Moritz KÖRNER

Policy topics Moritz KÖRNER is active on

What Moritz KÖRNER has said (76)

• 2026-01-28 “E-000355/2026 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission Aligned with the Treaty on the EU, the Commission condemns all animal cruelty. The Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation on the welfare of dogs and cats 1 setting standards for their management in shelters. A provisional agreement has been reached 2 and the Regulation will soon be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. Stray dog management remains within the responsibilities of a Member State. The Commission remains committed to ensuring that EU funds are used in accordance with EU law. Under shared management, the Member State is responsible at first place for the management and control of programmes funded by the EU Funds. 1. Under the current and previous programming periods, the cohesion policy programmes for Hungary do not include stray dog management as eligible activities. Member States authorities are responsible for selecting operations for support while respecting all eligibility criteria. Regarding EU-funding under shared management, based on the requirements of the Common Provisions Regulation 3 , a list of supported projects is publicly available on the website of the responsible Hungarian authority 4 . 2. Stray dog management activities are not eligible in Hungary’s programmes and any expenditures related to such activities have not been declared for reimbursement from EU funds. If verifications, audits or other controls reveal that EU Funds were used for ineligible activities, the corresponding expenditures will have to be recovered or replaced by eligible expenditure. 3. The Commission takes reports from civil society regarding the misuse of funds seriously. To date, the Commission has not received formal complaints showing evidence that EU funds were misused for stray dog management in Hungary. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023PC0769. 2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2024_2029/plmrep/COMMITTEES/AGRI/LA/2026/0112/1334329EN.pdf. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1060 : Article 49(3). 4 https://www.palyazat.gov.hu.”
  Conditions to access EU budget · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-11-13 “E-004524/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission According to Telegeography 1 and the report from the Commission Expert Group on the security of submarine cables 2 , there are almost 600 active optical submarine cables around the world, of which around 200 have at least one landing station in a Member State. According to the same report, at least 14 major companies own 29 dedicated data cable repair vessels globally along with numerous companies owning multipurpose vessels primarily used near shores and in small sea basins for repairing and installing small power and submarine data cables. To ensure continued connectivity of submarine cables, the Commission adopted the EU Action Plan on Cable Security 3 enhancing the resilience of submarine cable infrastructures while also fostering collaboration with Member States for emergency response as outlined in the Recommendation (EU)2024/779 4 . The Action Plan prioritises incident prevention by encouraging Member States to establish regional Cable Hubs for improved threat assessment and information-sharing within a given sea basin. To mitigate consequences of a potential widespread submarine cable disruption, the Action Plan focuses on minimising incident impact by deploying additional data cables. The Commission has already invested, via Connecting Europe Facilit, approximately EUR 548 million in 58 submarine cable projects across the EU or linking EU to third countries. The Expert Group will identify key cable projects of European interest to further strengthen redundancy. Additionally, to expedite repairs, the Commission will launch a call on deploying modular repair equipment at strategic locations, serving as a contingency for urgent repairs during large-scale incidents when repair services cannot meet urgent needs. 1 https://www.submarinecablemap.com/. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/security-cables-commission-publishes-landmark-report-andfunding-cable-hubs. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0009. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reco/2024/779/oj/eng.”
  Cybersecurity investments for critical infrastructure
• 2025-11-13 “E-004534/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Climate finance is part of the Official Development Assistance provided by the EU to developing countries, with an overview presented in the annual reports on the implementation of the EU’s external action instruments 1 . Additional information on international climate action is available in the Climate Action Progress Report 2 . The total level of climate finance committed by the Commission to non-EU countries over the period 2019-2024 is approximately EUR 19.4 billion. A breakdown of these figures can be found on the European Environment Agency website 3 . The official 2024 figures will be updated in January 2026. The allocation of the Commission’s climate finance to non-EU countries is done as part of the programming of the EU’s external instruments, including through thematic, regional and national financial envelopes. The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe includes a climate spending target of 30%. The funding of specific projects and programmes is determined as part of the Commission’s programming process. Priorities are set out through the Multi-annual Indicative Programmes 4 . Project and programme objectives are tracked using both the Commission’s own methodologies, and internationally agreed OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) methodologies such as the OECD’s Rio Markers. A database of EU projects and programmes is available on the Commission’s website 5,6 . 1 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/publications-library/2024-annual-report-implementationeuropean-unions-external-action-instruments-2023_en. 2 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/progress-climate-action/eu-climate-actionprogress-report-2025/chapter-8-international-clim. 3 https://climate-energy.eea.europa.eu/topics/climate-finance/assistance-to-developing-countries/data. 4 https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/funding-and-technical-assistance/funding-instruments/globaleurope-programming_en. 5 https://team-europe-explorer.europa.eu/oda/explore-oda_en. 6 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a3916ee0-79bd-4b87-912ed1cb2f3c6711_en?filename=ClimateFinanceCOP30-factsheet-final.pdf.”
  Climate efforts
• 2025-11-13 “E-004522/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation 1 is meant to provide financial assistance to Member States, enabling them to carry out urgent and major public investments in support of the European defence industry in response to the current crisis situation. The Regulation does not foresee an ex-ante allocation of resources. It requires Member States to express an interest in receiving financial support. Once it received expressions of interest from Member States during the summer 2025, the Commission allocated tentatively the loan amounts to the Member States by applying the principles of equal treatment, solidarity, proportionality and transparency. The Commission agreed on the tentative allocation of loan amounts on 9 September 2025 2 . Member States were requested to present a formal request for financial assistance, accompanied by a European defence industry investment plan by 30 November 2025, describing the plans to use the funds and ensure compliance with the provisions of the SAFE Regulation. The Commission is assessing Member States’ requests and how the conditions laid down in the Regulation would be fulfilled, in particular when it comes to the conditions to use the SAFE instrument and its eligibility rules. Member States remain responsible for their defence planning and defence procurement decisions, as well as for respecting international commitment taken in fora other than the EU. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng/pdf. 2 https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/704924ae-3aa2-4bd3-9675e9cf1e5dfb96_en?filename=communication-to-the-college.pdf.”
  Defence spending · Relations with NATO
• 2025-11-13 “E-004527/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is swiftly advancing with the implementation of the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030). It has launched the European Sites of Holocaust Memory (ESHEM) initiative, has institutionalised an annual Holocaust Remembrance Conference and has significantly increased funding for Holocaust remembrance initiatives, such as the Network of young European Ambassadors to promote Holocaust Remembrance, through its Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme. Holocaust remembrance is of paramount importance to the Commission as the last Shoah survivors are leaving us and we are at the same time confronted with rising Holocaust denial, distortion and trivialisation. In addition, under Creative Europe programme, the Commission launched the Simone Veil Prize, a new European cultural heritage award to highlight the contribution of Jewish cultural heritage to European culture. The Commission is determined to set in motion all aspects of the EU antisemitism strategy until 2030, including the commitment to support the creation of a participatory European Holocaust Monument in Brussels, linked with pieces of arts in EU capitals. The first step is a feasibility study to explore potential sites and concepts for such a memorial. For the development of a European Holocaust Monument in Brussels, funding opportunities will have to be explored through the new multiannual financial framework, in cooperation with Member States or other EU institutions.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism
• 2025-11-13 “E-004530/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission The Commission does not possess the specific data regarding the total number of aircraft currently grounded in the EU due to the application of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 1 . Consequently, it is unable to provide a breakdown of these numbers by Member State. Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 establishes the legal framework for EU's restrictive measures. However, the responsibility for the enforcement and monitoring of compliance with these sanctions lies primarily with the competent national authorities of the Member States. Each Member State is tasked with implementing and ensuring adherence to the sanctions within its respective jurisdiction. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-11-13 “E-004531/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Tables 35 and 36 of the annex of the European Economic Forecast Autumn 2025 respectively provide the interest expenditure and the primary balance observed in recent years for all Member States 1 . In 2025, based on the Commission autumn 2025 forecast, most euro area countries have a primary deficit (it reaches 1.2% for the euro area as a whole) and therefore fully finance their interest expenditures via new debt issuances. Conversely, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal are expected to have sufficiently large primary surpluses to finance their interest expenditure without issuing new debt. Finally, while Italy and Spain have primary surpluses, those are smaller than their interest expenditure, with the excess being financed by new debt. On average over 2008-24, the euro area as a whole recorded deficits in both the primary balance and the budget balance (-1.1 and -3.3% of GDP respectively) (see Annex 1). The capacity to finance interest expenditure is one of the factors determining fiscal sustainability. The debt level and its expected dynamic over time is another key aspect to consider. In that respect, the differential between the average interest rate the government pays on its debt and the growth rate of the economy is a crucial variable for debt dynamics. A negative differential supports debt reduction, while a positive differential has the opposite effect. Over 2008-24, the differential has been negative, although clearly narrowing at the end of the period (see Debt Sustainability Monitors available online) 2 . 1 The report is available here: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/european-economic-forecastautumn-2025_en. Moreover, annual series are available are avaible in DG ECFIN AMECO database: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-research-and-databases/economic-databases/amecodatabase_en. 2 The latest report, the 2024 DSM, is available online: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/debtsustainability-monitor-2024_en.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-11-13 “E-004528/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission As announced in ProtectEU, the EU Internal Security Strategy 1 , the Commission has tasked an Expert Group, in line with Commission Decision C (2016)3301 establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of Commission expert groups 2 . The group's Terms of Reference, composition and expert names are available in the Register of Expert Groups 3 . Agendas, minutes and submissions will be accessible in the Register or via a website, except when disclosure undermines interest protection set in Article 4, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 4 . To ensure a balanced and inclusive member selection, a public call for applications 5 invited technical experts from both public and private sectors in the areas of home affairs, cybersecurity, telecommunications, big data, standardisation, justice and fundamental rights. The EU Cybersecurity Agency, the EU Data Protection Supervisor, and Europol are also included as members. Other entities, such as the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Eurojust, and the EU Data Protection Board, will be invited on an ad hoc basis. If the expert group finds that there is no technological solution for lawful access to encrypted data that respects fundamental rights and does not undermine cybersecurity, the group is expected to recommend the development of such solutions 6 . The Commission will consider these recommendations in its future policy work. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0148. 2 https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/regdel/web/meetings/2548/documents/6945. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expertgroups/consult?lang=en&groupID=4005. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R1049. 5 See footnote 2, tab ‘Additional information’. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expertgroups/consult?lang=en&groupID=4005.”
  Privacy & law enforcement · Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2025-10-15 “E-004042/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Network and Information Systems (NIS)2 Directive 1 requires providers of public electronic communications networks and services to take appropriate and proportionate cybersecurity risk-management measures, including to guarantee confidentiality of communications. The European Free Trade Association countries that are members of the European Economic Area participate in the NIS Cooperation Group. The European Media Freedom Act 2 introduces safeguards for the confidential communications of journalists whereby Member States shall not deploy intrusive surveillance software on any material, digital device, machine or tool used by media service providers, their editorial staff or any person who, because of their regular or professional relationship with them, might have information related to or capable of identifying journalistic sources or confidential communications. Journalists are able to seek judicial protection and challenge in courts any future use of intrusive surveillance software against them. The European Electronic Communications Code requires national regulators (NRAs) to monitor the compliance with the general authorisation conditions and obligations for rights of use of scarce resources. Unlike market surveillance authorities under the product legislation, they have no oversight competences on the hardware/software sold on the market. The functions of the Body of the European Regulators in Electronic Communications (composed of Members of the NRAs) exclude any control functions. The future Digital Networks Act is expected to be with similar scope, while being complementary to the forthcoming revision of the Cybersecurity Act, and the NIS2 Directive. 1 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148. 2 Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• 2025-07-17 “E-002965/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The latest forecast for the German general government deficit by the Commission was published on 19 May 2025 1 , as part of the European Commission Spring 2025 forecast. This forecast covers 2025 and 2026, with projected deficits of 2.7% and 2.9% of gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. These estimates do not incorporate the policy intentions of the new government, as they were not sufficiently detailed at the time of the forecast's cut-off date. The next forecast – the autumn 2025 forecast – is set to be published by mid-November and will include projections for 2025 to 2027. Germany submitted its medium-term fiscal structural plan to the Commission on 17 July 2025. The plan puts forward maximum growth rates of net primary expenditure for the 2025-2029 period and is currently being assessed by the Commission. The plan is required to comply with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, which sets the maximum allowed expenditure growth based on various factors, such as public deficit levels and potential economic growth. If the plan is assessed positively, the Commission will recommend that the Council adopt a recommendation setting out a net expenditure path for Germany in line with the plan. The National Escape Clause for defence spending provides budgetary flexibility and is applied ex post in the Commission’s assessment of compliance with the net expenditure path recommended by the Council. It covers a period of four years (2025-2028) and allows for a deviation of up to 1.5% of GDP from the recommended net expenditure path that is justified by additional defence expenditure compared to the 2021 level as a share of GDP. 1 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-economies/germany/economic-forecastgermany_en.”
