a different system. And at the end of the day, we changed the article twenty nine in the DCFTA and now the situation is clear and this was accepted by the legislative bodies of the European Union. But nevertheless, we have still import bans in force by Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in place since spring twenty twenty three and of course there might be some understanding as a reaction to the surge in agricultural imports. But nowadays we have fixed everything with the new regulation and therefore it is really a discussion how to deal with this situation and of course it's politically very sensitive. But nevertheless, unilateral risk import restrictions are not in line with our common commercial policy and therefore we put it here on the agenda and I want to first invite the commission and welcome Mr. Leon Delvogh, our well received guest here, to explain the situation for ten minutes.”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• “Perfect. Commissioner. And indeed, this legislation was the wish of the Parliament and you delivered. I guess this should be the regular relation between Parliament and the Commission. So now we have two rounds. One is around with rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs, and then the second round with the political groups and anybody who wants to take the floor first round. I start with the rapporteur from the Inter and give her the floor for four minutes. It's a video where she is stopped.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “So. Okay. Dear members, uh, ladies and gentlemen, let's start our inter meeting of of the 24th and 25th of September. First of all, I would like to welcome 23 students of the University Libre de Brussels. They are doing a masters course in simulation de la co-decision at the Institute of European Studies. So I hope that you have not such a bad impression about the Inter Committee. We are really an active co-legislator. We had our last trilogue yesterday about the foreign direct investment Regulation. So we are normally really engaged in with a lot of of members. And of course, a special welcome to the Professor Comey, a former assistant here in the Parliament. And all the best for you and good to see you again. We have an agenda. Are there any wishes to change the agenda? It is not the case. The agenda is adopted as usual. This meeting is web streamed. So welcome from Lüneburg to Lisbon, from Cork to Constanza, all over Europe, and perhaps also on the other side of the Atlantic. The last meeting where we discussed the US custom issue, where 40 members were present. We had 507 people watching the meeting on online, and they stayed for 59 minutes in average. So that's really huge. So you see, to the students, there is also a big interest, um, in this work all over Europe and perhaps also on the other side of the Atlantic. We have uh, 21 languages available to for interpretation. And, um. 1.3 the announcement concerning the coordinators decision, the decision of the coordinator of the last meeting on the 15th of July will be included in the minutes of today's meeting.”
  Multilingualism in EU institutions
• “Mr. president. Commissioner. Minister. We are not engaging in trade war. This is the point of departure for the USA. What we can see is that we've ended up in a situation where we are basically being blackmailed with the question of our security partnership. And what's quite clear is that the time of kings is gone, where kings draw up treaties without involving the people, and the time of parliaments is upon us. And, Marsh, Mr. Marsh, we're not going to get security through this 14 days after the conclusion of the deal. The USDA. Struck 407 products from the lower percentage and put it up under steel and aluminium. So we're not going to get jobs up here. We've got so many more people paying the 40%, uh, trades. And that means that, uh, people are fighting for survival here. So in the Parliament, we need to take action. We need to take this opportunity in our legislation to change things while we've got this situation whereby European companies are brought into question by us, uh, trade policies. And what we need here is changes, we need amendments. We need changes to the clear link between changes in the USA and changes in the government. Very. That needs to happen very quickly, very clearly, because there's no, um, there's no immobility clause in this third year. We need to have this WTO compatible with Mr. von der Leyen talking about having a better deal than other people. People do. And, uh, this is good for our competitiveness. That is something that flies in the face of the WTO. We need to have our deal in a situation where, uh, people can carry on trading with us, not only in agreements that we're concluding, but also with the US deal. Thank you.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “And indeed we will do it. We will have a further exchange of views, specifically when now the text is going into the ratification process, and then you have a lot of discussion in the Parliament. By the way, it is also not the first discussion we had here in the hearing some years ago. We had a hearing. We have our monitoring groups and a lot of bilateral issues, and we will go to Brazil, uh, in the end of June, July, so that we have direct contact with a lot of organizations and stakeholders and of course the indigenous people as well. So we are looking to hear all the argument. And based on that, we will then, um, formulate our assessment of the agreement. And of course, we are quite confident that we are looking at what is necessary. What is in are the additions, uh, and uh, we are really, uh, um, we have the power to also make some additional requirements in the process. But at the end of the day, I'm really, um, convinced that we should really have a good sailing into this historic partnership with, uh, between the European Union and the Mercosur country, specifically in this challenging global times. Thanks a lot to everybody here on the podium. Thanks a lot, Leopoldo. And thanks, of course, to the colleagues as well.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “53:38 – 16:54:15): Thanks a lot and no doubt about the importance of AI. I recently visited the Customer Authority in Hamburg and they showed me how you can really analyze with AI the custom formalized procedure and the registration elements which took days and days. Now it's served in one minute. So that's also really an improvement for the customer services. Mando to conclude.”