  EU competences on defence
• 2025-07-17 “E-002959/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Recent geopolitical developments have prompted many Member States to increase defence expenditure, consistent with long-standing EU recommendations, including the Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 1 . According to available data 2 , Member States defence expenditure in 2024 rose for the tenth consecutive year, reaching EUR 343 billion – 19% more than in 2023 – and equalling 1.9% of gross domestic product (GDP). Preliminary estimates suggest that in 2025, spending could reach EUR 392 billion or 2.1% of GDP. This upward trend is expected to continue. This trajectory aligns with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) defence investment pledge – 23 Member States are also NATO’s Allies – to allocate 3.5% of GDP annually to core defence requirements and 1.5% to broader security needs by 2035 3 . Security and defence remain national competences and the EU plays a complementary role by supporting national efforts and mobilising EU-level resources. Measures proposed include leveraging EUR 650 billion through the Stability and Growth Pact’s national escape clause, launching a EUR 150 billion loan instrument 4 for joint procurement, redirecting cohesion funds, and expanding the role of the European Investment Bank. To ensure long-term financial stability and predictability in investments in defence and space, the Commission has proposed the establishment of a European Competitiveness Fund within the next Multiannual Financial Framework. This fund will include a dedicated defence and space window with a budget of EUR 131 billion, providing a stable investment horizon through to 2034. These initiatives can improve spending efficiency, foster interoperability of armed forces, and reduce defence market fragmentation across the EU. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc03867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readines s%202030.pdf. 2 https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf. 3 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202501106.”
  Defence spending
• 2025-07-17 “E-002968/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is closely monitoring the implementation of the Chips Act and the investments it has triggered. Out of the EUR 43 billion of investments announced, Pillar I of the Chips Act - the Chips for Europe Initiative 1 (including pre-existing activities under the former Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking) - represents a total of EUR 11 billion in public spending during 2022-2030. For the 2021-2027 period, more than 80% of the available budget has already been allocated to activities such as the setting up of a design platform, pilot lines, quantum chip pilots, semiconductor competence centres and activities under the Chips Fund. Under Pillar II (security of supply) 2 , over EUR 80 billion in investments in manufacturing facilities have been announced by private companies. To date, the Commission has approved State aid for eight projects (with over EUR 31.5 billion of private investments, including roughly EUR 12.7 billion in State aid). In addition to this, an Important Project of Common European Interest on Microelectronics and Communication Technologies started in 2023 3 , consisting of EUR 13.7 billion in private investments and EUR 8.1 billion in State aid. Finally, regarding the Digital Decade target to reach 20% of global semiconductor production by 2030, it is expected that the EU’s market share will increase from 9.8% in 2022 to 11.7 % by 2030, while the global semiconductor global market is expected to double 4 . This means that, although the 20% target remains challenging, the EU’s production is projected to more than double by 2030, in a market likely to reach one trillion dollars globally. 1 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/european-chips-act-chips-europe-initiative. 2 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/european-chips-act-security-supply-and-resilience. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3087. 4 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/report-state-digital-decade-2024., Annex 2.”
  EU industrial funding
• 2025-07-17 “E-002983/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is determined to fight all forms and manifestations of antisemitism. To this aim, the Commission works closely with Member States. The protection of people, especially the most vulnerable to attacks including Jewish communities, is at the heart of the EU’s work on security 1 . The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to the replies to written questions E-002886/2024 and E-002590/2025 as policing matters, including working conditions of law enforcement officers, fall under national competence. The Commission does not receive statistics about the number of Member States in which the behaviour of law enforcement officers which the Honourable Member describes would have occurred. The Commission does not receive statistics regarding the number of EU citizens who have emigrated to Israel since 7 October 2023. As indicated in the Commission’s reply to written questions E-000900/2023 and E002427/2023, Member States are competent to apply public security measures to prevent violence and hooliganism at sports events. The Arrangement for Cooperation between the Commission and the Union of European Football Associations acknowledges ‘the importance of sport, and football in particular, in the prevention of and fight against racism and antisemitism in Europe’ 2 . Member States have established national football information points to increase the effectiveness of police cooperation in connection with football matches with an international dimension. Regarding the two topics the Honourable Member is interested in, the Commission does not have specific information as these issues are matters for the national authorities concerned. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0148. 2 https://sport.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/202210/C_2022_3721_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_part1_v5_0.pdf.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · Privacy & law enforcement
• 2025-07-17 “E-002985/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission provided accurate EU volumes and value aggregates of imported gas in its answer to written question E-002890/2024 1 . The most comprehensive official data source of international energy trade of EU Member States is Eurostat’s COMEXT database. COMEXT data only captures imported volumes and values at the initial entry point to the EU and therefore, it does not necessarily reflect the ultimate destination of imports, which are unrestrictedly traded within the EU. Information on the exact payment made by each Member State for net energy imports would require information on confidential contractual arrangements. The Commission has proposed measures to improve transparency, monitoring, and traceability of Russian energy products across EU markets and by Member States in the REPowerEU Roadmap 2 , the EU's strategy to fully end its dependence on Russian energy sources by 2027, and the proposal for a Regulation on the phase-out of imports of Russian natural gas currently being negotiated by the co-legislators. As regards external policies (development cooperation; neighbourhood and enlargement policies; partnership), between February 2022 and October 2025 payments to Russia amounted to approximately EUR 3.6 million under contracts concluded prior 2021, providing support through direct management for civil society and independent media. Regarding internal policies (research on sustainable food security; competitiveness/single market), less than EUR 30,000 were paid to Russian entities (monitoring/evaluation experts under Horizon Europe, meeting costs under the Single Market programme) during the same period. Between December 2024 and October 2025, no new commitments have been awarded to Russian legal entities. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 2 https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/repowereu-roadmap_en.”
  EU approach to energy security (home-made vs import sources) · Natural gas
• 2025-07-17 “E-002958/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 1 requires Member States to submit a medium-term structuralfiscal plan containing fiscal, reform and investment commitments. The fiscal adjustment covers a four-year period, which can be extended to up to seven years if the adjustment is underpinned by a relevant set of reforms and investment. The Commission assesses whether the adjustment ensures that the government deficit and debt meet certain requirements over the medium term, as described in Articles 6 and 16. For the first plans, this assessment is based on the methodology described in the Debt Sustainability Monitor 2023 2 , which considers ‘medium term’ as the period covering the adjustment period plus an additional 10year period with unchanged fiscal policy. The same definition is used in the context of the activation of the national escape clause. The Commission services’ Institutional Paper “Assessment of the Fiscal Sustainability Condition for Member States Requesting the Activation of the National Escape Clause” 3 presents the approach followed by the Commission to assess whether Member States’ requests to activate the national escape clause to step up defence expenditure fulfilled the sustainability condition. Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 does not specify the duration of an exceptional circumstance but requires the Council to set a time limit for the deviation, so that the duration can be tailored to different exceptional circumstances. In line with the Commission’s Communication on Accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability and Growth Pact 4 , when activating the national escape clause for the Member States that requested it, the Council specified that the deviation was allowed during the period 20252028. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202401263 2 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Debt Sustainability Monitor 2023, Institutional Paper 271, March 2025, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/debtsustainability-monitor-2023_en, see Chapter II.1 “The DSA methodology in the new economic governance framework” 3 European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Assessment of the Fiscal Sustainability Condition for Member States Requesting the Activation of the National Escape Clause, June 2025, Institutional Paper 321, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/assessment-fiscal-sustainabilitycondition-member-states-requesting-activation-national-escape_en. 4 Commission Communication (C (2025) 2000 final) of 19 March 2025.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-07-17 “E-002975/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission As laid down in Article 12(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 1 , part of the ‘Ukraine Territorial Integrity’ sanctions regime, the Commission and the Member States inform each other regarding funds and economic resources (assets) frozen under the said Regulation. The applicable regulations, including the aforementioned Regulation, specify that any information that the Commission receives in relation to such frozen assets can be used only for the purposes for which it was provided or received. Therefore, the Commission is not in a position to provide information on the breakdown of assets frozen in each individual Member State. Nonetheless, the Commission can confirm that the total amount of assets frozen in the EU under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 is about EUR 28 billion. In addition, some EUR 210 billion worth of reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia are currently immobilised in the EU, in line with Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 2 , part of the ‘Russia economic sanctions’ regime. 1 Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 078 17.3.2014, p. 6). 2 Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ L 229 31.7.2014, p. 1).”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2025-07-17 “E-002961/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission On 29 February 2024, the Commission carried out a formal assessment 1 of compliance of Poland with the milestones related to some aspects of judicial independence set out in its Recovery and Resilience Plan. It concluded that Poland satisfactorily fulfilled the two ‘super milestones’ to strengthen important aspects of the independence of the judiciary by reforming the disciplinary regime for judges. These reforms ensured notably that disciplinary and judicial immunity cases concerning judges are adjudicated by a court meeting the requirements of Article 19(1) TEU. They also ensured the unrestricted right of Polish courts to submit requests for preliminary ruling to the CJEU and that the content of judicial decisions is not classified as a disciplinary offence. They ensured that the initiation of verification of compliance with the requirements of Article 19(1) TEU is possible and is not classified as disciplinary offence. They further strengthened procedural guarantees and powers of parties in disciplinary proceedings and granted the judges affected by the decisions of the Disciplinary Chamber the right to have their cases reviewed by a court meeting the requirements of Article 19(1) TEU. The 2025 Rule of Law Report noted significant efforts of Poland towards the implementation of the Action Plan on the Rule of Law to address long-standing concerns regarding judicial independence. The Commission will continue monitoring the progress made through the Rule of Law Report. 1 The assessment is available here: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/52bd45c7-da37-4ba0b623-95da8cdad7f9_en?filename=C_2024_1438_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_nlw_part1_v1.pdf.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• 2025-07-17 “E-002962/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Member States retain the primary competence for the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security on their own soil. This includes investigation and information sharing on this matter. The Commission is closely following the reports on China’s unofficial police stations allegedly established in a number of Member States and opposes any attempted foreign interference, threats or intimidation on the sovereign territory of its Member States. The Commission continues to stand ready to support Member States as necessary. Hybrid threats are a challenge to the EU’s security and need to be addressed. The EU-China Strategic Outlook from March 2019 1 already reflected this and the EU has raised this with China in bilateral meetings. Work is ongoing to step up common efforts in this area. The Commission will announce a European Democracy Shield that will provide a strategic approach to safeguard and strengthen democracy in the EU. 1 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, EU-China – A strategic outlook, 12 March 2019, https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/1fedf472-1554-416e-83511346f80a4ff8_en?filename=communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf.”