  Artificial Intelligence
• “Thanks a lot indeed seems to be going quite well, and the entire delegation will come to the Philippines in February end of February, so pushing for further progress. Thanks a lot. And next Asean community country is Indonesia and Julio is the rapporteur.”
  Asia-Pacific
• “Thanks a lot. And Lucas, I can assure you that in my delegations it's work and not leisure. And I guess all my colleagues have some experience with that, huh? And the Secretariat as well. Um. Now, I will give the floor to the commission. Um, and I'm really happy that Jack is here with us. Well known. Perhaps one question also to the commission from my side. So we have the different countries where different EU delegations are present. Um, is there some some, some guidelines also for the delegation, how to deal with the ducks, how to support their work, how to promote their work. Perhaps also an exchange of best practice so that everybody ahead of delegation can learn a little bit from, from experience, from others. So but now you have the floor.”
  Discharge of EU institutions and agencies
• “And the last item for today is item number 14, the report back from the monitoring groups. And just to remind everybody in our guidelines for the monitoring groups, the standing rapporteurs are obliged to report back as soon as possible from the actual monitoring groups. So because the monitoring groups are integrated part of the work of our committee. Having said that, we start with South Korea and the standing rapporteur is not here. The monitoring took place on the 20th of February, and there was an exchange with the eeaS on the most recent political developments in South Korea. You will remember there was a problem with the president and the discussion also regarding the trade implementation implementation. So then we have the monitoring group on Indonesia. And here we have the rapporteur with us. Julio you have the floor for two minutes.”
  Asia-Pacific
• “And this leads me to the last point of our agenda for today. We have, on the 1st of August, the five years anniversary of the trade agreement with Vietnam. And the figures are quite impressive. We have increase of trade between Vietnam and the European Union from around about 50% in these five years. But of course, a little bit, let's say unbalanced Vietnam has a increase of 57% and the European Union have an increase of 10%. So there is a slight and balanced. So when I was recently in Vietnam, I mentioned this to the trade minister as well. So this is of course linked to the fact that Vietnam is still a developing country, and they should move quicker ahead than than us to have a equal possibility to further economic growth. But on the other side, there are some. Obstacles on pharmaceuticals, on car parts and whatever. So licenses for for some agricultural products uh which took not the in the agreement foreseen 45 days but months and months and years. So some elements where we have to discuss and um on the trade and sustainability issue, we agreed uh, five years ago on a roadmap. And, um, still, one ILO convention is missing, the ILO convention 87, uh, of uh, the possibility to create independent trade unions. So there is some room for further improvement. But, um, uh, I will first give the floor to the deputy head of unit trade relations with South and Southeast Asia. Mr. Ettore Montesa. For ten minutes maximum.”
  Trade relations with Vietnam
• “So once again council in parallel. What does it mean? So I thought this point on the agenda of an Inter, because we got no information at all from the commission on that. And I want now to know when you presented anything to the Council.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “So from from my side, two items. One is on the United States. Also, I'm not really clear what's going on now. So there are negotiations. But what do you expect on on the outcome and also regarding the procedure. Now, you know, this is our last meeting session of the Parliament. I am not sure that all the Minister will not go to on holiday and waiting for the results from the United States. So how do you think the procedure will be gone? At the end of the day, we have to decide if a deal, if there will be a deal and the deal is acceptable or not. And at the moment, to be honest, Minister, I'm not so optimistic that this will be a really balanced deal in both interests. And this leads to the question of countermeasures. So the Commission has a first list as a countermeasure to the illegal steel tariffs in force. And what about the second list? The commission presented it yesterday and this has to be approved by the council. So this has to be, I guess, ready also for the 6th of August. Are you is this manageable so that we have the second list also ready if there will be no acceptable deal? And the second item, Minister, you mentioned that we have always to decide between openness and defending our economic interest. So quite pragmatic approach. And on the other side, you mentioned this economic security doctrine. Um, I have so my doubts that we can really formulate a doctrine which is a set of beliefs, which is are valid for everybody. So I know the Truman Doctrine, I know the British and Jeff, uh, doctrine, um, and uh, uh, is this the right approach or shouldn't be, uh, still looking on a pragmatic way to deal with challenges which are coming in front of us and looking to defend our economic interests and sovereignty of the European Union.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thanks a lot. Yeah. The precipitation of members in the monitoring group is a general issue. But by the way, also the participation of members in the full committee is a problem. So the political groups are full of power. Ask for a hearing with five experts this morning. And there were more experts in the room than members. So I guess this was really a shame. Um, yeah. Okay, so we switch now to investment and Anna.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• “Thanks a lot. So now we have a lot of shadow rapporteurs from both committees, and they have each of them two minutes sharp. I will really look to the clock. And the first is from the EPP. Andrea Wexler.”
  EU political integration
• “Thanks a lot. And from my side I'm a little bit disappointed, to be honest. And and secondly, also a little bit puzzled because you mentioned, of course, again, the targets and the estimation. And you also said at the moment there's zero import, how we will really manage it in five years to have an import structure and partners worldwide of 10 million tons of green hydrogen. Uh. I have no clue. And therefore, of course, we know the regulations. We know all the measures. The European Commission is foreseen. So we read, of course, this as well. But John's question is totally in line with them. So what is the status of a concrete project? Is there a Meuse concrete investment in production capacities and also in infrastructure in Namibia? Is there an electrolyzer at the port to transport hydrogen from there to us? So what is this concrete status of the whole exercise you described? And where are the restrictions? Where are the shortcomings? What should we do to improve? Is this a possibility to improve our harbor infrastructure? Are there some problems in connecting our harbors with imports? Or where is the problem to go to get some concrete starting point and the curve which is really increasing and where is really, um, the, the investment going on.”
  Low-carbon hydrogen
• “Yeah. Thanks a lot, Matthias. And we are not recognizing you as a representative of the US embassy. Thanks. Thanks a lot. This concludes our internal meeting of this week. And thanks a lot to the interpretation. And we have our next meeting on the sixth and 7th of May. And I guess we have on the 6th of May also another trilogue on this issue. Thanks a lot. Have a good time.”