  EU-China relations · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2025-07-17 “E-002963/2025 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission Based on the Commission’s proposal, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices. The above Regulation contained measures, such as the cap on market revenues from inframarginal electricity generators and the temporary solidarity contribution for companies active in the field of the extraction, mining, refining of petroleum or manufacture of coke oven products, aimed to generate revenues for Member States to finance support measures for the consumers of energy. The Commission issued a report on the review of emergency interventions to address high energy prices 1 , including on the income or expectation of income from the inframarginal revenue cap, based on information provided by the Member States. Member States submitted their reports within a few months after the entering into force of the inframarginal revenue cap, and by that time most of them still did not have information about the revenues collected through the measure. Revenues were originally expected to exceed EUR 50 billion in total. However, those assumptions already seemed unlikely to materialise by the time of the reporting since these estimates were based on expected high wholesale electricity prices. As regards the temporary solidarity contribution, the estimated total proceeds for the fiscal years 2022 and 2023 amount to more than EUR 28.6 billion. This figure exceeds the original Commission estimates of EUR 25 billion upon the adoption of the proposal. The data on collected and estimated proceeds per Member State are available in the Commission’s Report to the Council on implementation of Chapter III of the above Regulation 2 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023DC0302#footnote20. 2 Report on Chapter III of Council Regulation (EU) No 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices Solidarity contribution and enacted equivalent measures: stocktaking (14.5.2025, COM(2025) 237 final).”
  EU approach to electricity market and prices
• 2025-07-17 “E-002979/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU stands for freedom of expression and freedom of media – within and outside its borders. This is why it takes measures such as sanctioning media outlets very seriously. In each case, the Council ensures it has sound evidence, solid legal basis, and consensus for undertaking such measures. In the context of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, certain media outlets may be subject to restrictive measures, including a broadcasting ban in the EU. Media outlets are included in Annex XV to Regulation (EU) 833/2014 1 and Annex IX to Decision 2014/512/CFSP 2 if they are found to be engaged in systematic propaganda actions related to Russian unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. Each of those banned outlets is under the control of the Russian state and is essential in justifying the aggression. Additionally, the Council now also has a possibility to ban the broadcast of media under Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 3 and Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 4 , which impose sanctions against Russia in response to its destabilising activities against the EU and its Member States. For such potential designations, the involvement in information manipulation and interference, as well as the control of Russian state, has to be demonstrated. At the moment there is no legal basis in any other sanctions regime to ban the broadcast of Al Jazeera. The decision to impose sanctions is for Member States in the Council to take, acting by unanimity. 1 Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0833-20250720. 2 Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014D0512-20250701. 3 Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02024R264220250715&qid=1755594396342. 4 Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02024D264320250715&qid=1755594396342.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU relations with Qatar
• 2025-07-17 “E-002971/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission In the emergency context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission swiftly put forward the proposals for the temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) and NextGenerationEU. The subsequent establishment of both instruments required political agreement, which was reached quickly in both cases. Both the SURE ex-post evaluation 1 and the European Court of Auditors Special Report on SURE 2 confirm that the Commission reacted quickly and efficiently to the challenge of helping Member States preserve employment and income during the COVID-19 pandemic. 1 https://commission.europa.eu/about/departments-and-executive-agencies/economic-and-financialaffairs/evaluation-reports-economic-and-financial-affairs-policies-and-spending-activities/ex-post-evaluationeuropean-instrument-temporary-support-mitigate-unemployment-risks-emergency-sure_en. 2 https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR22_28/SR_SURE_EN.pdf.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-07-17 “E-002970/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The increase of defence expenditure covered by the flexibility under the national escape clause is normally calculated relative to the reference year of 2021 since that is the year immediately prior to the start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which is the source of the exceptional circumstance triggering the activation of the national escape clause. Using this reference year ensures the equal treatment of Member States that had already ramped up their defence spending since the beginning of the war 1 . For Member States where defence expenditure did not increase between 2021 and 2024, 2024 has been used as reference year 2 . The EU fiscal surveillance framework relies on Eurostat statistics. The increase in defence expenditure is measured as the difference between the level of total defence expenditure compiled under Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) division 02 – Defence (in percent of GDP) in the years 2025 to 2028 and the corresponding level (in percent of GDP) in the reference year 3 . Expenditure funded by the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loans will benefit from the flexibility of the national escape clause 4 . Eurostat, in cooperation with the national statistical authorities, will establish a data collection process 5 . Subject to the activation of the national escape clause, the maximum amount by which Member States can deviate from the net expenditure path recommended by the Council due to increased defence spending in 2025 (and annually throughout 2028) is 1.5% of GDP. 1 Commission Communication Accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability and Growth Pact (C(2025)2000 final). 2 Each Council recommendation that activates the national escape clause specifies the reference year used to calculate the increase in defence expenditure for the Member State concerned. The Commission communication on the 2025 European Semester (COM(2025) 200 final) includes a table, on page 37, summarising the information related to the activation of the national escape clause in spring 2025, which also shows the reference year for the 15 Member States concerned. 3 Manual on sources and methods for the compilation of COFOG statistics (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/10142242/KS-GQ-19-010-EN-N.pdf/ed64a194-81db-112b074b-b7a9eb946c32). 4 Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument. 5 The starting point should be COFOG Defence categories, while also considering the NATO definition.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-07-17 “E-002969/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin on behalf of the European Commission All policy programmes financed by debt issuances are determined in line with the relevant procedures outlined in the treaties. This includes the use of the procedure under Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1 , which allows for swift EU responses in exceptional circumstances, as in the case of the short-term employment schemes 2 and the Security Action for Europe 3 programmes. In line with the joint declaration made in December 2020 by the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission 4 , the European Parliament is able to fully exercise its role as the budgetary authority. In addition, the Commission regularly and transparently informs the European Parliament and the Council on its borrowing operations, through a series of reports 5 covering all EU borrowing and lending programmes and through regular interinstitutional meetings throughout the year. The Commission also provides information to investors and other external stakeholders on its borrowing activities and on the general institutional framework of the EU, which includes the European Parliament. Such information can be found in the general investor presentation in the Commission’s webpage 6 as well as in the specialised offering circular publicly available in the Luxembourg Stock Exchange website 7 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2012/art_122/oj/eng. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/sure_en. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/safe_en. 4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.CI.2020.444.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AC%3A2020%3A444I%3AFU LL. 5 They include semi-annual report on borrowing and lending operations, quarterly report on borrowing and lending operations sent to the European Parliament and the Council on a voluntary basis, annual report on contingent liabilities (COM(2024) 507 final), annex to the Annual Budget on borrowing-and-lending operations, and budgetary transparency report. 6 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/investorpresentation_en. 7 https://www.luxse.com/issuer/UE/24055.”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions · EU political integration
• 2025-07-17 “E-002977/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission The EU has repeatedly called 1 on Israel to fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. It has recalled the need to fully implement the provisional measures orders rendered by the International Court of Justice on 26 January, 28 March, and 24 May 2024 2 . Any actions by Israel must ensure the protection of civilians and access to humanitarian aid 3 . On 26 June 2025, the EU called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and the unconditional release of all hostages, leading to a permanent end to hostilities 4 . The EU deplores the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, the unacceptable number of civilian casualties and the levels of starvation. Israel must fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law. The EU reiterates its strong opposition to Israel’s settlement policy and activities, including in and around East Jerusalem. The EU will not recognise changes to the 1967 lines, unless agreed by the parties. The EU recalls that annexation is illegal under international law. The EU calls on Israel to halt continued settlement expansion and related activities, including state land declarations, evictions, demolitions, confiscation and forced transfers of Palestinians, which have reached record levels in the past year. The EU firmly believes that a two-state solution is the only sustainable way to achieve longterm stability and peace in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the developments on the ground risk jeopardising a political horizon. The Commission is not mandated to define what constitutes genocide or apartheid and will respect rulings by the multilateral system based on international law and the universality of human rights. 1 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-general-assembly-1stcommittee-regional-disarmament-and-security-1_en?s=63; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf; https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/09/26/statement-by-the-high-representative-onbehalf-of-the-eu-on-the-military-escalation-between-israel-and-hezbollah/. 2 https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-ord-01-00-en.pdf; https://www.icjcij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240328-ord-01-00-en.pdf; https://www.icjcij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240524-ord-01-00-en.pdf. 3 Geneva Convention (IV), Geneva, 12 August 1949. 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/cjtb3oep/20250626-european-council-conclusions-en.pdf.”
  Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-07-17 “E-002976/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission While certain pension funds are subject to EU prudential rules, others operate almost entirely under national law. Supervision rests with the competent authorities of each Member State, and no harmonised EU reporting framework covers all EU pension funds. The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) collects data on institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) within the scope of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 1 . For the fourth quarter 2024, IORPs total investments amounted to EUR 2.8 trillion, including EUR 568 billion in USD-denominated assets. The European Central Bank (ECB) gathers data on euro area pension funds as defined in Regulation (EU) 2018/231 2 , showing total assets of EUR 3.6 trillion. However, neither EIOPA nor ECB publishes data on the geographical allocation of assets. The Commission has not conducted calculations on the potential impact of hypothetical changes to the allocation of pension funds assets. It is not possible to draw a definitive link between pension funds’ fragmentation and their share of investment in the United States, as other factors may be at play. To tackle broader capital market fragmentation, the Commission launched the Capital Markets Union in 2015 3 . Under the Savings and Investments Union 4 , the Commission is committed to address remaining fragmentation in capital markets. The Commission will also review the EU frameworks for supplementary pension provision and assess possible measures to address, amongst others, the limited scale and fragmentation of pension institutions. A consultation was launched in June 2025, and proposals are expected by the fourth quarter 2025 to strengthen supplementary pensions. 1 OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p. 37–85. 2 OJ L 45, 17.2.2018, p. 3–30. 3 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-building-capital-markets-union_en. 4 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/regulation-and-supervision/savings-and-investments-union_en.”
  EU Single Market harmonisation · Financial regulation
• 2025-07-17 “E-002966/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission The Stability and Growth Pact’s deficit reference value of 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been breached since its inception in various instances, in particular during periods of economic downturn 1 . During the 2009-2010 economic and financial crisis, 24 out of 27 Member States entered an excessive deficit procedure due to non-compliance with the deficit criterion. By 2018, all Member States had corrected their excessive deficits. Significant deviation procedures were opened for Romania (2017-2019) and Hungary (2018-2019) due to non-compliance with the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. An excessive deficit procedure was opened for Romania in early 2020. After the COVID-19 pandemic, excessive deficit procedures were opened for eight additional Member States (Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) due to their deficits in excess of the 3% of GDP reference value. 2 The Commission has so far not proposed financial sanctions in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact. In most cases, Member States acted upon the recommendations of the Council before the procedure reached the stage of sanctions. In 2016, Spain and Portugal failed to take effective action to correct their excessive deficits. The Commission proposed the cancellation of the fine to be imposed for both Member States following a reasoned request by the Member States concerned. Both proposals were adopted by the Council. One of the objectives of the revised economic governance framework that entered into force last year is precisely to enhance Member States’ ownership, compliance and enforcement, including through a more gradual system of financial sanctions. 1 For a full analysis, see the Commission’s Staff Working Document accompanying the 2020 review of the economic governance framework (SWD(2020) 210 final): https://economyfinance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/90074c4d-6bcd-4ee1-be53ceb17c6bc548_en?filename=swd_2020_210_en.pdf. 2 An overview of ongoing and closed excessive deficit procedures can be found here: https://economyfinance.ec.europa.eu/economic-and-fiscal-governance/stability-and-growth-pact/corrective-arm-excessivedeficit-procedure/excessive-deficit-procedures-overview_en.”
  EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-07-17 “E-002960/2025 Answer given by Mr Kubilius on behalf of the European Commission The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) 1 instrument aims to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base and improve defence readiness of Member States by providing loans to Member States to invest in defence. SAFE encourages common procurement by Member States even with Member States that did not request any SAFE loans. By facilitating common procurement of defence equipment through coordinated planning and harmonised requirements, SAFE promotes better interoperability, cost-efficiency, and industrial coordination. German defence companies can benefit from increased demand and investment, that will contribute to job creation and innovation. The instrument further supports the standardisation and modernisation of capabilities across Member States, aligning with Germany’s defence policy priorities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.”
  Defence spending · EU competences on defence
• 2025-07-17 “E-002967/2025 Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission 1.The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) concerns national budgets, which include Member States’ contributions to and transfers from the EU budget. Loans provided to Member States are considered Member State debt towards the EU and accounted in Member States statistics. 2.The SGP concerns Member States own fiscal positions and does not concern the EU budget, including joint contingent liabilities. The Commission manages the financial implications of joint EU borrowing efficiently. Loans to Member States are provided under attractive conditions providing relief to Member State budgets. For the borrowing for grants under NextGenerationEU which is to be repaid by the EU budget, the Commission has proposed for the next multiannual financial framework a fixed annual amount of EUR 24 billion per year in current prices.1 This approach ensures full predictability as regards the impact on Member States’ national budgets, which will help to respect the net expenditure path recommended by the Council. 3. For Member States for which the national escape clause for higher defence expenditure is activated, the national expenditure funded by loans provided by the SAFE instrument (Security Action For Europe) will automatically benefit from that flexibility.2 While access to SAFE loans is not conditioned on Member States’ compliance with the SGP, the Commission will continue to work with Member States to ensure coherence of the use of SAFE loans with the SGP. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_25_1848. 2 Communication from the Commission: Accommodating increased defence expenditure within the Stability and Growth Pact, of 19.03.2025.”
  Size of EU budget · EU fiscal rules and oversight of national budgets
• 2025-04-09 “E-001439/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission To date, the EU has imposed restrictive measures in the broadcasting sector in the form of the broadcast or dissemination restrictions only in clearly defined circumstances, most notably in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP 1 and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 2 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. The restrictions on the broadcasting and dissemination of content of certain media outlets (designated entities), including those under the control of the Russian Federation in this sanctions regime are justified by the designated outlets’ essential and instrumental role in systematically spreading disinformation and propaganda campaigns in support of that war of aggression, and by their permanent direct or indirect control by the leadership of the Russian Federation as justified in the relevant statement of reasons. Under the Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 any proposal to consider restrictive measures against a media outlet would need to be assessed in light of such criteria, namely substantial evidence of systemically spreading disinformation and propaganda and a demonstrable link to Russian state control. Any potential restrictive measures on media outlets operating within the jurisdiction of the EU would fall under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and require unanimous agreement by the Council. 1 OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13–17. 2 OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1–11.”
  Disinformation & online freedoms · EU relations with Qatar
• 2025-04-09 “E-001468/2025 Answer given by Mr Serafin On behalf of the European Commission The Commission is committed to protect the financial interests of the EU and to ensure the correct application of EU law and implementation of the EU budget. Commitments and payments to Hungary, as for any Member State, follow the relevant rules. As regards discrimination in taxation, since 3 October 2024, an infringement procedure against Hungary is on-going for non-compliance of its retail tax regime with the freedom of establishment 1 . The Commission also closely monitors the use of authorisation procedures and the enforcement of restrictive measures, particularly in the construction, mining and retail sectors. Under the European Semester, the Commission follows related developments, notably on disproportionate burdens through sector-specific taxes and complaints of foreign firms about unequal and arbitrary treatment, and reports on them 2 . The concentration of awards was taken into consideration when adopting measures under the general regime of conditionality, which led to a suspension of 55% of three Cohesion Policy programmes in Hungary 3 . Within that procedure, Hungary committed to implement remedial measures to reduce the share of public procurements with single bids, monitor concentration and increase transparency of the public procurement market. Moreover, Hungary’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) includes the same commitments as milestones and targets 4 . The Commission monitors the correct implementation of remedial measures and will – once Hungary submits a payment request under its RRP – assess the fulfilment of the related milestones and targets. Until then, all RRP funds are suspended. EU funding to Hungary is also blocked under the horizontal enabling condition regarding the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 5 related to the programmes under the Common Provisions Regulation 6 . The Commission follows closely the developments in Hungary via its annual Rule of Law Report 7 , and will not hesitate to make use of the available tools to protect the financial interests of the EU and enforce EU law. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT. 2 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/2024-european-semester-country-reports_en. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOL_2022_325_R_TOC, OJ L 325, 20.12.2022, p. 94109. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resiliencefacility/country-pages/hungarys-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en#documents. 5 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT. 6 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R1060. 7 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en.”
  Rule of law in Hungary · Accounting and auditing of EU budget
• 2025-04-09 “E-001443/2025 Reply The Council unequivocally condemns Hamas terrorism, including the heinous attack that Hamas carried out on 7 October 2023. The Council is concerned about any possible activities in the EU in support of Hamas. and has established a dedicated framework of restrictive measures against supporters of violent actions by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad on 19 January 2024. 12 individuals and 3 entities are listed under this dedicated framework as of June 2025. For data assessments regarding numbers of members of terrorist groups in the European Union, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator relies on Europol and EU INTCEN, who may receive such data or estimates from each of the Member States on a voluntary basis, if Member States collect such data at national level. No data or estimates on the number of Hamas members or sympathisers in the EU have been brought to the attention of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator focuses on the fight against terrorism. The EU CounterTerrorism Coordinator does not monitor pro-Palestinian demonstrations.”
  EU policy on integration and ethnic, racial and religious discrimination · EU policy on Islam · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2025-04-09 “E-001447/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Hawala is an informal, trust-based money transfer system often used for money remittances. It operates outside traditional banking, without using authorised financial institutions. Under EU legislation, all operators providing payment services 1 must become authorised payment institutions. This mandates such operators to perform customer due diligence 2 and report suspicious transactions to law enforcement authorities 3 . Enforcement actions have been ongoing since 2019, both at national level and through international monitoring mechanisms. The Commission actively participates in the Financial Action Task Force and MONEYVAL 4 mutual evaluation processes, which assess countries’ compliance with anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. These evaluations have identified risks associated with informal value transfer systems, including hawala, in both EU Member States and third countries. They recommend strengthening supervision and adopting measures, practices and detailed guidelines on effective parallel financial investigations. Conducting these types of funds transfers informally and without authorisation already exposes their perpetrators to the risk of being severely sanctioned in all EU Member States. Hence, making a legislative proposal to limit the use of hawala has so far not been considered necessary. Instead, the focus remains on practical enforcement and supervision. With the entry into application of the AML/CFT package adopted in 2024 5 and the establishment of the AML Authority (AMLA), the EU and its Member States will further enhance their capacities to supervise illicit financial flows, including when performed through unauthorised hawala activities. 1 Which includes money remittance, as per Annex I, point 6 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market (PSD2). 2 As per Article 11 of Directive (EU) 2015/849, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73–117. 3 As per Article 33 of Directive (EU) 2015/849, OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73–117. 4 Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism. 5 https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-update-anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorismlegislative-package-2024-04-24_en.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• 2025-04-09 “E-001456/2025 Answer given by Mr Várhelyi on behalf of the European Commission 1. The provision of telemedicine in cross border healthcare is regulated by several pieces of EU legislation. These include Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients' rights in cross-border healthcare 1 and other legislative acts in the field of e-commerce, recognition of qualifications, medicinal products and medical devices. The Commission has published an ‘overview on the applicability of the existing EU legal framework to telemedicine services in 2012’ 2 . No specific EU legislation is available on cross-border postal delivery of health treatments. Specific rules and restrictions apply depending on the countries involved, the type of medication, and whether a valid prescription is in place. Cross-border postal delivery of medical treatment is in principle subject to Directive 2011/24/EU and Commission Implementing Directive 2012/52/EU on measures to facilitate the recognition of medical prescriptions issued in another Member State 3 . However, reimbursement of medicinal products is possible if they are covered by the national health system of the home country. 2. The Commission has launched a study to support the review of the 2012 document on the applicability of the existing EU legal framework to telemedicine services. The study aims to gather a better understanding of relevant legislation related to telemedicine at EU and Member State level and is expected to also identify possible barriers to telemedicine services. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/24/oj/eng. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52012SC0414. 3 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir_impl/2012/52/oj/eng.”
  Pharmaceuticals regulation in EU · EU competences on health
• 2025-04-09 “E-001469/2025 Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments made to Member States during the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), i.e. in financial years 2021-2024, are listed in the attached table 1 . While the Commission bears overall responsibility for the financial management of the CAP, most of the CAP budget (around 99.5%) is implemented under ‘shared management’ between the Commission and Member States. In the financial year 2024, 5.7 million farmers received CAP support directly, not counting all other beneficiaries. On the second and third questions, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1475 2 sets out detailed rules for the monitoring and evaluation of the CAP Strategic Plans, including the provision of information from Member States. Under this Regulation, Member States have to submit data to the Commission on CAP interventions and beneficiaries. The first deadline for data submission was 30 April 2025. The Commission is currently conducting quality checks to ensure the accuracy and completeness of data collected. Given the volume of data the Commission estimates that the dataset will be ready for analysis by the fourth quarter of 2025. Under the transparency rules for the CAP, Member States publish details of the beneficiaries of CAP payments 3 . 1 For more details the Commission refers the Honourable Member to the annual financial reports on the European agricultural guarantee fund (EAGF) and the European agricultural fund for rural development (EAFRD): https://ag\riculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/financing-cap/cap-funds/financialreport-eagf-and-eafrd_en. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2022/1475/oj. 3 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/financing-cap/beneficiaries_en.”
  Accounting and auditing of EU budget · Agricultural funding
• 2025-04-09 “E-001465/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Palestinian Authority (PA) committed to the reform process, including the education sector, through a letter of intent in July 2024, which will be part of the Multiannual Comprehensive Support Programme to foster Palestinian recovery and resilience, announced on 14 April 2025 during the High-Level Political Dialogue with the PA. The education sector reform envisaged by the PA encompasses various aspects, including the revision of textbooks to align with United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) standards. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Ministry of Education has a continuous process of reviewing and amending textbooks used in Palestinian schools. The latest round started with grade 12 as of end 2024 and has moved in recent months to earlier grades. The Commission and other donors are also introducing technical assistance to monitor and support the education reform and the revision of textbook and educational material. Newly published books, adhering to UNESCO standards, are expected to be used for grades one to four starting in September 2025, with other grades following for the school year 2026/27.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2025-04-09 “E-001435/2025 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission The Digital Services Act (DSA) 1 aims at creating a safe, predictable and trusted online environment. There are currently two open formal proceedings against TikTok under the DSA 2 . The first proceedings, opened on 19 February 2024, examine TikTok's management of systemic risks arising from its system design, particularly how algorithms could foster behavioural addictions and ‘rabbit hole effects’ and their potential impact on mental and physical well-being, children's rights and radicalisation processes. They also assess TikTok's measures to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security for minors, advertising transparency by providing a searchable ad repository, and accessibility to public data for researchers. 3 The second proceedings, launched on 17 December 2024, scrutinises TikTok's role in managing risks to electoral processes and civic discourse. It focuses on TikTok’s risks linked to its recommender systems, notably to the coordinated inauthentic manipulation or automated exploitation of the service. Additionally, it assesses TikTok's policies on political advertisements and paid political content 4 . The Commission is gathering and analysing evidence as regards both proceedings. The duration of such in-depth investigations depends on several factors, including the complexity of the case. Should the Commission establish a breach of the DSA, it may adopt a decision imposing fines up to 6% of the global turnover of the provider concerned and order that appropriate measures are taken. As a last resort measure, if the infringement persists and causes serious harm to users and entails criminal offences involving threat to persons' life or safety, the Commission can request the temporary suspension of the service 5 . 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:4625430. 2 Besides, on 5 August 2024, the Commission closed a case against TikTok after the company made binding commitments to withdraw the TikTok Lite Rewards Programme, which had been launched without adequate risk assessment and effective risk mitigation measures. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4161. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_926. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6487. 5 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-enforcement.”