  EU public communication strategy
• “I spoke with farmers last week for two hours. Let's talk about the facts. If you look, the German farmers, the European farmers have a trade surplus of €65 billion in the agri sector. So it's in the interest of farmers to export. If we look at Mercosur, we have possibilities for our dairy, for our cheese and for our alcoholic drinks. We also must tell the truth. We already import 3 million tonnes of soya and that is cheap soya. And we use that soya to feed our cattle and our pigs. So that's also part of it. We need to look at the facts.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thanks a lot. And a small additional question, but perhaps not so relevant for Europe. But in this new regulation is a part saying if a product is produced with aluminium, copper or steel from the United States, this tether will be reduced. Has the Commission any knowledge about products produced in Europe using steel, aluminium, copper from Europe? Is this relevant for us? So Mathias, a lot of questions.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “Thanks a lot. Are there any further requests for the floor? Then from my side, two elements, one going in the direction of Jurgen. So we have some trade agreements and we have also in the trade agreement, some elements regarding IPR protection going to such one of these countries. At the airport, I will I got offered from bags and shoes and which name from Italy and whatever. It's totally clear that they are not real. So what is the mechanism to motivate our partners where we have a trade agreement to execute? Also, what is in the agreement? And secondly, uh, Jürgen mentioned, um, Indonesia. Uh, this is on the list three, but also Thailand. And we are negotiating with Thailand and how we can really integrate a better enforcement in such an agreement. And my second item is a little bit going in the direction of China. Of course, we know the, the whole the issues of problems and misuse of IPR and also the situation that China is trying to avoid to going to court also in a foreign country. What about this standard essential patents, where China is trying to misuse the market power to give pressure to consumer in this direction, and therefore also harming the IPR of companies? So some small question for you.”
  Trade relations with China
• “So from my side, two questions. One is on the trade in goods and services. Are there any problems or any investigation regarding the goods and services coming specifically from occupied territories? We have a lot of new settlements in the West Bank. And are there any issues where you would say this is not in line with the trade agreement. And secondly, we heard a lot of voices. Now for the suspension of the agreement in this article 79. There are also there is the question of take appropriate measures. So this is a little question mark for me. What is a separate measure. Is it really only the suspension or do you have other possibilities to react and then link to that. He is also the the clear obligation that before doing before taking any measures there should be a discussion in the Association Council. Is there a discussion going on in the Association Council? I missed one request for the floor. I guess.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• “It was an additional pressure towards the European Union increasing this so-called reciprocal tariffs. And I would say this inflation traps from uh announced in 2nd of April from 20% to 30% Act on the goods covered by this baseline tariffs. Um, and, um, there was, of course, a discussion what to do during the weekend. And the commission decided to postpone the first set of countermeasures, which originally should come into force today in the morning. Postpone it until the 6th of August, which was decided today. So a little bit after the 1st of August deadline from President Trump. And of course, um, my opinion was that after this long discussion during negotiation and after having an unfriendly, um, move seen by the US president. When he increased the tariffs on steel and aluminum from 25% to 20 to 50%, even in a situation where we are negotiated, we saw this additional unfriendly act. And therefore, my personal view was that we should stick to the first set of countermeasures. The commissioners decided differently and wanted to postpone it again. And of course, Leopoldo, you will explain this to us, and then we have the opinion where we put until now some more general amendments regarding the trade relations on the table. But of course we have to modify the opinion in full knowledge of the situation where we are now. So, um, the floor is yours.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thanks a lot. And from my side, three questions. One is you really, uh, put a wave or exempting 1% of the emissions. We heard it as well. But you're not changing the ETS, giving back a free allowance for 1% to these companies. Why is this? And does this lead to some disadvantages for our export? And secondly, on the circumvention, um, some questions were raised. So we had also a lot of discussion about the circumvention in our assessment regarding Cbam. Can you really give some further reassurance that there is a strong anti-circumvention provision and also implementation in this approach so that we really have a guarantee that this is not misused by importers. And thirdly I was a little bit surprised about the proposal. And now we have to rush and simplify the procedure because on the 11th of February. It was not in the work programme of the Commission. Two weeks later it came on our table. So this was a little bit surprising. Specifically regarding the necessary to have a revision of Cbam, which is in the legislation. So perhaps you can learn a little bit about how this went through and how this, let's say, urgency appeared without having proper information of the European Parliament before. And now it gives a floor to my dear friend Mohamed from the Env Committee.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)
• “I would like to go for a provisional application, no doubt about it. And this is important because as you know, Argentina is negotiating also with the United States. And it's clear that, for example, the question of GIS is also in the portfolio of the negotiations. So there is a kind of urgency. So what, what and what when will you do? Thirdly, we discuss this also in Nicosia quite recently. The time between finishing of an agreement and signature and then transmitting to the parliament. Sometimes it's two years. And this. I never understood how this could happen. Translation and legal scrubbing. Two years. You have some ideas to really speed up the process. Perhaps you can elaborate this as well, so that we are in a time where sometimes in a week more happened than in previous times in decades. We should also quicker in the process of finalising the agreement. And fourthly. There are more and more the so-called mini deals as the cifa with Ecuador, the Raw Materials Partnership, the investment partnership and what? I have no clue what else. So what is in mind in your mind for further mini deals? Are you having some specific countries in in the perspective, and when will some mini deals come on the table, and how will the European Parliament be involved? First month for you.”
  Trade relations with Mercosur
• “Thanks a lot. And from my side, Peter, um, we had this famous TTC, and in this TTC is was there a discussion about this measures and what was the mood if there was a discussion, what was the mood during the exchange of views with our American counterparts? And secondly, um, I would really underline the question from Selena, what is your reaction now? At the moment I see nothing concrete in the air. And of course, this is also my third point. As Karine mentioned, we need to need to stabilize our unity. And this piece of legislation is clearly a try to split the European Union. And how will the Commission react? Peter.”
  US-EU tech coordination
• “52:22 – 15:52:58): So we are now switching to point six and the next delegation will go to Yahounde in Cameroon and we have the MC fourteen and we requested as coordinators a paper the role of the WTO in EU trade state of play ahead of WTO MC fourteen and I give immediately the floor to mister Steve Wulock who will present the paper and the result for ten minutes please thank”
  EU-Cameroon relations
• “So, dear colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, let's start this joint exercise between the committee, the famous Ito Committee and the Inter committee. Um. There is a agenda, and I have so far no rejection, no opposition or objection to the agenda. So I think we can adopt the agenda. We have two chairs announcements. So this meeting is web streamed. I hope that more people are looking Come on screen to this then here in the room so far and so welcome from Lunenburg to Lisbon, from Cork to Constanza, and perhaps also welcome to some other parts of the world. Interesting in energy question. Indeed. Um, so also we have interpretation here. So please speak moderate. And um, despite the limited time the cooperatives have produced a draft report which is now in English, uh, available to everybody. And this will be the basis for the discussion to day. Uh, of course, we have also some minutes which have to be approved, the minutes of the meeting of the 29th of January, and they will be approved until there is no objection until the end of this meeting. And of course, the main point of today is the discussion about the phasing out of Russian natural gas imports and improving monitoring of potential energy dependencies, and amending the regulation. 2017. 1938. And I guess this is really a crucial legislation internally, but also regarding the relation to Russia, but also, I guess it is playing a role in the discussion with the United States as well. So there is a need of additional supply of energy based on this legislation as well. And of course, I could now make some interesting introductory remarks, but I will not do it because we have our commissioner, Dan Jurgensen, here with us, and I give him immediately the floor to introduce this legislation, and he's done for ten minutes of yours.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources)
• “Thanks a lot. Good. This concludes this point of information on that. And good luck for the negotiations. Next point is also a bit delicate, I would say, where we have, um, a situation with the Ukraine where everybody has known that we had a situation, that the autonomous trade measures will expire on the 5th of June, and this is not a long away. So 5th of June is less than one month. Um, so, um, therefore we are a little bit concerned what this would mean for Ukraine. Um, of course everybody is knowing that the ATMs are also under discussion. We had twice ATMs with more or less zero tariff for products from the Ukraine in the agricultural sector. And last time we had some discussion about safeguards and we established safeguards. Um, so this is expiring. And on the other side, we have our DC FTA, where we have the article 29 with quite restrictive quotas for agriculture products. And this would be coming into force on the 6th of June if nothing happened. And therefore I would now and we would now like to know what is the plan of the Commission in the next for the next three weeks. I guess I guess it's a can, Mr. Delvaux. Excuse me for that, but. ***10. State of play of the review of the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area in view of the impending expiration of the EU’s Autonomous Trade Measures - Exchange of views with Commission representatives”
  Agricultural trade: Ukraine imports