  Recommender systems · Disinformation & online freedoms
• 2025-04-09 “E-001440/2025 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission The heating transition takes place at varying speeds across European regions. Whilst national, regional and local authorities are at the forefront of the transition, European law creates a regulatory framework to facilitate this change. The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 1 requires Member States to develop policies and measures to decarbonise heating and cooling in buildings, with a view to a phase out of fossil fuel boilers by 2040. The Energy Efficiency Directive 2 requires Member States to ensure adoption of local heating and cooling plans at municipal level as of October 2025. Other policies introduce pricing incentives to decarbonise, such as the proposed revision of the Energy Tax Directive or the Emission Trading System 2 3 that includes fuel use in buildings. The latter is accompanied by a Social Climate Fund to alleviate the social and economic impacts, ensuring a fair transition. To ensure that gas networks adapt in the most cost-effective manner the Hydrogen and Gas Markets Package 4 requires regional decommissioning plans when a significant decrease in gas demand is expected as of August 2026. The heating and cooling plans, as well as the decommissioning plans will provide details of the envisaged phase-out of natural gas across European regions. In addition, the European Commission commissioned a study 5 analysing scenarios for fossil fuel replacement, including that of natural gas in heating. Any cost implications of changing infrastructure needs would be addressed through financing regimes as they apply at the time in question. 1 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive. 2 Energy Efficiency Directive (EU) 2023/1791. 3 Emission Trading System 2 (EU) 2023/959. 4 Article 57 of Directive (EU) 2024/1788. 5 Potentials and levels for the electrification of space heating in buildings (https://op.europa.eu/en/publicationdetail/-/publication/2ae4481d-8f3b-11ee-8aa6-01aa75ed71a1/language-en).”
  Energy performance of buildings · Natural gas
• 2025-04-09 “E-001437/2025 Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission According to the information available in the Commission’s database 1 , since 2014, the following amounts from Erasmus+ and European Solidarity Corps programmes have been granted to the following organisations: — TRT: EUR 448 000 — TÜGVA: EUR 1 013 138 — TÜRGEV: EUR 773 315 — IHH: EUR 102 438 — ÖNDER İmam Hatipliler Derneği: EUR 182 683 — Dünya Etnospor Konfederasyonu: EUR 554 058 The amounts represent total contracted or finalised grants for the projects where these organisations appeared as applicants. The funding was provided via the Turkish national agency under the indirect management mode. Under the Instrument for pre–Accession Assistance (IPA) II 2015 programme, the contract with SETA 2 amounted to EUR 126 951.81, of which 90% constituted EU funds. This programme was implemented through indirect management by Türkiye. The Commission was not involved in the selection process of the projects, nor is responsible for the content of communication material and reports produced by contractors, partners or organisations using EU funds; these are the sole responsibility of the beneficiaries. The Commission ensures that strict rules, governed by transparency and equal treatment, were applied in the way the grants or contracts were awarded. According to the Financial Regulation 3 and grant agreements, the Commission must ensure that beneficiaries uphold EU values and avoid professional misconduct. If a beneficiary violates laws or EU values during the project, the Commission and national agency will recover the funds. Since 2017, aiming at stricter control over the use of IPA funds, the Commission has moved away from entrusting Türkiye with the management of EU funds in support to civil society. 1 Beneficiary Module and Programme Management Module – internal IT tool for project management of Erasmus + granted projects. 2 https://www.setav.org/en/. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/publications/eu-financial-regulation_en.”
  EU-Turkey relations · Funding for EU Neighbourhood
• 2025-04-09 “E-001441/2025 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission Protecting EU citizens abroad, including those who may be imprisoned in non-EU countries, as well as the collection and provision of detailed information regarding the imprisonment of EU citizens in non-EU countries, falls within the exclusive competency of Member States. At their request, the European External Action Service can support Member States in coordinating efforts to ensure the consular protection of unrepresented EU citizens, and may facilitate information sharing where possible, but it does not have the mandate to directly collect or disseminate such data.”
  EU competences on foreign affairs
• 2025-04-09 “E-001436/2025 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission EU legislation in the area of insurance does not address issues of the renewal or the termination of insurance policies. In particular, the Solvency II Directive 1 and the Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) 2 establish pre-contractual information requirements, but do not provide specific rules for the conclusion, renewal or termination of insurance contracts. Therefore, the legal conditions for the annual renewal of insurance policies are left to the national insurance contract law and the civil law of Member States, subject to compliance with the general EU consumer protection framework applicable in this area. The Commission is aware that Member States have various consumer protection rules covering different aspects of the renewal of insurance policies 3 . The Commission established in 2013 an expert group to examine the differences in insurance contract laws and to what extent they can hinder cross-border trade of insurance products. The expert group delivered its final report in January 2014 4 . However, in view of the complexity of the matter and of the interconnection with national civil law, the expert group did not recommend a clear roadmap for further harmonisation. 1 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance. 2 Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution. 3 See https://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/expert_groups/renewal_en.pdf. 4 https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/doing-business-eu/contract-rules/insurancecontracts/expert-group-european-insurance-contract-law_en.”
  Regulation of vehicles insurance
• 2025-04-09 “E-001433/2025 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission Following 7 October 2023, the President of the Commission made clear that ‘There is no justification to the rise in antisemitism. No war, no political argument can excuse it’ 1 . With the Joint Communication ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ of 6 December 2023, the Commission and the High Representative/Vice-President responded to the increase of antisemitism and all other forms of hatred 2 . As shown in the progress report 3 on the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life 81 of the 90 actions in the strategy have been implemented or set in motion, and the Commission stepped up its efforts as a response to 7 October 2023. Among others it made available EUR 5 million to protect Jewish places of worship 4 and set-up a Project-BasedCollaboration with 14 Member States to address antisemitism in radicalisation processes. EUR 14 million of funding was made available for projects on European remembrance, including the Holocaust 5 , and the Commission concluded a contract to develop the ‘network of places where the Holocaust happened’. Yad Vashem received EUR 10 million in funding for the development of the Valley of the Communities. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation and Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe were supported with an additional EUR 2 million to address antisemitism through education. Currently, a network of experts to tackle antisemitism online, and a Jewish cultural heritage award 6 are under preparation. The Commission will ensure that all actions in the EU Strategy are delivered as foreseen by 2030 and remains ready to develop further actions to deliver on its the long-term commitment to fight antisemitism. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_6501, December 2023, Brussels. 2 https://commission.europa.eu/document/c60c451c-ccd2-406a-be3a-ef65123f2bb6_en. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combattingdiscrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-antisemitism/eu-strategy-combating-antisemitism-andfostering-jewish-life-2021-2030/first-progress-report-eu-strategy-combating_en. 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/ISF-2024-TF2AG-PROTECT-jewish-placesworship?isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&callIdentifier=ISF-2024-TF2-AGPROTECT&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=startDate. 5 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/CERV-2024CITIZENS-REMHOLOCAUST?isExactMatch=true&status=31094501,31094502,31094503&callIdentifier=CERV-2024CITIZENS-REM&order=DESC&pageNumber=1&pageSize=50&sortBy=startDate. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_24_6.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism
• 2025-04-09 “E-001471/2025 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission Detailed information on the percentage of aid channelled through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) can be accessed directly from UNRWA or other platforms such as the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) 1 . According to the latest data from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2 on the 2025 flash appeal for the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), UNRWA was the second largest recipient of funding, having received USD 451 million out of a total of USD 2.93 billion - or 15.3% of the global funding. Through the Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), the Commission provides humanitarian aid to Palestinians in need through a range of humanitarian aid organisations, including UN agencies, international non-governmental organisations and the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement. In response to the escalation of hostilities in October 2023, the UNRWA received EUR 14.5 million from DG ECHO, amidst other humanitarian organisations, for continuing its humanitarian operations in Gaza and the West Bank. In 2024, the EU's humanitarian aid budget amounted to EUR 2.48 billion. Of this, EUR 38.5 million was earmarked for UNRWA activities in the OPT, as well as EUR 10 million for UNRWA operations in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. EUR 33.5 million was for Gaza, while the remaining EUR 5 million supported the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Additionally, the Commission provided EUR 92 million in development funding to UNRWA’s core budget for 2023 and 2024. 1 https://fts.unocha.org/. 2 https://fts.unocha.org/countries/171/summary/2024.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2025-04-09 “E-001445/2025 Answer given by Mr McGrath on behalf of the European Commission The Commission refers the Honourable Member to the answer given to written question E000520/2025 1 in which it has addressed the issues raised in his question. In particular, in its answer, the Commission explained that Executive Order 14086 (EO 14086) 2 adopted by the President of the United States (US) continues to be in place and to provide key safeguards on which the adequacy decision on the EU-US Data Privacy Framework 3 is based. EO 14086 notably ensures that access to and use of personal data of Europeans by US intelligence agencies is limited to what is necessary and proportionate in pursuit of defined national security objectives. Moreover, EO 14086 established a Data Protection Review Court, with binding investigatory and remedial powers, to which EU citizens have access. As regards the dismissal of some members of the Privacy Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), the Commission’s answers referred to the official statement published by the PCLOB on 27 January 2025 that clarifies that, even when it does not have a quorum, it retains its ‘significant ability to continue functioning with its full staff and remaining member […] to continue the Board’s important missions, including its advice and oversight functions, and its current projects’ 4 . Also, a US Court recently ruled in favour of the dismissed members and reinstated them 5 . The Commission is in close contact with the relevant US authorities and other relevant stakeholders. The Commission will continue to monitor relevant developments and assess their potential impact. More generally, as regards any adequacy decision, the Commission has the power to propose its suspension, amendment or repeal if it concludes that the required level of protection is no longer ensured. 1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/-ASW_EN.html. 2 Executive Order 14086 on ‘Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities’. 3 https://commission.europa.eu/document/fa09cbad-dd7d-4684-ae60-be03fcb0fddf_en. 4 As further explained in the answer to written questions E-000520/2025 and E-000540/2025, the Board has been established by a law adopted by Congress providing that it is composed of five members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It also requires bi-partisan membership as no more than three members can be of the same political party. The press release can be found here: https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/EventsAndPress/994df0d66bae-4284-a95f-3f3699e0a0f0/PCLOB%20press%20release%20(1-27-25)%20-%20508%20Complete.pdf. 5 United States District Court For The District Of Columbia - Civil Action No. 25-542 (RBW) of 21 May 2025.”
  EU-US data transfers · Privacy & digital economy
• 2025-01-16 “E-000173/2025 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Commission learnt from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) in early 2024 about the very serious allegations against 19 UNRWA staff members regarding their possible involvement in the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks. The Commission was also informed by the United Nations in August 2024 that the Office of Internal Oversight Service OIOS had completed its investigation of the 19 staff members. The investigation found that in one case, no evidence was obtained to support the allegations. In nine other cases, the evidence was insufficient to support claims of involvement. In the remaining nine cases, the evidence obtained by OIOS, if authenticated and corroborated, might indicate that the staff members may have been involved, and their employment was terminated in the interest of UNRWA. In response, the Commission has taken decisive action engaging with UNRWA’s Commissioner General to tackle the serious issues at stake. Among others, the Agency has adopted an Action Plan to implement the recommendations of the Independent Review Group 1 , and swiftly followed up on the UN OIOS report on the allegations against UNRWA’s staff. Among the measures agreed between the Commission and UNRWA, the Agency has reinforced its Internal Oversight Service and Ethics Department, increased the frequency of sharing staff information to a quarterly basis with host countries, including Israel, and continue to perform monthly screening of staff against EU and the UN Security Council Consolidated Sanctions List. These measures show the Agency's commitment to uphold the humanitarian principle of neutrality, to ensure rapid and adequate responses to such allegations, and to implement disciplinary sanctions on personnel who breach neutrality. The Commission will continue to closely monitor the implementation of the Action Plan stemming by the Independent Review Group report and the EU system audit, to guarantee that the Agency works in full compliance with humanitarian principles, including neutrality. 1 https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/colonna-report-and-action-plan”
  Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2025-01-16 “E-000179/2025 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. In accordance with Article 5(1) of the Detailed Rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 1 , annexed to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 2 (hereinafter, the Detailed Rules), ‘Any content that constitutes important information that is not short-lived shall be registered pursuant to Article 7 of Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121’ 3 . On this basis, the President of the Commission, the Commissioners and the Commission staff are not expected to keep and register text messages unless they satisfy the criteria of Article 7(1) of Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121. It must also be noted that, pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Detailed Rules, text messaging applications on corporate mobile phones shall not be used for important information that is not short-lived, unless where this is strictly required in the interest of the service. The same provision states that text messaging applications shall comply with the Commission’s information technology security recommendations for the automatic disappearance of messages. Commission guidelines for acceptable use of public instant messaging applications recommend to have recourse to Signal as the preferred instant messaging application. 2. and 3. The most recent rules have been introduced by the Detailed Rules, which apply as from 6 December 2024. They provide in Article 5 rules for the registration of documents and the deletion of unregistered content. Any content that constitutes important information that is not short-lived shall be registered pursuant to Article 7 of Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121; if not, it does not need to be registered and kept. 1 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31/05/2001, p. 43–48, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32001R1049 2 Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3080 of 4 December 2024 establishing the Rules of Procedure of the Commission and amending Decision C(2000) 3614, OJ L, 2024/3080, 5.12.2024, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/3080/oj 3 Commission Decision (EU) 2021/2121 of 6 July 2020 on records management and archives, OJ L 430, 2.12.2021, p. 30–41, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2021/2121/oj/eng”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-12-12 “E-002882/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The EU bilateral allocation for Palestine  under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe amounted to approximately EUR 1.36 billion for 2021-2024. During this period, commitments to the Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion de l'Aide Socio-Économique (PEGASE mechanism), for direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority (PA), amounted to EUR 516.75 million (yearly average approximately EUR 130 million). The overall EU funding for 2021-2024 supported the financing of the most essential services for Palestinians, contributed to the PA’s recurrent expenditures, via PEGASE, by supporting payments of salaries for civil servants, social allowance payments, funding for the East Jerusalem hospitals, and also supported various development projects and financial assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. The EU has never contributed to the Palestinian ‘Martyr Fund’ of the PA, which was discontinued with the new social protection law entering into force on 10 February 2025 1 . The PA was running the Prisoner’s Fund off-budget, while PEGASE contributed to the budget of the PA. The Commission’s extended screening vetting system ensured that no EU funding went to the beneficiaries of the Prisoners Fund. The detainees and families (a list is provided by the PA) were categorically excluded from any payment made through PEGASE. Finally, Member States’ contributions to the EU budget are not earmarked for specific purposes. Instead, they are pooled and allocated proportionally across all expenditure categories.  This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue. 1 Decree-Law No. (4) of 2025, which amends Decree-Law No. (1) of 2019 regarding the Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Institution.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine · Conditions to access EU humanitarian aid
• 2024-12-12 “E-002881/2024 Answer given by Ms Roswall on behalf of the European Commission The EU programme for the environment and climate action (LIFE 1 ) provides amongst others financial support for the functioning of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), supporting civil society’s participation in policy making, in line with the LIFE Regulation 2 and the EU Financial Regulation 3 . Each year, 30 to 35 operating grant agreements are awarded competitively under the LIFE Programme. Applying NGOs submit proposals outlining their work programme of activities in policy areas indicated in the LIFE Regulation. This work programme is annexed to their grant agreement. The Commission does not prescribe the specific activities to be carried out by the NGOs in their work programme, nor does it instruct them to support specific positions. According to the grant agreements, any opinions expressed, and activities carried out remain the sole responsibility of NGOs. The Commission agrees that work programmes involving specifically detailed activities directed at EU institutions and some of their representatives, even if they do not breach the legal framework, may entail a reputational risk for the EU. To mitigate this risk, the Commission issued guidance 4 for both existing grant agreements and future calls, addressed to all Commission services and applicable to all spending programmes. The guidance clarifies which activities should not be mandated as a requirement or condition for EU financing. The Commission adheres strictly to its transparency obligations 5 . The information about the entities and organisations benefiting from LIFE operating grants and the amounts received is published annually in the Commission’s Financial Transparency System 6 , as well as on the LIFE website 7 . 1 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life_en 2 Regulation (EU) 2021/783 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing a Programme for the Environment and Climate Action (LIFE), and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1293/2013. 3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj 4 https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/guidance-fundingdev-impl-monit-enforce-of-eu-law_en.pdf 5 Article 38 of the Financial Regulation. 6 https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/index.html, the annual publications are based on Article 38 of the Financial Regulation (OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1–239), and in accordance with the third paragraph of the article, data on recipients is not disclosed for very low value contracts below EUR 15 000 and where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the persons or entities. 7 https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/programmes/life/life-operating-grants_en”
  Transparency requirements for interest groups · EU engagement with civil society
• 2024-12-12 “E-002878/2024 Answer given by President von der Leyen on behalf of the European Commission The Commission publishes information on meetings held by President von der Leyen with, among others, political leaders on the President’s online public calendar 1 or through other channels of communication including press releases and social media. In addition, the Commission publishes information on all meetings held by Members of the College and their Cabinets with interest representatives in accordance with Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 2 . Meetings with representatives of political parties as well as meetings of a purely private or social character are not covered by publication rules set out in the said Decision. 1 Calendar items of the President and Commissioners - European Commission https://commission.europa.eu/about/organisation/college-commissioners/calendar-items-president-andcommissioners_en?f%5B0%5D=commissioner_dynamic_commissioner_dynamic%3Ahttp%3A//publications.eu ropa.eu/resource/authority/political-leader/COM_00006A0440FF 2 Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3081 of 4 December 2024 on transparency measures concerning meetings held between Members of the Commission and interest representatives, and repealing Decision 2014/839/EU, Euratom (OJ L, 2024/3081, 5.12.2024).”
  Transparency requirements of EU institutions
• 2024-12-12 “E-002888/2024 Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission 1. The Commission applies strict transparency rules concerning interest representation and publishes information on all meetings held with interest representatives on the transparency websites of the Members of the Commission and/or Directorates-General. As of 1 January 2025, the transparency rules apply to all Commission staff holding management functions. Meetings with public authorities of third countries, including their diplomatic missions and embassies, are not covered by these rules (Commission Decisions (EU) 2024/3081 and 2024/3082). 2. The Commission has a strong ethical framework and governance structure in place to ensure that its Members and its staff respect the highest ethical standards and that its decisions are not unduly influenced, as set out in its Communication on Governance in the Commission 1 . It has taken steps to further strengthen its internal transparency framework and is a signatory to the agreement on the interinstitutional ethics body of 15 May 2024. The Commission has full trust in the work of competent authorities and courts and is ready to cooperate with them upon their request. The Commission has also proposed a directive introducing transparency requirements for interest-representation activities carried out in Member States on behalf of third countries 2 , which will help address foreign influence in a balanced and proportionate way, fully respecting fundamental rights. 3. According to Eurostat data the Foreign Direct Investment flows from Qatar to the Member States that published it in 2023 (the latest data available) amounted to 1,12 billion EUR. 1 C(2020) 4240 final; https://commission.europa.eu/publications/governance-european-commission_en 2 COM(2023)0637 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937.”
  EU relations with Qatar · Foreign interference in Europe
• 2024-12-12 “E-002895/2024 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission EU restrictive measures (sanctions) are a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instrument to uphold international law, prevent international crises, support conflict resolution, fight terrorism and organised crime and tackle the proliferation of weapons. According to the EU Treaties, the decision to adopt sanctions lies with the Council, acting by unanimity, on a proposal by the High Representative/Vice-President and/or one or more Member States. EU sanctions designations are based on specific listing criteria and require legally robust evidence. They must respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, as stipulated by the EU Treaties. While the EU recognizes the significant economic damage caused by illicit activities of Zhao Wei and the Zhao Wei Transnational Crime Organisation, providing a precise quantification of the impact in this specific case is currently not feasible. The EU remains committed to addressing these challenges through continuous international cooperation and targeted measures.”
  EU-Cambodia relations · Asia-Pacific · EU-Myanmar relations
• 2024-12-12 “E-002879/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy 1 contributes among others to the specific objective of supporting effective European integrated border management at the external borders, by facilitating legitimate border crossings, preventing and detecting illegal immigration and cross-border crime and effectively managing migratory flows. In accordance with the nomenclature of the General Budget of the EU for 2021-2027, the amounts are financed from budget line 11 02 01, under Heading 4: Migration and Border Management. It is legally possible for Member States to request EU funding for physical barriers to secure the EU’s external borders. The Commission has so far focused funding where the needs are the most urgent and where EU money has had the most impact. This includes in particular border surveillance systems and equipment, IT systems, and mobile and stationary units as well as the maintenance of equipment. Now, going forward and in view of the developments at our borders in the past years, it is clear that the overall needs for border management will need to be reassessed as part of the preparation of the next Multiannual Financial Framework proposal. This will have to be done in close cooperation with Member States and the European Parliament. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, OJ L 251 of 15.7.2021, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1148/oj”
  Asylum & border control
• 2024-12-12 “E-002880/2024 Answer given by Ms Lahbib on behalf of the European Commission The Commission can confirm that in 2024 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was the second largest recipient of humanitarian funding from the EU for the ongoing crisis in Palestine * . The EU's humanitarian funding to UNRWA amounted to EUR 48.5 million, or some 20% of the EUR 237 million total humanitarian budget allocated in 2024 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory by the EU. In the context of the ongoing conflict in Gaza, the EU’s humanitarian partners are striving to address critical needs under immense constraints. As of January 2025, 17 EU humanitarian partners - 10 non-governmental organisations, five UN agencies, and two International Red Cross and Red Crescent partners - are working tirelessly with local Palestinian organisations. The EU is a firm supporter of the UN and the multilateral and rules-based global governance system of which UNRWA, as an UN Agency, is an integral part. The EU is a longstanding humanitarian partner of UNRWA, which plays an irreplaceable role in delivering essential services for Palestine refugees - not only in Palestine, but also in the region (Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria). The EU will continue to support UNRWA, noting as per established practice the importance of transparency, accountability, and neutrality in its operations. * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine · Support for international humanitarian organisations
• 2024-12-12 “E-002890/2024 Answer given by Mr Jørgensen on behalf of the European Commission As clearly stated by the European Leaders in the Versailles Declaration in March 2022, and in line with the REPowerEU Plan, the European Union aims to fully phase out Russian fossil fuels. On 6 May 2025 the Commission adopted a roadmap 1 towards fully ending Russian energy imports in a coordinated, gradual and secure manner, supporting Member States in stepping up and accelerating efforts in that direction. Based on Eurostat’s trade statistics 2 , Member States paid to Russia EUR 21,6 billion in 2024 as compared to EUR 144 billion in 2022. This 85% decline in payments translates into savings of EUR 122 billion, underscoring the EU’s progress in reducing its dependence on Russian energy imports. To achieve this, the measures under the REPowerEU and the EU's sanctions regime, promoting inter-alia domestically produced renewable energy, energy efficiency and supply diversification have been paramount. All Russian pipeline gas imports, but those coming via the Turkstream, have halted. As regards external policies, between February 2022 and December 2024 payments to Russia amounted to approximately EUR 3,5 million under contracts concluded prior to 2021 and providing support through direct management for civil society and independent media. Regarding internal policies, less than EUR 30,000 were paid to Russian entities during the same period. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1131. 2 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ds-045409__custom_15257993/default/table?lang=en.”