• “President. Minister. Commissioner. Colleagues. So Isaac Newton knew back in the day that once you have an action, you always have a reaction. And this is what we are experiencing now. This morning the I read the order from President Trump. His tariffs from 2018 have been put into full. Full validity. And our imports with tariff free imports have been done away with. And also he's done the same thing with Ukraine, which I find, um, really not acceptable because they need the possibility of exporting goods. And so this means from the 1st of April, we will have to bring in our counter tariffs against the USA. And if Trump also raises tariffs against the pharmaceutical industry, we will also have to have a counter reaction against this tariff. Jungle of tariffs being set up by the USA. Thank you very much.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Thank you, Mr. President. Minister. Moreover. The tariffs are unjustified. The Minister has made that point. For that reason, we need to be very clear in setting out our proposals. And, Mr. Morris, if a deal is now coming, then the criteria must be clear. Also, as a Parliament, we need to be clear on what we can accept. And I think it is clear with a deal we need to ensure that tariffs come down significantly immediately. And also we should have a standstill clause so that we don't have overnight new tariffs or different measures coming around the corner. Thirdly, it is also very clear that European law cannot be changed or watered down or evaded. Fourthly, we want an international system which is strengthened and not undermined by a deal, and that is in the interests of other countries in the WTO. If those criteria are not upheld, then we must adopt countermeasures, because it is very clear that the Rolling Stones have already said you can't always get what you want.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “We made an assessment. Yeah, it is an advantage not to make a clear declaration how many or how much percentage steel and aluminium is in a product. So it's better to have one tariff, but 25 is more than clubs before. The German Association for machinery analyzed that before the April regulation they had to pay an average 21% tariff. And with this new regulation, they have to pay 26%. So an increase of tariffs with this new regulation. And therefore, I guess we should really look to the concrete figures so that we have an an proper assessment. That's also relevant of course for our negotiation regarding the two files. Um if this is really the assessment that at the end of the day, this new regulation brings more tariffs than before. This is not a positive element. Even the motorcycles are accepted. Um, and secondly, on, on the, the the steel and aluminium and copper. We had of course in the deal from Scotland. Also the question regarding, uh, the proof for tech solution on that. Are there any negotiations going on? So is this still, uh, untouched since, uh, one year? Um, and, um, the, the, the, um, yeah, overall assessment, um, is, is, um, uh, the, the development regarding the bureaucratic burden, the different tariffs. Is this still a development which goes in the right direction. Are you? You think that the movement we see so far is still stabilizing or even making the situation worse, and that he is in this whole exercise about the assessment of these derivatives.”
  EU policy on custom fee on non-EU imports
• “Thanks a lot. And of course in the field of battery we need a lot and I guess we miss also some opportunities in the past. But now on the 10th I guess we will have also battery booster coming from the commission. So let's see what the future will bring. Thanks a lot. Mr. Glynn.”
  Sustainability of batteries regulation
• “Thanks a lot. I guess you're quite right. That's really important to stabilize Moldova and to bring it to the European Union. Thanks a lot. I guess you have another report for the Philippines replacing Mr. Warburton, please.”
  EU-Moldova relations
• “So let's restart. And now the webstream is on. Okay. So welcome to everybody from Lüneburg to Ljubljana, from Cork to Constanza and even outside the European Union. Welcome to our Webstream point five is the carbon border adjustment mechanism in the new proposal by the Commission for Downstream goods and anti-circumvention measures. And this is really a quite important change in the cbam legislation so far. And I guess we are now keen to hear from the Commission. What is the background of that and which implications this will have? Also to our trading partners, I heard that Cbam was also some kind of element in the discussion with India yesterday, and I can imagine this question of downstream users and anti-circumvention will also lead to some further discussion with other trading partners. So therefore I give now the floor to Martin Becker from DG Taxud for ten minutes to to explain to us the background of this revision of the legislation and of course, also the implication of for trade policy. Please.”
  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)