  EU-Russia relations (from March 2022)
• 2024-12-12 “E-002883/2024 Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission Based on aggregate harmonised index of consumer prices 1 for EU Member States as published by the statistical office of the EU, aggregate inflation between December 2010 and November 2024 was 39,6%. Directive 2014/49/EU 2 , does not include a mechanism to automatically adjust the coverage level to inflation. The primary objective of the Directive is to improve depositors’ confidence that their deposits up to the guaranteed amount are protected. This confidence limits the risk of panic withdrawals which could threaten financial stability in the EU. In 2019, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has assessed the adequacy of the current coverage level for deposits, as per Article 19(6) of the Directive. While this assessment 3 did not take into account inflation, the EBA concluded that the current coverage level under Directive 2014/49/EU is adequate and that the proportion of depositors fully covered by the EUR 100 000 coverage level has increased in comparison with 2007. EBA issued an additional report on deposit coverage in December 2023 4 . According to this report, 96% of depositors are fully covered and a potential increase of the coverage level would have no impact on the vast majority of depositors. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Commission does not intend to modify the corresponding provisions of the existing framework. 1 The Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices measure the changes over time in the prices of consumer goods and services acquired by households. They give a comparable measure of inflation as they are calculated according to harmonised definitions. 2 OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149–178. 3 https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/2622242/324e89ec-3523-4c5bbd4fe415367212bb/EBA%20Opinion%20on%20the%20eligibility%20of%20deposits%20coverage%20level%20and %20cooperation%20between%20DGSs.pdf?retry=1 4 Report on Deposit Coverage in response to European Commission’s call for advice:https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2023-12/cfe9c89f-23ec-42d0-88fdfc873ff26c76/EBA%20Report%20on%20deposit%20coverage%20in%20response%20to%20EC%20CfA.pdf”
  European Deposit Insurance Scheme · Financial regulation
• 2024-12-12 “E-002889/2024 Answer given by Mr Tzitzikostas on behalf of the European Commission The threat of explosions of electronic devices combined with explosives is known to the Commission, the Member States and EU airport authorities. The Commission has no information that the existing security measures in the Union airports would not allow detecting such devices. Nevertheless, it is important to remain alert. The Commission is working with Member States and airports on actions to further raise the security at all EU airports, against all threats, including electronic devices with explosives. It is also engaged in dialogue with its international partners on these matters.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware · EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-12-12 “E-002893/2024 Answer given by Ms Šuica on behalf of the European Commission The Letter of Intent with the Palestinian Authority 1 (PA) signed on 19 July 2024 consisted of: (i) a short-term emergency financial support of EUR 400 million of grants and loans, (ii) a multi-year comprehensive programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience. As part of the EU emergency support package to the PA of EUR 400 million, the Commission has disbursed EUR 382.5 million between July and November 2024. The pending tranche of EUR 17.5 million was disbursed in February 2025. All the disbursements were linked to PA actions identified in the Letter of Intent. The PA reached all prior actions from the Letter of Intent. The Commission and the PA have agreed on the Reform Matrix 2 that will be at the core of the comprehensive programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience. The Reform Matrix, anchored on the PA’s own reform agenda, will be the basis for future disbursements under the comprehensive programme. The multiannual comprehensive support programme for Palestinian recovery and resilience for 2025–2027, was announced on 14 April 2025 during the High-Level Political Dialogue between the EU and the PA. It consists of up to EUR 1.6 billion: a grant amount of up to EUR 1.196 billion as well as guarantees from the Commission to enable EUR 400 million loans by the European Investment Bank. The milestones for future disbursements will be identified in the framework of the financing agreement between the Commission and the PA to be signed in June 2025. The Commission is also in discussions with other donors and partners, as their active participation and involvement is crucial for the sustainability of the support to the PA. 1 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/597ce07b-fb47-4bd2-b7ef46c4401487de_en?filename=Letter%20of%20Intent%20-%20EU%20PA%20final.pdf. 2 The Reform Matrix has been developed in close cooperation between the PA and the Commission and based on the PA’s own reform agenda. It includes important fiscal, economic and governance reforms, as well as social protection.”
  EU Development & Humanitarian Aid · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-12-12 “E-002894/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The question is not of speed to achieve a warming target but of how to use the remaining carbon budget 1 to limit global warming to 1.5°C. This requires strong reductions of global greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) in the coming years and decades. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2 ) shows global GHGs need to be cut by 43% in 2030 compared to 2019 and that in 2050 global CO2 emissions need to be at 0. Limiting global warming to 1.5°C requires other countries to join the EU on the path to climate neutrality. Countries such as China and India and other major emitters should be encouraged to present and implement long-term strategies for net zero aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5°C. The EU climate neutrality target is compatible with action required at global level to limit global warming to 1.5°C. If a Member State reduces emissions faster, this contributes to a slower reduction of the remaining global carbon budget compatible with 1.5°C and so makes limiting global warming to 1.5°C more likely. As EU GHG emissions are now 6% of global emissions, the direct, additional impact is limited, but the level of ambition shown by the EU and its Member States is closely watched by international partners and serves as a global role model for climate action. The outcome of the negotiations for the EU Budget cannot be anticipated. Scientific literature and economic analyses show that the costs of inaction are significantly higher than costs of ambitious action to reach climate neutrality, with significant added value from EU action in terms of competitiveness, energy security, potential for clean tech leadership and reduced climate and health impacts from reducing GHG emissions alongside measures to boost preparedness for climate impacts. 1 The carbon budget over a period is defined as the cumulative net carbon emissions over the period. The IPCC (6 th Assessment Report) defines remaining carbon budget associated with long-term temperature objectives. 2 IPCC 6 th Assessment Report (AR6).”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-12-12 “E-002886/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission It is essential that all Europeans are able to go about their lives free from fear. As stated in the European Internal Security Strategy, ‘the protection of people, especially those most vulnerable to attacks, which tend to disproportionately affect children, women and minorities, including Jewish and Muslim communities, is at the heart of the EU’s work on security. This is essential to build resilient and cohesive societies’ 1 . The EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) 2 will continue guiding Commission’s actions on protecting the Jewish community. At the same time, national security matters, including actions by national authorities for the purpose of maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security, remain the responsibility of the Member State concerned. Consequently, policing matters fall within the remit of the Dutch, Belgian and Hungarian authorities. 1 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0148. 2 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=COM:2021:615:FIN&pk_campaign=doc&pk_source=EURLex&pk_medium=tw&pk_keyword=No2Antisemitism.”
  Jewish culture and antisemitism · Relations with Israel - Palestine
• 2024-12-12 “E-002892/2024 Answer given by Mr Brunner on behalf of the European Commission The European Statistical Office (Eurostat) collects statistics on crime in the Member States annually on voluntary basis, focusing on criminal offences as set out in the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS) 1 . Data on police-recorded offences are disseminated in the Eurostat database 2 . However, separate data on the number of criminal offences or number of victims of knife attacks are not available. More information on the annual crime data collection is available on the Eurostat website 3 . Insights can be drawn from the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), issued annually by the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). The TE-SAT provides a situational overview of terrorist-related incidents, including the number of terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions, and penalties for terrorist offences, as reported by Member States to Europol. While the TE-SAT may include references to stabbing as a modus operandi in terrorist attacks when such information is reported by Member States, its scope is strictly limited to terrorismrelated incidents. Therefore, it does not cover all knife attacks against individuals. The TESAT reports are publicly accessible via Europol’s website for further consultation 4 . 1 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/iccs.html 2 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/crim_off_cat/default/table?lang=en&category=crim.crim_off 3 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/crime/overview 4 https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report”
  EU law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters
• 2024-12-12 “E-002887/2024 Answer given by Executive Vice-President Fitto on behalf of the European Commission The EU’s Cohesion Policy 1 , with a budget 2 of over EUR 400 billion for the programming period 2014-2020 and of EUR 376 billion for the 2021-2027 period, contributes substantially to investments in support of European competitiveness and to the creation of a greener, more connected and socially integrated Europe. The analysis presented in chapter 9 of the ninth Cohesion Report 3 suggests that the impact is particularly high in the less developed regions that joined the EU after 2004. However, the policy also benefits many developed regions of Member States that joined before 2004. This is due to the cohesion support that all regions receive and to the strong spillovers generated by supported projects in less developed Member States and regions. These spillovers are created by the procurement of goods and services directly in the implementation of projects, as well as through the additional demand created by higher levels of growth in less developed regions. As shown in the annex, the impact in the medium term is positive in all Member States which joined before 2004, irrespective of their level of development. 1 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/2021-2027_en 2 The figures correspond to the amounts allocated to Cohesion Policy in the respective Multiannual Financial Frameworks in current euro. They cover the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund. For the 2014-2020 period, the amount also covers the Youth Employment Initiative and includes the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe. For 2021-2027, the amount covers the Just Transition Fund. 3 https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information-sources/cohesion-report_en”
  Cohesion and rural funding
• 2024-12-12 “E-002884/2024 Answer given by Mr Hoekstra on behalf of the European Commission The Commission is aware of the matter raised by the Honourable Member, and it is in contact with the German national authorities to monitor the progress of the investigations currently underway. According to the information available to the Commission, the national authorities have reacted promptly and taken appropriate steps to carry out investigations, that are now at the jurisdiction of the State Prosecutors Office. At this time, the Commission is not aware of any fraud cases related to the use of Upstream Emission Reductions (UERs) in Austria or in any other Member States. Under the European Climate Law 1 , only domestic emission reductions or removals can be counted towards the 2030 and 2050 climate targets. This is the case also under the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) 2 , where compliance is possible only by surrendering EU allowances. Thus, the quoted schemes do not pose a risk for the EU ETS nor for its revenues. The use of UERs was one of the options that fuel suppliers could use to meet the 6% greenhouse gas emission intensity reduction target under Article 7a of the Fuel Quality Directive 98/70/EC (FQD). The Directive provided flexibility to Member States on whether to use that option and how to implement it, including on the setting up of national certification systems. The Commission issued a Guidance note 3 on the main principles. However, the 6% target has been removed from the FQD by the revised Renewable Energy Directive (EU) 2018/2001 (RED), which entered into force in 2023. The revised RED target no longer includes the option of using UERs in the scope. Based on the latest available reporting data 4 , UERs were reported by 15 Member States, contributing to a reduction of the greenhouse gas intensity of about 0.5% out of the total EU reduction of 5.6%. 1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’). 2 Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union. 3 https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ecd390db-ea00-48b5-bd384c36804e9aa6_en?filename=guidance_note_on_uer_en.pdf 4 Data for 2022: https://www.eionet.europa.eu/etcs/etc-cm/products/etc-cm-report-2024-04”
  Energy (green transition)
• 2024-10-01 “E-001888/2024 Answer given by Mr Gentiloni on behalf of the European Commission The Commission acknowledges that the deliberate destruction of usable goods gives rise to serious concerns as it leads to high costs for the society and the environment. As regards donations given free of charge to a charitable organisation, these are, in principle, outside the scope of Value Added Tax (VAT). However, Member States have some flexibilities to establish conditions for certain free-of-charge supplies, including donations to charitable organisations 1 . The Commission will continue reflecting about further measures to disincentivise the destruction of goods that are still in a good state. With the condition to respect the principle of tax neutrality and without opening the door for unlimited tax avoidance possibilities as well as tax fraud, this may include changes to the rules on VAT. 1 As illustrated by the guidelines agreed by the VAT Committee (Document C – taxud.c.1(2012)1701663 – 745) (https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2024-01/guidelines-vat-committee-meetings_en.pdf, p. 168).”
  EU competences on taxation · VAT harmonisation
• “Yes, I've said that quite clearly. It is a good House budget policy to have priorities and that something may be done. We need to look at where we can be better. We need to look at where we can spare. Now, it is a difficult debate and it's a debate we need to have. I've not said that I'm against a debt, but in the Covid pandemic, we had a Covid debt and we have no plan about how we're going to play that back. We're still not going to achieve that with own resources. And when we take on even more debt for defence, we've not even said whether how we're going to organise that at European level.”
  Own EU resources
• “Short last question? Yes, yes, yes. Mr.. Thank you very much. You mentioned the TFTP and that you're thinking about starting the own European one. Are there discussions within the Commission maybe to accelerate this even? And and, you know, I'm not as be not as dependent anymore on the US in this regard due to the geopolitical Situation we face.”
  EU-US trade relations
• “Does the Commissioner you like talking about the national plans? And I'd like to just say a few words about the MFF and ask why we don't have better protection for rule of law in all of the programs. This is a clause which is in the national plans. That's an important step forward. But miss von der Leyen promised that all monies would have ex-ante controls with regard to the upholding of the rule of law. I think more needs to be done, and there's a letter that made it clear from the groups that when it comes to rule of law, we need more than we need a mechanism for all appropriations to be quite sure that every euro cent spent by the European taxpayer is spent correctly. And when it comes to corruption and lax of upholding the rule of law, that things can be done. I think, unlike many people here, that this is a courageous proposal. We do have to be realistic. We do have to accept that member States are not prepared to pay more money when it comes to own resources. Member states don't want to see a situation where we have to do more. We've got all these priorities these days, but that means that in the budget you have to set priorities. The commission has done that. It's a courageous proposal. Now it's up for debate after all. Think that it's down to us in this House to think about the changes that are required to face this situation on the ground. In the times in which we live, we have to face the modern challenges. And when it comes to cohesion and agricultural policy, that is going to have to be change.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Yes. Thank you, chair, and thanks to the panelists for their very good presentations. First of all, I think on the issue raised earlier by Mr.. I think the evidence framework might help. Actually, you know, making sure that Big Tech has to comply with questions coming. So we made sure I think with, with that legislation to have a little bit more clarity here, which I think is a very good point, but I want to ask you a question I already posed to the commission earlier, and our first panel you you raised, of course, the question more or less the general fundamental questions around data retention, privacy and so on. But I also just on practicality of data retention with different data retention frames throughout Europe, actually, you should see different successions or successfulness rates between for, for for police work in different countries with like countries having a longer period or even within countries because for example, in Germany the data retention was struck down. So are you aware especially to the academia studies showing a clear. Correlation between the time frame of data retention and their success, because I looked it up after our first around with the commission. And actually, I only found a study by the by the German Bundestag research service that says there's actually no statistically statistically significant correlation or improvement with with the longer data retention frames. Are you aware of other studies or new studies? On on this question.”
  Privacy & law enforcement
• “Dear colleagues, this debate is sort of becoming either or so. We have values on one hand and the economy on the other. There is a dilemma here. Yes, we need our values. We need to protect our data. But we can set international standards because Europe has been economically quite successful and that's why other people have adopted our standards. Let's be honest, over the last 10 or 15 years, growth in the US, the productivity gains that they've made, and that's down to the digital economy. And of course, it's not just the digital rules and our data protection rules which are cause for concern. It's also, you know, our single market. But digital rules are part and parcel of that. And this is what the Draghi report says. Everybody likes to uh, to quote that like it's the Bible here. And that is why I think we need to forge ahead. But we need to protect our values. And, you know, we need to bear this in mind in our debate. Um, I'm really annoyed at this because we always talk about data protection. But in the EU we were ready. Or are we going to actually implement our very expensive regulations? License? No. We've got two data exchange programs with the, um, uh, with with the US. Uh, they failed at the European court. And so we need to make smarter rules, but we also need to actually then implement the things.”
  Privacy & digital economy
• “Thank you chair, and thanks for the panel for this interesting discussion. I have two questions. First of all, Mr. O'Neill, you mentioned you see that or you or you are looking forward to the progress we will make with the evidence, of course. I always look for also look forward to this progress, because we worked a long time on making sure that we make evidence. Right. Will the progress that might come with, you know, evidence coming into into place will be considered when within the impact assessment, to make sure that we see that the new improvements are already already passed so that we don't, you know, add things on it when we have the new system in place. My first question. Second question. I am not sure. I think you mentioned it, but also it was mentioned by Europol. So we have this different time frames for data retention 7 to 90 days. Is there data or might the commission look into data and evidence that actually a longer time frame in some member states leads to better results? So I actually I would be very interested to see that. For me, I knew that when we had in Germany data retention and it got struck down by court. Actually, we couldn't really show that when we had a longer time frame for data retention. We had actually better know it. There was no data on that, no data on that, that showed that actually with a longer time frame, we had a better realization in in cases and everything. So is there data? And if some colleagues are very clear that this data there so that we really get the, the result from all different member states where we have different time frames and data retention and show that actually there is a causal effect in better police cooperation.”
  Privacy & law enforcement
• “Short last question? Yes, yes, yes. Mr.. Thank you very much. You mentioned the TFTP and that you're thinking about starting the own European one. Are there discussions within the Commission maybe to accelerate this even? And and, you know, I'm not as be not as dependent anymore on the US in this regard due to the geopolitical Situation we face.”
  Anti-money laundering regulation
• “Thank you for accepting my blue card. Actually, I just put it to be also in your viral video. Um, but here's my question. You mentioned that, of course, polarizing content is getting more reach. But isn't that also something that we also saw in before there was an online media like the Bild-zeitung big, big, uh, headline, um, that's trying to catch the attention. And isn't that maybe translated in Digital World? And how can we make sure that the algorithms still really go to, to put the attention in the right way?”
  Recommender systems
• “Later we heard the Commission president say in plenary that Hungary discriminates against European companies by taxing them more than others, targeting them with arbitrary inspections and permit blockages, and awarding public contracts, contracts, contracts mostly to a small group of beneficiaries. Nevertheless, she released 10 billion money for Hungary. When it comes to Poland, the Commission never made use of conditionality regulation and released all withheld funds before any of the criticized laws were abolished under the RF Super Milestones. Consequently. Consequently, in order to ensure the consistent application of the rules and the defense of citizens financial interests, we need an actual revision of the conditionality regulation. We must ensure that the entire rule of law toolbox is united under the umbrella of conditionality regulation, and that Parliament is placed on an equal footing with the Commission and Council on all relevant decisions. I will table amendments in this regard. Thank you again for the great draft. As I said, I think especially in the details and the analysis, we are very much united and I look forward to working with you on these issues.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Dear colleagues, we are discussing digital sovereignty here in Europe. Obviously we talk about the USA and China, but at the same time that, um, obviously, um, when we look at track control, it's a Chinese, uh, values which are being, uh, implemented now. This is the digital world, actually, um, the opposite of what we're trying, what we need. So I'm calling on the European Council. Finally, please listen to this. Please begin with the member states to start thinking about what we have already mentioned here in the Parliament. We want to see protection of minors, but not to mass oversight and mass surveillance. Please, uh, with the right of this House, are using this against, um, uh, Europeans. This is the not the correct way. And please come back, uh, to this and focus on protection of children, but not on mass surveillance.”
  Privacy & detection of online child abuse
• “Colleague, colleagues. Commissioner, this will be a particular budget. We have huge challenges. Defence, competitiveness, defence. We must find a pay back €30 billion in corona debts. And we must spend more money. I think it won't work. It just won't work. In the last financial period we have, if you include Covid debts, we spent twice as much in the period before that. Has Europe become twice as good? So given these challenges, we must set priorities. The Commissioner rightly said we must have better results for European citizens also with less money. We have to think about how we can spend smarter. How we can do things simpler to access European money. And we must become more efficient. But we must make sure that money doesn't go into corrupt pockets. So we need a strong system of the rule of law. It must be clear that this. The rule of law is closely linked to the budget. You must fight for that, Commissioner. And I call on the council to do that. It can't be the case that member states that stick to the rules require further taxpayers money.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law
• “Dear colleagues. President. Commissioner. Imagine that Pegasus is on your phone. This surveillance phone. What could happen? Well, the microphone and camera can be remotely turned on. You can record conversations. You can see where the person is. You can read all of the messages. You can get into the calendar, the passwords, the photos. You have access to everything. It's crazy to think, but that's what happened in 14 member states of the EU that was illegally done to spy on journalists, members of the opposition and their families. Now, we've heard that everything is fine now, but I don't think it is. I think it's just been swept under the carpet under the pretext of national security. I think this is a real violation of people's Privacy now. We investigated this. We did a lot of work in the investigative committee. And two years later, what's happening? What has Europe done? What has the commission done? They're sitting on their hands doing nothing. They say that they're concerned, but there's no legal framework. There's no protection for the victims, for our democracy. The commission has to finally act. We need some protection mechanisms in place to protect our democracy and the rule of law. Thank you.”
  Surveillance equipment & spyware
• “Colleagues, we must talk about that. People are talking about the debt for, uh, defense. If people want to see, um, uh, do this and it's being called pro European, but really, should we is it really pro European to have more joint debt for just for defense? Is it European? Uh, after the, um, the, the Covid crisis to have European debt, even though we haven't actually used all of that money yet to whatever crisis is always the same. Um, response more European debt? Is it European to push debt on to future, um, future generations? European to push to to say that the future generations will have less leeway to, um, to deal with future crisis? How will it, um, how will it all be paid back? And obviously our economy, uh, Needs to be strengthened so that we can have a more a defense. Obviously, priorities is absolutely clear. We are the generation that must make Europeans secure, make sure there's no threats from outside the EU and need to have, uh.”
  Defence spending
• “Thank you very much, chair. I'm happy to go back to the the actual draft text, which I warmly welcome. Thank you very much, Monica and Jean-Marc, for this text. I have rarely read such a detailed and well prepared draft. Any report. I think you did a fantastic job, and I'm happy to cooperate with you on this file in the months and years to come. I support everything you wrote in the draft ini. You point out very well in your draft the details where further improvements are necessary. In particularly, I welcome the insistence on safeguarding final beneficiaries and also linking the final findings of the annual Rule of Law report with the conditionality mechanism. Additionally, I also fully support looking into ways to incorporate the single market perspective more into the conditionality mechanism. These are also key points for my group. I would also like to highlight one point where I believe we can be more ambitious, and it's a big point. You mentioned that we need a revision of the guidelines and a stronger scrutiny for the Parliament. I believe we actually need more than that. Um, in the case of Hungary, we saw that the commission was initially reluctant to use the conditionality regulation, and that the Council immediately reduced the amount to to be withheld from Hungary without explanation.”
  EU Supervision of the Rule of Law